Relevant bibliographies by topics / Philosophy and fallibilism

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Philosophy and fallibilism'

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Published: 4 June 2021
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Journal articles on the topic "Philosophy and fallibilism"

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Marushak, Adam. "Fallibilism and Consequence." Journal of Philosophy 118, no. 4 (2021): 214–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118415.

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Alex Worsnip argues in favor of what he describes as a particularly robust version of fallibilism: subjects can sometimes know things that are, for them, possibly false (in the epistemic sense of ‘possible’). My aim in this paper is to show that Worsnip’s argument is inconclusive for a surprising reason: the existence of possibly false knowledge turns on how we ought to model entailment or consequence relations among sentences in natural language. Since it is an open question how we ought to think about consequence in natural language, it is an open question whether there is possibly false knowledge. I close with some reflections on the relation between possibly false knowledge and fallibilism. I argue that there is no straightforward way to use linguistic data about natural language epistemic modals to either verify or refute the fallibilist thesis.
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Berman Shifman, Nadav. "Pragmatism and Jewish Thought: Eliezer Berkovits’s Philosophy of Halakhic Fallibility." Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 27, no. 1 (March 29, 2019): 86–135. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1477285x-12341239a.

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Abstract In classical American pragmatism, fallibilism refers to the conception of truth as an ongoing process of improving human knowledge that is nevertheless susceptible to error. This paper traces appearances of fallibilism in Jewish thought in general, and particularly in the halakhic thought of Eliezer Berkovits. Berkovits recognizes the human condition’s persistent mutability, which he sees as characterizing the ongoing effort to interpret and apply halakhah in shifting historical and social contexts as Torat Ḥayyim. In the conclusion of the article, broader questions and observations are raised regarding Jewish tradition, fallibility, and modernity, and the interaction between Judaism and pragmatism in the history of ideas.
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Dodd, Dylan. "Against Fallibilism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 4 (December 2011): 665–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2010.510530.

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Gava, Gabriele. "Can Transcendental Philosophy Endorse Fallibilism?" Contemporary Pragmatism 8, no. 1 (April 21, 2011): 133–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000187.

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Richmond, Sheldon. "Is Fallibilism Mistaken?" Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science, no. 4 (June 10, 2018): 182. http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2018.i4.16.

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Margolis, Joseph. "Rethinking Peirce's Fallibilism." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy 43, no. 2 (April 2007): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/tra.2007.43.2.229.

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Roorda, Jonathan. "Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief." Journal of Philosophy 94, no. 3 (March 1997): 126. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2941106.

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BRUECKNER, ANTHONY. "Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, no. 2 (September 2005): 384–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00454.x.

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WEINTRAUB, RUTH. "Fallibilism and Rational Belief." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no. 2 (June 1, 1993): 251–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/44.2.251.

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Neta, Ram. "A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism." Noûs 45, no. 4 (January 20, 2011): 658–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00778.x.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Philosophy and fallibilism"

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Shand, J. A. "Consequences of fallibilism." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.234133.

