Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Political economy of aging'

Low fertility and mortality rates combined with the retirement of the generation of “baby boomers” bring about dramatic population ageing and are projected to reverse the demographic pyramid in many advanced economies. The main implication derived from the population ageing concerns the public finance of the major public intergenerational transfers (i.e., pensions and education). Ageing makes the political clout of the elderly stronger and more inclined to support transfers towards their retirement, intensifying the intergenerational conflict between young and old. In parallel, an increasing income inequality constitutes another major trend in developed countries. This trend aggravates the intragenerational conflict between rich and poor over the redistribution and the size of the welfare state. This Ph.D. thesis investigates the interplay between the public finance of intergenerational transfers (i.e., pensions and education), population ageing and income inequality within a political economy framework. The main purpose of the second chapter is to conduct an empirical investigation on the effect of current and future population ageing on education spending taking into account the strategic intergenerational link that exists in a system with a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension structure. The design of the PAYG pension system provides the appropriate incentives for the working age generation to invest in public education of young “today” in order to “reap” future benefits “tomorrow” in terms of higher taxable income, social security contributions and returns on savings. We conduct a panel analysis on OECD countries over an extended period in order to test the effect of ageing on education spending in total and per educational level. Findings suggest that the intergenerational conflict is present however it depends on the level of total level of pension spending, indicating that in times of limited fiscal resources ageing has a negative effect on education spending. Furthermore, when we consider the intergenerational link projected (future) population ageing has a positive effect on education spending that seems to be driven by non-mandatory educational levels (pre-primary and tertiary). Better quality pre-primary schooling can increase the participation rate and liberate parents from a time intensive task of raising children, and hence can generate a substantial boost in parental productivity that is directly linked to the current pensions. Second, an increase in the quality of early-education for children could have a significant effect on their future productivity and therefore on future taxable income. In the same vein, higher quality tertiary education would lead to higher future productivity, and thereby higher taxable income that is linked with the pensions of current middle-aged workers. In the third chapter, taking into account the aforementioned intergenerational link between working age and young we aim to evaluate whether a system of public intergenerational transfers – both to the elderly and to the young – can be politically sustained. In other words, we investigate whether the electorate would choose to provide publicly intergenerational transfers (pensions and education) if this decision per se was put under voting? To examine this question we employ the unique dataset taken from the National Transfers Accounts project -that provides a coherent accounting framework of economic flows from one age group to another- and a theoretical framework for the political viability of public intergenerational transfers developed in the literature. We find that most of the developed countries meet the conditions to have a politically sustained system of pensions and education and that ageing contributes positively to the political viability of such a system. In the fourth chapter, we develop an overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents with respect to their position in the income distribution, endogenous fertility and probabilistic voting to investigate how the size of public pensions and education is decided and how it is affected by population ageing and income inequality. The contribution is to include in a model with private and public education the dimension of pensions that are linked to the general level of education of the previous generation. This allows us to consider simultaneously both intragenerational and intergenerational conflicts as well as the intergenerational link. The model predicts that an increase in income inequality increases the income of the agent indifferent between public and private education, and thus decreases the participation in public education. This reduces the share of voters caring for public education through altruism for their children, which reduces the total public education spending (which in turn decreases taxes and increases pensions). However, the number of children attending public education decreases faster than the total spending, which leads to an increase in per student spending on public education. The mechanism in the case of an increase in the number of retirees works in a similar fashion: The increase in the number of pensioners increases the political weight of the retirees, increasing total pension spending (which increases taxes and decreases per student public education spending). The number of pensioners increases faster than the total pension spending, thus the per pensioner pension is decreasing. In both cases we find a positive relationship between per student public education spending and pensions through the budget constraint. Empirical evidences derived from a panel analysis of OECD countries seem to support our theoretical predictions. To sum up, this thesis reviews the existing literature on the effect of population ageing on pensions and on education, and explores empirically and theoretically the intergenerational link between these intergenerational transfers. This link between the adults and the young generation plays a crucial role in the analysis of both the effect of population ageing and the effect of income inequality on public finance of pensions and education. As we observe, ageing pressure in financial health of the PAYG pensions system indicates a conflict between financial and political sustainability. Nevertheless, if population ageing fosters political support for both public pensions and education, this can create some positive feedback improving future financial prospects of the PAYG system. Using the findings from this thesis and previous theoretical research we can suggest that it might be a useful reform to require legislation to vote on pensions and education as a unique social policy package in order to boost the sustainability of both public intergenerational transfers. The main policy conclusion is that the debate on pension reform should be widen to consider the comprehensive action of public policy along the life cycle, i.e. the joint role of forward (from parents to children) and backward (from adults to elderly parents) intergenerational transfers. This will offer a more complete view of the incentives given to agents in decisions like savings, fertility and education.

From the 1990s, welfare state and civil society in Taiwan were confronted with challenges and opportunities brought by population ageing. The author chooses NPOs with "Active Ageing" programs for the elderly, a group thriving as a consequence of Taiwan's unique transitional democratization and privatization under Neoliberalism, as a case to systematically investigate the governance structure. Four core NPOs of various scales and capacities are sampled while their stakeholders are also interviewed. Findings reveal that after the pension reform made possible by social movement and electoral politics, these institutionalized social forces secure their position in the welfare delivery system. However, problems remain unresolved because of structural inertia while NPOs operate under the changing field frame and conflicting institutional logics between the welfare state and civil society. Though partially impeded, NPOs develop an East-Asian way of solution with various counterplots. Contrasting rationales of networking explain NPOs' diverse achievements while quasi-subordination and structural loop consolidate respective constituency. Four patterns of perceived relational social capital relate to NPOs' networking practices and institutional settings. The connection among institutions, networking configurations, and relations further crystalizes the tripartite governance structure composed of the institutional, technical, and social environment. Legitimation of means functions mainly within the institutional environment while legitimation of ends through technical and social environment also justifies NPOs' social appropriateness. Various types of legitimacy are conferred to NPOs at different development stages while both formal and informal norms guide NPOs' behavior in the two-dimensional governing kinetics. Through this case study, the author also demonstrates how a meso-level approach of organizational study, integrating Sociological Institutionalism and Organizational Social Capital Theory, possibly sheds lights on the different areas of Sociology, especially those of social movement, NPOs, and ageing society.

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'apporter une contribution sur la question de la réforme du système de retraite par répartition lequel devient plus que jamais fragilisé dans un contexte de vieillissement des populations. Aussi, dans le cadre de cette recherche, nous avons analysé les effets du système de retraite par répartition ainsi que de sa réforme sur les variables macroéconomiques et sur le bien être des générations. Dans cette perspective, nous avons construit un modèle d'équilibre général calculable à générations imbriquées à partir duquel nous avons simulé différents scénarii de réforme du système de retraite tunisien en tenant compte de l'évolution de la population. Les résultats empiriques corroborent ceux dégagés d'un point de vue théorique et montrent qu'une combinaison d'une hausse du taux de cotisation, d'une baisse du taux de remplacement et d'un recul de cinq ans de l'âge de départ à la retraite, améliorerait le solde budgétaire du système par répartition mais aurait un effet négatif sur l'épargne ainsi que sur le stock de capital de l'économie. Par ailleurs, il s'avère que l'introduction d'un pilier par capitalisation, tout en maintenant constant le taux global de cotisation, aurait des effets positifs sur les variables macroéconomiques mais affecterait négativement le bien-être des générations de la transition. Les résultats des simulations nous ont également permis de formuler une proposition de réforme qui se déroulerait en deux étapes et qui permettrait de maintenir l'équilibre financier du système de retraite tunisien jusqu'en 2040
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the social security reform debate which is becoming an up-to-date concern with an aging population context. In this research, we analyze the impact of the macroeconomic and welfare effects of the pay-as-you-go system and of its reform especially during the transition. In this perspective we developed an overlapping generation model based on a general equilibrium framework. Our model takes into account the evolution of the Tunisian demographic structure. Results from simulations suggest that a social security reform combining a decrease in the replacement rate, an increase in the contribution rate and a five year increase in the retirement age have positive financial effects. However, it has negative effects on savings and on capital stock in the economy. According to our model, a fully funded pillar introduction, keeping total contribution rate constant, has a positive impact on macroeconomic variables. Nevertheless, this reform hurts the transitional generations welfare. Using these results, we propose a two-step reform of the Tunisian retirement system which introduces a fully funded pillar. This reform proposal can insure financial equilibrium of the retirement system until 2040

This thesis consists of an introduction and three stand-alone essays. In the introduction I discuss the commonalities between the three essays. Essay I charts the the main political cleavages among 59 Swedish unions and business organizations. The main conclusion is that there appear to exist two economic sources of political cleavage: The traded versus the nontraded divide and the labor versus capital divide. Essay II suggests a political rationale for why strikes have been more common in those OECD countries where the legislature is elected in single member districts (e.g. France, Great Britain) than where it was elected by proportional representation (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands). In Essay III I present a theoretical model of political support for different types of labor market regulations. From it I recover two implications: Support for industrial relations legislation that enables unions to bid up wages should be inversely related to the economy's openness, while support for employment protection legislation should be positively related to the size of the unionized sector. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of 70 countries match my theoretical priors.

This dissertation consists of three essays each of which considers a political economy problem. In the first essay, we study a local government who can engage in both grabbing hand and helping hand activities with respect to the firms under its jurisdiction. We find that there are two dynamic paths for this economy. It can either stagnate or take off, i.e., grow without bound. The path actually taken depends on three variables: If the initial capital stock, tax share of the local government, or the cost of covering up corruption is sufficiently high, the economy takes off. Otherwise it stagnates.
In the second essay, we model a situation where the government tries to help a distressed industry, but it needs to know the firms' adjustment costs to set its level of support. We show that lobbying can help the firms credibly reveal their adjustment costs, when the support takes the form of a subsidy or a tariff. Furthermore, the more firms there are in the industry, the smaller is the amount of lobbying necessary to convey information, and the higher is the social welfare. When lobbying is effort intensive rather than expenditure intensive, subsidies for high adjustment cost industries go up, and subsidies for low adjustment cost industries go down with the number of firms in the industry.
The third essay considers a game between an elite with political power and the rest of the population. Foreseeing that transition to majority rule will lead to redistribution, the elite engages in activities that decrease the efficiency of the public sector to discourage redistribution. We find that initial inequality in the economy increases corruption and decreases redistribution. The model's predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence that inequality and corruption are correlated, and that corrupt governments are smaller.

