Journal articles on the topic 'Political parties - Singapore'

Although there has been a great deal of publicity surrounding the restriction of free speech with regard to opposition parties in Singapore, in real terms, the value of free speech for such parties is limited. First, defamation laws in Singapore require the opposition parties to exercise extreme caution to ensure political comments do not result in costly defamation suits or even imprisonment. Second, free speech in itself is of limited use politically for opposition parties if the content of this speech is not disseminated widely by the local media. As a result, both the fear of legal suits and the limited dissemination of content continue to restrict the potential of free speech for opposition parties in Singapore. This means the contribution of free speech activities to inter-party debate is low in Singapore, thereby undermining the fundamental role of democracy premised on fair inter-party competition.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) system on the governance of Singapore, particularly in terms of equity and inclusiveness, accountability, and participation. Design/methodology/approach – Historical review and election data from Singapore government web site are used. Findings – The GRC system seems to be friendlier and fairer toward ethnic minorities than the traditional system. The GRC system also encourages political parties to be ethnically more inclusive. On the other hand, however, the GRC system has negative effects on opposition parties. A government cannot be called “accountable” if it lacks fair competition and sufficient popular participation. Originality/value – The Singapore experience shows that, in practice, ethnic equality/inclusiveness and even political stability on the one hand, and participation and accountability on the other hand, can present conflicts. Which value should receive priority thus requires serious consideration.

This paper examines the political history of the relationship between Malaysia and Singapore, focusing on the notion of citizenship and its ethnic, civic and political dimensions. It analyses the extent to which the merger of Singapore with Malaysia redefined the citizenship boundaries of the Malaysian national political identity. The incorporation of Singaporean citizens into the Malaysian political community was controversial, as it was closely related to electoral stakes. The ruling People’s Action Party and the Alliance Party attempted to delineate the political sphere of the population of each political unit through the demarcation between ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’. However, the citizenship crisis continued to trouble the relationship of these states to the point that both parties breached the perceived agreement not to interfere with the other’s political sphere of influence. This sphere of influence was delineated on the basis of race, thus cutting across political territory rather than territorial attributes. The ideological clashes over the meaning of citizenship that arose during the political merger of Singapore and Malaya, show that a truly Malaysian citizenship could not be developed-only a Malaysia of citizens.

We introduce the concept of a “credibility gap” to explain why the Workers’ Party has been more successful than other opposition political parties in recent elections in Singapore. We argue that opposition parties need to overcome a credible commitment problem with the electorate in order to win against hegemonic parties.

The article analyzes the alignment of political forces on the eve of the general parliamentary elections in Singapore. The author dwells on main political parties of the country, cites data on the results of the last parliamentary elections held in Singapore in 2015. Particular attention is paid to changing the procedure for conducting both the election campaign and the elections themselves in the context of the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic. In conclusion, the author makes a forecast about the results of the elections, which will be held on 10 July 2020.

AbstractThe People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore is one of the world's longest ruling dominant parties, having won every general election since the country's independence in 1965. Why do Singaporeans consistently vote for the PAP, contrary to the expectations of democratization theories? We argue that valence considerations—specifically, perceptions of party credibility—are the main factor in the voting behavior of Singapore's electorate, and are critical to explaining the PAP's resilience. Furthermore, we argue that the primacy of valence politics arose in part by design, as the PAP has used its control of Singapore's high-capacity state to reshape society and thereby reshape voter preferences towards its comparative advantages. We use a multi-methods approach to substantiate this argument, including a comprehensive quantitative analysis of recent elections. Ultimately, our findings suggest that a focus on valence politics can increase the resilience of dominant parties, but that such a strategy also faces natural limits.

This article explores the nature of the main opposition parties to the incumbent hegemonic regimes in Malaysia and Singapore. I argue that the differing characters of these opposition parties should be considered. In Singapore, where there is no ideological challenge to the ruling party, I contend that even if the opposition takes over it will be the end of a hegemonic party but not hegemony. In Malaysia, the opposite is true. This article contributes to the literature on transition theory in two ways: (1) it recognizes the diversity of authoritarian regimes and enhances analyses of various authoritarian regimes by focusing on one type – hegemonic parties; and (2) it brings ideology into the reckoning by focusing on the nature of the opposition parties most likely to take over.

By-elections in Singapore have played a different role depending on whether the country can be characterized as a hegemonic or competitive authoritarian regime. During the former, the ruling party was able to instrumentalize by-elections for leadership renewal and enhance its power. Conversely, they aided opposition parties as well, providing them a training ground.

AbstractIt is unusual to find a negotiation not linked to at least one other negotiation. In some domains, such as international trade policy, we can identify negotiation networks with parties simultaneously involved in negotiations in global, multilateral, regional, and bilateral trade policy settings. A single party (i.e., a national government) will manage similar issues in all four settings and also manage these same issues with multiple parties in a single setting. International trade policy is one of many "linkage-rich" environments.This study examines the relationship between two discrete but linked treaty negotiations: the Singapore-Australia Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (SAFTA) and the United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement of 2003 (USSFTA). Case analysis identifies five structural factors that enhance the potential and fundamentally shape the nature of negotiation linkage dynamics. If linkage occurs then role theory can be employed to define two functional role types, a link-pin party (Singapore in this study) and linked parties (Australia and the United States). Such theory and case analysis support the development of propositions and help establish guidance for managing negotiation behavior. Key structural characteristics that appear to create linkage dynamics in this study are used to build a four-part structural framework that maps the universe of negotiation-linkage phenomena and determines the fundamental nature of four discrete linkage conditions. This framework also provides descriptive and prescriptive guidance for managing strategy and power in linked negotiations.

Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) is one of the longest ruling parties in the world. The PAP’s ability to avoid overt factionalism over the years is exceptional, especially compared to the region’s personalistic or cadre parties. In recent years, the defection of former PAP cadre Dr. Tan Cheng Bock and the formation of the Progress Singapore Party (PSP) and PM Lee Hsien Loong’s family rivalry, which involved PAP elites, have challenged the cohesion of the PAP. This study examines a set of incentives and constraints institutionalised at the party and national levels to foster elite cohesion. It is argued that the critical junctures in the PAP’s early years led to the adoption of a cadre party model and a centralised candidate selection process that co-opts like-minded elites into a core that promotes elite unity. Nationally, party switching and factional alignments based on ethnicity or ideology have been systematically banned. Given the lack of credible alternatives that seriously challenge the incumbent PAP, ambitious party cadres would do better toeing the party line and staying loyal.

Singapore's 2020 general election was held amidst the most serious public health and economic crises in the country's history. Despite expectations that these parallel crises would precipitate a flight to safety and result in a strong performance by the dominant People's Action Party (PAP), the ruling party received its third-lowest popular vote share (61.2 percent) and lowest-ever seat share (89.2 percent) since independence. This article engages explanations for the unexpected results and argues that the vote swing against the PAP was enabled by a hitherto largely overlooked factor: the 2020 election included two opposition parties that could credibly compete with the PAP on the valence considerations that drive voting behaviour in Singapore, giving voters a perceived safe alternative to the PAP at the constituency level. Quantitative tests support the notion that party credibility—rather than demographic factors, incumbency advantages, Group Representation Constituencies, or assessments of the PAP's fourth- generation leaders—best explains variation in the vote swing against the PAP. Ultimately, the results suggest that the PAP's monopoly on party credibility is no longer assured, thus portending greater opposition competitiveness and pressure against the PAP in future elections. Nonetheless, the PAP's dominance remains intact and there is little evidence of a general appetite among the electorate for a non-PAP government, suggesting the likelihood of smaller course corrections rather than major steps towards democratization in the coming years.

AbstractThis research note studies the political representation of racial minorities in Singapore. Specifically, it analyzes whether racial minority members of parliament (MPs) are more likely than Chinese MPs to represent the interests of racial minorities in the Parliament. I answer this question through conducting content analyses of the parliamentary questions raised during the plenary meetings of the 10th–12th Parliament of Singapore (2002–2015). In total, 6,678 questions were asked. Our results show that racial minority MPs were significantly more likely (21.79 times) than Chinese MPs to ask questions related to racial minorities. While this study shows that racial minority MPs were significantly more likely than Chinese MPs to ask questions related to racial minorities, it also highlights the inadequacy of representation of racial minority interests in the Parliament of Singapore. During our period of study, only 1.2% of the total number of parliamentary questions focused on racial minorities. Besides MPs' race, this study finds that partisan affiliation crucially influenced the likelihood of MPs to represent racial minority interests. Political parties played an important role in shaping MPs' representational behavior. Compared to the People's Action Party (PAP) MPs, opposition MPs were significantly more likely to raise racial minority-related questions. One possible explanation could be that opposition MPs used parliamentary questions as an important tool to challenge and criticize the governing party's policies on racial minorities. Another explanation could be that PAP racial minority MPs' first loyalty has to be to the party and government rather than their co-ethnics, given that they are beholden to party elites for their seats.

