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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Philosophy of linguistics'
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Longworth, Guy Howard. "Logical form in philosophy and linguistics." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.268845.
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Barrios, Edison. "The foundations of linguistics : two theses." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.
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Nefdt, Ryan Mark. "The foundations of linguistics : mathematics, models, and structures." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9584.
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The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective. Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects. In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.
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Sin, Jessica M. 1975. "Essays in the philosophy of psychiatry." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41696.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2007.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-88).<br>This dissertation consists of three chapters in which I address metaphysical and epistemological issues that arise in psychiatry, with particular attention paid to anti-psychiatric concerns. In Chapter 1, I consider three versions of anti-realism about psychiatric illness. I argue that Szasz's version of anti-realism should be rejected because it rests on a misunderstanding of illnesses more generally. Although I do not offer any clear refutations of labeling theory or cultural relativism, I point out the serious disadvantages of holding either view. I argue that in the absence of compelling reasons to endorse either labeling theory or cultural relativism, we are within our rights to remain realists about psychiatric illness. In Chapter 2, I address an epistemological concern that the scientific legitimacy of psychiatric taxonomy is compromised by the role that value judgments play in the study of mental disorders. I claim that this worry presupposes a view of science according to which objective observation and theory construction would not even be possible. I argue that, on a revised understanding of science proposed by Helen Longino, a scientifically legitimate psychiatric taxonomy is within our reach. Finally, in Chapter 3, I turn to the metaphysical problem of providing an account of disorders. An important part of a realist view of mental disorders includes an account of disorders. I claim that in light of available evidence of the heterogeneity of disorders, it is unlikely that disorders share an essence, and I argue that previous attempts to provide a Lockean account of disorders fail for this reason. I propose instead that disorders are homeostatic property cluster kinds of the sort first described by Richard Boyd.<br>by Jessica Sin.<br>Ph.D.
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Lugtig, Joan F. (Joan Frances). "Philosophy, history, language and education : the hermeneutic epistemology underlying scientific linguistics." Thesis, McGill University, 1995. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23854.
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This thesis attempts to clarify a particular epistemological problem which surfaces in Chomsky's attempt to attain an objective psychological distance from the language used in his scientific theorizing, in taking language as an epistemological object. This is accomplished by examining the presumed objectivity underlying the theoretical basis of Chomskyan linguistics in its hermeneutical relation to the theories of language advocated by Quine, Wittgenstein, and other philosophers.<br>The thesis begins by situating the "metalanguage" in which the argumentation between Chomsky and Quine takes place in the Western philosophical tradition. It continues by outlining an historic-hermeneutic link between classical philosophy, early modernism and some twentieth century philosophies of language, most particularly those articulated by Wittgenstein in his two major works. Finally, the thesis concludes by identifying the hermeneutical nature of the philosophical discourse from which Chomsky's linguistics gains its epistemological force.
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Gentile, Francesco Paolo. "Talking metaphors : metaphors and the philosophy of language." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2013. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/13402/.
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In this dissertation I defend a non-indexicalist contextualist account of metaphorical interpretation. This theory, which works within Kaplan’s double-index semantic framework, claims that context does not have the only role of determining the content expressed by an utterance, but also the function of fixing the appropriate circumstance of evaluation relative to which that content is evaluated. My claim is that the metaphorical dimension of an utterance can be found in the circumstance of evaluation, and not in the content which is expressed by the utterance. To that effect, I introduce a parameter in the circumstance of evaluation of an utterance, which I call ‘thematic dimension’. I show how the introduction of this parameter is in harmony with a class of theories that have proposed a relativistic semantic treatment of other phenomena such as predicates of taste and knowledge ascriptions. At the same time, I question a number of other proposals, both semantic and pragmatic, which, I believe, do not reach the same level of empirical adequacy and formal correctness as my proposal.
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Berman, Lucy. "Lewisian Properties and Natural Language Processing: Computational Linguistics from a Philosophical Perspective." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2200.
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Nothing seems more obvious than that our words have meaning. When people speak to each other, they exchange information through the use of a particular set of words. The words they say to each other, moreover, are about something. Yet this relation of “aboutness,” known as “reference,” is not quite as simple as it appears. In this thesis I will present two opposing arguments about the nature of our words and how they relate to the things around us. First, I will present Hilary Putnam’s argument, in which he examines the indeterminacy of reference, forcing us to conclude that we must abandon metaphysical realism. While Putnam considers his argument to be a refutation of non-epistemicism, David Lewis takes it to be a reductio, claiming Putnam’s conclusion is incredible. I will present Lewis’s response to Putnam, in which he accepts the challenge of demonstrating how Putnam’s argument fails and rescuing us from the abandonment of realism. In order to explain the determinacy of reference, Lewis introduces the concept of “natural properties.” In the final chapter of this thesis, I will propose another use for Lewisian properties. Namely, that of helping to minimize the gap between natural language processing and human communication.
