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Journal articles on the topic 'Political economy of aid'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 2 February 2022

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1

Degterev, D. A. "Political Economy of International Economic Aid." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 4(19) (August 28, 2011): 99–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2011-4-19-99-104.

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2

de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. "A Political Economy of Aid." International Organization 63, no. 2 (April 2009): 309–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818309090109.

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AbstractWe model how the size of a leader's support coalition and government revenues affect trades between policy concessions and aid. We find that aid benefits donor and recipient leaders, while harming the recipient's, but not the donor's, citizenry. The willingness to grant policy concessions for aid depends on how easily leaders can reimburse supporters for their concession. As coalition size increases, incumbents rely more on public goods to reward supporters, making it difficult to compensate for policy concessions. Small-coalition leaders rely more on private goods to retain office, making it easier for them to grant policy concessions for aid. Empirical tests of bilateral aid transfers by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations between 1960 and 2001 support the predictions that (1) aid is given by wealthy, large-coalition systems; (2) relatively poor, small-coalition systems are most likely to get aid; but, (3) conditional on receiving aid, the amount increases as the recipient's coalition size, wealth, and policy salience increase. Evidence suggests that OECD members have little humanitarian motivation for aid giving.

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3

Lahiri, Sajal, and Katharina Michaelowa. "Editorial: The Political Economy of Aid." Review of Development Economics 10, no. 2 (May 2006): 177–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00310.x.

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4

Degterev, D. "A Political Economy of Foreign Aid." World Economy and International Relations, no. 4 (2014): 26–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-4-26-35.

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Representatives of various paradigms of international relations (realism, liberalism , neo-marxism and constructivism) and various currents of development economics (Keynesian, neoclassical, institutional) often take polar positions on the nature of international aid and its impact on the economy of the recipient countries. From the point of view of global justice there are also several different perspectives on the role of international assistance: development paradigm with correction function and distribution paradigm with redistributive function. The author investigates a number of contradictions in the system of administration of international aid in the framework of institutional analysis.

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5

Sharma, Pooja. "Political Economy of Conditional Aid in a Federal Economy." Review of Development Economics 12, no. 2 (May 2008): 327–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00390.x.

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6

Bowles, Paul. "The political economy of UK foreign aid." International Review of Applied Economics 1, no. 2 (June 1987): 225–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/758528899.

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7

SÖDERBERG, Marie. "Japan’s Aid: Lessons for Economic Growth, Development and Political economy." Social Science Japan Journal 19, no. 1 (2016): 122–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ssjj/jyw010.

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8

Kim, Jiyoung. "The Political Economy of Aid Failure in Zambia." International Area Studies Review 21, no. 4 (December 31, 2017): 271–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.21212/iasr.21.4.14.

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9

Anwar, Mumtaz, and Katharina Michaelowa. "The Political Economy of US Aid to Pakistan." Review of Development Economics 10, no. 2 (May 2006): 195–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2006.00312.x.

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10

Bates, Stephen. "Political Economy and the Aid Industry in Asia." Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 1 (June 2, 2015): 163–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2015.1051313.

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11

Tawiah, Vincent Konadu, Evans John Barnes, Prince Acheampong, and Ofori Yaw. "Political regimes and foreign aid effectiveness in Ghana." International Journal of Development Issues 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2019): 15–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijdi-02-2018-0029.

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Purpose This paper has examined the effectiveness of foreign aid on Ghanaian economy under different political regimes. Design/methodology/approach Using vector error correction and co-integration models on the annual data set over a period of 35 years, the authors demonstrate that foreign aid has had varied impacts on economic growth depending on the political ideology of the government in power. Findings With capitalist political philosophy, foreign aid improves private sector growth through infrastructural development. On the other hand, a government with socialist philosophy applies most of its foreign aid in direct social interventions with the view of improving human capital. Thus, each political party is likely to seek foreign aid/grant that will support its political agenda. Overall, the results show that foreign aid has a positive impact on the growth of the Ghanaian economy when there is good macroeconomic environment. Practical implications This implies that the country experiences economic growth when there are sound economic policies to apply foreign aid. Originality/value The practical implication of the findings of this paper is that donor countries and agencies should consider the philosophy of the government in power while granting aid to recipient countries, especially in Africa. The results are robust to different proxies and models.

