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Journal articles on the topic 'Political cycles'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 April 2022

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1

Roemer, John E. "POLITICAL CYCLES." Economics & Politics 7, no. 1 (1995): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1995.tb00101.x.

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2

Nanes, Matthew J. "Political Violence Cycles." Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 2 (2016): 171–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414016635198.

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3

Faye, Michael, and Paul Niehaus. "Political Aid Cycles." American Economic Review 102, no. 7 (2012): 3516–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3516.

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Researchers have scrutinized foreign aid's effects on poverty and growth, but anecdotal evidence suggests that donors often use aid for other ends. We test whether donors use bilateral aid to influence elections in developing countries. We find that recipient country administrations closely aligned with a donor receive more aid during election years, while those less aligned receive less. Consistent with our interpretation, this effect holds only in competitive elections, is absent in US aid flows to non-government entities, and is driven by bilateral alignment rather than incumbent characteri

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4

BURKLIN, Wilhelm P. "Why study political cycles?." European Journal of Political Research 15, no. 2 (1987): 131–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1987.tb00868.x.

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5

Foremny, Dirk, Ronny Freier, Marc-Daniel Moessinger, and Mustafa Yeter. "Overlapping political budget cycles." Public Choice 177, no. 1-2 (2018): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0582-9.

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6

Alesina, Alberto, and Nouriel Roubini. "Political Cycles in OECD Economies." Review of Economic Studies 59, no. 4 (1992): 663. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2297992.

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7

Pástor, Ľuboš, and Pietro Veronesi. "Political Cycles and Stock Returns." Journal of Political Economy 128, no. 11 (2020): 4011–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/710532.

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8

ELLIS, CHRISTOPHER J., and MARK A. THOMA. "CAUSALITY IN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES." Contemporary Economic Policy 9, no. 1 (1991): 39–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1991.tb00313.x.

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9

ELLIS, CHRISTOPHER J., and MARK A. THOMA. "CAUSALITY IN POLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLES." Contemporary Economic Policy 9, no. 2 (1991): 39–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1991.tb00329.x.

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10

SHUGHART, WILLIAM F., and ROBERT D. TOLLISON. "Legislation and Political Business Cycles." Kyklos 38, no. 1 (1985): 43–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1985.tb02216.x.

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11

Ohlsson, Henry, and Anders Vredin. "Political Cycles and Cyclical Policies." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 98, no. 2 (1996): 203. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3440854.

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12

Franzese, Robert J. "Political cycles and the macroeconomy." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19, no. 3 (2000): 501–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1520-6688(200022)19:3<501::aid-pam14>3.0.co;2-5.

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13

Guo, Gang. "China's Local Political Budget Cycles." American Journal of Political Science 53, no. 3 (2009): 621–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00390.x.

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14

Bohn, Frank. "Political cycles: Beyond rational expectations." PLOS ONE 13, no. 10 (2018): e0203390. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0203390.

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15

Davidson, Lawrence S., Michele Fratianni, and Jürgen von Hagen. "Testing for political business cycles." Journal of Policy Modeling 12, no. 1 (1990): 35–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0161-8938(90)90018-a.

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16

Martinez, Leonardo. "A theory of political cycles." Journal of Economic Theory 144, no. 3 (2009): 1166–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.10.006.

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17

Ellis, Christopher J., and Mark A. Thoma. "Credibility and political business cycles." Journal of Macroeconomics 15, no. 1 (1993): 69–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0164-0704(93)90053-o.

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18

FIALHO, TÂNIA MARIA MAIA. "Ciclos políticos: uma resenha." Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 19, no. 2 (1999): 381–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/0101-31571999-1016.

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RESUMO Nas últimas quatro décadas, a relação entre desempenho econômico e política foi examinada por meio de várias abordagens teóricas e empíricas, sugerindo a possibilidade de um ciclo político de negócios em muitos países. Este estudo apresenta uma revisão dos principais modelos da Teoria do Ciclo de Negócios e dos principais achados relatados na literatura internacional. Em parte, a evidência empírica sugere que a variável política, particularmente a variável eleitoral, é um determinante importante dos movimentos cíclicos da economia, indicando que a Teoria do Ciclo de Negócios é consisten

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19

Johnston, Richard. "Business Cycles, Political Cycles and the Popularity of Canadian Governments, 1974–1998." Canadian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 3 (1999): 499–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423900013949.

