Academic literature on the topic 'Polish-Ottoman War'

The Siege of Vienna in 1683 by the Ottoman army marks a key shift in the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire. The power of the Ottomans had continuously risen since 1453 but the defeat of the Ottoman army at Vienna marked the beginning of Ottoman decline in military and geographical power. The years following the siege forced the Ottomans to fight a united alliance of Austrian, Venician, and Polish armies from Europe. This article follows the events from the siege of Vienna through to the year 1699, when the war following the siege, finally came to an end with the Ottomans seceeding land to all three of its European opponents. By tracing the academic debate on what impacted the Ottoman defeat the most, the article explores the different theories behind why the Ottomans were defeat and what were the causes for the shift in power away from the Ottoman Empire toward the countries in Europe.

This article examines the impact of Ottoman fashions on the clothing worn by men in early modern Poland and Hungary, and argues that fashion was an optimal tool for advertising political allegiance. Ottoman garments were coveted by the nobilities in East-Central Europe, and often displayed in portraiture, because they were imbued with associations of anti-absolutism and autonomy, even if the Ottomans themselves were reviled as invasive infidels. However, the legibility of the political statement these fashions made was limited to their local contexts—when viewed by foreigners they were perceived as exotic and Otherly. Various factors enabled the popularization and subsequent politicization of Ottomanizing styles, including the Polish and Hungarian nobilities’ self-fashioning as Eastern, and the widespread availability of Ottoman and Iranian commodities through import, as war booty, and through local imitation. This essay hopes to expand our understanding of the range of early modern responses to the Ottoman East, while challenging the notion of Europe as a uniform entity to which it was opposed.

The study is а consideration of the Turkish vector in the diplomatic activities of the Ukrainian Hetmans in the 17th century based on the Ukrainian and the Turkic-Ottoman sources. The circumstances of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytshky’s residence in Bakhchisarai under the reigning of Sultan Mehmet IV, as well as making the agreement between the Ukrainian Cossack State and the Crimean Khanate have been investigated. In particular, the focuse has been made on the importance of diplomatic activities of Hetman Petro Doroshenko in the relations with the Ottoman Empire. The analysis of the Turkish-written sources also revealed the fact that from the time of the start of Hetman P. Dorosheko’s ruling the rise of the diplomatic relations between Chyhyryn and Istanbul has taken place. A series of envoys from the Turkish Sultan in 1169 resulted in Mehmed IV’s issuing an order on awarding P. Doroshenko with hetman’s authorities in regard of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The Turkish side has been recognizing the hetman’s authority in Ukraine for a long period. The liberation of Ukraine from the Polish-Lithuanian occupation has become the result of the observing the terms and conditions of the agreement made with Hetman Petro Doroshenko, which were provided in the above said Ferman of Mehmed IV. In the war of the Ottoman Empire against the Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Moscow, Austrian and German soldiers, as well as the Ukrainian Cossacks (the latter ones were headed by Hetman Mykhailo Khanenko) have been engaged to combat on the Polish side. Despite such an alignment of the military forces, the Turkish Army together with the Cossacks headed by Hetman P. Doroshenko and the Crimean warriors succeeded in winning the battle. In the Turkish Army sources one can find some compliments addressed to the Ukrainian hetman, e.g. “the Pride of all the Christian Rulers, the Ruler of a Free Nation worshipping Jesus Crist”, which proves that, apart from the diplomatic recognition of the said hetman, the Ukrainian Cossacks have been highly respected, and that the Christianity has been treated with tolerance.

In 1683 Stanisław Herakliusz Lubomirski was one of the most important politicians in Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He was part of anti-royal opposition, which was against alliance with Austria and war against Ottoman Empire. Lubomirski’s letters date before Warsaw Sejm indicates that he supported war against Muscovy. During Sejm he fulfilled his role as Grand Marshal, but at the same time he worked towards French interests. When the king and his supporters managed to defeat political opposition, Lubomirski switched sides and claimed that he never supported the king’s opponents. He then participated in signing a treaty with Austria and also enlisted few military units to take part in war against the Turks. After 1683, Sejm - for the time being - limited his political activities. Despite political defeat, he managed to achieve some personal successes – became owner of the town of Jazdów (Ujazdów), while his brother Hieronim was nominated for the office of Crown Court Marshal.

Not only in Soviet patriotic historiography the conduct of war and the foreign policy of Alexander i were regarded as heroic only from the battle of Borodino onward. The earlier years of the Napoleonic Era and the retreat of Russian armies during the summer of 1812 appeared in a negative light. Revisionist research in Russia and abroad offers another interpretation. When the French army in 1807 after some victorious battles reached the Russian border Alexander maintained a much better bargaining position in talks with Napoleon than disappointed critics among the Russian elite recognized. The emperor of the French was not prepared to continue the war on Russian soil and did not make territorial demands on Russia. Napoleon wanted not only an armistice and peace, but also an alliance with Russia against Britain. Thus Alexander, using the power of the weak opponent, succeeded in winning time. Russia was able not only to maintain her strategic goals against the Ottoman Empire in the Rumanian principalities and in the Black Sea, but also to defend the political existence of Prussia as a possible Russian ally in a future coalition with Austria against Napoleon, which meant a sacrifice of Polish interests by Russia.