Authoritarian ruling parties are expected to be exceptionally resistant to democratization. Yet some of the strongest authoritarian parties in the world have not resisted democratization, but have embraced it. This is because their raison d'etre is to continue ruling, not necessarily to remain authoritarian. Democratization requires that ruling parties hold free and fair elections, but not that they lose them. Authoritarian ruling parties can thus be incentivized to concede democratization from a position of exceptional strength as well as extreme weakness. This “conceding-to-thrive” scenario is most likely to unfold when regimes (1) possess substantial antecedent political strengths and resource advantages, (2) suffer ominous setbacks signaling that they have passed their apex of domination, and (3) pursue new legitimation strategies to arrest their incipient decline. We illustrate this heretofore neglected alternative democratization pathway through a comparative-historical analysis of three Asian developmental states where ruling parties have democratized from varying positions of considerable strength: Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia. We then consider the implications of our analysis for three “candidate cases” in developmental Asia where ruling parties have not yet conceded democratization despite being well-positioned to thrive were they to do so: Singapore, Malaysia, and the world's most populous dictatorship, China.

This article discusses the impact of Malaysia's formation on September 16, 1963. The establishment of Malaysia involves Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. Planning at the early stage includes Brunei but the State withdrew at the end of Malaysia's formation. Singapore also dropped out from the Malaysia Formation two years later in 1965. The formation of Malaysia has affected Malaysia to this day. The objective of the study is to discuss the benefits of politics, socialization and racial relations in Malaysia. Among the things discussed in this article are the benefits of the platform of socialisation and racial relations in Malaysia as well as the political aspects. Both of these were examined using historical approaches and library research. The findings show that Malaysia's establishment has made Malaysia a unique nation with racial diversity. This includes the establishment of many political parties based on their respective race or tribe, especially in Sabah and Sarawak. All Malaysians enjoy the benefits of Malaysia’s establishment for harmony and peace.

This paper examines the tensions between the law, politics and public opinion in Singapore via a landmark 2014 ruling that upheld the constitutionality of Section 377A of the Penal Code criminalising sex between men. It argues that the ruling dealt a serious blow to the human rights project for minority groups in Singapore due to complex socio-political biases towards homosexuals and a narrow legal logic that is overly deferential to the legislature. This “tyranny of the majority” not only reinforces longstanding prejudices against the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) community and deprives them of their rights, but potentially results in the graver consequence of compromising the integrity of the Singapore Constitution and the country’s democratic ideals. The paper also illustrates how the court of public opinion, split between conservative and liberal pro-humanist camps, not only keeps this issue at an impasse through opposing representations of homosexuality but also reflects an important ideological juncture that Singapore currently finds itself at as it navigates the path to modernisation and liberalisation. It urges a humanistic re-imagination of the law where the formulation and instrumentalisation of laws are constantly renegotiated and reworked to become more responsive as historical contexts and social relations between various parties beyond the State and its apparatus evolve. It also ventures that decriminalising homosexuality presents Singapore with the opportunity to define a new Asian post-colonial modernity and that the concept of “rights capital” can introduce greater equity and dignity within society.

AbstractThis article investigates the efficacy of a form of electoral innovation unique to the island-state of Singapore, the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme, and its impact on democratic governance, in light of the changing political landscape. A comparative perspective will be employed and broader conclusions on electoral engineering will be reached, especially for democratizing countries. Contrary to conventional scholarly wisdom, I argue that the NMP scheme can actually boost democratic representation in the country, considering the changing political landscape in the state previously dominated by a hegemonic party. This is via two ways: firstly, NMPs could better represent the voices of the people at the margins of society and, secondly, they could be better positioned to raise issues that are deemed too ‘sensitive’ to be raised by opposition parties. NMPs can enhance democratic governance by promoting deliberation, accountability, and representation.

Recent political science research has suggested that autocrats adopt a variety of institutions such as nominally democratic elections and ruling parties to buttress authoritarian durability. In this article I investigate the role of constituency service in an authoritarian regime. I argue that Singapore's Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS) is a complementary institution that can serve to mitigate the weaknesses of other authoritarian institutions, thereby entrenching authoritarianism, rather than serve as a form of democratic representation. First, it is a mechanism to gain valuable everyday information about grievances within the population, thereby allowing the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) to formulate policies and effectively target its response. Second, it is a convenient venue to recruit and socialize ordinary party members, thus helping the PAP forestall potential party decay. Symbolically, conducting MPS is a material performance of the hegemonic ideology of elitism between PAP politicians and ordinary Singaporeans.

Abstract In 2020, law of the sea tribunals rendered one decision on jurisdiction and decided one case on the merits. First, the arbitral tribunal in the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait dispute dismissed the jurisdictional objections raised by the Russian Federation and thus will proceed to hear the merits of Ukraine’s claims. Second, the arbitral tribunal in the Enrica Lexie Incident case found, after upholding its jurisdiction in relation to the dispute before it, that the Italian marines who had shot an Indian fisherman in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone were entitled to immunity under international law and that Italy had breached certain provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). These two arbitral awards have confirmed and developed certain trends in the jurisprudence of law of the sea tribunals. In addition, a novelty in 2020 was the conclusion of a Model Agreement between Singapore and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), for the latter to be able to discharge its judicial business in Singapore. Last, the Meeting of the States Parties to UNCLOS elected five new members of ITLOS and re-elected two.

Abstract CETA, the EU-Vietnam FTA, and the EU-Singapore FTA are the first investment treaties to replace the practice of ad hoc tribunals and party-appointed arbitrators with a two-tiered investment tribunal system (ITS), consisting of a standing tribunal of first-instance and an appeal tribunal, comprised of a roster of members who are pre-selected by the treaty parties. Underlying this retreat to domestic court structures is the perception of partiality sometimes associated with party-appointed arbitrators. The article explores this risk of bias rationale and identifies potential drawbacks associated with the shift away from disputing party involvement in the selection of the tribunal, towards a more institutionalized form of adjudication. The array of foreseeable challenges with regard to the identity, tenure, and qualifications of arbitral members, particularly when combined with the duty to remain available and prohibition on “double-hatting”, cast doubt on the efficacy of these reforms in resolving the legitimacy concerns that spawned its creation. A better solution might be to expand the role of arbitral institutions in mediating the link between the parties and their chosen arbitrator.

Abstract This study explores the relevance of readiness theory’s analytical framework in illuminating the fundamentals that contribute to the de-escalation process in international crises. By applying this analytical framework to the U.S.-North Korea crisis management episode of 2017–2018, this study elucidates the interplay of elements that led to the winding down of the intense crisis and to the parties’ agreement to formally embark on negotiations at the end of the Singapore Summit in June 2018. The study shows how the multiple variables underlying the movements in conflict transformation, as outlined by readiness theory, can help to explain the effect of bilateral strategies applied by the U.S. and North Korea and the role of third-party involvement by South Korea and China in managing the crisis.

Cross-national models of party system fragmentation hold that social diversity and district magnitude interact: higher levels of district magnitude allow for greater expression of social diversity that leads to higher levels of party system fragmentation. Most models, however, ignore differences between majoritarian and proportional electoral rules, which may significantly alter the impact of district magnitude, as well as the way in which district magnitude impacts the translation of social cleavages into party system fragmentation. Examining the case of Singapore suggests majoritarian multimember districts limit party system fragmentation, particularly by reducing the degree to which ethnic and religious diversity are translated into political parties. Applying these insights to a standard cross-national model of party system fragmentation, the results suggest that majoritarian multimember districts produce lower levels of party system fragmentation than proportional multimember districts.

Although modernisation and incorporation of public transport systems in cities of developing countries have often been acknowledged, few studies have been made of this process in detail or of the possible causal factors. In Singapore, the bus services have changed from a disjointed system involving eleven companies to a unified operation, but this modernisation did not occur smoothly, nor did it follow inevitably from changes in demand, land use, or technology. Instead, there were several countervailing factors which included a lack of resources, both by operators and by government, the depredations of pirate taxis, and, for much of the period under discussion, a lack of political commitment to public transport. This last factor appeared only after the government had consolidated power, and opposition from interested parties had been disarmed. The complexity of the modernisation and incorporation process is highlighted.

Abstract The recently-concluded Singapore Mediation Convention and Hague Judgements Convention have aimed to facilitate the cross-border enforcement of mediated settlement agreements and court judgements in the same way that the New York Convention has facilitated the cross-border enforcement of arbitral awards. This shift in the international dispute resolution landscape is analysed on three levels: normative, strategic and operational. Drawing from theories of private international law, international political economy and comparative public policy, this article asserts that convergent public and private interests likely championed the elaboration of international conventions as a means of promoting harmonization in international dispute settlement. It demonstrates that while the conversion of court judgements and mediated settlement agreements into arbitral awards could also have facilitated their cross-border enforcement, the further development of new mechanisms that respond directly to commercial parties’ needs remains necessary to complement the evolving treaty framework.

In a recent issue of this Journal Professor Yap asks whether and how governments in what she calls ‘less-democratic’ countries, that is those where elections are uncompetitive due to a lack of democratic safeguards or opposition parties, are held accountable for the effects of their policies on economic performance. She argues that governments in these countries have an interest in avoiding strife and inducing private actors to provide resources necessary for economic prosperity. Because of this, ‘when their economies are performing less than optimally, these governments tend to offer credible apologies in the same year to attenuate the potential labour disquiet and loss in production investment.’ Yap develops the concept of a credible apology as the joint occurrence of punishment of responsible actors or reparations to injured parties, and an increase in monitoring activity by non-government actors. She then presents evidence for South Korea for 1964–87 and Singapore and Malaysia for 1966–94 showing that, ceteris paribus, the tendency of production investment to decrease and strike activity to increase in years with high unemployment is offset if the government makes a credible apology.Yap is quite clear that she assumes a causal arrow running from poor economic performance to credible apologies. Indeed, such a causal relationship is necessary for the concept of accountability; the events that Yap classifies as credible apologies must be made in response to unsatisfactory economic performance in order for us to say that these governments are being held (or are holding themselves) accountable for the consequences of their policies.

