Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Political and managerial accountability'
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DI, DOMENICO GERMANA. "Towards performance governance in the public sector and administrations at international level: three essays." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata", 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2108/1391.
Full textThe study moves from the international debates about performance-based public management systems and its purpose is to answer critical questions at both policy and administrative level through a cross-cutting issues approach (institutional-political, cultural and administrative) in multi-entity settings, such as, in particular, the United Nations System. Our main objective is indeed to explore the connection between (complex and inter-related aspects of) governance and performance and especially if/how the latter may be improved by “manipulating” the former within complex environments, thus designing a possible evolutionary path towards “performance management” and ideally “performance governance” where “power-sharing” and dynamic interactions between the network members are based on defined rules and shared objectives. Through a collection of three essays by the author herself, we therefore explore, through a qualitative methodological approach based on case-study, the functioning of public sector institutions and their societal impacts through improved policies and programs effectiveness across several levels: Employment Services at European level (chapter 1 section II); International Agencies – UNESCO (chapter 2 - section II); World-wide Organisations - United Nation System (chapter 3 – section II).
Owens, Hayley. "Influencing accountability in organisations : a critical managerial competence." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/52285.
Full textMini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
zk2016
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
MBA
Unrestricted
Padró, i. Miquel Gerard. "Essays in political accountability." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/32401.
Full text"June 2005."
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis is composed by three independent essays on the limits of political accountability. In the first essay I analyze an extremely stylized model of political agency with two dimensional outcomes. I show that the non-contractible nature of rewards to the agent (the politician) is especially taxing when the voters want to control outcomes in more than one dimension. I compare and contrast this environment with traditional multitasking analyses in the context of the theory of the firm. The second essay examines why political accountability has failed so miserably in post- colonial, sub-saharan Africa. I provide a theory based on the exploitation of ethnic divisions by self-interested but weak rulers. This cleavages allow the leaders to expropriate resources from the citizenry, included their own ethnic supporters and still remain in power. The model predicts ethnic bias, patronage, inefficient policies and absence of public investment. The third essay is an empirical analysis of legislative performance in the North Carolina General Assembly. Using a new dataset I am able to show that legislators find their good performance rewarded both within the state legislature and in their electoral careers. These findings have relevance for the discussion on term limits and the theoretical modeling of political agency.
by Gerard Padró i Miquel.
Ph.D.
Guraieb, Duenas Marlene. "Information, Disclosure, and Accountability." Thesis, New York University, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10618922.
Full textDemocratic regimes have developed numerous institutions to enhance accountability through procedures that formally and informally probe public officials’ actions. The ongoing expansion of public evidence available to citizens has strengthened their ability to judge the performance of public officials. However, this increase in “investigative power” cannot be analyzed without regard for the structural cost of searching, sorting, and putting information to work to adjudicate open inquiries. Political accountability is tested in increasingly more sophisticated strategic settings where the principal's success in scrutinizing the agents depends both on the evidence made available and on the effort expended on investigation.
This work analyzes some of the main mechanisms that underlie these institutions. In chapter 2, I develop a model of endogenous information acquisition where politicians can choose how much evidence to disclose after taking a suspicious action. The model focuses on the effects of the open-ended nature of political investigations – they may uncover misdeeds related or unrelated to the event that triggered them – and sheds light on the previously unexplained nature of cover-up in political settings, including the presence of incentives for good incumbents to withhold as much information as possible from the investigative bodies. Chapter 3 studies the behavioral plausibility of these findings in a laboratory setting.
Chapter 4 is focused more on informal probing institutions, such as the continuous scrutiny of politicians through and by the media. The model explicitly differentiates between the quality of information (linked to the likelihood of producing dispositive results) and the cost associated with processing this information (linked to the resources needed to put it to use). One of the main results of this analysis is that citizens of democracies with lower cost of information may optimally choose to be less informed.
Patrawart, Kraiyos. "Essays in political accountability and conflict." Thesis, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.538758.
Full textDodlova, Marina. "Political Accountability and Organization of Government." Thesis, Paris 10, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010PA100149.
