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1
Murgier, Charlotte. "Platon et les plaisirs de la vertu." Chôra 17 (2019): 31–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/chora2019174.
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How does Plato conceive the pleasures attendant on the virtuous life? Does he provide a specific account of them ? By reading through key passages from Laws book 5, Republic book 9 and the Philebus, I try to assess the way Plato endeavours to demonstrate that the virtuous life is also happy and thereby pleasant. I investigate to what extent these texts put forward any specificity of the pleasures of being virtuous, and how far the account they provide harmonizes with Plato’s general views about pleasure.
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Cacoullos, Ann R. "Democracy in Republic: Plato’s Contestation." Synthesis: an Anglophone Journal of Comparative Literary Studies, no. 9 (May 1, 2016): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.12681/syn.16223.
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Plato has been read as a virulent opponent of democracy, a common interpretation that, among other things, either ignores or dismisses his perceptive account of the ways democracy can be a mistaken political culture. In Books 8-9 where he designs other cities that are less than his ideal city, Plato tries to show how the whole manner of living and esteeming of a ruling class pervert the preferences and decision-making of everyone living in the city. Attention to this account can reveal Plato not so much rejecting but contesting the democracy he designs-in-theory. In the city he models, freedom and equality are misdirected, its own political culture ultimately betrays itself. I argue that, for Plato, democracy’s failure is due largely though not exclusively to a remnant of oligarchy that remains within it —the underhanded and excessive pursuit of money— which undermine the freedom and equality that define its political culture.
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Ausland, Hayden W. "Colloquium 1: On The Decline Of Political Virtue In Republic 8-9." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2013): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-90000002.
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The political teaching of the Republic is rooted in its peculiar use in book 4 of what would later be canonized as the four cardinal virtues. Socrates’ account of four deficient political regimes in Republic 8-9 is framed as an examination of four kinds of vice, and so may be read as a study of the political consequences of a serial loss of these same virtues. Socrates’ colorful description of the inferior regimes and their corresponding human types confirms that Plato has represented generational changes occasioning transitions in regime-types as just such a gradual breakdown of virtue as a whole. The particular virtues provide the main fourfold scheme underlying the seemingly historical logic of political decline, while realistic touches and psychological explanation supplement rather than determine the overall scheme. Close literary attention is necessary to bring out this character of Socrates’ analysis of political degeneration.
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Saxonhouse, Arlene W. "Democracy, Equality, and Eidê: A Radical View from Book 8 of Plato's Republic." American Political Science Review 92, no. 2 (June 1998): 273–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585663.
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A Plato opposed to democracy fills the literature, and while some scholars question whether Plato adequately captures Socrates' possibly favorable views of democracy, Plato himself remains a paragon of elitism. I argue that Plato's response to democracy is far more theoretically interesting than simple disdain for the unenlightened masses. Rather, in Book 8 of the Republic he explores the fundamental tensions of a regime identified with freedom and equality, which he presents as characterized by formlessness, and the epistemological and theoretical problems posed by the absence of forms (eidê). Eidê give structure and identity to regimes and to their citizens; they are necessary for intellection and philosophy, but they are also the grounds for compulsion. Plato's analysis of democracy thus becomes a more serious challenge for democratic theorists than previously recognized.
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Smith, Nicholas. "Unclarity and the Intermediates in Plato’s Discussions of Clarity in the Republic." PLATO JOURNAL 18 (December 22, 2018): 97–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_18_8.
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In this paper, I argue that the two versions of divided line (the first in Book VI and the recalled version in Book VII) create problems that cannot be solved — with or without the hypothesis that the objects belonging to the level of διάνοια on the divided line are intermediates. I also argue that the discussion of arithmetic and calculation does not fit Aristotle’s attribution of intermediates to Plato and provides no support for the claim that Plato had such intermediates in mind when he talked about διάνοια in the Republic. The upshot of my argument is negative: even if Aristotle’s report about Plato and intermediates is correct, there is no evidence for such objects provided in the passages I review from the Republic. If they are to be found in Plato, it will have to be elsewhere that they are found.
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Wisnewski, J. Jeremy. "Ergon and Logistikon in Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 25, no. 2 (2008): 261–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000134.
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This paper explores the tension between two views attributed to Plato: 1) that every person in a just society must fulfil his function, and 2) justice requires philosophical wisdom. It is argued that (2) is not Plato’s view in Republic, and that this can be seen as early as Book II.
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Johnstone, Mark A. "Plato on the Enslavement of Reason." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 3 (January 22, 2020): 382–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.53.
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AbstractIn Republic 8–9, Socrates describes four main kinds of vicious people, all of whose souls are “ruled” by an element other than reason, and in some of whom reason is said to be “enslaved.” What role does reason play in such souls? In this paper, I argue, based on Republic 8–9 and related passages, and in contrast to some common alternative views, that for Plato the “enslavement” of reason consists in this: instead of determining for itself what is good, reason is forced to desire and pursue as good a goal determined by the soul’s ruler.
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Pappas, Nickolas, and Kimon Lycos. "Plato on Justice and Power: Reading Book I of Plato's Republic." Philosophical Review 100, no. 3 (July 1991): 515. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2185087.
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Lukes, Timothy J., and Mary F. Scudder. "Teaching Wisdom to Interest: Book Five of Plato's Republic." PS: Political Science & Politics 42, no. 01 (January 2009): 197–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096509090192.
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ABSTRACTWe suggest that Book Five of theRepublic, where Plato discusses the status of women in the guardian class, is a superb source of Platonic insight. For it is precisely the discussion of women that is most vulnerable to co-optation by the modern vernacular of interest, a vernacular to which theRepublicis vehemently opposed. If students come to appreciate an alternative perspective regarding this most sensitive of modern issues, the full impact of the Socratic approach is available to them.
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Tarrant, H. A. S. "Myth as a Tool of Persuasion in Plato." Antichthon 24 (1990): 19–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0066477400000514.
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Much is said in the text-books about Plato’s hankering after answers to moral questions which would offer scientific accuracy and absolute truth. It is to dialectic it seems that Plato turns in the hope of finding such accuracy. The Republic values Platonic dialectic rather higher than mathematical procedures, if only because the mathematician fails to explain the ultimate terms through which he conducts his inquiry. But the epistemologica! status of mathematics is at least as high as that of physical inquiry, whereas it is certainly higher than that of all this-worldly images. The images of the imitative artist were criticised for their distance from Platonic reality in Book X of the Republic, and it is not at all clear that they differ in this respect from the stories which Plato believes should be used at the commencement of his city’s education programme in Republic II (376e ff.). If myths are images, and images are low in epistemological status in the Republic and related middle period dialogues, then why does Plato use myths so prominently in precisely these dialogues?
