Academic literature on the topic 'Plato – Timaeus'

There are almost irreconcilable differences between Plato?s notion of science (episteme) and the modern notion, but also certain similarities. In the late dialogues such as The Theaetetus, The Philebus, and The Timaeus, Plato redefines his own notion of knowledge developed in The Republic to some extent. Genuine knowledge does not refer solely to the unchangeable aspects of reality. Plato?s characterization of cosmology as an eikos logos (?likely story?) in The Timaeus is an anticipation of the concept of falsifiability that dominates modern philosophy of science. Experience and observation, as well as mathematical, psychological and biological concepts, occupy a significant, indispensable place within the structure of Timaeus? cosmological model.

In her 2014 monograph, Sarah Broadie argues that Timaeus’s cosmology points to a radical Platonic insight: the full rationality of the cosmos requires the existence of individualized, autonomous, and finite beings like us. Only human life makes the cosmos truly complete. But can Timaeus do full justice to the uniquely human way of being and hence to his own insight? My paper argues that he cannot and that Plato means for us to see that he cannot, by showing how Timaeus treats a famous Platonic theme: eros. Timaeus describes human perfection as assimilation to the mathematical proportions of the cosmos, but by comparing Timaeus with the Symposium I show that, given his deeply mathematized conception of reason, Timaeus cannot provide what Diotima can: a phenomenologically satisfactory account of how we come to identify ourselves with this perfection. Such identification is a transformation in our self-understanding explicable only because of the desirous and reflexive character of the soul. Expressing this character, however, requires combining the mathematical with a poetic, or even mantic, register. Only these sensibilities together grant access to Plato’s cosmology in its fullness.

In his opening speech, Timaeus (Timaeus27d5-29b1) argues that the cosmos must be the product of a craftsman looking to an eternal paradigm. Yet his premises seem at best to justify only that the world could have been made by such a craftsman. This paper seeks to clarify Timaeus’ justification for his stronger conclusion. It is argued that Timaeus sees a necessary role for craftsmanship as a cause that makes becoming like being.

I argue that Plato thinks that the soul has location, surface, depth, and extension, and that the Timaeus’ composition of the soul out of eight circles is intended literally. A novel contribution is the development of an account of corporeality that denies the entailment that the soul is corporeal. I conclude by examining Aristotle’s objection to the Timaeus’ psychology and then the intellectual history of this reading of Plato.

Plato?s cosmological dialogue The Timaeus initiates, among other things, the question of the status of mathematical entities: do they exist completely independently of the physical world whose structure they supposedly explain, are they present in a certain sense within the physical world, or are they, perhaps, exclusively psychological in nature. The author of the paper critically examines Johansen?s interpretation according to which the inherent structure of the human psyche, in the case of Plato?s Timaeus, is already mathematically ideal. Although Johansen?s interpretation is pervasive and well-grounded, the relationship between mathematical and sensory entities is considered mainly in the context of astronomy, disregarding Plato?s theory of micro-structures (the so-called geometric atomism). Thus, the author confronts Johansen?s interpretation with the opinions of other influential researchers of ancient philosophy, such as Cornford, Vlastos, Popper, Lloyd, Brisson, as well as the philosophers of the ancient era, Proclus, Aristotle, and others, in an effort to develop an interpretation that is as close as possible to the whole of Plato?s text. It seems that, when it comes to Plato?s Timaeus, one cannot discuss about the psychological origin of the mathematical model of explanation of natural phenomena without realizing that, in a quite complicated way, such mathematical model possesses a physical aspect as well. Plato himself, at the end of The Timaeus, claims that psychological disorders are caused by disruptions of the mathematically ideal proportions of bodily parts of the human organism (86b), which is only one of his claims that points to the psychophysical nature of mathematical entities.

Abstract In this paper, I argue that Plato conceives self-motion as non-spatial in Laws X. I demonstrate this by focusing on the textual evidence and by refuting interpretations according to which self-motion either is a specific type of spatial motion (e. g. circular motion) or is said to require space as a necessary condition for its occurrence. Moreover, I show that this non-spatial understanding differs from the identification of the soul’s motion with locomotion in the Timaeus. Consequently, I provide an explanation for this difference between the Timaeus and Laws X by considering developmentalist and contextualist viewpoints.