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AbstractThis article examines the popularity of Canadian governments between 1974 and 1998 as revealed by the monthly Gallup poll. Approval of each majority government in the 1974–1993 period underwent a cycle of honeymoon, decay and recovery. Underneath the cycle was a long-term downward trend. A simple politicoeconomic model accounts for a large fraction of long-term decay and helps explain the anti-government landslides of 1984 and 1993. But the model leaves inter-election popularity cycles largely unexplained. After 1993, the economy ceased to account for popularity and a wholly new, but a

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20

Herzog, Bodo. "Does transparency mitigate the political budget cycle?" Journal of Economic Studies 44, no. 5 (2017): 666–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jes-07-2016-0132.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of transparency on the political budget cycle (PBC) over time and across countries. So far, the literature on electoral cycles finds evidence that cycles depend on the stage of an economy. However, the author shows – for the first time – a reliance of the budget cycle on transparency. The author uses a new data set consisting of 99 developing and 34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. First, the author develops a model and demonstrates that transparency mitigates the political cycles. Second, the author confi

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21

Heckelman, Jac C., and Hakan Berument. "Political Business Cycles and Endogenous Elections." Southern Economic Journal 64, no. 4 (1998): 987. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1061215.

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22

Sieg, Gernot, and Irem Batool. "Pakistan, Politics and Political Business Cycles." Pakistan Development Review 51, no. 2 (2012): 153–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v51i2pp.153-166.

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This paper studies whether in Pakistan the dynamic behaviour of unemployment, inflation, budget deficit and real GDP growth is systematically affected by the timing of elections. We cover the period from 1973-2009. Our results can be summarised as follows: (1) Unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election periods and tends to increase immediately after elections, perhaps as a result of politically motivated employment schemes. (2) Inflation tends to be lower in pre-election periods, perhaps as a result of pre-electoral price regulation. (3) We find increase in the governmental budget deficit,

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23

al-Nowaihi, Ali, and Paul Levine. "Can political monetary cycles be avoided?" Journal of Monetary Economics 42, no. 3 (1998): 525–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(98)00032-4.

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24

Imami, Drini, Luca J. Uberti, Endrit Lami, and Edvin Zhllima. "Political business cycles and construction licensing." Economics of Transition 26, no. 3 (2018): 523–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12151.

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25

GONZÁLEZ, PAULA, JEAN HINDRIKS, and NICOLÁS PORTEIRO. "Fiscal Decentralization and Political Budget Cycles." Journal of Public Economic Theory 15, no. 6 (2013): 884–911. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12039.

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26

Klomp, Jeroen, and Jakob De Haan. "Do political budget cycles really exist?" Applied Economics 45, no. 3 (2011): 329–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2011.599787.

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27

CLEMENS, CHRISTIANE, and MAIK HEINEMANN. "DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICT, POLITICAL CYCLES AND GROWTH." Manchester School 73, no. 4 (2005): 500–521. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00456.x.

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28

Garmann, Sebastian. "Political budget cycles and divided government." Regional Studies 52, no. 3 (2017): 444–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2017.1316839.

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29

Swensen, R. Bruce, and Jayen B. Patel. "NYSE Sector Returns and Political Cycles." Journal of Business Ethics 49, no. 4 (2004): 387–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:busi.0000020873.62435.f5.

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30

JULIO, BRANDON, and YOUNGSUK YOOK. "Political Uncertainty and Corporate Investment Cycles." Journal of Finance 67, no. 1 (2012): 45–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01707.x.

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31

WILLETT, THOMAS D., and KING BANAIAN. "Legislation and Political Business Cycles: Comment." Kyklos 41, no. 3 (1988): 507–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6435.1988.tb01267.x.

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32

Chortareas, Georgios, Vassilis E. Logothetis, and Andreas A. Papandreou. "Political cycles in Greece’s municipal employment." Journal of Economic Policy Reform 20, no. 4 (2016): 321–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17487870.2016.1180251.

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33

Bee, C. Adam, and Shawn R. Moulton. "Political budget cycles in U.S. municipalities." Economics of Governance 16, no. 4 (2015): 379–403. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-015-0171-z.

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34

Hanusch, Marek. "Coalition incentives for political budget cycles." Public Choice 151, no. 1-2 (2010): 121–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9736-0.

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35

Hanusch, Marek, and Daniel B. Magleby. "Popularity, polarization, and political budget cycles." Public Choice 159, no. 3-4 (2013): 457–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-0055-5.

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36

Klomp, Jeroen, and Jakob de Haan. "Political budget cycles and election outcomes." Public Choice 157, no. 1-2 (2012): 245–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9943-y.

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37

Veiga, Francisco José, Linda Gonçalves Veiga, and Atsuyoshi Morozumi. "Political budget cycles and media freedom." Electoral Studies 45 (February 2017): 88–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.11.008.

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38

Castro, Vı́tor, and Francisco José Veiga. "Political business cycles and inflation stabilization." Economics Letters 83, no. 1 (2004): 1–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.07.016.