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Skedzielewski, Sean. "Justice and the Supposed Fallacy of Irrelevance in Plato’s Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 37, no. 2 (May 11, 2020): 317–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340277.
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Abstract Previous commentators on Plato’s Republic have relied on mistaken assumptions about the requirements for Plato’s theory of justice: that Plato establishes a bi-conditional between proper psychic rule and the performance of conventionally just acts. They believe that if Plato does not establish this bi-conditional, then his theory of justice as a virtue will succumb to the fallacy of irrelevance. I claim Plato need not meet that requirement. A novel interpretation of the arguments of Book IV concerning justice in the soul suffices to dispense with one aspect of the bi-conditional – that conventional justice must imply justice as psychic harmony. Then, situating the theory of justice as psychic harmony in the context of the divided line, and in the dialectical ascent in the education of the philosopher-rulers, I show that the other conditional requirement – that justice in the soul must imply the performance of conventionally just actions – is also mistaken.
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Austin, Emily A. "Plato on Grief as a Mental Disorder." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 98, no. 1 (January 20, 2016): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2016-0001.
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Abstract:This paper considers two competing interpretations of Socrates’ discussions of the appropriateness of grief in Plato’s Republic. The commonly accepted ‘Stoic Reading’ maintains that Plato thinks grief can and should be eliminated by the fully virtuous individual. I offer a textual case for the ‘Conflict Reading’, according to which grief is ineliminable, and sometimes appropriate. I focus primarily on three passages: the justification for censoring depictions of grief in Book III (387d–388a), the shared grieving of the collective family in Book V (462a–463e), and the Book X passage about the decent person’s measured grief (603e–604d). I show that these passages offer not only evidence that grief cannotbe eliminated, but also hint at an underlying account of why it resists elimination.
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Mayhew, Robert. "Persuasion and Compulsion in Plato’s Laws 10." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 24, no. 1 (2007): 91–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000109.
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There is a greater use of the language of persuasion in Plato’s Laws than there is in the Republic. Christopher Bobonich has recently offered powerful arguments (against the claims of Popper, Morrow and others) for the view that this difference is a sign that the Laws is less authoritarian than the Republic, and that Plato in the Laws is more concerned with the freedom of the individual. In the present paper, it is demonstrated that this interpretation of the Laws cannot account for what Plato says in Book 10 (which discusses the nature of the gods, and impiety). This article first examines four passages from Laws 10 that reveal a different picture than the one Bobonich champions, and then argues that the context for Plato’s statements on persuasion — the political philosophy of the Laws generally—actually makes genuine rational persuasion impossible, whatever Plato actually says about its nature and value.
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Yu-Jung, Sun. "Lies in Plato’s Republic: poems, myth, and noble lie." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 87. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3860.
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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that 1) the ostensible inconsistency between the judgments of value on different kinds of lying, like poetry, fabricated story, myth and noble lies, is not a veritable one, and 2) Plato does not hold a utilitarian position on the question of lying, or making up something false to be more precise, and lies do not turn into noble lies once they are told to be in the service of some superior purpose. Plato does state in Book II of the Republic that the veritable lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) is what all gods and all man hate (382a), and poets must be punished for deceiving people by linking the Supreme Being to its contrary. But Plato also discusses the useful lie, especially the one lie that is necessary for the unity and stability of the polis: the Noble Lie. Neither useful lies nor noble lies can be acceptable just because we can make a use out of it, and it does not hold either that the greater the use we can make out of a lie, the nobler a lie is. A true lie (ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος) for Plato is the kind of lie leading people to believe that the hierarchy of the forms can be reordered in any way, and we can make random associations between the forms, like forming the relation between gods and the action of war. On the other hand, useful lies and the noble lies are in fact a duplicate of the order of the forms. This order, which articulates forms, is what makes thinking of truth possible, and we can later find this idea of the order of the forms which allows us to think truth and falsity in both the Theaetetus and the Sophist.Keywords: Lie, imitation, dialectic, falsehood
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Greco, Anna. "On the Economy of Specialization and Division of Labour in Plato’s Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 26, no. 1 (2009): 52–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000142.
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This essay takes issue with a common interpretation of Book II of Plato’s Republic as anticipating the modern theory of division of labour, first promoted by Adam Smith. It is argued that, far from anticipating Adam Smith, Plato developed original reflections which, though naturally shaped by the economic reality of his time, reveal a concern for fundamental issues of economic thought: the value of labour, the nature of economic interdependence in a political association, the relation between economic behaviour and justice. However, despite having recognized some of the fundamental forces behind human economic behaviour, Plato ends up with an envisioned ideal state in which those forces are given no scope, for he makes no room for economic competitiveness and technological advancement.
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Pacewicz, Artur. "Plato and the Classical Theory of Knowledge." Folia Philosophica 42, no. 2 (December 30, 2019): 91–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/fp.8515.
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In this paper, the notion of the classical theory of knowledge is analysed with reference to its primary source – the philosophy of Plato. A point of departure for this analysis is the description of the classical theory of knowledge presented by Jan Woleński in his book Epistemology (but it can be also found in the works of other researchers devoted to epistemology). His statements about Plato are examined in the context of Plato’s thought. The dialogues Apology, Gorgias, Meno, fragments of the Republic, Theaetetus, Timaeus and the testimonies about the so-called agrapha dogmata are especially taken into consideration.
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Larivée, Annie. "Eros Tyrannos: Alcibiades as the Model of the Tyrant in Book IX of the Republic." International Journal of the Platonic Tradition 6, no. 1 (2012): 1–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187254712x619575.
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Abstract The aim of this article is to make use of recent research on ‘political eros’ in order to clarify the connection that Plato establishes between erosand tyranny in RepublicIX, specifically by elucidating the intertextuality between Plato’s work and the various historical accounts of Alcibiades. An examination of the lexicon used in these accounts will allow us to resolve certain interpretive difficulties that, to my knowledge, no other commentator has elucidated: why does Socrates blame erosfor the decline from democracy into tyranny? What does he mean by ‘ eros’ here, and what link existed between erosand tyranny in the minds of his contemporaries? And finally, who are the mysterious ‘tyrant-makers’ ( turannopoioí, 572e5-6) who, according to Socrates, introduce a destructive erosin the soul of the future tyrant? After a careful examination of the passage from book IX on the genesis of the tyrannical man (focused on the last stage of the metamorphosis, which is concerned with éros túrannos, 572d-573b), I will offer answers to these questions by turning to the writings of Thucydides, Aristophanes and Plutarch while examining the portrait of Alcibiades that Plato paints in the Alcibiades Iand Symposium.
