Academic literature on the topic 'Policing and politics in Ethiopia'

In Addis Ababa's vast Revolution Square there are large pictures of Marx, Lenin, and Engels, and of Mengistu Haile Mariam, the head of the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia and leader of the newly organized Workers Party of Ethiopia. In the decade since a military committee, the dirgue, dethroned Haile Selassie and abolished the monarchy, these four have been proclaimed the saviors of Ethiopia. Today, however, many Ethiopians believe the dirgue's policies are responsible for inciting the nationalities to insurrection, reducing agricultural yields in the south, helping to cause the famine in the northeast, tying Ethiopia to the capital-poor Soviet Union and its allies, and unnecessarily alienating the capital-rich West. In their opinion, the government has failed the. revolution by being repressive and rigid. Mengistu and the ideology he represent should give way to new and more flexible leaders and politics.

When foreign policies of states are examined, pride of place often goes to what are called high politics: the politics of diplomacy and war. However, for most developing nations, especially those in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, economic foreign policy, or low politics, may be as, or even more, important. In fact, the foreign policies of African nations are often seen as an extension of strategies to consolidate domestic political power. African leaders routinely place themselves in charge of foreign policy as a means of controlling these resource flows as well as to create some autonomy from competing domestic political forces. This is not to say that external state forces do not impinge on the ability of leaders to stay in power; however, in sub-Saharan Africa, this has been less of a priority, perhaps with the significant exception of Ethiopia. This paper seeks to show that the general foreign policy perspectives of Ethiopia from 1991 to the present have been an extension of the leaders and ruling elites trying to obtain significant sources of financial resources by exploring the general trends of how Ethiopia has engaged in international flows of resources. Examining Ethiopian foreign policy on three levels—international, regional, and domestic—this paper explains how, despite being a potential regional hegemon, Ethiopia has significant problems stemming from domestic issues of poverty and legitimacy. Moreover, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will be highlighted as a case to explore how it affects, and is impacted by, all three levels.

Abstract Global environmental imaginaries such as “the climate crisis” and “water wars” dominate the discussion on African states and their predicament in the face of global warming and unmet demands for sustainable livelihoods. I argue that the intersecting challenges of water, energy, and food insecurity are providing impetus for the articulation of ambitious state-building projects, in the Nile Basin as elsewhere, that rework regional political geographies and expand “infrastructural power”–the ways in which the state can penetrate society, control its territory, and implement consequential policies. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam should be understood as intending to alter how the state operates, domestically and internationally; how it is seen by its citizens; and how they relate to each other and to their regional neighbors. To legitimize such material and ideational transformations and reposition itself in international politics, the Ethiopian party-state has embedded the dam in a discourse of “environmental justice”: a rectification of historical and geographical ills to which Ethiopia and its impoverished masses were subjected. However, critics have adopted their own environmental justice narratives to denounce the failure of Ethiopia's developmental model and its benefiting of specific ethnolinguistic constituencies at the expense of the broader population.

AbstractThis article examines the relationship between the politics of ethnicity and road construction in Hawassa, Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state has recently invested unprecedented amounts of money in the construction of urban roads. These roads both undermine and reinforce longstanding ethnic hierarchies within Ethiopian cities. Contrary to the image promoted by the state of harmony among residents of different ethnic backgrounds, our research revealed a great deal of tension, particularly concerning the distribution of benefits from state-led infrastructural development. The experiences of residents in rapidly changing neighbourhoods, demonstrate that the benefits of recent road construction are not necessarily distributed according to the policies of the current regime. Instead, historical inequalities interact with contemporary urban development in ways that may actually disrupt the state's vision of unity through diversity. Stratification is built into the city and attempts to reshape the city necessarily interact with recent and long-standing inequalities.

ABSTRACTThe implementation of community policing schemes and development programmes targeting street youth in inner city Addis Ababa, intended to prevent crime and unrest, has resulted in an expansion of structures of political mobilization and surveillance of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), the party that has ruled the country since 1991. Yet the fact that the government managed to implement its programmes does not imply that the ruling party was entirely successful in tackling ordinary crime as well as political dissent. As neighbourhoods continued to be insecure, especially at night, the efficacy of the ruling party's politicized narratives on community policing and crime prevention was questioned. An appreciation of the shortcomings of government action on the streets of the inner city raises questions about the extent of the reach of the EPRDF's state into the grass roots of urban society as well as about the ways in which dissent is voiced in a context where forms of political surveillance and control are expanding. This paper investigates these issues in order to contribute to the study of the Ethiopian state and to the broader debate on community policing and crime prevention on the African continent.

