Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Political power'

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO<br>A iconografia de Luís XIV foi um exemplo de representação da soberania onde a separação espacial e o acabamento perfeito das figuras refletia a organização social e política que a produzia. Contudo, fora da Igreja e do Estado, desenvolveram-se ao longo da modernidade, expressões estéticas opostas à representação do poder transcendental. Ao final do reinado de Luís XIV, surgiu um discurso histórico-político que, após revelar as múltiplas nações que lutam sob o Estado, autodialetizou-se quando, ao reivindicar uma função totalizadora, o Terceiro Estado retomou, de certa maneira, a tese monárquica onde a nação residia inteiramente na pessoa do rei. Esse movimento explicaria uma certa continuidade do discurso visual do poder - dos portraits monárquicos aos republicanos - por um lado e, por outro, a multiplicidade das formas de resistência: os cartazes políticos de maio de 68 foram a expressão das diversas nações contestadoras dos poderes e saberes constituídos daquele momento, manifestando o desejo de proximidade social e de renovação política através de elementos próximos da estética carnavalesca. Na transição contemporânea de uma soberania moderna para uma soberania imperial, a crise político-estético entre transcendência e imanência perdura. Por um lado, monarquia e aristocracia imperial apresentam a unidade transcendental através de recursos estéticos semelhantes. Por outro, no terceiro nível do Império, encontramos expressões estéticas que se afastam radicalmente das representações do poder e que denominamos manifestações de potência a partir da definição sociológica, política e ontológica de multidão.<br>Louis XIV´s iconography was an example of sovereignty representation in which the spatial separation and the perfect finishing of figures reflected the social and political organization that produced it. However, outside the Church and the State, aesthetic expressions opposed to transcendental representation were developed all along modern times. At the end of Louis XIV´s reign arose a historical-political discourse that, after revealing the multiple nations which fought under the State, dialectized itself when the Thiers- États, in the process of claiming a totalizing function, resumed to a certain extent the monarchic thesis in which the nation dwells entirely in the person of the king. This movement would explain on the one hand, a certain continuity of the visual discourse of power - from the monarchic to the republican portraits - and, on the other hand, the multiplicity forms of resistance: the May 1968 political posters were the expression of the diverse nations, contestant of the powers and knowledge constituted at that moment, and displayed the desire of social proximity and political renewal, through elements close to the aesthetic of Carnival. In the contemporary transition from a modern sovereignty to an imperial one, a politicalaesthetic crisis between transcendentalism and immanentism subsists. On the one hand, monarchy and imperial aristocracy introduce the transcendental unity through similar aesthetic resources. On the other hand, in the Empire third level, we find aesthetic expresions which fundamentally deviate from the representations of power and which we designate display of potential power from the sociological, political and ontological definition of multitude.

Limited time is an important constraint and resource that is fundamental to governing. This dissertation studies the connection between limited time and political power in three different contexts.<br>Government

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Delaware, 2009.<br>Principal faculty advisors: Young-Doo Wang, School of Urban Affairs & Public Policy; and John Byrne, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy. Includes bibliographical references.

California has now become a majority-minority state. Latinos, currently the largest minority group in the Golden State, have made remarkable political gains in the past two decades, more recently since the the approval of Proposition 187 in 1994. How have Latinos used this new political power? This thesis provides an in-depth look into the dynamics of the Latino political entity in California, along with a quantifiable analysis of voting trends. Discussion of policy implictions since the Latino wave into the state Legislature is also provided, along with interviews with notable Latino figures, such as Senator Art Torres and Redistricting Commissioner Gabino Aguirre.

This thesis is an analysis of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and the impact it held on the role of Congress and the President in entering war. More specifically, this thesis takes a look at President Richard M. Nixon’s influence on the 93rd Congress’s decision to pass the War Powers Resolution after multiple failed attempts at similar legislation. Through a major domestic policy blunder, the Watergate break-in, and a foreign policy disaster, the on-going war in Vietnam, opposition to Nixon’s presidential conduct united both the House and the Senate and resulted in legislation that would attempt to restore the Constitutional balance of power.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Far East, Southeast Asia, Pacific))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008.<br>Thesis Advisor(s): Miller, Alice. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 29, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-57). Also available in print.

The 2003 energy white paper was widely considered to have signalled the end of new nuclear power stations in the UK. Yet only three years later, new nuclear power seemed so inevitable that Greenpeace took the British government to court over its !,; consultation process. Using political discourse theory, this thesis explores how such an apparent reversal of policy could take place by examining the discourses surrounding policy decisions over electricity generation generally and nuclear power in particular. After first setting out political discourse theory and justifying its use over other approaches to policy analysis in this case, the history of nuclear power in the UK is examined. This allows exploration of the meanings that have been attached to nuclear power in governmental circles, from its status as a national success story to its abandonment after privatisation. Nuclear is traced from its politically untouchable beginnings in military research, through the technological optimism of the 1960s, to the economic disasters of the 1970s and the effect of green opposition of the 1980s. This provides the background against which the 2003 decision against nuclear is examined. It is argued that although this white paper goes against nuclear and nominally in favour of renewables, there was little governmental enthusiasm for the proposals, primarily due to the radical changes to British lifestyles and energy provision needed to enact them. They are adopted in the absence of alternatives. The lobbying activity of a key pro-nuclear group, Supporters of Nuclear Energy, directly following this white paper is then examined. It is shown how this group specifically adopted a public relations strategy aimed at portraying nuclear power in ecological modernist terms, by following the 2003 white paper in reducing the concept of sustainability to the problem of climate change alone whilst depoliticising electricity demand. It is argued that this successfully set a discursive context in which nuclear power could once again be adopted. The informal relationship between Supporters of Nuclear Energy and government figures problematises conceptualisations of the state and its role in policy making in network governance theory, which are resolved through reference to the work of Antonio Gramsci and Timothy Mitchell.

Dyadic power theory proposes that the speed of power-ratio change between two nations predicts to both the onset of war and alliance formation. The speed of power-ratio change is measured utilizing the concepts of velocity and acceleration. It is posited that decision-makers perceive high velocity change and/or high acceleration of change in the power-ratio between them and a potential adversary as threatening. The lack of reaction time encourages the decision-makers to act in non-traditional ways. Thus, they opt for hostilities or alliance partners rather than utilize traditional diplomatic measures such as "summits", conferences, protests, etc. The independent variables of national power were provided by Jacek Kugler in private correspondence, and the dependent variables of alliances and wars were selected from data-sets compiled by Singer and Small. Dyadic changes in power previous to these events were then correlated with the events, themselves. Moderate support for the theory was obtained. Although there was little correlation between acceleration of power-ratio change and either event, there were moderate correlations between average velocity of change and the event, suggesting that decision-makers react precipitously to rapidly changing conditions vis-a-vis potential adversaries. The findings suggest that future studies that will isolate such factors as size of nation, century of event, contiguity, and even type of political system of the adversaries or partners are warranted.