Full textBureaucracy is a key player in political game. However, its power has been often underestimated as well as the questions of its structure and constant growth remain not properly understood. This thesis represents a detailed study of the major features of the government bureaucracy by focusing on its information leverage in policy making. Normatively, the thesis explores the issues of delegation in a three-tier hierarchy and information rent distribution in common agency with several political principals, and thus contributes to opening a black box of the composite organizational structure of government. Positively, the comparative approach helps to explain the growth of government bureaucracies in democracies in terms of government administration employment
Carrillo-Viramontes, Jose Antonio. "Essays on political accountability and selection." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/51666/.
Full textPage, Jennifer Marie. "Reparations and State Accountability." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467498.
Full textGovernment
Distelhorst, Gregory Michael. "Publicity-driven accountability in China." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/84853.
Full textCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
What, if anything, renders unelected bureaucrats accountable to the public? This thesis draws upon field research on contemporary China's news media, officials, and activists to theorize the role of publicity in non-electoral accountability. "Publicity-driven accountability" argues that even in highly undemocratic settings officials respond to critical media coverage for two reasons: revealing agency slippage and producing common knowledge about government failings. This mechanism empowers the news media and individual citizens even when formal political rights are severely curtailed, producing a degree of public accountability within authoritarian institutions. The study begins with original evidence that China's Internet news outlets created forms of journalistic autonomy within the constraints of state censorship. Next it documents the sensitivity of Chinese officials to negative media coverage with an original survey experiment on local bureaucrats. The third empirical chapter provides case studies of contemporary activists in China wielding publicity to change the behavior of unelected officials. Publicity-driven accountability has consequences for theories of political development and the roles of both authority and information in aligning nondemocratic governance with the public interest.
by Gregory Michael Distelhorst.
Ph.D.
Greenwood, Margaret. "Financial accountability and managerial incentives in English NHS Hospital Trusts 2003-2008." Thesis, University of Bath, 2012. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.558860.
Full textLandauer, Matthew Walter. "Accountability and Advice in Greek Political Thought." Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10365.
Full textGovernment
Araya, Esayas Kassa. "Political Control and Accountability in Ethiopian Rulemaking." ScholarWorks, 2019. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/6301.
Full textBezuidenhout, Lydia. "Evaluating political accountability in water projects with the aim of determining the impact of political accountability on project sustainability." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/2449.
Full textThe study investigated what the degree of political accountability is in water projects as practiced by project implementers. The evaluation was also aimed at determining the impact of political accountability on project sustainability. In order to evaluate the question, field research was conducted. Field research was of a quantitative nature, using a questionnaire. This involved (a) selecting two systems (project implementers, a municipality and a non-governmental organisation) where the systems’ political accountability within water projects could be compared, and (b) interviewing community respondents from a set questionnaire in four villages. The main findings are that (i) the level of political accountability in water projects depends on the system implementing a water project, (ii) three elements of political accountability (responsibility, information, and inclusion) differ significantly between the two systems, and (iii) political accountability has a significant impact on project sustainability. It is recommended that project implementers take into consideration the identified three elements of political accountability in order to improve project sustainability.
Hoffman, Barak Daniel. "Political accountability at the local level in Tanzania." Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3229904.
Full textTitle from first page of PDF file (viewed October 11, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 223-232).
Martínez, Bravo Mónica. "Essays on political accountability in non-democratic regimes." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/57704.