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Habgood-Coote, Joshua. "Knowledge-how : linguistic and philosophical considerations." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/11566.
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This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V' involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.
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Hetherington, F. M. L. "Language and the body : Merleau-Ponty's critique of the philosophy of language." Thesis, University of Essex, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371176.
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Kermode, Robert. "Three aspects of the nature of linguistic meaning." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/10902.
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Hunter, David Alexander. "Expression, analysis and understanding : three essays in the philosophy of language." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11684.
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Steen, Mark Edward. "Stuff, process, and object an examination of substance and its alternatives /." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/syr/main.
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Dwyer, Susan Jane. "Making "implicit" explicit--toward an account of implicit linguistic knowledge." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13442.
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Prevett, Elizabeth. "In defense of a linguistic model for reflective equilibrium in ethics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14138.
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Bale, Alan Clinton. "The universal scale and the semantics of comparison /." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=102479.
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Comparative constructions allow individuals to be compared according to different properties. Such comparisons form two classes, those that permit direct, comparisons (comparisons of measurements as in Seymour is taller than he is wide) and those that only allow indirect comparisons (comparisons of relative positions on separate scales as in Esme is more beautiful than Einstein is intelligent). Traditionally, these two types of comparisons have been associated with an ambiguity in the interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes (see, Bartsch & Vennemann, 1972; Kennedy, 1999). In this thesis, I propose that there is no such ambiguity. The interpretations of the comparative and equative morphemes remain the same whether they appear in sentences that compare individuals directly or relative to two separate scales. To develop a unified account, I suggest that all comparisons involve a scale of universal degrees that are isomorphic to the rational (fractional) numbers between 0 and 1. All comparative and equative constructions are assigned an interpretation based on a comparison of such degrees. These degrees are associated with the two individuals being compared. Crucial to a unified treatment, the connection between individuals and universal degrees involves two steps. First individuals are mapped to a value on a primary scale that respects the ordering of such individuals according to the quality under consideration (whether it be height, beauty or intelligence). Second, this value on the primary scale is mapped to a universal degree that encodes the value's relative position with respect to other values. It is the ability of iv the universal degrees to encode positions on a primary scale that enables comparative and equative morphemes to either compare individuals directly or indirectly. A direct comparison results if measurements such as seven feet participate in the gradable property (as in Seven feet is tall). Such participation can sometimes result in an isomorphism between two primary scales and the ordering of measurements in a measurement system. When this occurs, comparing positions in the primary scales is equivalent to comparing measurements. If this type of isomorphism cannot be established then the sentence yields an indirect comparison.
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Etemad, S. "Cognitive science, linguistics and philosophy of science : an inquiry into their connection and divergence." Thesis, Brunel University, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.304235.
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Farrar, Rebecca M. "Stargazing| Re-enchantment through language." Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=1545416.
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<p> Modern, Western people often conceive the universe as a mindless void full of lifeless objects. This mistaken conception perpetuates a deep-seated loneliness and disconnection from the larger universe. German philosopher and sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) used the term <i>disenchantment </i> to describe how modern humans experience the universe without any magical or mystical explanations for its or their own existence. Mythology, religion, philosophy, and science are all attempts to orient to myriad beings and the vast universe. Thus far, none of these endeavors has provided an adequate feeling of being at home in the universe. </p><p> Many scholars of language have attributed the disenchantment of the world with the invention of the alphabet and the formation of language. This thesis argues it was not language that separated humans from the universe, but instead a changing relationship to the stars. The works of philologist Owen Barfield (1898-1997) focus specifically on word etymology and offer insights into humanity's ever-evolving consciousness and correlating worldview orientations. His studies reveal meaningful correlations between the way humans think and their vocabularies. </p><p> Since the earliest recorded Proto-Indo-European language, Sanskrit, the word <i>star</i> has remained the same in its meaning and transliteration into English. Through a brief linguistic explanation of how the word <i>star</i> came into modern English, it is possible to appreciate not only its history, but the mystical power of the word itself. When correlated with humanity's most original worldview orientation, the word <i> star</i> brings back the language and consciousness of our early ancestors whose influence might otherwise be forgotten. Behind words and letters that seem to signify a lifeless, meaningless universe, is a worldview imbued with sacredness. This thesis argues for the revival and excavation of English etymologies (through Barfieldian philology) and an appreciation of language itself to move humanity towards a re-enchanted relationship with the stars and the larger universe.</p>
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McDonald, Brian Edison. "Constraint variational semantics." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2007. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3274279.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2007.<br>Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-07, Section: A, page: 2977. Adviser: Anil Gupta. Title from dissertation home page (viewed Apr. 9, 2008).
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McCaffery, Stephen James 1966. "Deictic use." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289633.