The first chapter shows that the ideological dimension is the key determinant of the decision to vote. We do so with a unique data base that analyses the elections in 16 OECD multi-party system countries for a period of time that spans from the 1979 to the 1995. This data set contains information on the ideological position taken by each party competing in an election and the self-declared ideological position of the citizens on the same ideological continuum. We estimate that the likelihood of voting is higher when there is a close distance between a voter’s bliss point and the preference of the nearest party. We also find that ideological location of the second nearest party matters for the decision to vote. Moreover, our results exclude that the ideology of political parties other than the first two nearest to the preferences of the voters are significant for the decision to vote. The second chapter focuses on why turnout varies across elections and across districts. A simple micro-founded measure of policy based party competition is developed and calculated for every district at every election in 15 European countries over the period 1947-1998. Our results suggest that a large proportion of the within-district inter-election variance in turnout levels can be attributed to differences in the intensity of district-level of political competition. The third chapter extends the research on happiness and spatial theory of voting by exploring whether the ideological vote affects the level of subjective well-being in the society. I rely my analysis on data on the subjective life satisfaction of a large sample of individual over 50 elections in 15 OECD countries. The results of the analysis lend firm support to the dominant role of ideological vote in the well-being of the individuals. Specifically, I demonstrate that subjective life satisfaction is negatively affected by the presence of strategic voting. The results also suggest that the level of well-being is lower when the citizen votes strategically for a political party that has not won the electoral competition. Moreover, when I account for the political affiliation, the right-wing voters are more susceptible to ideological consideration than the left wing one. My results are robust to different measures of strategic voting.

This dissertation consists of three essays on political economy. The first essay studies the various ways in which political activism affects policy making, drawing upon evidence from the Tea Party movement in the United States in 2009 and 2010. The second essay develops a policy-centered framework for understanding voting behavior in proportional-representation systems, and tests its predictions using survey data collected around the 2002 Dutch general elections. The third essay focuses on a specific aspect of the implementation of policy, the consequences regulatory supervision may have on firm performance, and assesses the net effect of this kind of supervision on firms' operating costs in the setting of the commercial-banking sector in the United States in the period 2001-2007.
Economics

