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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Philosophy. Realism. Reductionism

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Academic literature on the topic 'Philosophy. Realism. Reductionism'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 14 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Philosophy. Realism. Reductionism"

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Tooley, Michael. "Causation: Reductionism Versus Realism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1990): 215. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108040.

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Matthews, Steve. "Parfit's “realism” and his reductionism." Philosophia 31, no. 3-4 (2004): 531–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02385200.

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Ridge, Michael. "Anti-Reductionism and Supervenience." Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, no. 3 (2007): 330–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468107083248.

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AbstractIn this paper, I argue that anti-reductionist moral realism still has trouble explaining supervenience. My main target here will be Russ Shafer-Landau's attempt to explain the supervenience of the moral on the natural in terms of the constitution of moral property instantiations by natural property instantiations. First, though, I discuss a recent challenge to the very idea of using supervenience as a dialectical weapon posed by Nicholas Sturgeon. With a suitably formulated supervenience thesis in hand, I try to show how Shafer-Landau's proffered strategy to explain supervenience not o

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Plantinga, Alvin. "Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism." Philosophical Perspectives 1 (1987): 189. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2214146.

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Strijbos, D. "The Mechanistic Property Cluster View of Mental Disorder: A Tenable Form of Non-Reductionist Realism?" European Psychiatry 33, S1 (2016): S511. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2016.01.1886.

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IntroductionThe question what mental disorders are lies at the heart of the philosophy of psychiatry. In search of a valid taxonomy of mental disorders, it is a question that needs a proper answer. In recent work, Kenneth Kendler et al. (2011) have put forward the “mechanistic property cluster” (MPC) model of mental disorder. On this view, mental disorders are mechanistically mediated clusters of multi-level (bio-psycho-social) properties. Kendler et al. present the MPC-model as a non-reductionist form of realism – realist because it tries to account for mental disorders in terms of the causal

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SCOTT, MICHAEL, and ANDREW MOORE. "CAN THEOLOGICAL REALISM BE REFUTED?" Religious Studies 33, no. 4 (1997): 401–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412597004058.

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In a number of recent articles D. Z. Phillips has presented an exposition and defence of his views on theological realism, views which are based on his reading of Wittgenstein. Eschewing the label ‘anti-realist’ so often applied to his philosophy, Phillips claims that realists and anti-realists alike have ‘failed to appreciate how radical a challenge Wittgenstein makes to our philosophical assumptions’ (SL 22). Far from supporting non-realism above realism, Phillips – following Wittgenstein – wishes to upset the realist/non-realist debate by showing that the two theories offer equally confused

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Witherington, David C., Timothy I. Vandiver, and Jacob A. Spinks. "Embracing variability and complexity and the explanatory reductionism of scientific realism." Theory & Psychology 31, no. 3 (2021): 417–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/09593543211016095.

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We agree with Arocha’s criticism of psychological science’s reliance on statistical procedures that factor out intraindividual variability and the complex dynamics inherent to behavior, as well as with his call for the adoption of a metatheoretical framework that embraces such variability. However, we disagree that scientific realism provides such a framework, given its reductive privileging of certain forms of explanation over others. We advocate, instead, a process-relational paradigm and the explanatory pluralism that it supports, allowing psychological science to more dynamically, and real

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CAI, Yu. "中國傳統的整體觀的思維模式對意義與神聖價值的拯救". International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 13, № 2 (2015): 123–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.131600.

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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.The failure to reform the modern Western model of medicine stems from the reductionist mode of thinking, as demonstrated by Prof. Jeffrey Bishop. Since the Enlightenment, the popular mode of thinking in Western medicine has been a kind of mechanical materialist reductionism, which is characteristic of instrumental rationality. It is also a spatial pattern of thinking—the body becomes separable from the mind. The thinking underlying Chinese medicine and Confucian bioethics based on Chinese philosophy, in contrast, is holistic in

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Spencer, Mark K. "The Many Phenomenological Reductions and Catholic Metaphysical Anti-Reductionism." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 95, no. 3 (2021): 367–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq202167230.

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While all phenomenologists aim to grasp the “things themselves,” they disagree about the best method for doing this and about what the “things themselves” are. Many metaphysicians, especially Catholic realists, reject phenomenology altogether. I show that many phenomenological methods are useful for reaching the goals of both phenomenology and realist metaphysics. First, I present a history of phenomenological methods, including those used by Scheler, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Marion, Kearney, Rocha, and others. Next, I consider two sets of challenges raised to some of these methods.