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This dissertation is comprised of four chapters. In chapter 1 I examine Kaplan's theory of deictics (indexicals and demonstratives) and show that the very data that is used to support various aspects of the theory actually show it to be inadequate. In chapter 2 I present a variety of uses of deictics and argue that semantic theories in general are not equipped to handle them. In chapter 3 I examine two other views of deictic reference and show them to be inadequate. I then outline my own two component use-based theory of deictics. In my theory I combine a semantic theory of deictics with a theory of reference determining intentions by showing that the linguistic meanings of deictic terms create constraints on a speaker's referential intentions. In chapter 4 I fill out a number of aspects of my theory and deal with the attributive use of deictics.
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Wellwood, Alexis. "Measuring predicates." Thesis, University of Maryland, College Park, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3644213.
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<p> Determining the semantic content of sentences, and uncovering regularities between linguistic form and meaning, requires attending to both morphological and syntactic properties of a language with an eye to the notional categories that the various pieces of form express. In this dissertation, I investigate the morphosyntactic devices that English speakers (and speakers of other languages) can use to talk about comparisons between things: comparative sentences with, in English, <i>"more... than", "as... as", "too", "enough",</i> and others. I argue that a core component of all of these constructions is a unitary element expressing the concept of measurement. </p><p> The theory that I develop departs from the standard degree-theoretic analysis of the semantics of comparatives in three crucial respects: first, gradable adjectives do not (partially or wholly) denote measure functions; second, degrees are introduced compositionally; and three, the introduction of degrees arises uniformly from the semantics of the expression <i> "much".</i> These ideas mark a return to the classic morphosyntactic analysis of comparatives found in Bresnan (1973), while incorporating and extending semantic insights of Schwarzschild (2002, 2006). Of major interest is how the dimensions for comparison observed across the panoply of comparative constructions vary, and these are analyzed as a consequence of what is measured (individuals, events, states, etc.), rather than which expressions invoke the measurement. </p><p> This shift in perspective leads to the observation of a number of regularities in the mapping between form and meaning that could not otherwise have been seen. First, the notion of measurement expressed across comparative constructions is familiar from some explications of that concept in measurement theory (e.g. Berka 1983). Second, the distinction between gradable and non-gradable adjectives is formally on a par with that between mass and count nouns, and between atelic and telic verb phrases. Third, comparatives are perceived to be acceptable if the domain for measurement is structured, and to be anamolous otherwise. Finally, elaborations of grammatical form reflexively affect which dimensions for comparison are available to interpretation.</p>
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Sisovics, Milena. "Embedded jussives as instances of control : the case of Mongolian and Korean." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/120681.
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Thesis: Ph. D. in Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2018.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 179-185).<br>This dissertation is an investigation into the semantics of imperatives and imperative-like forms (collectively referred to as jussives) in embedded contexts. The long-held view that imperatives are confined to root (matrix) contexts has been challenged by recent findings of counterexamples from a variety of languages. This thesis contributes to the debate by introducing novel empirical evidence from Mongolian confirming that the restriction on imperative embedding is not universal: Mongolian is shown to allow for embedding of a a speaker-directed jussive form voluntative and a hearer-directed imperative. The empirical domain is widenend to include data from jussive embedding in Korean (drawing on Madigan 2008, Pak et al. 2008b, a.o.). This thesis takes special interest in the complex combination of properties characterizing the subjects of embedded jussives in Mongolian and Korean, to wit, (i) their dependence on an antecedent in the embedding clause, (ii) the requirement to be interpreted de se, and (iii) the presence of [phi]-features. These properties are used to make a case for an analysis of jussive subjects as instances of Obligatory Control PRO, and against an analysis as indexical pronouns. In particular, it is demonstrated how a view of PRO as a syntactically and semantically complex unit closely resembling de re expressions in attitude reports (Percus & Sauerland 2003a) provides an elegant way of accounting for the combined characteristics of jussive subjects. Set against the background of a Neo-Davidsonian event semantics, this thesis puts forward the idea that jussive clauses denote sets of events whose propositional content amounts to a desire statement. An analysis of jussives as sets of events is shown to afford a natural extension to matrix occurrences on the assumption that the content denoted by matrix jussives is anchored to the speech event. Finally, this thesis proposes to bridge the gap between jussive reports and canonical Obligatory Control constructions and demonstrates how the presented account can be generalized to provide a novel perspective on Obligatory Control constructions as well.<br>by Milena Sisovics.<br>Ph. D. in Linguistics
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Simon, Steven H. 1957. "Contributions to a physicalistic theory of action." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8145.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 139-141).<br>My project of giving a general physicalistic reduction of action contrasts with Donald Davidson's view that only individual actions can be explained in physicalistic terms. The main reason for his view is that he thinks the problem of internal causal deviance is insoluble. In the first chapter, I reconstruct the theory of action Davidson develops in Essays and Events and extend the theory to solve the deviance problem. The idea of the solution is that action requires "modulated movement," an ongoing process of monitoring and modulating the movements in which actions consist. In the second chapter, I develop the theory of modulated movement in more detail and argue that it can explain a number of cases of defective agency. I defend my contention that the analysis of modulated movement solves the deviance problem against several objections. In doing so, one of the main points I argue is that "ballistic movements," movements the agent cannot modify, cannot be actions. The psychological states in terms of which I analyze modulated movement are belief and desire, and in the third chapter I develop a reductive physicalistic account of a component of belief, indication. I start with a theory of indication that Robert Stalnaker presents in Inquiry, anddevelop the theory to cope with some problems for it that I identify. In the second part of the chapter, I extend the theory to explain cases of indication in which indicators are combined so that together they indicate propositions more specific or precise than any of the propositions they indicate alone, thus reducing complex cases of indication to simpler ones.<br>by Steven H. Simon.<br>Ph.D.
