Relevant bibliographies by topics / Political and managerial accountability

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Political and managerial accountability'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 21 February 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Political and managerial accountability"

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Page, Stephen. "The Web of Managerial Accountability." Administration & Society 38, no. 2 (May 2006): 166–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095399705285990.

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Patience, Obeng Ahwireng. "The effect of privatisation on political and managerial accountability." African Journal of Business Management 9, no. 4 (February 28, 2015): 186–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5897/ajbm2014.7564.

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Root, Hilton l. "Pakistan's Managerial Dilemmas (Distinguished Lecture)." Pakistan Development Review 36, no. 4I (December 1, 1997): 467–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v36i4ipp.467-496.

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Discretion without accountability is deeply rooted in Pakistan's political history, profoundly shaping the country's administrative system. Pakistan's political institutions offer the leadership many opportunities for violating citizen trust. Institutional change is proposed as a tool for politicians to maintain their authority through policy reform rather than patronage. Institutions are needed that allow politicians to lead while preserving the impartiality, permanence, and expertise of a public bureaucracy
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Armstrong, Peter. "DESIGNING ACCOUNTABILITY: THE MANAGERIAL SEMIOTICS PROJECT." Critical Perspectives on Accounting 11, no. 1 (February 2000): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/cpac.1998.0305.

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Mir, Monir, Haiwei Fan, and Ian Maclean. "Public sector audit in the absence of political competition." Managerial Auditing Journal 32, no. 9 (October 2, 2017): 899–923. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/maj-03-2016-1357.

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Purpose The paper aims to explore whether different models of public sector audit exist in China without adhering to the goals and objectives of public sector audit systems in democratic jurisdictions. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a single embedded case study involving multiple methods of data collection including public documents, semi-structured interviews and site visits. The research methods and the analytical framework of the study draw on the concepts of political competition, public sector accountability and audit independence. Findings The study finds that the Chinese National Audit Office’s (CNAO) objectives derive from the neo-classical economic discourse and not from ideas of public accountability, as is the case in democratic parliamentary jurisdictions. The study finds that public sector audit in China functions in ways which are similar to that of internal audit. The CNAO may provide limited political and public accountability for Chinese public officials indirectly by enhancing their managerial accountabilities. Research limitations/implications The study goes against the prevailing view that supreme audit institutions which are part of the executive will lead to poor accountability of the public sector and increased public sector corruption. Practical implications The study suggests that enhancing managerial accountability in non-democratic (and pseudo-democratic) jurisdictions through public sector audit can by itself be of significant benefit. Further, such enhancements may also strengthen public sector accountability. Originality/value This paper fills a research gap by exploring public sector audit independence in a developing country with a unitary system of government.
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Jenlink, Patrick M. "Democracy Distracted in an Era of Accountability: Teacher Education Against Neoliberalism." Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies 17, no. 3 (October 12, 2016): 163–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532708616672676.

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Democracy’s distraction by the politics of accountability and the public’s disaffection in an ideologically bound culture of accountability further defines the work ahead for teacher educators in an era of neoliberalism. The author discusses the hegemony of neoliberalism and its political and economic threat to education and, more importantly, to the function of education in a democratic society. The author argues the need for teacher educators to advance a culture of democratic accountability in preparing future teachers. Further argued is that the current culture of technical-managerial accountability is counter intuitive to a democratic society and its educational system. The author examines the meaning of technical-managerial standards of accountability as a neoliberal agenda, presenting a counter narrative of standards of complexity as return to a culture of professional and democratic accountability.
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Ozga, Jenny. "The politics of accountability." Journal of Educational Change 21, no. 1 (December 5, 2019): 19–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10833-019-09354-2.