AbstractWhat explains public attitudes towards a former aggressor state? Conventional wisdom would suggest the prevalence of negative sentiments rooted in historical hatred. In this article we contend that when individuals are proficient in a foreign language—e.g. a lingua franca—they have an alternative channel through which they are exposed to positive narratives put forth by other parties regarding the former aggressor state. And as a result, their attitudes towards the former aggressor state are more positive than those held by their linguistically limited counterparts. To test our argument, we focus on public attitudes towards the Japanese in Mainland China, Singapore, and Taiwan—three Chinese-ethnic majority political units that experienced Japanese aggression leading up to and during World War II. Using survey data, we demonstrate that individuals who are proficient in the English language are much more likely to hold positive attitudes of the Japanese. These results are robust even when we consider whether some individuals are predisposed to being cosmopolitan; whether some individuals have more opportunities to learn English; and whether the linguistic effects are symptomatic of American soft power.

AbstractThis article examines the problem of the law governing the validity of the arbitration agreement. The cases of Sulamérica in the English Court of Appeal and of FirstLink in the High Court of Singapore demonstrate that leading arbitration jurisdictions around the world can come to diametrically opposite results. In particular, there are currently diverging views as to whether the law applicable to the arbitration agreement should be the law chosen by the parties to govern their substantive legal relationship or the law of the seat of the arbitration. The issue is unlikely to be settled soon at international level. However, without embracing extreme approaches that purport to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement without reference to any national legal system, a more ‘transnational’ approach should be encouraged. This may emerge, based on three structured principles which would be desirable for international convergence, namely the non-discrimination principle, the estoppel principle and the validation principle. These principles can be developed without conflicting with the conventional conflicts-of-laws approach which was adopted by the English Court of Appeal in Sulamérica.

Related party transaction or RPT is a transaction that could either be harmful or beneficial to the company and minority shareholders. RPT can be considered as an efficient tool for the company or abused by the controlling shareholders. Therefore, one of the key factors to address this transaction is through disclosure. This study applied a content analysis method using materials that were largely library-based including primary and secondary data. The former was gathered from relevant theories to explain the application of the legal theories. Meanwhile, the latter was derived from published materials, such as textbooks, journal articles and online databases. In order to assess these materials, a combination of descriptive, critical and comparative data analysis approaches was employed in this study. This paper aims to understand the underlying applicable legal theories on RPT by analysing and comparing the disclosure framework in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand that adopt the ASEAN Disclosure Standards (“ADS”). This paper finds that there is a disparity in the disclosure standard among these states despite having ADS in place. This problem calls for a clearer ex-ante approval process in ADS and to consider the model from the European Union’s Shareholders Amending Directive 2017/828 to improve the disclosure framework in each jurisdiction. In conclusion, ADS indicated the requisite for the conflicted parties to declare and obtain approval from the minority shareholders however with unclear procedure and minimal threshold.

Take a drive through the Suzhou Industrial Park (SIP) and you will see what appears to be a model industrial estate: cleanly laid out roads interspersed with green parks and endless rows of factories humming with activity. There is none of the chaotic, thrown-together feel of so many Chinese industrial parks; the atmosphere is almost serene. Talk to the managers of these factories and you will hear nothing but praise for the managers of the park. Even the biggest problems – the rapidly rising cost of land, the shortage of workers – are indications of success. Surprisingly, and despite these outward appearances, the SIP was, until recently, viewed by many as a grave disappointment.The SIP was not supposed to be just another industrial park in China: it was a grand experiment. The idea was to transplant the strengths of the Singaporean model – effective bureaucratic management, world-class infrastructure and a stable business environment – to China through government co-operation. The park was a joint venture between a foreign consortium directed by the Singaporean government and a Chinese consortium consisting of local governments and centrally-controlled, state-owned enterprises. From the perspective of the Chinese government, the hope was that the SIP would provide a model of effective governance for the rest of the country at the same time as it served as an engine of growth in the Jiangsu region. From the perspective of the Singaporean government, the SIP was partly an attempt to capitalize upon its strength in management in a location with far lower costs, and partly an attempt to demonstrate the relevance of the Singaporean “model” in a Chinese context. The stakes were high for both parties.

The DPRK has become one of the most striking news-maker of 2018. Kim Jong-un took decisive steps to establish cooperation with the ROK – the parties had quite coordinated interaction during the Olympic Games in Pyeongchang, and hold three Inter-Korean summits in April, May and September 2018. Kim Jong-un have hold three meetings with Xi Jinping. The summit of Kim Jong-un and Trump in Singapore was equally resonant. The President of the Russian Federation during the WEF invited Kim Jongun to Russia, earlier the leader of North Korea had a meeting with S.V. Lavrov and V.I. Matvienko. These steps look particularly important against the previous period, when the DPRK was mainly presented by the United States and other states as a security threat. However, despite the changes that took place and the fact that Kim Jong-un is attempting to build a dialogue in different areas, the position remains about the real interests and intentions of the DPRK and the future of the North Korean regime remains ambiguous. The article analyzes existing points of view on the issue and identifies and the prospects’ of the problem development. At the beginning of the study, a comprehensive analysis of the problem of the Korean Peninsula is presented. It examines the features of the interaction of the DPRK with key international players, the question of sanctions against the country, and the peculiarities of the internal political line of the DPRK. Further analysis focuses on the current foreign policy line of Kim Jong Yin, assesses the results of major international meetings, including the opinion of experts and the analysis of the significance of specific agreements for understanding possible scenarios. Specific attention is payed to the Russian policy towards the inter-Korean settlement and Russian potential role in this process.

AbstractDespite growing recognition that authoritarianism can be far more durable than transition theorists previously expected, transition theory assumptions continue to constrain attempts to understand authoritarian regimes. In particular, alternative avenues of political participation to opposition political parties and electoral contests are under examined. Singapore's authoritarian regime involves a range of such innovative institutional and ideological initiatives, one of the most significant being the Nominated Members of Parliament scheme. This promotes notions of representation different from democratic parliamentary representation that are not without appeal to targeted, emerging social forces. Singapore's political economy dynamics contribute to this responsiveness by obstructing independent power bases.

This article aims to explain how the contestation of social spaces in the lives of the plural society at Lasem it processes dynamically. It is a pattern of space contestation that leads to the affirmation and strengthening of identity or a pattern that leads to the fusion of identities. As a consequence, the first pattern creates social friction or conflict. On the contrary, the second pattern is directed towards acculturation and assimilation of culture which can strengthen social harmony. The important finding of this research is that it can be known the real issue, so that problems related to all parties can be found a solution as well as a resolution. This research also proves that social mechanism preparedness is considered urgent to prevent negative excesses (negative things) from the space contestation. 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Surat Kabar Harian “Suara Merdeka”, edisi: 23 Oktober 2019. "Said Aqil Singgung Sentimen Agama dan 212 di Depan Anies", sumber; https://www.cnnindo nesia.com/nasional/20191022212949-20-441966/said-aqil-sing gung-sentimen-agama-dan-212-di-depan-anies, diunduh pada tanggal 23 Oktober 2019. Pukul:07.43 wib.

It is undeniable that media is mostly used as a propaganda tool of the political elite to achieve the national interest of its country. This research identifies and explains the establishment of CNN Indonesia in making public opinion as one of the extensions on CNN International regarding the Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump Summit in Singapore in 2018. This research utilized: agenda-setting, priming and framing theory to find out the detail process of forming public opinion by CNN Indonesia. This research also utilizes qualitative research methods based on Robert E. Stake’s explanation. The finding suggests that CNN Indonesia, through its agenda-setting, was able to make the summit has an urgency to be discussed in public. Its priming is able to increasing awareness of the importance of denuclearization and world peace which has been Indonesa’s foreign policy agenda. Through its framing, CNN Indonesia attempted to construct public opinion that the United States able to utilize its super power label in order to perquisite many parties, namely creating the world peace.