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Hawley, Patrick 1964. "Skepticism avoided." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17644.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-126).<br>I evaluate three replies to skepticism, drawing conclusions about the meaning of "justified", the viability of foundationalism, the value of knowledge, and the role of belief in rational action. In the first chapter, I examine the following skeptical argument: Something is justified only if justified by a justified thing; circular and infinite chains of justification are illegitimate; therefore, no belief is justified. A linguistic investigation reveals that this argument contains two ambiguities not yet noticed by epistemologists. The linguistic observations favor foundationalism about justification, showing how the foundationalist can maintain his view, while explaining away the force of the skeptical argument. However, in the second chapter, I argue that foundationalism is unsatisfactory, for non-skeptical reasons. If a foundationalist tries to explain how some things can be basic, then she must endorse a certain kind of circularity. But a foundationalist should not endorse this circularity. Dissecting a single skeptical argument is an interesting although limited endeavour. In the third chapter, I argue that an entire class of skeptical arguments can be avoided. Distinguishing rational action from rational belief change, I claim that certain changes in belief cannot occur during a rational act. In particular, I argue, some skeptical conclusions cannot be accepted while performing an ordinary rational act. The main conclusion of this chapter is: to avoid acting irrationally, it is rational to avoid certain skeptical arguments. Sometimes it is better to concede to skepticism than to flee.<br>(cont.) In the fourth chapter, I argue that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief. This surprising claim supports the conclusion that skepticism about knowledge is harmless. Even if we cannot know anything about the external world-or even if we cannot know anything at all-we may have something just as valuable as knowledge: stable true beliefs.<br>by Patrick Hawley.<br>Ph.D.
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Richardson, Kevin Andrew. "Grounding pluralism." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113777.
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Thesis: Ph. D. in Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2017.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 93-98).<br>My dissertation consists of a series of papers on grounding pluralism, the broad view that there are multiple kinds of metaphysical grounding relations. Specifically, I argue that there are three species of grounding: why-grounding (which tells us why things are the case), how-grounding (which tells us how things are the case), and what-grounding (which tells us what it is for things to be the case). I call the resulting view wh-pluralism. I show how wh-pluralism can resolve various debates within metaphysics.<br>by Kevin Andrew Richardson.<br>Ph. D. in Philosophy
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Sartorio, Ana Carolina 1972. "The causal and the moral." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17580.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-92).<br>My dissertation is about the following two questions: The causal question: When is something a cause of something else? The moral question: When is someone morally responsible for something? I examine the way in which these questions overlap. I argue that, in some important respects, the relation between the causal and the moral question is tighter than people have taken it to be, but, in other important respects, it is looser than people have taken it to be. The dissertation consists of three chapters. Each of the chapters is a self-contained paper, but the three papers are interconnected in various ways. Chapters 1 and 2 are concerned with how the causal question and the moral question intersect, and Chapter 3 is concerned with how they come apart. In Chapter 1, I lay out a view of causation according to which causing is a particular way of making a difference. I show that an advantage of this view is that it carves up a concept of cause that is particularly well suited for the work causation does in moral theory. In Chapter 2, I argue that a moral asymmetry that exists between actions and omissions has a causal basis. I argue that the conditions under which actions and omissions make us morally responsible are different, and that this is so because the causal powers of actions and omissions are different. In Chapter 3, I argue against the received view about the relation between causation and moral responsibility, according to which being responsible for something requires causing it. I offer an alternative picture according to which causation is a necessary condition for the transmission of responsibility, although not for the existence of responsibility itself.<br>by Ana Carolina Sartorio.<br>Ph.D.