This thesis is concerned with the influence of campaign finance on the interplay between political power and electoral competition in the United States and the United Kingdom. The thesis considers both the donation and expenditure sides of campaign finance: In the context of U.S. state and federal legislative elections (1980-2014), I study how political power affects the allocation of campaign contributions, and in the context of U.K. House of Commons elections (1885-2010), I examine how campaign spending restrictions affect political power via electoral behavior. The three papers which make up the construct of the thesis answer the following questions: (i) What is the financial value of incumbency status, and who generates it? (ii) Who values legislative agenda setters, and why do they do so? (iii) What are the electoral consequences of statutory limits on campaign expenditure? I argue that campaign donors make their contributions to powerful politicians in exchange for access to the policy-making process, and that the power of these politicians is sustained, at least in part, due to these contributions. In the first paper, I document that U.S. incumbent legislators enjoy sizeable financial advantages compared to challengers, and I demonstrate that this advantage is the result of donations from access-seeking industries. In the second paper, I show that U.S. legislators who are institutionally endowed with agenda-setting powers are given special treatment by campaign donors. I document that donors with vested economic interests in regulatory policy place great value on agenda-setting legislators – in particular when institutions provide these legislators with the authority to block new legislation. In the final paper, I study the consequences of campaign spending limits in the context of U.K. House of Commons elections. I show that unrestrained spending reduces electoral competition, promotes professionalized campaigns, and benefits incumbents and centerright parties.

Shedding new light on the relationship between Black Power and mainstream American politics and society, this thesis explores the ways in which white politicians, institutions, and organizations engaged with, and responded to, African Americans‘ demands for economic and political empowerment during the mid-to-late 1960s through the mid-1970s. At the same time, it considers how these demands themselves reflected urban African American communities‘ own responses to, and engagement with, Black Power ideology. The final and broadest concern of this study is how these two processes – along with the political and economic pressures created by white mainstream resistance to demands for racial and socio-economic change – affected urban African American society and politics during the Black Power era and beyond. This story is traced by exploring the nexus of public policies, black community organizations, white and black elected officials, liberal foundations, and Black Power activists in New York, Atlanta, and Los Angeles during the mid-to-late 1960s through the 1970s. By considering throughout how African American community activists in the three cities fought to capitalize on, and create, new opportunities through public policies, this project details the impact that Black Power had upon existing grassroots community activism, illuminating Black Power‘s development at the local level. Finally, focusing on the evolution and longer term trajectory of public policies intended to negotiate and control the meaning of Black Power, this thesis explains how and why those policies sought to cultivate a mainstream, middle-class interest oriented brand of Black Power politics that aimed to reinforce the nation‘s existing political and social order. Highlighting the relationship between these policies and black middle-class progress of the period, this thesis underscores the enduring capacity of mainstream whites to successfully defend and assert their interests and resist transformative socio-economic and racial change, and ultimately, to dictate the scope and direction of black progress.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Electricity is the key to economic growth and numerous aspects of human development. Africa’s installed generation capacity is dire, alongside it being the biggest funding backlog the power sector. There is however hope with the projection that to date, only 7% of this power potential has been harnessed. The increased acknowledgement of the importance of electricity for states to improve along with the knowledge that the capacity is there, has driven states within Southern Africa, to engage in increased and committed cooperation with one another. Within the greater vision of regional integration of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa, energy was one of the first formal cooperative arrangements of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which is the region this study will be focusing on. The form of electricity cooperation adopted was that of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP), which is geared at increasing cross-border electricity trade and ensuring secure and reliable supply to its members. The study investigates the formation of an electricity regime within Southern Africa, by using the Southern African Power Pool as a case study. In order to properly assess the development of the SAPP, regime theory will be used. An analytical framework, derived from different studies around regime theory has been constructed. This framework assists in the analysis of the formation and evolution of the SAPP, which facilitates the assessment of the type of regime which has emerged, and guides a sound analysis around the degree of the electricity regimes effectiveness. Given the process of formation and characteristics underlying the SAPP, it has been found that it falls within the category of a negotiated regime. The analytical framework provided clear guidelines in assessing the degree of effectiveness regarding the case study at hand. After an analysis of the historical and organisational functioning of the regime - it can be argued that the SAPP is a stable and effective regime, at least on paper. It however faces various challenges, which have constrained its efficient functioning. It is concluded that members of the regime are committed to the SAPP’s continued development despite the problems identified.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Elektrisiteit is die sleutel tot ekonomiese groei en baie ander aspekte van menslike ontwikkeling. Afrika se geïnstalleerde opwekkingskapasiteit is net so nypend soos die feit dat dit die grootste befondsing agterstand in die kragvoorsiening sektor is. Daar is egter hoop met die projeksie dat, tot op datum, slegs 7% van hierdie kragpotensiaal benut word. Die toenemende erkenning van die belang van elektrisiteit vir state om vooruit te gaan, gepaard met die wete dat die kapasiteit beskikbaar is, het state binne suider Afrika gedryf om hulle tot toenemende en volgehoue samewerking met mekaar te verbind. Binne die groter visie vir streeksintegrasie van die Streek se Ekonomiese Gemeenskappe (SEG) [Regional Economic Communities (REC)] in Afrika, was energie een van die eerste formele korporatiewe akkoorde van die Suider Afrikaanse Ontwikkelings Gemeenskap (SAOG) [Southern African Development Community (SADC)], wat die streek is waarop hierdie studie sal fokus. Die vorm wat elektrisiteit samewerking aangeneem het, was die Suider Afrika Krag Poel (SAKP) [Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)], wat aangepas is om elektrisiteithandel oor grense heen te bevorder en veilige, asook betroubare lewering aan die lede te verseker. Hierdie studie ondersoek die totstandkoming van ’n elektrisiteit ‘regime’ binne suider Afrika deur die SAKP as ’n gevalle studie te gebruik. Om die ontwikkeling van die SAKP behoorlikte asesseer, sal die regime teorie gebruik word. ’n Analitiese raamwerk, wat afgelei is van verskeie studies met betrekking tot regime teorie, is dus saamgestel. Hierdie raamwerk help met die analise van die totstandkoming en evolusie van die SAKP wat die asessering van die tipe regime, wat ontstaan het, vergemaklik en dit rig ook ‘n streng analise met betrekking tot die graad van effektiwiteit van die elektrisiteit regimes. Gegewe die proses van totstankoming en die eienskappe onderliggend aan die SAKP, is daar bevind dat dit binne die kategorie van ’n onderhandelde regime val (negotiated regime). Die analitiese raamwerk het duidelike riglyne voorsien om die effektiwiteitsgraad, met betrekking tot die gevallestudie, te assesseer. Na ’n analise van die historiese en organisatoriese funksionering van die regime – kan mens aanvoer dat die SAKP, ten minste op skrif, ’n stabiele en effektiewe regime is. Dit staar egter verskeie struikelblokke in die gesig, wat die effektiewe funksionering beperk. Daar kan egter afgelei word dat die lede van die regime toegewyd is tot die volgehoue ontwikkeling van die SAKP, ten spyte van die probleme wat geïdentifiseer is.

