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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Philosophy of science'
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SHERRON, CATHERINE ELIZABETH. "CRITICAL VALUES: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE COMPUTING SCIENCES." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1054218563.
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Sherron, Catherine E. "Critical values feminist philosophy of science and the computing sciences /." Cincinnati, Ohio : University of Cincinnati, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=ucin1054218563.
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Jones, Scott R., and University of Lethbridge Faculty of Arts and Science. "Critical realist philosophy for science." Thesis, Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Faculty of Arts and Science, 2002, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10133/184.
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This paper considers the philosophy of science that is central to Critical Realism (CR). Following a discussion of the foundational transcendental arguments of the movement, it reviews stratification, emergence, and the possibility of a unity between the natural and the social sciences. CR is broadly contrasted with other versions of scientific realism, empiricism, and idealism. the philosophy of psychology is considered as a test case in which critical realism can be demonstrated to be a workable theory of science. Specifically, a theory is propsed of social psychology that would be scientific in virtue of meeting the standards of a critical realist view of science.i, 95 leaves ; 28 cm.
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Mwamba, Tchafu. "Michael Polanyi's philosophy of science /." Lewiston (N.Y.) ; Lampeter : Edwin Mellen press, 2001. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb38802840s.
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VAN, DONGEN NOAH N'DJAYE NIKOLAI. "Methods and Philosophy: Doing Science." Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Genova, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/11567/1038249.
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The purpose of this dissertation can be summarized as small set of modest attempts to contribute to improving scientific practice. Each of these attempts was geared towards either increasing understanding of a particular problem or making a contribution to how science can be practiced. The general focus was on philosophical nuance while remaining methodologically practicable. The five papers contained in this dissertation are both methodologically and philosophically diverse. The first three (Chapters 2 through 4) are more empirical in nature and are focused on understanding and evaluating how science is practiced. The last two (Chapters 5 and 6) are focused on the improvement of scientific practice by providing tools for the improvement of empirical research with a strong philosophical foundation.
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Brown, Matthew J. "Science and experience a Deweyan pragmatist philosophy of science /." Diss., [La Jolla] : University of California, San Diego, 2009. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3359062.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009.Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 14, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 224-232) and index.
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Culpin, David. "Philosophy and Science : The Place of Philosophy and Science in the Development of Knowledge and Understanding." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1118.
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This thesis examines the roles played by philosophy and science in the development of knowl-edge and understanding from ancient times to the present day. It is maintained that the sole contributor to this development has been science, philosophy for the most part acting as an impediment, contrary to the philosophically inspired myth that philosophy lays the groundwork for science, and consonant with the suspicions of most scientists who give thought to the matter. This thesis is expounded from two perspectives, the historical and the analytic. From the historical perspective, Part I of the thesis, the development of scientific ideas is traced in its philosophical context, principally that of the physical sciences from the time of Galileo, but also touching on the position of science in Greek thought. It is concluded that science effectively began with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and pro-gressed from that time generally in opposition to philosophical dogma, and, once established, almost entirely independently of it. From the analytical perspective, Part II of the thesis, some recent and contemporary philosophical issues in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, cen-tred principally on issues concerning the connection between mind and the world, are evalu-ated for their contributions to our current knowledge and understanding. The evaluation is that, by its resort to inappropriate terminology, for the most part philosophy generates confu-sion in matters that in everyday terms are inherently simple and in scientific terms are more complex than philosophers ever imagined—the issue of consciousness is given particular attention. The discussion devolves upon the view, also put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his later years, that controversy in these areas of philosophy arises largely from a confusion of theory with the referents of theory, of word with object, and from the consequent ideological commitment of philosophers to irreconcilable positions in the realist–idealist spectrum. The thesis maintains that although it is a scientific (that is, empirically based) fact that theories, concepts, percepts and the like are constructs of the human mind (suggesting an idealist view, and therefore a fact causing difficulty for realists), it does not follow that the referents of these constructs are themselves constructs of the human mind—indeed, the proposition that they are is without meaning (and hence the realism–idealism dualism is meaningless). This is because the referents of constructs are accessible only by means of those constructs, which do not speak of their own basis in the human mind—the reality of an object referred to depends on the empirical validity of the construct by which the reference is made (and, of course, it may not be real in this sense at all, but be an illusion or a deliberate fiction), not on some philosophical notion of reality. Thus, for example, while the theory of evolution is a human construct, there is no sense in which evolution can be spoken of as a human construct or oth-erwise—evolution is dealt with in its entirety through its theory. Such a resolution of age-old philosophical controversy reflects no more than the human condition (as epitomised by Neurath’s simile of “sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea”), which is fully en-compassed by the scientific approach, and from which there is no escape by means of any religious or philosophical construction.
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Culpin, David. "Philosophy and Science : The Place of Philosophy and Science in the Development of Knowledge and Understanding." University of Sydney, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/1118.