In Plato’s eponymous dialogue, Timaeus, the main character presents the universe as an (almost) perfect sphere filled by tiny, invisible particles having the form of four regular polyhedrons. At first glance, such a construction may seem close to an atomistic theory. However, one does not find any text in Antiquity that links Timaeus’ cosmology to the atomists, while Aristotle opposes clearly Plato to the latter. Nevertheless, Plato is commonly presented in contemporary literature as some sort of atomist, sometimes as supporting a form of so-called ‘mathematical atomism’. However, the term ‘atomism’ is rarely defined when applied to Plato. Since it covers many different theories, it seems that this term has almost as different meanings as different authors. The purpose of this article is to consider whether it is correct to connect Timaeus’ cosmology to some kind of ‘atomism’, however this term may be understood. Its purpose is double: to obtain a better understanding of the cosmology of the Timaeus, and to consider the different modern ‘atomistic’ interpretations of this cosmology. In short, we would like to show that such a claim, in any form whatsoever, is misleading, an impediment to the understanding of the dialogue, and more generally of Plato’s philosophy.

Plato tries to explain the becoming of the cosmos by referring to the concepts of order and disorder. Scholars have usually focused on the relationship between the cosmos and the demiurge that Plato puts forward to explain the reasonable (i.e., well-ordered) development. Along these lines, scholarship has examined the providential role played by both the demiurge and the soul of the world. Yet, an interesting prob­lem still remains open: what exactly is the function of disorder? What is the sense of the concept of a perfectly established order if we do not know the manner in which it is achieved, since we have no understand­ing of the conditions that make it possible? Pursuing this line of thought, one may point to a providential role of the disorder given the balance of forces that operates in Plato’s cosmic becoming.

The Timaeus presents a fascinating account of the cosmos. It includes a creation myth that introduces the figure known as the Demiurge who, despite the fact that he is the cause of the sensible world, is reverently attributed with reason, and whose creation – the cosmos – is actually beautiful and good. In this dialogue Plato offers his readers a panorama of the universe. But just what are his intentions for this? Is his approach a precursor to the methods of natural science,1 or does the Timaeus fall under the category of theology? This thesis will discuss the outcome Plato wished to achieve by finally writing on cosmology and how the methods used to accomplish these ends reveal a more existential attitude towards aesthetics.

By framing his deconstruction of Plato’s Phaedrus and Timaeus as a response to Platonism, Jacques Derrida overlooks the possibility of a Platonic philosophy beyond dogma and doctrine. This thesis argues that Derrida’s deconstructions target a particularly Platonist abstraction of the dialogues, and thus, his critique relies on the underlying assumption that Plato defends the metaphysics of presence. Derrida attempts to show how the thesis that Being is presence undermines itself in both dialogues through hints of différance like pharmakon and khôra. To answer the Derridean critique, I analyze the hermeneutics of Derrida’s deconstruction of Plato and identify what in the dialogues lies beyond the limits Derrida’s reading, for example Derrida’s notable exclusion of ἔρως.

