Academic literature on the topic 'Political posters, Russian'

The former Lenin State Library in Moscow, now the Russian State Library, holds extensive collections of graphic and photographic materials, Russian and foreign, dating from the 15th century to the present day. These include a collection of some 434,000 posters, of which film and political posters form the largest subsections; a smaller number of pre-Revolutionary posters is of special interest. The collection of engravings totals some 93,000 items, and includes both works of European masters and Russian popular prints. There are also collections of postcards, “albums”, and manuscripts.

Over the last two decades, Russian Internet accumulated a range of images originating from the Soviet epoch, including everything from official portraits of Soviet leaders to representations of Soviet greeting cards and postage stamps. While some of those digitised items remain intact, others become a part of different creative practices inherent to online environment, such as photo manipulating, remixing, recombining and merging with elements attributing to other historical or national contexts. The current article investigates one instance of creative re-appropriation of the Soviet visual legacy on the Internet: construction of digital memes from the former Soviet propaganda posters. Upon focusing on three iconic posters, namely Did you Volunteer? (1920), Do not Talk! (1941) and Motherland is Calling! (1941), this study examines how the propaganda images have been transformed by contemporary Russian users into ‘templates’ for meme-making. Furthermore, the article identifies two particular functions of memes based on the Soviet propaganda posters: first, as a form of a peculiar humour, known in Russian tradition as stiob and, second, as an instrument for voicing of public opinion, through which users comment on urgent political and social issues. The article concludes that the remakes of Soviet propaganda images do not fall within any hitherto discovered category of humorous, political or historical memes, and therefore, they should be considered as a separate case in contemporary production of memes.

Based on the methodology applied in the discipline of Theory and History of Architecture and Urbanism IV, based on part of its programmatic content that approached the organization of the built environment resulting from the Industrial Revolution until the First World War, a fanzine was developed as an evaluative exercise of the subject to expose the knowledge produced. Under the title "Architecture and Revolution", the fanzine depicts the relationship between historical moments and architecture, specifically on the French and Russian Revolutions and the Neoclassical and Constructivist architectural styles. The material produced seeks through its graphic and visual organization to reflect on the occurrences and social changes of each period and its reflection in the architectural environment, employing on its pages the contrast of the characteristics of each movement. As a reference for the development of the graphic content, political posters of the 20th century were used, which present an expressive and innovative visual language in relation to the materials from which they were produced up to that time, mainly the Russian posters, which used to be based on French pamphlets and have their own language, used as a means of political persuasion.

ARTISTIC VERSUS POLITICAL AVANT-GARDISM: THE VISUAL ARTS IN AND AROUND THE MAGAZINE ‘NIEUW RUSLAND’/‘CULTUUR DER U.D.S.S.R.’ (NEW RUSSIA/CULTURE OF THE USSR), 1928-1934 This article concentrates on the position of the visual arts in Russia as presented in Nieuw Rusland (New Russia), organ of the Netherlands – New Russia Society. This Society was initiated by VOKS, the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, established to coordinate international cultural contacts with artists and intellectuals in other countries in order to help lending the Soviet Union a positive and civilised image. The Netherlands – New Russia Society was suspected to be a communist umbrella organization, and indeed some of its members were moles. At the time, visual arts in Russia were in transition: the abstract avant-gardism of the first years after the Revolution was making way for moderately modern, figurative, and politically engaged painting. Easel painting in general had to yield to the graphic arts, photography and composite picture, especially as applied in posters, children’s books and magazines. Dutch editors of Nieuw Rusland had to communicate and explain or soften the often staunch political art theories of their Russian authors. From around 1932, Nieuw Rusland made a change of course from cultural information towards explicit political propaganda. In combination with a ban on membership of left-wing organizations for all public servants, this meant the end of the magazine.

On September 18, 2013, several Greenpeace activists, bearing ropes and posters, attempted to board a Gazprom oil platform, the Prirazlomnaya, in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Russian Federation. They did so in inflatable craft launched from a Greenpeace vessel, the Netherlands-flagged MV Arctic Sunrise. They were soon arrested by the Russian Coast Guard. The following day, armed agents of the Russian Federal Security Service boarded the Arctic Sunrise itself from a helicopter, arresting those on board. The Netherlands was apparently informed of Russia’s intention to board and arrest the vessel shortly after the original boarding of the platform. Over the next four days, the vessel was towed to Murmansk. Russian authorities charged the thirty detained persons (the so-called Arctic 30) with “piracy of an organized group.” Although President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that the protesters were “obviously... not pirates,” he also noted that “formally, they tried to seize our platform.” On October 4, the Netherlands announced that, under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it had commenced arbitration proceedings against Russia over the detention of the Arctic Sunrise and the legality of its seizure. On October 21, the Netherlands filed with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) a request for the prescription of provisional measures pending the constitution of the Annex VII arbitration tribunal.