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The overall aim of this thesis is to trace the consequences of fallibilism in certain important areas of human intellectual activity. An awareness of the absence of immutable beliefs has profound consequences for many areas; it might be seen as undermining our concepts of knowledge, justification, values, freedom, and indeed rationality and philosophy. The first problem considered is the relation between our theories and the world. General coherence and convergence epistemologies provide no answer. The solution whereby experience is subject to necessary, transcendental, conditions is also rejected, following detailed examination of an area where the expectation of such conditions being found is high- the nature of space. Further standard attempts to impose certain kinds of limits on our choice of concepts, from which metaphysical conclusions can be drawn are seen to fail. Then the function of presuppositions and concepts is examined in detail, and it is concluded that the logic of our talk concerning them is fundamentally muddled. Anti-realism is rejected as an unsatisfactory reaction to fallibilism. Further, it is shown that transcendentalism is an unavailing attempt to save anti-realism from vacuity. In the presence of general fallibilism the notions of knowledge, rationality and justification have to be re-thought. The question of whether we can countenance the possibility of intelligence quite unlike our own is affirmatively answered- a question the anti-realist and transcendentalist should answer negatively. A distinction between subsystems and the global system is introduced and the basis of rationality for the fallibilist is derived from a distinction between questions and answers which make sense within subsystems of concepts and inquiry, but which are senseless at a global level. A need for a fallibilist form of realism is given content through the subsystem and the eroding of a world/concepts dualism at the global level. The existence of knowledge as traditionally thought of is seen to fade under the impact of fallibilism; knowledge is, however, replaced by rational belief which does not require the satisfaction of truth-conditions. This intellectual perspectivism is supported by considering natural man, while the sceptic's position is seen to be as senseless as the assertion of absolutism. Philosophy is also deeply affected by fallibilism and perspectivism and the inevitable natural limits of our minds and language. To this extent we may be deceived in our formulation of problems, and we cannot assume that we are so formed as to be cognitively competent to comprehend all aspects of the world. Once we weaken the grip of an overarching singular rationality, which does not however accept that 'anything goes', philosophical discussion ceases to be stultified by its subjection to inappropriate standards; philosophy can again tackle the problems of value and meaning. This leads on to an examination of fallibilism on our concept of the free society; epistemic theories have real consequences.
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Main, Robert. "Pragmatism's Promise, Naturalism's Prospects: Fallibilism and the "Frieghtage of Eternity"." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/88081.

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Philosophy
Ph.D.
This dissertation traces the development of classical American pragmatism in the work of C.S. Peirce and Josiah Royce, and its convergence with the naturalist project that currently dominates anglophone philosophy. I argue that naturalism, as it is typically construed, either neglects or underestimates the importance of a rich and nuanced model of selfhood, one that captures not only the biological, but also the cultural features of human persons; what is needed is an account that shows how culture and human selves are themselves "natural." John McDowell has recently offered a promising line of thought which pursues this intuition, but his model has faced heavy criticism and its viability remains questionable. My project, then, is an alternative account that incorporates the best of McDowell's intuitions, but which is immune to the most common objections brought against his model. I proceed by focusing on one aspect of what it means to be a human person that has enormous significance for all areas of philosophical inquiry and which has a rich, if often overlooked, philosophical history. This is the inherent finitude or ignorance which characterizes human knowledge and practice, what Peirce referred to as "fallibilism." Peirce's notion of fallibilism, which today remains his greatest legacy, tempers philosophical discussions of universal concepts such as truth and "the good" by way of considerations of scope and context, forcing such abstractions to find their place within the practical environments of actual lived existence. I offer that Peirce is perhaps a unique figure in the Western philosophical tradition with respect to the importance he gives to fallibilism and in his understanding the doctrine not only in terms of its negative consequences, but also a positive theory that generates a practical response to the sort of existential crisis introduced by the recognition of human fallibility and finitude. Ultimately, Pierce offers a naturalized model of the self which is both a semiotic artifact and communal in nature. The self is a sign that emerges within an interpretive community and which manifests itself as an individual primarily through its fallibility. As such, the self is a cultural artifact, but Peirce's metaphysics makes this a natural process continuous with those processes studied by natural sciences. As a scientist, he was committed to naturalism but not reductionism; his account, therefore, embraces the work of culture and the importance of cultural idioms which are often left out of modern naturalist projects. In this, Peirce offers a promising way to fulfill McDowell's project of "naturalizing" culture and "re-enchanting" nature, thereby eliminating the gap between "mind and the world." However, despite its importance to his philosophical system, Peirce's explicit treatment of selfhood is notably unfocused. It is therefore necessary to couple his philosophical system with that of another of the classical pragmatists who was deeply influenced by Peirce's philosophy but who extended its development into detailed discussions of selfhood and community. The figure I have in mind is Josiah Royce. Royce's philosophy hinges on two central notions, loyalty and community. Loyalty is, for Royce, the means by which individual selves are connected with communities and moral concerns. For Royce, loyalty is given first and foremost to an individual community. However his development of this concept comes to include loyalty to loyalty itself, thus making an individual's loyalty to a particular community continuous with a loyalty to a global community. Moreover, his account of community picks up on Peirce's semiotic theory of interpretation, and connects his account of the individual with Peirce's metaphysical and epistemological concerns. I read the theory of selfhood Royce develops as providing the crucial element that Peirce's philosophical system requires but does not explicitly provide. Throughout this discussion, I show how this model is a promising direction for the future course of contemporary philosophical naturalism.
Temple University--Theses
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Nilsson, Jonas. "Rationality in inquiry : on the revisability of cognitive standards." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Filosofi och lingvistik, 2000. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-6417.