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Master of PhilosophyThis thesis examines the roles played by philosophy and science in the development of knowl-edge and understanding from ancient times to the present day. It is maintained that the sole contributor to this development has been science, philosophy for the most part acting as an impediment, contrary to the philosophically inspired myth that philosophy lays the groundwork for science, and consonant with the suspicions of most scientists who give thought to the matter. This thesis is expounded from two perspectives, the historical and the analytic. From the historical perspective, Part I of the thesis, the development of scientific ideas is traced in its philosophical context, principally that of the physical sciences from the time of Galileo, but also touching on the position of science in Greek thought. It is concluded that science effectively began with the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, and pro-gressed from that time generally in opposition to philosophical dogma, and, once established, almost entirely independently of it. From the analytical perspective, Part II of the thesis, some recent and contemporary philosophical issues in the areas of epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of mind, cen-tred principally on issues concerning the connection between mind and the world, are evalu-ated for their contributions to our current knowledge and understanding. The evaluation is that, by its resort to inappropriate terminology, for the most part philosophy generates confu-sion in matters that in everyday terms are inherently simple and in scientific terms are more complex than philosophers ever imagined—the issue of consciousness is given particular attention. The discussion devolves upon the view, also put forward by Rudolf Carnap in his later years, that controversy in these areas of philosophy arises largely from a confusion of theory with the referents of theory, of word with object, and from the consequent ideological commitment of philosophers to irreconcilable positions in the realist–idealist spectrum. The thesis maintains that although it is a scientific (that is, empirically based) fact that theories, concepts, percepts and the like are constructs of the human mind (suggesting an idealist view, and therefore a fact causing difficulty for realists), it does not follow that the referents of these constructs are themselves constructs of the human mind—indeed, the proposition that they are is without meaning (and hence the realism–idealism dualism is meaningless). This is because the referents of constructs are accessible only by means of those constructs, which do not speak of their own basis in the human mind—the reality of an object referred to depends on the empirical validity of the construct by which the reference is made (and, of course, it may not be real in this sense at all, but be an illusion or a deliberate fiction), not on some philosophical notion of reality. Thus, for example, while the theory of evolution is a human construct, there is no sense in which evolution can be spoken of as a human construct or oth-erwise—evolution is dealt with in its entirety through its theory. Such a resolution of age-old philosophical controversy reflects no more than the human condition (as epitomised by Neurath’s simile of “sailors who must rebuild their ship on the open sea”), which is fully en-compassed by the scientific approach, and from which there is no escape by means of any religious or philosophical construction.
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Sachse, Christian. "Reductionism in the philosophy of science." Frankfurt, M. [i.e. Heusenstamm] Paris Ebikon Lancaster New Brunswick Ontos-Verl, 2007. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2922502&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Anzola, David. "The philosophy of computational social science." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2015. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/808102/.
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The thesis is a collection of six stand-alone chapters aimed at setting the foundations for the philosophy of computational social science. Agent-based modelling has been used for social research since the nineties. While at the beginning it was simply conceived as a methodological alternative, recently, the notion of ‘computational social science’ has started to be used to denote a separate disciplinary field. There are important differences with mainstream social science and traditional social research. Yet, the literature in the field has not accounted for these differences. Computational social science is a strongly practice-oriented field, where theoretical and philosophical concerns have been pushed into the background. This thesis presents an initial analysis of the methodology, epistemology and ontology of computational social science, by examining the following topics: 1) verification and validation and 2) modelling and theorising, 3) mechanisms 4) explanation 5) agency, action and interaction and 6) entities and process philosophy. Five general conclusions are drawn from the thesis. It is first argued that the wider ontological base in agent-based modelling allows for a new approach to traditional social dualisms, moving away from the methodological individualism that dominates computational social science. Second, the need to place a distinction between explanation and understanding and to make explanatory goals explicit is highlighted. Third, it is claimed that computational social science needs to pay attention to the social epistemology of the field, for this could provide important insights regarding values, ideologies and interests that underlie the practice of agent-based modelling. Fourth, it is suggested that a more robust theorisation regarding the experimental and model-based character of agent-based modelling should be developed. Finally, it is argued that the method can greatly contribute to the development of a processual account of social life.
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Ward, Laura Aline. "Objectivity in Feminist Philosophy of Science." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/36098.
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Feminist philosophy of science has long been considered a fringe element of philosophy of science as a whole. A careful consideration of the treatment of the key concept of objectivity by such philosophical heavyweights as Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, followed by an analysis of the concept of objectivity with the work of such feminist philosophers of science as Donna Haraway, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Sandra Harding, reveals that feminist philosophers of science are not members of some fringe movement of philosophy of science, but rather are doing philosophical work which is both crucial and connected to the work of other, "mainstream" philosophers of science.Master of Arts
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Irvine, Elizabeth. "Consciousness science : a science of what?" Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9816.
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While the search for scientific measures, models and explanations of consciousness is currently a growing area of research, this thesis identifies a series of methodological problems with the field that suggest that ‘consciousness’ is not in fact a viable scientific concept. This eliminativist stance is supported by assessing the current theories and methods of consciousness science on their own grounds, and by applying frameworks and criteria for ‘good’ scientific practice from philosophy of science. A central problem consists in the way that qualitative difference and dissociation paradigms are misused in order to identify measures of consciousness. Another problem concerns the wide range of experimental protocols used to operationalise consciousness and the implications this has on the findings of integrative approaches across behavioural and neurophysiological research. Following from this the way that mechanisms of consciousness have been inadequately demarcated, and how this affects whether ‘consciousness’ refers to any scientific kinds, is discussed. A final problem is the significant mismatch that exists between the common intuitions and phenomenological claims about the content of consciousness that motivate much current consciousness science, and the properties of neural processes that underlie sensory and cognitive phenomena. It is argued that the failure of these methods to be appropriately applied to the concept of consciousness, both in particular cases, and in the way that these methods fail to fulfil their crucial heuristic role in the practise of science, suggests that the concept of ‘consciousness’ should be eliminated from scientific discourse. Aside from the purely negative claim found in eliminativist accounts, the strong empirical grounding of this eliminativist claim also allows positive characterisations to be made about the products of the current science of consciousness, to (re-)identify real target phenomena and valid research questions for the mind sciences, and to suggest how the intuitions that ground the confused research program on consciousness result from real features of our cognitive architecture.
