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Journal articles on the topic 'Philosophy and fallibilism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 5 February 2022

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1

Marushak, Adam. "Fallibilism and Consequence." Journal of Philosophy 118, no. 4 (2021): 214–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil2021118415.

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Alex Worsnip argues in favor of what he describes as a particularly robust version of fallibilism: subjects can sometimes know things that are, for them, possibly false (in the epistemic sense of ‘possible’). My aim in this paper is to show that Worsnip’s argument is inconclusive for a surprising reason: the existence of possibly false knowledge turns on how we ought to model entailment or consequence relations among sentences in natural language. Since it is an open question how we ought to think about consequence in natural language, it is an open question whether there is possibly false knowledge. I close with some reﬂections on the relation between possibly false knowledge and fallibilism. I argue that there is no straightforward way to use linguistic data about natural language epistemic modals to either verify or refute the fallibilist thesis.

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2

Berman Shifman, Nadav. "Pragmatism and Jewish Thought: Eliezer Berkovits’s Philosophy of Halakhic Fallibility." Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 27, no. 1 (March 29, 2019): 86–135. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1477285x-12341239a.

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Abstract In classical American pragmatism, fallibilism refers to the conception of truth as an ongoing process of improving human knowledge that is nevertheless susceptible to error. This paper traces appearances of fallibilism in Jewish thought in general, and particularly in the halakhic thought of Eliezer Berkovits. Berkovits recognizes the human condition’s persistent mutability, which he sees as characterizing the ongoing effort to interpret and apply halakhah in shifting historical and social contexts as Torat Ḥayyim. In the conclusion of the article, broader questions and observations are raised regarding Jewish tradition, fallibility, and modernity, and the interaction between Judaism and pragmatism in the history of ideas.

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3

Dodd, Dylan. "Against Fallibilism." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89, no. 4 (December 2011): 665–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2010.510530.

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4

Gava, Gabriele. "Can Transcendental Philosophy Endorse Fallibilism?" Contemporary Pragmatism 8, no. 1 (April 21, 2011): 133–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000187.

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5

Richmond, Sheldon. "Is Fallibilism Mistaken?" Transversal: International Journal for the Historiography of Science, no. 4 (June 10, 2018): 182. http://dx.doi.org/10.24117/2526-2270.2018.i4.16.

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6

Margolis, Joseph. "Rethinking Peirce's Fallibilism." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy 43, no. 2 (April 2007): 229–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/tra.2007.43.2.229.

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7

Roorda, Jonathan. "Fallibilism, Ambivalence, and Belief." Journal of Philosophy 94, no. 3 (March 1997): 126. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2941106.

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8

BRUECKNER, ANTHONY. "Fallibilism, Underdetermination, and Skepticism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, no. 2 (September 2005): 384–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00454.x.

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9

WEINTRAUB, RUTH. "Fallibilism and Rational Belief." British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no. 2 (June 1, 1993): 251–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/44.2.251.

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10

Neta, Ram. "A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism." Noûs 45, no. 4 (January 20, 2011): 658–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00778.x.

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11

Chuard, Philippe. "Non-transitive looks & fallibilism." Philosophical Studies 149, no. 2 (January 23, 2009): 161–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9326-x.

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12

Zweber, Adam. "Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment." Philosophical Studies 173, no. 10 (February 3, 2016): 2745–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0631-5.

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13

Shusterman, R. "FALLIBILISM AND FAITH." Common Knowledge 13, no. 2-3 (April 1, 2007): 379–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-2007-012.

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14

Kubok, Dariusz. "The antecedents of fallibilism in the philosophy of Carneades." Analiza i Egzystencja 41 (2018): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/aie.2018.41-01.

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15

Almeder, Robert. "Fallibilism, coherence and realism." Synthese 68, no. 2 (August 1986): 213–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00413832.