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The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized. It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy. The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable. It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping. The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality.
digitalisering@umu
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Taylor, Anthony David. "Expressing our fallibility : a conception of public reason." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:7c4b5662-7fa8-4908-a659-5f783c1ff9ad.

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This thesis is about the reasonable agreement principle, a principle which holds that the exercise of political power must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to be morally legitimate. Though this principle has become popular in contemporary political philosophy, it has been formulated and defended in a variety of often conflicting ways. I argue first that a successful defence of the principle will have to meet three conditions. First, it must explain who reasonable citizens are. Second, it must offer a compelling a rationale for tying the legitimacy of the exercise of political power to what these citizens accept. Third, it must show that the rules or principles that would be acceptable to reasonable citizens are not implausible. In the first part of the thesis, I examine some of the most significant ways in which the principle has been formulated and defended, and argue that none meets these three conditions. In the second part of the thesis, I develop an account of the reasonable agreement principle which can meet these three conditions. I argue that reasonable citizens should be understood as agents in circumstances where their powers of moral judgment operate free of distortions, offer an account of what these circumstances consist in, and suggest that a compelling rationale for the principle can be given when they are understood in this way. I then go on to consider what citizens in such circumstances would accept, arguing that they would accept principles of political morality that express a commitment to the fact that they are fallible choosers of their final ends.
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Jung, Darryl. "The problem of the external world : a fallibilist vindication of our claim to knowledge." Thesis, McGill University, 1989. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=59442.

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The celebrated 'veil-of-ideas' argument is a skeptical argument that moves from a certain epistemological doctrine about perception to a general negative conclusion concerning our thoughts about external material objects. Indeed, the argument concludes not only that we do not know, but that neither could we know nor even reasonably believe, any of the thoughts that we may possibly entertain concerning external material objects. The epistemological doctrine about perception referred to in the argument has been in fashion since Descartes and states that the nature of perceptual knowledge in general is inferential.
In this thesis, we will attempt to defuse this argument by calling into question the epistemological doctrine upon which it relies. This method of defusing the argument appeals to some of the reasoning to be found in the writings of J. L. Austin and, more recently, John McDowell. The following is a rough outline of how we will proceed. First, we will briefly look at the skeptical argument in question. Second, we will examine the mainstay of the epistemological doctrine, the Argument from Illusion, and argue that without the appeal to a certain view about the nature of appearance, this argument is ineffective. Third, we will adduce reasons for rejecting this view of appearance and put forward an alternative. This alternative requires us to construe knowledge in fallibilist rather than infallibilist terms. Thus, finally, we will examine the fallibilist and infallibilist conceptions of knowledge.
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Wright, Thomas. "Subjectivity and Fallibility in the Instrumental and Epistemic Defenses of a "Right to Do Wrong"." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2010. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/67.

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An instrumental defense of a right to do wrong is plausible because we cannot directly intervene in an individual's choices so as to effectively promote that individual's moral good, if her moral good is conceived as being some form of individual autonomy. An epistemic defense is also plausible if we reorient J.S. Mill's epistemological argument for his Harm Principle in "On Liberty" to center on the agent's knowledge, rather than on the interfering observer's knowledge. Restrictions on harmless acts that are imposed because the acts are wrong are only justifiable to that individual if she herself knows that her acts are wrong. Both approaches depend upon the limited subjectivity and fallibility of the agent or interfering observer. Moreover, both approaches make the justification for a right to knowingly do wrong problematic.
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Dutra, Victor Hugo de Castro. "Em face do mal: uma propedêutica do conceito de mal em Paul Ricoeur." Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora, 2012. https://repositorio.ufjf.br/jspui/handle/ufjf/1871.