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Stockall, Linnaea C. 1975. "Magnetoencephalographic investigations of morphological identity and irregularity." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28833.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-111).<br>This thesis addresses the longstanding debate in the psycholinguistics literature about the correct way to characterize the psychological status of morphological relatedness and irregular allomorphy. The model argued for here is one in which the mental lexicon consists of lexical roots (sound -meaning pairs that are arbitrary in the Saussurian sense, such as CAT: 'feline'<->/kaet/) and functional morphemes (affixes such as the plural marker -s, that carry purely grammatical information). Complex words are assembled by the grammar out of these roots and affixes. We argue that this is true even for words like "gaze" which don't clearly separate into two pieces, but are abstractly parallel to "walked," which does. Evidence for this full, across the board decomposition model is provided in a series of priming experiments that use magnetoencephalography to measure the earliest stages of lexical processing. Both regular and irregular allomorphs of a root are shown to access their root equally. These results, then, are incompatible both with connectionist models which treat all morphological relatedness as similarity, and with dual mechanism models which argue that regular allomorphy and irregular allomorphy arise from completely different systems, and only regular allomorphy involves root activation and composition. In this model, morphological relatedness is argued to be an identity relation between various allomorphs of a single, shared root, and is therefore clearly distinguished from semantic and phonological relatedness, which merely involve similarity between the meaning, or form, of different roots. The experiments reported in this dissertation support this model: the neural responses evoked by identity are significantly distinct from<br>(cont.) the neural responses evoked by similarity.<br>by Linnaea C. Stockall.<br>Ph.D.
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Hoffman, Virginia Anne. "Antidepressants, bioenhancements, and the ethics of self-respect." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55178.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 121-124).<br>Antidepressants and bioenhancement technologies raise special concerns - both for those who use them and those who don't - about who we are and how we should treat ourselves. In this dissertation, I confront these concerns by asking and answering two ethical questions about different forms of self-treatment. These are: 1. Is antidepressant use morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying?, and 2. Is bioenhancement use morally problematic insofar as it undermines self-respect? (Note: by "morally problematic," I mean "possessing a wrong-making feature," not "always wrong, all things considered.") The first two chapters focus on the former question - the question of whether antidepressant use is morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying. In order to answer this, I first step back, in Chapter 1, and look at the phenomenon of self-objectification generally construed. I draw from Martha Nussbaum's and Rae Langton's work on objectification to formulate my own definition of "self-objectification." I then argue that self-objectification is indeed possible, and that it assumes a number of interesting forms. The second chapter turns to the specific bioethical question of whether antidepressant use is morally problematic insofar as it is self-objectifying. I argue that the answer is "yes." Although I'm not the first to voice this particular objection to antidepressant use, I extend this previous scholarship in two principal ways. First, I draw from my definition and analysis of self-objectification in Chapter 1 to characterize exactly how antidepressant use is self-objectifying, and to pinpoint the accompanying specific moral offense.<br>(cont.) Second, I argue in detail against Neil Levy's contention that some cases of self-objectification with antidepressants are completely permissible. In my third and final chapter, I turn to the second question: whether bioenhancement use is morally problematic insofar as it undermines self-respect. I argue that it is, while also acknowledging that there are other senses in which it, simultaneously, can promote self-respect. I offer a few options for conceptualizing this tension, and maintain that the undermining of self-respect nevertheless constitutes one reason to worry about bioenhancement technologies.<br>by Virginia A. Hoffman.<br>Ph.D.
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Newman, Anthony E. (Anthony Edison) 1970. "Causal efficacy and externalist mental content." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8147.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 150-155).<br>Internalism about mental content is the view that microphysical duplicates must be mental duplicates as well. This dissertation develops and defends the idea that only a strong version of internalism is compatible with our commonsense commitment to mental causation. Chapter one defends a novel necessary condition on a property's being causally efficacious - viz., that any property F that is efficacious with respect to event E cannot be instantiated in virtue of any property G that is itself ceteris paribus sufficient for E -- and shows that that necessary condition vindicates the idea that externalism is incompatiblewith our commonsense commitment to mental causation. The internalist's core intuition is that only intrinsic properties can be causally efficacious. Chapter two defends that intuition from the common externalist response that extrinsic properties abound. A popular "Middle Way" between externalism and internalism holds that although ordinary, "folk-psychological" contents of prepositional attitudes are extrinsic, there exists some other non-folk-psychological kind of content that is intrinsic. Chapter three argues that Jerry Fodor's influential argument for the Middle Way is incoherent. Chapter four identifies a weak but popular grade of internalism, endorsed by John Searle among others, and argues that it is untenable.<br>(cont.) The preceding defense of internalism can be believed only if there is something wrong with the canonical arguments for externalism developed by Hillary Putnam, Tyler Burge, and Saul Kripke. My postscript says what I think is wrong with the canonical externalist arguments: they assume the nonexistence of propositions that are truth-evaluable only relative to particular persons, places, or times; while I argue that our commonsense commitment to mental causation requires at least some such "indexical propositions".<br>by Anthony E. Newman.<br>Ph.D.