ABSTRACTThis article offers a political analysis of the practices and motives of public order policing in Ethiopia and Uganda. It offers an explanation of the continuation of forceful tactics against political protest in a context of changing methods of information gathering, organisation and mobilisation by urban activists resulting from their access to internet and communication technology. It finds the two regimes, as anocracies, are caught between legally allowing protest and yet, conscious of their fragility, determined to crush opposition. For the latter approach, their militarist leaderships rely heavily on continued police violence. The paper concludes that failure of the police to adapt their public order policing to the new protest environment leaves them increasingly ineffective and unpopular. It is likely to provoke an escalation of violence and may both undermine the legitimacy of their regimes and reverse their attempts to open political space that justified their rebellions against former autocracies.

Policy discourses urging environmental rehabilitation, and rapid agricultural intensification for food self-sufficiency are firmly entrenched in Ethiopia. This paper examines the actor-networks and key policy spaces associated with the establishment of these discourses, taking natural resource management policies, and institutionalisation of the SG-2000 extension programme as case studies. An emergent, and potentially challenging, participatory natural resource management discourse is also identified. Contrasting the regions of Tigray and the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Region (SNNPR), the paper concludes by arguing that, with decentralisation, differences between regional administrative and political cultures are key to policy processes, affecting the degree to which central policies reflect local concerns.

Abstract:Current classification systems create typologies of authoritarian regimes that may overlook the importance of national policies. Rwanda and Ethiopia in particular are perplexing case studies of post-1990s governance. Both nations are characterized by high growth economies with significant state involvement and the formal institutions of democracy, but deeply troubling patterns of domestic governance. This article proposes a new category of authoritarianism called “developmental authoritarianism,” which refers to nominally democratic governments that provide significant public works and services while exerting control over nearly every facet of society. The article then reflects upon the durability and implications of this form of governance.

The Horn of Africa has become the most fragmented post-colonial region in Africa. The largest state in the region, Ethiopia, with its unequalled demographic and resource power lost one of its provinces to secession and the rest of the country became divided into ethnic enclosures called killiloch, which are federal states with tribal designation. The recitation of divisive counter-narratives on the history of the Ethiopian state by ethnically inspired governing and non-governing political elite has minimized the collective identity of Ethiopians leading to their decomposition into tribal groupings in killiloch with neo-tribal restrictive covenants that include the right of secession. The supporters of such divisions have touted the policies as emancipatory that are ostensibly designed to help in the self-determination of Ethiopia’s various nationalities and to govern their own local affairs under a form of dual federalism (exclusive states’ rights). The objective of this article is to reflect on the adverse consequences of dual federalism based on ethnic killils and to explore an alternative framework for cultural and functional integration of the Ethiopian state under the rubric of cooperative federalism.

In attempting to explain the causes of famine, the literature on famine points to different factors. This list of causes includes: drought; neo-Malthusian population growth; environmental degradation; limited technology; capitalist development, or the lack of it; the nature of the state, blamed either for lack of intervention or, on the contrary, for too much intervention; and, war. However, to attempt to determine how causation of famine might be quantitatively apportioned between the different factors listed in the debates on causes of famine is of limited value, precisely because the different factors that promote famine - drought, environmental degradation, economic decline, war - are inextricably intertwined and interact with one another. Moreover, famine is not simply predetermined by the factors that the debate on causes itemizes. People's own actions and what people choose to do also shapes the outcome and future strategies for survival. The concern of this thesis is with famine in the case study areas, but our concern is not with debating the causes of famine as much as with identifying consequences. We examine the effects of the array of forces on people's strategies for survival in the research areas during and after the drought and famine of the mid-1980's. We describe the different strategies pursued by people in the study areas in the circumstances that existed during the drought and famine of the mid-1980's; and then discuss the consequences of those actions for people's ability to recover and for people's future survival strategies. The empirical data are based on two case studies carried out over a 6 month period from late October 1991 to end April 1992 in the Kallu area of southern Wollo. Wallo is the province that was hit hardest by famine during 1984/5 and in 1972/4. In documenting the resource base in which people in the study areas sought to survive, our findings challenge commonly held assumptions about the effects of the 1975 Land Reform, the nature of Peasant Associations, and the nature of gender relations. The findings on the consequences of people's responses during the drought and famine of the mid-1980's indicate that we need to reconsider the issue of what is meant by the notion of 'coping', so central to much of the literature on famine survival strategies.