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A presente dissertação pretende explorar o conceito de mal, na obra de Paul Ricoeur (1923- 2005). Para isso avaliamos sua obra como um todo, mas com foco em três livros, pois os mesmos destacam os momentos de interpretação, do nosso autor, no que tange sua aproximação do problema do mal. São eles: THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, O MAL: UM DESAFIO À FILOSOFIA E À TEOLOGIA, e O SI-MESMO COMO UM OUTRO. Contudo, invertemos a ordem cronológica dos textos para uma abordagem original que prima chegar à maneira de como Paul Ricoeur propõe uma solução ao problema do mal. Desenvolvemos como o autor interpreta que a história da filosofia e a história da teologia desenvolveram o problema do mal, e a partir daí expomos como nosso autor o aborda, isto é na perspectiva de uma pessoa que sofre. Para então verificar como as raízes da interpretação e possível solução são encontradas nos mitos e símbolos do mal, e mais como o homem é falível e frágil em relação ao problema do mal. Para então, enfim, explorar sua pequena ética. Onde acreditamos ser possível concluir o combate ao mal através das instituições justas.
This present thesis will explore the concept of evil, in the work of Paul Ricoeur (1923-2005). To do this we evaluate his work as a whole, but focused on three books, as they highlight moments of interpretation, of our author, regarding their approach to the problem of evil. They are: THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, EVIL: A CHALLENGE TO PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, and THE ONESELF AS ANOTHER. But we inverted the chronological order of the texts to make an original approach that excels as a way to get to Paul Ricoeur proposal of a solution to the problem of evil. We have exposed how, as the author interprets the history of philosophy and history of theology, he developed the problem of evil, and from there too we have exposed how our author addresses it, that is, from the perspective of a person who suffers. To then see how the roots of the interpretation and possible solution, for the problem, are founded in myths and symbols of evil, and more, how man is fallible, and fragile in relation to the problem of evil. By then, finally, exploring his small ethics. Where we believe we can finish with the confrontation against evil through just institutions.
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Dove, Ian J. "Certainty and error in mathematics: Deductivism and the claims of mathematical fallibilism." Thesis, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/18625.

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This project has two goals: (1) to analyze the claims of mathematical fallibilism in order to show that they are less controversial than their usual statement implies; (2) to resurrect deductivism with modifications from its premature burial. For the purposes of this project fallibilism is the disjunctive claim that mathematical proofs are insufficient either (a) to justify mathematical knowledge where knowledge has a certainty-clause or (b) to establish conclusively any mathematical truths. The first clause contrasts with the traditional view that mathematical knowledge is certain. The second clause reinforces this uncertainty by undermining the demonstrative force of proofs. Five arguments for fallibilism are considered. First, (Chapter 2) the distinction between pure and applied math leads to an uncontroversial form of mathematical fallibilism. Moreover, this distinction is shown to fit well with deductivism. Second, (Chapter 3) mathematics employs non-deductive methods. Non-deductive procedures are also, prima facie, difficult to reconcile with deductivism. The fallibility entailed by non-deductive methods is both limited and uncontroversial. In terms of deductivism, old-style Russellian deductivism is abandoned in favor of a more general notion of deductive proof. Third, (Chapter 4) there is the possibility of an infinite regress for mathematical justification. For Lakatos the regress originates in the various prospects for mathematical foundations. His favored theory, quasi-empiricism, is justified by comparison to foundational approaches. Modified deductivism is shown to halt the infinite regress as well. Fourth, (Chapter 4) the fact that informal arguments---i.e., arguments not valid in terms of their logical form---are nearly ubiquitous in mathematics is prima facie evidence in favor of quasi-empiricism. Deductivism is shown to be consistent with informal arguments. Fifth, (Chapter 5) Quine's naturalism is shown to lead to fallibilism. However, when properly understood this fallibility is shown to be uncontroversial. Moreover, although Quine never officially endorses anything but naturalism, it is shown that naturalism is both consistent with and aided by deductivism. Finally, (Chapter 6) the modifications to deductivism are unified and the claims of fallibilism are restated in their uncontroversial forms.
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Thomas, Jean-Philippe. "Dynamique épistémologique de la science : défense d'une gestion pragmatique des problèmes complexes." Thèse, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1866/23807.