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Osborne, Peter Gordon. "The carnival of philosophy : philosophy, politics and science in Hegel and Marx." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.253269.
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Wang, Zhenwu. "Tradition in science." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9927.
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Thomas Kuhn's "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" got people to pay attention to tradition in science. This thesis considers how what Kuhn says about paradigms is closely linked with the idea of science as involving tradition. Kuhn takes paradigms to be a source of coherence in scientific traditions and the carrier of them, i.e., in normal science traditions are embodied in paradigms and hence maintained by them. I argue that when Kuhn emphasizes the priority of paradigms, he is actually emphasizing the role of tradition in normal science. I suggest that Kuhn's discussion about the priority of paradigms not only shows that he emphasizes the role of tradition, it also clarifies how traditions are formed and changed. Kuhn's work is often taken as the basis for resisting the rational view of science. His "incommensurability thesis" and "community authority thesis" are viewed by people, such as Feyerabend, as implying science is arational of irrational. They suggest that in science there is only replacement of paradigms, not the continuation of tradition. To better understand Kuhn's view about tradition, I argue that we need to understand his views about practice, rule, and theory. Comparing Kuhn's and Wittgenstein's views, I argue that Kuhn holds that practice and rules stand at the same level. Thus when Kuhn emphasizes the priority of paradigms, what he wants to say is that paradigms are more binding and more complete than any set of rules for research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them. For Kuhn paradigm changes are caused by the discovery of new facts and the invention of new theories together and this takes time. Thus, when the old tradition gives way to the new one, many concepts and ideas of the old tradition will inevitably be retained. Moreover, during the change of tradition, the old tradition plays a role in the formation of the new one, a point that Kuhn overlooks. In addition, a change of tradition in the development of science usually appears as a change of a small part of science while the main part of it continues as before. I examine how tradition plays a role in scientific discovery and justification. I first clarify the understanding of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. What Kuhn should have said, I believe, is that just as in normal science scientists use solutions to typical problems as paradigms and solve new problems by imitating the way in which typical problems were solved, so they use paradigms of individual sciences as examples of inquiry and deal with crises in scientific revolutions. I argue that the process of the establishment of a new tradition is a rational process. In addition to these arguments, I argue against Kuhn's"community authority thesis". I point out that for Kuhn community authority does not come from or represent tradition, rather, it seems to be independent of traditional authority, even to be definitive of tradition. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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Duguid, Callum James. "Humean metaphysics and the philosophy of science." Thesis, University of Leeds, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18464/.
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Humeanism is often taken to be a prime example of metaphysics which has failed to be sufficient attention to contemporary science. I argue that these claims have been made too hastily: there are moves available to Humeans which bring the account closer to scientific practice while still preserving the spirit of the view. The thesis comprises two parts. In the first half, I deal with the Best System Account of laws, and consider how it ought to treat initial conditions. From there, I turn to the question of whether Humean laws can explain events. This has recently been a topic of renewed interest in the literature and I disentangle the various claims philosophers have made on behalf of Humeanism. From these, I identify three promising responses to the argument that Humean explanations are circular. In the second half of the thesis, I consider how the Humean approach to laws can be extended to cover symmetry principles when the latter are understood as laws of laws. In response to a problem concerning properties and language, I suggest that the account go language-relative. The result of this is a regularity-based approach that can incorporate both laws and their symmetries into a single unified framework. Finally, I draw upon some examples from biology to indicate how the account can deal with the special sciences.
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Byun, Jiwon. "Thomas Henry Huxley's agnostic philosophy of science." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/62665.
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This dissertation examines Thomas Henry Huxley’s notion of agnosticism and its bearings on his conception of science. Although agnosticism is commonly regarded as a position that recognizes the limits of human knowledge, Huxley – who coined the term “agnostic” – characterized it as more than a theory of ignorance or limits. I argue that Huxley intended his agnosticism to be a guide to knowledge that can work regardless of our ignorance or limits. To this end, I draw attention to Huxley’s less famous philosophical works. I examine his discussions of Descartes to show that he had an epistemological project and to clarify the structure of agnosticism; I analyze his Hume to illuminate the reasoning behind his claim that verification is the only justificatory method and to highlight his reasons for situating agnosticism within what he called “modern critical philosophy”; I investigate his other essays to argue that his agnosticism concerns a claim to knowledge and should not be understood as ethics of belief.
Based on his epistemological inquiry, Huxley offered a quick guide to knowledge, consisting of an account of legitimate evidence and an ethics of knowing: agnosticism. It can be summarized as follows. Propositions concerning anything beyond phenomena lack evidential value; verified propositions have evidential value; if one wishes to make a claim about the knowledge status of a proposition, one should evaluate the evidence and be honest about the result without further pretension. Huxley discussed the realm of ignorance to show its lack of justificatory value. The signature remark of Huxleyan agnostics is “Show me evidence,” rather than “I don’t know.”
This interpretation undermines the widely accepted view that Huxley’s endorsement of agnosticism poses philosophical obstacles to his larger project of promoting science in Victorian society. His intention behind agnosticism was to establish and maintain epistemic merit of science without any unknowable, metaphysical or theological, apparatus. Science is the practice of agnosticism, and for this reason, our best way to knowledge. Our understandings of his life-long project and of the growth of science’s autonomy during the 19th century would remain incomplete without due appreciation of this notion of agnosticism.Arts, Faculty of
Philosophy, Department of
Graduate
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Hedfors, Eva. "Reading Fleck : questions on philosophy and science /." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-4250.