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12

Mosley, Paul. "Fiscal Composition and Aid Effectiveness: A Political Economy Model." World Development 69 (May 2015): 106–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.020.

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13

Tilak, Jandhyala B. G. "Political economy of external aid for education in India." Journal of Asian Public Policy 1, no. 1 (February 27, 2008): 32–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17516230701835898.

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14

Ear, Sophal. "The Political Economy of Aid and Governance in Cambodia." Asian Journal of Political Science 15, no. 1 (April 2007): 68–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185370701315624.

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15

Kassim, Hussein, and Bruce Lyons. "The New Political Economy of EU State Aid Policy." Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 13, no. 1 (February 2, 2013): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10842-012-0142-9.

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16

Brautigam, Deborah. "Governance, economy, and foreign aid." Studies In Comparative International Development 27, no. 3 (September 1992): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02687132.

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17

Milner, Helen V., and Dustin H. Tingley. "Who Supports Global Economic Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy." International Organization 65, no. 1 (January 2011): 37–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818310000317.

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AbstractIn this article we bring together opposing international relations theories to better understand U.S. foreign policy, in particular foreign trade and aid. Using votes in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1979–2004, we explore different theoretical predictions about preferences for foreign economic policy. We assess the impact of domestic factors, namely political economy and ideological preferences, versus foreign policy pressures. Our three main results highlight the differential effect of these factors in the two issue areas. First, aid preferences are as affected by domestic political economy factors as are trade preferences. Second, trade preferences, but not economic aid ones, are shaped by the president's foreign policy concerns; for economic aid, domestic political economy factors matter more than foreign policy ones. Third, aid preferences are shaped more by ideological factors than are trade ones, but ideology plays a different substantive role in each. Different constituencies support aid and trade. This finding has implications for foreign policy substitutability, “the internationalist coalition” in U.S. foreign policy, “statist” theories of foreign policy, and the connection between public opinion and legislative voting.

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18

Francken, Nathalie, Bart Minten, and Johan F. M. Swinnen. "The Political Economy of Relief Aid Allocation: Evidence from Madagascar." World Development 40, no. 3 (March 2012): 486–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.007.

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19

Kibria, Ahsan, Reza Oladi, and Ryan Bosworth. "Political economy of aid allocation: The case of Arab donors." World Economy 44, no. 8 (June 21, 2021): 2460–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/twec.13139.

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20

Kapstein, Ethan B. "Political Economy." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (1996): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20047731.

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21

Oates, Wallace E., Francesco Forte, and Alan Peacock. "Political Economy." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 6, no. 2 (1987): 270. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3324526.

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22

Stewart, Frances. "Food Aid During Conflict: Can One Reconcile Its Humanitarian, Economic, and Political Economy Effects?" American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80, no. 3 (August 1998): 560–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244558.

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23

Mahmood, Mir Annice. "Mumtaz Anwar. The Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Pakistan. HWWA Studies. Volume 79. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics. 2006. 141 pages. Paperback. Price not given." Pakistan Development Review 47, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 215–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.30541/v47i2pp.215-216.

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Foreign aid has played a significant role in Pakistan’s economic development. In the 1950s and 1960s it was aid that helped propel the high rates of growth of the economy. Again in the 1980s and the early 21st century, aid has supported the high levels of growth in the economy. Many books and articles have looked at the role of aid in a narrow economic perspective, but the present volume looks at aid in a political economy framework. The time-period covered is 1960-2002, and both bilateral as well as multilateral aid flows are included in the analysis. Seven chapters makeup the book, along with a number of tables at the end which throw light on the author’s analysis. The theoretical framework followed is one that examines both the donor’s and the recipient’s need for aid. The objectives and the needs of both do not always match. Chapters 3, 5, and 6 form the crux of the book. Chapter 3 discusses and examines the politico-economic factors that are responsible for the allocation of aid........