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Ce mémoire propose une analyse du rôle épistémologique des problèmes scientifiques complexes. En partant du holisme épistémologique hérité des positions philosophiques de Pierre Duhem et de Willard Van Orman Quine, et de la thèse voulant que la pratique scientifique s’effectue toujours à partir d’un champ théorique et conceptuel reconnu, nous développons un modèle de gestion qui propose aux chercheurs l’adoption d’une attitude pragmatique pour réagir aux problèmes complexes. Nous expliquons dans cette recherche que ces problèmes affectent l’applicabilité des théories et concepts qui forment les connaissances scientifiques. Pour les résoudre, il faut initier des recherches qui suivront les étapes d’un processus pragmatique permettant d’évaluer progressivement la situation et d’en acquérir une meilleure compréhension. Durant cette période, les conséquences négatives du problème complexe sont tolérées afin d’assurer le maintien des activités scientifiques, qu’elles visent directement ou non l’atteinte d’une solution. La thèse défendue dans cette étude veut que la gestion des problèmes complexes qu’elle propose se conclut par l’élaboration rationnelle, encadrée par des décisions pragmatiques et une conjoncture favorable, d’une hypothèse ad hoc offrant une solution au problème. Si la communauté scientifique reconnait la valeur épistémologique de cette hypothèse, elle sera intégrée au champ théorique et conceptuel ce qui aura pour effet d’enrichir les connaissances scientifiques et de redonner à la science son statut « normal ».
This thesis proposes an analysis of the epistemological role of complex scientific problems. Starting from the epistemological holism inherited from the philosophical positions of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine, and from the thesis that scientific practice is always based on a recognized theoretical and conceptual field, we develop a management model that proposes that researchers adopt a pragmatic attitude to react to complex problems. We explain in this research that these problems affect the applicability of theories and concepts that form scientific knowledge. To solve them, we must initiate research that will follow the steps of a pragmatic process to progressively assess the situation and gain a better understanding. During this period, the negative consequences of the complex problem are tolerated in order to ensure the maintenance of the scientific activities that it directly targets, or not, the achievement of a solution. The thesis defended in this study is that the management of the complex problems that it proposes is concluded by the rational elaboration, framed by pragmatic decisions and a favorable conjuncture, of an ad hoc hypothesis offering a solution to the problem. If the scientific community recognizes the epistemological value of this hypothesis, it will be integrated into the theoretical and conceptual field which will have the effect of enriching scientific knowledge and giving back to science its "normal" status.
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Welter, Brian. "Reconstructing truth in modern society: John Paul II and the fallibility of Nietzsche." Thesis, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10500/2081.

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This thesis examines the intellectual environment in which Pope John Paul II's thought operates, especially as it pertains to his writings on the truth. The pontiff's thinking faces open hostility toward Christianity, as exemplified by Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. The pope's theology pays attention and builds links to modern thought through its positive engagement with phenomenology and personalism, as well as through its opposition to materialism. Despite these connections, this theology fails to fit well with (post)modern thinking, as it takes a wider view of things in two ways: (1) By offering a spiritual sense of things, it goes beyond thought and takes into account supernatural sources of knowledge, sources which are both a one-time event (the Resurrection of Jesus Christ) and part of the ongoing journey of the Christian community; (2) By boldly referring to traditional, outmoded language, as with the words obedience and humility, with the same level of reverence and fullness of their sense as they were used before the secular-feminist era condemned these virtues. The strange and unique qualities of John Paul II's thinking issues from these two practices. It also arises from his bold ability to engage with modern thought without becoming defensive and without hiding behind the Bible or Catholic piety, though he uses both of these generously. John Paul II offers a clear alternative to the chaos and confusion of post-Enlightenment thought, in both his thought's style and substance. The Holy Father's words cause us to reflect more deeply than those of modern or postmodern thinkers, and call us away from the relativism of Richard Rorty, Foucault, and so many others. The pope's thought succeeds in part because he takes a much wider vista of things, in that he digs more deeply into Western and Christian thought and that he enters this heritage as an inheritor rather than as a skeptical scientist-researcher as in Foucault's case. The pope's thought also succeeds because he assigns spiritual meaning to this journey of Christian and world people. In this sense, his thought is also radically inclusive.
Systematic Theology & Theological Ethics
D. Th. (Systematic Theology)
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Books on the topic "Philosophy and fallibilism"

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Fallibilism democracy and the market: The meta-theoretical foundations of Popper's political philosophy. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001.