(Views of Major General S B Asthana,SM,VSM, (Veteran), Questioned by Jiangtao Shi of South China Morning Post on 29 August 2017.Question 1 (SCMP)Are you surprised that the over 70-day military standoff ended all of a sudden just days ahead of PM Narendra Modi’s trip to China for the BRICS summit? The deliberate ambiguity in both sides’ statements seems to indicate that both sides were willing to make some kind of concessions in a bid to end the dispute in a mutually acceptable face-saving manner. What are the main reasons and factors behind the seemingly peaceful solution for China and India respectively? (For China , BRICS and the 19th party congress? For India, domestic political support and economic reform?)Answer 1 by Major General S B AsthanaI am not really surprised that the over 70-day military standoff ended all of a sudden just days ahead of PM Narendra Modi’s trip to China for the BRICS summit. As you have rightly pointed out, both sides (China and India) were looking for an opportunity for a face saving resolution, without appearing to be weak domestically. The likelihood of absence of PM Modi in BRICS Summit, and its resultant political and diplomatic cost, triggered that opportunity. In my opinion, the main reasons behind such a sudden resolution were:-Any escalation beyond the point of standoff as on 28 August could have been cost prohibitive in terms of economical engagement, political and diplomatic cost, human casualties, without any worthwhile gains for both sides. Prolonging it was not in the national interest of either of the country.Success of BRICS is important for all member countries including China. China refusal to talk without precondition of Indian withdrawal and repeated provocative statements was exhibiting its arrogance. This wasn’t going well with global community, besides giving an indirect message to all including BRICS, about its hegemonic intentions and poor diplomatic acumen. Even US and Japan, who were not involved with Doklam, chose to state that both must talk to resolve it. The fact that China did not accept ICA verdict, continued aggressive posturing in South China Sea, violated 2012 Agreement in Doklam Triangle, and was seen as not doing enough to implement UN obligation against North Korea. It was affecting its global image adversely, hence some midcourse correction was needed, which has been done through this adjustment.An India China conflict, besides shattering dreams of economic prosperity of both countries, could have escalated to international dimensions, more so with ongoing problems of North Korea and South China Sea, and turbulence in Af- Pak Region. The fact that both are nuclear states cannot be discounted in strategic calculus of escalation dynamics.Militarily the escalation dynamics was not thought through. If war gamed properly, the escalation would have resulted in stalemate, which would have damaged the image of President Xi Jinping and reduced his chances for getting favourable people in 19th Party Congress in his second term and any possible prospects of his third term.From Indian perspective also, escalation of this standoff wasn’t in its National Interest. India needs China’s market for its growth in future, even if the balance of trade is not in its favour today. Now that India is on ‘Make in India’ path, as fastest growing economy to bring prosperity to its people,it may not like to slow down due to such meaningless disruptions.There was no domestic pressure on Indian Government, as all political parties,Security forces and public were determined to check Chinese encroachment and arrogance, at any cost.Question 2(SCMP)While an “expeditious disengagement” in Doklam brought an end to the border standoff and ease tensions between the two countries, do you think it could fuel nationalist sentiment, mistrust and hostility in both nations and cast a long shadow over the longstanding border dispute between China and India and their relations? What are the immediate and long-term implications of the border standoff on bilateral relations, especially considering the strategic competition and rivalry for dominance in the region between the nuclear-armed Asian giants? Will it have a long-term impact on the regional geopolitical landscape?Answer 2 by Major General S B AsthanaDoklam standoff is neither the first, nor the last, and not even the longest standoff between India and China. Many strategists argue that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are strong leaders, leading their nations with patriotic sentiments. The nationalist self-confidence from both sides may ignite a heated rivalry in which bilateral relations could deteriorate, because an “expeditious disengagement” in Doklam is only a temporary answer to the bigger problem of longstanding border dispute between both.Out of 14 countries with which China had border issues, it has resolved with 12 except India and Bhutan. With India, China has been delaying settling the border issue on some pretext or the other, and with Bhutan it has been shifting its claim lines many times. I understand that permanent resolution of Border Dispute is the ultimate solution, which needs to be expedited. It is a complex problem, as both sides read history in a manner that it supports their claims. This was the reason for both countries to have signed various agreements to ensure peace and tranquillity along the borders, which have been reasonably successful, as no bullet has been fired amongst both Forces in last four decades.Even if resolution of boundary is considered to be a complex problem, the demarcation, delineation and defining of Line of Actual Control (LAC), (which is not a mutually accepted line as of now), is an inescapable necessity. This is do-able by cooperative political intent, to be followed by intense diplomatic efforts. This action cannot be postponed further if the two neighbours have to live peacefully in future without further standoffs’. It needs to be understood that with un-demarcated LAC, troops of both sides will patrol as per their own perceptions of LAC; some areas will be common which both sides will patrol to be its own. Every such patrol will be called as intrusion by the other side, hence such face-offs will continue tillit’s demarcated, and the identification of its demarcation is made known to troops manning the borders. The short term impacts of standoffs were the anxiety among people, possible temporary setback to trade, tension on borders, non attendance of important events like BRF/BRICS if not resolved. The long term impact could have been hardening of varying stand on border resolution, aggressive strategic competition, and growth of interest based strategic partnerships to balance each other.Being neighbors, most populated, developing countries and significant trading partners of future, China and India have convergence of interests in many areas.Our economical engagements, mutual cooperation can proceed with strategic divergences, and this has been demonstrated adequately in past.Question3(SCMP)What are messages for other Asian nations caught between the increasing rivalry between China and India? What are the main takeaways for countries like Bhutan , Sri Lanka , Vietnam , Myanmar , Japan , Singapore and Mongolia ?Answer 3 by Major General S B AsthanaI do not subscribe to the idea of growing rivalry between China and India. The extension of economical and strategic space by large growing countries like China and India, to fulfil their genuine needs is natural and may not necessarily be a rivalry. In case some Asian nation is caught between contradictory needs of China and India, in my opinion it should look after its own national interest.The main message which comes out loud and clear from Doklam episode is that in today’s world no country can afford to be arrogant to bully smaller sovereign nation, if the smaller Nation is determined to stand up for its national interest. If Cuba could stand up to US, Bhutan could stand up to China, Vietnam could stand up to China as well as US, then smaller countries should also look after their national interest, without worrying about the size and might of any power, trying to push them or manipulate their genuine strategic choices.In my perception, the DoklamPlateau was presumably chosen by China for road construction to violate 2012 Treaty at this point of time because:-India and Bhutan boycotted Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation, the Doklam ingress could embarrass both the countries simultaneously.Stressing on 1890 Treaty by China takes away the logic of Tibet, as a player in dealing with India, thus a subtle message to Dalai Lama that he is not a stake holder in Tibet.Test the depth of Indo- Bhutanese security relationship.The area being too close to Siliguri Corridor/Chicken’s Neck, India had to be concerned and had to decide whether to intervene or otherwise in India’s own national interest, thereby conveying a message of standing up or not standing up to a challenge from Beijing in future too.As the construction activity was in Bhutanese Territory, a strong Indian reaction was not expected.In case India takes action, China can proclaim itself as an innocent victim and blame India to be an aggressor.China was however surprised by an unexpectedly strong Indian reaction, and then it realized that the point chosen was such, where it had strategic and tactical disadvantages for her in escalating it. China was also surprised that in multiparty democracy like India, all parties are on the same page as far as stand on sovereignty and Doklam Issue was concerned.The end result was that China was extremely disturbed about it, and churning out fresh provocative statements almost on daily basis, launching psychological and propaganda war, war of words, and resorting to every possible means short of war to put pressure on India to withdraw its troops. The Indian side on the other side has been relatively balanced, but firm in its stance, making very few statements, and was globally appreciated for its diplomatic maturity. No one bought the idea of India being an aggressor. India proved that it could physically resist China when its national interest demands so, and it also honors the security arrangement promised to Bhutan by physical action.Chinese efforts to establish bilateral talks with Bhutan, including financial allurement (Purse Diplomacy) did not materialize. India and Bhutan stood by each other and could resist Chinese aggressive activity. Chinese efforts to involve Nepal also resulted in response from their Deputy Prime Minister expressing unwillingness to take sides. Japanese Ambassador in New Delhi also said that there should be no attempt to change status quo on the ground by force.Vietnam has stood up earlier against China as well as US for its national interest. The Doklam episode will encourage countries like, Mongolia (Visit of Dalai Lama), Singapore( trade issues), Srilanka ( Hambantota Port), Myanmar( Dam construction), and Japan( East China Sea/Senkakuislands) to stand up to China for various issues of divergences, and cause others like Philippines, to reconsider their options to give away their strategic choices.China in last few years has been on island grabbing spree using ‘Incremental Encroachment’ as part of ‘Active Defence’ Strategy’, with its economic and military clout, using ‘Purse Diplomacy’ with some countries and ‘Infrastructure Diplomacy’ with others. In some cases the disagreements amongst some countries have become quite pronounced due to unfair deals. Singaporehad a strong interest in ensuring navigation in South China Seas is not restricted. Mongolia displayed the temerity of hosting the Dalai Lama, despite Chinese opposition.The bigger lesson is that no sovereign country should be pushed to take sides, and if it is done aggressively by any stronger power, the nation which is being pushed will be forced to seek security and other interests elsewhere, in terms of various other partnerships.Question 4 (SCMP)With India insisting that China should respect the 2012 understanding on tri-junctions, which specifically said “the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries,” do you think it will further delay the border talks between China and Bhutan? Does it mean India will have to be directly involved as the third party in Sino-Bhutanese border talks in the future?Answer 4 by Major General S B AsthanaAs per the lay of the ground, the resolution of border dispute of China and Bhutan especially at triangle/ junction points, is closely linked and cannot be done in isolation. At Doklam plateau the location of Tri-junction as per India supported by Bhutan is Batang La, whereas China contends it to be at Gyemochenon Jampheri Ridge, which amounts to an encroachment of 7-8 km. These issues cannot be resolved in isolation. If there is political will to resolve it, then meeting of three delegation will not take any time. The delay is only in making political decision and directing the diplomats to resolve it in time bound manner.Additional PointAlthough there is a contradiction in the manner in which each country has reported it perhaps to amuse their domestic audience, and both sides can claim it to be a diplomatic achievement. It is a welcomed step towards peace and tranquilityalong the borders, hence which side blinked first or had an upper hand is not relevant, although both will claim it. This resolution has ensured that there has been no exchange of bullets, and India and China as responsible nations have been able to resolve their differences peacefully on Doklam Standoff. It also ensured that both the countries found a peaceful solution, with a face-saving gesture to ease tension, without disturbing the core interest of either.