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AbstractThis paper draws on recent research in Europe and England to discuss the politics of accountability. It is suggested that, as policies in education are increasingly focused on delivering technical-managerial accountability, that is accountability understood as evidenced in international, national, institutional and individual comparative measures of performance, so the shifting power relations of system redesign supported by data use are concealed and suppressed. System redesign is promoted by ‘networked’ governance and the de-centred state, in institutional ‘freedom’ from bureaucracy, in the de-professionalisation of public sector workers, in the proliferation of managers, in the redefinition of citizens as consumers. The implications of such reforms for politics are profound, as political legitimacy is a fundamental precondition for the sustainability of the welfare state and welfare state organizations are dependent on active political processes of producing legitimacy and political accountability.
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Skaife, Hollis A., and Timothy Werner. "Changes in Firms’ Political Investment Opportunities, Managerial Accountability, and Reputational Risk." Journal of Business Ethics 163, no. 2 (June 11, 2019): 239–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-019-04224-6.

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Mattei, Paola. "Managerial and political accountability: the widening gap in the organization of welfare." International Review of Administrative Sciences 73, no. 3 (September 2007): 365–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020852307081147.

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Shortt, S. E. D., and J. K. MacDonald. "Toward an Accountability Framework for Canadian Healthcare." Healthcare Management Forum 15, no. 2 (July 2002): 24–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0840-4704(10)60577-7.

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State-funded healthcare systems increasingly recognize accountability as an important public policy issue. This article explores significant aspects of current theory and practice in order to describe an accountability framework for the Canadian health system. Stakeholders include governments, institutions, providers and patients. Their relationships may be framed in constitutional, political, financial, managerial, clinical or ethical terms. The specific processes and instruments to operationalize accountability depend on the terms by which it is framed.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Political and managerial accountability"

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DI, DOMENICO GERMANA. "Towards performance governance in the public sector and administrations at international level: three essays." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata", 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2108/1391.

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La ricerca nasce dal dibattito a livello internazionale sui Sistemi pubblici manageriali orientati alla “performance” ed affronta il tema attraverso un approccio trasversale a livello sia di policy che di amministrazione nel contesto di entità istituzionali di tipo multilaterale, quali, in particolare, il sistema delle Nazioni Unite. Il focus dell’ analisi è la connessione tra performance e governance, investigando, nello specifico, la possible graduale transizione verso un sistema di “performance governance”, caratterizzato da condivisione di “poteri” e interazioni dinamiche tra i vari stakeholders coinvolti nei processi decisionali e di implementazione degli interventi amministrativi e di policy, affine di incrementarne l’efficacia e l’impatto sulla società. Attraverso una raccolta di tre saggi a cura dello stesso autore della ricerca, si studiano, in particolare, le seguenti realtà istituzionali, avvalendosi di una metodologia qualitativa improntata sul case-study: Servizi pubblici per l’impiego in Europa (capitolo 1 sezione II); Agenzie internazionali – UNESCO (capitolo 2 – sezione II); Organizzazioni mondiali – Sistema ONU (capitolo 3 – sezione II).
The study moves from the international debates about performance-based public management systems and its purpose is to answer critical questions at both policy and administrative level through a cross-cutting issues approach (institutional-political, cultural and administrative) in multi-entity settings, such as, in particular, the United Nations System. Our main objective is indeed to explore the connection between (complex and inter-related aspects of) governance and performance and especially if/how the latter may be improved by “manipulating” the former within complex environments, thus designing a possible evolutionary path towards “performance management” and ideally “performance governance” where “power-sharing” and dynamic interactions between the network members are based on defined rules and shared objectives. Through a collection of three essays by the author herself, we therefore explore, through a qualitative methodological approach based on case-study, the functioning of public sector institutions and their societal impacts through improved policies and programs effectiveness across several levels: Employment Services at European level (chapter 1 section II); International Agencies – UNESCO (chapter 2 - section II); World-wide Organisations - United Nation System (chapter 3 – section II).
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Owens, Hayley. "Influencing accountability in organisations : a critical managerial competence." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/52285.

