Academic literature on the topic 'Political leadership – South Sudan'

This research examines engagement in diaspora philanthropy through the lens of Lost Boys of Sudan and their founding of small international nonprofit service organizations based in the United States. We seek to understand refugees’ motivations to take upon themselves leadership roles in their local United States communities and in the provision of goods and services to their homeland, South Sudan. By becoming founders of international service nonprofits, Lost Boys make meaning of their experiences and are able to motivate local support in their United States communities to give to distant communities in South Sudan.

Southern Sudanese civilian populations have been trapped in a rising tide of ethnicised, South-on-South, military violence ever since leadership struggles within the main southern opposition movement – the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) – split into two warring factions in August 1991. This paper traces the devastating impact of this violence on a particularly volatile and fractured region of contemporary South Sudan: the oil rich heartlands of the Western Upper Nile Province. Foregrounding the historical experiences and grassroots perspectives of Nuer civilian populations in this region, the paper shows how elite competition within the southern military has combined with the political machinations of the national Islamic government in Khartoum to create a wave of inter- and intra-ethnic factional fighting so intense and intractable that many Nuer civilians have come to define it as ‘a curse from God’. Dividing Sudan's seventeen-year-long civil war (1983–present) into four distinct phases, the paper shows how successive forms and patterns of political violence in this region have provoked radical reassessments of the precipitating agents and ultimate meaning of this war on the part of an increasingly demoralised and impoverished Nuer civilian population.

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) has for decades presented a “New Sudan” as its “vision.” But SPLM/A’s official ideology was socialism and its vision a united secular and socialist Sudan. With time, this vision became “New Sudan” and its presumptive guiding ideology became “The New Sudan Vision” (NSV) without any official institutionalisation of this NSV. In fact, “NSV” does not appear in the Movement’s founding manifesto until the revision of the manifesto in 2008 when NSV was incoherently included. I argue, therefore, that the New Sudan Vision was not really an SPLM/A political ideology but John Garang’s ideology. Besides, its immediate disappearance in South Sudan after the death of John Garang and the overwhelming vote for independence was an unequivocal rejection of NSV by the South Sudanese.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Republic of Sudan represented by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement) which represented the people of the Southern part of Sudan in January 2005 ushered in a rare era of peace and hope for the rebuilding and construction of the war ravaged South Sudan. Coupled with the attainment of Independence for South Sudan through an internationally supervised referendum in January 2011, the objectives of years of struggle by the people of the formerly semi-autonomous region were completed. From 2005 until after the independence of South Sudan however, a period that initially was marked by huge euphoria and broad based anticipation of development boom, the support from both local and international actors for the struggle and the plight of the people of South Sudan is waning and at worst has now turned into despair and hopelessness. After attaining independence in 2011, the highest party organ, the Political Bureau decided to remove candidates who were popularly voted by their constituents and replaced them with their cronies, leading to mass exodus of cadres from the party. On top of that, the wide believe that the elections were rigged for SPLM candidates at the expense of the Independent candidates led to another wave of exodus and open rebellion by many veteran cadres of the movement. Today, these rebellions coupled with some complex problematic societal issues are major concern and a source of political instability and violence in some parts of the country. Secondly, the hasty process of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) campaign, which in some cases were forcefully done left some communities exposed and venerable to attacks by rival communities. This continue to exacerbate and ignite tribal hatred, tension and stereotypes between communities especially in the traditionally volatile parts of the country that are known for cattle rustling and tribal rivalry as a form of cultural practice. Unresolved post secession issues within the SPLM had resulted to political instability and violence thus having negative economic consequences for South Sudan and all the gains the country had made in the past few years vanished after December 15 2013 political upheaval. This thesis will examine the effects of these mentioned complex political instability and economic dilemma South Sudan is being confronted with in the face of the fact that it is still in the process of nation building having attained its Independence only in July 2011.