goes viral after the September 11 tragedy, this book adds another scholarly work on how Muslims fared in the twentieth century Europe. The buzz word indicating anti-Islam rhetoric has become contagious particularly after the Runnymede Trust Report (1997) which resulted in many Muslims fearing for their lives. Post September 11 popularises such rhetoric. For various reasons, religion and race have indeed been the targets in this challenging civilised world. The book is timely given the current scenario where one will encounter readings which tend to portray a rather bias perspective on Muslims; Muslims as the group to be avoided, or the group with extreme religious fundamentalism. The stigmatised Muslim—to borrow Goffman’s term—has become a narrative of today’s world, in particular, the social media where the public is frequently exposed to such (negative) debates about Muslims and on being Muslims. As the editors rightly point out, “[a]cross Western Europe, public discourse has been suffused by claims about Muslims and Islam. These claims are negative” (p. 1). Comprising eleven chapters, this book is a result of thorough research on how Muslims and non-Muslims in the European states embrace their daily lives in various institutions including schools, courts, hospitals, the military, electoral politics, and the labour market. Through a blend of practical schemas of others, the narrative unfolds stories of diverse people in their chosen realms. Readers are also exposed to comparative views of civic education courses in France and Germany. Multiculturalism in Europe and elsewhere is indeed challenging. The book content speaks volumes. The (in)tolerance of religious beliefs and practices might escalate into endless debates which either favour the state or the believers; for instance, in the case of wearing headscarves among female Muslims. The editors acknowledge this in the very first line of the preface that the book “...responds to the often loud debates about the place of Muslims in Western Europe” (p. i), and in the second paragraph on the 2004 ban wearing the veil in public schools in France. In so doing, the chapters skillfully embrace the discourse of practical schemas of those who are labelled as Muslims in a fast-changing Europe. The four book editors come from diverse backgrounds; for sure, two of the editors specialise in Islam and have done rather extensive research on Muslims. Bowen is Dunbar-Van Cleve Professor in Arts and Sciences at Washington University in St. Louis where he studies Islam and society in Indonesia and Europe. Bertossi is director of the Centre for Migration and Citizenship at the French Institute for International Relations in Paris. Of the other two editors, Duyvendak focuses on urban sociology and nativism, whilst Krook is Associate Professor of Political Science. She studies electoral gender quotas in cross-national perspective. Through their collaborative effort,and insights based on fieldwork and policy analysis, the discourse on perceptions and boundaries by the actors, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, are unfolded. The book is divided into two parts, with the first part exposing readers to the practical schemas in everyday institutional life. The second part discusses institutions and national political ideologies. In the first part, contributors presents practical schemas of people in various institutions including hospitals in France and Germany, as sites of cultural confrontation and integration that is illustrated in Chapter Two. The following chapter discusses how schools in France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany fared and blended in with the Muslims, and poses the readers with a challenging question, “how the school should reflect society” (p. 59). Meanwhile, the Military in France is explored in Chapter Four; the title is rather throught-provoking given that it is framed as a question: French “Muslim” Soldiers? The military, being the military as argued by the contributor (Bertossi himself), “de-emphasizes any ethno-cultural, racial, or religious identities of civilians” when they become soldiers (p. 73). French schools, hospitals, and the relevant practical schemas are revisited in Chapter Five. In the second part, the courtroom scenario leads us to the juridical framings of Muslims and Islam in France and Germany (Chapter 6). Embedded elements include how judges enact their daily roles in decision making through the acts of marriage and adaptation to religious freedom. Chapter Seven exposes readers to the comparative analysis of the civic education course content in France and Germany whilst Chapter Eight examines minorities in electoral politics in Sweden, France and Britain. Chapter Nine deals with the Scandinavian headscarf debates in public and private institutions in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The exclusion of Muslims in the Netherlands is explored in Chapter Ten. It is interesting to observe how the contributors guide us to the discourse of “neoculturalism”, which they argue, is “to identify a form of cultural protectionism, representing the world as divided into different, inimical cultures, and to distinguish this way of thinking from forms of cultural relativism” (p. 235). Here, we are exposed to the complicated scenario of “multiculturalism” in the country as I posited earlier. The binary perspective adopted by the Netherlands, between the “Dutch values” and the “Islamic values”, can escalate the tension caused by multiculturalism. One might have to further fine-tune the meaning of such a word in the current world where social media can help to propagate both good and bad intentions. I find this book an eye-opener to the discourse on perceptions and boundaries where Muslims in particular are involved, which are delicate and complicated to understand for any person who is not exposed to, or experience racism, and Islamophobia. Such acts of racism and Islamophobia are embedded in institutions as existing contexts of enactments and national ideologies as claimed by the editors in Chapter One and later reinforced in Chapter Five. They posit that in such non-homogeneous institutions, “actors develop practical schemas about Muslims and Islam”. The practical schemas, in turn, are constantly being reshaped and re-weighted by the events. In this sense, how we should embrace diversity in the name of multiculturalism, voiced often by many countries, for example, Malaysia, Singapore, and Britain; in particular, the United States, need further deliberation. It seems to me that in the deliberation, both parties, the authority and the people affected (Muslims), must partake in easing the tension and constraints. As the editors clearly articulate in the concluding chapter, institutions differ by token, by functions and by the contexts they are in. Obviously, there is no easy answer to comprehend the complex situations faced by the countries cited in the book; this is clearly made known by Bowen and associates. They have argued that “it is through the public institutions that citizens experience the state” (p. 266). Sensitivities weave in among the people (citizens) they spoke with, between duties to the states and to religion. This, in turn, brings us to the question of nation-building which seems to be an endless debate. In this regard, Mustafa Ishak’s book entitled, The Politics of Bangsa Malaysia: Nation-Building in a Multiethnic Society (2014) is worth reading for those who want to know more about Malaysian politics given the multicultural setting and Islam as the official religion. How do we tolerate diversity in the name of multiculturalism with people confessing different religious beliefs and ways of practising such beliefs while at the same time conform to the national ideologies and idea of being complete citizens? I find that in this context, the editors have managed to highlight the so-called tensions or tug-of-war between such competing needs. Arguably, it is fairly evident in the title with the use of “European States” and the possessive pronoun “their Muslim Citizens”, as it also suggests a sense of belonging for both sides though the book title is a bit wordy. The book contributors are rather courageous to discuss the issues given the depth of understanding and sensitivity required of the subject matter. Perhaps, more is needed in deliberating the idea which calls for a concerted effort from all parties involved. To be sure, those discussing the Muslims must have sufficient knowledge about Islam and its practices.