Abstract In this thesis I tackle the question of what the normative logic of political realism is. Thus, I have two goals to accomplish. First, and foremost, I want to offer an account of what it means to be a political realist. Secondly, I want to inquire why one should be a political realist. As, for the first question, what are the defining features of a realistic political philosopher? Given that realists tend to defend a variety of positions and that they are not often systematic in their arguments, this question is not as simple as it might seem. Thus, in the first three methodological chapters I develop a possible systematic account for political realism. While I am evidently sympathetic with the tradition of political realism, my aim here is merely reconstructive. However, such rational reconstruction aims to fix a significant flaw in this tradition: a lack of clarity and structure. In the first chapter, I argue that realists rely on a specific account of reality, in the second that from this account they derive a particular view of possibility and necessity and in the third one that the most important necessities in politics are the recurrence of conflicts and the need for order. My aim here is to provide a rational reconstruction of political realism by outlining a possible consistent interpretation of its basic commitments. More specifically, Chapter 1 focuses on the notion of reality adopted by political realists. I open the chapter by introducing a preliminary discussion of the commitments a realistic political philosophy seems bound to subscribe. I then argue that a metaphysical view matching these commitments is one that links reality with causality. This view, which I call ‘effectual realism’, is partially drawn from Alexander’s dictum and the ‘ad lapidem’ argument in metaphysics, and claims that something is real if and only if it causally interacts with the world in some way. I close this chapter by observing that this view of reality is a form of metaphysical realism, because it satisfies three conditions: reality is knowable, independent from desires and independent from beliefs. These conditions, I conclude, fit very well with the idea common throughout the literature of political realism, that reality is something that resists our actions. From this causal account of reality, Chapter 2 draws a causal account of possibility and necessity. While political idealists focus on conceivability or compatibility with the world as criteria for possibility, a more realistic criterion would be one that links possibility and causality. I call this relation of realistic possibility ‘trackability’: a state of affairs is trackable if and only if there is some causal chain to move there from the actual world. I debate the implications of this view, and conclude that it allows to account for the contextual importance of the starting point, the inclination to prudence, and the focus on action. From this conception, I can derive a symmetric notion of necessity, whereby something is necessary, if there is no causal chain to avoid it. By the same argument, something is impossible, if no causal chain allows us to realize it. These two arguments can be neatly derived from effectual realism and the additional assumption that we are not omnipotent. Given that reality is independent from our beliefs and desires, and assuming that our power is limited, some states of affairs will lay beyond our ability to change. Among these necessary states of affairs, I argue in Chapter 3 that there are two, which are particularly relevant in the political sphere: the inevitability of conflict and the need for order. Conflicts, in my definition, emerge among actors with different views when one wants to impose his will against the resistance of others. Given that there is no causal chain to consistently avoid neither the different views nor the will to prevail, conflict appears a necessary feature in the sense specified in the previous chapter. The second necessary element is the need for order. As men need to feed, whether or not they want to, so they need a cooperative order, whether or not they want to. This is a weaker necessity compared to that of conflict, because it holds only conditionally. While conflicts are always inevitable and therefore necessary, order is necessary only provided that we want to survive. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that these two necessities of politics can be used as a criterion to determine whether a political theory is realistic or not. Clearly not every political realist would recognize himself in this reconstruction. ‘Isms’ are always more discordant than their adversaries believe them to be, and political realists are particularly diverse in their reflections. Thus, any unified account is likely to leave some disagreeing. This is inevitable, and thus one cannot realistically be blamed for it. Nevertheless, I think it is important to try to develop a consistent positive view of political realism. To summarize, in the first three chapters I defended the following conception of political realism: 1. Realism  Reality 2. Reality  Possibility and Necessity 3. Political Necessity  Conflict and Order Being realist means, in this view, paying attention to reality. Paying attention to reality means identifying accurately what is possible and what is necessary. Thus, being realist means that we should acknowledge that conflict and order are the two cardinal necessities of politics. The fourth and last chapter is intended to tackle the question of why one ought to be a realist and, thus, to turn the results of the first three chapters from reconstructive into normative claims. Political realism, I argue here, offers a set of hypothetical imperatives based on the conditional assumption that one wants to realize one's own preferences. This, I maintain, provides the driving force behind normative political realism. In fact, if it is true that one wants to realize one's own preferences, then, contrary to idealism, one ought not to choose between end-states, but among courses of action. I suggest that a more realistic account of rationality is one that tempers the value of a desired state of affairs with the costs or benefits of the best available means to reach it, their likelihood of success, and the unintended consequences of one’s action. If this is how a realistically rational deliberation works, than the distinctive features of political realism I reconstructed in the first three chapters are shown to have an important normative force, as they are revealed to be the path realists point at in order for political actors to realize their preferences. In short, if you want to realize your preferences, you ought to be a realist. Differently from what I do in the previous chapters, here I try to put forward a justificatory argument for political realism. Notwithstanding this difference between the first three chapters and the last one, they all combine to provide a possible answer to my research question. If we put together the first three chapters with the conditional assumption that you want to realize your preferences, we get the following hypothetical imperatives: 1) You ought to be rational, and for realists this means that when you deliberate what is best you should not limit yourself to consider the value or disvalue of the ideal that you want to realize. Along with this, you ought to ponder the costs of the best means available to you, their likelihood of success, and the cost of their consequences. 2) You ought to acknowledge reality. This means that any descriptive theory of the world is normative for the agent, insofar as it sets the background conditions of his action. Reality determines the means he has at his disposal, his likelihood of success in reaching what he desires, and the consequences of his action. It thus gives him reasons to do something instead of something else. 3) You ought to pinpoint possibilities and necessities accurately. Reality sets the conditions of what is possible and what is necessary. Necessary states of affairs are of paramount importance for action, and political realism rightly emphasizes them. A necessary state of affairs is a state of affairs whose avoidance is impossible and thus any desire that requires that this be abandoned is unrealistic. This does not mean that there is nothing we can do in such cases. Rather, realists claim that necessities give us reasons to contain their negative consequences instead than eliminate them at their root, and to reallocate our efforts in alternative goals which can actually be reached. 4) You ought to acknowledge that the recurrence of conflicts and the need for order are necessary features of the political sphere. This is the substantive and defining claim of political realism. Any desire that requires one to be done with conflict or the need for order is unrealistic, whatever one wants. Moreover, any political theory that pays insufficient attention to this fact is bound to be of inadequate guidance in political matters. Any actor who does not satisfy these requirements risks being irrational insofar as he would be self-undermines his own preferences, whatever they are. Thus, we end up with the following claims: 0. If you want to realize your preferences, then you ought to: 1. Evaluate courses of action instead of states of affairs 2. Pay attention to reality 3. Individuate its possibilities and necessities 4. In politics, consider specifically the inevitability of conflict and the need for order In synthesis, political realism as an affirmative, analytical, normative theory would be, in my opinion, committed to these claims.

