Academic literature on the topic 'Philosophy of linguistics'

The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective. Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects. In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2007.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-88).<br>This dissertation consists of three chapters in which I address metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry, with particular attention paid to anti-psychiatric concerns. In Chapter 1, I consider three versions of anti-realism about psychiatric illness. I argue that Szasz's version of anti-realism should be rejected because it rests on a misunderstanding of illnesses more generally. Although I do not offer any clear refutations of labeling theory or cultural relativism, I point out the serious disadvantages of holding either view. I argue that in the absence of compelling reasons to endorse either labeling theory or cultural relativism, we are within our rights to remain realists about psychiatric illness. In Chapter 2, I address an epistemological concern that the scientific legitimacy of psychiatric taxonomy is compromised by the role that value judgments play in the study of mental disorders. I claim that this worry presupposes a view of science according to which objective observation and theory construction would not even be possible. I argue that, on a revised understanding of science proposed by Helen Longino, a scientifically legitimate psychiatric taxonomy is within our reach. Finally, in Chapter 3, I turn to the metaphysical problem of providing an account of disorders. An important part of a realist view of mental disorders includes an account of disorders. I claim that in light of available evidence of the heterogeneity of disorders, it is unlikely that disorders share an essence, and I argue that previous attempts to provide a Lockean account of disorders fail for this reason. I propose instead that disorders are homeostatic property cluster kinds of the sort first described by Richard Boyd.<br>by Jessica Sin.<br>Ph.D.

This thesis attempts to clarify a particular epistemological problem which surfaces in Chomsky's attempt to attain an objective psychological distance from the language used in his scientific theorizing, in taking language as an epistemological object. This is accomplished by examining the presumed objectivity underlying the theoretical basis of Chomskyan linguistics in its hermeneutical relation to the theories of language advocated by Quine, Wittgenstein, and other philosophers.<br>The thesis begins by situating the "metalanguage" in which the argumentation between Chomsky and Quine takes place in the Western philosophical tradition. It continues by outlining an historic-hermeneutic link between classical philosophy, early modernism and some twentieth century philosophies of language, most particularly those articulated by Wittgenstein in his two major works. Finally, the thesis concludes by identifying the hermeneutical nature of the philosophical discourse from which Chomsky's linguistics gains its epistemological force.

In this dissertation I defend a non-indexicalist contextualist account of metaphorical interpretation. This theory, which works within Kaplan’s double-index semantic framework, claims that context does not have the only role of determining the content expressed by an utterance, but also the function of fixing the appropriate circumstance of evaluation relative to which that content is evaluated. My claim is that the metaphorical dimension of an utterance can be found in the circumstance of evaluation, and not in the content which is expressed by the utterance. To that effect, I introduce a parameter in the circumstance of evaluation of an utterance, which I call ‘thematic dimension’. I show how the introduction of this parameter is in harmony with a class of theories that have proposed a relativistic semantic treatment of other phenomena such as predicates of taste and knowledge ascriptions. At the same time, I question a number of other proposals, both semantic and pragmatic, which, I believe, do not reach the same level of empirical adequacy and formal correctness as my proposal.

Nothing seems more obvious than that our words have meaning. When people speak to each other, they exchange information through the use of a particular set of words. The words they say to each other, moreover, are about something. Yet this relation of “aboutness,” known as “reference,” is not quite as simple as it appears. In this thesis I will present two opposing arguments about the nature of our words and how they relate to the things around us. First, I will present Hilary Putnam’s argument, in which he examines the indeterminacy of reference, forcing us to conclude that we must abandon metaphysical realism. While Putnam considers his argument to be a refutation of non-epistemicism, David Lewis takes it to be a reductio, claiming Putnam’s conclusion is incredible. I will present Lewis’s response to Putnam, in which he accepts the challenge of demonstrating how Putnam’s argument fails and rescuing us from the abandonment of realism. In order to explain the determinacy of reference, Lewis introduces the concept of “natural properties.” In the final chapter of this thesis, I will propose another use for Lewisian properties. Namely, that of helping to minimize the gap between natural language processing and human communication.

This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V' involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.