The twentieth was, from one perspective, the democratic century — a span of one hundred years which began with no fully functioning democracies in existence anywhere on the planet (if one defines democracy as a political system in which there is both universal suffrage and competitive elections), and ended with 120 countries out of 192 classified by the Freedom House think tank as ‘democratic’. There are of course still many societies where democracy is denied or effectively neutered — the remaining outposts of state socialism, such as China, Cuba, and North Korea; most if not all of the Islamic countries; exceptional states such as Singapore, unapologetically capitalist in its economic system but resolutely authoritarian in its political culture. Many self-proclaimed democracies, including those of the UK, Australia and the US, are procedurally or conceptually flawed. Countries emerging out of authoritarian systems and now in a state of democratic transition, such as Russia and the former Soviet republics, are immersed in constant, sometimes violent struggle between reformers and reactionaries. Russia’s recent parliamentary elections were accompanied by the intimidation of parties and politicians who opposed Vladimir Putin’s increasingly populist and authoritarian approach to leadership. The same Freedom House report which describes the rise of democracy in the twentieth century acknowledges that many self-styled democracies are, at best, only ‘partly free’ in their political cultures (for detailed figures on the rise of global democracy, see the Freedom House website Democracy’s Century). Let’s not for a moment downplay these important qualifications to what can nonetheless be fairly characterised as a century-long expansion and globalisation of democracy, and the acceptance of popular sovereignty, expressed through voting for the party or candidate of one’s choice, as a universally recognised human right. That such a process has occurred, and continues in these early years of the twenty-first century, is irrefutable. In the Gaza strip, Hamas appeals to the legitimacy of a democratic election victory in its campaign to be recognised as the voice of the Palestinian people. However one judges the messianic tendencies and Islamist ideology of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it must be acknowledged that the Iranian people elected him, and that they have the power to throw him out of government next time they vote. That was never true of the Shah. The democratic resurgence in Latin America, taking in Venezuela, Peru and Bolivia among others has been a much-noted feature of international politics in recent times (Alves), presenting a welcome contrast to the dictatorships and death squads of the 1980s, even as it creates some uncomfortable dilemmas for the Bush administration (which must champion democratic government at the same time as it resents some of the choices people may make when they have the opportunity to vote). Since 9/11 a kind of democracy has expanded even to Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit at the point of a gun, and with no guarantees of survival beyond the end of military occupation by the US and its coalition allies. As this essay was being written, Pakistan’s state of emergency was ending and democratic elections scheduled, albeit in the shadow cast by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Democracy, then — imperfect and limited as it can be; grudgingly delivered though it is by political elites in many countries, and subject to attack and roll back at any time — has become a global universal to which all claim allegiance, or at least pay lip service. The scale of this transformation, which has occurred in little more than one quarter of the time elapsed since the Putney debates of 1647 and the English revolution first established the principle of the sovereignty of parliament, is truly remarkable. (Tristram Hunt quotes lawyer Geoffrey Robertson in the Guardian to the effect that the Putney debates, staged in St Mary’s church in south-west London towards the end of the English civil war, launched “the idea that government requires the consent of freely and fairly elected representatives of all adult citizens irrespective of class or caste or status or wealth” – “A Jewel of Democracy”, Guardian, 26 Oct. 2007) Can it be true that less than one hundred years ago, in even the most advanced capitalist societies, 50 per cent of the people — women — did not have the right to vote? Or that black populations, indigenous or migrant, in countries such as the United States and Australia were deprived of basic citizenship rights until the 1960s and even later? Will future generations wonder how on earth it could have been that the vast majority of the people of South Africa were unable to vote until 1994, and that they were routinely imprisoned, tortured and killed when they demanded basic democratic rights? Or will they shrug and take it for granted, as so many of us who live in settled democracies already do? (In so far as ‘we’ includes the community of media and cultural studies scholars, I would argue that where there is reluctance to concede the scale and significance of democratic change, this arises out of continuing ambivalence about what ‘democracy’ means, a continuing suspicion of globalisation (in particular the globalisation of democratic political culture, still associated in some quarters with ‘the west’), and of the notion of ‘progress’ with which democracy is routinely associated. The intellectual roots of that ambivalence were various. Marxist-leninist inspired authoritarianism gripped much of the world until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war. Until that moment, it was still possible for many marxians in the scholarly community to view the idea of democracy with disdain — if not quite a dirty word, then a deeply flawed, highly loaded concept which masked and preserved underlying social inequalities more than it helped resolve them. Until 1989 or thereabouts, it was possible for ‘bourgeois democracy’ to be regarded as just one kind of democratic polity by the liberal and anti-capitalist left, which often regarded the ‘proletarian’ or ‘people’s’ democracy prevailing in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba or Vietnam as legitimate alternatives to the emerging capitalist norm of one person, one vote, for constituent assemblies which had real power and accountability. In terms not very different from those used by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, belief in the value of democracy was conceived by this materialist school as a kind of false consciousness. It still is, by Noam Chomsky and others who continue to view democracy as a ‘necessary illusion’ (1989) without which capitalism could not be reproduced. From these perspectives voting gave, and gives us merely the illusion of agency and power in societies where capital rules as it always did. For democracy read ‘the manufacture of consent’; its expansion read not as progressive social evolution, but the universalisation of the myth of popular sovereignty, mobilised and utilised by the media-industrial-military complex to maintain its grip.) There are those who dispute this reading of events. In the 1960s, Habermas’s hugely influential Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere critiqued the manner in which democracy, and the public sphere underpinning it, had been degraded by public relations, advertising, and the power of private interests. In the period since, critical scholarly research and writing on political culture has been dominated by the Habermasian discourse of democratic decline, and the pervasive pessimism of those who see democracy, and the media culture which supports it, as fatally flawed, corrupted by commercialisation and under constant threat. Those, myself included, who challenged that view with a more positive reading of the trends (McNair, Journalism and Democracy; Cultural Chaos) have been denounced as naïve optimists, panglossian, utopian and even, in my own case, a ‘neo-liberal apologist’. (See an unpublished paper by David Miller, “System Failure: It’s Not Just the Media, It’s the Whole Bloody System”, delivered at Goldsmith’s College in 2003.) Engaging as they have been, I venture to suggest that these are the discourses and debates of an era now passing into history. Not only is it increasingly obvious that democracy is expanding globally into places where it never previously reached; it is also extending inwards, within nation states, driven by demands for greater local autonomy. In the United Kingdom, for example, the citizen is now able to vote not just in Westminster parliamentary elections (which determine the political direction of the UK government), but for European elections, local elections, and elections for devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The people of London can vote for their mayor. There would by now have been devolved assemblies in the regions of England, too, had the people of the North East not voted against it in a November 2004 referendum. Notwithstanding that result, which surprised many in the New Labour government who held it as axiomatic that the more democracy there was, the better for all of us, the importance of enhancing and expanding democratic institutions, of allowing people to vote more often (and also in more efficient ways — many of these expansions of democracy have been tied to the introduction of systems of proportional representation) has become consensual, from the Mid West of America to the Middle East. The Democratic Paradox And yet, as the wave of democratic transformation has rolled on through the late twentieth and into the early twenty first century it is notable that, in many of the oldest liberal democracies at least, fewer people have been voting. In the UK, for example, in the period between 1945 and 2001, turnout at general elections never fell below 70 per cent. In 1992, the last general election won by the Conservatives before the rise of Tony Blair and New Labour, turnout was 78 per cent, roughly where it had been in the 1950s. In 2001, however, as Blair’s government sought re-election, turnout fell to an historic low for the UK of 59.4 per cent, and rose only marginally to 61.4 per cent in the most recent general election of 2005. In the US presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 turnouts were at historic lows of 47.2 and 49.3 per cent respectively, rising just above 50 per cent again in 2004 (figures by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). At local level things are even worse. In only the second election for a devolved parliament in Scotland (2003) turnout was a mere 48.5 per cent, rising to 50.5 in 2007. These trends are not universal. In countries with compulsory voting, they mean very little — in Australia, where voting in parliamentary elections is compulsory, turnout averages in the 90s per cent. In France, while turnouts for parliamentary elections show a similar downward trend to the UK and the UK, presidential contests achieve turnouts of 80-plus per cent. In the UK and US, as noted, the most recent elections show modest growth in turnout from those historic lows of the late 1990s and early Noughties. There has grown, nonetheless, the perception, commonplace amongst academic commentators as well as journalists and politicians themselves, that we are living through a ‘crisis’ of democratic participation, a dangerous decline in the tendency to vote in elections which undermines the legitimacy of democracy itself. In communication scholarship a significant body of research and publication has developed around this theme, from Blumler and Gurevitch’s Crisis of Public Communication (1996), through Barnett and Gaber’s Westminster Tales (2000), to more recent studies such as Lewis et al.’s Citizens or Consumers (2005). All presume a problem of some kind with the practice of democracy and the “old fashioned ritual” of voting, as Lewis et al. describe it (2). Most link alleged inadequacies in the performance of the political media to what is interpreted as popular apathy (or antipathy) towards democracy. The media are blamed for the lack of public engagement with democratic politics which declining turnouts are argued to signal. Political journalists are said to be too aggressive and hyper-adversarial (Lloyd), behaving like the “feral beast” spoken of by Tony Blair in his 2007 farewell speech to the British people as prime minister. They are corrosively cynical and a “disaster for democracy”, as Steven Barnett and others argued in the first years of the twenty first century. They are not aggressive or adversarial enough, as the propaganda modellists allege, citing what they interpret as supine media coverage of Coalition policy in Iraq. The media put people off, rather than turn them on to democracy by being, variously, too nice or too nasty to politicians. What then, is the solution to the apparent paradox represented by the fact that there is more democracy, but less voting in elections than ever before; and that after centuries of popular struggle democratic assemblies proliferate, but in some countries barely half of the eligible voters can be bothered to participate? And what role have the media played in this unexpected phenomenon? If the scholarly community has been largely critical on this question, and pessimistic in its analyses of the role of the media, it has become increasingly clear that the one arena where people do vote more than ever before is that presented by the media, and entertainment media in particular. There has been, since the appearance of Big Brother and the subsequent explosion of competitive reality TV formats across the world, evidence of a huge popular appetite for voting on such matters as which amateur contestant on Pop Idol, or X Factor, or Fame Academy, or Operatunity goes on to have a chance of a professional career, a shot at the big time. Millions of viewers of the most popular reality TV strands queue up to register their votes on premium phone lines, the revenue from which makes up a substantial and growing proportion of the income of commercial TV companies. This explosion of voting behaviour has been made possible by the technology-driven emergence of new forms of participatory, interactive, digitised media channels which allow millions to believe that they can have an impact on the outcome of what are, at essence, game and talent shows. At the height of anxiety around the ‘crisis of democratic participation’ in the UK, observers noted that nearly 6.5 million people had voted in the Big Brother UK final in 2004. More than eight million voted during the 2004 run of the BBC’s Fame Academy series. While these numbers do not, contrary to popular belief, exceed the numbers of British citizens who vote in a general election (27.2 million in 2005), they do indicate an enthusiasm for voting which seems to contradict declining rates of democratic participation. People who will never get out and vote for their local councillor often appear more than willing to pick up the telephone or the laptop and cast a vote for their favoured reality TV contestant, even if it costs them money. It would be absurd to suggest that voting for a contestant on Big Brother is directly comparable to the act of choosing a government or a president. The latter is recognised as an expression of citizenship, with potentially significant consequences for the lives of individuals within their society. Voting on Big Brother, on the other hand, is unmistakeably entertainment, game-playing, a relatively risk-free exercise of choice — a bit of harmless fun, fuelled by office chat and relentless tabloid coverage of the contestants’ strengths and weaknesses. There is no evidence that readiness to participate in a telephone or online vote for entertainment TV translates into active citizenship, where ‘active’ means casting a vote in an election. The lesson delivered by the success of participatory media in recent years, however — first reality TV, and latterly a proliferation of online formats which encourage user participation and voting for one thing or another — is that people will vote, when they are able and motivated to do so. Voting is popular, in short, and never more so, irrespective of the level of popular participation recorded in recent elections. And if they will vote in their millions for a contestant on X Factor, or participate in competitions to determine the best movies or books on Facebook, they can presumably be persuaded to do so when an election for parliament comes around. This fact has been recognised by both media producers and politicians, and reflected in attempts to adapt the evermore sophisticated and efficient tools of participatory media to the democratic process, to engage media audiences as citizens by offering the kinds of voting opportunities in political debates, including election processes, which entertainment media have now made routinely available. ITV’s Vote for Me strand, broadcast in the run-up to the UK general election of 2005, used reality TV techniques to select a candidate who would actually take part in the forthcoming poll. The programme was broadcast in a late night, low audience slot, and failed to generate much interest, but it signalled a desire by media producers to harness the appeal of participatory media in a way which could directly impact on levels of democratic engagement. The honourable failure of Vote for Me (produced by the same team which made the much more successful live debate shows featuring prime minister Tony Blair — Ask Tony Blair, Ask the Prime Minister) might be viewed as evidence that readiness to vote in the context of a TV game show does not translate directly into voting for parties and politicians, and that the problem in this respect — the crisis of democratic participation, such that it exists — is located elsewhere. People can vote in democratic elections, but choose not to, perhaps because they feel that the act is meaningless (because parties are ideologically too similar), or ineffectual (because they see no impact of voting in their daily lives or in the state of the country), or irrelevant to their personal priorities and life styles. Voting rates have increased in the US and the UK since September 11 2001, suggesting perhaps that when the political stakes are raised, and the question of who is in government seems to matter more than it did, people act accordingly. Meantime, media producers continue to make money by developing formats and channels on the assumption that audiences wish to participate, to interact, and to vote. Whether this form of participatory media consumption for the purposes of play can be translated into enhanced levels of active citizenship, and whether the media can play a significant contributory role in that process, remains to be seen. References Alves, R.C. “From Lapdog to Watchdog: The Role of the Press in Latin America’s Democratisation.” In H. de Burgh, ed., Making Journalists. London: Routledge, 2005. 181-202. Anderson, P.J., and G. Ward (eds.). The Future of Journalism in the Advanced Democracies. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007. Barnett, S. “The Age of Contempt.” Guardian 28 October 2002. < http://politics.guardian.co.uk/media/comment/0,12123,820577,00.html >. Barnett, S., and I. Gaber. Westminster Tales. London: Continuum, 2001. Blumler, J., and M. Gurevitch. The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, 1996. Habermas, J. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. Lewis, J., S. Inthorn, and K. Wahl-Jorgensen. Citizens or Consumers? What the Media Tell Us about Political Participation. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 2005. Lloyd, John. What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics. London: Constable, 2004. McNair, B. Journalism and Democracy: A Qualitative Evaluation of the Political Public Sphere. London: Routledge, 2000. ———. Cultural Chaos: News, Journalism and Power in a Globalised World. London: Routledge, 2006.