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Lamberov, Lev D. "Benacerraf and Set-Theoretic Reductionist Realism." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, no. 1 (2021): 142–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158115.

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The paper is devoted to analysis of P. Benacerraf’s argument against set-theoretic reductionist realism which is a fragment of a broader argument, know as the “identification problem”. The analyzed fragment of P. Benacerraf’s argument concerns the possibility of reducing of mathematical notions to set-theoretic notions. The paper presents a reconstruction of P. Benacerraf’s original argumentation, its analysis and also several possible objections proposed by P. Benacerraf himself about 30 years later after the original publication. Namely, he claimed (1) that a set-theoretic definition of natu

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Philosophy. Realism. Reductionism"

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Boyden, Aaron-Dirk. "Reducing realism." View abstract/electronic edition; access limited to Brown University users, 2008. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3318296.

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Rauckhorst, Garrett. "Railton's Reductive Moral Realism." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1366631026.

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Books on the topic "Philosophy. Realism. Reductionism"

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David, Charles, and Lennon Kathleen, eds. Reduction, explanation, and realism. Clarendon Press, 1992.

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Ross, Alf. On Law and Justice. Edited by Jakob v. H. Holtermann. Translated by Uta Bindreiter. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198716105.001.0001.

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This book is a classic work of twentieth-century legal philosophy. The first translation into English was notably poor and misrepresented the views expressed in the text. Translated from scratch from the original Danish, this new critical edition casts light on the work and resituates it firmly in the context of current debates in the field. In recent years, Alf Ross (1899–1979) has attracted increasing attention. In H. L. A. Hart’s words, he was ‘the most acute and best-equipped philosopher’ of Scandinavian legal realism. This book provides a comprehensive outline of Ross’s legal realist posi

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Nissim-Sabat, Marilyn. Race and Gender in Philosophy of Psychiatry. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, et al. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0012.

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This chapter focuses on a critical analysis of particular theoretical frameworks in psychiatry in their interplay with issues of race and gender. (Important sources documenting racism and sexism in psychiatry are cited.) Analysis shows that theoretical perspective is one of the most important factors in play in working toward the goal of eliminating racism and sexism from psychiatry. To this end, four types of theoretical frameworks are considered: naturalism, social constructionism, relativism and antirelativism, and phenomenology. Also considered are efforts to show the compatibility of two

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Carman, Taylor. Phenomenology. Edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199668779.013.31.

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This article explores the role of phenomenology in philosophical inquiry. It begins by discussing Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological reductions (the “transcendental” and the “eidetic”), the sharp distinction he draws between consciousness and reality, and his intuitive claims about intentionality. It then considers Martin Heidegger’s conceptions of phenomenon and phenomenology in relation to hermeneutics before returning to Husserl’s argument that we have a direct intuition, not just of entities, but of the phenomenal appearance of their being (and nonbeing). It also examines Heidegger’s claim

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Book chapters on the topic "Philosophy. Realism. Reductionism"

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Buzzoni, Marco. "Multilevel Reality, Mechanistic Explanations, and Intertheoretic Reductions." In European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10707-9_7.

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Cogburn, Jon. "Neither Substance Nor Process I: Anti-Reductionism." In Garcian Meditations. Edinburgh University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474415910.003.0001.

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The first chapter focuses on Garcia’s arguments against reductionism, with (i) an explanation of Garcia’s affirmation of ontological liberality, and (ii) a discussion of Garcia’s important supplementary arguments against the view that some putative entities are not things. The first few sections of the chapter contain an analysis of Garcia’s argument against what Graham Harman calls overmining and undermining. Both philosophers’ efforts are tied to contemporary work concerning reductionism in analytic philosophy. This discussion motivates (i) a brief presentation of Harman’s account of Heidegger’s “readiness-to-hand”, (ii) a discussion of capacity metaphysics, and (iii) Garcia’s differential ontology of objects. In this manner, Garcia’s central motivation and broad picture are situated with respect to recent trends in continental philosophy, particularly speculative realism and object-oriented ontology.

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Coulmas, Florian. "1. ‘Who am I?’ Identity in philosophy." In Identity: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198828549.003.0001.