Thesis (M. Ap. C.T. & M.)--Cleveland State University, 2009.<br>Abstract. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed June 17, 2009). Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-76). Available online via the OhioLINK ETD Center. Also available in print.

Political parties are ideal subjects for the study of power because they are specific sites in which it is produced and organised, fought over, captured and lost. However, the literature on political parties largely lacks an explicit and systematic theorisation of power as it is exercised and operates in them. As a result, the study of parties has not kept up with developments in theoretical approaches to power and power relations. For example, the failure to recognise how power works through constituting subjects who are empowered as effective agents with appropriate skills and capacities is a major lacuna in the literature. Parties are not only electoral machines or vehicles for personal ambition: they are organisations, complex relations of individuals, rules and rituals. An approach to power in parties should reflect this. To this end, I develop a five-dimensional framework of power which I use to account for political parties in all their complexity. My aim is to introduce some of the more nuanced and sophisticated insights of political theory to the analysis of political parties without dismissing the benefits of some of the more established ways of looking at power. Power is therefore approached as a rich, multi-dimensional concept, derived from diverse intellectual traditions, including behaviouralist, structuralist and Foucauldian accounts. My framework encapsulates individual agency, the strategic mobilisation of rules and norms, rationalisation and bureaucracy, the constitution of subjectivities and the micro-level discipline of bodies. Theory is employed in conjunction with original interview and archive research on the British Labour Party to construct an account of how power operates in party settings. This provides a unique and, I argue, much richer perspective on the exercise and operation of power in political parties than has been offered before.

In this thesis I argue that formal political power is a human-created artificiality, erected over previously unfettered lives for a specific purpose. As such, the act of establishing and maintaining political power can be assessed like any other person-affecting act, ethically, and must always be justified if it is to be considered legitimate. I show that underlying all such attempted justifications for political power is an implicit, but necessary, ethical contract: that political power X is justified only because it makes life 'better' for 'people' than it would be without it. Utilizing a form of ethical constructivism, I unpack a plausible account of what this universal political teleology can be said to objectively demand, constructing first a reasonable account of which 'people' we can justifiably say ought to be considered within the ethical contract (everyone affected), and then, working from that definition, and what we can reasonably claim to know of the shared goals and interests of such people, constructing a plausible account of what could be said to constitute a 'better' life for them (the protection and fulfilment of seven basic and universal 'species-interests'). I use this account as a critical tool, showing that, despite the multiplicity of varied political structures which have historically traded on divergent interpretations of this same underlying contract, once we have unpacked a compellingly objective account of its terms by which to judge each interpretation, there appears to be only one form of political power seemingly capable of fulfilling its requirements and thus achieving the legitimate goals of an objectively justified politics: a form of federated, small-scale anarchism, which I describe as 'authentic democracy'.

This thesis examines the relationships between political power, corruption, and witchcraft in modern Indonesia through an analysis of the discursive construction of these concepts in Indonesian society. The subject is approached through an observation of how public discourses of corruption and sorcery are used by people in an instrumental way to talk about and understand political processes in the country. The central argument of the thesis is that Indonesian society experiences contemporary politics in a context that combines values and practices of political modernity and secular rationality with those of witchcraft, sorcery, and the occult. The thesis demonstrates how Indonesian politics has been transformed into a modern-secular democracy by juxtaposing traditionalism and modernism. Both are interconnected features of contemporary Indonesian modernity. The thesis focuses on corruption and sorcery discourses within the context of the political democracy that has been established in Indonesia following the collapse of the New Order state. There is currently a great deal of expectation that the system of democracy will promote public participation - in the sense that people become involved in political processes, that civil society becomes more effective and that the holders of state powers become more accountable - which should in turn curb corruption. Unfortunately, corruption appears to be pervasive within the new democratic polity, and both corruption and sorcery persist alongside the dynamics of political contestations and power struggles. In the light of continuing corruption practices, many groups of Indonesian society initiate anti-corruption movements by mobilizing social and political resources through collective action. Anti-corruption initiatives are taken by both state institutions and civil society associations, and seek to improve public governance and promote political reform. Nevertheless, non-state actors—NGOs and civil society agencies—appear to have become the major voices of public criticism against corruption and they have taken the lead in promoting anti-corruption reforms. These actors involve educated people from the urban middle classes: social and political activists, intellectuals, artists, poets, journalists, as well as religious leaders associated with Islamic organizations: the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU), the Muhammadiyah, and the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). It is argued that the ideas and practices of anti-corruption have found new spaces of expression under the new democratic system, and that Indonesian civil society and NGO activists are determined to continue their struggles to fight corruption for the betterment of the nation despite a great deal of opposition which is mostly political. They believe that the new system of political democracy will be much more beneficial for all Indonesian people if corruption can be eliminated from state agencies and political institutions.

The aim of this thesis is to resurrect interest in the concept of power in political theory by shedding light on some of its relatively unexplored discursive dimensions and developing a fresh approach to its understanding. Particularly, it studies an under-examined theme in the current literature, which, however, forms a crucial aspect determining different definitions of power: in what manner do different ways of thinking about power underpin variable conceptual formulations and theoretical interpretations of this key political concept? What types of cognitive, ideational and conceptual 'micro-processes' shape different ways of thinking about power in political thought? The thesis suggests novel interpretative possibilities that may be distilled from developing a hermeneutical approach extending across the dimensions of historical time and disciplinary space, by combining methodological insights from the fields of morphology, intellectual history and interdisciplinary study. To that end, it engages perspectives gleaned from historical treatments of power, as well as recent understandings of spatiality and force provided by scientific discourse. The concept of power is explored through the perspectives of (i) cultural historicity and (ii) interdisciplinarity. Along the axis of cultural historicity, the analysis studies Aristotle's classical concept of 'dunamis' as the original conceptual modality of power in political thought. Along the axis of interdisciplinarity, the examination explores the concept of force in the discourse of physics, and its parallel development in political thought. This dissertation shows that the exploration of those conceptual modalities can yield a new appreciation of certain diachronic and contingent conceptual features of power and enhance our understanding of the multifaceted discursive processes through which those form, including the underpinning 'micro-semantic', linguistic and ideational processes which contribute to the emergence of variable modes of thinking about power. In so doing, the thesis aims at illuminating our modern understanding of the concept, moving the scholarly discourse forward towards new horizons of meaning and interpretation.