This study is based on Leadership & Accountability in managing the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), the case of Yei River County (YRC) of Central Equatoria State, Republic of South Sudan (RSS). CDF is one of the initiatives of the government of South Sudan created by a legislation of Parliament to compliment development of the community needs as they expect more from the government of the day. The CDF Act 2007 which was passed by the parliament stipulated structures that govern the operation of the fund in terms of management, leadership and accountability to enhance effective and efficient provision of services to the people. The CDF Act provided that fund allocated to the MPs is to address the challenges that face the communities such as construction of schools, health facilities, water, roads and government facilities but not for personal interest or individual use. The problem that motivated the researcher to explore the performance of the CDF was inadequate service to the community although the government has allocated funds to each constituency channeled through the members of parliament to improve the socio-economic status of the community. The research looked at how the CDF roles, functions, and procedure were applied in the utilization of the funds to ensure efficiency. It analysed and evaluated the effectiveness and efficiency of management of CDF to promote service delivery in the constituencies of Yei, Ottogo, Tore and Mugwo Payams. The study investigated the following questions: How is the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) been managed and utilized by the Members of Parliament (MPs) to promote development in their constituencies? To what extent is the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) used in accordance with the provisions of the CDF Act (2007)? To what extent does the CDF achieve its objective in promoting development to meet the aspirations of the people within the constituencies? And, what is the nature of the relationship between the MPs, the community and the County Local Authority in relation to the CDF? The study also examined the linkage between the various committees formed by the CDF Act 2007 to guide the implementation of the fund as well as the projects at grass-root levels in regards to monitoring and evaluation process. The study used both descriptive and explanatory techniques to guide the researcher in gathering information required on the best of CDF practice in Yei River County which were carried out using interviews, focus group discussion and observation. Twenty (20) respondents comprising of head of departments, women, youth, MPs of both parliaments - the National and the State, chiefs, councilors, CDF committees from the four constituencies mentioned above were interviewed about the use of the CDF. The study reveals that there are no clear linkages between the various committees formed by the CDF Act 2007 to guide the implementation of the fund as well as the projects at the grass-root level in regards to monitoring and evaluation process. In addition to this, less participation of the community in identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the CDF community projects was one of the contributing factors that affected the effectiveness and efficiency of the result. Although creation of CDF has effect in some of the areas of the county, it requires more improvement in the implementation process to increase development in other areas. Based on these findings, the study argues that for the best of the CDF utilization, leadership and accountability which are components of the Public Administration Discipline that enhances efficiency in the public institutions need to be put into practice. Hence, rigorous application of the CDF rules, regulations and procedures is paramount in managing the utilization of the fund allocated for the purpose of development.

There have been severe shortcomings in the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and gaps in research with academic and legal focus remaining on refugees instead. These gaps are revealed and correspondingly explored in this thesis through a case study analysis of South Sudan. The main objective of this thesis is to expose the overall protection discrepancies facing IDPs, and the need to re-address international responsibility to protect in cases where national authorities are unable or unwilling to do so. The lack of a clear definition, legal status and institutional framework at an international level is shown to have an adverse impact on protection. The case study of South Sudan is introduced through an overall analysis of key events and displacement trends. Evidence in support of the main argument is presented through an analysis of the injustices and human rights violations facing IDPs in South Sudan. The roles of the two major providers of protection in South Sudan - the national authorities and the international community - are evaluated to ultimately show how a more flexible approach must be adopted by the international community in such cases. Overall, this thesis seeks to bring the displaced in South Sudan to the forefront of the debate about who is responsible for their protection.

In 2011 the state of South Sudan gained its independence from Sudan and thus became the world’s youngest country to date. During its nine years of existence the country has ratified several major conventions and protocols on women’s rights, whereas Sudan has yet to ratify any. Despite being the same country until barely a decade ago the two authoritarian countries have approached the legislative rights of women in very different manners. Based on a Method of Difference-design, and with the help of process-tracing, this study seeks to answer why this is. By consulting previous research on why authoritarian states advance women’s rights, this study distinguishes three main, indicative theoretical patterns from earlier research which argues under what circumstances authoritarian states advance women’s rights, and when they do not. These patterns include the stability of the government, the work of women’s rights movements and the states relations with the international community. It is concluded that the explanation for the different behaviours of the two Sudans lay mainly in their tactics of governing. South Sudan adopts reforms on gender equality to keep its population content but makes sure to closely control and monitor these reforms. Their women’s rights organisations can be outspoken, and they share the goals of ratifying certain women’s rights conventions. Furthermore, their main donors often include conditions of state-building on their foreign aid, forcing South Sudan to advance on issues such as women’s rights. In contrast, Sudan applies a more violent and oppressing stance against its population, suppress women’s movements and rely mainly on unconditional investments rather than conditional aid from the international community. Furthermore, the women’s movements of Sudan have not expressed a shared goal of ratifying conventions on women’s rights.

