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Margagliotta, Giusy Maria [Verfasser], and Günter [Akademischer Betreuer] Figal. "Il demonico in Platone e la nascita della demonologia platonica." Freiburg : Universität, 2017. http://d-nb.info/1172203261/34.
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PINHEIRO, MARCUS REIS. "VITAL EXPERIENCE AND PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2004. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=5135@1.
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CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICOEsta tese defende que é através de uma experiência vital que, em Platão, se efetiva uma compreensão filosófica. Trata-se de sublinhar os aspectos pessoais e profundos da vivência filosófica para apresentar a idéia de que, em Platão, a filosofia é uma experiência que, mesmo sendo estritamente racional, perpassa a totalidade da alma humana. A tese estrutura-se em quatro capítulos. O primeiro e o segundo salientam o aspecto psicagógico da filosofia, analisando a relação de Platão com a poesia grega (cap. 1) e a retórica (cap.2). No primeiro capítulo afirma-se que, mesmo com todas as críticas que Platão apresenta contra a poesia, ele ainda reserva um aspecto essencial desta, a psicagogia (condução da alma), como parte constituinte da filosofia. O segundo capítulo defende que há um aspecto da retórica - também a psicagogia - que deve estar presente na filosofia para que esta inscreva o conhecimento na alma do aprendiz. O terceiro capítulo analisa as críticas de Platão à palavra escrita, presentes na Carta VII e no Fedro. Defende-se que a filosofia depende de um processo pessoal que não está garantido ao ser descrito por palavras: precisa, antes, ser vivido por uma experiência vital para tornar-se vivo naquele que sabe. Por fim, o quarto capítulo apresenta a noção de dialética na República como uma conversão. A noção de conversão corrobora esta tese, pois afirma que o processo racional filosófico pretende uma transformação pessoal e profunda do aprendiz de filosofia.
This thesis claims that a philosophical understanding, in Plato, may only happen correctly whenever it comes through a vital experience. It intends to highlight the personal and deep aspects of philosophical experience. The thesis supports that, in Plato, philosophy is a kind of experience that, although being strictly rational, the whole soul engages in it. It has four chapters. The first and second present the psykhagogikos aspect of philosophy, analyzing Plato`s relation with Greek poetry (chap. 1) and rhetoric (chap. 2). In the first chapter, we claim that, despite all Plato`s criticism against poetry, he still retain an essential aspect of it - psykhagogia - as a necessary part of philosophy. The second chapter supports that there is an aspect of rhetoric - also psykhagogia - that must be present in philosophy so that knowledge might be inscribed in the soul of the student. The third chapter analyses Plato`s criticism against the written word, present in The Seventh Letter and the Phaedrus. We claim that philosophy depends on a personal process that is not assured by being described through words: it is necessary, first, to be felt by a vital experience, so that it may become alive in one who knows. At last, the forth chapter presents the notion of dialectic in the Republic as a conversion. The notion of conversion confirms this thesis because it claims that the rational philosophical process intends a personal and deep transformation in the student of philosophy.
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PEREIRA, BIANCA PEREIRA DAS NEVES VILHENA CAMPINHO. "ABOUT DREAMS IN PLATONIC PHILOSOPHY." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2018. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=35698@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROCONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
O presente estudo tem como foco investigar os sonhos (para os quais os gregos empregavam três diferentes palavras: oneiros/oneiron, onar e enupnion) e suas incursões nos diálogos de Platão. Dentre os aproximadamente vinte e oito diálogos raramente considerados apócrifos, em dezoito deles encontramos numerosas incidências à irrupção do sono e ao processo do despertar, à formação dos sonhos, bem como ao problema da diferenciação entre sonho e vigília, motivo pelo qual consideramo-las preocupações filosóficas caras a Platão. Embora esta tese tenha como objetivo geral apresentar um panorama das menções aos sonhos ao longo do corpus platônico, nossa investigação concentra-se sobretudo em seis diálogos e suas respectivas tematizações dos sonhos: Teeteto, Cármides, República, Apologia, Críton e Fédon. O nosso objetivo específico, por sua vez, consiste em compreender a doutrina do filósofo a partir destas incursões, visto que, como veremos, se, por um lado, mostrar-se-á evidente a dificuldade de encontrar um critério capaz de discernir ilusão e realidade, sonho e vigília, à hipótese platônica das formas imutáveis será atribuído importante papel nesta distinção. Em paralelo, encontramos nos dramas filosóficos alguns relatos de sonhos que Sócrates sonhara, os quais, com a ajuda do próprio sonhador, somos levados a investigar. Junto a isso, observamos ainda a influência das concepções mitológicas homérica e hesiódica dos sonhos sobre a concepção platônica deles, bem como a sua própria reinvenção filosófica.
The present study focuses on investigating dreams (for which the Greeks used three different words: oneiros/oneiron, onar and enupnion) and their incursions into Plato s dialogues. Of the approximately twenty-eight dialogues rarely considered apocryphal, in eighteen of them we find many incidences to the irruption of sleep and the process of awakening, to the formation of dreams, as well as to the problem of the differentiation between dream and wake, which is the reason why we consider them philosophical concerns dear to Plato. Although the general objective of this thesis is to propose an overview of the mentioning of dreams throughout the Platonic corpus, our investigation focuses mainly on six dialogues and their respective thematizations of dreams: Theaetetus, Carmides, Republic, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Our specific aim is to understand the philosopher s doctrine through these incursions, since, as we shall see, if, on the one hand, it shall be made evident the difficulty of finding a criteria capable of discerning illusion and reality, dream and wake, to the Platonic hypothesis of immutable forms an important role in this distinction shall also be assigned. In parallel, we find in these philosophical dramas various accounts of dreams that Socrates had dreamed, which, with the help of the dreamer himself, we are led to investigate. In conjunction with that, we also observe the influence of the Homeric and Hesiodic mythological conceptions of dreams on the Platonic conception of them, as well as his own philosophical reinvention.
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Michaud, Myriam. "L'acte de philosopher en Philosophie pour enfants." Thesis, Université Laval, 2010. http://www.theses.ulaval.ca/2010/27431/27431.pdf.
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Fontaine, Patrick. "Platon, non-philosophe." Paris 10, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA100051.