Full textPage 173 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis is a collection of three independent essays on the causes and consequences of local elections in non-democratic regimes. The first essay examines the political consequences of local elections on the first democratic election after the fall of an autocratic regime. My theoretical analysis highlights that officials that were appointed by upper levels of government have a stronger incentive to continue to use local patronage networks to signal their alignment to upper levels of government, in order to protect their jobs. Therefore, if the previous dictator's party has a substantial probability of winning the election, appointed leaders will promote their electoral chances, which could become an impediment for the process of democratic consolidation. In contrast, elected local officials have a weaker incentive to signal their political leanings since their continuity in their positions does not depend on changes in upper levels of government. I provide evidence from the first democratic election in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto that corroborates the implications of the model. The second essay evaluates the economic and social impact of the introduction of local elections rural China during the last three decades. Our empirical findings highlight that elections led to a substantial reduction in income and income growth, decreased within village inequality and relaxed the enforcement of unpopular policies. These effects seem to be driven by a redistribution of assets from firms to households. We provide a simple model to illustrate how these findings can theoretically be a consequence of the shift in the accountability of local leaders, from the central government towards villagers. The third essay investigates the determinants of the existence of local elections in nondemocratic regimes. I develop a theoretical framework to explore the trade-offs for a dictator in the decision to allow local elections. The model highlights that, if the dictator values the competence of local politicians and voters have intermediate costs of military intervention, the dictator prefers local elections over an appointment system. In this scenario, elections aggregate voters' private information on competence efficiently and the ex-post alignment of voters' and dictator's preferences is maximized.
by Mónica Martínez Bravo.
Ph.D.
Sibanda, Desire Mutize. "Financial accountability in the Government of Zimbabwe." Thesis, University of Dundee, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.364916.
Full textWoodhouse, Diana. "The constitutional accountability of ministers : 1979-1990." Thesis, Open University, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.293013.
Full textMarshall, John Louis. "Information Consumption and Electoral Accountability in Mexico." Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493495.
Full textGovernment
Ispas, Ileana Alexandra. "Political accountability in practice : a conversation analytic study of ministerial accountability towards the Scottish parliamentary committees." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4496.
Full textRodan, G., and Caroline Hughes. "The Politics of Accountability in South East Asia." Oxford University Press, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10454/10062.
Full textCalls by political leaders, social activists, and international policy and aid actors for accountability reforms to improve governance have never been more widespread. For some analysts, the unprecedented scale of these pressures reflects the functional imperatives and power of liberal and democratic institutions accompanying greater global economic integration. This book offers a different perspective, investigating the crucial role of contrasting ideologies informing accountability movements and mediating reform directions in Southeast Asia. It argues that the most influential ideologies are not those promoting the political authority of democratic sovereign people or of liberalism's freely contracting individuals. Instead, in both post-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes, it is ideologies advancing the political authority of moral guardians interpreting or ordaining correct modes of behaviour for public officials. Elites exploit such ideologies to deflect and contain pressures for democratic and liberal reforms to governance institutions. The book's case studies include human rights, political decentralization, anticorruption, and social accountability reform movements in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. These studies highlight how effective propagation of moral ideologies is boosted by the presence of powerful organizations, notably religious bodies, political parties, and broadcast media. Meanwhile, civil society organizations of comparable clout advancing liberalism or democracy are lacking. The theoretical framework of the book has wide applicability. In other regions, with contrasting histories and political economies, the nature and extent of organizations and social actors shaping accountability politics will differ, but the importance of these factors to which ideologies prevail to shape reform directions will not.
Australian Research Council
Ågren, Hanna. "Essays on political representation, electoral accountability and strategic interactions /." Uppsala : Department of Economics, Uppsala University, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-6052.
Full textKoo, Ming-chu Pearl, and 古明珠. "A study of political accountability in the HKSAR government." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2001. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31966536.
Full textGARRÌ, ICONIO. "ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL SHORT - TERMISM, AND POLICY (UN) PERSISTENCE." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/503.
Full textIn the democratic countries, elections are the primary mechanism for ensuring that, once in office, a politician actually acts in the collectivity's interest. In the first chapter, I present a survey of the literature on electoral accountability. In the second chapter, I show that the presence of the elections may be the cause of the politicians' reluctance to invest in long-term public goods (political short-termism), and such behavior may be optimal for the collectivity. In the third chapter, I show that reelection concern may induce a politician to continue a policy he introduced in the past even when a policy change would be optimal for the collectivity, and not to continue a policy introduced in the past by a rival politician even when a policy change would not be optimal for the collectivity. These results may help to explain why the incumbent politicians have an "electoral advantage" over new politicians.