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The question of how consciousness and self-awareness connect with personal identity has accompanied philosophy since antiquity. Sages of diverse orientations have put forth various elaborate answers, showing among other things that self-awareness is more than just being conscious. The ensouled matter of the self-conscious brain still poses deeply puzzling questions about individual identity, and nowadays the new reality of anthropo-technology once again poses the question how we can know about ourselves. ‘ “Who am I?” Identity in philosophy’ considers the concept of identity in philosophy through time and the mind–body problem. It also discusses empiricist reductionism, mentalist essentialism, ordinary language analysis, and interactionism.

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Siderits, Mark. "Persons and Selves in Buddhist Philosophy." In Persons. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190634384.003.0012.

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While Buddhists famously deny the existence of a self, they distinguish between selves and persons, and allow for the existence of persons as entities having a sort of derived reality. By “self” they understand whatever counts as the essence of the psychophysical complex, while by “person” they understand the psychophysical complex as a whole. This essay explores the arguments whereby Buddhists sought to establish their claim that strictly speaking neither self nor person exists, but that persons are nonetheless useful posits of a scheme that is meant to accommodate our everyday interests and cognitive limitations. This yields a way of understanding the connection between reductionism about persons and consequentialism in ethics, as well as why it might be that puzzle cases have loomed so large in recent discussions of diachronic personal identity.

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Ludwig, Pascal. "Reduction and Emergence." In The Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190690649.003.0008.

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How are our scientific theories related to each other? Do they draw, together, a unified picture of the world, or should we infer from their disunity that reality is ontologically plural in some way? This chapter addresses the question of whether ontological pluralism is a defendable metaphysical thesis and whether philosophy of science has anything to say about it. It examines whether psychological phenomena possess an irreducible nature of their own that would be distinct from the nature of the phenomena studied by neuroscience. If, on the contrary, the explanatory gap between physics and special sciences is to be filled, the question is raised as to how it has to be done. Is conceptual analysis enough? Or should the explanatory gap be simply dismissed as being badly formulated? The chapter proposes a discussion of the current reductionist strategies.

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Pelletier, Jenny. "Social Powers and Mental Relations." In Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 8. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198865728.003.0008.

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Taking its departure from the current interest in the metaphysics of the social world, this paper argues that lordship or ownership (dominium) on Ockham’s view is a power that is really identical to a person, persons, or collectivity of persons. In this sense, it is not a real entity that adds to Ockham’s famously parsimonious ontology. Rather, lordship is a mental relation connecting certain human beings (‘lords’ or ‘owners’) with certain things (‘property’) that is instituted by the individual intellective and volitional acts performed by members of the past and present community. Lordship is real, however, to the extent that the community authorizes certain members of the community to perform certain acts with respect to certain things. On the reading defended, Ockham’s view is ontologically reductionist but receptive to the shared reality of the social world.

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Mander, W. J. "G. H. Lewes and Karl Pearson." In The Unknowable. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809531.003.0009.

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Examining the cases of two further nineteenth-century empiricists, this chapter begins by considering how G. H. Lewes moved from an early position of neo-Comtean positivism which was avowedly anti-metaphysical to the advocacy of what he described as ‘empirical metaphysics’. An examination is made of five different ways in which Lewes moves beyond simple sensualism to a more sophisticated understanding of ‘the empirical’, before considering in detail three examples of his empirical metaphysics, respecting physical reality, mind, and causation. The discussion of Lewes concludes by reflecting upon the sense in which he remains hostile to what he describes as ‘metempirics’ including the notion of the unknowable thing-in-itself. The chapter concludes with a consideration of Karl Pearson’s philosophy which centre stages sense-impressions and champions both reductionism and scientism. But it is noted that even with Pearson we find willingness to engage in a degree of metaphysical speculation.

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Conference papers on the topic "Philosophy. Realism. Reductionism"

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McCarthy, Steven J., and Ian Scott. "The WR-21 Intercooled Recuperated Gas Turbine Engine: Operation and Integration Into the Royal Navy Type 45 Destroyer Power System." In ASME Turbo Expo 2002: Power for Land, Sea, and Air. ASMEDC, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2002-30266.

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The WR-21 gas turbine engine will be employed by the Royal Navy and potentially by the United States and French Navies in their future Integrated Full Electric Powered Surface Combatants. The Intercooled Recuperated (ICR) advanced cycle means that in a Warship power system a single WR-21 engine sits on the throne of the realm that traditionally would have been occupied by two gas turbine engines, one for ‘cruise’ and one for ‘boost’; not forgetting that it is also doing the job of at least two diesel generators in our traditional example. This performance will provide Warship operators with an

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