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L'embarras de la tradition à distinguer Platon et Socrate témoigne d'une réception traditionnelle de la philosophie : générale mais pas universelle. Nous renouvelons la lecture de Platon grâce à la non-philosophie de Laruelle, qui propose une approche universelle de la tradition. Laruelle pose le problème de la réception de la pensée, et Platon fait du personnage de Socrate la figure essentielle de la réception. Il y a une pensée platonicienne, en laquelle Socrate tient cette place déterminante d'être, dans un dispositif insurmontable, le pivot fondamental et révélateur. L'accueil est le signe d'un dispositif que Platon met en place : le dispositif de la réception de toute pensée selon l'identité humaine. Nous ne lisons plus Platon depuis la prise de parole de la tradition philosophique, mais selon le réel humain que Platon pose (et non pas " vise ", comme la tradition le croit). Nous posons, avec Laruelle, qu'il y a une pensée d'homme, depuis l'homme, selon l'homme en son immanence radicale, Platon en lui-même comme tout homme, réelThe embarrassment of the tradition to distinguish Plato and Socrates testifies to a traditional reception from philosophy : general but not universal. We renew the reading of Plato thanks to the not-philosophy of Laruelle, which proposes a universal approach of the tradition. Laruelle poses the problem of the reception of the thought, and Plato made of the character of Socrates the essential figure of the reception. There is a Platonic thought, in which Socrates holds this determining place to be, in an insurmountable device, the fundamental and revealing pivot. The reception is the sign of a device that Plato sets up: the device of the reception of very thought according to the human identity. We do not read any more Plato since the speech of the philosophical tradition, but according to human reality that Plato poses (and not "aims", as the tradition believes it). We pose, with Laruelle, that there is a thought of man, since the man, according to the man in his radical immanence, Plato in itself like any man, reality
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Colrat, Paul. "Le mythe du philosophe-roi : savoir, pouvoir et salut dans la philosophie politique de Platonε." Thesis, Normandie, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019NORMC005.
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La question du règne des philosophes ne se comprend qu’au prix d’un détour par les marges de la politique classique. D’abord nous avons montré que ces marges sont définies historiquement par un discours qui articule le règne, le savoir et le salut (chapitre I). Puis nous avons montré que la notion de règne, dès lors qu’elle est attribuée à des philosophes, s’établit dans les marges de la notion classique de basilein, en en subvertissant le sens classique (chapitre II). Ensuite nous avons montré que le discours sur le règne des philosophes est une tentative venant des marges de la politique pour subvertir en en faisant usage, c’est-à-dire pour destituer, la liaison classique entre le muthos et l’unification politique (chapitre III), ce qui a impliqué de comprendre comment le philosophe peut être aux marges de la politique tout en en étant le fondement (chapitre IV). Cela nous a conduit à voir que le philosophe est en marge par rapport à l’exigence d’être utile à la cité (chapitre V) et par rapport à l’exigence d’un savoir fondé sur l’expérience (chapitre VI). Enfin, nous avons essayé de montrer que le règne des philosophes s’inscrit dans la recherche du salut de la cité, thème marginal dans les études sur Platon (chapitre VII)The question of the philosophers’ reign can only be understood at the cost of a detour through the margins of classical politics. First of all, I have shown that these margins have historically been defined by a discourse focusing on the relationship between kingdom, knowledge and salvation (chapter 1). I have then shown that the notion of kingdom itself, when it is attributed to philosophers, positions itself in the margins of the notion of basilein, while actively subverting its classical meaning (chapter 2). The discourse about the philosophers’ reign must therefore be understood as an attempt coming from the margins of politics to use the traditional relation between the muthos and political unification, in order to subvert it, namely, to depose it. This required me to explore the way in which the philosopher can simultaneously be in the margins of politics and at the very foundation of politics (chapter 4). The philosopher’s position in the city is doubly marginal: first, he is not subject to the imperative to be useful to the city (chapter 5), and secondly, he is not subject to the imperative to ground knowledge in experience (chapter 6). Finally, I have set out to show that the philosophers’ reign inscribes itself within a quest for the city’s salvation, a theme that is itself marginal in Plato studies, and deserves more attention than it has hitherto received (chapter 7)
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Sekimura, Makoto. "Réception et création des images chez Platon." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210799.
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L’objet de ce travail consiste à étudier systématiquement le rôle de l’image platonicienne en mettant surtout en relief les modalités des actions des hommes qui reçoivent et créent les apparences. Platon intègre la fonction de l’image dans son propre système de pensée qui porte sur la relation du sensible et de l’intelligible. Ce philosophe est très sensible à la modalité par laquelle les phénomènes apparaissent dans le champ de notre perception et oppose deux types d’apparence :l’image et le simulacre. L’image est une apparence qui invite le spectateur à saisir le modèle et à mesurer la proportion de l’apparence par rapport au modèle, tandis que le simulacre est une apparence qui trompe le spectateur en lui faisant prendre une illusion pour une réalité. L’opposition entre ces deux types d’apparence constitue l’ensemble de la motivation philosophique de Platon qui s’engage dans la lutte contre l’illusionnisme. C’est dans le Phédon que l’on peut découvrir la scène où émerge la conviction platonicienne à l’égard de cette stratégie fondée sur la mise en rivalité du simulacre et de l’image par la promotion de celle-ci. L’émergence de sa théorie innovatrice des images n’est pas indépendante de la formulation de l’idée selon laquelle les choses sensibles participent aux réalités intelligibles. C’est sans doute dans la République qu’il se préoccupe le plus de la mise en œuvre de cette idée en développant les questions qui concernent la réception et la création des images. Dans ce dialogue, ces deux actions sont étroitement reliées et synthétisées, pour former le système original de Platon, dans lequel le fondement de la théorie des Idées relève d’un certain dynamisme de l’action humaine qui crée et qui reçoit les images. Ce dynamisme se fonde notamment sur la fonction conductrice du tupos qui, comme principe, réglemente la perception et la création des images. On peut ainsi soutenir que la réflexion esthétique de Platon sur la fonctionnalité des images va de pair avec le mouvement intellectuel pour établir et développer la théorie des Idées.Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation philosophie
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Maiullo, Stephen Anthony. "From Philosopher to Priest: The Transformation of the Persona of the Platonic Philosopher." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1267726367.
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Lopez, Noelle Regina. "The art of Platonic love." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2014. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5e9b2d70-49d9-4e75-b445-fcb0bfecdcef.
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This is a study of love (erōs) in Plato’s Symposium. It’s a study undertaken over three chapters, each of which serves as a stepping stone for the following and addresses one of three primary aims. First: to provide an interpretation of Plato’s favored theory of erōs in the Symposium, or as it’s referred to here, a theory of Platonic love. This theory is understood to be ultimately concerned with a practice of living which, if developed correctly, may come to constitute the life most worth living for a human being. On this interpretation, Platonic love is the desire for Beauty, ultimately for the sake of eudaimonic immortality, manifested through productive activity. Second: to offer a reading of the Symposium which attends to the work’s literary elements, especially characterization and narrative structure, as partially constitutive of Plato’s philosophical thought on erōs. Here it’s suggested that Platonic love is concerned with seeking and producing truly virtuous action and true poetry. This reading positions us to see that a correctly progressing and well-practiced Platonic love is illustrated in the character of the philosopher Socrates, who is known and followed for his bizarre displays of virtue and whom Alcibiades crowns over either Aristophanes or Agathon as the wisest and most beautiful poet at the Symposium. Third: to account for how to love a person Platonically. Contra Gregory Vlastos’ influential critical interpretation, it’s here argued that the Platonic lover is able to really love a person: to really love a person Platonically is to seek jointly for Beauty; it is to work together as co-practitioners in the art of love. The art of Platonic love is set up in this way to be explored as a practice potentially constitutive of the life most worth living for a human being.
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Mekhitarian, Aram S. "Emergences du Tupos chez Platon." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/212122.
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Tausch-Pebody, Gudrun. "Form and content in eight platonic dialogues." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.243068.
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Hobbs, Angela. "Homeric role models and the Platonic psychology." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.292786.