The twentieth was, from one perspective, the democratic century — a span of one hundred years which began with no fully functioning democracies in existence anywhere on the planet (if one defines democracy as a political system in which there is both universal suffrage and competitive elections), and ended with 120 countries out of 192 classified by the Freedom House think tank as ‘democratic’. There are of course still many societies where democracy is denied or effectively neutered — the remaining outposts of state socialism, such as China, Cuba, and North Korea; most if not all of the Islamic countries; exceptional states such as Singapore, unapologetically capitalist in its economic system but resolutely authoritarian in its political culture. Many self-proclaimed democracies, including those of the UK, Australia and the US, are procedurally or conceptually flawed. Countries emerging out of authoritarian systems and now in a state of democratic transition, such as Russia and the former Soviet republics, are immersed in constant, sometimes violent struggle between reformers and reactionaries. Russia’s recent parliamentary elections were accompanied by the intimidation of parties and politicians who opposed Vladimir Putin’s increasingly populist and authoritarian approach to leadership. The same Freedom House report which describes the rise of democracy in the twentieth century acknowledges that many self-styled democracies are, at best, only ‘partly free’ in their political cultures (for detailed figures on the rise of global democracy, see the Freedom House website Democracy’s Century). Let’s not for a moment downplay these important qualifications to what can nonetheless be fairly characterised as a century-long expansion and globalisation of democracy, and the acceptance of popular sovereignty, expressed through voting for the party or candidate of one’s choice, as a universally recognised human right. That such a process has occurred, and continues in these early years of the twenty-first century, is irrefutable. In the Gaza strip, Hamas appeals to the legitimacy of a democratic election victory in its campaign to be recognised as the voice of the Palestinian people. However one judges the messianic tendencies and Islamist ideology of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it must be acknowledged that the Iranian people elected him, and that they have the power to throw him out of government next time they vote. That was never true of the Shah. The democratic resurgence in Latin America, taking in Venezuela, Peru and Bolivia among others has been a much-noted feature of international politics in recent times (Alves), presenting a welcome contrast to the dictatorships and death squads of the 1980s, even as it creates some uncomfortable dilemmas for the Bush administration (which must champion democratic government at the same time as it resents some of the choices people may make when they have the opportunity to vote). Since 9/11 a kind of democracy has expanded even to Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit at the point of a gun, and with no guarantees of survival beyond the end of military occupation by the US and its coalition allies. As this essay was being written, Pakistan’s state of emergency was ending and democratic elections scheduled, albeit in the shadow cast by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. Democracy, then — imperfect and limited as it can be; grudgingly delivered though it is by political elites in many countries, and subject to attack and roll back at any time — has become a global universal to which all claim allegiance, or at least pay lip service. The scale of this transformation, which has occurred in little more than one quarter of the time elapsed since the Putney debates of 1647 and the English revolution first established the principle of the sovereignty of parliament, is truly remarkable. (Tristram Hunt quotes lawyer Geoffrey Robertson in the Guardian to the effect that the Putney debates, staged in St Mary’s church in south-west London towards the end of the English civil war, launched “the idea that government requires the consent of freely and fairly elected representatives of all adult citizens irrespective of class or caste or status or wealth” – “A Jewel of Democracy”, Guardian, 26 Oct. 2007) Can it be true that less than one hundred years ago, in even the most advanced capitalist societies, 50 per cent of the people — women — did not have the right to vote? Or that black populations, indigenous or migrant, in countries such as the United States and Australia were deprived of basic citizenship rights until the 1960s and even later? Will future generations wonder how on earth it could have been that the vast majority of the people of South Africa were unable to vote until 1994, and that they were routinely imprisoned, tortured and killed when they demanded basic democratic rights? Or will they shrug and take it for granted, as so many of us who live in settled democracies already do? (In so far as ‘we’ includes the community of media and cultural studies scholars, I would argue that where there is reluctance to concede the scale and significance of democratic change, this arises out of continuing ambivalence about what ‘democracy’ means, a continuing suspicion of globalisation (in particular the globalisation of democratic political culture, still associated in some quarters with ‘the west’), and of the notion of ‘progress’ with which democracy is routinely associated. The intellectual roots of that ambivalence were various. Marxist-leninist inspired authoritarianism gripped much of the world until the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war. Until that moment, it was still possible for many marxians in the scholarly community to view the idea of democracy with disdain — if not quite a dirty word, then a deeply flawed, highly loaded concept which masked and preserved underlying social inequalities more than it helped resolve them. Until 1989 or thereabouts, it was possible for ‘bourgeois democracy’ to be regarded as just one kind of democratic polity by the liberal and anti-capitalist left, which often regarded the ‘proletarian’ or ‘people’s’ democracy prevailing in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba or Vietnam as legitimate alternatives to the emerging capitalist norm of one person, one vote, for constituent assemblies which had real power and accountability. In terms not very different from those used by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, belief in the value of democracy was conceived by this materialist school as a kind of false consciousness. It still is, by Noam Chomsky and others who continue to view democracy as a ‘necessary illusion’ (1989) without which capitalism could not be reproduced. From these perspectives voting gave, and gives us merely the illusion of agency and power in societies where capital rules as it always did. For democracy read ‘the manufacture of consent’; its expansion read not as progressive social evolution, but the universalisation of the myth of popular sovereignty, mobilised and utilised by the media-industrial-military complex to maintain its grip.) There are those who dispute this reading of events. In the 1960s, Habermas’s hugely influential Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere critiqued the manner in which democracy, and the public sphere underpinning it, had been degraded by public relations, advertising, and the power of private interests. In the period since, critical scholarly research and writing on political culture has been dominated by the Habermasian discourse of democratic decline, and the pervasive pessimism of those who see democracy, and the media culture which supports it, as fatally flawed, corrupted by commercialisation and under constant threat. Those, myself included, who challenged that view with a more positive reading of the trends (McNair, Journalism and Democracy; Cultural Chaos) have been denounced as naïve optimists, panglossian, utopian and even, in my own case, a ‘neo-liberal apologist’. (See an unpublished paper by David Miller, “System Failure: It’s Not Just the Media, It’s the Whole Bloody System”, delivered at Goldsmith’s College in 2003.) Engaging as they have been, I venture to suggest that these are the discourses and debates of an era now passing into history. Not only is it increasingly obvious that democracy is expanding globally into places where it never previously reached; it is also extending inwards, within nation states, driven by demands for greater local autonomy. In the United Kingdom, for example, the citizen is now able to vote not just in Westminster parliamentary elections (which determine the political direction of the UK government), but for European elections, local elections, and elections for devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The people of London can vote for their mayor. There would by now have been devolved assemblies in the regions of England, too, had the people of the North East not voted against it in a November 2004 referendum. Notwithstanding that result, which surprised many in the New Labour government who held it as axiomatic that the more democracy there was, the better for all of us, the importance of enhancing and expanding democratic institutions, of allowing people to vote more often (and also in more efficient ways — many of these expansions of democracy have been tied to the introduction of systems of proportional representation) has become consensual, from the Mid West of America to the Middle East. The Democratic Paradox And yet, as the wave of democratic transformation has rolled on through the late twentieth and into the early twenty first century it is notable that, in many of the oldest liberal democracies at least, fewer people have been voting. In the UK, for example, in the period between 1945 and 2001, turnout at general elections never fell below 70 per cent. In 1992, the last general election won by the Conservatives before the rise of Tony Blair and New Labour, turnout was 78 per cent, roughly where it had been in the 1950s. In 2001, however, as