European and Turkish translations and reception of works by Juda Tadeusz Krusiński SI regarding the Afghan-Persian war and the fall of the Safavid dynasty This article discusses the process of developing, editing and translating a Latin text written by the Polish Jesuit J.T. Krusiński dedicated to the reasons behind the fall of the Safavid dynasty and to the course of the Afghan-Persian War. The first manuscript was titled by the author as Historia revolutionis persicae. The Latin text, which was prepared in Rome, was then sent to Paris where it wasnot only translated into French, but also significantly modified and shortened by A. du Cerceau. The French paraphrase, published in 1728, became the basis for the English and Italian editions. Another version of Krusiński’s work was prepared and published in German by J. Stöcklein. He used not only the French edition, but also the Latin original of Krusiński’s text, which he had received from Vienna, as well as other sources. For the needs of the Ottoman court, Krusiński reviewed the Latin version, which was then translated and published in Turkish in 1729. This last edition caused a sharp dispute over the authorship of the Turkish translation between Krusiński and Ibrahim Mütaferrika, head of the Istanbul printing house. The Turkish edition of Father Juda Tadeusz Krusiński’s work complicated its reception in Europe even more, especially after the Turkish version had been retranslated into Latin by J.Ch. Clodius. The manuscripts stored in the Vienna library make it possible to trace the stages of developement of Krusiński’s work, which culminated in the publication of the book Tragica vertentis … (Lviv, 1740), his most comprehensive study of the Persian revolution.

It can be said that Sweden’s appeal to Ukraine during the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and the formation of an imperial state was quite understandable: Ukraine was the enemy of Sweden’s enemies. But the peculiarities of political and economic development of Sweden and its allies caused their claims to the West Ukrainian and Belarus lands. This made it impossible to conclude a full-fledged political treaty. The like situation is with Ukrainian-Swedish relations in 1708–1709, when Sweden was a guarantor of possession of West Ukrainian lands by Polish-Lithuanian state. Ukrainian-Swedish treaties of the XVII – early XVIII centuries had only a military-tactical character and a short-lived action. Only a crisis after Swedish-Ukrainian forces defeat and prolonged living hand-by-hand in the Ottoman Empire (1709–1714) gradually brought royal Swedish protectorate as a form of military alliance to full-fledged recognition of Ukraine as the state and concluding treaty of political nature. Unfortunately, its implementation was very limited. In addition, the close encounter with foreign legal culture and other circumstances of UkrainianSwedish relations gave the impetus to reviewing the grounds of state and law of Ukraine and the emergence of the “Pacts and Resolutions of the Rights and Privileges of the Viysko Zaporozke”, known as the Constitution of Ukraine of 1710. We argue that this document together with confirmation and assecuration charters by Karl XII is not only a monument of Ukrainian constitutionalism, but also a treaty between Ukraine and its protector, the king of Sweden.

In recent years, researchers are increasingly focused on the Viacheslav Lypynskyi (Ukrainian politician, theorist of Ukrainian conservatism) : from practical political actions to a detailed study of theoretical reflections. They interested in various vectors of Lipin studies. It should be noted that V. Lypynskyi became sufficiently studied in recent years as the head of the Ukrainian Embassy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Scientists, on the work of which drawn attention in the relevant topic: Igor Ducks, Igor Girich, Tatyana Ostashko, Irina Interim and others. This article is aimed at summing a certain result in the long run of scientists. The article is trying to collect, analyze, explore and outline certain results in the historiographic study of the place of V. Lypynskyi in the international politics of the Ukrainian state. The main submers are considered, which researchers studied in the context of the activities of V. Lypynskyi as ambassador during their work from 1918 to 1919. The topics of scientific research were especially studied: Embassy staff (appointment, the appointment of those who are responsible for certain sectors and criticism of personnel by opponents, both from among the government and the social democratic forces); The struggle for territorial encroachments and at the same time ratification of Beresia Agreement (peace treaty between the Ukrainian People’s Republic on the one hand and German, Austria-Hungarian, Ottoman Empires and the Bulgarian kingdom of the other side). The strong Polish diaspora prevented the joining of the Kholm region and part of the smashes in the Ukrainian state. Also, the activity that puts themselves the goal of helping the prisoners of war in concentration camps and citizens of Ukraine, which were in Austria – Hungary); Lypynskyi’s care from the post of Representative of Ukraine in Vienna (comes to power in Kiev in November 1918, the directory of UNR and the inability to find a common language with new government structures). As a result of scientific research, we conclude that this topic is sufficiently studied. Most scientific works used during the writing of the article are combined into a positive assessment of the role of V. Lipinsky as ambassador.