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Faggion, Cristina. "Particulars as aggregates of qualities in Platonic thought." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/6607.
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Brisson, Luc. "Mythe et philosophie chez Platon." Paris 10, 1985. http://www.theses.fr/1985PA100304.
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Testut-Prouha, Arnaud. "Théocrite, lecteur de Platon." Thesis, Montpellier 3, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017MON30103/document.
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Il s'agit de montrer que l'art poétique de Théocrite s'appuie sur des éléments littéraires et spéculatifs propres à Platon : dialogue, mimèsis, genres, mythes, imagesThis is to show that Theocritus poetic art is based on literary and speculative elements specific to Plato : dialogue, mimesis, genres, myths, images
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Ioannídis, Kleítos. "Le philosophe et le musicien dans l'oeuvre de Platon /." Nicosie : Centre de recherche de Kykkos, 1990. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb357061031.
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Tordjman, Pierre-Alexandre. "L'invention de la philosophie chez Platon." Paris 8, 2002. http://octaviana.fr/document/181323036#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.
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Le but de ce travail est de donner une interprétation de l'invention de la philosophie chez Platon. Il nous a semblé que pour être cohérente, une telle interprétation devait pouvoir être énoncée d'un point de vue non-philosophique. En effet, une interprétation philosophique de l'invention de la philosophie chez Platon impliquerait certains problèmes qui invalideraient la cohérence de sa démarche. Au-delà de la difficulté d'identifier ce que pourrait être une interprétation philosophique, une telle identification aboutirait nécessairement à une réduction du sens de la philosophie platonicienne au point de vue adopté. Nous avons plutôt tenté de transposer, d'une manière que nous avons appelée nai͏̈ve, certains éléments de connaissances non philosophiques, et d'être attentif à la dimension littéraire de l'œuvre. Notre interprétation relève à la fois d'un certain réductionnisme matérialiste et de la critique littéraire. Le premier permet d'essayer de dire des choses qui ont un sens littéral, la seconde prend en compte la dimension poétique de l'œuvre platonicienne. Nous avons conclu que l'invention de la philosophie chez Platon est un événement littéraireThe aim of this work is to give an interpretation of Plato's invention of Philosophy. It has appeared to us that, in order to be consistent, such an interpretation should be elaborated from a non philosophical point of view. A philosophical interpretation of Plato's invention of Philosophy would confront us with problems damaging to its own consistency. Beyond the difficulty of identifying clearly what a philosophical interpretation would be, such an identification would necessarily result in a reduction of the meaning of Plato's Philosophy to our interpretative approach. This reduction could not analyse the novelty of the platonic invention as it would mainly recognize its own philosophical stand in that of Plato's Philosophy. Instead, we have adopted a reductionist and materialist approach wich we have qualified as naive. This seemed to us necessary in order to give interpretations whose meaning can be intended literally. At the same time we have been cautious to give all its relevant importance to the poetic aspect of Plato's Dialogues in the invention of his Philosophy. We have reached the conclusion that Plato's invention of Philosophy is a literary event
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Juk, Hea-Wok. "Herrschaftsbegründung und Herrschaftsziel in der Philosophie Platons." [S.l. : s.n.], 2000. http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/2001/25/index.html.
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Ryan, Tim. "The influence of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy on the evangelism of C.S. Lewis." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN) Access this title online, 2003. http://www.tren.com.
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Petraki, Zacharoula Anastasiou. "Platonic poetics into philiosophy : the Republic's language of philosophy and Pindar's epinician odes." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.419724.
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Hart, Michael Richard. "Platonic education : teaching virtue in a constantly changing moral culture." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/50299/.
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In this thesis I shall argue (1) that for Plato ‘moral’ education, rightly understood (or ‘Platonic education’ as I shall call it), can be an effective method for cultivating virtue in non-ideal societies; (2) that Platonic education is a process that occurs (or Plato hopes might occur) through an engagement with some of the dialogues; (3) that Platonic education strongly mirrors Sokratic discourse in its aims; (4) that Plato’s whole approach to education should be understood mainly from the context of the problem of teaching virtue in imperfect societies; (5) that Plato intends some of the dialogues to serve as a propaedeutic for a possible education in virtue and not as a method for creating fully virtuous people. Lastly, (6) Platonic education is primarily concerned with human virtue, and insofar as it can support a notion or notions of civic virtue, it cannot do so unequivocally. The evidence for these claims is found not chiefly in the educational programmes and theories of the Republic and the Laws but in a number of techniques, such as protreptic rhetoric, life-models, argumentation, and myth, which Plato employs in some of the dialogues. Platonic education is specifically designed to function in imperfect societies. With this in mind therefore, an additional concern of this thesis is with whether we could imagine any of Plato’s educational principles or techniques being used to improve moral education today.
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Wiehart, Alexander. "Philosophos Platons Frage und ihre Verteidigung." Marburg Tectum-Verl, 2005. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=3045117&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Wiehart, Alexander. "Philosophos : Platons Frage und ihre Verteidigung /." Marburg : Tectum Verl, 2008. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=3045117&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Ricciardone, Chiara Teresa. "Disease and Difference in Three Platonic Dialogues| Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus." Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10615142.
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This study traces a persistent connection between the image of disease and the concept of difference in Plato’s Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus. Whether the disease occurs in the body, soul, city, or cosmos, it always signals an unassimilated difference that is critical to the argument. I argue that Plato represents—and induces—diseases of difference in order to produce philosophers, skilled in the art of differentiation. Because his dialogues intensify rather than cure difference, his philosophy is better characterized as a “higher pathology” than a form of therapy.
An introductory section on Sophist lays out the main features of the concept of difference-in-itself and concisely presents its connection to disease. The main chapters examine the relationship in different realms. In the first chapter, the problem is moral and political: in the Gorgias, rhetoric is a corrupting force, while philosophy purifies the city and soul by drawing distinctions. In the second chapter on Phaedo, the problem is epistemological: if we correctly interpret the illness of misology, as the despair caused by the inability to consistently distinguish truth and falsity, we can resolve the mystery of Socrates’ cryptic last words (“We owe a cock to Asclepius; pay the debt and do not neglect it”). In the third chapter on Timaeus, Plato treats diseases of the soul, the body, and the cosmos itself. There, the correlation between disease and difference actually helps humans situate themselves in the vast universe—for in both cases, proper differentiation is the key to a healthy, well-constructed life.
My emphasis on Plato’s theory of difference counters the traditional focus on his theory of Forms. Elucidating the link between the concept of difference and the experience of disease has broader impact for the ageless question of how we should live our lives. In Plato’s system, neither disease nor difference is a wholly negative element to be eradicated. Instead, difference and disease, in their proper proportions, are responsible for the fullness of the world and the emergence of the philosophical subject.
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Macé, Arnaud. "Platon, philosophie de l'agir et du pâtir /." Sankt Augustin : Academia Verl, 2006. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40235712k.
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Siniossoglou, Niketas. "Plato and Theodoret : the Christian appropriation of Platonic philosophy and the Hellenic intellectual resistance." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615236.
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Leask, Ian Albert. "Identity and difference : Platonism reassessed." Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.387892.