This dissertation disputes conventional interpretations of the comparative political economy literature on higher education. In particular, I challenge the common assumption that access to higher education is structured by income. Instead, based on insights from the relevant psychology, sociology and economics literature, I argue that a child's probability of entering higher education is predominantly a function of her abilities, and that her abilities are strongly related to her parents' level of education. I develop a theory of the distributive politics of higher education solidly grounded in this relationship. The result of this model is the counter intuitive hypothesis that the initial expansions of higher education benefit the children of more highly educated parents. Moreover, more highly educated families are the net beneficiaries of free higher education and generous subsidies. Extensive survey evidence from Britain, Australia, Canada and Sweden of higher education policy preferences confirms this picture of the politics of higher education as a zero-sum distributive game between highly and lesser educated families. In order to analyse the consequences of these preference patterns for higher education policy, I develop a theoretical and empirical measure of voting power for multi-party systems. Voting power measures how many votes a party stands to gain from converting and mobilising voters by distributing resources from one group to another. Using data from 15 EU countries, I show that parliaments and cabinets, on average, stand to win more votes from pleasing highly educated voters than from targeting less educated voters. Furthermore, the conversion imperative is much stronger than the mobilisation imperative. Statistical analyses show that variations in the voting power of highly educated individuals over the government help to explain variations in higher education policy across countries and within countries over time. All in all, the theoretical and empirical analyses presented in this dissertation represent a significant contribution towards understanding the specific distributive politics of higher education, and the political economy of redistribution more generally.

Includes abstract.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>This research paper uses content analysis to analyse the subtext of Obama's campaign messages and virtual ethnography to analyse the way that information technology was used to further his campaign's goals. The findings suggest that while historic forces, such as economic turbulence and the unpopularity of outgoing President George W Bush, helped propel Obama to power, his campaign was nonetheless revolutionary. It will be argued that it contained several elements of trail blazing innovation that are likely to redefine political communications in the U.S and globally.

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Comunicação e Expressão, Programa de Pós-graduação em Letras/Inglês e Literatura Correspondente<br>Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-25T20:09:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 299821.pdf: 1348939 bytes, checksum: b9f9a6a82914a2020f00e8f7481a9152 (MD5)<br>The "Phenomenon of Juazeiro" has fascinated the academic world as Braga (2008) in anthropology, Araujo (2007) in economics, and della Cava (1970) in history attest. Nevertheless, research from a linguistic and discourse perspective has lagged far behind. To tap this gap, the present work looks at Padre Cícero's epistolary political discourse on the fight for Juazeiro's independence from Crato, by drawing on concepts and categories from systemic-functional grammar (SFG) and critical discourse analysis (CDA) with a view to analyzing power relations among the social actors involved in the fight. From SFG, I utilized the systems of transitivity, speech function, mood, and modality for the descriptive and interpretative stages of analysis; from CDA, I borrowed the concepts of ideology (Fairclough, 1989, 2003) and hegemony (Gramsci, 1971, Fairclough, 2003, Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Five research questions were posed: The first looks at how Padre Cícero represents himself and the other political actors of the social practice of fighting for Juazeiro's independence. The second asks how he construes, for himself and for the other social actors, their social roles. The third and the fourth questions inquire how the concepts of ideology and hegemony assist in the explanatory analytical stage. The last one looks at the kinds of power relations originated from the previous analyses. To answer the research questions, I analyzed four letters written by Padre Cícero in 1910 and published in O Rebate, with my access to them having been through Guimarães and Dumoulin (1983). The first two ones were addressed to the Governor of Ceará Col. Nogueira Accioly (L1 & L2), and the latter two, to the Mayor of Crato Col. Antônio Luís (L3 & L4). The letters were broken down into clauses, which were analyzed in relation to the categories of transitivity, speech function, mood, and modality. The transitivity results showed that two macro-figures emerged from the data, the first being of Padre Cícero as a powerful political actor as realized by his taking up prominent transitivity roles such as Actor in material processes, for instance, and the second being of him as a conciliatory political player as realized by, for example, his use of relational processes for the purpose of representing his relationship with Col. Antônio Luís as friendly. These macro-figures were reinforced by the results generated from the speech function, mood, and modality analyses. Padre Cícero construes his social role as a powerful politician by engendering his political world as a place of little space for uncertainty by using little modality. Parallel to this, his image of a conciliatory political player emerges as he struggles to reinforce his friendship with the Mayor of Crato and to show a disposition to help with the independence project on many occasions. Additionally, he construes Col. Antônio Luís's social role as equally powerful as the transitivity analysis of L3 and L4 shows. As for Col. Nogueira Accioly and Juazeiro and/or its people, Padre Cícero maintains the same passive pattern that characterized them throughout the analyses. The data were then analyzed for the concepts of ideology and hegemony, giving rise to three hegemonic lines and to three power relations. Next, the limitations of the present study were discussed, which were followed by suggestions for future research. Finally, two pedagogical implications were discussed, and the presentation of a sketchy model for analyzing political discourse proper was put forward<br>O "Fenômeno de Juazeiro" tem fascinado o mundo acadêmico,como atestam Braga (2008) na antropologia, Araujo (2007) naeconomia e della Cava (1970) na história. Entretanto, a pesquisado ponto de vista linguístico e discursivo não acompanhou asoutras áreas. Para explorar essa lacuna, o presente trabalhoanalisa o discurso político epistolar de Padre Cícero produzido durante a luta de Juazeiro por sua independência em relação a Crato. Vale-se de conceitos e categorias da Gramática Sistêmico-Funcional (GSF) e da Análise Crítica do Discurso (ACD), com vista a analisar as relações de poder entre os atores sociais envolvidos na luta. Da GSF, utilizei os sistemas de transitividade, função discursiva, modo e modalidade nas fases descritiva e interpretativa da análise; da ACD, apropriei-me dos conceitos de ideologia (Fairclough, 1989, 2003) e de hegemonia (Gramsci, 1971, Fairclough , 2003, Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Cinco perguntas de pesquisa foram feitas. A primeira interroga sobre como Padre Cícero representa a si mesmo e aos outros atores sociais da prática social de lutar pela independência de Juazeiro. A segunda indaga como ele constrói, para si e para os outros atores, seus papéis sociais. A terceira e quarta inquirem como os conceitos de ideologia e de hegemonia ajudam na fase explicativa da análise. A última questão aborda os tipos de relações de poder que emergiram das análises anteriores. Para responder as perguntas, analisei quatro cartas, coletadas em Guimarães e Dumoulin (1983), escritas por Padre Cícero em 1910 e publicadas em O Rebate. As duas primeiras foram endereçadas ao Governador do Ceará, Cel. Nogueira Accioly (L1 e L2); e as outras duas, ao Prefeito de Crato, Cel. Antônio Luís (L3 e L4). As cartas foram segmentadas em orações, que foram analisadas em relação às categorias de transitividade, função discursiva, modo e modalidade. Os resultados de transitividade mostraram que duas macro-figuras surgiram a partir dos dados. A primeira é a do Padre Cícero como um ator político poderoso, evidenciada por papéis relevantes de transitividade, tais como Ator em processos materiais, por exemplo. A segunda mostra-o como um político conciliador, o que é percebido, por exemplo, no uso que ele faz de processos relacionais com a finalidade de forjar uma relação amigável com o Cel. Antônio Luís. Essas macrofiguras foram reforçadas pelos resultados oriundos da análise da função discursiva, do modo e da modalidade. Padre Cícero, ao usar pouca modalidade, interpreta seu papel social como um político poderoso, construindo seu mundo político como um lugar com pouco espaço para incertezas. Paralelamente a isso, sua imagem de político conciliador emerge quando ele se empenha para reforçar sua amizade com o Prefeito do Crato e mostrar disposição, em muitas ocasiões, para ajudar com o projeto de independência. Além disso, ele representa o Cel. Antônio Luís como igualmente podero, tal como evidenciado pela análise de transitividade de L3 e L4. Quanto ao Cel. Nogueira Accioly e a Juazeiro e/ou ao seu povo, Padre Cícero mantém o mesmo padrão passivo que os caracterizou ao longo das análises. Esses resultados foram confrontados com os conceitos de ideologia e hegemonia. Como resultado, o confronto mostrou a existência de três linhas hegemônicas e três relações de poder. Em seguida, as limitações do presente estudo foram analisadas e foram dadas sugestões para futuras pesquisas. Finalmente, duas implicações pedagógicas foram discutidas e um modelo esquemático para a análise do discurso político propriamente dito foi apresentado