The genre of animated posters emerged at the dawn of animation. In 1899, A. Cooper an English director created one of the first movie-posters in the history of world animation. The need for movie-posters with propaganda characteristics arose during the period of the WW1. During that time, the genre of the animated poster had been developed and had even become a stimulus to the development of the animation and film industry. It had achieved its greatest success in the UK due to the advanced level of printed graphics, as well as the fact that the British pioneered the development of systematic promotion approaches. German animators also worked in the genre of animated posters, but they filmed mostly instructional movies which presented technical or military information in a clear and simple form. By the end of the WW1 the structure of movie posters had evolved from transparent to narrative. During the war the genre of the animated poster was not developed in Russia. After the war, propaganda film-posters disappeared from the screens. Their place was taken by mostly political, educational and promotional posters. The time of experimentation with figurative language, technology, and structure of the animated poster was in 1920-1930s. Themes, targets and the form of presentation had changed, but the function remained the same - informational and visual propaganda. As the commercial poster had developed predominantly in European and American animation, the release of political posters initiated the development of Soviet animation. Sentiment changes in global politics and the situation in Europe during the late 1930s which evolved into the WW2, once again stimulated the entertainers interest for the genres of political-propaganda, patriotic, and instructive posters. During the war the production of animated posters formed a considerable portion of all the animation filmed in Soviet as well as American studios. With the cessation of hostilities films in the poster animation genre almost disappeared from the screens.

The formation of the Soviet image of the past in the context of the doctrine of «our great ancestors» was extended not only to historiography, fiction and journalism. A special place was occupied by cinema. The Bolsheviks were very early realized the tremendous role of cinema as a means of influencing mass culture. With the help of cinema, the party leadership sought to form a «true» view of reality, thereby educating people in the spirit of «communism and internationalism». Founded in the early 30’s oftheXX century. the genre of historical cinema, became the basis of all Soviet cinema. Rejecting the leading role of the «masses» in the tapes, bolsheviks turn to the biography of outstanding and «progressive» historical personalities, first of all, rulers and generals. Throughout the period of existence of Soviet cinema, the historical biographies of Alexander Nevsky, Ivan the Terrible, Peter I, Michael Kutuzov, Alexander Suvorov and others were filmed. The most important document of the memory of Danylo Romanovich in the era of Soviet patriotism was the film of Ukrainian director Yaroslav Lupiya – «Danylo – Prince Galician». The Film was created in 1987 at the Odessa Film Studio named after O. Dovzhenko. Before us is a work that was supposed to create a stable image of Prince Danylo Halytsky in the consciousness of Ukrainian society. The image is dictated «from above». The ecranisation of Danylo Romanovych requires a detailed study of not only the history of the film, but also the reception of the ruler in the Soviet image. This will allow us to trace and analyze the struggle for the appropriation and stylization of the image in detail, as well as contradictory directions in forming the concept of the «Soviet patriot» of Danylo Halytsky.
 The figure of King Danylo as well as the political history of the Galician-Volyn was state remained unknown to a wide cinema. In the official historical discourse of the USSR, the image of Danylo Romanovych was used very carefully and only where «party» leadership needed it. Despite the growing interest in the history of Kievan Rus in the cinema, Danylo’s film adaptation resembled his «popularity» in the scientific literature of that time. Certain changes occurred only during the Perestroika period. The directorate of the Odessa film studio named after O.Dovzhenko was interested in the history of the medieval past of Ukraine. Here the Ukrainian director Yaroslav Lupi created his picture «Danylo – Prince Galitsky».
 The film is considered to be the banner of publicity. The tape appeals to the heroic Ukrainian past of the times of Kyivan Rus and Galicia-Volyn state, which became the shield of Europe against the Mongol-Tatar invasion. On the posters devoted to the premiere of the film, it was indicated that the tape glorifi the famous Ukrainian prince Danylo Halytsky. However, we have doubts about the screen image of the key hero of the Western Ukrainian myth. What was the real stylization of the image of the Old Russian ruler in the eponymous painting that had so long been in the «shadow» of the Soviet historical culture?
 Keywords: thesoviet image, soviet historical culture, wide cinema, ecranisation of King Danylo Romanovych, historical discourse