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Donato, Marco. "[Platone] Erissia, o sulla ricchezza : introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e commento." Thesis, Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PSLEP017.
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Cette thèse de doctorat consiste en une nouvelle édition critique avec introduction, traduction en italien et commentaire de l’« Éryxias » pseudo-platonicien, un dialogue socratique ayant été transmis parmi les œuvres de Platon mais qui était déjà connu par les anciens pour être inauthentique et faussement attribué au grand philosophe (voir par exemple Diogène Laërce 3, 62). L’édition critique la plus récente du texte, publiée dans la « Collection des Universités de France » par les soins de Joseph Souilhé en 1930, est fondée sur une reconstruction de la tradition manuscrite qui a été remise en question par les études de L.A. Post (1934). En outre, malgré le récent retour d’intérêt pour les dialogues « apocryphes » du corpus platonicien, l’« Éryxias » reste méconnu et peu étudié : après les deux dissertations allemandes d’O. Schrohl (Göttingen 1901) et G. Gartmann (Bonn 1949), il n’y a pas eu de travaux dédiés spécifiquement au dialogue, exception faite de la décevante traduction annotée par R. Laurenti (Bari 1969). L’hypothèse avancée au cours de ce travail voit en l’« Éryxias » un produit composé à l’école fondée par Platon, l’Académie, après la mort du fondateur et plus précisément pendant la première moitié du troisième siècle avant Jésus-Christ : cela ferait du dialogue un témoin de la reconstruction de la pensée et de l’activité littéraire de l’Académie hellénistique. L’introduction est divisée en quatre chapitres. Les deux premiers abordent les problèmes plus strictement philologiques, liés à la transmission du corpus et du dialogue dans l’antiquité et à la chronologie du texte, notamment fixée par les savants sur la base de la présence d’un magistrat – le gymnasiarque – qui n’apparaît pas à Athènes avant la fin du quatrième siècle avant Jésus-Christ. Le troisième chapitre porte sur le contenu philosophique : le sujet de l’« Éryxias » est le rapport entre richesse (ploutos) et vertu (arete). Deux conclusions différentes sont présentées, en s’appuyant sur deux définitions différentes de la richesse : selon la première, ayant trait au concept de valeur, le sage est le plus riche des hommes ; selon la seconde, identifiant la richesse à la possession de biens matériels (chremata), le plus riche des hommes sera le plus méchant. Les deux conclusions sont parfaitement en accord avec un arrière-plan philosophique constitué par les dialogues de Platon et s’insèrent dans une tentative visant à accorder les divers traitements de la richesse dans les écrits authentiques. La recherche menée dans l’« Éryxias » peut bien être contextualisée dans le mouvement général de « renaissance du Socratisme » qui a été individué par les savants durant la première moitié de l’époque hellénistique (voir A. A. Long, Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy, CQ 38, 1988, 150-171 ; F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Napoli 2000). L’Académie, comme le montre la production de dialogues socratiques, occupe un rôle central dans ce mouvement, ayant l’effort de revendiquer l’héritage de Socrate à travers son disciple, Platon. Le quatrième chapitre porte sur l’aspect littéraire : l’« Éryxias » a été reconnu par les savants comme le plus soigné des dialogues inauthentiques en ce qui concerne la cure de l’élément artistique. Après un paragraphe sur la poétique du dialogue dans l’« Éryxias », nous relevons une étude approfondie du proème, qui se montre particulièrement détaillé, ainsi que de Socrate et des autres personnages. À la fin du chapitre, le style et la langue du dialogue sont examinés. À la suite d’une note sur la tradition manuscrite, est donnée une nouvelle édition critique avec apparat du dialogue, suivie d’une traduction en italien. Le commentaire extensif porte sur des questions de détail s’insérant dans le plus grand cadre tracé au cours de l’introduction : son approche est autant philologique-littéraire qu’historique et philosophique. Un appendice de tables et une bibliographie sont ajoutés en qualité d’instruments nécessaires au lecteurThis PhD thesis consists in a new critical edition with introduction, italian translation and commentary of the pseudo-platonic Eryxias, a Socratic dialogue transmitted inside the corpus of Plato’s works but already known in antiquity (see Diogenes Laertius 3.62) to be inauthentic and falsely attributed to the ancient philosopher. The latest critical edition of the Eryxias, which dates back to 1930 and was published by J. Souilhé in the «Collection des Universités de France», is not reliable, as it depends on a misleading reconstruction of the manuscript tradition, outdated at least since the pioneering work of L. A. Post (1934, The Vatican Plato and its Relations, Middletown); moreover, notwithstanding the text’s philosophical and literary interest and length inside the group of the Platonic spuria, the Eryxias has not been object of specific studies in the past century, exception made for the two dissertations by O. Schrohl (Göttingen 1901) and G. Gartmann (Bonn 1949), two works that remain hardly accessible even to scholars in the field, and for the italian edition by R. Laurenti (Bari 1969). Even in recent years, when the spurious dialogues have seen a renaissance as a field of study (see for example the volume edited by K. Döring, M. Erler and S. Schorn, Pseudoplatonica, Stuttgart, 2005), the Eryxias remains less studied than other items in the corpus, mainly due to its extension – fifteen pages of the canonic edition by Stephanus (1578) – and to its overall complexity. In spite of this marginal role in recent studies, the Eryxias had attracted since the 18th century the interest of scholars and historians of ancient economy, as it presents an ancient discussion on the value of wealth and material goods. The first part of the introduction deals with the philological issues and the general problems related to the transmission of the text in antiquity. In the second chapter I turn to the philosophical content. The theme of the Eryxias is an enquiry on the relationship between wealth (ploutos) and virtue (arete), led by Socrates together with his interlocutors Erasistratus, Eryxias and Critias (the tyrant). Two definitions of wealth are investigated: according to the first, which is centered on value (axios) the wealthiest man will be the wise man (sophos), as wisdom is the greatest value for mankind. According to the second, which identifies wealth with the possession of material goods (chremata), the richest man will be the most wicked. Both of these conclusions are consistent with the main model of the dialogue, that is to say the authentic writings of Plato. In the introduction I argue that the philosophical aim of the Eryxias is in fact an attempt to draw a coherent doctrine of wealth based on the Platonic dialogues and on the research developed inside Plato’s school, the Academy, in the first decades of the third century: to prove this point I show the coherence with many parallel passages in Plato’s writings, which show a careful study of the whole body of work associated to the name of the founder of the Academy, and I try to set the Eryxias in its historical frame, namely the «return to Socrates» that historians have seen in the first part of the Hellenistic Age (see A. A. Long, Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy, CQ 38, 1988, 150-171; F. Alesse, La Stoa e la tradizione socratica, Napoli 2000). In the third and final chapter I concentrate my attention on the literary aspect, with a particular interest in the reception of the models of Socratic literature in the composition of the dialogue. Follows a note on the medieval tradition. After the text and translation, the extended commentary focuses on issues of detail, both literary-philological and philosophical. An appendix with tables as a full bibliography are included
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Bentley, Russell K. "Language, politics and order in Plato's political thought : a study of four Platonic works." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1995. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2834/.
