Academic literature on the topic 'Poison pills'
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Journal articles on the topic "Poison pills"
Gleason, Katherine I., and Mark S. Klock. "Is there power behind the dead hand? An empirical investigation of dead hand poison pills." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 1 (2009): 370–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i1c3p4.
Full textSanford Jr, Douglas, Yong-Yeon Ji, and Won-Yong Oh. "Poison pills and CEOs: The résumé matters." Corporate Board role duties and composition 8, no. 2 (2012): 24–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv8i2art3.
Full textNguyen, Duc Giang. "The endogeneity of poison pill adoption and unsolicited takeovers." International Journal of Managerial Finance 14, no. 1 (February 5, 2018): 23–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-04-2017-0075.
Full textSolomon, Daniel H. "Poison pills." Journal of Clinical Investigation 119, no. 3 (March 2, 2009): 427. http://dx.doi.org/10.1172/jci38430.
Full textSchepker, Donald J., Won-Yong Oh, and Pankaj C. Patel. "Interpreting Equivocal Signals: Market Reaction to Specific-Purpose Poison Pill Adoption." Journal of Management 44, no. 5 (March 18, 2016): 1953–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206316635250.
Full textTurk, Thomas A., Jeremy Goh, and Candace E. Ybarra. "The effect of takeover defenses on long term and short term analysts’ earnings forecasts: The case of poison pills." Corporate Ownership and Control 4, no. 4 (2007): 140–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv4i4p11.
Full textJohnson, Dana J., and Nancy L. Meade. "Shareholder Wealth Effects Of Poison Pills In The Presence Of Anti-Takeover Amendments." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 12, no. 4 (September 8, 2011): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v12i4.5780.
Full textTurk, Thomas A., Jeremy Goh, and Candace E. Ybarra. "Do poison pills increase firm risk?" Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 3 (2008): 47–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i3p5.
Full textAzevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva, and Sílvio Hiroshi Nakao. "THE INFLUENCE OF POISON PILLS ON EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION." Advances in Scientific and Applied Accounting 12, no. 3 (December 31, 2019): 039–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.14392/asaa.2019120303.
Full textTian, Xiaoli (Shaolee). "Does Real-Time Reporting Deter Strategic Disclosures by Management? The Impact of Real-Time Reporting and Event Controllability on Disclosure Bunching." Accounting Review 90, no. 5 (March 1, 2015): 2107–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51095.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "Poison pills"
Zhou, Xin, Teuta Alija, and Owoicho Ochoche. "Poison Pills : A management-shareholder benefits comparison." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Administration, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-12413.
Full textAbstract
Problem: The problem of this thesis involves the controversy that the implementation of poison pills generates. The conflict amongst various stakeholders that are affected directly or indirectly by the implementation of the poison pill also contributes significantly to the problem of this thesis.
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and compare the benefits of the poison pill adoption on shareholder and management interests. We also seek to evaluate arguments for and against pill adoption, and determine if these arguments are valid in view of facts established from our study.
Conclusions: Our study in this thesis has brought us to five conclusions about the poison pill policy in fulfillment of the purpose. We state in our conclusion that arguments for and against the poison pill can both be validated depending on the case, we also state that a general conclusion cannot be drawn as to the negative or positive effect of the poison pill on stakeholders. We proceed to argue that the pill is a very effective fighting toll in the current business world and state that more should be done to regulate pill implementation. We finish up our conclusion by identifying what appears to be an inverse relationship between management and shareholders benefits from the implementation of the pill.
Originality: The uniqueness of our study resides in the theoretical framework that is developed from two prevailing hypotheses in the academic research of the poison pill. The previous studies either take on the management entrenchment hypothesis (MEH) or the shareholder interest hypothesis (SIH). However, we have combined the elements of both hypotheses and jointly revealed the advantages and disadvantages of the pill adoption for both management and shareholders via our original management shareholder benefits comparison matrix.
Kusserow, Berthold F. "Poison pills in Canada : good news for bad management?" Thesis, McGill University, 1989. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=55694.
Full textAzevedo, Yuri Gomes Paiva. "Poison Pills e gerenciamento de resultados: um estudo das Companhias Listadas na B3." PROGRAMA DE P?S-GRADUA??O EM CI?NCIAS CONT?BEIS, 2018. https://repositorio.ufrn.br/jspui/handle/123456789/25042.