istorical experience creates a particular system of codes and meanings in the culture of nations and societies. The memory of the past, with triumphs and defeats intertwined, is the basis of any form of collective identity. In some cases, the present and the past share a common historical guilt, in others, a great victory. It becomes a foundation for new moral imperatives, patriotic symbols, images of victims and heroes. For seventy years, the national historiography has been dominated by an apologetic concept of the Great October Revolution that had laid the foundation for the Soviet national identity. The historiographic canon, created in the thirties, underwent virtually no change. The gigantic historiography of the Great October has been developing within the traditional framework of the CPSU history espoused by several generations of historians. The unsuccessful February Revolution served as a simple background for the victorious October that brought down the tsarist regime and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. In the era of glasnost and archive revolution, there began a heated revision of the Soviet concept where emotions often won over scientific analysis. The changes of the last two decades made it possible to interpret the Revolution of 1917 as a multidimensional process of a drastic transformation of the entire Russian system, which, in its turn, changed the world order. Over the past few years, there has been a steep increase in the number of nonfictional historical publications containing archival materials, memoirs, and visual sources (posters, caricatures, etc.). The buildup of narrative material is so fastpaced that historians lag behind in interpreting and summarizing it. Factbased, fragmentary descriptions significantly prevail over the attempts to give it a conceptual interpretation, even though recent studies actively explore the mechanisms that trigger revolution, the nature of social protest and violence, the forms of legitimation of the new power, the cultural references of political radicalism, A particular attention is paid to the ethnocultural discourse of the revolutionary process. Despite a certain fragmentation of topics, The stages of political struggle gave way to one another as different forces attained power but found themselves unable to hold together this gigantic country that was falling apart. In this aspect, the dynamics of the revolutionary crisis in Russia was similar to the one of the French Revolution. It should be noted that the overall narrative of the revolutionary process and the vision of its development stages are defined not only by the center, but also by regions. The revolutionrelated research carried out by local historians is particularly impressive. Regional archives allow a recreation of a colorful, dramatic history of takeover/ interception/ transfer of power at the local level, full of clashes and conflicts. It is obvious though that the regional research requires further development and classification. At the same time, the level of scientific research does not allow to address the issue of the way in and out of the revolution. Many questions still remain unanswered after numerous conferences and publications in 2017. Which criteria are necessary to date the beginning and the end of the revolutionary process in Russia Can civil war be included in the overall revolutionary context, similar to the French Revolution The anatomy of any grandscale protest comprises of a sum of internal radical projects and strategies of external players with their own geopolitical interests. The Interests and Identities of all people, social and political groups, national and international elite that got involved in the process, voluntarily or involuntary, manifest themselves best of all in the cauldron of revolutionary ebullition. And for a researcher, the key motivation consists in distinguishing visible and seemingly invisible interactions of all these entities, comparing the external, eventrelated processes with the internal dynamics of power struggles. The topic of power and society analyzed against the background of the Revolution of 1917 includes the issues essential for understanding the quality of development of the Russian Empire in the early XXth century. In the papers by B. Mironov, V. Nikonov, N. Smirnov, the genesis of revolution is seen as a conflict of tradition and modernity. In 1905, Russia began its slow and painful progress from tsarist autocracy to parliamentary monarchy. this connection, modern historiography puts a particular emphasis on the analysis of civic engagement and the forms of selforganization of society. The Soviet vision of the tsarist regime as a suppressor of civil liberties, so actively used in modern Western papers, was revised. The Russian historiography is currently undergoing intense debates and methodological realignment, searching for new paradigms in the analysis of the revolutionary process. But most importantly, the historical continuity between the imperial, Soviet and postSoviet eras is being gradually restored in the papers covering the Revolution of 1917, and the idea of existence of a single revolutionary process from February to October 1917 is slowly taking shapeисторический опыт создает особую систему кодов и смыслов в культуре народов и обществ. Память о прошлом, где переплетаются триумфы и поражения, является основой любой формы коллективной идентичности. В одних случаях настоящее и прошлое объединяет общая историческая вина, в другихВеликая Победа. Она становится основой для новых нравственных императивов, патриотических символов, образов жертв и героев. На протяжении семидесяти лет в отечественной историографии доминировала апологетическая концепция Великой Октябрьской революции, заложившая основы советской национальной идентичности. Историографический канон, созданный в тридцатые годы, практически не претерпел изменений. Гигантская историография Великого Октября развивалась в традиционных рамках истории КПСС, поддерживаемой несколькими поколениями историков. Неудачная Февральская революция послужила простым фоном для победоносного октября, обрушившего царский режим и диктатуру буржуазии. В эпоху гласности и архивной революции начался бурный пересмотр советской концепции, где эмоции часто одерживали верх над научным анализом. Изменения последних двух десятилетий позволили интерпретировать революцию 1917 года как многомерный процесс кардинальной трансформации всей российской системы, которая, в свою очередь, изменила мировой порядок. За последние несколько лет резко возросло количество нехудожественных исторических изданий, содержащих архивные материалы, мемуары, визуальные источники (плакаты, карикатуры и др.). Накопление повествовательного материала происходит настолько быстро, что историки отстают в его интерпретации и обобщении. Фактологические, фрагментарные описания значительно превалируют над попытками дать ему концептуальную трактовку, хотя в последних исследованиях активно исследуются механизмы, запускающие революцию, характер социального протеста и насилия, формы легитимации новой власти, культурные отсылки политического радикализма, идеологические и социальные проблемы.В. Symbolic символическое перекодирование публичного пространства. Особое внимание уделено этнокультурному дискурсу революционного процесса. Несмотря на определенную фрагментарность тематики, российские историки разделяют идею непрерывности революционного процесса с февраля по октябрь 1917 года. Этапы политической борьбы сменялись друг другом по мере того, как различные силы приходили к власти, но оказывались неспособными удержать вместе эту гигантскую страну, которая разваливалась на части. В этом аспекте динамика революционного кризиса в России была схожа с динамикой Французской революции. Следует отметить, что общая нарративность революционного процесса и видение этапов его развития определяются не только центром, но и регионами. Особенно впечатляют исследования, связанные с революцией, проведенные местными историками. Региональные архивы позволяют воссоздать красочную, драматичную историю захвата / перехвата / передачи власти на местном уровне, полную столкновений и конфликтов. Однако очевидно, что региональные исследования требуют дальнейшего развития и классификации. В то же время уровень научных исследований не позволяет решить вопрос о входе и выходе революции. Многие вопросы до сих пор остаются без ответа после многочисленных конференций и публикаций в 2017 году. По каким критериям необходимо датировать начало и конец революционного процесса в России Может ли гражданская война быть включена в общий революционный контекст, подобный Французской революции Анатомия любого масштабного протеста складывается из суммы внутренних радикальных проектов и стратегий внешних игроков со своими геополитическими интересами. Интересы и идентичности всех людей, социальных и политических групп, национальной и международной элиты, которые вольно или невольно оказались вовлеченными в этот процесс, лучше всего проявляются в котле революционного кипения. А для исследователя ключевая мотивация состоит в различении видимых и, казалось бы, невидимых взаимодействий всех этих сущностей, сопоставлении внешних, событийных процессов с внутренней динамикой борьбы за власть. Тема власти и общества, анализируемая на фоне революции 1917 года, включает в себя вопросы, существенные для понимания качества развития Российской империи в начале ХХ века. В работах Б. Миронова, В. Никонова, Н.Смирнова Генезис революции рассматривается как конфликт традиции и современности. В 1905 году Россия начала свой медленный и болезненный путь от царского самодержавия к парламентской монархии. в этой связи современная историография уделяет особое внимание анализу гражданской активности и форм самоорганизации общества. Советское видение царского режима как подавителя гражданских свобод, столь активно используемое в современных западных газетах, было пересмотрено. Российская историография в настоящее время переживает интенсивные дискуссии и методологическую перестройку, поиск новых парадигм в анализе революционного процесса. Но самое главное, что историческая преемственность между имперской, советской и постсоветской эпохами постепенно восстанавливается в работах, освещающих революцию 1917 года, и постепенно оформляется идея существования единого революционного процесса с февраля по октябрь 1917 года

Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, 2016.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 317-351).<br>This dissertation proposes and evaluates the performance of three theories that aim to explain Russia's nuclear force posture choices since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two are rooted in concepts of inter-state competition. Of these, one begins with a central hypothesis that nuclear weapons, being more destructive than other weapons, are sufficient to deter a broad range of threats and will be preferred for doing so. The second argues that nuclear weapons contribute to a state's overall power and prestige, but are not sufficient to define it. They are preferred to deter nuclear, but not conventional, threats. The third theory postulates that strategic culture shapes which government actors will be most successful at garnering resources, resulting, in Russia's case, in a proclivity for offensive, ground-based weapons. I develop these theories and test them against the reality of Russia's nuclear rhetoric and force structure from 1992-2012. I find strongest support for the explanation rooted in cultural and bureaucratic factors. However, this theory predicts only force structure. In contrast, the theory that predicts states will treat nuclear weapons as one contributor to power and prestige appears to successfully predict Moscow's declaratory policy, but not its force structure (except between 2009 and 2012, when force structure is compatible with both this theory and the culture and bureaucracy theory). My analysis indicates that cultural and bureaucratic factors appear to play an important role in Russia's force structure choices, and help explain a continued emphasis on silo-based systems. Systemic factors appear crucial to Russian declaratory policy, but their impact on force structure is less pronounced, with the exception of Russia's desire for prestige driving larger force size. The divergence between declaratory policy and force structure is a notable finding not predicted by my theories (although allowed for by the culture and bureaucracy theory). Finally, I hope that with my culture and bureaucracy theory, I have proposed a useful way forward in operationalizing cultural factors for testing and analysis.<br>by Olga Oliker.<br>Ph. D.