This thesis consists of three stand-alone chapters studying theoretical models concerning a range of issues that take place within the context of political delegation: tax enforcement, political selection, electoral campaigning. First chapter studies the problem of a small electorate of workers who cannot influence tax rates but can influence their local politicians to interfere with tax enforcement. It develops a two-candidate Downsian voting model where voters are productivity-heterogenous workers who supply labour to a local firm that can engage in costly tax evasion while facing an exogenously given payroll tax collected at the firm level. Two purely office motivated local politicians compete in a winner-takes-all election by offering fine reductions to take place if the firm gets caught evading. Two results stand out. First, equilibrium tax evasion is (weakly) increasing in the productivity of the median voter as a result of the latter demanding a weaker enforcement regime through more aggressive fine reductions. Second, if politicians were able to propose and commit on tax rates as well, then the enforcement process would be interference-free and the tax level would coincide with the median voter's optimal level. These two results underline the fact that from voters' perspective, influencing enforcement policy is an imperfect substitute for influencing tax policy in achieving an optimal redistribution scheme due to tax evasion being costly. In other words, a lax enforcement pattern in a given polity can be indicative of a political demand arising as an attempt to attain a redistributive second-best when influencing tax policy is not a possibility. Second chapter turns attention to the role and incentives of media in the context of ex ante political selection, i.e. at the electoral participation level. It constructs a signalling model with pure adverse selection where a candidate whose quality is private information decides on whether to challenge an incumbent whose quality is common knowledge given an electorate composed of voters who are solely interested in electing the best politician. Electoral participation is costly and before the election, a benevolent media outlet which is assumed to be acting in the best interest of voters decides on whether to undertake a costly investigation that may or may not reveal challenger's quality and transmit this information to voters. The focus of the chapter is on studying the selection and incentive effects of changes in media's information technology. The setting creates a strategic interaction between challenger entry and media activity, which gives rise to two main results. First, an improvement in media's information technology, whether due to cost reductions or gains in investigative strength always (weakly) improves ex ante selection by increasing minimum challenger quality in equilibrium. Second, while lower information costs always (weakly) make the media more active, an higher media strength may reduce its journalistic activity, especially if it is already strong. The intuition behind this asymmetry is simple. While both types of improvements increase media's expected net benefits from journalism, a boost to its investigative strength also makes the media more threatening for inferior challengers at a given level of journalistic activity. Combining this with the first result implies that the media can afford being more passive without undermining selection if it is sufficiently strong to begin with. In short, a strong media might lead to a relatively passive media, even though the media is "working as intended". Third chapter is about electoral campaigns. More precisely, it is a theoretical investigation into one possible audience-related cause for diverging campaign structures of different candidates competing for the same office: state of political knowledge in an electorate. Electorate is assumed to consist of a continuum of voters heterogenous along two dimensions: policy preferences and political knowledge. The latter is assumed to partition the set of voters into ignorant and informed segments, with the former consisting of voters who are unable to condition their voting decisions on the policy dimension. Political competition takes place within a probabilistic voting setting with two candidates, but instead of costless policy proposals as in a standard probabilistic voting model, it revolves around campaigning. Electoral campaigning is modelled as a limited resource allocation problem between two activities: policy campaigning and valence campaigning. The former permits candidates to relocate from their initial policy positions (reputations or legacies), which are assumed to be at the opposing segments of the policy space (i.e. left and right). The latter allows them to generate universal support via a partisanship effect and can be interpreted as an investment into non-policy campaign content such as impressionistic advertising, recruitment of writers capable of producing emotionally appealing speeches, etc. The chapter has two central results. First, a candidate's resource allocation to valence campaigning increases with the fraction of ignorant voters, ideological (non-policy) heterogeneity of informed voters and proximity of candidate's initial position to the bliss point of the informed pseudo-swing voter. The last one results from decreasing relative marginal returns for politicians from converging to pseudo- swing voter's ideal position. Second, even if candidates are otherwise symmetric, a monotonic association between policy preferences and political knowledge can induce divergence into campaign structures. For instance, if ignorance and policy preferences are positively correlated (e.g. less educated preferring more public good) then the left candidate would conduct a campaign with a heavier valence focus and vice versa. Underlying this result is again the decreasing relative marginal returns argument: a candidate whose initial position is already close to that of the informed pseudo-swing voter would benefit more from a valence oriented campaign. An implication of this is that a party that is known having a relatively more ignorant voter base can end up conducting a much more policy focused campaign compared to a party that is largely associated with politically aware voters.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2011.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 177-187).
The chapters in this thesis tackle different questions, but share the attempt to open the "black box" of the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes. In the first chapter, I examine mass media's role in countering special interest group influence by studying county-level support for US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy capture of politicians by special interests, and compare the reaction to increases in concentration by voters covered by two types of media markets - in-state and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets, out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states' politics and elections. Consistent with the idea that citizens punish political capture exposed in the media, I find that an increase in concentration of special interest contributions reduces candidate's vote shares in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage. The second chapter (with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson) examines the effect of population growth on violent conflict. Exploiting the international epidemiological transition starting in the 1940s, we construct an instrument for changes in population (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007) and find that countries with higher (exogenous) increases in population experimented larger increases in social conflict. Using a simple theoretical framework, we interpret these findings as evidence that a larger population generates greater competition for resources and makes violence more likely if institutions cannot handle the higher level of disputes. The third dissertation chapter asks the following question: if property rights in land are so beneficial, why are they not adopted more widely? I propose a theory based on the idea that limited property rights over peasants' plots may be supported by elite landowners to achieve two goals. First, limited property rights reduce peasants' income from their own plots, generating a cheap labour force. Second, they force peasants to remain in the rural sector to protect their property, even if job opportunities appear in the urban sector. The theory identifies conditions under which weak property rights institutions emerge, and provides a specific mechanism for the endogenous persistence of inefficient rural institutions.
by Leopoldo Fergusson.
Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. "Joint with Abhijit Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto"--Page 115, Chapter 3.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 151-156).
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first two chapters explore how different organizational forms, and in particular different hiring and firing practices, affect bureaucracies. In the first chapter, I study how the introduction of merit systems reducing politicians' control over police officers' hiring and firing affected police performance in the 1970s. I exploit population-based mandates for police department merit systems in a regression discontinuity design. Merit systems improved performance: in the first ten years after the reform, the property crime rate was lower and the violent crime clearance rate was higher in departments operating under a merit system than in departments operating under a spoils system. I explore three possible channels: resources, police officers' characteristics and police officers' incentive structure. Employment and expenditures were not affected and there is limited evidence of selection changing pre-1940. Instead, I provide indirect evidence that changes in the incentive structure faced by police officers were likely important. In the second chapter, I study how the introduction of civil service boards in charge of meritocratic hiring affected the demographic composition and the performance of police officers, fire fighters and other municipal employees 1900-1940. Identification exploits the staggered timing of the reform in large municipalities using a differences-in-differences design. I find that civil service boards decreased the probability that police officers were first or second generation immigrants but mixed evidence on how the demographic characteristics of other workers were affected. Finally, I find that no effect on police performance. The third chapter, joint with with Abhijit Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto, analyzes a large-scale experiment in Indonesia. In particular, we study how a national governmental health insurance program characterized by flexible coverage responds to subsidies and assisted registration through a website. Lowering prices and reducing hassle costs increase enrollment but households often let their coverage lapse. Subsidies attract healthier households in the short run, but over time the average value of claims equalizes because of differential claim dynamics. Overall, we find that, when dynamic adjustments to coverage are possible, subsidies do not improve the financial sustainability of health insurance programs.
by Arianna Ornaghi.
Ph. D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2016.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 159-161).
This thesis consists of three essays on economics focusing on the determinants of regime change and economic growth. I put the focus primarily on political, institutional, and historical factors. I started working on these topics after studying the importance of regime change and institutions in the modern economics literature. The first essay analyzes how media can be a powerful tool to promote regime change in tightly controlled political systems. I analyze the impact of Radio Liberty, an American radio with an anti-communist slant, on the 1991 Russian elections, which were the first elections in the country, to study the role of Western media on the demise of the Soviet Union. I use a novel empirical strategy exploiting ionospheric variation with the aim of obtaining a measure of Radio Liberty availability in each Russian electoral district. The results show a significant effect of these broadcasts in favor of Yeltsin, documenting that media can play an important role in political processes of regime change. In the second essay, I analyze the persistent effects of the territorial division in Spain between the Christian kingdoms in the north and Islamic Iberia in the center and south of the country during the Middle Ages. I analyze this question empirically using a spatial donut discontinuity design which compares Christian and Muslim territories exploiting the dynamics of the reconquest process undertaken by the Christians which resulted in the Muslim defeat. I find important differences in current municipal economic development with substantial positive effects in Christian municipalities. The third essay analyzes the importance of protests for regime change. I provide empirical evidence that protests have a significant and non-linear impact on the likelihood that a country successfully democratizes. I show that it is for intermediate values of protests that the likelihood of democratization is higher. I present a dynamic model to explain the empirical evidence. The main implication is that protests could play an important role for regime change as long as they are not too high because in the latter case there will be a backlash which will block regime change.
by Javier Garcia-Arenas.
Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2011.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first chapter is an empirical investigation of social change, looking at the Prohibition Era in the U.S. It explores how the implementation of policies affects the evolution of beliefs about their effects, giving rise to a feedback between preferences and policy choices. Using city-level data on law enforcement and crime, it estimates a structural model where crime outcomes are the result of Prohibition enforcement, and lead to changes in public opinion about Alcohol-related policies. Enforcement depends on moral views and beliefs, but only beliefs are shaped by the outcomes of past policies. The model can account for the variation in public opinion changes, and for the heterogeneous responses of enforcement and violence across cities. Its estimates are used to perform a series of counterfactual exercises. The second chapter is a theoretical investigation of entrenchment and encroachment of rulers. It studies the strategic interaction between competition and ratchet effect incentives in a coalition-formation game of incomplete information. Rulers require the support of a subset of politically powerful groups to remain in power. These have private information about their cost of providing political support. A ruler can attempt to exploit the competitive nature of the coalition formation game to induce revelation. Its ability to do so determines the extent of entrenchment and encroachment. By restricting attention to Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibria, the model shows that limited learning is possible, and that learning dynamics are shaped by an informational commitment problem arising when rulers are "too optimistic". In joint work with James Robinson, the final chapter is a comparative empirical study of the impact of Frontier availability on long-run development across the Americas. It calls into question the notion of American exceptionalism due to its Westward Frontier, first proposed by Frederick J. Turner. Almost every country in the Americas had a substantial Frontier, but its allocation varied due to differences in the quality of political institutions around the mid-19* century, making the effect of the Frontier conditional on political institutions at the time of Frontier expansion. The empirical evidence is consistent with this "conditional Turner thesis".
by Camilo Garcia-Jimeno.
Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2018.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 179-184).
This thesis consists of three chapters on political economy. Each chapter explores the effects of a change to the equilibrium of a given market. In the first chapter, Jon Weigel and I study a randomized controlled trial in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on corruption at tolls. We randomly vary incentives for drivers to comply with rules instead of engaging in corruption. These incentives affect the "supply" of corruption rather than the "demand" for corruption from bureaucrats. We find that sizable financial incentives produce a 7 to 10 percentage point increase in the probability that drivers get receipts, implying an elasticity of citizen supply of bribes ranging from 0.45 to -0.95. Social incentives have no effect. Similarly, providing information about other drivers' responses to treatment (to shift social norms) does not affect behavior. Drivers' appear remarkably inelastic in their supply of bribes. We argue this reflects the fact that bribe payment may increase the efficiency of transactions in the toll setting we examine and suggest that corruption may serve to "grease the wheels" in this context. In the second chapter, Christopher Blattman, Horacio Larreguy, Benjamin Marx, and I study a large-scale randomized controlled trial designed to combat vote-buying in the 2016 election in Uganda. We find that the campaign did not reduce the extent to which voters accepted cash and gifts in exchange for their votes. In addition, we designed the study to take advantage of our large sample (covering 1.2 million voters) to examine both direct treatment and spillover effects. The spillover effects on vote-buying are also zero, but the campaign had large direct and indirect effects on vote-shares for candidates. Heavily treated areas had increases in visits from non-incumbent candidates and non-incumbent candidates improved their vote shares substantially in these parishes. Consistent with these effects, we find evidence that the campaign diminished the effectiveness of vote-buying transactions by shifting local social norms against vote-selling and by convincing some voters to vote their conscience, regardless of any gifts received. In the third chapter, I examine the effect of the 26th Amendment, which lowered the voting age in the United States from 21 to 18. This change enfranchised a large population of new voters, expanding the electorate by almost 9%. However, I find that the Amendment had little effect on overall political outcomes in the United States. Although it did increase total turnout in areas with more young voters, it did not affect the partisan composition of the electorate and correspondingly did not lead to changes in representation or policy. These results stand in contrast to other well-studied expansions of the franchise and provide an important caveat to those findings: when the preferences of new voters are insufficiently distinct from those of existing voters, politicians have little reason to change their established positions.
by Otis Russell Reid.
Citizen participation in corruption : evidence from roadway tolls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (with Jonathan Weigel) -- A market equilibrium approach to reduce the incidence of vote -buying : evidence from Uganda (with Christopher Blattman, Horacio Larreguy, and Benjamin Marx) -- A "minor" expansion : political outcomes.
Ph. D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2010.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
Essay 1: The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities. In this paper, I use financial data of Portuguese municipalities (1992-2005) to investigate if political alignment between the central government and a local government brings financial benefit to local governments. I use a regression discontinuity design, in order to distinguish between generally partisan transfers (larger transfers to municipalities where the party in power has larger vote share), and the effect of political alignment per se, between the national government and the municipal chamber president. The benefit of pure alignment is substantial. Estimates imply that municipalities aligned with the central government receive 19% more targetable transfers than do municipalities where the party in power nearly won the local elections. I test an electoral motivation for this bias in transfers: extra transfers prove to increase the vote share of PSD incumbents, but not the vote share of PS incumbents; however, municipal incumbency does not lead to better results in national elections. Essay 2: Local Government Fiscal Policies: Left-wing vs. Right-wing Portuguese Municipalities. In this paper, I use financial data from Portuguese municipalities (from 2003 to 2007) to investigate if the ideology of the local government incumbent influences local fiscal policies. Regression discontinuity design is employed to ensure proper identification of the ideology effect on fiscal policies. Left-wing control of municipal presidency showed a significant effect on the likelihood of adopting a municipal corporate tax. Left-wing municipalities also proved more likely to invest in social infrastructure. On the other hand, right-wing municipalities were shown to be more likely to grant subsidies to families, as well as to offer more generous compensation to their municipal workers. Finally, left-wing municipalities were less likely to resort to high levels of debt than their right-wing counterparts. Essay 3: Political Alignment and Federal Transfers to the US States. In this paper, I use financial data regarding transfers from the US federal government to US States (1982-2001) to investigate if political alignment, defined as a state governor and the US President belonging to the same political party, influences the level of federal transfers received by a state. Regression discontinuity design is used to ensure proper identification of the alignment effect. Total federal transfers to aligned states are significantly larger, with the most trustworthy estimates in the neighborhood of 3%. Most of this advantage comes from significantly larger defense transfers to aligned states (the most credible estimates indicate a 13% advantage). Finally, other types of federal transfers are not significantly affected by political alignment, namely entitlements, salaries and, perhaps surprisingly, project grants.
by Marco Migueis.
Ph.D.

This thesis is divided into three parts. The first one evaluates the institution of compulsory vote, providing new estimates for the effects of the obligation to vote on individuals. The identification strategy relies on the Brazilian dual voting system - voluntary and compulsory - the exposure being determined by the date of birth. Using RD and IV approaches and data from a self-collected survey, we find that the compulsory legislation leads to a significant increase in voter turnout. These changes are followed by a sizable increase in the probability that individuals will express preference for a political party, but not by an increase in political knowledge among the population. Moreover, we find that the first compulsory voting experience permanently affects individuals\' preferences. The second part of the thesis empirically analyses episodes of sovereign debt default. Some of the salient features of the theoretical literature on sovereign debt, including its prediction that almost all defaults should arise in \"Bad Times\", are at odds with the data: over 38% of defaults actually occur in \"Good Times\", as measured by an HP filter. We explore the specific characteristics of each type of default and present econometric evidence that failures to repay foreign debt in good times can, usually, be rationalized by three components: (i) changes in the political environment, (ii) hikes in global interest rates and (iii) instances in which good HP times actually take place under quite poor economic conditions. We also present some suggestive indications that the duration of the episodes does not vary substantially with the type of default that precedes them, but with the environment in which they occur, drawing some important implications for the understanding of economies\' post-default market access. The third part of the thesis looks at the issue of campaign contributions in exchange for political favors (the so called \"pay-to-play\" scheme). I proposes a simple game to model the incentives of political parties and firms from public-revenue-intensive sectors, and test the implications of this model using data on campaign contributions and public contracts from Brazil. The data confirms the pay-to-play hypothesis.
Esta tese se divide em três partes. A primeira parte avalia a instituição do voto compulsório, proporcionando novas estimativas para os efeitos da obrigação de votar sobre os indivíduos. A estratégia de identificação se baseia no sistema dual em vigor no Brasil - voluntário e compulsório - sendo a exposição determinada pela data de nascimento. Usando as metodologias de RD e VI, e dados de uma pesquisa coletada especificamente para este estudo, concluímos que esta legislação leva a um aumento significante na participação política através do voto. Este aumento é acompanhado por uma elevação considerável na probabilidade de os cidadãos expressarem preferência por um partido político, mas não no seu nível de conhecimento sobre política. Além disto, concluímos que a primeira experiência de voto afeta permanentemente as preferências dos indivíduos. A segunda parte da tese analisa empiricamente episódios de calote da dívida soberana. Alguns dos aspectos fundamentais da literatura teórica sobre o assunto, incluindo a previsão de que quase todos os calotes deveriam ocorrer em \"Períodos Ruins\", não são confirmados pelos dados: mais de 38% dos calotes ocorrem em \"Períodos Bons\", sob a definição do filtro HP. Exploramos as características de cada tipo de calote e apresentamos evidência econométrica de que calotes na dívida externa em períodos bons em geral podem ser explicados por três componentes: (i) mudanças no ambiente político, (ii) aumentos nas taxas de juros internacionais e (iii) instâncias em que o filtro HP classifica um período como bom ainda que a real situação econômica seja bastante negativa. Por fim, apresentamos alguns resultados que sugerem que a duração do episódio de calote não depende substancialmente do tipo de calote em questão, mas sim do ambiente em que o calote ocorre. Tal resultado abre caminho para novas pesquisas sobre o acesso a mercados internacionais de crédito após calotes. A terceira parte da tese trata da questão de contribuições de campanha em troca de favores políticos (esquema conhecido como \"pay-to-play\"). Eu proponho um jogo simples para modelar os incentivos de partidos políticos e firmas de setores intensos em receitas públicas, e testo as implicações deste modelo usando dados de doações de campanhas e contratos públicos do Brasil. Os dados confirmam a hipótese de pay-to-play.