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Conque, João Gabriel. "A fisiologia do prazer no livro IX da República e os seus problemas." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3856.
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Resumo: Este artigo tem o objetivo de apontar alguns dos problemas decorrentes da concepção fisiológica do prazer apresentada por Platão no livro IX da República. Inicialmente, apresentarei como Platão lida com o tema do prazer no Górgias, destacando o papel de uma certa fisiologia nutricional em tal contexto. Em seguida, veremos que Platão lida com o tema do prazer no penúltimo livro da República de um modo mais amplo, uma vez que este diálogo fornece exemplos além da esfera nutricional. Apesar da abrangente discussão sobre o prazer na República mencionar os prazeres intelectuais, não encontramos uma acurada descrição dos mesmos nesse diálogo. Um dos obstáculos para a compreensão de tais tipos de prazeres diz respeito à controversa concepção fisiológica do prazer psíquico como um processo de preenchimento. Assim, chamaremos atenção na última seção para a frequente analogia entre corpo e alma no pensamento de Platão com o intuito de contribuir para as discussões sobre o prazer na República.Palavras-chave: Platão, prazer, Górgias, República, fisiologiaAbstract: This article intends to point out some problems arising from the physiological conception of pleasure presented by Plato in Republic Book IX. Initially, I will show how Plato addresses the theme of pleasure in the Gorgias, highlighting the role of a kind of nutritional physiology in such context. Next, we will see Plato returns to the theme of pleasure in the penultimate book of the Republic in a more comprehensive way since this dialogue provides examples beyond nutritional sphere. Although the extensive discussion on pleasure in the Republic mentions intellectual pleasures, it does not provide us an accurate description of them. One of problems for the correct under-standing of such types of pleasures concerns the controversial conception of psychic pleasures as a process of replenishment. Thus, in the last section, I will draw attention to frequent analogy body/soul in Plato’s thought in order to contribute to the discussions on pleasure in the Republic.Keywords: Plato, pleasure, Gorgias, Republic, physiology
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Blankenship, J. David. "Education and the Arts in Plato's Republic." Journal of Education 178, no. 3 (October 1996): 67–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002205749617800306.
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The education in ‘music’ described in Books II-III of the Republic combines the content and the manner of presentation of stories so that moral substance and formal beauty work together to inculcate the opinions and virtues required in the children who are to become guardians of the ideal city. The principles which underlie this section constitute a theory of the role of the arts in moral education that can be applied in others contexts. Plato's view of how such education works depends upon his view of the way in which imitation affects the soul, and can be understood thoroughly only after the parts of the soul have been distinguished and the epistemological and ontological groundwork has been laid for a full discussion of imitation. These requirements having been met in the course of Books IV through IX, Plato returns to imitation in Book X, using painting as a foil to mount ontological, epistemological, and psychological criticisms of imitative poetry, now focussing upon its effect on adults, not children. His attack tacitly exempts the kind of imitations exemplified by Socrates' own frequent image making and by the philosophical poetry of the Republic itself. Socrates imagines, but rejects, a certain defense of popular poetry, the very one which Aristotle developed in his doctrine of ‘catharsis.’ But that defense rests upon views of practical knowledge and of the psychological resources of the average person that Plato would be unlikely to have accepted.
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Blankenship, J. David. "Education and the Arts in Plato's Republic." Journal of Education 179, no. 3 (October 1997): 67–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002205749717900306.
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The education in ‘music’ described in Books II-III of the Republic combines the content and the manner of presentation of stories so that moral substance and formal beauty work together to inculcate the opinions and virtues required in the children who are to become guardians of the ideal city. The principles which underlie this section constitute a theory of the role of the arts in moral education that can be applied in others contexts. Plato's view of how such education works depends upon his view of the way in which imitation affects the soul, and can be understood thoroughly only after the parts of the soul have been distinguished and the epistemological and ontological groundwork has been laid for a full discussion of imitation. These requirements having been met in the course of Books IV through IX, Plato returns to imitation in Book X, using painting as a foil to mount ontological, epistemological, and psychological criticisms of imitative poetry, now focussing upon its effect on adults, not children. His attack tacitly exempts the kind of imitations exemplified by Socrates' own frequent image making and by the philosophical poetry of the Republic itself. Socrates imagines, but rejects, a certain defense of popular poetry, the very one which Aristotle developed in his doctrine of ‘catharsis.’ But that defense rests upon views of practical knowledge and of the psychological resources of the average person that Plato would be unlikely to have accepted.
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Byrd, Miriam. "Colloquium 6: When The Middle Comes Early: Puzzles And Perplexeties In Plato’S Dialogues." Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 28, no. 1 (2013): 187–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134417-90000017.
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In this paper I focus on the problem of accounting for apparent inconsistencies between Plato’s early and middle works. Developmentalism seeks to account for these variances by differentiating a Socratic philosophy in the early dialogues from a Platonic philosophy in the middle. In opposition to this position, I propose an alternative explanation: differences between these two groups are due to Plato’s depiction and use of middle period epistemology. I argue that, in the early dialogues, Plato depicts Socrates’ use of the “summoners” described in Book 7 of the Republic, and that Plato uses Socrates’ failed attempts to summon interlocutors for the purpose of summoning readers. In conclusion, I suggest that the hypothesis that Plato uses summoners provides a framework for addressing the wider problem of inconsistencies within the Platonic corpus.
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Hersch, Gil. "THE NEED FOR GOVERNMENTAL INEFFICIENCY IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC." Journal of the History of Economic Thought 43, no. 1 (March 2021): 103–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837220000097.
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In Book II of Plato’s Republic, Socrates discusses the cities of necessity and luxury (372d–373a). Discussions of these cities have often focused on citizens desiring more than they need, which creates a demand for luxury. Yet the second part of the equation, which is not usually recognized, is that there must be sufficient supply to meet this demand. The focus of this article is on the importance of supply in the discussion of the first two cities in Book II of the Republic. This article argues that the way Plato models the cities makes it the case that a surplus above levels of necessity will be generated from time to time. That the unwanted surplus cannot be spontaneously disposed of entails that the first two cities are institutionally incomplete. A government is needed in order to coordinate the disposal of the surplus supply the city will produce.
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Gotchold, Agnieszka. "O pragnieniu Prawdy. Propozycja Platona a kontekst przekazu biblijnego w świetle teorii mimetyczno-ofiarniczej René Girarda." Filozofia Chrześcijańska 16 (December 15, 2019): 105–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/fc.2019.16.6.