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Business, society and academic literature have all shown an increase in the demand for greater accountability. Despite this, and although accountability is central to improved performance within the workplace, it remains an ever-expanding, complex and elusive phenomenon. Although the literature has identified four overriding factors that influence accountability namely self, peers, managers and systems, there is very little empirical research that supports this. The aim of this study is to identify which of these factors has the greatest influence when holding an individual to account for performance in an organisation. Establishing the main drivers of accountability will enable managers and leaders to make better use of accountability mechanisms in order to improve the performance of their employees, teams and organisations.
Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
zk2016
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
MBA
Unrestricted
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Padró, i. Miquel Gerard. "Essays in political accountability." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32401.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2005.
"June 2005."
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis is composed by three independent essays on the limits of political accountability. In the first essay I analyze an extremely stylized model of political agency with two dimensional outcomes. I show that the non-contractible nature of rewards to the agent (the politician) is especially taxing when the voters want to control outcomes in more than one dimension. I compare and contrast this environment with traditional multitasking analyses in the context of the theory of the firm. The second essay examines why political accountability has failed so miserably in post- colonial, sub-saharan Africa. I provide a theory based on the exploitation of ethnic divisions by self-interested but weak rulers. This cleavages allow the leaders to expropriate resources from the citizenry, included their own ethnic supporters and still remain in power. The model predicts ethnic bias, patronage, inefficient policies and absence of public investment. The third essay is an empirical analysis of legislative performance in the North Carolina General Assembly. Using a new dataset I am able to show that legislators find their good performance rewarded both within the state legislature and in their electoral careers. These findings have relevance for the discussion on term limits and the theoretical modeling of political agency.
by Gerard Padró i Miquel.
Ph.D.
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Guraieb, Duenas Marlene. "Information, Disclosure, and Accountability." Thesis, New York University, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10618922.

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Democratic regimes have developed numerous institutions to enhance accountability through procedures that formally and informally probe public officials’ actions. The ongoing expansion of public evidence available to citizens has strengthened their ability to judge the performance of public officials. However, this increase in “investigative power” cannot be analyzed without regard for the structural cost of searching, sorting, and putting information to work to adjudicate open inquiries. Political accountability is tested in increasingly more sophisticated strategic settings where the principal's success in scrutinizing the agents depends both on the evidence made available and on the effort expended on investigation.

This work analyzes some of the main mechanisms that underlie these institutions. In chapter 2, I develop a model of endogenous information acquisition where politicians can choose how much evidence to disclose after taking a suspicious action. The model focuses on the effects of the open-ended nature of political investigations – they may uncover misdeeds related or unrelated to the event that triggered them – and sheds light on the previously unexplained nature of cover-up in political settings, including the presence of incentives for good incumbents to withhold as much information as possible from the investigative bodies. Chapter 3 studies the behavioral plausibility of these findings in a laboratory setting.

Chapter 4 is focused more on informal probing institutions, such as the continuous scrutiny of politicians through and by the media. The model explicitly differentiates between the quality of information (linked to the likelihood of producing dispositive results) and the cost associated with processing this information (linked to the resources needed to put it to use). One of the main results of this analysis is that citizens of democracies with lower cost of information may optimally choose to be less informed.

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Patrawart, Kraiyos. "Essays in political accountability and conflict." Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.538758.

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Dodlova, Marina. "Political Accountability and Organization of Government." Thesis, Paris 10, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010PA100149.