This thesis examines the relationship between the three artists' workshops Røde Mor (Red Mother), Folkets Ateljé (The People's Studio) and GRAS, who worked between 1968 and 1975 in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Røde Mor was from the outset an articulated Communist graphic workshop loosely organised around collective exhibitions. It developed into a highly productive and professionalised group of artists that made posters by commission for political and social movements. Its artists developed a familiar and popular artistic language characterised by imaginative realism and socialist imagery. Folkets Ateljé, which has never been studied before, was a close knit underground group which created quick and immediate responses to concurrent political issues. This group was founded on the example of Atelier Populaire in France and is strongly related to its practices. Within this comparative study it is the group that comes closest to collective practises around 1968 outside Scandinavia, namely the democratic assembly. The silkscreen workshop GRAS stemmed from the idea of economic and artistic freedom, although socially motivated and politically involved, the group never implemented any doctrine for participation. The aim of this transnational study is to reveal common denominators to the three groups' poster art as it was produced in connection with a Scandinavian experience of 1968. By ‘1968' it is meant the period from the late 1960s till the end of the 1970s. It examines the socio-political conditions under which the groups flourished and shows how these groups operated in conjunction with the political environment of 1968. The thesis explores the relationship between political movements and the collective art making process as it appeared in Scandinavia. To present a comprehensible picture of the impact of 1968 on these groups, their artworks, manifestos, and activities outside of the collective space have been discussed. The argument has presented itself that even though these groups had very similar ideological stances, their posters and techniques differ. This has impacted the artists involved to different degrees, yet made it possible to express the same political goals. It is suggested to be linked with the Scandinavian social democracies and common experience of the radicalisation that took place mostly in the aftermath of 1968 proper. By comparing these three groups' it has been uncovered that even with the same socio-political circumstances and ideological stance divergent styles did develop to embrace these issue.

AbstractThe North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is back in the business of deterring aggression on the part of Russia. This return to great power deterrence has brought widely acknowledged military challenges related to power projection, force modernization, and burden sharing but also and notably a political challenge of defining NATO’s collective political ambitions for a continental order in which Russia will not become like the West. Like during the Cold War, the most convincing posture for NATO has become one of deterrence by punishment, building on a fairly dynamic military ability to strike Russia at a point of choosing, as opposed to defending every entry point to Alliance territory. However, NATO, not sure of what political order it represents, struggles to read Russia’s political character and intent and size its military posture accordingly. NATO’s political deficit effectively robs it of a middle ground from where it can build its military posture and invest in its upkeep. In the 1960s, NATO forged such a middle ground as an essential platform for strategic adaptation; today, NATO’s full deterrence posture is suffering from the absence of such a middle ground. Thus, a comprehensive politico-military posture of deterrence vis-à-vis Russia will require NATO’s reengagement with its own political fundamentals.

A significant change in the Russian political economy took place from around 2000, coinciding with Vladimir Putin’s election as president. State capture gave way to increased state control in the economy, as Putin’s government moved against non-compliant oligarchs and seized control of strategically important industries. A state holding company, Rosspirtprom, was formed to recover federal control over alcohol assets. The Rosspirtprom project can be seen as part of President Putin’s re-establishment of the “power vertical” (centralised federal control) in view of the high value of alcohol revenues to regional authorities. And yet, far from providing valuable revenues to the federal coffers, Rosspirtprom has consistantly posted losses, despite its ostensibly strong starting position on the market. Where has all the money gone?