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The paper discusses the issue of the desire for truth in Plato’s Republic, Book VII, and the Old and New Testaments with regard to Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, the scapegoat mechanism and the founding murder. Both Plato and the Bible describe outstanding individuals – Anax, Moses and Jesus – who attain truth. This causes communal envy, leading to the outbreaks of mimetic violence. However, neither Plato nor the Old Testament allow the founding murder to happen. Consequently, they depict communities which deal with strict laws and suppressed violence. It is only in the New Testament that mimetic violence fi nds its outlet in the sacrifi cial killing of Jesus Christ.
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van den Berg, Robbert M. "PROCLUS ON HESIOD'S WORKS AND DAYS AND ‘DIDACTIC’ POETRY." Classical Quarterly 64, no. 1 (April 16, 2014): 383–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838813000773.
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In their introduction to the recent excellent volume Plato & Hesiod, the editors G.R. Boys-Stones and J.H. Haubold observe that when we think about the problematic relationship between Plato and the poets, we tend to narrow this down to that between Plato and Homer. Hesiod is practically ignored. Unjustly so, the editors argue. Hesiod provides a good opportunity to start thinking more broadly about Plato's interaction with poets and poetry, not in the least because the ‘second poet’ of Greece represents a different type of poetry from Homer's heroic epics, that of didactic poetry. What goes for Plato and Hesiod goes for Proclus and Hesiod. Proclus (a.d. 410/12–85), the productive head of the Neoplatonic school in Athens, took a great interest in poetry to which he was far more positively disposed than Plato had ever been. He wrote, for example, two lengthy treatises in reaction to Socrates' devastating criticism of poetry in the Republic as part of his commentary on that work in which he tries to keep the poets within the Platonic pale. This intriguing aspect of Proclus' thought has, as one might expect, not failed to attract scholarly attention. In Proclus' case too, however, discussions tend to concentrate on his attitude towards Homer (one need only think here of Robert Lamberton's stimulating book Homer the Theologian). To some extent this is only to be expected, since much of the discussion in the Commentary on the Republic centres on passages from Homer. Proclus did not, however, disregard Hesiod: we still possess his scholia on the Works and Days, now available in a recent edition by Patrizia Marzillo.
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Altman, William Henry Furness. "In Defense of Plato's Intermediates." PLATO JOURNAL 20 (August 4, 2020): 151–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.14195/2183-4105_20_11.
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Once we realize that the indivisible and infinitely repeatable One of the arithmetic lesson in Republic7 is generated by διάνοια at Parmenides 143a6-9, it becomes possible to revisit the Divided Line’s Second Part and see that Aristotle’s error was not to claim that Plato placed Intermediates between the Ideas and sensible things but to restrict that class to the mathematical objects Socrates used to explain it. All of the One-Over-Many Forms of Republic10 that Aristotle, following Plato, attacked with the Third Man, are equally dependent on Images and above all on the Hypothesis of the One (Republic 510b4-8).
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Gutiérrez, Raul. "The Structure of Plato’s Republic and the Cave Allegory." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 10, no. 1 (November 29, 2019): 65–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2019.1.3.
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As Plato’s Phaedrus 246c stipulates, every logos must be structured like a living being, i.e., the relation of all its parts to one another and to the whole must be appropriate. Thus, the present paper argues that Plato’s masterwork has been organized in accord with the ascent/descent movement as presented in the Allegory of the Cave: Book I represents eikasia, Books II–IV.434c exemplify pistis, Book IV.434d–444e illustrates dianoia and Books V–VII express noesis. Having reached the anabasis (with the Sun, the Line and the Cave images) the philosopher turns to the consideration of the deficient or unjust forms of the souls and the corresponding political regimes. Finally, the discussion comes back to eikasia through the renewed criticism of mimesis and the exposition of the Myth of Er. As is typical of Plato, this is not merely a formal matter, since the structure conveys that as the Good makes the Ideas intelligible, so the Sun, the Line and the Cave images also throw light on the whole dialogue.
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Arruzza, Cinzia. "‘Un paradigma in cielo’. Platone politico da Aristotele al Novecento, Mario Vegetti, Rome: Carocci, 2009." Historical Materialism 21, no. 1 (2013): 185–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569206x-12341269.
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Abstract Vegetti’s book tries to decipher and recast the complex history of the interpretation of the political Plato in a compelling historical and philosophical analysis. This review article presents an intellectual profile of Mario Vegetti and a critical engagement with his historical and politico-philosophical approach. It concludes with the suggestion that we should investigate the vicious circle of philosophy and politics in Plato’s Republic in light of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach.
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Leonard, Miriam. "Irigaray's Cave: Feminist Theory and the Politics of French Classicism." Ramus 28, no. 2 (1999): 152–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0048671x00001764.
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Although there are countless feminist readings of Plato and readings of Plato as (a) feminist, the French feminist theorist Luce Irigaray's extended—nearly 200 page!—reading of the cave passage from Book 7 of Plato's Republic may still come as something of a surprise to the classicist. In the recently published book Feminist Interpretations of Plato, however, there is an essay by Irigaray on Plato's Symposium included as just another example of this now established genre. Just any other?—well not quite… As in its sister volume Feminist Interpretations of Aristotle, the editors have decided that unlike any other article in the collection, Irigaray's contribution needs some further exegesis for the classical scholar. An essay on Irigaray reading Plato appears in tandem to her own article. Just like in the Aristotle volume, this essay presents itself as a guide to the perplexed, explaining to the ancient philosopher schooled in a more traditional idiom of Anglo-Saxon academic research some of the context for Irigaray's seemingly inappropriate style. Freeland writes of Irigaray's Aristotle piece: ‘Irigaray's essay will be astonishing to the Aristotle scholar who reads it unaware of Irigaray's earlier writings’; in fact, she continues, ‘…it may seem unclear whether one is reading Aristotle scholarship, a primitive biology text or an erotic novel ….Reading her then,’ she concludes, ‘is far different from reading the usual commentators on the Physics. Clearly, style is paramount to Irigaray's method of reading.’
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Irwin, Terence. "Grades of rational desire in the Platonic soul." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 20, no. 1 (April 5, 2017): 15–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-02001002.
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The partition of the soul is used extensively, both in Book iv and in Books viii-ix of the Republic, to describe and to explain the structure, growth, and decay, of just and unjust cities and souls. Plato has in mind a single conception of the three parts of the soul, and he expounds it gradually. He recognizes different grades of rationality in desire. These grades help us to understand the roles of the partition of the soul in Plato’s argument.
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Wu, Yi. "Philosophy as Memory Theatre." Politeia 1, no. 3 (2019): 28–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/politeia20191318.