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Este estudo tem por objetivo investigar se as poison pills exercem influ?ncia no n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados das companhias listadas na B3. Para isso, foram coletados dados referentes ? presen?a desse dispositivo anti-takeover bem como de cl?usulas acess?rias ?p?treas? associadas ?s poison pills nos estatutos sociais de 225 companhias n?o-financeiras. As informa??es necess?rias para estima??o dos accruals discricion?rios pelo modelo proposto por Dechow, Sloan e Sweeney (1995), assim como as vari?veis de controle inseridas no modelo econom?trico, foram obtidas por meio da base de dados Bloomberg?, compreendendo o per?odo 2010-2016. Com base nos resultados, verificou-se que a ado??o das poison pills n?o exerce influ?ncia significativa no n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados. Entretanto, a inexist?ncia dessa rela??o n?o sinaliza que essas companhias n?o est?o envolvidas em pr?ticas de gerenciamento de resultados, uma vez que a dummy Poisonpill n?o se apresenta estatisticamente distinta do grupo base, composto por companhias que n?o adotam poison pills e que apresentam rela??o negativa e significativa com os accruals discricion?rios. Por fim, no contexto nacional, foram encontradas evid?ncias de que as cl?usulas ?p?treas? podem ser inseridas nos estatutos sociais visando exacerbar o n?vel de gerenciamento de resultados, visto que os achados demonstram que as poison pills com cl?usulas ?p?treas? efetivamente se diferenciam das poison pills, apresentando rela??o positiva e estatisticamente significativa com os accruals discricion?rios.
This study aims to investigate if the poison pills influences on the earnings management level of the companies listed in B3. For this, data were collected regarding the presence of this antitakeover device as well as of ?eternity? accessory clauses associated with the poison pills in the bylaws of 225 non-financial companies. The informations that are necessary to estimate the accruals discretionary by the model proposed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), as well as the control variables inserted in the econometric model, were obtained through the Bloomberg? database, comprising the period 2010-2016. Based on the results, it was verified that the the adoption of the poison pills doesn?t have a significant influence on the earnings management level. However, the non-existence of this relationship doesn?t indicate that these companies are not involved in earnings management practices, since the Poisonpill dummy is not statistically distinct from the base group, which is composed by companies that do not adopt poison pills and that present negative and significant relation with the discretionary accruals. Finally, in the national context, evidence has been found that "eternity" clauses can be inserted into the bylaws to exacerbate the level of earnings management, since the findings demonstrate that poison pills with "etenity" clauses effectively differentiate themselves of the poison pills, presenting a positive and statistically significant relation with discretionary accruals.
Ericsson, Marcus, and Anthon Ivarsson. "Nya tider för försvarasstrategier : En fallstudie som behandlar försvarsstrategier och IR." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Business Studies, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-8689.
Full textBlease, John Robert. "The effect of the portfolio of takeover provisions on operating performance, takeovers, and takeover premiums /." view abstract or download file of text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3045084.
Full textTypescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-118). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
Xu, Puwei, and Wulf Loïc De. "Acquisitions: Poison Pill for Innovation?" Thesis, Högskolan i Halmstad, Sektionen för ekonomi och teknik (SET), 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-6149.
Full textMolin, Johan. "Essays on corporate finance and governance." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.], 1996. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/421.htm.
Full textMartes, Camilla Ribeiro. "Sobre o controle minoritário nas companhias listadas no novo mercado." Universidade de São Paulo, 2014. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-08122014-155609/.
Full textAmong the current challenges of the Brazilian Corporate Law, the structure of the capital ownership of the corporations and the identification of those who exercises control over it remains an important aspect to be taken into consideration when analyzing the main aspects of the Brazilian capital market. The heat up of the transactions carried out through the capital market, and the consolidation of the special corporate governance segments in Brazil resulted in the so called phenomenon of the dispersed ownership, which revealed a rupture from the traditional structure of extremely concentrated ownership, that was prevailing until now among the Brazilian corporations. Given such contrasting scenario of changes in the profile of corporate power over Brazilian corporations, these thesis, after describing, over its first two chapters, the structures of capital ownership existent in different economies and providing a retrospective on the capital ownership of Brazilian corporations, presents, in its third chapter, an extensive empirical research performed with the purposes of identifying the current structure of capital ownership prevailing among the Brazilian companies listed in the Novo Mercado, special segment of the Brazilian Exchange BMF&BOVESPA (the New Market), as well as ascertaining the existence of minority corporate control among such companies, as detailed in the appendixes hereto. The referred empirical research presents, furthermore, detailed data processing in connection with the information disclosed by such companies to the Brazilian Stock Exchange Commission, the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM), and is also used as basis for reviewing the need of eventual changes in the concepts embodied by the Brazilian Corporate Law, in view of the divergent understanding identified in the Brazilian doctrine and judgments issued by the CVM in connection with the existence of a corporate control exercised by a shareholder or group of shareholders owner of shareholding not representative of the majority of the voting capital stock, as detailed in the fourth chapter of these thesis. Finally, the fifth and last chapter of these study presents the final considerations in connection with the review proposed hereto, highlighting the main conclusions obtained through the elaboration of the third and fourth chapters described above, among them the existence of a not majority internal control (minority control) in companies listed in the New Market, as well as the effects of such conclusion in the light of the practice of corporate law.
Souza, Paloma dos Reis Coimbra de. "A tomada de controle de companhia aberta: a poison pill à brasileira." Universidade de São Paulo, 2011. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-21082012-110744/.