Markakis, Menelaos. "Political and legal accountability in economic and monetary union." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:5a9a0090-1dca-4461-8733-e09dd617d183.
Full textKoo, Ming-chu Pearl. "A study of political accountability in the HKSAR government." Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2001. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk:8888/cgi-bin/hkuto%5Ftoc%5Fpdf?B23295399.
Full textDe, Benedictis-Kessner Justin. "Local accountability : the role of attribution, institutions, and communication." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113491.
Full textCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages A61-A75).
How do people hold local governments accountable? My dissertation shows how cognitive and perceptual biases, as well as electoral institutions and strategic communication, can hinder voters' ability to hold government accountable. I gather data on local politics -- a level of government that people interact with on a daily basis, and one that encompasses the vast majority of elected officials and elections in the United States. My evidence comes from large-scale elections and communications data, surveys, and partnerships with governments and service providers. My findings indicate that widespread confusion around government responsibilities and a cognitive bias favoring recent information shape how voters evaluate government for performance, that election timing can prevent voters from effectively holding their incumbent politicians accountable, and that strategic communication by municipal governments can further bias the balance of information that citizens rely on to judge government. Together, these papers demonstrate how three facets of politics can frustrate accountability in cities. This work contributes to theoretical knowledge on political behavior and political institutions, as well as the urban politics literature, and does so using three independent sources of data that provide fertile ground for future extensions of this work.
by Justin de Benedictis-Kessner.
Ph. D.
Castro, Pedro Ernesto Vicente de. "Representação política e accountability eleitoral: genealogia e crítica." Universidade de São Paulo, 2018. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-12072018-131343/.
Full textThis thesis has two goals. The first one is to put together a genealogy of the most popular conception of representation in political science: that of electoral accountability. The theory of electoral accountability is a product of theoretical and normative reflection of political science from mid-20th century on, and especially of two different literatures. One is the literature on policy congruence or policy responsiveness, which takes congruence between the representatives and the constituents policy preferences or ideology as a normative ideal. The other one is the retrospective voting literature, which finds its most sophisticated version in political agency models. For this literature, what is normatively appealing is the selection of competent representatives, who are able to deliver good results. Both literatures specify the connection between elections and representation: through elections, constituents can get representatives to deliver what they want. The first part of this work retells these literatures trajectories, point out their impasses. The main one regards voters well documented lack of information: how can uninformed voters control their representatives? This works second aim is to assess the theory of electoral accountability in light of the pertinent empirical evidence. In order to do so, the work investigates the evidence on the problem of voters lack of information and voter competence in general. The balance of the evidence suggests skepticism towards electoral accountability. Given this, what can we expect from political representation? The thesis suggests that a possible path is to reverse the point of view of electoral accountability and see political representation as a top-down relationship in which representatives mobilize constituents. Constituents political support is a resource that representatives try to gather in order to pursue their own political objectives. This can be a way to reconcile the theory of representation with the phenomenon of political leadership.
Chaplin, M. Ann. "Officers of Parliament: Accountability, virtue and the Constitution." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/28452.
Full textShaw, Eric. "Managerial control in the Labour Party 1951-1986." Thesis, University of Manchester, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.294015.
Full textO'Neill, Aileen. "Quangos, accountability and devolution : the case of Northern Ireland." Thesis, University of Ulster, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365396.
Full textPöschl, Caroline. "Local government taxation and accountability in Mexico." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2015. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3680/.
Full textCarnaghan, Carla Ann. "Factors influencing managerial decisions about intangible asset disclosures, the role of accountability theory and impression management." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape7/PQDD_0035/NQ46814.pdf.
Full textKarbhari, Yusuf. "Managerial reforms in government and the impact of the agencification programme on accounting, accountability and effectiveness." Thesis, Cardiff University, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.388479.
Full textGreen, Jane. "Beyond managerial rhetoric : reclaiming what is practical, personal and implicit in the idea of educational accountability." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2007. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10019306/.