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Patton, Lydia. "Hermann Cohen's history and philosophy of science." Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=85027.
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In my dissertation, I present Hermann Cohen's foundation for the history and philosophy of science. My investigation begins with Cohen's formulation of a neo-Kantian epistemology. I analyze Cohen's early work, especially his contributions to 19th century debates about the theory of knowledge. I conclude by examining Cohen's mature theory of science in two works, The Principle of the Infinitesimal Method and its History of 1883, and Cohen's extensive 1914 Introduction to Friedrich Lange's History of Materialism. In the former, Cohen gives an historical and philosophical analysis of the foundations of the infinitesimal method in mathematics. In the latter, Cohen presents a detailed account of Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics of 1894. Hertz considers a series of possible foundations for mechanics, in the interest of finding a secure conceptual basis for mechanical theories. Cohen argues that Hertz's analysis can be completed, and his goal achieved, by means of a philosophical examination of the role of mathematical principles and fundamental concepts in scientific theories.
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Chiesa, Mecca. "Radical behaviourism and the philosophy of science." Thesis, Cardiff University, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.292994.
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Haely, Karen Cordrick. "Objectivity in the feminist philosophy of science." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1064415629.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003.Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 145 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Louise M. Antony, Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 142-145).
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Riesch, H. "Scientists' views of the philosophy of science." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2008. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1446063/.
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Many studies in public understanding of science emphasise that learning how to do science also involves learning about the philosophical issues surrounding the nature of science. This thesis aims to find out how scientists themselves talk and write about these philosophical topics, and how these topics get used in scientific thought. It contrasts scientists' opinions on these issues with how they are portrayed in popular science, and also contrasts them with how philosophers themselves have justified their ideas. Through analysing how scientists talk and write about philosophical topics, it aims to find out what and how scientists themselves think and learn about the nature of science, and what they would like other people to learn about it. 30 popular science books were analysed for how they treat philosophical topics on the nature of science. 40 academic scientists were then asked in a series of semi- structured interviews questions based on the philosophical topics that were found discussed most often in the books. Five philosophical topics are dealt with in detail: The demarcation question of "what is science", the philosophies of Popper and Kuhn, Occam's razor and reductionism, which reflect the most common philosophical themes in the popular science books. In interpreting the books and the scientists' responses on these topics, I use the concepts of boundary work and boundary objects, and social identity theory. It demonstrates that philosophical topics can be used to draw boundaries and to define social identities around science or various disciplinary affiliations. Philosophies and famous philosophers like Popper also act as boundary objects facilitating scientific communication across boundaries. The talk surrounding the various philosophical categories however often hides a big variation in actual philosophical opinion, which is set slightly apart from how the philosophy itself is discussed.
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Krehbiel, Matthew D. "Science is as science does : aligning teaching philosophy, objectives, and assessment." Manhattan, Kan. : Kansas State University, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/191.
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O'Gorman, Francis. "Ruskin's late science." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240353.
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Castell, Paul Tristram Lutz. "Epistemic probability in science : the prospects for probabilism as an epistemology for the natural sciences." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.240903.
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Guèye, Thierno. "Les nanotechnologies ou l'impensé de l'épistémologie : d'une science qui représente à une science qui intervient." Thesis, Grenoble, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014GRENP001.
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Nous examinons une question que l'avènement des nanotechnologies rend de plus en plus pressante pour la philosophie des sciences. Elle prend les allures d'une critique de cette dernière en se fondant sur quelques théories philosophiques, représentatives et suffisamment originales sur la science, développées par Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Ian Hacking et Serge Robert. Les différents discours sur les nanos et plus précisément le concept de nanotechnologie se sont révélés, à tout le moins, polysémiques et décrivent parfois prématurément une activité qui n'existe pas encore. Ainsi, nous avons requalifié le concept de nanotechnologie en « nanotechnoscience ». Puis nous avons confronté les philosophies des sciences que nous avons retenues aux fins de les mettre à l'épreuve de ce qui apparaît comme un impensé de leurs philosophies, notamment la dimension technologique de la science souvent connue et reconnue, mais « sous-traitée » et reléguée au mieux au second plan. Nos recherches ont donc porté sur chacune des philosophies que nous avons annoncées, sur les nanotechnosciences elles-mêmes, la philosophie de la technologie, mais aussi sur celle naissante des technosciences et des nanotechnosciences sans oublier notre ouverture à des fins heuristiques sur la philosophie du langage d'Austin et la praxéologie de Denis Vernant. Dans cette étude, nous avons traité d'étymologie, d'histoire du préfixe nano et de définition. Puis, nous avons examiné attentivement les différentes philosophies des sciences par lesquelles il nous a paru pertinent d'examiner les nanotechnosciences émergentes afin de voir ce qui dans ces doctrines permettrait d'envisager une réflexion philosophique sur les nanos. Sachant que ces pensées privilégient la représentation sur l'intervention, nous nous sommes posés la question de la place de la technologie dans ces systèmes philosophiques avec l'idée que la technologie est une condition nécessaire quoique non suffisante de toute philosophie à prétention technoscientifique ou nanotechnoscientifique. C'est dans cette optique que nous avons sollicité la