Local government is an important level of participatory democracy, where communities play an active role not only as the electorate, but also as end-users and consumers, and thereby holding their municipal councils accountable for their actions. Given the above statement, the interim Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan 2011, entrusts local government with the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. It also provides for the promotion of social and economic development and the promotion of a safe and healthy environment. This also entails the need for a commitment to service delivery hence, public representatives and public officials must take seriously their obligation to render services to the people that could be in the form of ensuring that refuse gets collected, electricity being supplied and other services rendered which better the general welfare of citizens. There are several definitions of public participation, but it can be defined as a process of empowering citizens by involving them in making decisions on all issues that concern them, which can be political, social or economic. The main aim of this study was to, investigate and identify the nature and extent of integrated participatory planning in Yei River County and the extent to which opportunities for public participation are accessible to the communities. The study sought to investigate: How different stakeholders in the community in Yei River County make use of public participation opportunities during the integrated participatory planning process? As such, the main objectives of the study were to; to assess the existing integrated participatory planning practices in Yei River County, to examine and evaluate how the existing integrated participatory planning practices influence service delivery in Yei River County and lastly to identify the barriers to effective integrated participatory planning in YRC and advance recommendations for improvement. Purposive and snowball sampling methods were used and data was collected from a sample of two hundred and twenty-six (226) public officials, comprising of Local Government officials, County councillors and members of the public. Results from the data collected using open and close-ended questionnaires, showed that public participation is very important in local government planning as it leads to incorporation of public suggestions and interests in the development strategies. The results further showed that public meetings and workshops were the only public participation mechanisms being used by Yei River County. The study therefore recommended among other things that, Yei River County should strengthen public participation in integrated participatory planning by providing adequate skilled human resources and establishing structures, as well as public participation mechanisms at the Payam and Boma levels. It was also recommended that the communities needed to utilise all available mechanisms of participation to ensure maximum participation during the integrated participatory planning processes.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.
Bibliography
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Chinese national oil corporations have increased their foreign direct investments over the last decade in Africa, where the political environment of oil producing countries often expose the firms to high political risk. The analysis of political risk is increasingly relevant for the investment decision-making process of Chinese corporations, as changes in political dynamics of host countries can affect the opportunities and profitability of investments. The study emphasises the need for firm-specific political risk analysis as a decision-making tool for international businesses operating in foreign countries. The main research question of the study is concerned with the main indicators of political risk that Chinese corporations may face in the African oil and gas industry. Chinese oil corporations may be affected by political instability, international and internal conflict, corruption, and poor economic and social development in African countries. The political risk they face may be influenced by indicators such as the location of the oil operations, the relative importance of the Chinese oil firm to the host country’s oil industry, the competitive advantage and technical abilities of Chinese oil firms, the support of the Chinese government to state-owned firms, and economic relations that the host government have with China and the oil firm. The