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Contrary to its self-proclamation, philosophy started not with wonder, but with time thrown out of joint. It started when the past has become a problem. Such was the historical situation facing Athens when Plato composed his Socratic dialogues. For the philosopher of fifth century BCE, both the immediate past and the past as the Homeric tradition handed down to the citizens had been turned into problematicity itself. In this essay, I will examine the use of philosophy as memory theatre in Plato's Republic. I shall do so by interpreting Book X of the Republic as Plato's “odyssey” and suggest that such Platonic odyssey amounts to an attempt to re-inherit the collapsed spatial and temporal order of the fallen Athenian maritime empire. In my reading, the Odysseus in the Myth of Er comes forth for Plato as the exemplary Soldier-Citizen-Philosopher who must steer between the Scylla of ossified political principles and the whirling nihilism of devalued historical values, personified by Charybdis. I shall further suggest that Plato’s memory theatre also constitutes a device of amnesia and forgetting. The post-Iliadic Odysseus must drink of forgetfulness from the river Lethe, so that the revenant soldier, Er, and those who inherited the broken historical present during and after the Peloponnesian War, would be enabled to remember in a particular way. Such remembrance, I shall conclude, may be what Plato means by philosophy, a memory theatre of psychic regulation and moral economy that sets itself decidedly apart from earlier tragic and comic catharsis.
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Alvis, John. "The Philosopher's Literary Critic." Review of Politics 78, no. 4 (2016): 681–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670516000620.
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Leon Craig's five books are interrelated by a common approach: Craig writes of philosophic matters juxtaposing them with literary works, or one may reverse the order—whichever way, the exegesis proceeds in tandem. Moreover, he has intertwined the books in a sequential development. One can perceive Craig discovered his fountainhead in Plato. His first book, in 1993, The War Lover: A Study of Plato's “Republic,” has left its genetic pattern upon the next four, Of Philosophers and Kings: Political Philosophy in Shakespeare's “Macbeth” and “King Lear” (2001), The Platonian Leviathan (2010), Philosophy and the Puzzles of “Hamlet” (2014), and his latest, The Philosopher's English King: Shakespeare's “Henriad” as Political Philosophy (2015). In this latest effort, Shakespeare is the philosopher and Henry V the best of Shakespeare's English kings. But you will not appreciate the extent and intricacy of Craig's web unless you recognize that Plato's thought, especially as that thought has been conveyed in The Republic, runs through every filament. To be precise, taking such themes of that dialogue as Socrates's notion of a tripartite human soul, his taxonomy of defective regimes, his all but best regime of “Guardians,” and Socrates's ultimately best constitution, rule by a philosopher become king or king become philosopher, or only somewhat less improbably, a king become an understanding student of a counselor philosopher. Then, best self-government within the individual soul is likewise worked out in The Republic as Craig reads it. To my mind he has read Plato aright.
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Bobonich, Christopher. "Persuasion, Compulsion and Freedom in Plato's Laws." Classical Quarterly 41, no. 2 (December 1991): 365–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800004547.
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One of the distinctions that Plato in the Laws stresses most heavily in his discussion of the proper relation between the individual citizen and the laws of the city is that between persuasion and compulsion. Law, Plato believes, should try to persuade rather than compel the citizens. Near the end of the fourth book of the Laws, the Athenian Stranger, Plato's spokesman in this dialogue, asks whether the lawgiver for their new city of Magnesia should in making laws ‘explain straightaway what must and must not be done, add the threat of a penalty, and turn to another law, without adding a single bit of encouragement or persuasion [παραμυθας δ κα πειθος … ἓν] to his legislative edicts’ (Laws 720a 1–2). A few lines later, the Athenian Stranger himself condemns such a procedure as ‘the worse and more savage alternative’ (τò χεῖρον τοῖν δυοῖν κα γριώτερον 720e4). The better method is for the laws themselves to try to persuade (πεθειν) the citizens to act in the manner that they prescribe. And as a means of doing this, Plato proposes attaching preludes (προομια) to particular laws and to the legal code as a whole: such preludes will supplement the sanctions attached to the laws and will aim at persuading the citizens to act in the way that the laws direct for reasons other than fear of the penalties attached to the law. Such a practice, Plato believes, is an innovation: it is something that no lawgiver has ever thought of doing before (722b–e). And we have no reason to think that Plato is here excluding his earlier self, e.g. the Plato of the Republic and the Politicus, from this criticism.
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Andrade Maronna, Helena. "A mimesis nos Livros III e X da República de Platão." CODEX – Revista de Estudos Clássicos 2, no. 1 (July 5, 2010): 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.25187/codex.v2i1.2818.
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<div class="page" title="Page 22"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>O presente estudo tem como objetivo investigar a questão da <em>mimesis</em> na <em>República</em> de Platão; que o leva a banir a poesia de sua cidade ideal e o porquê deste ataque. No início da <em>República</em> Platão aparenta assumir uma posição branda em relação à poesia imitativa, mas ao longo da obra a sua censura vai tornando-se cada vez mais violenta até culminar com o banimento do poeta de sua cidade ideal. Quando Platão desvela o seu maior ataque à poesia no Livro X, muita discussão já foi feita acerca da educação da cidade ideal e do cidadão ideal; paralelo entre o todo e a parte que Platão estabelece durante toda a exposição de sua doutrina. Apoiando-nos na crítica moderna sobre tal problemática pretendemos obter uma visão mais abrangente sobre os estudos da mimesis retratada nos Livros III e X da <em>República</em> de Platão.</span></p><p><span><br /></span></p><div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><strong>Mimesis in Book 3 and 10 of Plato’s Republic </strong></p><p><strong>Abstract </strong></p><p><span>The present study aims to investigate the question of the mimesis </span><span>in Plato’s </span><span>Republic, what motivates him to banish the poetry of its ideal city and the reasons of this attack. At the beginning of the Republic, Plato seems to assume a lenient position on the imitative poetry, but throughout the dialogue his censorship becomes increasingly violent until culminating with the banishment of the poet from its ideal city. When Plato evinces his major attack against the poetry in Book X, much discussion had already been made concerning the ideal </span><span>city’s education and the ideal citizen by the parallel between the whole and the part that </span><span>Plato establishes during the entire exposition of his doctrines. With the support of the modern critics about such problematic, we intend to get a more including understanding of the studies of mimesis </span><span>in Books III and X of Plato’s </span><span>Republic. </span></p><p><span><strong>Keywords:</strong> Ancient Philosophy, Plato, Republic, mimesis. </span></p></div></div></div><p><span><br /></span></p></div></div></div>
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Sommerville, Brooks. "PLEASURE AND THE DIVIDED SOUL IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC BOOK 9." Classical Quarterly 69, no. 1 (May 2019): 147–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838819000582.