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24

Copestake, James, and Richard Williams. "Political-Economy Analysis, Aid Effectiveness and the Art of Development Management." Development Policy Review 32, no. 1 (December 23, 2013): 133–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12047.

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25

Masaki, Takaaki. "The Political Economy of Aid Allocation in Africa: Evidence from Zambia." African Studies Review 61, no. 1 (February 1, 2018): 55–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asr.2017.97.

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Abstract:This article utilizes a newly available dataset on the geographical distribution of development projects in Zambia to test whether electoral incentives shape aid allocation at the subnational level. Based on this dataset, it argues that when political elites have limited information to target distributive goods specifically to swing voters, they allocate more donor projects to districts where opposition to the incumbent is strong, as opposed to districts where the incumbent enjoys greater popularity.

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26

Oloka‐Onyango, J., and J. J. Barya. "Civil society and the political economy of foreign aid in Uganda." Democratization 4, no. 2 (June 1997): 113–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510349708403517.

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27

Young, Helen, and Daniel Maxwell. "Participation, political economy and protection: food aid governance in Darfur, Sudan." Disasters 37, no. 4 (September 6, 2013): 555–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/disa.12023.

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28

Krpec, Oldřich, and Vladan Hodulák. "Political Economy of Trade Policy - Institutions, Regulation, Social and Political Context." Politická ekonomie 60, no. 1 (February 1, 2012): 20–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.polek.830.

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29

Stoner, Bradley. "The Political Economy of AIDS:The Political Economy of AIDS." American Anthropologist 100, no. 3 (September 1998): 841–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.1998.100.3.841.2.

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30

Bonin, Bernard, Michael Trebilcock, and D. G. McFetridge. "The Political Economy of Economic Adjustment." Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques 13, no. 1 (March 1987): 120. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3550564.

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31

Lal, Deepak. "The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization." World Bank Economic Review 1, no. 2 (1987): 273–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wber/1.2.273.

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32

Howlett, Michael, and Paul Phillips. "Canadian Political Economy: An Economic Introduction." Labour / Le Travail 28 (1991): 336. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25143526.

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33

Kalu, Kelechi A., and Jiyoung Kim. "The Political Economy of Development Assistance: Lessons from South Korea for Sub-Saharan Africa." International Studies Review 10, no. 1 (October 15, 2009): 29–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01001002.

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This paper examines the political economy of development assistance in sub-Saharan African countries and South Korea focusing on the importance of good governance and domestic policies in a successful management and utilization of development aid. South Korea, along with Malaysia, has been widely recognized as one of the successful cases where foreign aid actually led to a significant level of economic development. From one of the major recipient nations and the poorest countries, South Korea, in about 40 years, has emerged as a donor nation with the 12th largest economy in the world. Comparatively, despite international efforts to help Africans out of their economic and political malaise, there has been a lack of visible progress in sub-Saharan African nations as far as changing the lives of the people. In the paper, we argue that weak institutional and political structures dominated by autocrats and democrats that practice illiberal politics are the main cause of poor development policies in sub-Saharan Africa. lt is weak institutional structures that continue to undermine the efficient use of foreign aid in the interest of the people. In this context, we examine political factors that contributed to a successful management of development aid in South Korea, and extract some lessons and policy suggestions from the South Korean case for sub-Saharan African countries.

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34

STONE, RANDALL W. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." American Political Science Review 98, no. 4 (November 2004): 577–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000305540404136x.