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Sliwa, Paulina Anna. "Praise without perfection." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/77802.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2012.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-86).<br>This dissertation is about agents like us, who are both epistemically flawed and morally imperfect. First, how should such agents form and revise their moral beliefs? Second, how should we morally evaluate the actions of such agents - under which conditions do their actions have moral worth? I approach these questions by focusing on moral testimony. Moral testimony is particularly interesting in this context because we often rely on it to compensate for our moral and epistemic imperfections. Yet it has been viewed with suspicion by moral philosophers and epistemologists alike. I argue that these suspicions are unfounded: moral testimony is an important source of moral knowledge - in some situations it is the only source of moral knowledge available to agents like us - and actions on the basis of moral testimony can have moral worth. In arguing for this conclusion, I develop a novel account of moral worth. I argue that moral knowledge is central to moral worth. 'he epistemic question about how we should form our moral beliefs and the moral question about when our actions are morally praiseworthy turn out to be closely related.<br>by Paulina Anna Sliwa.<br>Ph.D.
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Harbour, Daniel 1975. "Elements of number theory." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17581.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 202-205).<br>The dissertation argues for the necessity of a morphosemantic theory of number, that is, a theory of number serviceable both to semantics and morphology. The basis for this position, and the empirical core of the dissertation, is the relationship between semantically based noun classification and agreement in Kiowa, an indigenous, endangered language of Oklahoma. The central claim is that Universal Grammar provides three number features, concerned with unithood, existence of homogeneous subsets, and properties of those subsets. The features are used to analyze a wide variety of data. Semantic topics include the difference between granular and non-granular mass nouns, collective, non-collective and distributive plurals, and cardinality. Syntactic topics include the structure of DP, noun marking, agreement and suppletion. Morphological topics include the inventory of morphological operations, the featural basis of complex syncretisms, the difference between agreement and suppletion, whether features are privative or binary, and the nature of the Kiowa/Tanoan inverse. Keywords: Kiowa-Tanoan, number, morphology, semantics, agreement, suppletion, inverse, noun class, singular, dual, plural, features, binary, privative.<br>by Daniel Harbour.<br>Ph.D.
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Batty, Clare (Clare E. ). "Lessons in smelling : essays on olfactory perception." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/41703.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2007.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 66-76).<br>This three-paper dissertation focuses on olfactory perception, with each paper exploring an ongoing debate in the perceptual literature through the olfactory 'lens'. Philosophers of perception have typically assumed what I call the Unification Thesis: the thesis that certain philosophical issues about perception should be settled in the same way for each of the sensory modalities. I argue that olfaction presents special challenges to the Unification Thesis. Meeting these challenges rewards us with new insight into three topics: 1) the nature, and extent, of representational content, 2) qualia and the alleged transparency of experience and 3) the nature of the secondary qualities. In the first chapter, I consider the challenge that olfactory experience presents to upholding a representational view of the sense modalities. It is commonplace to suppose that visual experience is representational. But, given the phenomenology of olfactory experience, it is difficult to see how a representational view of it might go. I take on the challenge and argue for a representational account of olfactory experience that honors its phenomenology. In the second chapter, I consider what olfactory experience can tell us about the controversy over qualia and, in particular, the argument against them that focuses on the alleged transparency of experience. Although most transparency theorists claim that transparency holds for all of the sense modalities, transparency seems unintuitive for olfactory experience. I argue that olfactory experience is indeed transparent and that explanations of what transparency is supposed to be have been obscured by a reliance on the visual model.<br>(cont.) In the final chapter, I turn to the question of what smells are. For many philosophers, the view that colors can be explained in purely physicalistic terms has seemed very appealing. In the case of smell, this kind of view has seemed less appealing. Philosophers have been drawn to the view that the nature of smells must be explained in terms of our subjective reactions. In this chapter, I consider a contemporary argument for this view for the case of color. I argue that physicalistic views of smell have nothing to fear from this argument.<br>by Clare Batty.<br>Ph.D.
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Pérez, Carballo Alejandro. "Rationality without representation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68519.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2011.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-109).<br>This dissertation is about whether and how non-representational attitudes could play a role in our theories of rationality. In Chapter 1 ('Negation, expressivism, and intentionality') I argue that the best explanation for why two mental states are inconsistent need not presuppose that such states are representational-that they have, in the jargon, truth-conditions. I use this to provide a solution to the 'negation problem' for metaethical expressivism. In Chapter 2 ('Structuring logical space') I sketch an account of mathematical practice along non-representational lines. I show how it can do justice to the applicability of mathematics, and propose ways in which one's epistemic goals can impose substantial constraints on which mathematical theories to accept. Chapter 3 ('Good questions') provides a general account of the way in which rationality constrains changes in our hypothesis space. In particular, I show how some such changes can be better than others by placing the discussion within a general framework of rational dynamics, on which rational epistemic change involves maximizing expected epistemic utility.<br>by Alejandro Perez Carballo.<br>Ph.D.