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In Book 9 of Plato's Republic we find three proofs for the claim that the just person is happier than the unjust person. Curiously, Socrates does not seem to consider these arguments to be coequal when he announces the third and final proof as ‘the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows’ (μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων) (583b7). This remark raises a couple of related questions for the interpreter. Whatever precise sense we give to μέγιστον and κυριώτατον in this passage, Socrates is clearly appealing to an argumentative standard of some kind, and claiming that his final argument alone meets (or comes closest to meeting) this standard. But what precise standard is Socrates invoking here? And given that the first two arguments of Book 9 fall short of this (as yet undetermined) standard, why does he not simply leap directly to the third, most decisive proof?
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Borthwick, E. Kerr. "‘The Wise Man and the Bow’ in Aristides Quintilianus." Classical Quarterly 41, no. 1 (May 1991): 275–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838800003876.
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In the second book of the De Musica, Aristides Quintilianus discourses at length on the educational value of music, drawing on many earlier sources, Pythagorean, Damonian, and of course Plato and Aristotle. In ch. 6 (p. 60 W.-I.) Plato's censorious views in the Republic are particularly referred to, but, like Aristotle in the eighth book of his Politics, Aristides takes a less severe attitude towards the pleasure-giving content of melody on appropriate occasions, and points to the natural human taste for such music: τ⋯ς δ ϕὺσεως κα τ τοιατα παιτοσης, μποδίζειν μν δνατον (εὖ γρ εἴρηται τῷ σοϕῷ κα τò περ το τòξου), τν δ νσεων τν ὠϕλιμον προκριτον.
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Schultz, Anne-Marie. "Narrative Tyranny in American Political Discourse and Plato's Republic I." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2021): 401–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche2021526179.
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This paper begins with a brief examination of the contemporary American political landscape. I describe three recent events that illustrate how attempts to control the narrative about events that transpired threaten to undermine our shared reality. I then turn to Book I of Plato’s Republic to explore the potentially tyrannizing effect of Socrates’s narrative voice. I focus on his descriptions of Glaucon, Polemarchus and his slave, and Thrasymachus to show how Plato presents Socrates’s narrative activity as a process that controls how the auditor understands the events that follow. I then turn to an alternate understanding of Socratic narrative which extols its philosophically and politically liberatory possibilities. I use my own previous work on Socratic narrative, Jill Frank’s Poetic Justice, and Rebecca’s LeMoine’s Plato’s Cave as three examples that emphasize the more positive dimensions of Socratic narrative. Finally, I end with a brief exploration of Cornel West’s Democracy Matters, and bell hooks’ works on pedagogy to argue for the possibility a Socratically-informed public space for political discourse.
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Cordero, Néstor-Luis. "De la inutilidad a la justificación de una “Forma del dedo” en Platón (De la República al Sofista)." Nova Tellus 39, no. 1 (January 27, 2021): 11–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.19130/iifl.nt.2021.39.1.27541.
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While in Republic (523a) Plato considers there is no need of the existence of a Finger’s Form, since a no-finger can be imagined, in Book X he affirms the existence of a Bed’s Form, a substantial object such as the finger. This Platonic inaccuracy related to the Form of substances is confirmed in the Parmenides, when Socrates confesses his doubts about them. But in the Sophist, a later dialogue, we find a coherent response because The Form of the Other justifies that there be an opposite to the finger, a “no-finger”, which is simply something different from the finger.
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Brumbaugh, Michael E. "THE GREEK ὝΜΝΟΣ: HIGH PRAISE FOR GODS AND MEN." Classical Quarterly 69, no. 1 (May 2019): 167–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838819000624.
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Over a hundred instances of the word ὕμνος from extant archaic poetry demonstrate that the Greek hymn was understood broadly as a song of praise. The majority of these instances comes from Pindar, who regularly uses the term to describe his poems celebrating athletic victors. Indeed, Pindar and his contemporaries saw the ὕμνος as a powerful vehicle for praising gods, heroes, men and their achievements—often in service of an ideological agenda. Writing a century later Plato used the term frequently and with much the same range. A survey of his usage reveals instances of ὕμνοι for gods, daimones, heroes, ancestors, leading citizens, noble deeds, sites and landscapes. Despite abundant evidence of Plato's own practice, studies of the Greek hymn posit an extreme narrowing of the genre in the classical period and cite the philosopher as the sole witness to, if not the originator of, this development. Two passages in particular, one from the Republic and one from the Laws, are seen to support the claim that by the fourth century b.c.e. the term ὕμνος refers exclusively to songs for gods. In Republic Book 10, we find the memorable edict on poetic censorship: ‘But we must know that of poetry only ὕμνοι for the gods and ἐγκώμια for the good must be admitted into our city.’ Laws Book 3 offers what appears to be an even more straightforward pronouncement: ‘Back then our music was divided according to its various types and arrangements; and a certain type of song was prayers to the gods, and these were called by the name ὕμνοι.’ From these two statements has arisen the consensus that Plato saw a divine recipient as the defining feature of the ὕμνος and, moreover, that this position reflects the communis opinio from at least the fourth century b.c.e. onward.
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Halkos, George E., Nicholas C. Kyriazis, and Emmanouil M. L. Economou. "Plato as a Game Theorist towards an International Trade Policy." Journal of Risk and Financial Management 14, no. 3 (March 10, 2021): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm14030115.
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In the beginning of the second book of his Politeia (Republic) Plato in passage 2.358e–359a–c raises the issue of the administration of justice as a means of motivating people to behave fairly regarding their relationships and when cooperating with each other because, at the end, this is mutually beneficial for all of them. We argue that this particular passage could be seen as a part of a wider process of evolution and development of the institutions of the ancient Athenian economy during the Classical period (508–322 BCE) and could be interpreted through modern theoretical concepts, and more particularly, game theory. Plato argued that there are two players, each with two identical strategies, to treat the other justly or unjustly. In the beginning, each player chooses the “unjust” strategy, trying to cheat the other. In this context, which could be seen as a prisoner’s dilemma situation, both end with the worst possible outcome, that is, deceiving each other and this has severe financial consequences for both of them. Realizing this, in a repeated game situation, with increasing information on the outcome and on each other, they choose the “just” strategy so achieving the best outcome and transforming the game in a cooperative one. We analyze this, formulating a dynamic game which is related to international commercial transactions, after explaining how such a situation could really arise in Classical Athens. We argue that this is the optimal scenario for both parties because it minimizes the risk of deceiving each other and creates harmony while performing financial transactions.