study follows a qualitative research approach by way of an empirical case study of the political risk faced by one of China’s national oil corporations, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in South Sudan. A major part of CNPC’s business operations in Sudan was transferred to South Sudan after the country seceded from Sudan in July 2011. The political risk for CNPC in South Sudan is analysed and measured in accordance with an industry-specific political risk model for the oil and gas industry. The study finds that CNPC faces a high level of political risk in South Sudan since independence. An examination of the political risk analysis is done to serve as a basis for answering the main research question. The hostile relationship between South Sudan and Sudan in particular may expose CNPC to high political risk as it led to the shutdown of the oil industry and violent interstate conflict. However, CNPC’s political risk exposure may be mitigated by certain indicators, such as CNPC’s significance in the operation of the South Sudanese oil industry, CNPC’s attributes of being a Chinese state-owned enterprise, the availability of support from the Chinese government in the form of economic cooperation packages and CNPC’s technical abilities in exploration operations. Furthermore, while negative sentiments on the part of the South Sudanese government towards China and CNPC due to the latter’s close relations with Sudan might expose CNPC to high risk, the risk is mitigated by the high level of economic dependency of South Sudan on both China and CNPC.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In die laaste dekade het Chinese nasionale oliekorporasies hulle buitelandse direkte beleggings in Afrika uitgebrei. Die politieke omgewing van hierdie lande veroorsaak egter dikwels dat hierdie firmas aan hoë politieke risiko blootgestel word. Omdat politieke dinamiek in gasheerlande die geleenthede en winsgewendheid van beleggings kan affekteer, is die analise van politieke risiko toenemend relevant in die beleggingsbesluitnemingsproses van Chinese oliekorporasies. Die hoof-navorsingsvraag in hierdie studie handel oor die hoofindikatore van politieke risiko waaraan hierdie korporasies in Afrika se olie- en gasindustrie blootgestel kan word. Politieke onstabiliteit, internasionale en nasionale konflik, korrupsie, asook swak ekonomiese en sosiale ontwikkeling in Afrikalande kan Chinese oliekorporasies affekteer. Die politieke risiko waaraan hulle blootgestel word, kan beïnvloed word deur faktore soos die ligging van oliebedrywighede, die relatiewe belangrikheid van die Chinese oliekorporasie vir die gasheerland se olie-industrie, die kompeterende voordeel en tegniese vermoëns van die Chinese oliekorporasies, die Chinese regering se ondersteuning van staatskorporasies en die ekonomiese verhoudings wat die gasheerland met China en die oliefirmas het. Die studie volg ‘n kwalitatiewe navorsingsbenadering by wyse van ‘n empiriese gevallestudie van die politieke risiko waaraan een van China se nasionale oliekorporasies, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), in Suid-Soedan blootgestel word. Sedert Suid-Soedan se onafhanklikheidswording in Julie 2011 is die grootste gedeelte van CNPC se bedrywighede in Soedan na Suid-Soedan oorgedra. Die politieke risiko vir CNPC is volgens ‘n industrie-spesifieke politieke risiko-model geanaliseer en bereken. Die studie toon dat CNPC inderdaad aan ‘n hoë vlak van politieke risiko blootgestel is sedert onafhanklikheid. Die politieke risiko-analise word ondersoek ten einde as basis te dien vir die beantwoording van die hoof-navorsingsvraag. In die besonder kan die vyandiggesinde verhouding tussen Suid-Soedan en Soedan CNPC blootstel aan hoë politieke risiko, onder andere vanweë die sluiting van die olie-industrie en die gewelddadige interstaat-konflik wat dit meegebring het. CNPC se blootstelling aan politieke risiko kan egter verminder word deur sekere faktore soos CNPC se beduidende belangrikheid in die bedryf van die Suid-Soedanese olieindustrie, CNPC se kenmerke as ‘n Chinese staatsonderneming, die beskikbaarheid van die ondersteuning van die Chinese regering in die vorm van ekonomiese samewerkingspakette asook CNPC se tegniese vermoëns in die veld van eksplorasiebedrywighede. Alhoewel die negatiewe sentiment in die Suid-Soedanese regering teenoor China en CNPC as gevolg van hulle noue verbintenis met Soedan vir CNPC aan hoë risiko kan blootstel, word hierdie risiko verminder deur Suid-Soedan se hoë vlak van ekonomiese afhanklikheid van CNPC en China.