In the past decades, political theory and philosophy have seen the canonization of a new conceptual difference, whose roots have been traced back to a number of thinkers, but whose main theoretical elaboration can be said to have begun with the Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique founded by Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe in 1980 and closed in 1984: the difference between la politique and le politique, or between ‘politics’ and ‘the political’. As Chantal Mouffe (2005a: 8f), borrowing Heidegger’s vocabulary, has pointed out, the two terms operate on different levels: whereas ‘politics’ refers to the ‘ontic’ level and designates the empirical ‘facts’ of political organization – practices, institutions, discourses, etc. – ‘the political’ implies a philosophical inquiry at the ‘ontological’ level, asking, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1981: 12) put it, about the ‘essence of the political’. While, in theorists as diverse as Alain Badiou, Jacques Rancière, Slavoj Žižek, Claude Lefort, Roberto Esposito, Ernesto Laclau, and many others – most of them located on the political left – this inquiry has yielded very different results, they all agree on the basic necessity to make this distinction between conventional politics, on the one hand, and a more profound dimension concerning the institution of the social itself, on the other. Similarly, virtually all the thinkers mentioned are in agreement as to the state of the political in the contemporary world: they all see it as in danger of being ignored, repressed or neutralized in the context of what they criticize as increasingly ‘post-political’ and ‘post-democratic’ social arrangements. This critique of today’s post-politics is a powerful and important one. In the following, I want to argue that the work of Stuart Hall to some extent shares in – in fact, anticipates, since most of the relevant theories were developed after 1989 – this critical discourse. More specifically, I will 1) bring out and discuss Hall’s critique of post-politics; 2) elaborate upon his own understanding of the political, which is implicit in this critique and elsewhere in his writings – I will argue that Hall’s thought can be considered as belonging to what the sociologist Oliver Marchart (2010) has termed ‘the moment of the political’, insofar as it is a product of and response to our ‘post-foundational condition’, emphasizing as it does conflictuality, contingency and the groundlessness of society; 3) and finally, building on this, I will briefly talk about the conclusions concerning (ontic) politics that the post-foundationalism Hall shares with most of the other theorists I have mentioned leads him to, which are very different from those arrived at by philosophers such as Badiou, Rancière or Žižek and closer – partly via the shared engagement with Gramsci – to those of Mouffe and Laclau or Lefort.

The thesis explores the role and impact of the internet on Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora political activism, focusing on both the experiences of political activists and on an analysis of web content related to diaspora activism. The central argument of the thesis is based around the relationship between political agents and cyberspace. The thesis argues that the political strategies and tactics adopted in the Tamil diasporan political sphere have changed with an increased dependence on the internet changing with it the politics and lives of individual activists. Cyberspace is presented as a site of power struggle with power as both an objective and source in micro-political struggles. The thesis also highlights the double sense of space attributed to cyberspace, both as a space facilitating political activism and as a qualitatively new space for politics. It traces the manifestation of violence in cyberspace based on its extensive reach and the collateral damage it can cause in political conflicts. Also the thesis argues that these intense web engagements for domination and resistance within the diaspora communities cause the emergence of new political priorities in Tamil diaspora politics. These do not parallel political developments in the conflict back in Sri Lanka. The thesis is based on research conducted from 2005 to 2008 during heightened rivalries between supporters of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and dissident Tamil diaspora political activists which involved the extensive use of cyberspace for political purposes. The empirical research consisted of an integrated framework of online and offline research. The offline research was based on eight months of fieldwork in London including interviews with Tamil diaspora political activists across the spectrum from pro-LTTE to anti-LTTE dissidents. The online research was based on the technique of Web Sphere Analysis, which enables a framing of web content into a coherent unit of analysis.