Blair’s government sought re-election, turnout fell to an historic low for the UK of 59.4 per cent, and rose only marginally to 61.4 per cent in the most recent general election of 2005. In the US presidential elections of 1996 and 2000 turnouts were at historic lows of 47.2 and 49.3 per cent respectively, rising just above 50 per cent again in 2004 (figures by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). At local level things are even worse. In only the second election for a devolved parliament in Scotland (2003) turnout was a mere 48.5 per cent, rising to 50.5 in 2007. These trends are not universal. In countries with compulsory voting, they mean very little — in Australia, where voting in parliamentary elections is compulsory, turnout averages in the 90s per cent. In France, while turnouts for parliamentary elections show a similar downward trend to the UK and the UK, presidential contests achieve turnouts of 80-plus per cent. In the UK and US, as noted, the most recent elections show modest growth in turnout from those historic lows of the late 1990s and early Noughties. There has grown, nonetheless, the perception, commonplace amongst academic commentators as well as journalists and politicians themselves, that we are living through a ‘crisis’ of democratic participation, a dangerous decline in the tendency to vote in elections which undermines the legitimacy of democracy itself. In communication scholarship a significant body of research and publication has developed around this theme, from Blumler and Gurevitch’s Crisis of Public Communication (1996), through Barnett and Gaber’s Westminster Tales (2000), to more recent studies such as Lewis et al.’s Citizens or Consumers (2005). All presume a problem of some kind with the practice of democracy and the “old fashioned ritual” of voting, as Lewis et al. describe it (2). Most link alleged inadequacies in the performance of the political media to what is interpreted as popular apathy (or antipathy) towards democracy. The media are blamed for the lack of public engagement with democratic politics which declining turnouts are argued to signal. Political journalists are said to be too aggressive and hyper-adversarial (Lloyd), behaving like the “feral beast” spoken of by Tony Blair in his 2007 farewell speech to the British people as prime minister. They are corrosively cynical and a “disaster for democracy”, as Steven Barnett and others argued in the first years of the twenty first century. They are not aggressive or adversarial enough, as the propaganda modellists allege, citing what they interpret as supine media coverage of Coalition policy in Iraq. The media put people off, rather than turn them on to democracy by being, variously, too nice or too nasty to politicians. What then, is the solution to the apparent paradox represented by the fact that there is more democracy, but less voting in elections than ever before; and that after centuries of popular struggle democratic assemblies proliferate, but in some countries barely half of the eligible voters can be bothered to participate? And what role have the media played in this unexpected phenomenon? If the scholarly community has been largely critical on this question, and pessimistic in its analyses of the role of the media, it has become increasingly clear that the one arena where people do vote more than ever before is that presented by the media, and entertainment media in particular. There has been, since the appearance of Big Brother and the subsequent explosion of competitive reality TV formats across the world, evidence of a huge popular appetite for voting on such matters as which amateur contestant on Pop Idol, or X Factor, or Fame Academy, or Operatunity goes on to have a chance of a professional career, a shot at the big time. Millions of viewers of the most popular reality TV strands queue up to register their votes on premium phone lines, the revenue from which makes up a substantial and growing proportion of the income of commercial TV companies. This explosion of voting behaviour has been made possible by the technology-driven emergence of new forms of participatory, interactive, digitised media channels which allow millions to believe that they can have an impact on the outcome of what are, at essence, game and talent shows. At the height of anxiety around the ‘crisis of democratic participation’ in the UK, observers noted that nearly 6.5 million people had voted in the Big Brother UK final in 2004. More than eight million voted during the 2004 run of the BBC’s Fame Academy series. While these numbers do not, contrary to popular belief, exceed the numbers of British citizens who vote in a general election (27.2 million in 2005), they do indicate an enthusiasm for voting which seems to contradict declining rates of democratic participation. People who will never get out and vote for their local councillor often appear more than willing to pick up the telephone or the laptop and cast a vote for their favoured reality TV contestant, even if it costs them money. It would be absurd to suggest that voting for a contestant on Big Brother is directly comparable to the act of choosing a government or a president. The latter is recognised as an expression of citizenship, with potentially significant consequences for the lives of individuals within their society. Voting on Big Brother, on the other hand, is unmistakeably entertainment, game-playing, a relatively risk-free exercise of choice — a bit of harmless fun, fuelled by office chat and relentless tabloid coverage of the contestants’ strengths and weaknesses. There is no evidence that readiness to participate in a telephone or online vote for entertainment TV translates into active citizenship, where ‘active’ means casting a vote in an election. The lesson delivered by the success of participatory media in recent years, however — first reality TV, and latterly a proliferation of online formats which encourage user participation and voting for one thing or another — is that people will vote, when they are able and motivated to do so. Voting is popular, in short, and never more so, irrespective of the level of popular participation recorded in recent elections. And if they will vote in their millions for a contestant on X Factor, or participate in competitions to determine the best movies or books on Facebook, they can presumably be persuaded to do so when an election for parliament comes around. This fact has been recognised by both media producers and politicians, and reflected in attempts to adapt the evermore sophisticated and efficient tools of participatory media to the democratic process, to engage media audiences as citizens by offering the kinds of voting opportunities in political debates, including election processes, which entertainment media have now made routinely available. ITV’s Vote for Me strand, broadcast in the run-up to the UK general election of 2005, used reality TV techniques to select a candidate who would actually take part in the forthcoming poll. The programme was broadcast in a late night, low audience slot, and failed to generate much interest, but it signalled a desire by media producers to harness the appeal of participatory media in a way which could directly impact on levels of democratic engagement. The honourable failure of Vote for Me (produced by the same team which made the much more successful live debate shows featuring prime minister Tony Blair — Ask Tony Blair, Ask the Prime Minister) might be viewed as evidence that readiness to vote in the context of a TV game show does not translate directly into voting for parties and politicians, and that the problem in this respect — the crisis of democratic participation, such that it exists — is located elsewhere. People can vote in democratic elections, but choose not to, perhaps because they feel that the act is meaningless (because parties are ideologically too similar), or ineffectual (because they see no impact of voting in their daily lives or in the state of the country), or irrelevant to their personal priorities and life styles. Voting rates have increased in the US and the UK since September 11 2001, suggesting perhaps that when the political stakes are raised, and the question of who is in government seems to matter more than it did, people act accordingly. Meantime, media producers continue to make money by developing formats and channels on the assumption that audiences wish to participate, to interact, and to vote. Whether this form of participatory media consumption for the purposes of play can be translated into enhanced levels of active citizenship, and whether the media can play a significant contributory role in that process, remains to be seen. References Alves, R.C. “From Lapdog to Watchdog: The Role of the Press in Latin America’s Democratisation.” In H. de Burgh, ed., Making Journalists. London: Routledge, 2005. 181-202. Anderson, P.J., and G. Ward (eds.). The Future of Journalism in the Advanced Democracies. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2007. Barnett, S. “The Age of Contempt.” Guardian 28 October 2002. http://politics.guardian.co.uk/media/comment/0,12123,820577,00.html>. Barnett, S., and I. Gaber. Westminster Tales. London: Continuum, 2001. Blumler, J., and M. Gurevitch. The Crisis of Public Communication. London: Routledge, 1996. Habermas, J. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. Lewis, J., S. Inthorn, and K. Wahl-Jorgensen. Citizens or Consumers? What the Media Tell Us about Political Participation. Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 2005. Lloyd, John. What the Media Are Doing to Our Politics. London: Constable, 2004. McNair, B. Journalism and Democracy: A Qualitative Evaluation of the Political Public Sphere. London: Routledge, 2000. ———. Cultural Chaos: News, Journalism and Power in a Globalised World. London: Routledge, 2006. Citation reference for this article MLA Style McNair, Brian. "Vote!." M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/01-mcnair.php>. APA Style McNair, B. (Apr. 2008) "Vote!," M/C Journal, 10(6)/11(1). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/01-mcnair.php>.