Full textO presente trabalho cuida das técnicas comumente referidas como cláusula de proteção à dispersão acionária, empregadas pelas companhias brasileiras. Tais técnicas foram apelidadas pela comunidade jurídica nacional de poison pills (pílulas de veneno). A expressão já é utilizada na experiência norte-americana para se referir a um conjunto de medidas defensivas contra a tomada de controle hostil, com as quais a poison pill à brasileira guarda pouca semelhança. O tema insere-se no contexto mais amplo da tomada de controle da companhia aberta (takeover) e as técnicas de defesa usualmente empregadas para impedi-la ou dificultá-la, quando indesejada. Tais técnicas são principalmente empregadas por companhias com capital disperso no mercado mobiliário e cujo poder de controle é exercido com a detenção de parcela reduzida do capital social. A busca pela maior dispersão acionária, bem como a presença apenas de ações votantes, fez com que a pílula brasileira se tornasse especialmente comum nas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&F-Bovespa S.A. Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros. A análise proposta circunscreve-se a tais companhias e à defesa por elas adotada. Dessa forma, parte-se da análise da disciplina jurídica das ofertas públicas voluntárias (artigo 257 da Lei das Sociedades por Ações), principal instrumento para a tomada de controle da companhia aberta, passa-se pelos dois principais sistemas de regulação da tomada de controle, com destaque para os modelos norte-americanos e inglês/europeu, para enfim chegar à apreciação da medida defensiva denominada poison pill tanto como originalmente concebida, na prática forense norte-americana, quanto em sua versão brasileira. É tema recente na literatura jurídica brasileira, ainda pouco explorado, mas bastante conhecido, estudado e vivenciado pela doutrina e experiência estrangeira, com apoio na qual o presente trabalho foi desenvolvido
Lowrance, Daniel Scott. "An examination of agency costs the case of REITs /." Diss., Texas A&M University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1969/127.
Full textBooks on the topic "Poison pills"
Jaenicke, Ted. Poison pills: Issues in corporate governance : background report. Washington, DC (1755 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington 20036): Investor Reponsibility Research Center, 1991.
Find full textPoison pills: The untold story of the Vioxx drug scandal. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2008.
Find full textOlive, David. White knights and poison pills: A cynic's dictionary of business jargon. Toronto, Ont: Key Porter Books, 1990.
Find full textComment, Robert. Poison or placebo?: Evidence on the deterrent and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.
Find full textCharles E. Simon & Company. Corporate anti-takeover defences: The poison pill device. New York, NY: Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1997.
Find full textWeisner, Arnd. Verteidigungsmassnahmen gegen unfreundliche Übernahmeversuche in den USA, Deutschland und nach europäischem Recht. Münster: Lit, 2000.
Find full textB. T. M. Steins Bisschop. De beperkte houdbaarheid van beschermingsmaatregelen bij beursvennootschappen: Een analyse aan de hand van certificering. Deventer: Kluwer, 1991.
Find full textStone, T. W. Pills, potions, and poisons: How drugs work. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Find full textAggarwal, Reena. Bargaining in the shadow of peoplesoft's (defective) poison pill. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2006.
Find full textA, Hancock William, and Williams Monica B, eds. Special study for corporate counsel on poison pills. Chesterland, Ohio: Business Laws, Inc., 2000.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Poison pills"
Frigg, Roman, Seamus Bradley, Reason L. Machete, and Leonard A. Smith. "Probabilistic Forecasting: Why Model Imperfection Is a Poison Pill." In New Challenges to Philosophy of Science, 479–91. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-5845-2_39.
Full textOsugi, Kenichi. "Transplanting poison pills in foreign soil." In Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia, 36–59. Routledge, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203931202.ch2.
Full text"Transplanting poison pills in foreign soil: Japan’s experiment." In Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia, 46–69. Routledge, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203931202-9.
Full textHill, Jennifer G. "Takeovers, Poison Pills and Protectionism in Comparative Corporate Governance." In Festschrift für Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010, edited by Stefan Grundmann, Brigitte Haar, Hanno Merkt, Peter O. Mülbert, Marina Wellenhofer, Harald Baum, Jan von Hein, et al. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783899496321.795.
Full text"Chapter Seven: “Institutional Investors in the U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner’s Perspective”." In Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, 201–24. De Gruyter, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110893380.201.
Full textEmsley, John. "Lead murders." In The Elements of Murder. Oxford University Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192805997.003.0021.
Full text"7. A 'poison pill' and collateral trust bonds." In The Beauharnois Scandal, 88–94. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/9781487580520-011.
Full textAnand, Anita Indira. "Shareholders and Takeover Bids: Revisiting the Poison Pill." In Shareholder-driven Corporate Governance, 83–100. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190096533.003.0006.
Full textConference papers on the topic "Poison pills"
Terra, Egidio, and Robert Warren. "Poison pills." In the 14th ACM international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1099554.1099646.
Full textKamath, Arun, Hans Bihs, and Øivind A. Arntsen. "Calculation of Wave Forces on Cylindrical Piles Using a 3D Numerical Wave Tank." In ASME 2013 32nd International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/omae2013-10337.
Full textLari, Noora, Noof Al-Rakeb, Noor Al Emadi, and Sundos Ashi. "Fertility Transitions: Implications for Future Demographic Trends in Qatar." In Qatar University Annual Research Forum & Exhibition. Qatar University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.29117/quarfe.2020.0253.
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