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La bureaucratie joue un rôle-clé dans l'arène politique. Le pouvoir de l'administration publique a néanmoins souvent été sous-estimé, tandis que sa structure comme sa croissance constante restent mal compris. Cette thèse est consacrée à l'étude approfondie des principales caractéristiques de l'administration publique et plus particulièrement à son avantage informationnel dans la prise de décisions politiques. Dans une perspective normative, la thèse explore les questions de délégation dans une hiérarchie à trois niveaux, et de répartition de rente informationnelle en 'common agency' avec plusieurs mandataires politiques. Ceci me permet d'entrevoir ce que renferme la boîte noire de la structure organisationnelle composite du gouvernement. D'un point de vue positif, l'approche comparative me permet d'analyser et d'expliquer la croissance des administrations publiques dans les démocraties sur le plan de l'emploi de fonctionnaires d'État
Bureaucracy is a key player in political game. However, its power has been often underestimated as well as the questions of its structure and constant growth remain not properly understood. This thesis represents a detailed study of the major features of the government bureaucracy by focusing on its information leverage in policy making. Normatively, the thesis explores the issues of delegation in a three-tier hierarchy and information rent distribution in common agency with several political principals, and thus contributes to opening a black box of the composite organizational structure of government. Positively, the comparative approach helps to explain the growth of government bureaucracies in democracies in terms of government administration employment
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Carrillo-Viramontes, Jose Antonio. "Essays on political accountability and selection." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51666/.

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The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the political agency literature by analysing theoretically how media can enhance political accountability and selection. In this thesis, I identify and analyse two channels in which media can affect political accountability and selection. First, media spillovers can improve voters' imperfect information and promote politicians' discipline. Second, journalism can affect the distribution of candidates' quality across levels of government. The thesis is composed of three chapters. In Chapter 1, I present a theoretical model that analyses how voters use information from media spillovers to discipline politicians, but the spillovers depend on the geographic localization of a jurisdiction. The yardstick competition model demonstrates that within isolated jurisdictions (without media spillovers) politicians are more likely to subtract private rents. Whereas in a jurisdiction connected with two neighbouring jurisdictions, politicians have a lower probability of engaging in rent extraction. Moreover, I also show that even incumbents in isolated jurisdictions have a lower probability of engaging in obtaining private rents due to positive spillovers from neighbouring jurisdictions via voters' incumbency advantage. Chapter 2 theoretically analyses the effects of a journalist on the distribution of bad and good candidates across levels of government. Specifically, how bad (good) candidates self-select to local or national office anticipating the journalist's decision to investigate at local or national level. In the model, candidates' decisions are driven by the relative difference in the rewards for being the representative at a local or national office; and in the case of bad candidates also by the potential scandal cost of being exposed by the journalist. The theoretical model demonstrates that increasing the scandal cost of being exposed in a journalist report, does not deter bad candidates from running nationally (when the reward ratio is large enough). Indeed, it only makes that both, bad and good candidates to be distributed evenly across levels of government. Also, I found that when the reward ratio is on a specific range, increasing the scandal cost of being exposed in a journalist report creates only two opposite types of equilibria: one in which a bad candidate runs locally, whereas, in the other one, a good candidate runs locally. Moreover, I found a non-monotonic relationship between the probability of a bad candidate being elected at a local level and the reward ratio. Chapter 3 provides a brief description and an overview of the political system in Mexico. In particular, it describes the economic and political consequences that a one-party hegemony has had on the political corruption and accountability in Mexico. As the evidence suggests, the characteristics of the Mexican political system along with the hegemony, high centralized public finances, and a lack of electoral punishment have increased Mexico's political corruption, and ultimately reduced political accountability.
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Page, Jennifer Marie. "Reparations and State Accountability." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467498.