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Ferrari, Franco. "Natura e costrizione nel paragone della caverna." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 123. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3464.
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Riassunto: Con il mito della caverna, Platone riprende uno dei motivi centrali del VI libro della Repubblica, ossia i pericoli ai quali si espongono le nature filosofiche se alle loro qualità naturali non viene affiancato un corretto percorso educativo. Con la liberazione dei prigionieri dalla caverna Platone rappresenta la volontà di preservare il “filosofo naturale” dai rischi ai quali lo espone il contatto con le dinamiche sociali e politiche della città malata; soltanto la costrizione educativa permette che il processo di liberazione sia interamente positivo.Parole chiave: mito della caverna, natura filosofica, liberazione, educazioneAbstract: With the myth of the cave, Plato resumes one of the central motives of the Book 6 of the Republic, the dangers to which the philosophical nature is exposed, if its qualities are not accompanied by a proper educational pathway. With the liberation of the prisoners from the cave Plato represents the will to preserve the “natural philosopher” from the risks to which he is exposed by contact with the social and political dynamics of the sick city; only the educational constraint allows the liberation process to be entirely positive.Keywords: myth of the cave, philosophical nature, liberation, education
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Garadja, Alexei. "Praestigiae Platonis: the cavernous puppetshow." ΣΧΟΛΗ. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 13, no. 1 (2019): 78–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.25205/1995-4328-2019-13-1-78-82.
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The paper deals with Plato’s Allegory of the Cave at the beginning of the 7th book of the Republic, focusing on the two lowest stages of the Cave (and the corresponding parts of the Line from the simile in the Sixth book), occupied, respectively, by ‘prisoners and puppeteers’; the identity of these groups is questioned, along the lines set by J. Wilberding in his homonymously entitled article. The puppeteers and their show are examined with regard to the lexical peculiarities of Plato’s text, in particular his usage of thauma and the derived thaumatopoios. The overall ironical, playful character of the Allegory is emphasized, calling for cautious reading beyond its apparent face value. A Russian term vertep, meaning both ‘a cave’ and ‘a portable puppetshow’, may prove itself helpful in approaching the sense Plato actually intended with his Allegory.
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Cooper, Laurence D. "Beyond the Tripartite Soul: The Dynamic Psychology of the Republic." Review of Politics 63, no. 2 (2001): 341–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500031211.
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Few philosophic devices have proved as influential or enduring as the tripartition of the soul in Plato's Republic. For all its virtues, however, we are mistaken to believe that the tripartite model is sufficient to convey, or that it was meant to convey, all the elements of the dialogue's psychological teaching. What is needed is an interpretation that takes fuller account of the soul's forces, and not just its “parts” (which are metaphorical anyway). This article outlines the basic elements of such an interpretation. After considering the virtues and limits of the tripartite model and of the structural perspective from it arises, the article examineseros and spiritedness, the soul's chief and most politically consequential forces, both in themselves and in their (surprising) relation to one another.Few philosophic devices have proved as influential or enduring as the tripartition of the soul in Plato's Republic. The division of the psyché into the rational, spirited, and desiring parts, first introduced by Socrates in book 4, established the terms of psychological thought not only for the remainder of the Republic but for a great part of Western thought even to the present day. Perhaps even more important than the particular content of this schema has been the mode of analysis that it exemplifies. With Plato began a tradition of considering the soul as a differentiated structure whose respective parts perform specific, assignable functions.
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Fronterotta, Francesco. "Il sole e il bene. Funzione e limiti dell’analogia in Resp. VI 505a-509b." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 2, no. 1 (December 14, 2017): 109. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2017.3855.
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Riassunto: La presenza dell’analogia nel libro VI della Repubblica di Platone, concepita come rapporto, orizzontale o verticale, di semplice uguaglianza funzionale tra ambiti eterogenei, dischiude promettenti scenari di comprensione sullo statuto e la funzione dell’idea del bene in sé e in relazione ai suoi stessi “prodotti”. In particolare, l’immagine del Sole come “figlio” del bene non implica alcuna ammissione da parte di Platone di una generazione o di una derivazione integrale del primo dal secondo, così come non suggerisce una derivazione integrale delle cose sensibili dalle idee intellegibili.Parole chiave: Repubblica, bene, Sole, analogia, produttore/prodotti, idee, realtà sensibileAbstract: The presence of analogy in Book VI of Plato’s Republic, conceived as a relationship, horizontal or vertical, of functional equality between heterogeneous domains, offers promising options to understand the status and function of the good itself and in relation to its own “products”. In particular, the image of the Sun as the “son” of the good does not imply that Plato admits an integral generation or a derivation of the first from the second, nor does it suggest an integral derivation of sensible things from intelligible ideas.Keywords: Republic, good, Sun, analogy, productor/products, ideas, sensible reality
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Moors, Kent. "Taking Republic I Seriously - Kimon Lycos: Plato on Justice and Power: Reading Book I of Plato's “Republic”. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Pp. ix, 201. $39.50. $16.95, paper.)." Review of Politics 50, no. 3 (1988): 481–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003467050003638x.
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Sánchez Canales, Gustavo. "“The Answer a Philosopher Gives Determines the Entire Shape of his Metaphysics”: The Influence of Plato and Descartes on Rebecca Goldstein’s The Mind-Body Problem." Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses, no. 25 (November 15, 2012): 401. http://dx.doi.org/10.14198/raei.2012.25.27.
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To date, Rebecca Goldstein’s The Mind-Body Problem (1983) has been mostly analysed from two points of view. On the one hand, the significance of Renee Feuer’s Orthodox Jewish background in addressing the/her mind-body problem; on the other, the implications of the Holocaust for Noam’s life and, therefore, for the Noam-Renee relationship. Surprisingly, this novel has not been studied from a purely philosophical perspective. For this reason, the present article attempts to shed some light on the protagonist’s mind-body problem by focusing on the references to René Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) and Plato’s Republic, Book VII.
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Bergren, Theodore A. "Plato’s “Myth of Er” and Ezekiel’s “Throne Vision”: A Common Paradigm?" Numen 64, no. 2-3 (March 8, 2017): 153–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685276-12341458.
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In Republic 614B–621D, Plato describes the post-mortem experiences of Er, a Pamphylian warrior. Er sees an afterworld vision of the workings of the cosmos. Revolving around a pillar of light that extends through heaven and earth is a huge cosmic structure, resembling a spindle and whorl. The biblical book of Ezekiel also features visions of cosmic proportions (chapters 1 and 10). Ezekiel sees four “living creatures.” These were of human form, but each had four faces and four wings. The creatures were arranged with their outstretched wings touching each other. Ezekiel saw four wheels beside the creatures and, over their heads, a throne with a numinous occupant. Although these visions appear distinct, on deeper examination they reveal close structural similarities. This article aims to compare and contrast the visions and to evaluate their relationship. The conclusion presents several modern scholarly constructs by which the similarities could be explained.