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Why has IMF lending achieved such poor results in Africa? Is it because the Fund imposes the wrong conditions, or because it fails to enforce them? Analysis of monthly data on 53 African countries from 1990 to 2000 shows that the IMF's loans-for-reform contract lacks credibility because donor countries intervene to prevent rigorous enforcement. Countries that have influence with developed-country patrons—as measured by U.S. foreign aid, membership in postcolonial international institutions, and voting profiles in the UN—are subject to less rigorous enforcement (shorter program suspensions). They have more frequent program suspensions, because they violate their conditions more often. The IMF will have to become more independent in order to become an effective champion of reform.

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35

Van Dyk, Silke, and Elène Misbach. "Zur politischen Ökonomie des Helfens." PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 46, no. 183 (June 1, 2016): 205–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v46i183.109.

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Starting out from the huge movement of aid to refugees in Germany, the article deals with the political economy of volunteering within its wider socio-economic and political context. The authors ask in how far civic engagement and volunteer involvement are not just appreciated as part of the new “Willkommenskultur” (‘welcome culture’), but explicitely exploited and co-opted as a productive resource in the context of welfare state cutbacks. The social and economic implications of the political economy of volunteering are discussed, i.e. the status of social rights in contrast to charitable help, the professionality and quality of services being provided by (non-trained) volunteers as well as the hierarchical interdependence between volunteers and refugees. At the same time, we take the specifics of the field “aid to refugees” into account since the anti-racist appeal of volunteers’ engagement should not be underestimated in times of new right-wing populist forces. The article finally deals with the question in how far practices of politically explicit “recalcitrant civic engagement” might prevent the co-optation and exploitation of volunteer involvement in contemporary capitalism with its restrictive border regime.

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36

Tollison, Robert D. "Chicago Political Economy." Public Choice 63, no. 3 (December 1989): 293–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00138169.

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37

Donnelly, Michael W. "Review: The International Political Economy: The Global Political Economy, Restructuring the World Economy." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 45, no. 1 (March 1990): 170–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002070209004500106.

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38

Sayer, Stuart. "New Political Economy." Journal of Economic Surveys 13, no. 2 (April 1999): 211–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00082.

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39

Davies, R. W. "PERESTROIKA'S POLITICAL ECONOMY." Economics and Politics 2, no. 1 (March 1990): 109–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1990.tb00025.x.

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40

Jennings, Jeremy. "Tocqueville’s Political Economy." Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 39, no. 3 (May 2010): 351–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094306110367909ddd.

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41

Blitch, C. P. "Kaldor's Political Economy." History of Political Economy 23, no. 2 (June 1, 1991): 353–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00182702-23-2-353.

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42

Markusen, Ann. "Communicating Political Economy." Review of Radical Political Economics 37, no. 3 (September 2005): 269–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0486613405278153.

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43

Mellor, Mary. "Ecofeminist political economy." International Journal of Green Economics 1, no. 1/2 (2006): 139. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijge.2006.009341.

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44

Duhs, Alan, and Jim Alvey. "Schumacher's Political Economy." International Journal of Social Economics 16, no. 6 (June 1989): 67–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03068298910133223.

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45

Kapossy, Béla. "Republican political economy." History of European Ideas 33, no. 4 (December 2007): 377–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2007.10.001.

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46

MARCHAK, PATRICIA. "Canadian political economy." Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue canadienne de sociologie 22, no. 5 (July 14, 2008): 673–709. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-618x.1985.tb00388.x.

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47

Rubin, Irene. "Regional Political Economy." Urban Affairs Quarterly 23, no. 2 (December 1987): 309–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/004208168702300208.

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48

Walter, Ryan. "The economy and Pocock's political economy." History of European Ideas 34, no. 3 (September 2008): 334–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.histeuroideas.2007.12.010.

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49

Agnew, John. "From the political economy of regions to regional political economy." Progress in Human Geography 24, no. 1 (March 2000): 101–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1191/030913200676580659.

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50

Michaelowa, Axel, and Katharina Michaelowa. "Coding Error or Statistical Embellishment? The Political Economy of Reporting Climate Aid." World Development 39, no. 11 (November 2011): 2010–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.07.020.

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