Abstract Common to most protracted conflicts that relapse into war is a disconnect between elites and local communities, which typically suffer the most when the former undermine peace agreements to further their own narrow interests. The central argument in this chapter, drawing heavily on the recent history of Sudan/South Sudan and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), is that African conflict resolution and peacebuilding relies too heavily on political agreements between politico-military elites. These deals focus largely on elite power and resource-sharing arrangements. Mostly ignored are the communal and societal dynamics that initially fed the violence. Sudan/South Sudan’s persistent conflict and instability is a prime example of what happens when peace agreements are signed without due regard for the true nature and genesis of the conflict.

Southeast Asia (SEA) is not only rich in multicultural areas but also rich in multilingual nations with the population of more than 624 million and more than 1,253 languages (Ethnologue 2015). With the cultural uniqueness of each country, this region also accords each national languages with language planning and political management. This strategy brings a challenges to SEA and can lead to conflicts among other ethnic groups, largely owing to leadership. The ethnic conflicts of SEA bring controversy between governments and minorities, such as the ethnic conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, the Muslim population of the south Thailand, and the Bangsa Moro of Mindanao, of the Philippines. The objective of this paper is to investigate the characteristics of the linguistic perspectives of SEA. This research examines two main problems. First, this paper investigates the linguistic area which refers to a geographical area in which genetically unrelated languages have come to share many linguistic features as a result of long mutual influence. The SEA has been called a linguistic area because languages share many features in common such as lexical tone, classifiers, serial verbs, verb-final items, prepositions, and noun-adjective order. SEA consists of five language families such as Austronesian, Mon-Khmer, Sino-Tibetan, Tai-Kadai, and Hmong-Mien. Second, this paper also examines why each nation of SEA takes one language to become the national language of the nation. The National language plays an important role in the educational system because some nations take the same languages as a national language—the Malay language in the case of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The research method of this paper is to apply comparative method to find out the linguistic features of the languages of SEA in terms of phonology, morphology, and grammar.

This rapid review focusses on whether there is international evidence on the role of non-partisan elections as a form of decentralised local government that improves performance of local government. The review provides examples of this from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. There are two reported examples in Sub-Saharan Africa of non-partisan elections that delink candidates from political parties during election campaigns. The use of non-partisan elections to improve performance and democratic accountability at the level of government is not common, for example, in southern Africa all local elections at the sub-national sphere follow the partisan model. Whilst there were no examples found where countries shifted from partisan to non-partisan elections at the local government level, the literature notes that decentralisation policies have the effect of democratising and transferring power and therefore few central governments implement it fully. In Africa decentralisation is favoured because it is often used as a cover for central control. Many post-colonial leaders in Africa continue to favour centralised government under the guise of decentralisation. These preferences emanated from their experiences under colonisation where power was maintained by colonial administrations through institutions such as traditional leadership. A review of the literature on non-partisan elections at the local government level came across three examples where this occurred. These countries were: Ghana, Uganda and Bangladesh. Although South Africa holds partisan elections at the sub-national sphere, the election of ward committee members and ward councillors, is on a non-partisan basis and therefore, the ward committee system in South Africa is included as an example of a non-partisan election process in the review.

The purpose of this study was to provide evidence-based advice on the status and future role of the Humanities in South Africa to government and other stakeholders (such as science councils, the department of education, universities) as a contribution towards improving the human condition. Everywhere, the Humanities is judged by many to be in “crisis.” The reasons for this, in South Africa, include the governmental emphasis on science and technology; the political emphasis on the economically-grounded idea of “developmentalism;” the shift of values among youth (and their parents) towards practical employment and financial gain; and the argument that the challenges faced by our society are so urgent and immediate that the reflective and critical modes of thinking favoured in the Humanities seem to be unaffordable luxuries. The Report provides invaluable detail about the challenges and opportunities associated with tapping the many pools of excellence that exist in the country. It should be used as a guideline for policymakers to do something concrete to improve the circumstances faced by the Humanities, not only in South Africa but also around the world. Amongst other recommendations, the Report calls for the establishment of a Council for the Humanities to advise government on how to improve the status and standing of the Humanities in South Africa. It also calls for initiation, through the leadership of the Department of Basic Education, considered measures to boost knowledge of and positive choices for the Humanities throughout the twelve years of schooling, including progressive ways of privileging the Arts, History and Languages in the school curriculum through Grade 12.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.