This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the issue that in a political environment wherein the development of a political career may encompass frequent transitions between offices, it is usually unclear how winning a given position may ultimately affect subsequent electoral performances and career formation. We exploit regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian elections to estimate the electoral advantage derived by incumbents of various positions both when running for reelection to the same held position, and when trying to win a different elective office. Then, we document that incumbency in legislative offices at state and federal levels is associated with a strong positive effect on the probability of winning the same position in the following election, whereas officeholders in diverse branches of local government do not appear to benefit electorally from their incumbency status and may even be harmed by it when they have relatively little political experience. Moreover, we find that state deputies also receive an incumbency advantage when running for the position of federal deputy, and that such a cross-office effect, along with all incumbency effects on winning the same position, is not due to selection into candidacy. Aside from the transition from state deputy to federal deputy, however, incumbents of any position tend to be less likely than their defeated counterparts to run for, and win, other positions. In the second part, we investigate whether incentive-compatible clientelistic transactions may be sustained through the observation of voters\' party-affiliation status by politicians. We argue that since affiliation consists of an instance of public demonstration of support for a given party, vote-buying attempts by parties may be made more effective by targeting voters that are (or in order for them to become) affiliated to them. Using electoral and demographic data on Brazilian municipalities, we find that voters affiliated to parties in the municipal coalition of the Workers\' Party are significantly more likely to start receiving benefits from the Bolsa Família program upon the incumbency of a party in that coalition. We also investigate political determinants of party affiliation and find that while partisan incumbency at the local level appears to affect affiliation only in restricted situations, the provision of payments from the Bolsa Família has a robust positive effect on affiliation. Lastly, the third part investigates the extent to which teachers with strong partisan stances are capable of influencing electoral outcomes through shaping their students\' voting behavior. We address this question by exploiting unique datasets on party-affiliated voters and on public high school teachers in the state of São Paulo, Brazil---through which we are able to identify teachers\' political affiliations. Along with such information, we also make use of very rich datasets on election results and voter characteristics to explore the relationship between the density of affiliated teachers in a given region and electoral outcomes observed for that region. To overcome endogeneity issues such as that of selection in the assignment of teachers to schools and of voters to polling places, for instance, we explore the varying intensity of the hypothesized effect according to electorate characteristics at the polling station level, a very specific site within the polling district to which voters and teachers are suggested not to be able to select themselves. Our results are suggestive of a positive and significant effect of the presence of affiliated teachers on the electoral performance of the corresponding party, especially in elections based on plurality voting systems. However, our evidence also indicates that such an effect is more relevant for (and possibly restricted to) teachers affiliated to the Workers\' Party, and that these teachers appear to be altering political
Esta tese se divide em três partes. A primeira parte lida com a questão de que, em um ambiente político em que o desenvolvimento de uma carreira política possa envolver frequentes transições entre cargos, não se tem claro como a ocupação de uma dada posição eletiva pode fundamentalmente influenciar o desempenho eleitoral subsequente e a formação de uma carreira pelos políticos. São exploradas regressões descontínuas baseadas em eleições brasileiras com o intuito de se estimar o impacto eleitoral de ser o mandatário experimentado por políticos tanto ao concorrerem à reeleição ao cargo que ocupam, quanto ao disputarem outro cargo eletivo. Documenta-se, então, que a incumbência de cargos legislativos aos níveis estadual e federal encontra-se associada a um expressivo efeito positivo sobre a probabilidade de vitória da disputa seguinte pelo mesmo cargo, ao passo que mandatários de governos locais não aparentam ser eleitoralmente beneficiados por tal status, podendo ainda ser prejudicados por tal condição no caso de exibirem pouca experiência política. Além disso, verifica-se que deputados estaduais também usufruem de uma vantagem eleitoral da incumbência ao disputarem o cargo de deputado federal, e rejeita-se que tal efeito, bem como os impactos sobre a probabilidade de ser reeleito a um mesmo cargo, seja devido à seleção em novas candidaturas. À exceção da transição do cargo de deputado estadual para o de deputado federal, no entanto, mandatários de qualquer cargo tendem a ser menos propensos do que seus homólogos derrotados a se candidatar e a vencer eleições para outros cargos. Na segunda parte, investigamos se transações clientelistas podem ser sustentadas através da observação, por parte de partidos políticos e candidatos, do status de filiação partidária dos eleitores. Argumenta-se que, sendo tal filiação um exemplo de demonstração pública de apoio a um partido, tentativas de compra de voto por partidos podem se tornar mais eficazes quando direcionadas a eleitores que sejam filiados, ou no intuito de que venham a sê-lo. Por meio do emprego de dados eleitorais e demográficos acerca de municípios brasileiros, observa-se que eleitores filiados a partidos das coligações municipais do Partido dos Trabalhadores são significativamente mais propensos (relativamente a eleitores em geral) a passar a receber benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família quando da eleição de tais partidos. Investigam-se também determinantes políticos da filiação partidária, e encontra-se que o simples fato de ser o mandatário de governos locais afeta os níveis de filiação ao partido correspondente apenas em situações específicas; por outro lado, a provisão de pagamentos do Bolsa Família apresenta um efeito positivo e robusto sobre a evolução dos índices de filiação. Por fim, a terceira parte investiga o potencial exibido por professores com elevada participação política de influenciar resultados eleitorais ao induzirem os votos de seus alunos. Explora-se tal questão através da utilização de dados sobre filiação partidária e sobre professores de ensino médio de escolas estaduais no estado de São Paulo, Brasil. Combinando-se informações sobre o status de filiação partidária de tais professores com dados sobre resultados eleitorais e características do eleitorado, investiga-se especificamente a relação entre a densidade de professores filiados e o desempenho eleitoral dos partidos em uma dada região. Problemas de endogeneidade, como os possivelmente decorrentes da alocação de professores a escolas, são evitados por meio da exploração de variação na intensidade do efeito proposto de acordo com características do eleitorado em um nível ao qual eleitores (e professores) não são capazes de se selecionar. Os resultados relacionados sugerem um efeito positivo e significante da presença de professores filiados sobre o desempenho eleitoral dos partidos, particularmente em eleições majoritárias. No entanto, a evidência apresentada indica que tal efeito é aparentemente restrito a professores filiados ao Partido dos Trabalhadores, e que tais professores são capazes de alterar as preferências políticas de alunos que compareceriam à votação independentemente de sua influência. .

The papers in this thesis study distortions and inefficiencies that impede the correct functioning of democratic systems. I specifically focus on two phenomena: organised crime and media bias. The first paper presents an analysis of the consequences of the collusion between criminal organisations and politicians on the allocation of public resources and the collection of fiscal revenues. To measure the presence of criminal organisations it exploits newly collected data on public spending, local taxes and elected politicians at the local level. Differences-in-differences estimates reveal that infiltrated local governments not only spend more on average on construction and waste management and less on police enforcement, but also collect fewer fiscal revenues. In addition, I uncover key elements of local elections associated with mafia-government collusion. In particular, Regression Discontinuity estimates show that infiltration is more likely to occur when right-wing parties win local elections. The second paper moves on to the study of media bias and persuasive communication. In democracies voters rely on media outlets to learn about politically salient issues. This raises an important question: how strongly can media affect public perceptions? This paper uses a natural experiment – the staggered introduction of the Digital TV signal in Italy – to measure the effect of media persuasion on the perceptions individuals hold. It focuses on crime perceptions and, combining channel-specific viewership and content data, this paper shows that the reduced exposure to channels characterized by high levels of crime reporting decreases individual concerns about crime. The effect is particularly strong for the elderly who are more exposed to television and less to other sources of information. Finally, it shows that such change in crime perceptions is likely to have relevant implication for voting behaviour. The third paper continues on the study of persuasive communication by investigating whether the amount and the type of news related to sovereign debt might have played a role in the triggering of the crisis by increasing the level of uncertainty among investors. In order to test these claims empirically, I collect a unique and new dataset on news from the main media outlets in a set of 5 European Countries from September 2007 to September 2014. I restrict my search to news related to sovereign debt and, in particular, to media stories related to political aspects of the debt. Time series and dynamic panel regressions reveal that, conditional on a full set of controls and falsification tests, the frequency of news is correlated to an increase in bond prices. Both time series and panel analysis reveal a certain extent of country heterogeneity in the effect. In particular, an increase in the number of news leads to an increase in bond yields of peripheral countries. Finally, this paper also shows how it is not just the amount of news that matters, but also their tone. More precisely, negative news in country i at time t − 1 increases significantly the sovereign bond yield of country i at time t. On the opposite positive news leads to a decrease in sovereign bond yields. In sum, the three chapters of this thesis aim to contribute to the academic study of organised crime and media bias. First, this thesis provides new conceptualisation in the study of these phenomena. Second, it exploits set of newly collected dataset which will eventually constitute a public good for all the researchers interested in the study of these topics. Finally, to overcome the difficult identification challenges that the above questions pose, this thesis contributes to the literature by proposing a set of rigorous ways to claim causality in the results.