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In the United States, many associate the idea of reparations with the longstanding African American claim of being owed redress for slavery and Jim Crow. Many defend the black reparations claim based on the exceptional nature of the hardships that African Americans have endured: paying reparations to blacks need not open a Pandora’s Box of other grievances, it is argued. My dissertation puts forward a theory of reparations in the domestic liberal democratic context, grounded in a variety of real world cases, that suggests that governments owe reparations in a much wider range of situations than is usually recognized. Though some compelling reparations claims refer to racialized state-sponsored injustices (e.g., Japanese American internment, the illegal annexation of Hawaii, the Tuskegee syphilis study), others have little to do with race (e.g., eugenical sterilization surgeries, LSD experimentation conducted under the CIA’s MKULTRA program, harms to “Atomic” veterans). The argument for paying reparations to blacks is grounded in an argument for liberal democratic governments to pay reparations whenever political power is abused. The core claim of the dissertation is that the government is unaccountable at the very times when it matters the most morally. When an injustice is conducted according to the law, not only are the activities of state personnel and taxpayer resources channeled towards unjust ends, an individual who is harmed does not have a viable means of recourse against the state. Sovereign immunity, the legal principle that the government cannot be sued without its consent, or “the King can do no wrong,” precludes redress in the majority of cases. Reparations seekers may appeal to the legislature, but this is an unreliable avenue to redress. I argue that reparations claims are fundamentally about the government’s accountability for injustice, and that reparations claimants are reasonable to call state power to account. On an accountability-based theory of reparations, liberal democratic governments should recognize that the safeguards against the abuse of power are not infallible, and observe a norm of redress. A liberal democracy that willingly takes responsibility for its abuses, apologizes, and pays reparations demonstrates its adherence to its legitimizing commitments.
Government
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Distelhorst, Gregory Michael. "Publicity-driven accountability in China." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/84853.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
What, if anything, renders unelected bureaucrats accountable to the public? This thesis draws upon field research on contemporary China's news media, officials, and activists to theorize the role of publicity in non-electoral accountability. "Publicity-driven accountability" argues that even in highly undemocratic settings officials respond to critical media coverage for two reasons: revealing agency slippage and producing common knowledge about government failings. This mechanism empowers the news media and individual citizens even when formal political rights are severely curtailed, producing a degree of public accountability within authoritarian institutions. The study begins with original evidence that China's Internet news outlets created forms of journalistic autonomy within the constraints of state censorship. Next it documents the sensitivity of Chinese officials to negative media coverage with an original survey experiment on local bureaucrats. The third empirical chapter provides case studies of contemporary activists in China wielding publicity to change the behavior of unelected officials. Publicity-driven accountability has consequences for theories of political development and the roles of both authority and information in aligning nondemocratic governance with the public interest.
by Gregory Michael Distelhorst.
Ph.D.
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Greenwood, Margaret. "Financial accountability and managerial incentives in English NHS Hospital Trusts 2003-2008." Thesis, University of Bath, 2012. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.558860.

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A continuing programme of NPM reforms, grounded in quasi-market modes of governance and private sector best practice, have been applied to English NHS hospitals over the last thirty years in response to concerns about their performance efficiency and accountability. However, in the transition to market modes of governance, the retention of hierarchical features gave rise to a multi-layering of accountability. From 2001-02 balanced scorecard inspired performance measurement systems (PMS), were introduced into the NHS, aimed at improving service standards through improved cost efficiency. Study 1 in this thesis finds that, in this context, the relationship between service standards and cost efficiency is positive and that, consistent with it being a more effective PMS, this was stronger for the ‘Annual Health Check’, a PMS characterised by features aimed at reducing manipulation, than the Star ratings, its predecessor. The approach to the manipulation of financial breakeven, a key accountability measure, was however more relaxed, particularly when service standards were under threat. The system of ‘financial support’ had its roots in previous hierarchical relationships and acted to shift revenue across the NHS in order to allow Trusts in financial difficulty to meet their financial objectives without damaging service standards. These transfers, which were effected through the revenue account, were generally reversed out in future years with the result that financial support accelerated revenue recognition in Trusts receiving it. In Study 2, the receipt of financial support by Trusts in financial difficulty was found to be associated with an improvement in service standards and in future financial performance but, in an increasingly demanding performance regime and multi-layered accountability, evidence was also found of opportunistic exploitation of the system. Financial support had a considerable impact on the accountability of both NHS Trusts and the wider NHS because of the limited transparency around financial support transactions.
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Books on the topic "Political and managerial accountability"

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Curbing bailouts: Bank crises and democratic accountability in comparative perspective. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009.

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New, S. J. Supply risk and managerial accountability. York: ESRC Risk & Human Behaviour Programme, 1995.