This thesis is an exploratory study of the relationship between Foucault's conception of disciplinary power and the philosophical ideas of ancient Greece as exemplified by Aristotle. Foucault claims that disciplinary power arose only in the 17th and 18th centuries. This thesis demonstrates that there are similarities and parallels between certain facets of Aristotle's ethical and political theory and Foucault's idea of disciplinary power--parallels and similarities sufficiently strong to weaken, if not contradict, Foucault's description of the historical origin of disciplinary power.<br>Master of Arts

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2009.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>This project sets out two broad aims. First, I seek to explain the persistence of racial inequality in an era of formal racial inequality. I offer a theory of power, historically evolved socially embedded power. The theory states that racial inequality is to be explained in the first instance by the way historical racial norms become embedded in practices and processes of path dependent institutions, shaping the way institutions value persons of color. Subsequently, this impacts the way broader society values persons of color, and the way they value themselves. This sets up the conclusion that the problem of racial inequality is fundamentally a problem of racial valuation rather than a problem of distributive justice. In articulating the theory of power, I depart from orthodox analytic political thought methodology by relying on a cross-section of empirical resources, such as history, sociology, and social psychology. Second, I conclude from the above that a theory of justice appropriate for the needs of racial inequality must center on a normative ideal as its primary aim to counteract this more fundamental dynamic. Given the above characterization of racial inequality, I argue that self-respect is the necessary ideal and the social bases of self-respect are the appropriate currency of justice. By self-respect I mean, one's disposition towards oneself such that plans and perceived purposes are reflectively developed in line with an autonomously articulated morally appropriate conception of the good life.<br>(cont.) By the social bases of self-respect I mean, the public commitment and efforts made by major social institutions to embrace and affirm persons of color as substantive equals in a way that reckons with both the history and contemporary reality of racial injustice. I formulate justice as democratic partnership as the appropriate conception of racial justice. It states that justice obtains when institutions consistently provide the social bases of self-respect as per a defined set of institutional principles, and persons of color utilize this resource, as per a defined set of personal principles, by conceiving and pursuing the good of their lives just as the more socially and politically advantaged are able to.<br>by Christopher J. Lebron.<br>Ph.D.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2013.<br>This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections.<br>"September 2013." Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 99-112).<br>The meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi's nuclear plant was one of three disasters that rocked Japan on 11 March 2011, a day often referred to as "3.11." This nuclear accident led to increased attention to and disapproval of nuclear power among the Japanese public. However, despite widespread antinuclear sentiment, the public did not mobilize into sustained mass protests until June 2012. Using historical and contemporary comparisons, this thesis shows that Japan's 15- month delay in antinuclear mobilization was unusual. Both the 1979 Three Mile Island and the 1986 Chernobyl accidents had been quickly followed by mobilized protests. Moreover, the 3.11 Fukushima meltdown prompted mass protests in Germany almost immediately. Given these patterns, one would expect to have seen the Japanese mobilize earlier. The question that drives this thesis is: What led to Japan's 15-month delay in antinuclear power mobilization? Using social movement theory, I test to see whether low levels of grievance, limited availability of resources, or the lack of effective mobilizing structure and strategy help to explain this delay. Of the three explanations, I find the mobilization structure and strategy explanation to be best supported. Due to a history of overlooking antinuclear power issues in Japanese civil society, the early post-3.11 movement lacked longstanding true believers and activists, the two types of participants most effective at mobilizing. Furthermore, the use of social media platforms to organize the early protests may have contributed to why sustained protests were delayed. The empirical findings from this thesis allow us to examine more closely the devastation resulting from 3.11's nuclear meltdown and assess the strengths and weaknesses in Japanese civil society after the disaster. On a theoretical level, these findings may encourage us to question the relevance of grievance to mobilization, refine how resource availability is measured, and ask if the growing use of social media and other online tools should change the way we study social movement mobilization.<br>by Lin Ern Charis Teo.<br>S.M.

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2007.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>Russia has organized its energy industry similarly to a vertically integrated energy corporation. Not only does Russia possess vast oil and gas reserves, it also has capabilities at every step in the production chain. The execution of Russian energy strategy is incredibly intricate and flows from all points including the state, firms, suppliers, degrees of ownership and transit locales. This work reviews five important aspects of Russia's vertical integration strategy. Firstly, Russia is brining the domestic industry under state control. Secondly, it has pushed out particular types of foreign investment in order to gain control of domestic reserves, their monetization and the development of important projects. Thirdly, Russia seeks to keep resource rich states in its near abroad in its sphere of influence in order to keep their supply within its grasp. Fourthly, it manages relations with neighboring states in possession of transit infrastructure to keep supply routes open to markets. Lastly, it invests abroad in order to increase market presence, cut out middlemen, and further build production chains. Russia expects to strengthen its international position, both economically and geopolitically by undertaking this strategy of vertical integration.<br>by Nina J. Fahy.<br>S.M.

The aim of this practice-led research is to explore the ways in which the political and social power structures between filmmaker and protagonist are manifested in the aesthetics and cinematic means of documentary film. Through a synthesis of filmmaking practice and “hidden knowledge” with critical theories from the fields of cultural studies and political philosophy the research devise methodological approaches to the critical analysis of documentary films in light of the political and material conditions of their emergence. By exploring filmmaking practice, both through the practical aspects of the research as well as through experiences made and reported by filmmakers, and placing those in the context of wider theories pertaining to issues of power structures and representation, it sheds light on the different aspects which must be considered when approaching the analysis of a documentary film for its ideological and political content. The work also asserts that in order to fully understand and analyse a documentary film, a wider range of factors must be considered, most prominently the material conditions of the filmmaking process. Those include the financing and commissioning of the film, the conditions of its production as well as its distribution and reception. Drawing on methodologies of dialectical materialism in cultural studies, the research approaches the studied films as well as the practical experiences in a holistic fashion, contextulaising them in historical, political and cultural processes instead of viewing them as isolated texts divorced from social context.

The thesis uses a neoclassical realist framework to investigate the link between economic influence and political power in China’s foreign policy, taking Kazakhstan as a case study. Over the last decades, China developed formidable relative economic capabilities that it increasingly projects externally. An in-depth look at Chinese trade, finance and investment elucidates the drivers of China’s economic influence in Kazakhstan. The analysis shows that Beijing created strong economic dependencies, which in turn introduced a steep hierarchy in the bilateral relationship that leaves Astana in a subordinate and Beijing in a dominant position. This dependency is driven by the legitimacy and revenue needs of the Kazakhstani elite, on the one hand, and China’s relative economic capabilities, guided by Beijing’s “Go Global” and “Go West” initiatives, on the other. The thesis discusses the complex array of economic institutions that project Chinese economic power into Kazakhstan and their relationship with Beijing to determine whether Kazakhstan’s economic dependence is the outcome of a deliberate policy directed by Beijing. After establishing the extent of the hierarchy and dependency of the relationship, the thesis addresses China’s ability to translate the dependency into meeting its foreign policy interests. Beijing does indeed successfully leverage this dependency to meet its political objectives, most notably in gaining access to Kazakhstani resources. Furthermore, an in-depth cases study of the Sino-Kazakhstani transboundary water dispute illustrates that Beijing can maximise its foreign policy objective of maintaining absolute sovereignty over its rivers on the back Kazakhstan’s economic dependence. However, this outcome is driven largely by Kazakhstan itself, particularly by its elite. This turns China into a hydro-hegemon, undermining its foreign policy principles of “win-win” and “mutually beneficial” cooperation.