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Wagner, Michael Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Prosody and recursion." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33713.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2005.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 317-341).<br>This thesis proposes a recursive mapping of syntactic derivations to prosodic representations. I argue that the prosody of an expression, just like its meaning, is determined compositionally, as originally proposed in Chomsky et al. (1957), Chomsky and Halle (1968). Syntactic structure are cyclically spelled out and assigned a semantic and phonological interpretation. The cyclic approach is motivated based on data from the prosody of coordinate structures, integrating insights from syntax, combinatorics, and semantics. The algorithm distinguishes two ways of prosodically relating the output of cyclic domains: they can either be mapped to prosodic domains that are on a par and match in prosodic status: PROSODIC MATCHING; or the output of one cycle can be prosodically subordinated to another cycle: PROSODIC SUBORDINATION. Together, they derive a metrical structure that encodes information about phrasing, accent placement, and prominence. Scope relations, argument structure, and information structure affect prosodic phrasing indirectly by determining which of the two principles applies and when a syntactic cycle is spelled out. The derived metrical representation is a relational grid (Liberman, 1975).<br>(cont.) It encodes syntactic structure and also the derivational history of how it was assembled. The theory attempts to incorporate insights from recent work on stress and prominence (Cinque, 1993, Arregi, 2002) and prosodic recursion Ladd (1988), Dresher (1994), as well as insights from the research on prosodic phrasing and phrasal phonology (Gussenhoven, 1984, Selkirk, 1986, Truckenbrodt, 1995). Phonetic evidence from on-line production is presented to show that speakers implement the predicted metrical relations and scale boundaries later in the utterance relative to boundaries already produced, a phenomenon dubbed BOUNDARY STRENGTH SCALING.<br>by Michael Wagner.<br>Ph.D.
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Szabó, Zoltán. "Problems of compositionality." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11346.
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Flagg, Elissa Jill 1974. "Interface issues in the English imperative." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8156.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.<br>"September 2002."<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 155-159).<br>Two puzzles in the syntax of the English imperative are treated here as consequences of interface conditions. The first concerns the inability of certain predicates to take an overt subject in the imperative. The second concerns the ungrammaticality of certain negative and emphatic imperatives with an overt subject. The investigation yields a deeper understanding of the role of LF and PF ineffability in the grammar. A widely encountered generalization holds that the overt subject is optional in the English imperative. Evidence is presented that this generalization is problematic on two counts. First, the presence vs. absence of an overt subject actually correlates with a subtle aspectual distinction. Related to this phenomenon, some imperatives actually disallow an overt subject. This work argues that overt subject licensing in the imperative occurs in a phrase projected from an aspectual feature that is incompatible with the semantic representation of stative predicates. Therefore, the restriction against overt subjects in imperatives with such predicates reflects not a failure in the syntactic component, but ineffability at the LF-interface, where the meaning representation of the predicate is incompatible with it the syntactic context it is embedded in. A second major puzzle in the imperative is that the overt subject is disallowed in negative/emphatic imperatives with do (not), yet allowed in negative imperatives with don't. This restriction on the occurrence of the overt subject is argued to stem from a disruption that the subject argument causes for the satisfaction of a morphological adjacency requirement of the sentential negation head [NEG], or its affirmative counterpart, [AFF].<br>In this case, the unavailability of overt subjects in imperatives with do (not) stems not from a restriction in the syntax or semantics, but from ineffability at the PF-interface, where the overt subject exerts an intervention effect for a morphological adjacency requirement that holds between the polarity heads [NEG] and [AFF] and the verb. Chapter 1 provides background material and introduces previous attempts to explain the two major puzzles identified above. Chapter 2 deals with the semantic restriction on overt subject imperatives. In Chapter 3, the morphological adjacency disruption approach to the *do (not) subject puzzle is proposed. Consequences of this approach for the nature of head movement are explored, and a structural account of do-support under a PF head movement analysis is developed. Chapter 4 examines some consequences of the proposal in Chapter 3 for the phenomena of Auxiliary Reduction and Neg-raising in English.<br>by Elissa Jill Flagg.<br>Ph.D.
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Kang, Myung-Yoon. "Topics in Korean syntax : phrase structure, variable binding and movement." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14405.
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Klipple, Elizabeth Mary. "The aspectual nature of thematic relations : locative and temporal phrases in English and Chinese." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13364.
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Ritter, Elizabeth Ann. "A case study in the syntax of agreement : Hebrew noun phrases and Benoni verb phrases." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14452.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1989.<br>Title as it appeared in M.I.T. Graduate List, February, 1989: A case study in agreement.<br>Includes bibliographical references (leaves 164-172).<br>by Elizabeth Ann Ritter.<br>Ph.D.