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This thesis is an examination of Plato's Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic I, and the Phaedrus. The focus is on Plato's political thought and my aim is to examine politics and language within the context of Plato's belief in and desire for order. I try to show how he connects the way language is used with the political life of a community. I argue that he identifies a link between the stability of a political association and the uses, and users, of language. Given his fundamental belief in a metaphysical order, existing beyond and prior to human existence, I argue that Plato seeks to anchor language and politics, to rationalise them in accordance with the the universal harmony characterised by the Forms. In making this argument I try to show that, for Plato, the spread of order logically culminates in a harmonisation of the physical and metaphysical. So much is this so, I claim, that the stability of order in any sphere of human existence depends on the existence of order in all other spheres. Thus, an orderly political association, one organised in accordance with Platonic moral principles, simply cannot exist if the language its members share does not exhibit the very same order. Psychological order is the avenue through which the metaphysical order enters human affairs. Given the Greek assumption that life in the polis is the natural life for man, examination of the human psyche becomes for Plato also an examination of communal, or associative, living. The moral as intrinsically part of the political. Plato is concerned with both the quality of the association and the quality of its mode of interaction. Both politics and language must be harmonised to ensure a concordance between human existence and the metaphysical order in which Plato believes.
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Woolf, Raphael Graham. "Socrates and the self : the mapping of internal relations in some early Platonic dialogues." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.267307.
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González, Rendón Diony. "Cicero Platonis Aemulus : une étude sur le De Legibus de Cicéron." Thesis, Paris 4, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA040009.
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Cette thèse étudie la réception de la philosophie de Platon à Rome au cours du premier siècle av. J.-C., en s´attachant plus particulièrement à la façon dont Marco Tulio Cicéron interprète, étudie, traduit et imite l´œuvre du philosophe grec. Nous y analysons également la réception qu´en font les stoïciens étant donné que le platonisme romain et plus concrètement celui que Cicéron connait, est tributaire des enseignements des maîtres stoïciens de Rome.Cette réception sera le point de départ pour comprendre comment Cicéron imite et émule le style et le contenu des dialogues de Platon et cela afin de rendre compte des différences et des similitudes entre leurs doctrines philosophiques. Cette thèse permettra de révéler l´influence que la philosophie de Platon a eu sur la configuration de la pensée et du langage philosophique à Rome ainsi que sur celle du domaine religieux et de celui de la législation romaine.Le De Legibus de Marco Tulio Cicéron sera l´œuvre-pivot de notre recherche. Ce dialogue n´a pas été exclusivement rédigé en tant qu´une imitation du style et du contenu des Lois de Platon; en effet, son contenu reflète non seulement l´importance qu´a eu le dialogue platonicien en tant que modèle dans l´élaboration des dialogues philosophiques de Cicéron, mais plus exactement celle de sa perspective politique et philosophique telle qu´elle est exposée dans le De Oratore, De Re Publica et le De Legibus.C´est à partir du langage que nous aborderons le processus d´imitation et d´émulation, c´est-à-dire que dans un premier temps, nous analyserons la façon dont Cicéron traduit l´œuvre de Platon. Nous observerons ensuite comment Cicéron adopte la structure rhétorique du dialogue platonicien. Finalement, nous présenterons la notion de loi naturelle comme élément grâce auquel nous montrerons l´empreinte du platonisme contenu dans le De Legibus. Il est pertinent de souligner que ce platonisme cicéronien a été marqué par un dialogue constant entre les différentes traditions stoïciennes, académiciennes et péripatéticiennes tout autant que par les disputes contre les épicuriens et les griefs nourris par une réalité romaine déchirée par une crise politique et spirituelleThe following dissertation examines the reception of Plato’s philosophy in Rome, with special focus on how Marcus Tullius Cicero, between the years I to C. approximately, receives, studies, translates and imitates the work of the Greek philosopher. Furthermore, it analyses the way in which the Stoics received Plato’s philosophy, considering the fact that Roman Platonism, and that of Cicero in particular, was communicated by the Stoic teachers of Rome.This reception will be the starting point in order to comprehend Cicero’s imitation and emulation of the style andcontent in the dialogues of Plato, and to perceive similarities as well as dissimilarities in his philosophic doctrines. This dissertation will highlight the influence that Plato’s philosophy exerted on the development of the thoughts and philosophic language of Rome, as well as its contribution to Roman religion and legislation.The point of reference for this paper is the De Legibus by Marcus Tullius Cicero. The dialogue was not composedexclusively as an imitation of the style and content of Plato’s The Laws; instead, it reflects the importance of the Platonic dialogue as a model for the philosophic dialogues which Cicero formed, specifically the political and philosophical proposition that Cicero presents in De Oratore, De Re Publica and De Legibus.The process of imitation and emulation will be addressed from a linguistic perspective. In other words, an analysis ofhow Cicero translates the work of Plato will be followed by an observation of how Cicero adapts the rhetorical structure of the Platonic dialogue. Finally, the paper will discuss the notion of the natural law as an element through which it is possible to demonstrate the Platonism that encompasses Cicero’s De Legibus. It is also worth mentioning that Cicero’s Platonism was characterized by the continuous interchange with the various Stoic, Academics and Peripatetic traditions, the disputes with Epicureans, and the objections of a Roman society immersed in a political and spiritual crisis
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Coquio, Henri. "Platon : l'être et l'image." Paris 1, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001PA010636.
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La thèse a pour objet le statut ontologique de l'image chez Platon, lequel convoque l'ensemble de la philosophie platonicienne. L'image revêt à la fois un sens noétique, comme représentation, renvoyant à la mimesis, et un sens ontologique, comme autre que l'essence, désignant un certain non-être. Dans un premier temps, il s'agit de distinguer l'image de l'Idée en général; dans un second temps, de penser la relation de l'image et du langage à travers une interprétation du Cratvle. Les deux derniers moments sont consacrés respectivement à la question de l'image dans son rapport au monde, et à la question de l'image dans son rapport à l'homme au sein de la culture.
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Milligan, Tony. "Iris Murdoch's romantic Platonism." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2005. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/7485/.