théorie des paradigmes, puis celle du falsificationnisme sophistiqué revu et corrigé par le correctionnisme de Robert avant de tenter l'interventionnisme de Hacking. Nous avons pu constater l'omniprésence de la technologie tout comme l'hétérogénéité de la place qui lui est accordée dans ces théories philosophiques. Ainsi de Kuhn à Hacking, la reconnaissance du rôle et de la place de la technologie va crescendo, au point de nous inviter à penser les nanotechnosciences en termes d'« actes de discours ». L'enchevêtrement ou l'entrelacement entre science et technologie nous a inspiré deux analogies : la première avec l'idée de « contexte de performance oral » de Mamoussé Diagne analogue elle-même à la seconde, la performativité introduite et initiée par les réflexions d'Austin sur le discours ordinaire. Notre investigation prend les allures d'une mise à l'épreuve de toutes ces philosophies à l'aune de la place qu'occupe la technologie dans leurs systèmes respectifs. Nous avons eu recours à l'analyse comparative des discours philosophiques sur la science ainsi que ce que nous avons appris sur les pratiques scientifiques, le tout complété par une approche lexicométrique basée sur le corpus des principaux ouvrages de Kuhn, Lakatos, Robert et Hacking. Notre démarche nous a amené à mettre en cause l'étymologie du préfixe nano trop hâtivement attribuée au grec alors qu'il serait plus à propos de la considérer comme latine, puis nous avons tenté d'établir l'idée que les « nanotechnologies » n'existent pas et que ce que l'on appelle bien souvent ainsi relève d'un abus de langage et d'une sorte d'anachronisme inversée. De cette critique nous avons tenté de tirer des leçons qui ont inspiré la requalification conceptuelle de l'activité qu'est censé désigner ce morphème en « nanotechnoscience » que nous avons redéfini en tenant compte de plusieurs facteurs déterminantsThis thesis focuses on the consideration of a question that the advent of what is called nanotechnology makes it increasingly urgent to philosophy in general and the philosophy of science in particular because of the inexistence of the “nanotechnology” stricto sensu, the lack of good definition and the default of something like a “nanophilosophy”. We critique the latter based on some philosophical, representative and sufficiently original theories of science, developed by Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Ian Hacking and Serge Robert. Different discourses on nanos and more specifically the concept of nanotechnology proved, at least, polysemous and sometimes describe an activity which in the strict sense does not exist prematurely. Thus, we have reclassified the concept of nanotechnology "nanotechnoscience" and proposed a more rigorous definition emphasizing the hybrid nature of this activity, both theoretical and practical, scientific and technological. Then we compared the philosophies of science that we have selected to make them confront what appears to be an unthought of their philosophies, including the technological dimension of science often known and recognized, but "outsourced" and relegated to better secondary. Our research has therefore focused on each of the philosophies that we announced on the nanotechnosciences themselves, philosophy of technology, but also on emerging technosciences and nanotechnoscience not forgetting our opening for heuristic purposes on the philosophy of language of Austin and praxeology of Denis Vernant. Then, we carefully examined the different philosophies of science which seemed appropriate to consider the emerging nanotechnosciences so as to see what in these doctrines would help envisaging a philosophical reflection on the Nano. Knowing that these thoughts favor representing rather than intervening, we questioned the role of technology in these philosophical systems with the idea that technology is a necessary though not sufficient condition for any claim of technoscientific or nanotechnoscientific philosophy. It is in this context that we solicited the paradigms theory, then the sophisticated falsificationism reviewed and corrected by Robert's correctionism before attempting interventionism Hacking's interventionism. During this exercise we have seen the pervasiveness of technology as well as the heterogeneity of the place it is granted in these philosophical theories. The entanglement or intertwining between science and technology inspired us two analogies: the first with the idea of "context of oral performance" by Mamoussé Diagne, analogous itself to the second, performativity introduced and initiated by Austin's reflections on ordinary language. Our investigation takes on the appearance of a testing of all these philosophies in terms of the place of technology in their respective systems. To achieve this, we resorted to the comparative analysis of philosophical discourse on science and what we have learned about scientific practices, complemented by a lexicometric approach based on the corpus of the principal works published from Kuhn, Lakatos, Robert and Hacking. From our critique we have tried to draw lessons that inspired the conceptual requalification of the activity that this morpheme is intended to mean into "nanotechnoscience" which we have redefined. This established at the end of this analysis, we could say that neither the philosophy of Kuhn or Lakatos, nor that of Robert leave enough space for technology to position itself as philosophies of technosciences. The one which seems the most appropriate is the interventionism defended by Hacking, but which Gilbert Hottois criticized for not having taken the step that would have led to a philosophy of authentic technosciences. It was then that tracks to Bacon and Peirce are suggested respectively by Hacking and Schmidt and Nordmann
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Ozer, Husnu. "Scientific Realism Debate In The Philosophy Of Science." Master's thesis, METU, 2010. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/12611579/index.pdf.
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The primary concern of this piece of work is to reconsider scientific realism debate in the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the overall aim is to come up with the clues of a viable scientific realist attitude in the face of anti-realist interpretations of scientific theories. To accomplish this aim, I make use of two modified versions of scientific realism, that is, &lsquoepistemic structural realism&rsquo
and &lsquo
entity realism&rsquo
. Epistemic structural realism is a realist position of which proponents claim that the only knowable part of the reality is the structure of it which is expressed by the mathematical equations of our best scientific theories. On the other hand, according to entity realism, the only assured knowledge obtained from scientific theories is the existence of theoretical entities posited by these theories. I argue that a combination of the properly construed versions of these two positions might fulfill the afore-mentioned aim of this thesis.
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Swift, David J. "Curricular philosophy and students' personal epistemologies of science." Thesis, University of Surrey, 1986. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/848078/.