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16

Cruickshank, Justin. "The Usefulness of Fallibilism in Post-Positivist Philosophy." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 37, no. 3 (September 2007): 263–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393107303759.

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17

LITTLEJOHN, CLAYTON. "Concessive Knowledge Attributions and Fallibilism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83, no. 3 (February 17, 2011): 603–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00482.x.

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18

McGrath, Matthew. "Jessica Brown: Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge." Journal of Philosophy 116, no. 11 (2019): 637–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161140.

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19

Reed, Baron. "FALLIBILISM, EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY, AND EPISTEMIC AGENCY." Philosophical Issues 23, no. 1 (October 2013): 40–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phis.12003.

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20

Harper, Alexander S. "Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism." Philosophical Investigations 33, no. 4 (September 8, 2010): 339–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2010.01417.x.

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21

Carrier, L. S. "How to define a nonskeptical fallibilism." Philosophia 22, no. 3-4 (December 1993): 361–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02379653.

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22

Warenski, Lisa. "Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori." Philosophical Studies 142, no. 3 (January 30, 2008): 403–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9194-9.

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23

Legg, Catherine. "The Meaning of Meaning-Fallibilism." Axiomathes 15, no. 2 (June 2005): 293–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-004-6681-x.

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24

Rowlands, Stuart, Ted Graham, and John Berry. "Problems with Fallibilism as a Philosophy of Mathematics Education." Science & Education 20, no. 7-8 (March 11, 2010): 625–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11191-010-9234-2.

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25

Kelp, Christoph. "Classical Invariantism and the Puzzle of Fallibilism." Southern Journal of Philosophy 46, no. 2 (June 2008): 221–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2008.tb00077.x.

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26

Kvanvig, Jonathan L. "Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, by Jessica Brown." Mind 128, no. 512 (February 6, 2019): 1395–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz002.

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27

Olsson, Erik J. "F. P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism." Dialectica 58, no. 4 (June 23, 2005): 549–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00324.x.

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28

Anderson, Charity. "Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals." Philosophical Studies 167, no. 3 (March 23, 2013): 597–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0115-9.

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29

DOUGHERTY, TRENT, and PATRICK RYSIEW. "Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Concessive Knowledge Attributions." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78, no. 1 (January 2009): 123–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00234.x.

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30

Hannon, Michael. "Fallibilism and the value of knowledge." Synthese 191, no. 6 (July 23, 2013): 1119–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0315-z.

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31

Hetherington, Stephen. "Fallibilism and Knowing That One Is Not Dreaming." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32, no. 1 (March 2002): 83–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2002.10716512.

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Descartes challenged himself to know that he was not dreaming, with the supposed price to be paid if he lacked that knowledge being his failure to have any knowledge at all of the contingent existence and features of an external world. And subsequent epistemologist after subsequent epistemologist has kept that Cartesian skeptical challenge alive. Recent non-skeptical responses to it — most notably, Robert Nozick's — have focussed on whether one's not knowing that one is not dreaming really does entail one's lacking all external world knowledge. Seemingly, Nozick is unworried by the prospect of one's never knowing that one is not dreaming. He does argue that no one ever has that knowledge, but he reassures us that this does not entail that people do not have a steady and satisfying supply of the more ‘Standard’ sorts of external world knowledge. As I will argue in this paper, though, I see no good reason to concede in the first place that one cannot know that one is not dreaming.

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32

Haack, Susan. "Fallibilism, Objectivity, and the New Cynicism." Episteme 1, no. 1 (June 2004): 35–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2004.1.1.35.