The purpose of the present study is to assess the explanatory value of the concept of the World Soul in the cosmological account of Plato&rsquo<br>s Timaeus. The World Soul plays a crucial role in the account of the world of Becoming in the Timaeus and in Plato&rsquo<br>s philosophy of science. The World Soul explains why there is motion at all in the universe and sustains the regularity and uniformity of the motion of the celestial objects. Its constitution and the way it is generated by the Demiurge endow it an intermediary status between the world of Being and the world of Becoming. Through this status the World Soul facilitates the applicability of the items of the former world (Forms and Numbers) in the explanation of the latter, hence makes natural science possible. The appreciation of the place of the World Soul in the natural philosophy of Plato leads us to a better place to view Plato&rsquo<br>s contribution to ancient natural philosophy and science.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The analysis of the system of speculative thought of Plato and Zoroaster, as found in Plato's Timaeus and Zoroaster's Gathas, seeks to compare a well-known philosophy, that of Plato, to a lesser known and often misunderstood system of speculative thought within a religion, namely Zoroastrianism. The purpose of such a comparison is to show that the speculative thought found in religion is often comparable to philosophy, as is the case in the doctrines postulated in the Gathas. It serves to illuminate the philosophy within a lesser known religion (Zoroastrianism) by comparing it to a well-known philosophy (that of Plato), and in doing so, to cast new light on both. The comparison of Plato and Zoroaster has been proposed and sometimes executed by other scholars as well. The main problem in these other comparisons, thus far, has been the fact that no historical contact or definite doctrinal influence of Zoroaster on Plato has been or is likely to be established. Though Plato might well have been familiar with Zoroastrian doctrines, this cannot be satisfactorily proven. This study does not depend on historical contact or doctrinal influence (though the possibility of the latter has been discussed), but compares the two doctrines independent of historical factors and is based solely on the striking similarities between these two systems of thought. This study has focussed on some of the basic concepts within the two doctrines, such as creation, the soul, and dualism. In this study I have emphasised the philosophical aspect of Zoroastrianism, though it is classified as a religion, because I believe that much of what has been classified as religion also incorporates speculative thought that can be analysed separately, and as a system of speculative thought it is comparable to other traditions of speculative thought, such as Greek philosophy. This comparison therefore seeks to counteract some of the assumptions about religions, and how they are studied, by focusing on the philosophical basis underlying the doctrines in the Zoroastrian religion. Another aspect to the comparison is a focus on the similarities of doctrine originating in two cultures previously held to be vastly different, namely Persian and Greek. There has previously been a tendency to consider the cultures of the classical and the ancient Near Eastern world as separate and completely distinct from each other, and in doing so, ignoring important historical contact. Although the historical interaction between these two areas has received increased attention, comparative investigations have emphasised the differences between the cultures of these regions, although similarities do abound and the comparison of analogous aspects of the various cultures could prove valuable to the study of the ancient world. Recognition of the larger context within which the various cultures of the ancient world operated can only add to the understanding of the ancient world, and pave the way for reassessing the traditions and world-views of various cultures.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die analise van die spekulatiewe denkstelsels van Plato en Zoroaster, soos uitgelê in Plato se Timaeus en Zoroaster se Gathas, beoog om 'n bekende filosofie te vergelyk met 'n minder bekende en dikwels wangeïnterpreteerde spekulatiewe denkstelsel binne 'n religie, naamlik Zoroastrisme. Die doel van so 'n vergelyking is om te demonstreer dat die spekulatiewe denkstelsel wat binne 'n religie gevind kan word dikwels vergelykbaar is met 'n filosofie, soos die geval is met die leerstellings/denkstelsels wat uitgelê word in die Gathas. Dit dien om die filosofiese binne 'n relatief onbekende religie (Zoroastrisme) uit te lig deur dit te vergelyk met 'n bekende filosofie (dié van Plato), en in die proses is dit moontlik dat daar nuwe lig gewerp kan word op albei. Die vergelyking tussen Plato en Zoroaster is al deur verskeie academici voorgestel en soms uitgevoer. Die hoofprobleem in al die vorige vergelykings is dat daar tot dusver by Zoroaster geen historiese kontak met of invloed op die leerstellings van Plato vasgestel kon word nie. Alhoewel Plato heel moontlik bekend kon gewees het met Zoroaster se leerstellings, kan dit nie bo alle twyfel bewys word nie. Hierdie studie voorveronderstel geen historiese kontak tussen of beïnvloeding deur die leerstellings van Zoroaster en Plato nie (hoewel die moontlikheid van laasgenoemde bespreek word). Dit is 'n vergelyking wat slegs gemotiveer is deur die treffende ooreenkomste tussen hierdie twee denkstelsels. My studie fokus op 'n aantal basiese konsepte binne die twee leerstellings, soos skepping, die siel, en dualisme. Ten spyte van die feit dat Zoroastrisme as 'n religie geklassifiseer word, word die filosofiese aspek van Zoroastrisme in hierdie studie beklemtoon, want ek glo dat baie sisteme wat as religieë geklassifiseer word spekulatiewe denke inkorporeer wat onafhanklik van die religie self as 'n spekulatiewe denkstelsel soos filosofie geanaliseer kan word, en verder ook vergelyk kan word met ander tradisies van spekulatiewe denkstelsels, soos die oud-Griekse filosofie. Hierdie vergelyking poog om die aannames oor religieë, insluitend aannames oor hoe religieë bestudeer moet word, teen te werk deur te fokus op die onderliggende filosofiese basis in die leerstellings van Zoroastrisme. 'n Ander aspek van die vergelyking is 'n fokus op die ooreenkomste tussen leerstellings wat hul oorsprong het in twee kulture (die Persiese en Griekse onderskeidelik) wat voorheen as heeltemal uiteenlopend en verskillend beskou is, en in die proses is die belangrike historiese kontak geïgnoreer. Alhoewel die historiese interaksie tussen die twee areas toenemend aandag geniet, word die kulturele verskille beklemtoon ten spyte van die feit dat daar veelvuldige ooreenkomste is en dat 'n vergelyking van ooreenkomste tussen verskeie kulture baie waardevol kan wees vir die studie van die antieke wêreld. 'n Waardering van die wyer konteks waarbinne die verskeie kulture van die antieke wêreld gefunksioneer het, kan net bydra tot 'n beter begrip van die antieke wêreld en die weg baan vir 'n herevaluering van die tradisies en wêreldbeskouings van die betrokke kulture.