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Referenz und Fallibilismus: Zu Hilary Putnams pragmatischen Kognitivismus. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001.

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Docklosigkeit, oder, Zur Metaphysik der Moderne: Wie Fundamentalisten und Philosophen auf die menschliche Fehlbarkeit reagieren. Paderborn: Mentis, 2006.

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Dell'Utri, Massimo. L' inganno assurdo: Linguaggio e conoscenza tra realismo e fallibilismo. Macerata: Quodlibet, 2004.

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Fallible man. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.

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Perkinson, Henry J. Flight from fallibility: How theory triumphed over experience in the West. Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002.

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Die Grenzen des Naturalismus: Das Phänomen der Erkenntnis zwischen philosophischer Deutung und wissenschaftlicher Erklärung. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997.

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Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry: Fallibilism And Indeterminacy (Continuum Studies in American Philosophy). Continuum International Publishing Group, 2007.

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Schliesser, Eric. Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690120.003.0011.

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This chapter articulates Adam Smith’s philosophy of science. The first section emphasizes the significance of Smith’s social conception of science—science takes place, not always comfortably, within a larger society and is itself a social enterprise in which our emotions play a crucial role. Even so, in Smith’s view science ultimately is a reason-giving enterprise, akin to how he understands the role of the impartial spectator. The second and third sections explain Smith’s attitude to theorizing and its relationship, if any, to Humean skepticism. Smith distinguishes between theory acceptance and the possibility of criticism; while he accepts fallibilism, he also embraces scientific revolutions and even instances of psychological incommensurability. His philosophy is not an embrace of Humean skepticism, but a modest realism. Finally, the chapter explores the implications of Smith’s analysis of scientific systems as machines.
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Ricoeur, Paul. Fallible Man: Philosophy of the Will (Ricur, Paul. Philosophie De La Volonte.). Fordham University Press, 1986.

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Book chapters on the topic "Philosophy and fallibilism"

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Sæther, Knut-Willy. "The Many Faces of Fallibilism: Exploring Fallibilism in Science, Philosophy, and Theology." In The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy, Theology, and Religion, 13–34. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_2.

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Yong, Amos. "Fallibilism: A Philosophical-Pneumatological Apologetic." In The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy, Theology, and Religion, 51–66. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_4.

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McDonald, Hugh. "Peirce’s Theory of Truth and Fallibilism." In Richard J. Bernstein and the Pragmatist Turn in Contemporary Philosophy, 71–77. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137352705_5.

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Lillebø, Jonas Gamborg. "Fallibilism, Problematization, and the History of Thought." In The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy, Theology, and Religion, 35–50. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_3.

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Kim, Seung Chul. "A Pluralistic Pluralism: With Some Remarks on Fallibilism." In The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy, Theology, and Religion, 125–39. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_8.

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Dahill, Lisa E. "“Unworthy of the Earth”: Fallibilism, Place, Terra Nullius, and Christian Mission." In The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy, Theology, and Religion, 67–88. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_5.

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Hastings, Thomas John. "Restoring the Pro Nobis > Pro Me: A Translated Religion, Polycentric Ecumenism, and Moderate Fallibilism." In The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy, Theology, and Religion, 141–57. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_9.

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Anderson, Ronald. "Balancing Necessity and Fallibilism: Charles Sanders Peirce on the Status of Mathematics and its Intersection with the Inquiry into Nature." In The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, 15–42. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9107-0_2.

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Borga, Marco. "From Certainty to Fallibility in Mathematics?" In Philosophy of Mathematics Today, 39–50. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5690-5_2.

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Hastings, Thomas John, and Knut-Willy Sæther. "A Fallibilist Approach in the Age of COVID-19 and Climate Change." In The Grace of Being Fallible in Philosophy, Theology, and Religion, 1–11. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55916-8_1.

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