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Browning, Gary K. "Transitions to and from Nature in Hegel and Plato." Hegel Bulletin 13, no. 02 (1992): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200002834.
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The philosophical understanding of nature is a key concern of both Plato and Hegel. Their elaborations of the identity and status of nature within their respective philosophies exhibit significant affinities to which Hegel himself draws attention in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Hegel and Plato, indeed, are fundamentally at one in theorizing nature as both displaying and obscuring the principles of reason which they take as providing the foundations of a coherent explanation of reality. In his lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel takes great pains to emphasize the profundity of Plato's idealism as residing in its identification of the objectively real with the rational. Plato, according to Hegel, is to be revered, above all, for having “… grasped in all its truth Socrates' great principle that ultimate reality lies in consciousness, since according to him the absolute is in thought and all reality is thought.” The Timaeus, for Hegel, articulates how the world of nature is necessarily structured by reason, just as the Republic is seen by Hegel as providing a philosophical explanation of the rationality of the traditional, organic community of the Greek polis. Hegel's recognition of the Platonic foundations of his own version of “absolute” idealism in which the universality of thought assumes an explanatory priority over the material phenomena of nature as well as informing the spiritual activities of human beings has been noted, rightly, by a number of subsequent commentators. Michael Rosen, for instance, in his book, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism, while carefully distinguishing between aspects of Hegel's and Plato's conceptions of nature, intimates the continuity of Hegel's idealism with Plato's by observing how Hegel's language in effecting a transition from the categories of pure thought in the Logic to the material world of nature constitutes an “… echo of Plato's Timaeus.” Certainly, Hegel's cryptic account of the transition from the Absolute Idea, the categorial terminus of the Logic's interrogation of the determinations of pure thought, to the externality and materiality of nature evokes Plato's construal of the construction of the world in the Timaeus, both by the indeterminate character of the God which is invoked, as well as by the clear subordination of material phenomena to a separately articulable order of reason. In the account of the construction of the world developed in the Timaeus, Plato deploys the image of the divine demiurge imparting order to the world by referring to a pre-existing pattern of ideas. Hegel conceives of the Absolute Idea which at the outset of the Philosophy of Nature he likens to God, as, “… freely releasing itself…” into the externality of space and time, in which movement the Idea is seen as suffering neither a transition within nor a deepening of its character such as the mediated categories of the Logic incur in the process of their integration within the Absolute Idea.
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Piper, Mark. "Doing Justice to Thrasymachus." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 22, no. 1 (2005): 24–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000068.
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Thrasymachus variegated pronouncements on the nature of justice in Book I of the Republic have generated considerable dispute concerning whether those claims are consistent, and about what sorts of theoretical commitments those claims involve, if they are in fact consistent. After clarifying Thrasymachus position and explaining how it generates charges of inconsistency, I argue that the charges dissolve if we approach the text with the proper conception of just action, as being synonymous with adherence to the norms that proscribe taking advantage of others by fraud or force. A major virtue of this solution is that it allows us to give equal weight to virtually all of Thrasymachus claims without being forced to isolate one as Thrasymachus true position as against his other merely apparent positions. After completing my argument, I provide speculation as to why Plato might have been motivated to intentionally present Thrasymachus position in a way so generative of consistency disputes.
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Stefanides, Panagiotis. "Panagiotis Chr.Stefanides Invited to 4th TECHNIUM International Conference - Recognition of career." Technium: Romanian Journal of Applied Sciences and Technology 2, no. 3 (April 28, 2020): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.47577/technium.v2i3.454.
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As I anticipate, it concerns another genus of Polyhedron, a very Special one Ontologically, and this is very important Ι understand:
“....Στερεὰ δὲ σώματα λέγεσθαι χρὴ …. πέντε, ……., τὸ δὲ ἄλλο γένος ἅπαν ἔχει μορφὴν μίαν·…..…ψυχῆς γένος"
http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/philosophes/platon/cousin/epinomisgrec.htm
[..there are .. five solid bodies…. the other genus which in total has one form …the genus of the soul…] Plato’s Epinomis 981b. In 981a, of this work, Plato states that the composition of, soul and body bares a single form.
Similarly, Plato in Timaeus [53 E] refers to the solids having each its own genus and in his Republic makes reference to the Construction of the Universal Planets [XIV 616 E -617A].
Interpretation for γένος genus – form] Proposed By Panagiotis Stefanides is the “Generator Polyhedron”, ohis recent Abstract. Searching, for many years, Plato's Timaeus Work, geometry related to
the creation of the world- soul of the world] and presenting it to conferences nationally and internationally, I searched in the Liddell and Scott reference for the word “γένος” found in Plato's "Epinomis" 981b Discovered [Invention [ 03 April 2017].https://www.linkedin.com/…/generator-polyhedron-platonic-e…/ .
“Generator Polyhedron” refers to the geometric characteristics of this Solid found to be the root upon which other Solid Polyhedra are based i.e. the Platonic/Eucleidean Solids [Icosahedron Dodecahedron etc.] The Geometry of this paper is part of book: [ISBN 978 – 618 – 83169 – 0 - 4], National Library of Greece , 04/05/2017, by Panagiotis Ch. Stefanides.
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Kallinen, Timo, Michael D. Jackson, Gisela Welz, Hastings Donnan, Jeevan Raj Sharma, and Ronald S. Stade. "Book Reviews." Conflict and Society 1, no. 1 (June 1, 2015): 216–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/arcs.2015.010116.
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Crude Domination: An Anthropology of Oil Andrea Behrends, Stephen P. Reyna, and Günter Schlee, eds. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2011. 325 pp. Hardcover ISBN 978-0-85745-255-9.The War Machines: Young Men and Violence in Sierra Leone and Liberia Danny Hoffman. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. 295 pp. Paper ISBN 978-0-8223-5077-4.The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity Yael Navaro-Yashin. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012. 270 pp. Paper ISBN 978-0-8223-5204-4.The Risk of War: Everyday Sociality in the Republic of Macedonia Vasiliki P. Neofotistos. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012. 216 pp. Hardcover ISBN 978-0-8122-4399-4.Maoists at the Hearth: Everyday Life in Nepal’s Civil War Judith Pettigrew. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013. 200 pp. Hardcover ISBN 978-0-8122-4492-2.In Memoriam