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Political accountability. Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub. Co., 2010.

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Doern, G. Bruce. Political accountability and efficiency. Kingston, Ont: Queen's University, Government and Competitiveness, School of Policy Studies, 1993.

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Doern, G. Bruce. Political accountability and efficiency. [Kingston, Ont.]: Government and Competitiveness School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1993.

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The accountable leader: Developing effective leadership through managerial accountability. London: Kogan Page, 2008.

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Ceron, Andrea. Social Media and Political Accountability. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52627-0.

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Lederman, Daniel. Accountability and corruption: Political institutions matter. Washington, D.C: World Bank, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, Office of the Chief Economist, 2001.

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Congress, the press, and political accountability. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.

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Washington (State). Dept. of Social and Health Services. Final report, management accountability project. [Olympia, Wash.]: The Department, 1986.

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Book chapters on the topic "Political and managerial accountability"

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Chabal, Patrick. "Political Accountability." In Power in Africa, 54–67. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12468-8_3.

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Chabal, Patrick. "Political Accountability." In Power in Africa, 54–67. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23167-6_3.

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Smith, B. C. "Political Accountability." In Good Governance and Development, 17–44. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-06218-5_2.

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Papadopoulos, Yannis. "Political Accountability." In The SAGE Handbook of Political Science, 695–711. 1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781529714333.n44.

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Bastian, Mariella. "Political accountability frame." In Studies in International, Transnational and Global Communications, 255–82. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24787-4_9.

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Bauer, Michael W. "Accountability and Managerial Needs within the Commission." In Library of Public Policy and Public Administration, 41–59. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-0567-7_3.

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Rubin, Olivier. "The Political Accountability Approach." In Contemporary Famine Analysis, 73–99. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-27306-8_6.

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Mulgan, Richard. "Government Accountability: Political Mechanisms." In Holding Power to Account, 36–74. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403943835_2.

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Souffrant, Eddy M. "Inclusion and Accountability." In Identity, Political Freedom, and Collective Responsibility, 121–29. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137337979_18.

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Moten, Abdul Rashid. "Muḥāsabah: Accountability in Islam." In Political Science: An Islamic Perspective, 107–25. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230377578_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Political and managerial accountability"

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Kantnerova, Libena. "MANAGERIAL FINANCIAL SKILLS." In SGEM 2014 Scientific SubConference on POLITICAL SCIENCES, LAW, FINANCE, ECONOMICS AND TOURISM. Stef92 Technology, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2014/b22/s6.056.

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Chandranegara, Ibnu Sina, and Zainal Arifin Hoessein. "Defining Judicial Accountability Post Political Transition in Indonesia." In International Conference on Law Reform (INCLAR 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.200226.004.

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Yuslaini, Nina, Pahmi Amri, and Made Devi Wedayanti. "Political Participation And Electoral Society." In International Conference on Democracy, Accountability and Governance (ICODAG 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icodag-17.2017.15.

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Yuslaini, Nina. "Political Participation And Electoral Society." In International Conference on Democracy, Accountability and Governance (ICODAG 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icodag-17.2017.63.

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Afounxenidis, Dr Alex, and Dr Manto Lampropoulou. "Question of democracy & accountability." In 2nd Annual International Conference on Political Science, Sociology and International Relations. Global Science Technology Forum, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.5176/2251-2403_pssir12.83.

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Putra, Agus Andika, Rifki Sanahdi, David Efendi, and Husni Amriyanto. "Democracy and Political Consciousness Investigating Difabel Toward Political Participation in the 2014 Presidential Election in Yogyakarta, Indonesia." In International Conference on Democracy, Accountability and Governance (ICODAG 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icodag-17.2017.1.

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Basuki, Ayudya, Rutiana Wahyunengseh, and Kristina Setyowati. "19. Accountability and Democratization of Village Budget." In 5th International Conference on Social and Political Sciences (IcoSaPS 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icosaps-18.2018.19.