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Cheng, Lisa L. S. "On the typology of wh-questions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13938.
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McKay, David Andrew. "Metrical theory and English verse." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/10777.
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Fermino, Jessie Little Doe (Jessie Little Doe Christobal) 1963. "An introduction to Wampanoag grammar." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8740.
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John, James R. 1975. "Consciousness and intentionality." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/28838.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2004.<br>Includes bibliographical references (p. 174-180).<br>(cont.) having perceptual experiences, subjects can be--and usually are--directly aware of material objects.<br>This dissertation is about phenomenal consciousness, its relation to intentionality, and the relation of both to issues in the philosophy of perception. My principal aim is (1) to defend an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious and (2) to develop, within the terms set forth by this account, a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness. Given the way these matters are usually understood, it probably is not obvious why I distinguish two philosophical tasks here. One might ask: "Isn't defending an account of what it is for a perceptual experience to be phenomenally conscious the same thing as developing a particular theory of perceptual phenomenal consciousness?" I argue that it is not. In addition to my principal aim, I have three subsidiary aims. First, to shed some light on what it means for a perceptual experience to be an intentional mental event, one with representational content. Many philosophers regard the notion of perceptual intentionality as utterly unproblematic. Though I accept that experiences almost always have content, I subject this claim to more scrutiny than is usual. Second, to go some way towards better understanding the relationship between perceptual phenomenal consciousness and perceptual intentionality. In particular, I examine recent attempts to explain the former in terms of the latter. My conclusion is that there can be no such explanation. Finally, to show that, by improving our understanding of perceptual phenomenal consciousness, perceptual intentionality, and the relation between them, we can make headway on some very difficult problems in the philosophy of perception. I am especially interested in defending direct realism, the view that, in<br>by James R. John.<br>Ph.D.
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Bruening, Benjamin. "Syntax at the edge: cross-clausal phenomena and the syntax of passamaquoddy." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8198.
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Watanabe, Akira. "Agr-based case theory and its interaction with the A-bar system." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12497.
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LeSourd, Philip S. "Accent and syllable structure in Passamaquoddy." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14451.
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Uzquiano, Gabriel 1968. "Ontology and the foundations of mathematics." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9370.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1999.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>"Ontology and the Foundations of Mathematics" consists of three papers concerned with ontological issues in the foundations of mathematics. Chapter 1, "Numbers and Persons," confronts the problem of the inscrutability of numerical reference and argues that, even if inscrutable, the reference of the numerals, as we ordinarily use them, is determined much more, precisely than up to isomorphism. We argue that the truth conditions of a variety of numerical modal and counterfactual sentences (whose acceptance plays a crucial role in applications) place serious constraints on the sorts of items to which numerals, as we ordinarily use them, can be taken to refer: Numerals cannot be taken to refer to objects that exist contingently such as people, mountains, or rivers, but rather must be taken to refer to objects that exist necessarily such as abstracta. Chapter 2, "Modern Set Theory and Replacement," takes up a challenge to explain the reasons one should accept the axiom of replacement of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, when its applications within ordinary mathematics and the rest of science are often described as rare and recondite. We argue that this is not a question one should be interested in; replacement is required to ensure that the element-set relation is well-founded as well as to ensure that the cumulation of sets described by set theory reaches and proceeds beyond the level w of the cumulative hierarchy. A more interesting question is whether we should accept instances of replacement on uncountable sets, for these are indeed rarely used outside higher set theory. We argue that the best case for (uncountable) replacement comes not from direct, intuitive considerations, but from the role replacement plays in the formulation of transfinite recursion and the theory of ordinals, and from the fact that it permits us to express and assert the (first-order) content of the modern cumulative view of the set theoretic universe as arrayed in a cumulative hierarchy of levels. Chapter 3, "A No-Class Theory of Classes," makes use of the apparatus of plural quantification to construe talk of classes as plural talk about sets, and thus provide an interpretation of both one- and two-sorted versions of first-order Morse-Kelley set theory, an impredicative theory of classes. We argue that the plural interpretation of impredicative theories of classes has a number of advantages over more traditional interpretations of the language of classes as involving singular reference to gigantic set-like entities, only too encompassing to be sets, the most important of these being perhaps that it makes the machinery of classes available for the formalization of much recent and very interesting work in set theory without threatening the universality of the theory as the most comprehensive theory of collections, when these are understood as objects.<br>by Gabriel Uzquiano.<br>Ph.D.
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Collins, Christopher Thad. "Topics in Ewe syntax." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12496.
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Stainton, Robert James Harold. "Non-sentential assertions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12501.
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Kearns, Katherine Susan. "The semantics of the English progressive." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13730.
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Jung, Darryl 1962. "The Logic of Principia Mathematica." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11766.
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