The first chapter analizes conditional assistance programs. They generate conflicting relationships between international financial institutions (IFIs) and member countries. The experience of IFIs with conditionality in the 1990s led them to allow countries more latitude in the design of their reform programs. A reformist government does not need conditionality and it is useless if it does not want to reform. A government that faces opposition may use conditionality and the help of pro-reform lobbies as a lever to counteract anti-reform groups and succeed in implementing reforms. The second chapter analizes economies saddled with taxes and regulations. I consider an economy in which many taxes, subsidies, and other distortionary restrictions are in place simultaneously. If I start from an inefficient laissez-faire equilibrium because of some domestic distortion, a small trade tax or subsidy can yield a first-order welfare improvement, even if the instrument itself creates distortions of its own. This may result in "welfare paradoxes". The purpose of the chapter is to quantify the welfare effects of changes in tax rates in a small open economy. I conduct the simulation in the context of an intertemporal utility maximization framework. I apply numerical methods to the model developed by Karayalcin. I introduce changes in the tax rates and quantify both the impact on welfare, consumption and foreign assets, and the path to the new steady-state values. The third chapter studies the role of stock markets and adjustment costs in the international transmission of supply shocks. The analysis of the transmission of a positive supply shock that originates in one of the countries shows that on impact the shock leads to an inmediate stock market boom enjoying the technological advance, while the other country suffers from depress stock market prices as demand for its equity declines. A period of adjustment begins culminating in a steady state capital and output level that is identical to the one before the shock. The the capital stock of one country undergoes a non-monotonic adjustment. The model is tested with plausible values of the variables and the numeric results confirm the predictions of the theory.

xii, 116 p. : ill. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number.
The following essays address the impact of special interest groups on economic decision making processes. The hypothesis of the first essay is that there exists a dynamic relationship between politicians and lobby groups. Politicians may choose to support "projects" proposed to them by lobbies because they yield clear economic benefits. However, governmental support may continue after these benefits have been exhausted, implying a cost to society and yielding rents to the lobbies. A theoretical framework is developed to model the incentives a government might have to behave in a manner consistent with the hypothesis. In this structure despite the fact that they support projects from which all economic rents have been extracted, politicians are rationally reelected. In the second chapter I examine how structural changes in the US steel industry affect the voting behavior of House Representatives on trade related bills. The hypothesis is that Representatives face opposing incentives after the PBGC bailed out the pension plans of major steel firms. Representatives have an incentive to vote less for protectionist policies, because the bailout makes the steel firms more competitive. But the Representatives also have an incentive to yield to the demands of affected steel workers, who favor more protection after the bailout. The data set underlying this study is a panel including votes on trade related bills over 9 years. The results obtained using fixed effects techniques support the hypothesis. In the third chapter, I develop a theoretical model of the dissolution of countries. I model a society with two different groups of citizens, who have different preferences over public goods, to analyze under which political regime the dissolution of these groups into separate countries is most likely. Differentiating between revolutions and civil wars allows me to look at the effects of both forms of political violence. I find that while the threat of a revolution can induce oligarchies to increase the franchise, the threat of a civil war can induce a. country to dissolve peacefully. The model predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely in democracies, whereas oligarchies are more likely to risk civil war to stay united.
Committee in charge: Christopher Ellis, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Bruce Blonigen, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Glen Waddell, Member, Economics; Michael Dreiling, Outside Member, Sociology

Aquesta tesi combina dades històriques amb teoria de jocs per a intentar entendre millor la relació entre els partits polítics i l'opinió publica. En primer lloc, estudi les dinàmiques de les qüestions socials. Demostro que les qüestions socials (per exemple, aquelles relacionades amb els drets de les dones i les minories, o les qüestions racials) tendeixen a seguir patrons de comportament, tant en termes de partits com d'opinió pública. Després, basant-me en aquests patrons, proposo una nova forma de modelar el comportament dels partits i del que ciutadans. A través de tres articles teòrics, aprofundeixo en la interacció dinàmica entre partits polítics i opinió pública al voltant d'una qüestió política específica. Els meus resultats llancen llum sobre què incentiva els partits a donar suport polítiques oposades. També ajuden a entendre millor diversos fenòmens que s'han observat en la realitat, com ara el fet que els partits polítics semblen estar més polaritzats que els propis ciutadans.
Esta tesis combina datos históricos con teoría de juegos para intentar entender mejor la relación entre los partidos políticos y la opinión publica. En primer lugar, estudio las dinámicas de las cuestiones sociales. Demuestro que las cuestiones sociales (por ejemplo, aquellas relacionadas con los derechos de las mujeres y las minorías, o las cuestiones raciales) tienden a seguir patrones de comportamiento, tanto en términos de partidos como de opinión pública. Después, basándome en estos patrones, propongo una nueva forma de modelar el comportamiento de los partidos y de lo ciudadanos. A través de tres artículos teóricos, profundizo en la interacción dinámica entre partidos políticos y opinión pública alrededor de una cuestión política específica. Mis resultados arrojan luz sobre qué incentiva a los partidos a apoyar políticas opuestas. También ayudan a entender mejor diversos fenómenos que se han observado en la realidad, como por ejemplo el hecho de que los partidos políticos parecen estar más polarizados que los propios ciudadanos.
This thesis combines historical data with game theory to better understand the relationship between political parties and mass behaviour. First, I study the dynamics of social issues. I show that social issues (e.g, issues related to women's and minority rights, or racial issues) tend to follow behavioural patterns, both in terms of parties'and citizens' behaviour. Then, based on these patterns, I propose a new way of modelling parties' and citizens' behaviour. Through three theoretical papers, I deepen the dynamic interplay between political parties and the public opinion around a specific issue. My results shed light on what makes political parties be confronted with respect to an issue. They also help understanding some observed phenomena related to this interplay, like the sorting phenomenon or the question of why political parties seem to be more polarized than citizens.

L'économie politique est l'une des sous-disciplines de la littérature économique. Les économistes politiques étudient les effets des facteurs politiques sur les résultats économiques. Les institutions et l'influence de différentes structures institutionnelles sur les marchés sont parmi les principaux domaines de recherche de l'économie politique. Dans la littérature existante, le nombre d'analyses empiriques portant sur les déterminants des institutions est faible par rapport aux études qui se concentrent sur les effets des institutions sur les performances économiques. De plus, les analyses qui examinent l’impact de la culture, en particulier de la religion, sur les institutions sont rares. Sans aucun doute, la religion peut avoir des effets dramatiques sur les variables sociales et économiques. L’objectif de ce travail est donc d’examiner les effets de la religion et de la religiosité sur la corruption, le bonheur des individus et le comportement électoral. Nous contribuons à la littérature existante en fournissant de nouvelles preuves et en nous concentrant sur les pays non analysés dans les études précédentes. [...]
Political economy is one of the sub-diciplines of economics literature. Political economists investigate the effects of political factors on economic outcomes. Institutions and the influence of different institutional structures on markets are among the main research areas of political economy. In the existing literature, the number of empirical analyses which investigate the determinants of institutions is low in comparison to the studies that focus on the effects of institutions on economic performance. Moreover, the analyses which examine the impact of culture, specifically religion, on institutions are scarce. Without doubt, religion can have dramatic effects on social and economic variables. Hence, the aim of this work is to investigate the effects of religion and religiosity on corruption, individuals’ happiness and voting behaviour. We contribute to the existing literature by providing new evidence and by focusing on the countries which are not analysed in the previous studies. [...]

Cette thèse s’articule en trois essais qui contribuent à la littérature en économie politique des pays en voie de développement. Le premier chapitre étudie l’impact des distorsions dans la representation législative des provinces au sein du Congrès argentin dans la distribution des revenus fédéraux. Le chapitre 1 est coécrit avec Sebastián Galiani (University of Maryland) et Gustavo Torrens (University of Indiana). En utilisant trois types de variations exogènes dans la representation legislative des provinces on montre que des changements dans le nombre de sièges n’a aucun effet sur le montant de révenus fédéraux que chaque province reçoit. Le deuxième chapitre (co-écrit avec S. Galiani et G. Torrens) analyse la dynamique des réformes structurelles dans les pays en voie de développement, en présence d’organisations internationales pourvoyeuses de fonds. Nous développons un modèle dynamique où on montre que ces organisations modifient l’équilibre politique et peuvent induire des pays à sur-reformer et les exposer à un cycle de réformes et contre-réformes. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse étudie l’impact des nouvelles technologies d’information sur le comportement politique des jeunes en Argentine. J’analyse l’impact d’un programme de distribution d’ordinateurs portables ciblé aux étudiants des écoles secondaires, qui ont voté pour la première fois après une baisse de l’age du droit de vote à 16 ans. Je trouve que l’accès au programme a un effet négatif dans leur taux de participation aux élections; des données complementaires montrent que l’utilisation qu’ils donnent aux ordinateurs est plutôt de divertissement, un fait qui conduit au désintérêt en politique
This thesis consists of three essays on the political economy of developing countries. Chapter 1 « Fiscal Federalism and Legislative Malapportionment: Causal Evidence from Independent but Related Natural Experiments » (cowritten with S. Galiani and G. Torrens) investigates the impact of distortions in districts' representation in the Argentine Congress on the distribution of federal tax resources. Exploiting exogenous variations in the provinces' legislative representation, we show that changes in the share of seats do not result in changes in the share of federal tax resources each district gets. Chapter 2, entitled « International Organizations and Structural Reforms » (co-written with S. Galiani and G. Torrens), we analyze the dynamics of structural reforms in developing countries in the presence of international organizations that fund reforms. We develop a dynamic model in which we show that these organizations alter the local political equilibrium and may incentivize countries to over-reform. This, in turns, leaves countries prone to suffer violent cycles of reform and counter-reform. In chapter 3, « Computers and Youth Political Participation », I study the impact of new information technologies on the political behavior of young people in Argentina. I analyze the effect of a laptop distribution program aimed at high school students who voted for the first time after voting age was lowered to 16. My analysis show that exposure to the program is associated with a decrease in turnout rates of teenagers, and I present evidence that suggests that this may be due to increased entertainment use of computers, which eventually leads to apathy in politics