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39

Heckelman, Jac C., and Hakan Berument. "Political Business Cycles and Endogenous Elections." Southern Economic Journal 64, no. 4 (1998): 987–1000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.1998.tb00115.x.

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40

Iddrisu, Abdul Ganiyu, and Godfred A. Bokpin. "Political business cycles and economic growth in Africa." Journal of Economic Studies 45, no. 4 (2018): 760–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jes-02-2017-0056.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to understand both the incidence and the impact of the African political business cycle (PBC) in the light of a literature which has argued that, with major extensions of democracy since the 1990s, the cycle has both become more intense and has made African political systems more fragile. It answers two very important macroeconomic questions crucial to the validity of the opportunistic model. It, first, answers the question of whether election cycles contribute to money growth in the light of government expenditure, and second, whether election cycles have

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41

Moita, Rodrigo M. S., and Claudio Paiva. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5, no. 1 (2013): 94–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.1.94.

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The early work of Stigler (1971) treats the regulatory process as the arbitration of conflicting economic and political interests rather than a pure welfare-maximizing effort. This paper builds on these ideas and models the regulatory process as a game where the industry-lobby, consumers-voters, and a regulator-politician interact to define the regulated price, in alternating electoral and non-electoral periods. The equilibrium that emerges consists of a fully rational political price cycle in a regulated industry. Using monthly data for regulated gasoline and electricity prices from Brazil, w

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42

McFarland, Andrew S. "Interest Groups and Political Time: Cycles in America." British Journal of Political Science 21, no. 3 (1991): 257–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400006165.

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This article seeks to delineate a general theory of interest-group dynamics in America since 1890. Interest groups are seen to act in issue areas which cycle through phases of business control to reform activity and back again. Economic producer groups have a more stable incentive to participate in issue-area decision making than the reform groups that challenge their control. However, after a few years of the business-control phase of the cycle, unchecked producer groups tend to commit ‘excesses’, violations of widely shared values. This leads to political participation by reformers, most of

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43

Alt, James E., and David Dreyer Lassen. "Transparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries." American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 3 (2006): 530–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x.

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44

Faraji, Omid, Mohammad Kashanipour, Fakhroddin MohammadRezaei, Kamran Ahmed, and Nader Vatanparast. "Political connections, political cycles and stock returns: Evidence from Iran." Emerging Markets Review 45 (December 2020): 100766. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2020.100766.

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45

Schamis, Hector E., and Christopher R. Way. "Political Cycles and Exchange Rate-Based Stabilization." World Politics 56, no. 1 (2003): 43–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0007.

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Fixed exchange rates implemented to increase credibility and attract foreign investment, or as an alternative approach to stabilization in high inflation economies, have been shown to be successful in expanding economic activity and correcting inflation in the short term but often lead to undesirable outcomes in the medium to long term. Although there is a wealth of literature documenting the boom-bust cycles associated with the adoption of a nominal anchor, no adequate explanation has been proffered as to governments repeatedly choosing policies that are self-defeating. The authors address th

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46

Bell, Holly. "Cycles within Cycles." Violence Against Women 9, no. 10 (2003): 1245–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077801203255865.

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47

Štiková, Radka. "Models of political cycles: the czech experience." Prague Economic Papers 17, no. 3 (2008): 213–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.pep.330.

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48

Suzuki, Motoshi. "Political Business Cycles in the Public Mind." American Political Science Review 86, no. 4 (1992): 989–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1964350.

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Numerous studies have sought to discover political business cycles in macroeconomic variables. Although voters' subjective economic expectations have been shown to influence their electoral decisions, no existing research has attempted to uncover cyclical patterns in citizens' economic expectations. Using survey data, I seek to determine whether expectations shift to benefit the incumbent president's electoral interest. The analyses show that the percentage of the public predicting an economic upturn increases before a presidential election. One explanation for the findings is that voters migh

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49

Rakic, Biljana, Jelena Stanojevic, and Tamara Radjenovic. "Political cycles' influence on inflation and unemployment." Industrija 43, no. 2 (2015): 89–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/industrija43-7922.

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50

Wielechowski, Michał. "POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES – GOING BEYOND THE AVERAGE." Acta Scientiarum Polonorum. Oeconomia 18, no. 1 (2019): 91–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.22630/aspe.2019.18.1.10.

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We test whether there are country-specific election cycles present in the public expenditure in the European Union. Using panel data on all 28 current EU Member States from 1995 to 2015, we find in general evidence for an election-induced expansion in total government spending and within the categories of public services, safety, housing, recreation, and education. Our contribution is to combine the notion of targeting specific public spending categories and the occurrence of country-specific political budget cycles in the EU. The results indicate that election cycles vary substantially across

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