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This account of Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy takes the form of a critique. It attempts to show the ways in which she falls foul of what she criticises. Murdoch is concerned about the influence of the romantic tradition upon our contemporary (post-war) accounts of morality. She charges contemporaries, such as Sartre and R. M. Hare with having mistakenly extended freedom in ways that make morality seem like a matter of free choice. Against this, her own most rigorous work (The Sovereignty of Good) advances three central claims: (1) an idea of moral perfection (an ideal Good) is built into our ways of thinking and speaking; (2) this idea of Good/perfection is not an unavoidable fiction but a reality principle, it helps to undermine the egocentricity that prevents us from doing justice to the reality of others; (3) this idea of a single, unitary Good pulls us towards Platonic metaphors. (We are like pilgrims, trying to move out of dark egocentricity and into the light of attention to others). My response to this is advanced in the following three parts: Part one sets out Murdoch’s position, complete with an account of the stylistic peculiarities of its exposition. (She believes that value-laden metaphors are unavoidable, and in some cases irreducible). Part Two flags up her similarity to what she attacks. Far from being a moral quietist, Murdoch is deeply critical of our everyday lack of moral ambition. (It is as if we are content to lurk about in the dark). She rejects everyday (‘bourgeois’) contentment in favour of the command ‘be ye therefore perfect’. Having flagged up this shared rejection of everyday contentment, I explore the way that Murdoch’s apparently diffuse charge of ‘romanticism’ is held together by the idea of erotic striving. Such romanticism is the general theoretical correlate of the wrong model of love, romantic love rather than the slow patient love that she wants us to emulate. On this account, avoiding romanticism requires us to meet the following conditions. Firstly, we must direct loving attention towards the contingent reality of persons without puritanically avoiding attention to messy detail. (We should not just ‘tag’ people symbolically, as one of these or one of those.) Secondly, our attention to the other should really be about them, it should not covertly redirect attention to the self. Thirdly, we should not allow our fascinating suffering to obscure the reality of death. (The realisation of our finitude is a crucial aspect of undermining egocentricity). Part Three consists of chapter-pairs which examine the central Murdochian metaphors of fallenness, eros, and the death of the self in an attempt to show that Murdoch falls foul of what she attacks.
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Quinn, Patrick. "Aquinas, Platonism and the knowledge of God." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.262363.
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Bryson, Peter James. "The Christian Platonism of Thomas Jackson." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.607670.
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Markus, Andreas. "Philosophen- oder Gesetzesherrschaft? Untersuchungen zu Platons Politeia und den Nomoi." Marburg Tectum-Verl, 2001. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2771161&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
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Leitgeb, Maria-Christine. "Concordia mundi : Platons Symposion und Marsilio Ficinos Philosophie der Liebe /." Wien : Holzhausen, 2010. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=018973773&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Sattler, Stefan Georg. "Der griechische Fortschrittsbegriff - dargestellt an Platon /." Berlin : Verl. dissertation.de, 2000. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37635052f.
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Han, Jacques. "La structure de la philosophie de Socrate selon Platon." Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01H205/document.
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La philosophie de Socrate selon Platon se structure autour de six termes : la Forme, l'âme, l'ignorance, la science, la vertu et la dialectique. En effet, l'âme, immortelle, est la source de tous les biens et de tous les maux, parce qu'elle est le principe du mouvement spontané et par conséquent la cause première de tous les mouvements aussi bien intellectifs que sensitifs et physiques. Cela étant, rendre justes la cité et les citoyens, c'est avant tout rendre juste leur âme. Or, comment rendre meilleure une âme, si l'on ne connaît pas la cause même des biens et celle des maux ? Dans les premiers dialogues, Socrate philosophe contre l'ignorance qui est la cause du vice, lequel prive l'âme de la vertu. Dans les dialogues tardifs, Socrate philosophe pour la science, c'est-à-dire la connaissance de ce qui est, qui est la source même de la vertu. Or comment connaître ce qui est, si la réalité ou l'être ne cesse de changer? De là vient la nécessité de l'existence des réalités intelligibles qui sont universelles et immuables auxquelles participent les réalités sensibles qui sont particulières et changeantes. Une question se pose : si la réfutation est le moyen, à travers le dialogue, de faire apparaître l'ignorance, quel est le moyen de connaître ce qui est ? Ce moyen, c'est la dialectique qui permet, à travers le dialogue, de se remémorer des réalités véritables que l'âme eut jadis contempléesAccording to Plata, the philosophy of Socrates is structured around six terms: Form, soul, ignorance, knowledge, virtue, and dialectics. The soul, which is immortal, is the source of all goods and all evils, since it is the principle of spontaneous movement, and consequently the first cause of all movements, whether intellective, sensitive, or physical. Therefore, to make the city and its citizens just means, above all, making their soul just. Yet how can a soul be made better if one does not know the very cause of what is good and what is bad? ln the first dialogues, Socrates philosophizes against ignorance as the cause of vice, which deprives the soul of virtue. ln the late dialogues, Socrates philosophizes in favor of knowledge, that is, the knowledge of that which is, which is the very source of virtue. Yet how can one know that which is, if reality or being never cease changing? Hence the need for the existence of intelligible realities that are universal and immutable, in which sensible realities, which are particular and changing, participate. A question arises: if refutation is the means of revealing ignorance through dialogue, what is the means for knowing that which is? The answer is dialectic, which, through dialogue, allows one to recall the genuine realities which the soul once contemplated
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Lorenz, Hendrik. "Non-rational practical cognition in Plato and Aristotle." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365631.
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Pereira, Filho Gerson. "A cidade platonica das leis e seu percurso historico." [s.n.], 2005. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279894.
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Orientador: Alcides Hector Rodriguez BenoitTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-05T11:00:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 PereiraFilho_Gerson_D.pdf: 13290018 bytes, checksum: a2fdc79aa291b09494dbcf826907d231 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005
Resumo: A proposta desta tese de doutoramento é promover uma investigação sobre o processo de fundação da cidade platônica no Diálogo Leis, procurando verificar como esse texto e esse processo estão vinculados ao conjunto dos Diálogos, permitindo-nos compreender que o autor filósofo estabelece um percurso teórico, conceitual e metodológico relacionado diretamente ao contexto de transformações históricas das cidades e regimes políticos gregos. Assim, nesse percurso histórico dos textos dialógicos, verificamos a elaboração, ainda que incipiente, de uma teoria da história em Platão
Abstract: The proposol of this thesis of doctorate is to promote an investigation on the foundation process of the platonic city in the Dialogue of Laws, seeking to verify how this text and this process are linked to the set of dialogues, allowing us to comprehend that the philosopher author establishes a theoretical, methodological and conceptual path directly related to the context of the historical transformations of the Greek cities and their political regimes. Therefore, in this historical route of the dialogical texts, we verify an elaboration, even though incipient, of a theory of history in Plato
Doutorado
Doutor em Filosofia
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Thorsson, Elisabeth Maria Louise. "Between empiricism and Platonism : the concept of reason in Locke's philosophy." Thesis, University of York, 2018. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/20476/.
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Locke has long been read in the light of the ideas of Hobbes, that is, as a materialist philosopher, endorsing a conventional view of morality. Hobbes does this through an instrumentalist interpretation of the human reason and Epicurean naturalism (i.e. the hypothesis that everything is made of atoms). Even though Locke’s writings are replete with expressions of his Christian thought, scholars have suggested that Locke is committed to an empirical stance underwritten by these ultimately Epicurean commitments. There is, therefore, a tension in Locke’s philosophy between three divergent thought complexes: his empiricism, his commitment to Christianity, and what seems to be a form of scepticism. This tension poses an interpretative problem, especially concerning Locke’s claims about morality and theology, and the sincerity of his commitment to God. The Hobbist interpretation of Locke has gained ground in recent years, and as a result, Locke’s religious philosophy has been criticised for being either irrelevant or inconsistent. The purpose of this thesis is to engage in and refute that line of criticism by demonstrating that it is possible to give an alternative and richer account of Locke’s intellectual background. By focusing on Locke’s conception of reason, I trace new sources through an overlooked history of ideas from the ancient Platonic tradition, the Stoics, and the Jewish Neo-Platonist philosopher Philo of Alexandria, to the so-called Cambridge Platonists. In particular, I reinterpret Locke’s definition of reason in the light of the Platonist tradition, as containing certain metaphysical and universal traits that are inherently Platonist, and not as something instrumental. The Cambridge Platonists were prominently engaged in a debate against Hobbes, aiming to refute his materialism and arguing for the retainment of a classical understanding of the concept of reason in order to save Christian ethics from Epicureanism and atheism. With this thesis, I show that this debate was very much alive and present to Locke, which he also crucially partook in, and that he in fact sides with the Platonists more so than with Hobbes.