The relationship between the Angkorian Empire and its capital is important for understanding how this state was sustained. The empire’s political economy is studied by analysing data from Pre-Angkorian and Angkorian period inscriptions in aggregated form, in contrast to previous studies which relied mainly on detailed reading of the texts. The study is necessarily broad to overcome the constraints of having relatively few inscriptions which relate to a selected range of topics, and are partial in viewpoint. The success of the pre-modern Khmer state depended on: its long-established communication and trade links; mutual support of rulers and regional elites; decentralised administration through regional centres; its ability to produce or acquire a surplus of resources; and a network of temples as an ideological vehicle for state integration. The claim that there was a centrally controlled command economy or significant redistribution of resources, as for archaic, moneyless societies is difficult to justify. The mode of control varied between the core area and peripheral areas. Even though Angkor did not have money, it used a unit of account. Despite being an inland agrarian polity, the Khmer actively pursued foreign trade. There are indications of a structure, perhaps hierarchical, of linked deities and religious foundations helping to disseminate the state’s ideology. The establishment of these foundations was encouraged by gifts and privileges granted to elite supporters of the rulers. Contrary to some views, Angkor was not excessively rigid or unusually hierarchical and autocratic when compared with contemporary analogous states. Its political economy is marked by three simultaneous cycles indicative of changing power relationships: cycles of royal inscriptions; of non-royal inscriptions; and fluctuating control over peripheral territories. Its processes and strategies were sufficiently flexible for it to endure as an empire for approximately six centuries, despite internal and external disturbances.

Doctor of Philosophy<br>The relationship between the Angkorian Empire and its capital is important for understanding how this state was sustained. The empire’s political economy is studied by analysing data from Pre-Angkorian and Angkorian period inscriptions in aggregated form, in contrast to previous studies which relied mainly on detailed reading of the texts. The study is necessarily broad to overcome the constraints of having relatively few inscriptions which relate to a selected range of topics, and are partial in viewpoint. The success of the pre-modern Khmer state depended on: its long-established communication and trade links; mutual support of rulers and regional elites; decentralised administration through regional centres; its ability to produce or acquire a surplus of resources; and a network of temples as an ideological vehicle for state integration. The claim that there was a centrally controlled command economy or significant redistribution of resources, as for archaic, moneyless societies is difficult to justify. The mode of control varied between the core area and peripheral areas. Even though Angkor did not have money, it used a unit of account. Despite being an inland agrarian polity, the Khmer actively pursued foreign trade. There are indications of a structure, perhaps hierarchical, of linked deities and religious foundations helping to disseminate the state’s ideology. The establishment of these foundations was encouraged by gifts and privileges granted to elite supporters of the rulers. Contrary to some views, Angkor was not excessively rigid or unusually hierarchical and autocratic when compared with contemporary analogous states. Its political economy is marked by three simultaneous cycles indicative of changing power relationships: cycles of royal inscriptions; of non-royal inscriptions; and fluctuating control over peripheral territories. Its processes and strategies were sufficiently flexible for it to endure as an empire for approximately six centuries, despite internal and external disturbances.

A growing number of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes are being implemented in developing and developed countries alike in order to effect some internalisation of environmental costs. In China schemes under the name of ‘eco-compensation’ are often considered to be similar to PES. Neither the term eco-compensation itself, nor the projects that are supposedly examples of eco-compensation have been subject to scrutiny. This thesis therefore aims to investigate eco-compensation in China, with particular emphasis on water-related programmes. The thesis begins with a comprehensive review of PES literature in order to establish the definition and essential characteristics of such schemes, and to enable an examination of how China’s eco-compensation differs from PES. The analysis of PES provides a framework for focusing on eco-compensation by examining voluntariness, project types, payment, actors, and scales. A broad-scale analysis of 19 Chinese schemes is then undertaken, and this reveals that eco-compensation projects predominantly involve government agents, often with different levels of government as service sellers and buyers; in China individual land users are only directly involved in a few cases. Literature suggests that PES schemes are not simply technical solutions, but are inherently political. Having undertaken this general survey, the political dimension of eco-compensation is then examined in two case studies in great detail, based on semi-structured interviews and project documents. The first case study is of the Xin’an River eco-compensation scheme in which an upstream provincial government is paid to protect water quality to benefit the downstream province. Drawing from studies of “scale”, this case explores the power relationships of central-provincial governments and intra-provincial governments in transboundary river water quality management, especially in the negotiation process of the eco-compensation scheme. It finds that the upstream government mobilises the concept of “eco-compensation” to persuade the downstream government to share the costs of protecting the river and to gain favourable terms in setting the water quality target, using the narrative of “climate change”. The central government adopts a tough stance on the issue of environment protection by the upstream government by setting water quality targets and by introducing basin management planning. This case suggests that eco-compensation is shaped by struggles and conflicts among different actors concerning their strategies in defining eco-compensation rules, and that eco-compensation can also reconfigure power dynamics among these actors. The second case study is of the Miyun Reservoir watershed scheme, in which farmers in the upstream of the contributing watersheds are paid to convert from growing paddy rice to less water-intensive crops, and to reduce fertiliser use. The declared purpose is to increase the water supply to Beijing city, and improve water quality. Applying a political ecology approach, the case examines the history of water provision to China’s capital city, showing that Beijing has been extracting water from its territory and beyond by using its political power. This eco-compensation scheme is just a part of this story. The case also shows that the eco-compensation is justified by framing the upstream agricultural water consumption as the cause of decreasing water flow, while ignoring that large-scale afforestation has significantly contributed to water shortages through the excessive consumption of water. Meanwhile, Beijing has ignored its own huge environmental impact on water quality. This case provides useful insights into how eco-compensation is shaped and framed according to certain priorities and interests, and that it can lead to control over access to water resources amongst the less powerful farmers in order to support water uses in the politically-dominant urban centre. This thesis suggests that although eco-compensation in some instances can be similar to PES, more often than not it is a mechanism used to adjust the relationships between different governments. It includes both incentive-based and regulatory components. That makes it a potentially effective arrangement for river basin water quality management, in spite of contested negotiations. But caution must be exercised, as it can also be used under the market logic by powerful actors to control water resources.