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Nobody seriously doubts the possibility, or the usefulness, of finding things out; that is something we all take for granted when we inquire about our plane schedule, the state of our bank account, the best treatment for our child's illness, and so forth – a presupposition of the most ordinary, everyday looking into things as well as of the most sophisticated scientific research, not to mention of the legal system. Of course, nobody seriously doubts, either, that sometimes, instead of really looking into things, people fake, fudge, and obfuscate to avoid discovering unpalatable truths or having to give up comfortable tenets; that is something we all take for granted when we ask who paid for a reassuring (or a damning) study, who stands to gain from an Official Inquiry, which party an expert witness works for, and so on.Of late, however, radical feminists, multiculturalists, sociologists and rhetoricians of science, and (I am embarrassed to say) a good many philosophers as well – though they look into questions about their plane schedules, bank accounts, medical treatments, etc., just like everyone else – profess to have seen through what the rest of us take for granted.

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33

Cooke, Elizabeth F. "FALLIBILISM, PROGRESS, AND THE LONG RUN IN PEIRCE’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE." Southwest Philosophy Review 20, no. 1 (2004): 155–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200420116.

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34

Longoria, Richard T. "Pragmatism and the Mass Public." Contemporary Pragmatism 13, no. 2 (July 15, 2016): 169–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-01302003.

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This article examines public opinion as it relates to the primary tenets of the pragmatic philosophy. Anti-foundationalism, fallibilism, and an emphasis on practical consequences are observed in American public opinion. In addition, there is strong support for pragmatic politics in America. The evidence suggests that pragmatism is a common cultural attribute in American society.

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35

Little, Daniel. "Fallibilism and Ontology in Tuukka Kaidesoja’s Critical Realist Social Ontology." Journal of Social Ontology 1, no. 2 (September 1, 2015): 349–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0009.

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AbstractThis article addresses Tuukka Kaidesoja’s critique of the philosophical presuppositions of Roy Bhaskar’s theories of critical realism. The article supports Kaidesoja’s naturalistic approach to the philosophy of the social sciences, including the field of social ontology. The article discusses the specific topics of fallibilism, emergence, and causal powers. I conclude that Kaidesoja’s book is a valuable contribution to current debates over critical realism.

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36

Main, Robert. "The Frontier and Fallibilism: Toward "A More Perfect Union" of Peirce's Philosophy." Pluralist 5, no. 3 (2010): 89–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/plu.2010.0012.

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37

ROBERT MAIN. "The Frontier and Fallibilism: Toward “A More Perfect Union” of Peirce’s Philosophy." Pluralist 5, no. 3 (2010): 89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/pluralist.5.3.0089.

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38

Couvalis, George, Gonzalo Munévar, Eric Oberheim, and Paul Hoyningen-Huehne. "Radical fallibilism vs conceptual analysis: The significance of Feyerabend’s Philosophy of science." Metascience 8, no. 2 (July 1999): 206–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02913264.

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39

Agassi, Joseph. "The Limited Rationality of Technology." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49, no. 2 (December 5, 2018): 160–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393118814765.

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Ingemar Nordin’s Using Knowledge: On the Rationality of Science, Technology, and Medicine is a critical rationalist examination of medicine as a social system, largely science-based, but including quackery. Thus rationality is limited, as befits the author’s fallibilism.

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40

Weber, Eric Thomas. "Religion, Public Reason, and Humanism: Paul Kurtz on Fallibilism and Ethics." Contemporary Pragmatism 5, no. 2 (April 21, 2008): 131–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000095.

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41

Thorsrud, Harald. "Cicero on his Academic Predecessors: the Fallibilism of Arcesilaus and Carneades." Journal of the History of Philosophy 40, no. 1 (2002): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2002.0019.

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42

Kreiser, Catherine J. "The Scientific Method, Fallibilism, and Truth in the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce." International Studies in Philosophy 25, no. 3 (1993): 93–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil19932538.

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43

Boncompagni, Anna. "On Contexts, Hinges, and Impossible Mistakes." Logos & Episteme 11, no. 4 (2020): 507–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011438.

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In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce’s concept of the “indubitables,” which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein’s concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha’s contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein’s writings, his infallibilism does not.

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44

Fultner, Barbara. "The redemption of truth: Idealization, acceptability and fallibilism in habermas' theory of meaning1." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4, no. 2 (September 1996): 233–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559608570833.