This thesis examines the lifeworlds of Somali returnees in Ethiopia. Their experience of flight and return is distinctive, shaped by the history and culture of the Somali people and the political and economic conditions of this part of Africa. In emphasizing this distinctiveness, this thesis is an implicit critique of recent efforts by academics and aid agencies to homogenize the experience of refugees in this region and elsewhere. In Ethiopia, "development" and humanitarian aid, in interaction with political contests at many levels, provide the context for interpreting refugee experience and action. Globally, the most powerful of the reductionist accounts is based on the "trauma model" of refugee experience. In this model, "refugee experience" has come to be virtually synonymous with "psychosocial" and, in turn, "mental health" and "post-traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD). Somali refugees and returnees in Ethiopia, however, do not address violence, death, and war-related distress in a framework of psychological medicine, with its goal of reducing psychological, emotional and physiological symptoms of individual distress. Rather, such distress is predominantly assimilated into the framework of politics, with its goals of survival and restitution. Emotion, and talking about emotion, evoke complex individual and collective memories that situate individual and local community experience within, or in juxtaposition to, other realities: competing powers such as the Ethiopian and other states, dispossession, and the precariousness of survival in a harsh natural and political environment. Historical narratives, collective memory, anger, and the rhetorics of development and humanitarian aid play important roles in these communities' efforts to rebuild social networks and what they refer to as a "decent human life."

The purpose of this study was to explore salient issues in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector. In doing so, the research investigated the institutional history and origins of state-monopoly of telecommunications in Ethiopia from the first ministerial level communications-related institution, the Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telephone, to Ethio-Telecom presently. Using a theoretical framework informed by political economy of communications, development studies and political science, the study explored the foundations, rationales and implications of contesting ideologies in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector involving the Ethiopian state and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The study also explored the extent to which, and why, the Ethiopian public endorses/denounces state monopoly of the telecommunications sector. It also investigated the premises on which Sino-Ethiopian partnerships in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector are laid. A triangulated, multi-method research approach involving document analysis, online survey and semi-structured interviewing was employed in this study. World Bank documents and other secondary resources were analyzed to chronicle the institutional history of telecommunications in Ethiopia. IMF reports and Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front economic programs and political manifestos were carefully examined to address contesting liberalization discourses pertinent to the Ethiopian telecommunications sector. An online survey was administered to collect public opinion about, among other things, state monopoly of telecommunications in Ethiopia. Ethiopian government officials, IMF country representatives, Ethio-Telecom consultants and other important figures were interviewed to explore the pros and cons of Sino-Ethiopian relations in the Ethiopian telecommunications sector as well. The study revealed that a host of different factors, most notably the rise of China as an alternative global economic power, have shifted Ethiopia's preference of global development partnership from West to East including in telecommunications infrastructure development. Growing concerns over state monopoly of telecommunications were reported by users, particularly in relation to lack of quality of services and fear of surveillance.
2015-03-29

Human rights are a defining feature of how the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has been 'imagined and made' in its post-conflict society. This thesis marks the first attempt to make sense of how human rights are articulated, interpreted and applied by those intimately involved in Northern Irish policing. Based on extensive access to the PSNI, I marshal qualitative data collected from interviews with over one hundred police officers from various departments. I tour four sites of local policing to expose and examine the vernaculars and practices of human rights that lurk within each. The story I tell over the course of eight chapters is one of a police service trying to sustain human rights as a central narrative to explain its daily work and build its organisational identity in a divided society, to varying degrees of success. I argue that human rights are, in fact, a malleable, contested and conditional concept to 'imagine and make' a police service and regulate the decision-making of its officers; perhaps much more so than police reformers in Northern Ireland had realised or the PSNI wish to acknowledge. In the first half of the thesis, I identify and deconstruct how the PSNI's chief officers and local political parties seek to express and mobilise competing visions, values and agendas through human rights narratives. I then pay close attention to how human rights are interpreted and translated by junior officers performing two forms of routine policing in N.Ireland: the 'dirty work' of the Tactical Support Group and the 'community work' of Neighbourhood Policing Teams. I ask to what extent officers have internalised human rights as way of making sense of their daily work. In the second half of the thesis, I explore police officers as an important, but poorly understood, class of human rights practitioner. To better grasp how officers interpret and apply human rights standards, I closely analyse two sites of policing where distinct schemes of human rights-based regulation exist: public order policing and police custody. This thesis contributes to understandings of the concept of human rights, its interactions with law and politics and the condition of policing in contemporary Northern Ireland.

Thesis (Ed.D.) -- Teachers College, Columbia University, 1990.
Typescript; issued also on microfilm. Sponsor: William C. Sayres. Dissertation Committee: George C. Bond. Includes bibliographical references :(leaves 200-214).