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Daouti, Panagiota. "Homère et Platon chez Maxime de Tyr." Thesis, Montpellier 3, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015MON30042.
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Le retour à la littérature classique et l'héritage culturel sont omniprésents dans les œuvres littéraires, rhétoriques ou philosophiques de l'époque de Maxime de Tyr. Maxime suit cette tradition puisque dans ses Dialexeis sont éparpillées des références aux auteurs qui le précèdent. Maxime est influencé surtout par Homère et Platon comme on constate en lisant ses Dialexeis, où il montre sa prédilection pour les deux grands maîtres. Quant à Homère on trouve des citations utilisées pour illustrer ou pour compléter le sens d'un ensemble des phrases du texte de Maxime. Quelquefois Maxime procède à un léger changement dans les vers homériques afin de les adapter à l'entité syntaxique de son propre texte. Il y aussi des références aux noms ou aux épisodes pris dans les épopées homériques. Maxime utilise aussi l'allégorie homérique pour véhiculer des idées ou développer sa pensée philosophique.L'influence de Platon est profonde et s'étend à tous les domaines de la pensée de Maxime : politique, religieux, artistique, mais surtout philosophique. L'auteur des Dialexeis se trouve devant le problème épineux de la réconciliation de la philosophie avec la poésie. C'est en utilisant les citations des épopées homériques que Maxime trouve une manière de parler des conceptions philosophiques. Autrement dit, les exemples pris dans le texte d'Homère sont surtout utilisés afin que Maxime rende plus claire et explicite sa parole chaque fois qu'il expose ses idées philosophiques. Maxime prouve dans l'œuvre même, qu'un poète peut être aussi un grand philosophe, scellant ainsi la coexistence et arrivant à la réconciliation entre Homère et PlatonThe return to the classical literature and the evocation of cultural heritage are ubiquitous in the works of literature or those related to rhetoric and philosophy during the first centuries of the Roman Empire. Maximus of Tyr, who lived in the time of Commodus', follows this trend, as his Orations are full of citations or references to the works of his predecessors. However, he shows his preference for Homer and Plato, as their influence is evident in the Orations. As far as Homer is concerned, we mostly find citations that illustrate Maximus' text or complete the meaning of a series of phrases. Sometimes Maximus intervenes in Homer's text in order to adapt it to his own. Moreover, we can find references to names or to precise moments of the Iliad or the Odyssey, which are dispersed in the Orations. Maximus uses, also, the Homeric allegory in order to convey his thoughts about some philosophical issues such as the harmonious style of life, the pursuit of human felicity and the cultivation of a virtuous character. Plato's influence is also profound and it is extended to a wide range of Maximus' interests: politics, religion, art and mainly philosophy. Furthermore, in an effort to reconcile poetry and philosophy, Maximus uses the Homeric citations so as to develop more explicitly his philosophical conceptions, which, otherwise, would have stayed obscure. In this way he proves that a poet can be at the same time a great philosopher sealing the coexistence and bridging the differences between Homeric poetry and Platonic philosophy
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Shahin, Samar. "Tugend als Wissen in den frühen Dialogen Platons." Doctoral thesis, Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:15-qucosa-86707.
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Nōtomi, Noburu. "The unity of Plato's "Sophist" : between the sophist and the philosopher /." Cambridge : Cambridge university press, 1999. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb371040830.
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McLean, Karen, and n/a. "Samuel Taylor Coleridge�s use of platonic and neoplatonic theories of evil and creation." University of Otago. Department of English, 2008. http://adt.otago.ac.nz./public/adt-NZDU20080222.121810.
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Samuel Taylor Coleridge used theories of evil and creation from Plato, Plotinus and Proclus to refine his definitions of the Trinity and the Absolute and Apostate Wills, and to move beyond the Germanic Naturphilosophie concept of self-hood as achieved by a self-objectification which emphasised differences between the persons of the Trinity rather than their similarities. His use of specific classical Greek concepts allowed him to propose that the Absolute Will�s self-substantiative act established unity and distinction as simultaneous and interrelated equals. From this, Coleridge investigated how identity and relationship rely upon unity and distinction, as he believed that identity is a unified self distinct from others, and that relationship is the unified common ground of many selves.
My first chapter explains my methodology in dealing with Coleridge�s problematic relationship with both Greek and German sources, and describes how Coleridge�s philosophical investigations into evil and creation resulted from personal crises oyer his sense of self and sin. I provide an overview of the system Coleridge devised to address these concerns, concentrating upon the aspects which he believed clarified humanity�s status in relation to evil and the divine. I demonstrate how Coleridge accounts for the origin of the Apostate Will, and I explain his view of identity and relationships between the persons of the Trinity, providing a relevant overview that allows me to point out his use of the fundamental Greek concepts that anchor the subsequent chapters on Plato, Plotinus and Proclus.
My second chapter examines Coleridge�s statement that Plato had formulated a triune creative principle, a concept critical to Coleridge�s need to unite God to the created universe. After describing the Platonic structure of reality and its divine creative act, I focus on the Platonic triad of Difference, Unity and Being. Plato�s account of these three principles and how they arise from the divine principle activity influences Coleridge�s view of the Trinity, what it contains in terms of distinction and unity, and how the Trinity arises from the superessential Absolute Will. I explain how Coleridge refined his definition of Christ as pleroma by referencing the way that the Form of the Good simultaneously exhibits plurality and identity.
My third chapter shows how the Plotinian theory of the One�s will-based self-substantiation influenced Coleridge�s definition of the Absolute Will. I determine that Plotinus�s concept of heterotes (otherness) informs Coleridge�s view of the origin of evil, and I show how his concept of redemption is influenced by Plotinus�s account of noetic contemplation.
My fourth chapter explains how Coleridge used the Proclian concept of Bound to develop the actualising quality of the Logos, in relation to Christ as a successful plurality but also in terms of Christ�s role in the redemption.
My conclusion surveys all four philosophers to demonstrate how concepts drawn from Plato, Plotinus and Proclus helped Coleridge to define the Absolute Will and the way that its activity is the unity, distinction, identity and relationship of the Trinity. These three distinct yet related systems influenced Coleridge�s view of evil, as well as his understanding of the Absolute Will�s self-creative act, its relation to the Trinity, and the simultaneously fallen and divine status of humanity.
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Deng, Xiangling [Verfasser], and Jens [Akademischer Betreuer] Halfwassen. "Das zweite Prinzip in Platons Philosophie / Xiangling Deng ; Betreuer: Jens Halfwassen." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2019. http://d-nb.info/1201822009/34.