This dissertation consists of three essays on political economy. The first essay studies the effect of competition on media bias in the context of U.S. newspapers in the period 1870-1910. We measure bias as the intensity with which different newspapers cover scandals. We collected data on 121 scandals and 157 newspapers. We also collected data on the partisanship, frequency of publication, and circulation of the newspapers in our sample, as well as of the newspapers circulating in the same cities as those in our sample. Results indicate that partisan newspapers cover scandals involving the opposition party's politicians more intensely and cover scandals involving their own party's politicians more lightly. We find evidence that competition decreases the degree of media bias. The point estimates suggest that compared to a newspaper in a monopoly position, a newspaper facing two competitors will on average exhibits less than 50% as much overall bias in coverage intensity. The second essay shows how voters make choices even in single-party authoritarian elections where the number of candidates equals the number of parliamentary seats. Cuban citizens signal approval of, candidates within the framework of the regime. Voters support candidates who have grassroots links and experience of local multi-candidate electoral contestation. Voters choose based not on clientelist incentives but on the limited political information available to them, namely, posted biographies and direct knowledge of local candidates, friends and neighbors, who run in their communities. Voters have chosen, however, without rejecting the Cuban Communist Party. The third essay studies the unintended effects of the 2003 electoral reform in Colombia. In a context with fragmented and clientelistic parties and an electoral system that incentivizes intra-party competition instead of party discipline, scholars such as Shugart and Carey (1995) recommend the adoption of electoral reforms. A reform such as this was implemented in Colombia. What was unexpected was that the reform would promote a significant increase in the number of candidates running in each district. The effect of this was a lowering of the minimum threshold of the vote share required to obtain a seat, thereby maintaining clientelism as a viable campaigning strategy.
Political Economy and Government

Esta tesis investiga la economía política de las transferencias intergubernamentales. Se centra en los factores políticos que determinan la asignación de fondos bajo control de gobiernos centrales a las diversas regiones. El primer capítulo, contribuye a este asunto a través de un nuevo análisis de los datos del panel y una medida comprensiva de necesidades de gastos para el caso de Rusia. El segundo capítulo, desarrolla nuevas herramientas metodológicas para analizar sistemas políticos del multi-partido. Estas herramientas permiten medir a votantes cambiantes en dos dimensiones ideológicas usando datos individuales de los estudios electorales. En el tercer capítulo se utilizan las medidas de votantes cambiantes para probar teorías de las políticas distributivas para el caso de España. Este capítulo demuestra que las variables políticas son significativas en la asignación de las subvenciones del estado, y la magnitud del efecto es comparable a la de variables económicas.
This thesis investigates the political economy view of intergovernmental grants. It centers on the political factors that determine allocation of funds under the control of central governments to different regions. The first chapter contributes to this topic by a novel analysis of panel data and a comprehensive measure of expenditure "needs" for the case of Russia. The second chapter develops new methodological tools for analyzing multi-party political systems. These tools allow to measure swing voters on two "ideological" dimensions using individual survey data. In the third chapter the measures of swing voters are used to test theories of distributive politics for the case of Spain. This chapter shows that political variables are significant in the allocation of state subventions, and the magnitude of the effect is comparable to that of economic variables.

The article 1 addresses the role of political parties and studies whether popularity shocks are crucial for electoral accountability beyond their effects on voter behavior. It specifically examines the impact of the revelation of information about a government's conduct on the types of candidates who stand for election. The empirical test focuses on the Brazilian city council elections in 2004 and 2008. The identification approach exploits the randomness of the timing of the release of audit reports on the use of federal funds by municipal governments. The study finds that when the audit reveals a high level of corruption (i.e., when it represents a negative popularity shock), the parties supporting the incumbent select more educated candidates. On the contrary, parties pick, on average, less educated candidates when the audit finds low levels of corruption (i.e., when it represents a positive popularity shock). These effects are stronger in municipalities that have easier access to local media. The evidence confirms that parties are strategic players that consider specific features of the electoral competition when making decisions and that their decisions are affected by shocks that influence the electoral race. The article 2 is devoted to examining aspects of the voter preference assumptions. Citizen assessment of government performance is a cornerstone of successful democratic functioning. However, accountability is a double-edged sword. When voters misunderstand the stakes, and provide the wrong incentives to elected officials, political accountability leads to an implementation of suboptimal welfare policies. This paper reveals that an electorate can demand clientelism. To address this question, I study the behavior of voters in a context of vote-buying in Brazilian politics known as the drought industry. The data cover the Brazilian democratic elections from 1998 to 2012, and as empirical strategies I implement both fixed-effects models with panel data and a regression discontinuity design with heterogeneous treatment effects. I find evidence that after a drought, voters increase the vote share of local incumbent parties that are politically aligned with the central government to ensure the inflow of partisan government aid relief. Such behavior reinforces the central government's incentives to bias policies in favor of politically aligned municipalities to influence elections. Consequently, the cycle of distortion of aid relief allocation is perpetuated. In connection with the findings indicating that the incidence of droughts and the Brazilian political economy are directly linked, the article 3 investigates the behavior of the local governments regarding the level of corruption. The analysis studies whether the allocation of aid relief policies increases the level of corruption in the context of natural disasters. More specifically, the study investigates the number of federal emergency declarations against droughts, as a proxy for aid relief, and the number of irregularities in the local governments' expenditures found by auditors in Brazilian cities during a full mayor's term. The study implements an instrumental variable approach exploiting the quasi-random nature of the cycle component of a municipality's aridity relative to its trend. The findings show that an additional recognition of the state of emergency leads to an increase in corruption per capita for an entire term of a mayor.

This dissertation studies the applications of reputation games in social media and finance as well as decision games in political economy. Chapter 1 develops a reputation game in which a biased but informed expert makes a statement to attract audiences. The biased expert has an ideological incentive to distort his information as well as having a reputation concern. The expert knows that his expertise may vary in different topics, while the audiences cannot identify such differences. The biased expert is more likely to announce his favorite message when he knows less about it. Moreover, the biased expert is less willing to lie when the audiences have better outside options, and such improvements in outside options may benefit both the expert and the audiences.

Chapter 2 studies a credit rating game with a credit rating agency(CRA), an issuer and an investor. The privately informed and biased CRA provides a rating on the issuer's project, and the investor decides to purchase the project or not according to the report. As long as the CRA obtains a contract, he will inflate the rating. When the default risk is high, the CRA tells the truth. Moreover, he is more likely to tell the truth when the issuer's private benefit is larger. When the default risk is low, the CRA sends a good rating. He is more likely to inflate the rating if the issuer has a higher private benefit.

Chapter 3 presents a model in secessions and nationalism, with a special emphasis on the role of civil war. In our model, a disagreement on secession between the central government and the minority group leads to disastrous military conflicts. As a result, the tremendous potential cost of the war distorts the political choice of the minority group, and helps the central government to exploit them both economically and politically. Several key ingredients, such as population, per capita income and perceived winning chance of the civil war, play an essential role in the decision making process of the minority group. I also conduct an empirical test of this model, which supports the major findings stated above.