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In this thesis I employ a constructivist epistemological stance (principally influenced by that due to George Kelly) to critically examine the curricular response to contemporary notions of truth, objectivity and knowledge. I take science education (at both Secondary and Tertiary levels) as ray special reference within the education system. An important part of my work explores students' and teachers' personal meanings of science and scientific method, i. e. alternative conceptions of science, and I see it as contributing to the growing body of research concerned with alternative conceptions in science: the 'Alternative Conceptions Movement' (ACM) in educational research. To help articulate ray views on these matters I use an augmented version of a framework or model, developed by my immediate colleagues, for conceptualising cognitive aspects of science education and the transformation of scientific knowledge. My version of this framework features components under the following main headings: 'Scientists'-Science', 'Philosophers'-Science', 'Curricular-Science', 'Teachers'-Science', 'Students'-Science', and 'Childrens'-Science'. I argue that, suitably augmented and interpreted, Kelly's theory is capable of rationally integrating existing ACM research, together with my own. My classroom research uses a number of complementary investigative methods, some of them novel. These may be grouped under the following three headings: - interviews - lesson observations - written exercises I present an outline of a theory of teaching which is compatible with ACM research and make recommendations for future science teaching and research. N. B. To avoid an insidious (male) sexism and 'his/her' formulations which I find tedious, I shall use plural forms throughout this thesis, e.g. their, themself.
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Chimisso, Cristina. "Science and morality : the philosophy of Gaston Bachelard." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1996. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/272500.
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Olsaretti, Alessandro. "Philosophy and science in Gramsci's reconstruction of Marxism." Thesis, McGill University, 2013. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=119376.
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This thesis investigates the role that philosophy and science play in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks. While there is growing recognition of the importance of philosophy in Gramsci's prison work, the importance of science and its relationship to philosophy often go unremarked. Yet both fields were important to Gramsci's prison project. The bulk of the thesis consists in a detailed philological study of the unabridged Italian edition of the Prison Notebooks by Valentino Gerratana which brings out the importance of both philosophy and science to Gramsci's work, as well as their inter-relationship. In fact a crucial part of Gramsci' work while in prison, the part belonging to a second and most productive phase of the prison work according to current scholarship on Gramsci, consists in an effort to reconstruct Marxism as a philosophy of praxis within which a special place was reserved for science. Gramsci in fact dealt extensively with both natural science in its relationship to philosophy and, even more importantly, with social sciences like economics and political science. This was in keeping with the insight that Marxism was born out of the encounter between philosophy, economics and politics, which constituted the three keystones of Marx's new theory for Gramsci. The first part of this thesis analyzes Gramsci's reconstruction of Marxism as a philosophy of praxis, examining how the foundational concepts of praxis and human nature were interpreted by Gramsci in such a way as to lay the foundations for his theory of science. It then considers this theory of science in detail, examining first the place that Gramsci's reflection on natural science played within his reconstruction of Marxism, then considering how he laid the foundations for economics and political science within Marxism. Two novel concerns emerge in this discussion: the centrality of social science to Gramsci's reconstruction of Marxism and the importance that the individual played in both his philosophy and in this social science, particularly in economics.Cette thèse explore le rôle de la philosophie et de la science dans les Carnets de prison de Gramsci. Alors que l'importance de la philosophie dans les écrits de prison de Gramsci continue de gagner en reconnaissance, l'importance de la science et de son rapport avec la philosophie est souvent négligée. Ces deux champs de recherche sont toutefois aussi important l'un que l'autre dans le projet réalisé par Gramsci lors de ses années passées en prison. La plus grande partie de cette thèse consiste en une analyse philologique détaillée de la version italienne complète des Carnets de prison établie par Valentino Gerratana. Elle met en évidence la double importance de la philosophie et de la science dans les écrits de Gramsci et le rapport qui les unit. Effectivement, une part essentielle de l'oeuvre de prison de Gramsci, identifiée par la recherche portant sur Gramsci comme un second volet distinct et plus productif de ses écrits de prison, se présente comme un effort de reconstruction du marxisme comme philosophie de la praxis au sein de laquelle une place particulière est réservée à la science. En fait, Gramsci s'est largement intéressé aux sciences naturelles dans leur rapport avec la philosophie et, de manière plus importante encore, avec des sciences sociales comme l'économie et la science politique, et ce en cohérence avec l'idée que le marxisme est né de la rencontre de la philosophie, de l'économie et de la politique, les trois piliers de la nouvelle théorie de Marx chez Gramsci. Dans un premier temps, cette thèse analyse la reconstruction du marxisme comme philosophie de la praxis par Gramsci en examinant comment les concepts fondamentaux de praxis et de nature humaine sont interprétés par Gramsci de manière à jeter les bases de sa théorie de la science. La thèse s'intéresse ensuite à cette théorie de la science en détails, examinant d'abord la place des réflexions de Gramsci sur les sciences naturelles au sein de sa reconstruction du marxisme, puis en considérant la manière dont il établit les fondements de l'économie et de la science politique au sein du marxisme. Deux préoccupations nouvelles émergent de cette discussion : la centralité des sciences sociales dans la reconstruction du marxisme par Gramsci et l'importance de l'individu dans sa philosophie et dans ces sciences sociales, particulièrement en économie.
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Southall, Joel. "Situating Vine Deloria, Jr.'s Philosophy of Science." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/19344.
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This thesis provides a view of Deloria's thoughts on science and metaphysics, presenting his criticism of Western science and of his proposed alternative to what he presents as a historically evidenced epistemic attitude of exclusion. Deloria refers to Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, suggesting that the institution of Western science operates according to a paradigm that is both very different from that of traditional Indigenous knowledge practice and fundamentally exclusionary. A potential of communication between Western science and Indigenous knowledge is possible through paradigm shifts as well as through reference to epistemic anarchy. My presentation of Deloria's description of Indigenous metaphysics includes an account of an agential ontology and place-grounded epistemology with reference to Daniel R. Wildcat, Baruch Spinoza, Scott L. Pratt, and others. Ultimately, Deloria breaks with Feyerabend's epistemological anarchy in light of our contemporary environmental predicament and advocates a more restrained, relational epistemology.