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45

Cassini, Alejandro. "El fundacionismo de la epistemología aristotélica." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 20, no. 58 (December 10, 1988): 67–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1988.658.

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The aim of this paper is to make an evaluation of the Aristotelian axiomatic method of justification of knowledge in the light of the epistemological foundationalism. Its main theses are: 1) the Aristotelian axiomatic model of justification is an example of foundationalism in the wide sense of the term, which not restrains it to empiricism. 2) Aristotle’s foundationalism consists exclusively in his postulation of proper principles, but not in that of the common axioms. 3) His foundationalism is not based upon the immediate access —by perception or intellectual intuition— to the basic knowledges. The first principles of science are not data, and they are not evident nor self-justified. 4) The principles are not incorrigible statements, because their discovery is fallible. Moreover, they admit to be justified by a dialectical procedure. 5) Aristotle’s fallibilism is strongly limited: the principles are not —like in some modern epistemologies— always provisional. They become, in a finite time, necessary truths. This occurs when an essential definition is discovered after a mediate process, which has an inductive-dialectic character. These definitions are the proper principles of each science, strictly the foundations, and they are, once stated, incorrigible. The fallibilism of the process of discovery is not essential, but, according to Aristotle, accidental. 6) These assumptions produce two “absolutist” features in the Aristotelian conception of scientific knowledge: a) it is not provisional, but definitive; b) it is capable of to be complete. 7) Both features are supported by the basic assumption that a science is a finite set of necessary truths. 8) In this rigid model of scientific justification there is a scarce place for the concept of progress.

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46

BLAAUW, MARTIJN. "Divorcing theism from infallibilism: a reply to Robert Oakes." Religious Studies 43, no. 3 (August 14, 2007): 349–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412507009080.

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AbstractRobert Oakes has argued that theism defeats the ‘doctrine of public-world fallibilism’. That is, Oakes has argued that theism supports infallibilism about public-world beliefs such as ‘There is an olive on the floor’, or ‘I have two hands’. Given the enormous discussion of radical scepticism in the recent epistemological literature, this argument is well worth investigating. In this short note, however, I argue that the argument Oakes presents is unconvincing. The truth of theism does not support public-world infallibilism.

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47

Magada-Ward, Mary. "RESPONSE TO ELIZABETH COOKE’S “FALLIBILISM, PROGRESS, AND THE LONG RUN IN PEIRCE’S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE”." Southwest Philosophy Review 20, no. 2 (2004): 195–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview200420247.

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48

Kidder, William. "Resisting Empathy Bias with Pragmatist Ethics." Contemporary Pragmatism 16, no. 1 (February 22, 2019): 65–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-0161126.

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The paper employs a pragmatist perspective on ethics to address the problem of empathy bias, an empirically documented phenomenon in which one’s ability to empathize with another is diminished simply because of that other’s membership in a perceived out-group. I first argue that the philosophical commitments that I take to be distinctive of pragmatism, specifically fallibilism, anti-absolutism, and democracy, require proactive empathetic engagement as a central component of moral inquiry. While this may initially seem to leave pragmatism vulnerable to concerns about empathy bias, I argue that the pragmatist is uniquely equipped to provide a particular sort of response to the problem: a response that does not jettison empathy from moral judgment, but rather seeks to utilize awareness of bias to appropriately correct empathetic engagement when addressing moral problems.

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49

Haskell, Thomas L. "Farewell to Fallibilism: Robert Berkhofer's Beyond the Great Story and the Allure of the Postmodern." History and Theory 37, no. 3 (October 1998): 347–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0018-2656.00058.

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50

Leiviskä, Anniina. "Finitude, Fallibilism and Education towards Non-dogmatism: Gadamer’s hermeneutics in science education." Educational Philosophy and Theory 45, no. 5 (October 15, 2012): 516–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2012.732012.

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