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Durand, Marc. "Pour une lecture du "Phédon" de Platon." Aix-Marseille 1, 1987. http://www.theses.fr/1987AIX10045.
Full textAbstract:
Le phedon nous interpelle de facon triple. Nous pouvons proceder : - a une lecture religieuse, avec les themes de la mort, de la vie post-mortem, des differents dieux, des pratiques reli- gieuses. - a une lecture onto-epistemologique qui nous devoile une certaine demarche vers la saisie de l'etre, se trouvant definir la connaissance. - a une lecture existentielle qui etale devant nous la verite d'un existant recherchant la verite de l'existenceThe phaedo induces our reflection in three ways : - a religious way, with the themes of death, post-mortem life, different gods, and religious rites. - an onto-epistemological way with the process towards the appropriation of the idea, which definies knowledge. - an existential way which shows us the thruth of an existing being searching for the thruth of existence
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Quinquis, Benoît. "La conception de l'immortalité de l'âme dans les dialogues de Platon : sources et enjeux." Thesis, Brest, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015BRES0108/document.
Full textAbstract:
La démonstration de l’immortalité de l’âme dans les dialogues de Platon, notamment dans le Phédon, a été abondamment commentée au point d’avoir longtemps servi de référence majeure sur cette question. Cette thèse se propose donc de « déconstruire » le propos platonicien relatif à la survie de l’âme afin de découvrir si cette conception n’est pas sous-tendue par des intuitions spontanées que peut avoir tout homme lorsqu’il prend conscience de son être propre et qui, précisément, l’amènent à se penser doté d’une âme survivant à son corps ; que nous dit Platon, explicitement ou non, sur ces intuitions ? De quelles vérités humaines les mythes eschatologiques se font-ils l’écho ? Pour tenter de répondre à cette problématique, la thèse s’ouvre sur une première partie spécifiquement consacrée à un commentaire des développements platoniciens relatifs à l’immortalité de l’âme, ne passant sous silence ni le contexte dans lequel Platon situait ses dialogues ni son projet philosophique, éthique et politique global. Sur la base des conclusions de cette exégèse, s’engage ensuite une analyse des rapports qu’entretient la thèse de la survie post corporis mortem de l’âme avec les principaux aspects de la spécificité humaine mis en jeu dans la démonstration platonicienne ; la dernière partie, enfin, tente d’opérer la synthèse des idées développées antérieurement et propose quelques hypothèses pour identifier les sentiments se situant à la source de la croyance en l’immortalité de l’âme et déterminer si Platon faisait siens ces sentiments ou non : ainsi, la boucle sera bouclée et cette thèse devrait donner de quoi répondre à certaines idées reçues relatives à PlatonThe demonstration of immortality of soul in Plato’s dialogues, notably in Phædo, has been the object of many commentaries : as a result, it has been for a long time the major reference about this question. So, this thesis’ purpose is accomplishing the « deconstruction » of Plato’s writings about soul’s survival : when he begins to know his own being, every human might have spontaneous intuitions which make he thinks his soul survive after body’s death. Maybe such intuitions underlie this concept in Plato’s dialogues : so, what does Plato, explicitly or not, tell about these intuitions ? Which human features underlie his eschatological myths ? In order to try to answer these questions, the actual commentary of Plato’s explanations concering immortality of soul will be the object of thesis’ first part : this commentary will forget neither the context of dialogues nor Plato’s philosophical, ethical and politcal whole plans. This exegesis will lay the foundations for an analysis of links betweem the concept of soul’s survival after body’s death and human specificity’s major aspects which Plato mentions in his explanations ; the last part will try to summarize what has been previously presented and will propose some hypothesis in order to identify human feelings which constitute the source of belief in soul’s immortality and to see if these feelings were Plato’s ones or not. As a result, the thesis will come full circle and might contradict some wrongly widespread ideas concerning Plato
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Saulius, Tomas. "Platono metodologijos metmenys: elenktikos taikymas ankstyvuosiuose dialoguose." Doctoral thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2011. http://vddb.laba.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2011~D_20110531_105234-37840.
Full textAbstract:
Disertacijoje nagrinėjama ankstyvoji Platono filosofija, kuriai lietuviškoje mokslinėje literatūroje iki šiol, deja, nebuvo skiriamas deramas dėmesys. Nuo pat devynioliktojo šimtmečio dominuoja nuomonė, jog platoniškosios filosofijos pagrindas yra vadinamoji „idėjų teorija“, kuria remiantis sprendžiamos etinės, epistemologinės bei ontologinės problemos; nors pati ši „teorija“ susiformuoja tik viduriniojo laikotarpio dialoguose, yra manoma, jog jau „sokratiniame“ laikotarpyje išsikristalizuojančios etinės doktrinos suponuoja „grynųjų pavidalų“ egzistavimo teigimą. Disertacijoje šis stereotipas yra atmetamas ir, vadovaujantis Gregory Vlastoso idėjomis, pasiūloma alternatyvi dialogų interpretavimo perspektyva. Šiuo atveju platoniškosios filosofijos originalumas siejamas ne su tam tikra bendra „idealistine sistema“, bet būtent su specifine filosofinio tyrimo metodika. Pirmiausiai dėmesys sutelkiamas ties elenktikos metodu, kurį Vlastosas apibūdina kaip Sokrato (pagrindinio dialogų veikėjo) dažnai naudojamą priemonę nuneigti pašnekovo pradinę tezę, įrodant jos nesuderinamumą su kitomis pašnekovo išsakytomis nuomonėmis. Visgi logikos požiūriu elenktikos metodas nėra neproblemiškas: anot Vlastoso, elenktika neapsiriboja vien tik nuneigimu ir gali teikti pozityvių rezultatų, tačiau akivaizdu, kad jos kaip deduktyvaus metodo rezultatų vertė priklauso nuo prielaidų teisingumo, o Sokratas nenurodo aiškaus jų pasirinkimo kriterijaus. Tad nenuostabu, kad kai kuriais atvejais elenktika... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]The dissertation treats Plato’s early philosophy which, unfortunately, till now didn’t receive due attention in Lithuanian scholarship. From the nineteenth century a belief dominates among scholars that so-called “theory of ideas” is a foundation of Platonic philosophy and that ethical, epistemological and ontological issues are considered on the basis of this “theory”; although the latter was explicitly formulated only in the dialogues of the middle period, scholars believe that even doctrines which took shape in the “Socratic” dialogues presupposes the assertion of the existence of “pure forms”. In the dissertation this stereotype is discarded and, following Gregory Vlastos’ ideas, an alternative perspective of the interpretation of dialogues is proposed. In this case, the originality of Platonic philosophy is related with a specific methodic of the philosophical investigation, not with certain general “idealistic system”. First of all, we focus on the method of elenchus which Vlastos describes as a device (constantly used by Socrates, the main character of the dialogues) to refute interlocutor’s primary thesis, demonstrating its inconsistency with his other beliefs. However, from the point of view of logic, this method isn’t unproblematic: according to Vlastos, elenchus does not confine strictly to the refutation and can provide positive results, but it is evident that the value of its results depends on the veracity of its premises (because elenchus is deductive... [to full text]