Without a doubt, Slobodan Jovanovic was one of the greatest Serbian jurists, and in the period between the two World Wars, he was probably the most influential Serbian jurist. In this context, his views on the Serbian-Russian relations have exerted an influence on the formation of the dominant discourse, but also on many generations that came after his time (his bust in front of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade symbolically shows how highly he is valued in today?s legal circles, more than 60 years after his death). In his voluminous opus Jovanovic suggests that the Peace of Bucharest, the Akkerman Convention and the Peace of Edirne were bilateral agreements between Russia and Turkey, with provisions that went in favour of the third party (pactum in favorem tretii), i.e. Serbia. He also gave a positive assessment of the Russian diplomacy during the 19th century. In that sense, Jovanovic criticizes the Serbian historians who claimed the opposite, and even Milos Obrenovic himself. Finally, as a jurist, he also rejects the ideological division according to which only reactionary influences came from Russia, and only freedom and enlightenment from the West. In his analysis of the Serbian-Russian relations Jovanovic points out that it was Russia which insisted on the formation of a National Council in Serbia which was to ?limit? the absolute power of Milos Obrenovic. Such an attitude has retained its validity even in the 21st century because the dogma about the so-called Russian reactionary policy is still very much alive. As a jurist, Jovanovic also shows understanding of the conflict of Russian and Serbian interests, or the interests of a small country and those of an empire. He remains midway between the uncritical idealization of Russia and even more intolerant Russophobia. He cites and compares numerous examples. He pointed out that, for instance, a Polish insurrection broke out in 1830, at the very same time when Russia was in negotiations with the Ottoman Porte over the Serbian issue. However, despite these (undeniable) facts, Jovanovic does not draw Russophobic conclusions, which were so prevalent in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He remains midway between the non-critical idealization of Russia and even more intolerant Russophobia. Such opinions of a jurist, who was ideologically an anglophile, are still very important in 2018, when Russophobia present in the West, but also in a part of the Serbian elite, reaches the Cold War level.

Relations between the Ukrainian Church and Constantinople were difficult. This goes back as far as 988, when the Christianisation of the Rus created a strong alliance between Kiev and the Byzantine Empire. There were times when Constantinople had no influence over the Kiev Metropolis. During the Mongolian invasion in 1240, the Ukranian region was broken up and Kiev lost its power. The headquarters of the Kiev Metropolis were first moved to Wlodzimierz nad Klazma in 1299 and then to Moscow in1325. In 1458 the Metropolis of Kiev was divided into two; Kiev and Moscow, but Kiev still remained under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since that time, the orthodox hierarchs of Moscow no longer adhered to the title Bishop of Kiev and the whole of Rus and in 1588 the Patriarchate of Moscow was founded. In 1596 when the Union of Brest was formed, the orthodox church of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth was not liquidated. Instead it was formally revived in 1620 and in 1632 it was officially recognized by king Wladyslaw Waza. In 1686 the Metropolis of Kiev which until that time was under the Patriarchate of Constantinople was handed over to the jurisdiction of Moscow. It was tsarist diplomats that bribed the Ottoman Sultan of the time to force the Patriarchate to issue a decree giving Moscow jurisdiction over the Metropolis of Kiev. In the beginning of the 19th century, Kiev lost its Metropolitan status and became a regular diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church. Only in the beginning of the 20thcentury, during the time of the Ukrainian revolution were efforts made to create an independent Church of Ukraine. In 1919 the autocephaly was announced, but the Patriarchate of Constantinople did not recognize it. . The structure of this Church was soon to be liquidated and it was restored again after the second world war at the time when Hitler occupied the Ukraine. In 1992, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when Ukraine gained its independence, the Metropolitan of Kiev requested that the Orthodox Church of Ukraine becomes autocephalous but his request was rejected by the Patriarchate of Moscow. Until 2018 the Patriarchate of Kiev and the autocephalous Church remained unrecognized and thus considered schismatic. In 2018 the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople looked into the matter and on 5thJanuary 2019, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine received it’s tomos of autocephaly from Constantinople. The Patriarchate of Moscow opposed the decision of Constantinople and as a result refused to perform a common Eucharist with the new Church of Ukraine and with the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

This chapter provides an overview of the Polish–Lithuanian Jews who were taken captive to be ransomed or sold into slavery. Once captured, these Jewish women and men found themselves trapped in two major international economic systems of the period. The first was the international trade in Ukrainian, Polish, Russian, and Circassian captives carried out by the Crimean Tatars with the support of the Ottoman Empire. The second economic system was piracy in the Mediterranean. Two major issues are at the heart of the discussion on the fates of these Jewish captives. The first concerns the slave trade itself and how its market conditions shaped the fate of the captured Jews. The second deals with the effort to ransom the Jewish captives from eastern Europe and is focused on the transregional Jewish philanthropic networks that raised huge sums and transported them the long distances to the slave market, examining them in terms of both their form and their function.