El estudio de la relación entre el individuo y el grupo tiene una larga historia en las ciencias sociales. Aún si el impulsor principal de las acciones de la gente es perseguir sus propios objetivos, los seres humanos también cohabitamos, colaboramos y cuidamos unos de otros. Para armonizar los objetivos personales con los intereses del grupo, creamos normas y reglas. Estas normas y reglas afectan nuestras preferencias, gustos y decisiones. Las personas también pueden tener una influencia más directa entre sí: por ejemplo imitamos, enseñamos y aprendemos unos de otros. En la investigación del comportamiento político -- donde las decisiones pueden tener un efecto en el entorno social de quien toma las decisiones -- estas normas, reglas e influencias personales reciben cada vez más atención. Este nuevo enfoque no se centra solo en las características individuales, sino también en la relación y las interacciones de estos individuos. Para manejar la variedad casi infinita de las relaciones e interacciones, los investigadores necesitan agruparlas en estructuras sociales. En mi tesis doctoral, estudio el papel de dos estructuras sociales en la política. La primera estructura es la red social. La red social es la colección de todos los enlaces sociales bilaterales en un grupo. La segunda estructura que estudio en mi tesis es la facción política. Las facciones son grupos jerárquicos de políticos que trabajan juntos para obtener poder político. Mi tesis está dividida en tres capítulos principales. El primer capítulo es un trabajo empírico que mide la importancia de la posición (en la red social) de los políticos en su carrera pública. El segundo capítulo introduce en primer lugar un modelo nuevo de colaboración dentro de las facciones políticas, y luego contrasta empíricamente algunas de las principales predicciones del modelo. El tercer capítulo modela cómo se expanden las influencias en una red social y introduce una manera simple de encontrar el actor clave de una red política en una clase especifico de redes. El Capítulo 1 incluye mi trabajo de investigación titulado “Marrying the Right One -- Evidence on Social Network Effects in Politics from the Venetian Republic”. En este capítulo mido el efecto de las redes sociales en el desarrollo de la carrera de los políticos. Con este fin, construyo una base de datos que contiene información sobre la red social de todo el electorado de una nación soberana, la República de Venecia del siglo XV. También identifico las carreras de 2.500 políticos casados del período entre 1400 y 1524. Analizando este panel de datos, encuentro evidencia empírica de que casarse con la hija de un padre más central en la red mejora significativamente las perspectivas de carrera futura en la política del marido. Además, demuestro que este efecto es independiente de otras características de cualquiera de las dos familias, como el prestigio histórico, la riqueza o el poder de voto (tamaño de la familia), y no está sesgado por matrimonios selectivos. Además, encuentro que el efecto de la red es acumulativo (se disfrutan las ventajas de un buen matrimonio durante un período prolongado) y que el efecto es más fuerte durante periodos políticamente o económicamente difíciles (como en una guerra defensiva). El Capítulo 2 está basado en mi trabajo de investigación titulado “Politics Behind the Curtain -- A Model of Endogenous Factional Competition and Evidence from the Venetian Republic”. Este capítulo presenta un nuevo modelo de competición política entre facciones donde el poder político de una facción es endógeno. En el modelo, todos los políticos son miembros de una facción y la competencia (por una promoción) ocurre en dos etapas. Primero, los políticos compiten por el apoyo de su facción. Segundo, las facciones compiten para ganar la promoción para sus candidatos. El éxito del concurso en la segunda etapa es endógeno: depende del número y la posición de todos los afiliados de la facción. La primera contribución de este trabajo de investigación es que describe las fuerzas que facilitan la colaboración de los políticos y la aparición de facciones. El segundo es que revela la naturaleza ambivalente de la competencia política en sistemas dominados por facciones políticos: las facciones más grandes son más fuertes, pero sus miembros también se enfrentan a una competencia más fuerte dentro de las facciones. Usando datos de la República de Venecia, estimo los coeficientes del modelo teórico. La estimación separa los dos canales de efectos del tamaño (de la facción): el canal de competencia interna y el canal de poder de facción. Finalmente, capítulo 3 sigue el trabajo de investigación titulado “Influences and Elections in a Political Network”. En este capítulo, desarrollo un modelo nuevo de lobbying y votación en una red social. Los jugadores en la red son votantes y candidatos potenciales al mismo tiempo. Los votantes prefieren al candidato al que puedan influir más, y el poder de presión está determinado por la posición relativa del votante y el candidato en la red social. En este modelo, las preferencias muestran algunas regularidades que son suficientes para demostrar que hay uno (o dos vecinos) candidato(s) de Condorcet en cualquier red en árbol, y que el(los) tiene(n) la mayor centralidad de proximidad en la red. Además, las preferencias tienen un solo pico en las redes en árbol, por lo que en una red en cadena (o línea) el teorema del votante mediano es aplicable. Muestro que la centralidad de proximidad supera a otras medidas de centralidad frecuentemente utilizadas (centralidad de vector propio, centralidad de intermediación) en ciertas redes. Finalmente, comparo mi modelo principal con el modelo de Cruz et al. 2017 donde los votantes tienen sesgos ideológicos: el modelo de Cruz et al. 2017 proporciona resultados más generales, pero mi modelo se basa en supuestos mejor alineados con las evidencias empíricas.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University
PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.
A frequent discussion in the Political Economy literature is that of the directionality in the relationship between economic and political variables. Are our society's ideas, political orientation, concepts of morality and values conditioned by our economic development or, on the contrary, are our ideas, values and worldview what determine our political and economic attitudes, and, thereby, our economic performance and political development? This thesis comprises two parallel projects that address these two different approaches. The first project studies the effect of having land or housing property rights on the decisions of households' members of whether or not to participate in civil society organizations; I develop this idea in a paper called "Civil Society and Land Property Rights: Evidence From Nicaragua". For doing this I use household level panel data for the years 1998, 2001 and 2005. I conclude that contrary to what happens in more developed countries, in developing societies a household receiving formal property rights reduces the incentives to participate in civil society. The second project is aimed at studying the relationship between religion and welfare states: given the different possibilities available in terms of data sources and methodologies, this project is integrated by two papers. In the first one. "Religion, Political Attitudes and Welfare States" I use data from the World Values Survey in order to study the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes towards the welfare state and, thus, its aggregate impact on welfare state policies. In the second paper of this project, "Political Elites, Religion and Welfare States in Latin America" I continue studying this relationship but instead of using data from ordinary citizens I focus on the study of legislators in Latin America. I combine quantitative and qualitative data and show that more religious legislators have less progressive attitudes towards the welfare state. Similarly. I find important differences across religions in the attitudes of their members towards the relationship of religion wits state, politics, society and the economy.
2031-01-01

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references.
Essay 1: Allies and Adversaries: The Roles of Appointees in Administrative Policymaking under Separation of Powers. In a system of divided power, public sector agencies are an important front in the day-to-day battle for political supremacy between the executive and the legislature. The executive's key agents in this conflict are his appointees, who are observed playing two broad roles: allies, where they work to help Congress implement policy and adversaries, where they fight with Congress to shift policy strongly in the executive's direction. This paper studies how these two roles arise and what implications they have for the interaction of Congress and the executive, in administrative policymaking. Thereby, it highlights how intrinsically motivated bureaucrats combined with hierarchical control affect the ability of the political principals to control the execution of policy. Furthermore, I explore how this interaction shifts under alternative institutional forms, and how it leads appointees to "marry the natives." The model makes several predictions concerning Congressional oversight of bureaucratic agencies. These predictions are broadly supported by an empirical analysis of audit reports released by the Government Accountability Office. Essay 2: State Parties and State Policies: A Double Regression Discontinuity Approach. This paper identifies the causal effect of partisan power on tax and labor policies in the context of U.S. state legislatures from 1970 to 2000. Using a two dimensional regression discontinuity design, I identify the effect of Democratic control of the state legislature, as compared to divided control or Republican control, on tax burden and the state minimum wage.
(cont.) Using a novel instrumental variables approach, where the instrument is derived from the outcome of close legislative election, I also identify the effect of a marginal shift in the share of Democrats in the legislature on these same policies. To my knowledge this is the first paper to cleanly identify these pure partisan effects. In contrast to its prominence in popular discussions, the resulting estimates for control are quite small, suggesting that the pure partisan effect of control is relatively unimportant in understanding changes in these fiscal and labor policies. The estimates for party mix, however, are larger, suggesting this may be the more important channel by which party affects policy in this setting. Essay 3: Third-Party Auditors and Political Accountability. The most important tool that citizens have to police the decisions of their elected representatives is the ballot box. But the effectiveness of this tool depends crucially on the citizens' ability to correctly judge whether the politicians they select are doing their best to act in the interests of their constituents. This paper asks when and how specialist third-party auditors, people whose incentives come from outside the particular citizen-politician relationship under consideration, can nonetheless improve the ballot box as a tool of political accountability. I will look at three sorts of auditors: journalist, bureaucrat, and the opposition party, and show that because of the way that they respond to career-concern incentives, by auditing asymmetrically, auditors with incentives similar to journalists are particularly well suited to this role.
by Patrick L. Warren.
Ph.D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2016.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 167-171).
The dissertation consists of three essays on dynamic problems in political economy. The first essay studies motivated communication on networks. Agents have some hard information about the world and choose whether to tell their neighbors. Information received from other agents can be shared in later meetings. Agents' preferences are mis-aligned, tempting senders to lie by omission. The model yields three main conclusions. First, there is incomplete learning. Second, signals that are close to the mean are more likely to propagate. The reason is that moderate signals travel in both directions, whereas extreme signals are communicated in a predictable direction, which stifles their propagation. Third, if agents are forward-looking, concerns about informational cascades lead to segmentation: agents with close preferences hide information from each other to prevent it from traveling further. The second essay analyzes the evolution of organizations that allow free entry and exit of members, such as cities, trade unions, religious organizations and cooperatives. The organization chooses a policy, which influences the set of agents who want to become members, but current members decide policy in the next period. This generates feedback effects: an organization with a policy x may attract a population with a median-preferred policy higher than x, so a higher policy will be chosen in the next period; but the new policy will attract members wanting an even higher policy, and so on. The set of steady states is pinned down by the preference distribution; equilibrium paths converge to these steady states depending on the starting position. Unlike in models with a fixed population, a small change in the preference distribution can cause dramatic changes in the long-run policy. The third essay studies the impact of term limits on elections where biased candidates compete through ability investments and platform choice. Good politicians facing weak competition extract policy rents, which lowers welfare. Moreover, incumbents exacerbate rent extraction by deterring challenger entry. Term limits alleviate this problem by creating open elections. However, they also lower incumbent quality, so their overall impact is ambiguous. Strong limits are better when politicians are more biased, and challengers' entry cost is intermediate.
by Germán Sergio Gieczewski.
Ph. D.

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2017.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 147-160).
This thesis consists of four chapters on the causes of voter participation. In the first chapter, I study the effects of voting costs through a novel, quasi-experimental design based on geographic discontinuities. I compare parcels and census blocks located near borders between adjacent voting precincts. Units on opposite sides of a border are observationally identical, except for their assignment to different polling locations. The discontinuous assignment to polling places produces sharp changes in the travel distance voters face to cast their ballots. In a sample of nine municipalities in Massachusetts and Minnesota, I find that a 1-standard deviation (.245 mile) increase in distance to the polling place reduces the number of ballots cast by 2% to 5% in the 2012 presidential, 2013 municipal, 2014 midterm, and 2016 presidential primary elections. During non-presidential elections, effects in high-minority areas are three times as large as those in low-minority areas, while no significant difference emerges from the 2012 presidential election. Finally, I use my estimates to simulate the impact of various counterfactual assignments of voters to polling places. I find that erasing the effect of distances to polling places would increase turnout by 1.6 to 4 percentage points and reduce minority participation gaps in non-presidential elections by 11% to 13%. By contrast, the optimal feasible counterfactual boundaries, holding polling locations constant, would result in small changes in the minority participation gap. The second chapter, coauthored with Vincent Pons, tests whether politicians can use direct contact to reconnect with citizens, increase turnout, and win votes. During the 2014 Italian municipal elections, we randomly assigned 26,000 voters to receive visits from city council candidates, from canvassers supporting the candidates' party list, or to a control group. While canvassers' visits increased turnout by 1.8 percentage points, candidates' had no impact on participation. Candidates increased their own vote share in the precincts they canvassed, but only at the expense of their running mates. This suggests that their failure to mobilize nonvoters resulted from focusing on securing the preferences of active voters. The third chapter, coauthored with Ludovica Gazze, studies the turnout effects of concurrent elections. We notice that existing models of turnout behavior have different implications when regarding the impact of concurrent elections, both on voter turnout and on the probability of casting a valid ballot. We use a simple theoretical framework to formalize this argument and to derive testable predictions on the effects of concurrent elections. We test these predictions using administrative and survey data from Italy. Exploiting different voting ages for the two Houses of Parliament, we show that eligibility to cast a ballot for the Senate has no impact on turnout or information acquisition. By contrast, high-salience elections increase turnout and the number of valid ballots cast when they concur with lower-salience elections. These findings are consistent with information acquisition costs being relatively low for the lower-salience election, conditional on turning out to vote for the higher-salience one. Moreover, these findings appear inconsistent with social pressure to be seen at the voting booth and voter fatigue playing a prominent role as determinants of turnout and voting behavior. In the fourth chapter, I use county-level administrative data from 1992 to 2014 and a Differences-in-Differences research design to identify and estimate the impact of voter ID laws on turnout, Democratic vote share, and irregular ballots. I find no effect of ID laws on any of these outcomes. All estimates are fairly precise and robust to a number of regression specifications. Estimates of heterogeneous effects by educational attainment, poverty rate and minority presence are similarly supportive of ID laws having no impact on electoral outcomes of any type.
by Enrico Cantoni.
1. A Precinct Too Far: Turnout and Voting Costs -- 2. Do Interactions with Candidates Increase Voter Support and Participation? -- 3. Turnout in Concurrent Elections -- 4. Got ID? The Zero Effects of Voter ID Laws.
Ph. D.