Full textRabrenović, Aleksandra. "Financial accountability as a condition for EU membership." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2007. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/2265/.
Full textMacfarlane, Alastair. "Labour control : managerial strategies in the Namibian mining sector 1970-1985." Thesis, Oxford Brookes University, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.280640.
Full textMat, Isa Azman. "Records management and the accountability of governance." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2009. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1421/.
Full textEbenezer, Ph D. Leo the Great [Verfasser]. "Political Accountability and Voter Turnout in Nigeria / Leo the Great Ebenezer Ph.D." München : GRIN Verlag, 2020. http://d-nb.info/122016335X/34.
Full textLopez, John Emile. "Negotiating accountability: Administrative and legislative conceptions, characterizations, and strategies." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/279896.
Full textJohnson, Bryan Michael. "The Miseducation of the Underclass: A Historical Political Analysis of No Child Left Behind." Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School, 2008. https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/etd/553.
Full textHo, Ah-ying Rose, and 何亞英. "The accountability system for senior officials in HKSAR." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2003. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B31967188.
Full textFitzGerald, Michael. "Indigenous Party Formation and Success: The Strategic Roles of Reserved Seats, Parties, and Horizontal Accountability." PDXScholar, 2019. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/5269.
Full textCho, Yoon Jik. "Trust in managerial leadership within federal agencies antecedents, outcomes, and contextual factors /." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2008. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3331254.
Full textTitle from PDF t.p. (viewed on Jul 23, 2009). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-11, Section: A, page: 4493. Advisers: James L. Perry; Evan Ringquist.
Sama, Isa Mohammed. "Governance and accountability : a comparative study of Murtala-Obasanjo and Shagari regimes in Nigeria." Thesis, Lancaster University, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.364369.
Full textTeleki, Paul. "Rethinking Accountability: Making Canadian Democracy Work Toward an Interactive and Ethical Public Space." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/28560.
Full textBarrows, Sam George. "Political Responses to Educational Performance Data." Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13065019.
Full textGovernment
Freitas, Marisleily Rodrigues de. "Accountability e formulação de políticas públicas via web." Universidade Federal de Goiás, 2012. http://repositorio.bc.ufg.br/tede/handle/tede/4658.
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With the advent of the twentieth century, the world was faced with an intense transformation in the means of mass communication. The new forms of communication quickly dominated the world scene because they can cover a much more significant number of people, besides they transmit a much larger amount of information in less time. Thus, new possibilities have emerged to bridge the gap between government and voters. However, the media are not impartial when it comes to political debate. The commercial media are still the main sources of information and entertainment. From this perspective, the Internet as alternative media means such as printed newspapers, radio and TV could be a significant instrument for the formation of citizens politically participatory and be an affordable way to obtain political information.
Com o advento do século XX, o mundo se viu diante de uma intensa transformação nos meios de comunicação de massa. As novas formas de comunicação rapidamente dominaram o cenário mundial porque podem abarcar um número muito mais significativo de pessoas, alem de veicularem um montante muito maior de informações em menor tempo. Assim, novas possibilidades surgiram para diminuir a distância entre governo e eleitores. Contudo, os meios de comunicação não são imparciais quando o assunto é debate político. As mídias comerciais ainda são as principais fontes de informação e entretenimento. Nessa perspectiva, a Internet como mídia alternativa a meios como o jornal impresso, o rádio e a TV, poderia ser instrumento significativo para a formação de cidadãos politicamente participativos bem como ser uma forma mais acessível para a obtenção de informação política.
Meyer, Christoph Olaf. "Towards a European public sphere? : the European Commission, the media and political accountability." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.621115.
Full textDasgupta, Shomik. "Ethics, distance and accountability : the political thought of Rammohun Roy, c. 1803-32." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2016. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/ethics-distance-and-accountability-the-political-thought-of-rammohun-roy-c-180332(a463f549-6946-48eb-acaf-b1a8e0583af2).html.
Full textKeeler, Rebecca L. "Democratic Accountability for Outsourced Government Services." Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University, 2011. https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu-works/654.
Full text