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Benjamin, Garfield. "#FuckTheAlgorithm: algorithmic imaginaries and political resistance." In FAccT '22: 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533072.

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Suranto, Mr, Tunjung Sulaksno, Awang Daru Murti, and Titin Purwningsih. "Political Dynasty and Kinship Networking in Bantanese Pilkada." In International Conference on Democracy, Accountability and Governance (ICODAG 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icodag-17.2017.16.

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Kholmi, Masiyah. "Trilogy of Accountability in the Context of Political Party Organizations." In 2018 3rd International Conference on Education, Sports, Arts and Management Engineering (ICESAME 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/amca-18.2018.124.

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Reports on the topic "Political and managerial accountability"

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Snyder, James, and David Strömberg. Press Coverage and Political Accountability. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13878.

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Carvalho, Jean-Paul, and Christian Dippel. Elite Identity and Political Accountability: A Tale of Ten Islands. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22777.

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Knight, Brian, and Ana Tribin. Opposition Media, State Censorship, and Political Accountability: Evidence from Chavez's Venezuela. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25916.

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Martinez-Bravo, Monica, and Carlos Sanz. Trust and accountability in times of pandemics. Madrid: Banco de España, January 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.53479/29471.

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The COVID-19 pandemic took place against the backdrop of growing political polarization and distrust in political institutions in many countries. Did deficiencies in government performance further erode trust in public institutions? Did citizens’ ideology interfere with the way they processed information on government performance? To investigate these two questions, we conducted a pre-registered online experiment in Spain in November 2020. Respondents in the treatment group were provided information on the number of contact tracers in their region, a key policy variable under the control of regional governments. We find that individuals greatly over-estimate the number of contact tracers in their region. When we provide the actual number of contact tracers, we find a decline in trust in governments, a reduction in willingness to fund public institutions and a decrease in COVID-19 vaccine acceptance. We also find that individuals endogenously change their attribution of responsibilities when receiving the treatment. In regions where the regional and central governments are controlled by different parties, sympathizers of the regional incumbent react to the negative news on performance by attributing greater responsibility for it to the central government. We call this the blame shifting effect. In those regions, the negative information does not translate into lower voting intentions for the regional incumbent government. These results suggest that the exercise of political accountability may be particularly difficult in settings with high political polarization and areas of responsibility that are not clearly delineated.
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Martinez-Bravo, Monica, and Carlos Sanz. Trust and accountability in times of pandemic. Madrid: Banco de España, January 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.53479/25027.

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The COVID-19 pandemic took place against the backdrop of growing political polarization and distrust in political institutions in many countries. Furthermore, most governments fell short of expectations in their management of the pandemic. Did deficiencies in government performance further erode trust in public institutions? Did citizens’ ideology interfere with the way they processed information on government performance? To investigate these two questions, we conducted a preregistered online experiment in Spain in November 2020. Respondents in the treatment group were provided information on the number of contact tracers in their region, a key variable under the control of regional governments. We find that individuals greatly overestimate the number of contact tracers in their region. When we provide the actual number of contact tracers, we find a decline in trust in governments, a reduction in willingness to fund public institutions and a decrease in COVID-19 vaccine acceptance. We also find that individuals endogenously change their attribution of responsibilities when receiving the treatment. In regions where the regional and central governments are controlled by different parties, sympathizers of the regional incumbent react to the negative news on performance by attributing greater responsibility for it to the central government. We call this the blame shifting effect. In those regions, the negative information does not translate into lower voting intentions for the regional incumbent government. These results suggest that the exercise of political accountability may be particularly difficult in settings with high political polarization and areas of responsibility are not clearly delineated.
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Nazneen, Sohela. Women’s Leadership and Political Agency in Fragile Polities. Institute of Development Studies, June 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2022.046.