This thesis studies three channels through which elections and, ultimately, public policy may be interrelated: new media, electoral systems and vote motivation. The media has the fundamental role of providing political information to voters. New media such as the Internet brought about an enormous shift in the availability of political information during elections. Exploiting the timing and geographic variation in the introduction of Internet in Brazil, in the first chapter, I show that municipalities with higher Internet penetration voted more often in candidates who faced legal restrictions for advertising in traditional media. Electoral systems, in turn, have specific features that, in theory, may allow voters to select better politicians by providing more information about candidates and other voters' preferences. In the second chapter, using the discontinuous allocation of single- and dual-ballot electoral rules across mayoral elections in Brazil, I compare the quality of politicians fielded and elected in these systems. In general, dual-ballot candidates from major parties are more politically experienced. This experience may be translated into unobserved political skills that are required to deal with the more competitive electoral process, that, by itself, punishes female candidates, to the extent to which women's participation in politics has been historically low. No differences in performance are observed, except in the attraction of discretionary resources by dual-ballot mayors eligible for reelection, but only in election years. Finally, in the third chapter, I use a quasi-naturally generated group of voters with differential political information and voting motivations to show that politicians extract more rents in municipalities where they know a number of voters is not directly interested in public goods and do not have readily access to local sources of information.

We present a study of conflict from an economic perspective. We start by reviewing the approach to conflict in the economic sciences. We model conflict as a process of allocation of resources into two main technologies, production and appropriation. Then we complement this framework by allowing participants to negotiate. We introduce models of bargaining with complete and incomplete information. We incorporate the cost of conflict and this ensures that negotiated settlements always produce a more efficient outcome. The possibility of conflict arises as a result of incomplete information, which takes the form of informational asymmetry about the cost of conflict. We find endogenous war equilibrium outcomes and compare the outcome of optimal resource equilibria with arbitrary non-equilibria allocations. We also present some empirical evidence in the literature supporting the choice of utility models of conflict and present new results showing support for our propositions.

Cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier le rôle de l'information en économie et présente trois articles illustrant l’effet de restrictions d’information. L’information d’un individu peut être restreinte par la disponibilité des nouvelles, le biais des nouvelles enfin par les expériences sociales auxquelles l'individu a été confronté. Dans le premier chapitre, nous regardons l'effet d'un choc sur la disponibilité de l'information sur les échanges commerciaux de la fin du XIXeme siècle au début du XXeme siècle. Le deuxième chapitre montre l'effet sur "l'agenda setting'' et le biais des journaux après un changement de propriétaire. Le dernier chapitre est une évaluation de la suspension du service militaire obligatoire sur la participation électorale
This thesis aims at studying the role of information and provides three articles examples illustrating the effect of information restrictions. The information set an agent has can be restrained by the availability of news, the bias of the news he has access to and finally by the social experiences the individual has faced. In the first chapter, we look at the effect of a shock in information availability on late XIX and early XXth century trade flows. The second chapter documents the consequences on the agenda setting and bias of newspapers after a private acquisition of the media. The last chapter is an evaluation of the end of the mandatory military service on political participation

Qu'est-ce que la décroissance et quelles sont ses implications pour l'économie politique ? Divisée en trois parties, cette thèse explore le pourquoi, le quoi, et le comment de la décroissance.La première partie (De la croissance et des limites) étudie la nature, les causes, et les conséquences de la croissance économique. Chapitre 1 : Comprendre la croissance économique répond à plusieurs questions : Qu'est-ce qui croît exactement ? À quelle vitesse ? Quand et où est-ce que ça croît ? Comment est-ce que ça croît ? Et pourquoi est-ce que ça devrait croître ? Les trois chapitres suivants développent une triple objection à la croissance économique qui n'est plus possible (Chapitre 2 : Limites biophysiques de la croissance), plausible (Chapitre 3 : Limites socioéconomiques de la croissance), et souhaitable (Chapitre 4 : Limites sociales à la croissance).La deuxième partie (Éléments de décroissance) porte sur l'idée de la décroissance, en particulier son histoire, ses fondements théoriques, et ses controverses. Le Chapitre 5 : Origines et définitions retrace l'histoire du concept de 1968 à 2018. Le Chapitre 6 : Fondements théoriques présente une théorie normative de la décroissance comme déséconomisation, c'est-à-dire une réduction de l'importance de la rationalité et des pratiques économiques. Le Chapitre 7 : Controverses passe en revue les attaques reçues par le concept. Si la première partie a diagnostiqué la croissance économique comme étant le problème, cette partie propose une solution. L’argument principal est que la décroissance n'est pas seulement une critique mais aussi une alternative complète à la société de croissance.La troisième partie (Recettes de décroissance) concerne la transition d'une économie de croissance à une société de décroissance. La partie s'ouvre sur un inventaire des politiques mobilisées par les décroissants jusqu'à aujourd'hui (Chapitre 8 : Stratégies de changement). Les trois chapitres suivants, sur la propriété (Chapitre 9 : Transformer la propriété), le travail (Chapitre 10 : Transformer le travail) et l'argent (Chapitre 11 : Transformer l'argent) passent de la théorie à la pratique et transforment les valeurs et les principes de la décroissance en stratégies de transition. Le Chapitre 12 : Stratégie de transition décrit une méthode pour étudier l'interaction entre plusieurs politiques de décroissance, et cela pour mieux planifier la transition. Le message central de cette troisième partie est que la décroissance est un outil conceptuel puissant pour réfléchir à une transition vers la justice sociale et écologique
What is degrowth and what are its implications for political economy? Divided in three parts, this dissertation explores the why, what, and how of degrowth. The first part (Of growth and limits) studies the nature, causes, and consequences of economic growth. Chapter 1: Understanding economic growth answers a series of questions about the nature of economic growth: What is it exactly that grows? By how much does it grow? When and where does it grow? How does it grow? And why should it grow? The three following chapters develop a triple objection to economic growth as no longer possible (Chapter 2: Biophysical limits to growth), plausible (Chapter 3: Socioeconomic limits to growth), and desirable (Chapter 4: Social limits of growth). The second part (Elements of degrowth) is about the idea of degrowth, especially its history, theoretical foundations, and controversies. Chapter 5: Origins and definitions traces the history of the concept from 1968 to 2018. Chapter 6: Theoretical foundations presents a normative theory of degrowth as de-economisation, that is a reduction in importance of economic thoughts and practices. Chapter 7: Controversies reviews the attacks the concept has received. Whereas the first part diagnosed economic growth as the problem, this part offers a solution. The take-home message is that degrowth is not only a critique but also a fully-fledged alternative to the growth society. The third part (Recipes for degrowth) is about the transition from a growth economy to a degrowth society. It opens with an inventory of the policies that have been mobilised by degrowthers until today (Chapter 8: Strategies for change). The three following chapters on property (Chapter 9: Transforming property), work (Chapter 10: Transforming work), and money (Chapter 11: Transforming money) go from theory to practice and translate the values and principles of degrowth into operational transition strategies. Chapter 12: Transition strategy presents a method to study the interactions between degrowth policies in order to craft effective transition strategies. The central claim of this final part is that degrowth is a powerful conceptual tool to think about societal transformations for social-ecological justice

Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-106).
Mozambique is viewed by the donor community and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, as a success story of post-war construction and is used as a model to be emulated. The study proposes that, contrary to this belief, adjustment policies harm this poor economy. Also, neo-liberal economic policies have altered the role of state institutions, not eliminating state power, but redirecting it. This study challenges the neo-liberal claim that Mozambique's post-conflict political economy has been “revolutionary”. Economic reforms can benefit this economy, but alone, are insufficient to reduce poverty and economic dependence. The study found that, despite improvements in reducing the number of people living in poverty between 1992 and 2008, malnutrition, malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis and corruption are on the increase.

Many of the problems faced by the agents to whom we delegate public decisions involve dynamic considerations. Whether it is a public official whose reputation is on the line, or a politician who faces repeated elections or who worries about how successors will alter his legacy, decisions today are made with attention to what consequences may come tomorrow. In this dissertation, I discuss dynamic problems in political economy. The common thread to all three essays will be that decision makers face dynamic incentives to protect their own interest because their policy choice today affects tomorrow's decision environment and, as a result, how other agents (the public, or rival parties) will behave further down the line. The first chapter looks at how alternation in power of (pro-rich and pro- poor) partisan political groups affects incentives to implement short and long run redistributive policies. I identify a powerful incentive for both groups to make income-equalising investments as a form of insurance against takeover by the opposing group. The second chapter studies the pressures on an appointed regulator of some risky activity in society, who cares about protecting his reputation. The regulator is held to account by the general public, which use a heuristic approach to estimating risks and assessing the performance of the regulator. The public official will trade off trying to align his policy record with current beliefs and managing how beliefs change through observing the risky activity. In the third chapter, I consider parties that compete over a one-dimensional ideological policy space but face uncertain electoral outcomes. I find that if elections are systematically biased against the incumbent, this leads to higher ideological polarisation than a bias of the same size in favour of the incumbent, because it lowers the value of winning. I endogenise incumbency biases with a model where voters learn about candidates' competence.