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Zakatistovs, Atis. "Hume's science of human nature." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/9839.
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In my thesis I propose a new interpretation of Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. I claim that this Book must be read in the light of the Introduction to the Treatise. Thus, my interpretation revolves around Hume's intention of creating a new system of the sciences on the basis of his science of man. In this thesis I pay close attention to the following subjects: the analysis of the 'vulgar'; Hume's discussion about the impact of predispositions on our ideas; the distinction between the concept of causation and the process of causation. Finally, I discuss Hume's position on the question of the simplicity and complexity of ideas.
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Duica, William. "Science in a Radical Sense." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112889.
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Since the debate about the nature of scientific theories has been held in the context of the scheme-content dualism, philosophers from the most different traditions have had to face, sooner or later, the dilemma between realism and relativism. I shall argue that following Davidson's criticism against the so-called third dogma it is possible to find a way-out of this dilemma. This paper is an attempt to look at the meaning of the scientific language from the point of view of radical interpretation. The radical element of interpretation will join the conception of scientific theortes in order to supersede false alternatives in the light of a definitton of science in a radical sense.Dado que el debate sobre la naturaleza de las teorías científicas se ha sostenido en el contexto del dualismo esquema-contenido, los filósofos de las más distintas tradiciones han tenido que enfrentar, tarde o temprano, el dilema entre realismo y relativismo. Argumentaré que, siguiendo la crítica de Davidson en contra del así llamado tercer dogma, es posible encontrar una salida a este dilema. Este ensayo es un intento por examinar el significado del lenguaje científico desde el punto de vista de la interpretación radical. El componente radical de la interpretación será unido a la concepción de las teorías científicas para eliminar las falsas alternativas a la luz de una definición de la ciencia en un sentido radical .
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Brook, Hazel Isis. "Goethean science in Britain." Thesis, Lancaster University, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.238940.
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Sayan, Erdinc. "Idealizations, approximations and confirmation in science /." The Ohio State University, 1994. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487858106116249.
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Feldges, Thomas Karl. "Cognitive science and phenomenology : Varela's 'new science of consciousness' at the system-theoretical crossroads." Thesis, University of Hull, 2016. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:14801.
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Aarons, Jeremy P. (Jeremy Peter) 1968. "Thinking locally : a disunified methodology of science." Monash University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2001. http://arrow.monash.edu.au/hdl/1959.1/8540.
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Henderson, Leah. "Framework theories in science." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62410.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2010."September 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-133).
This thesis consists of three papers on the nature of scientific theories and inference. In many cases, scientific theories can be regarded as organized into hierarchies, with higher levels sometimes called 'paradigms', and lower levels encoding more specific or concrete hypotheses. The first chapter uses hierarchical Bayesian models to show that the assessment of higher level theories may proceed by the same Bayesian principles as the assessment of more specific hypotheses. It thus shows how the evaluation of higher level theories can be evidence-driven, despite claims to the contrary by authors such as Kuhn. The chapter also discusses how hierarchical Bayesian models may help to resolve certain issues for Bayesian philosophy of science, particularly how to model the introduction of new theories. The second chapter discusses the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and Bayesianism. Van Fraassen has raised the concern that the explanatory considerations in IBE go beyond the Bayesian formalism, making IBE incompatible with Bayesianism. The response so far has been that the explanatory considerations can be accommodated within the Bayesian formalism by stipulating that they should constrain the assignment of the probabilities. I suggest a third alternative, which is that the extra explanatory considerations have their origins in the relationship between higher and lower level theories and can be modeled in Bayesian terms without directly constraining the probabilities. The third chapter discusses an aspect of the debate over scientific realism. The No Miracles argument and the Pessimistic Induction are often seen as the primary arguments for and against scientific realism. Yet recently it has been alleged that both of these arguments commit the base-rate fallacy. I argue that both arguments can be formulated in a non-fallacious manner, so neither should be dismissed on the grounds of faulty form alone.
by Leah Henderson.
Ph.D.
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Downes, Stephen Matthew. "Prospects for a cognitive science of science." Diss., This resource online, 1990. http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-08252008-162811/.
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Callergård, Robert. "An Essay on Thomas Reid´s Philosophy of Science." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-1006.
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Though generally recognized as a formative force in his philosophy, Thomas Reid’s Newtonianism and his philosophy of science has not received due attention among scholars. My aim is to inaugurate a detailed survey. In ch. 1 it is shown that Reid demarcates physics as against metaphysics and theology, making his brand of Newtonianism different from first generation moral and religious Newtonianism. In ch. 2 it is argued that "Newtonian" is not an apt label on Reid’s call for a Science of the human mind. Neither his practice within the field, nor his methodological views, make lawlike connections the central kind of truth to be discovered. Ch. 3 is devoted to Reid’s account of the 1st and 2nd of Newton’s Regulae Philosophandi, and an ensuing notion of explanation which approaches the deductive-nomological model. It is shown that Reid’s account is very much his own, though presented as an explication of Newton’s intentions. Reid’s dismissive view towards simplicity as a guide in scientific reasoning leans on Bacon’s theory of idols and Reid’s theory of first principles of common sense. Ch 4 concerns hypotheses in connection with Newton’s phrase Hypotheses non fingo. It is argued that Reid does not mind speculation about unobservable or theoretical entities, and that his objections to particular ether theories are scientific rather than principled. Nonetheless, since Reid does not explain the difference between powerful conjecture and established truth, his notion of scientific reasoning remains elusive. Ch 5 concerns Reid’s views on the concept and ontology of forces of attraction. It is argued that Reid takes forces to be physical entities open for empirical enquiry, and that forces are neither active, nor efficient. Finally, Reid’s view of metaphysics is considered, and further differences with early Newtonians emphasised.