This thesis examines trends and issues in the policing of money laundering in Dubai focusing on the role of Dubai Police in money laundering control. It acknowledges that money laundering is a global phenomenon and Dubai is not an exception. It explores the existing governmental initiatives aimed at addressing money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Whilst the unit of analysis in this thesis is the Emirate of Dubai, the thesis also considered the impact of regional (GCC) and international legislations and regulations (UN and FATF) on the policing of money laundering in Dubai. It is argued in this thesis that the major problem with policing of money laundering in Dubai is the lack of accountability of the AMLSCU that plays a leading role in the fight against money laundering. In addition, the information sharing amongst various government agencies and financial institutions is extremely poor. Where information pertaining to money laundering cases is shared, they are inconsistent and haphazard. Consequently, the government is facing problems to effectively combat money laundering in the Emirate. Other factors identified as major impediments are the lack of national database of money laundering cases which can be shared amongst the Police, the Customs Authority and the AMLSCU of Central Bank of UAE. The thesis also argues that poor training and lack of multi-agency/ interagency working is making the work of Dubai police difficult. Finally, it is argued that an a formal, integrated and intelligence-led information sharing model such as the UK National Intelligence Model (that draws on the importance of multi-agency working, information sharing and accountability) can serve as a more effective approach to the policing of money laundering in Dubai.

This study examines the role and development of contemporary policing within the context of the social, political and economic conditions of late capitalism. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1 (FORMS OF POLICING THE WORKING CLASS) seeks to provide historical illustration and analysis of the development of the class role of the police under capitalism, its inherent para-militarism and some of the key events and processes which have determined its formal development. The analysis examines the development of preventive policing under early capitalism, and its transformation into reactive forms of policing under late capitalism. Part 2 (POLICING KNOWSLEY) centres on a study of the contemporary events and processes underlying the development and impact of reactive forms of policing on Merseyside working class communities. It examines the factors which have played key roles in shaping police organisation and law enforcement policies at Force, Divisional and Sub-Divisional levels. These factors, such as the development of corporate organisation, the centralisation and expansion of forces, the development of mobile patrols, deteriorating social conditions, greater use of coercion, specialisation in operations and administration, the introduction of new communication and computer systems, and the reactionary ideologies underlying the law enforcement policies of senior police command, are given particular consideration in relation to their development and impact on the Knowsley Borough area of Merseyside. Part 3 (THE POLITICS OF LATE ENFORCEMENT IN THE 1980's) examines the extent of the political autonomy of the police from central and local government. The analysis develops firstly a study on police power and privilege, centred on the inquest in Knowsley into the death of James Kelly at Huyton Police Station. This is then followed by analysis of the confrontations and conciliations between Merseyside Police Committee and the Chief Constable, arising out of 'K' Division incidents of 1979 and the anti-police riots of 1981. Central to the politics of law enforcement in the 1980's has been the development of new reactive forms of policing the daily lives of working class communities, and the formation of a nationally centralised and politically autonomous para-military third ford. Part 3 concludes by situating these developments within the wider social, political and economic conditions of late capitalism in Britain.