This thesis is an exploration of Plato’s understanding of the power of disorder as it is presented in his cosmology, The Timaeus and in his predominantly religious work, Laws X. In the former work this causal force is presented as the disordering power responsible for the physical chaos prior to the generation of the universe, as well as for any residual disorder found within the cosmos after it has been ordered and is the antithesis of ‘nous’ or reason. In the latter work, however, Laws X, the causal force for disorder is now understood as a disordering power capable of endangering the soul, active long after the cosmos has been generated and itself, a ‘Soul’. What ultimately emerges is a dynamic theory of disorder and a metaphysics supporting that theory, weaving through, connecting across and separating apart these two works. In Part I, consisting of five chapters, I provide the Greek, an original translation and commentary on seven key passages from The Timaeus where Plato presents his ideas on disorder, both as an effect within the cosmos and as a causal power or force for disorder prior to its generation. In this regard, I look closely at Plato’s use of the Greek word &V&YK~ in its role as a disordering power, but which has also been commonly understood and translated as ‘necessity’. I contrast this with Plato’s understanding of the role which the ‘Demiurge’ or the ordering power of the cosmos has played, with its faculty of ~06s or ‘reason’ and its access to ideal ‘Forms’ or ‘ideas’ when ordering or generating the universe. In Part 11, consisting of four chapters, Laws X is similarly presented, providing the Greek, a translation (for the most part, that of A. E. Taylor) and commentary on eight key passages. Here I investigate Plato’s understanding of disorder as it pertains specifically to the ‘soul’ and of the soul’s relation to the disordering power(s) and to ‘evil’. In the final chapter a theory of disorder is proposed, in which an epistemology is outlined, an ontology is given and from which, it is argued, a metaphysics of disorder emerges.

This dissertation is a study of appetite in Plato’s Timaeus, Republic and Phaedrus. In recent research is it often suggested that Plato considers appetite (i) to pertain to the essential needs of the body, (ii) to relate to a distinct set of objects, e.g. food or drink, and (iii) to cause behaviour aiming at sensory pleasure. Exploring how the notion of appetite, directly and indirectly, connects with Plato’s other purposes in these dialogues, this dissertation sets out to evaluate these ideas. By asking, and answering, three philosophically and interpretatively crucial questions, individually linked to the arguments of the dialogues, this thesis aims to show (i) that the relationship between appetite and the body is not a matter of survival, and that appetite is better understood in terms of excess; (ii) that appetite is multiform and cannot be defined in terms of a distinct set of objects; and (iii) that appetite, in Plato, can also pertain to non-sensory objects, such as articulated discourse. Chapter one asks what the universe can teach us about embodied life. It argues that Plato, in the Timaeus, works with an important link between the universe and the soul, and that the account of disorder, irrationality and multiformity identifying a pre-cosmic condition of the universe provides a key to understanding the excessive behaviour and condition of a soul dominated by appetite. Chapter two asks why the philosophers of the Republic’s Kallipolis return to the cave, and suggests that Plato’s notion of the noble lie provides a reasonable account of this. By exploring the Republic’s ideas of education, poetry and tradition, it argues that appetite – a multiform and appearance oriented source of motivation – is an essential part of this account. Chapter three asks why Socrates characterizes the speeches of the Phaedrus as deceptive games. It proposes that this question should be understood in the light of two distinctions: one between playful and serious discourse and one between simple and multiform. It argues that the speeches of the Phaedrus are multiform games, and suggests that appetite is the primary source of motivation of the soul addressed, personified by Phaedrus.