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Reeve, Andrew F. "Incommensurability in ethics and in the philosophy of science." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ51221.pdf.
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Carr, Jeffrey. "Aristotle's use of "genus" in logic, philosophy and science." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1794.
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In Metaphysics Delta.28, Aristotle provides four uses of the term "genus", which he then summarises in three separate accounts. The purpose of this dissertation is first, to explain each of the uses given by Aristotle, second, to explain how his summary of the four uses by three accounts is justified, and third, to examine some philosophical applications of each use. I will relate the different uses to each other as far as entailments can be established, and show that the focal, if not the most common sense of genus, corresponds to the use of genus as the substratum of differentiate, given in Aristotle's summary as the view that the genus is the matter. In the role of substratum, the genus is fundamental to Aristotle's account of the unity of an organic substance and ground a profound metaphysics thesis: the proximate genus is a necessary constituent in the nature and persistence of material objects.
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Howard, Stephen. "Kant and force : dynamics, natural science and transcendental philosophy." Thesis, Kingston University, 2017. http://eprints.kingston.ac.uk/38246/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis presents an interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s theoretical philosophy in which the notion of ‘force’ (Kraft) is of central importance. My analysis encompasses the full span of Kant’s theoretical and natural-scientific writings, from the first publication to the drafts of an unfinished final work. With a close focus on Kant’s texts, I explicate their explicit references to force, providing a narrative of the philosophical role and significance of force in the various periods of the Kantian oeuvre. This represents an intervention into Kant scholarship that seeks to correct the marginal role accorded to ‘force’. The central problem that emerges through the thesis’ attention to force is: how to interpret the simultaneous separation and connection of physical and psychological forces in Kant’s mature, critical philosophy? Physical and psychological forces are strictly separated, and yet a common, ontological conception of force underpins these two domains. I show that this issue has its basis in a tradition of philosophical ‘dynamics’ stemming from Leibniz, which is examined in part one. The three parts of the thesis proceed chronologically through the Kantian oeuvre. Part one reconstructs the historical context of Leibnizian and Newtonian conceptions of force, and presents a narrative of the employment of force in Kant’s pre-critical writings, in their relation to the broad problematic of Leibniz’s dynamics. Part two explores the account of physical and psychological forces, and the common, ontological notion of force, in the major critical-period discussions. Part three presents the late works, namely the third Critique and the Opus postumum, as a ‘philosophy of force’, in which force, with all its necessary ambiguities, plays central roles in Kant’s late systematising endeavours. I conclude that the perspective of this thesis makes possible a new understanding of the nature and unity of Kant’s philosophical project.
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Etemad, S. "Cognitive science, linguistics and philosophy of science : an inquiry into their connection and divergence." Thesis, Brunel University, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.304235.
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Williams, E. H. L. "Science, sociology and the new epistemology." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.309277.
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Baharuddin, Azizan. "Islam and science : some neglected perspectives." Thesis, Lancaster University, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.235816.
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Ney, Alyssa L. "The metaphysics of unified science /." View online version; access limited to Brown University users, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3174649.
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Jonmarie, Diana. "The Loss of the Philosophic Tradition and the Rise of the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte." Thesis, University of Nevada, Reno, 2015. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3707845.
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This study examines the loss of original principles that distinguish ancient Western philosophy as a valid conceptual framework for political theory and practice. I explore how the Philosophic Tradition as a centuries-old foundation of inquiry and discourse loses its significance and finally its authority in the postmodern world. With the exclusion of metaphysical reflection and reason as a basis for understanding human existential and political phenomena, the transition to Historicism and Philosophic Positivism effectively redefined the nature and application of politics. Critical to this research and serving as a focal point of this study are the works of theorist and originator of the Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte. I analyze the author's several volumes, these dedicated to establishing a new foundation of political thought, one in which scientific inquiry would serve as the ground for seeking truth and knowledge and as a basis for methodologically directing social and political reorganization. Essentially, Positive politics would as the theorist proposed, be free of abstract speculation (metaphysics) and work to reframe human nature by achieving a universal social state defined by `Order and Progress' and a futuristic system of advancement alike to no other period in human history. As this study examines this prophesy, it takes into view the rise and popularity of the Positive Philosophy from ancient perspectives to modern and postmodern Western thought. It further illustrates the resistance to and eventual replacement of traditional theoretical foundations leaving an indelible imprint on political philosophy which had experienced a profound transformation from its pre-scientific origins. Once as truth-seeking, self-critical and reflective as to moral values and ethical considerations of justice, prudence, and the public good, the Positive Philosophy would serve instead as the ground and authority for, as Comte envisaged, a modification of human existence. Thus politics reformulated was set to task in ordering the social world into its mission of productivity and progress and reconciling its vision of human perfectibility with a proposed end to political conflict.
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Ainsworth, Jonathan N. "Science, domination and the order of nature." Thesis, Lancaster University, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.264681.
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Lambert, Ian J. "Realism and social science." Thesis, University of Sussex, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.278516.
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Borda, Mara. "Knowledge, science, religion philosophy as a critical alternative to metaphysics." Würzburg Königshausen und Neumann, 2003. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2868028&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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