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Recent evidence from Afghanistan shows that even in the most difficult contexts, women will still protest for their rights. This paper draws on evidence from the Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research programme to show how women express their political agency and activism and seek accountability in repressive contexts. A4EA research looked at cases of women-led protest in Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Pakistan, and explored women’s political participation in Nigeria and Pakistan. The research shows that despite some success in claim-making on specific issues, ‘sticky norms’ and male gatekeeping prevail and govern women’s access to public space and mediate their voice in these contexts. The paper concludes by calling on donors to go beyond blueprints in programming, and to work in agile and creative ways to support women’s rights organising.
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Guiteras, Raymond, and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. Does Development Aid Undermine Political Accountability? Leader and Constituent Responses to a Large-Scale Intervention. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21434.

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Nazneen, Sohela, and Maria Fernanda Silva Olivares. Strengthening Women’s Inclusion in Social Accountability Initiatives. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2021.002.

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In the last 20 years, social accountability initiatives have facilitated the inclusion and participation of marginalised groups in governance processes. This Policy Briefing focuses on how and what factors prove effective in strengthening women’s voice in processes holding public service providers accountable. We argue that initiatives must: (a) build technical and other forms of capacity amongst women; (b) change formal rules on women’s inclusion; (c) apply political economy analysis to unpack power dynamics, identify actors in favour of gender equality, and build a network in support of women; and (d) make long-term funding commitments for sustainable change in gender-biased norms.
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Kelly, Luke. What Accountability Means in Somalia. Institute of Development Studies, June 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/k4d.2022.113.

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This rapid literature review finds that accountability programming in Somalia is focused on working effectively with the country’s hybrid governance. A number of programmes have generated findings on the potential of non-state actors to improve accountability, with a focus on contextual analysis and adaptive programming. Accountability is defined as mechanisms to hold people in power to account according to an agreed standard. Improving accountability may be difficult in fragile and conflict-affected states such as Somalia where power is dispersed and informal. Somalia is commonly described as a hybrid political order. Regions in Somalia have more and less robust governments and non-state actors have a number of important but informal roles in governance. Moreover, the prevalence of clan-based politics and patriarchal norms limits the inclusivity of accountability mechanisms, with women and members of minority clans among those commonly excluded. This report is focused on accountability in governance. It surveys both evidence on the status and contours of accountability in Somalia, and on programmes to improve accountability. It is based on evidence from the Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme (IAAAP) Somalia programme, as well as other relevant programmes. It describes the findings on the barriers and enablers to greater accountability in Somalia, as well as lessons on implementing programmes. It does not survey every accountability programme, or programme with accountability components, but instead focused on published evaluations and evidence syntheses. Several programmes, such as IAAAP, have sought to research, improve and learn lessons on accountability in Somalia. IAAAP ran from 2013 to 2019 and had a budget of GBP 23 million. It worked as an innovation laboratory to test models for greater accountability through adaptive programming. IAAAP worked on different themes, including civil society-state engagement, financial flows and extractive industries.
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Anderson, Colin, John Gaventa, Jenny Edwards, Anuradha Joshi, Niranjan Nampoothiri, and Emilie Wilson. Against the Odds: Action for Empowerment and Accountability in Challenging Contexts. Institute of Development Studies, February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/a4ea.2022.001.

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How and under what conditions does citizen-led social and political action contribute to empowerment and accountability? What are the strategies used, and with what outcomes, especially in settings which are democratically weak, politically fragile and affected by legacies of violence and conflict? The A4EA programme has explored these questions in Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan over five years between 2016-2021. This paper presents the key findings and policy and practice implications from this research across the themes of space for citizen action; citizen-governance relations; women’s political participation and collective action; citizen-led strategies for empowerment and accountability; and enabling citizen action. It also shares important lessons drawn from A4EA experience on conducting and communicating research in complex political contexts like these, and for research consortia. Whilst the research conclusions are drawn from A4EA’s four focus countries, in an increasingly fragile and authoritarian world, the findings are becoming pertinent for more and more contexts across the globe.
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