Montreal's radical queer scene espouses anti-state and anti-assimilation politics, offering a different approach than gay-rights movements seeking state recognition through legislative measures. Queer politics have a history of redefining and complicating norms, sexual and otherwise. As such, this thesis seeks to articulate how, in looking at safer-sex discourses in Montreal's queer community, we can imagine redefinitions of sexual 'health' and 'responsibility'. Situated in a critique of the ways in which public health operates as a tool of the state by surveying and controlling practices that violate normative sexuality, I argue this anti-assimilationist mode of sexual health challenges the 'norm' of health campaigning: that absence of infection is the epitome, entirety and ideal of sexual health. Rather, circulating discourses do not place 'safe' and 'unsafe' sex in opposition, and instead emphasize consent, accessibility, and the creation of safer spaces within which people can self-determine free from stigma, shame, and policing. Sensitive to the institutional roots of oppression, radical queers strive for solidarity to create environments conducive to autonomous choice, rather than declaring an individual need to assume the full burden of risk assessment and consequences. Using interviews, analysis of local artefacts such as zines and festival agendas, and fieldwork in queer spaces, this thesis seeks to explore some of the ways in which risk and safer sex are being (re)framed in contemporary queer communities in Montreal, Quebec. This research illuminates how any effective and respectful public health initiative requires a 'thick' description of a given community's discourses and practices around health. I offer related recommendations to sex-ed teachers in other communities, of particular importance in the wake of Quebec's 2003 sexual education reform.
Les milieux queer radicaux de Montréal s'oppose à l'État et aux politiques d'assimilation, et propose une approche différente de celle des mouvements pour les droits des homosexuels, qui tentent d'obtenir l'approbation de l'État par le biais de mesures législatives. Les politiques queer ont toujours cherché à redéfinir et à complexifier les normes, en matière sexuelle ou autre. Ainsi, ce mémoire tentera d'expliquer de quelle façon les discours de la communauté queer montréalaise peuvent nous aider à redéfinir les notions de « santé sexuelle » et de « responsabilité ». En réponse aux méthodes du système de santé public, qui permet à l'État de recenser et de contrôler les pratiques sexuelles marginales, nous affirmons que le modèle anti-assimilationniste relativise l'idée de « norme » que défend le système public, c'est-à-dire que l'absence d'infection est le fondement, l'unique raison d'être et l'idéal du principe de santé sexuelle. Plutôt que d'opposer les pratiques « sans risque » et celles « à risque », les discours actuels insistent sur les notions de consentement et d'accessibilité, et proposent la création d'espaces sûrs, où il est possible de faire des choix personnels à l'abri du jugement, de la honte ou de la coercition. Conscients des racines institutionnelles de l'oppression, les queer radicaux comptent sur la solidarité pour créer des environnements favorables au libre choix, qui ne font pas peser sur un individu le fardeau de l'évaluation des risques et des conséquences. Au moyen d'entrevues, d'analyses de documents tels des zines et des programmes de festival et d'études sur le terrain dans les milieux queer, ce mémoire explorera certaines des façons dont les notions de risque et de pratiques sexuelles sûres sont actuellement (re)formulées au sein de la communauté queer à Montréal, au Québec. Cette recherche illustre comment une initiative de santé publique efficace et respectueuse nécessite une description « épaisse » des discours et des pratiques autour de la santé d'une collectivité donnée. J'offre des recommandations aux enseignants d'éducation sexuelle dans d'autres communautés, d'une importance particulière dans le sillage de la réforme de l'éducation sexuelle au Québec en 2003.

Since the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia has undergone a remarkable economic transformation. Shunning liberal policy advice yet avoiding the pathologies of patrimonialism, its experience is increasingly presented as an example for others to follow. However, there has been surprisingly little research, and even less consensus, on what actually constitutes this 'Ethiopian model.' The present thesis provides an answer to this question by focusing on the role of the EPRDF - the former insurgency movement which has governed Ethiopia since 1991 - and the fundamental reconstruction of state and market it has overseen. It argues that the resulting political economy is best characterised as a form of 'vanguard capitalism,' which combines the centralising political logic of a Leninist movement party with the expansive logic of capitalist markets. At its base lies the monopolisation of state-society relations by the EPRDF which, in turn, allows for the creation, centralisation and strategic use of economic rents by its administration. The two processes of illiberal state- and market-building are complementary, and their outcomes mutually reinforcing: a state that seeks to derive legitimacy from 'developmental' interventions in the economy, and an economy that advances a particular vision of the Ethiopian state. To bear out this argument, the thesis traces the evolving relationship between party, state, and market through four distinct periods in the EPRDF's Ethiopia. While the administrative and economic institutions built during the wartime years were all subsumed into the movement's thrust toward military victory, structural adjustment during the 1990s led to a gradual differentiation between party, state, and market. The propagation of an Ethiopian 'developmental state' in the early 2000s implied a re-centralisation of economic rents, yet without a corresponding degree of control over society the party was left vulnerable. After the electoral near-defeat of 2005 the EPRDF thus reclaimed its 'vanguard' role, again fusing party, state, and market into a campaign for economic transformation that it presents as a logical extension of the original struggle for liberation. The thesis draws on over one hundred stakeholder interviews conducted during ten months of field research in Addis Ababa, Mekelle, and among the Ethiopian diaspora, as well as on extensive archival research.

In 2018, the Government of Ethiopia committed to large-scale, donor-supported reforms aimed at improving equitable learning in the basic education system—the General Education Quality Improvement Program for Equity (GEQIP-E). In this paper, we examine the reform design process in the context of Ethiopia’s political environment as a strong developmental state, assessing the influence of different stakeholder priorities which have led to the focus on equity within the quality reforms. Drawing on qualitative data from 81 key informant interviews with federal and regional government officials and donors, we explore the negotiation and power dynamics which have shaped the design of the reforms. We find that a legacy of moderately successful reforms, and a shared commitment to global goals, paved the way for negotiations of more complex and ambitious reforms between government actors and donors. Within government, we identify that regional governments were only tokenistically included in the reform process. Given that regions are responsible for the implementation of these reforms, their limited involvement in the design could have implications for success.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.