Journal articles on the topic 'Political violence – Ethiopia'

In 2019, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiyah Ahmed won the Nobel peace prize. His government is praised for releasing political prisoners, partially opening Ethiopia's political space to the opposition, and making peace with neighboring Eritrea. At the same time, in recent years nearly 3 million people have fled their homes in Ethiopia, mainly because of ethnic violence. Human rights organizations accuse the country's authorities of forcing people to return to their homes, where many still do not feel safe. In 2018 and 2019 alone, more than a million Ethiopians were forced from their homes by ethnic violence. Ethiopia currently ranks first in the world in the number of internally displaced persons. The authors analyze the controversial socio-political situation in Ethiopia in the context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2020.

ABSTRACTThis article examines the role of trade unions and of the Kebele – the most local urban administrative structures of the Ethiopian state – in the making of the Red Terror, a period of unprecedented political violence that closely followed the Ethiopian revolution of 1974. Drawing on a broad range of new source materials – from labour union files to oral histories and East German State Security archives – this article shows how the Red Terror was in large part the product of synergies between diverse groups and actors within these structures, and how it was rooted in histories, motives, and collaborations that have scarcely been considered in the historiography of revolutionary Ethiopia. In turn, the Red Terror radically reshaped both trade unions and Kebele administrations, affording Ethiopian state actors an unprecedented means of control over civil society and urban residents.

In 1960, women in southern Ethiopia's rural Konso district faced a violent campaign by local men to eradicate leather clothing following a ban imposed by the local governor, Tesfaye Hailu. Tesfaye, a man of the northern Amhara ethnic group, banned leather clothes along with bead necklaces and arm bracelets as part of imperial Ethiopia's “modernization,” which was influenced by disparate sources, including the United States. Tesfaye saw women's attire as “backward” and “unhygienic” and as obstructing modernization; its elimination was a means to improve Konso culture and help the empire join the community of modern nations. The “culture” of “the Other” has often been cast as impeding “modernity” and requiring elimination or change, particularly the practices of women, from genital cutting in eastern Africa to veiling among Muslim women in the Middle East and Europe (Hodgson 2009; Masquelier 2005; Merry 2009a). So it was with the widespread, politicized transition to cotton clothing in nineteenth- and twentieth-century eastern Africa. The target was clothing worn by all women in Konso and made by women in the low-status category of “Xauta,” sometimes referred to as a “caste.” Leather skirts signaled important stages in women's lives, and became extensions of individual women's tastes, experiences, and identities. Women today recall the violence and punishments of the campaign, including being chased, beaten, imprisoned, and fined, and even having their skirts forcibly removed at home and in public. They offer contradictory explanations of who initiated the ban and the reasons for it, but they remember clearly the local men involved in eradication efforts.

Religious violence has become increasingly relevant in political and academic discourses. Because of the revival of religions, the contemporary world cannot be understood without accounting for the role of religion and religious organizations in peace and conflict, including the case of Ethiopia. The purpose of this article is to examine the role of religion in peace and conflict in the post 1991 of Ethiopia. Methodologically, the paper employed qualitative research approach by relying on secondary sources of data. The findings of the research revealed that Ethiopia has many positive assets that have to be exploited fully and critically including the role of the Inter-Religious Council. The religious policies of the present Ethiopian government are remarkably different from any of the previous ones with regard to the measure of religious freedom they provide. Paradoxically, one may wonder why is it at this time, where religious freedom and equality of religion are guaranteed, we are witnessing increased tensions and violent religious conflicts in contemporary Ethiopia. Inter-religious relations in Ethiopia have been peaceful and tolerant for long period. However, the rise of inter-religious conflicts in recent decades is taking place. Generally, in contemporary Ethiopia religion is used both as an instrument for producing conflict in certain circumstances and as a powerful resource for peace and transformation of conflict in the society. On the whole, identifying the role of religion in conflict is a very complex task to accomplish, as there are multiple variables to be well-thought-out.

This article presents peasant grievances on the flawed 2000 elections in Hadiya zone, southern Ethiopia. For the first time in Ethiopia's electoral history, an opposition party managed to win the majority of the votes in one administrative zone. In the run-up to the elections, government cadres and officials intimidated and harassed candidates and members from the opposition Hadiya National Democratic Organisation (HNDO). Several candidates and members were arrested and political campaigning was restricted. On election day, widespread attempts at rigging the election took place, and violence was exerted in several places by government cadres and the police. Despite the government's attempt to curtail and control the elections in Hadiya, the opposition party mobilised the people in a popular protest to challenge the government party's political hegemony – and won. If this is an indication of a permanent shift of power relations in Hadiya, it is however, too early to say.

This study draws on a social norms framework to examine the influence of interview context—specifically the presence of other women and men—on women’s reported attitudes toward intimate partner violence (IPV) in Ethiopia, where IPV rates are among the highest in the world. The sample (16,515 women, ages 15-49) was taken from Ethiopia’s 2011 Demographic and Health Survey. Results showed the odds of women “justifying” IPV to be nearly twice as great when other women were present during the interview, and nearly half in the presence of men. Implications for more sensitive interview methodology are discussed.

This article is an analysis of the role of human smuggling practices and of the transnational social relations of Eritrean refugees exiting and transitioning through Ethiopia. Based on two years of multisited ethnographic fieldwork, I explore how smugglers, aspiring migrants, and former migrants, settled en route and in diasporic spaces, try to minimize the risk of violence through communities of support and knowhow. In so doing, I argue that smuggling is a socially embedded collective practice that strives to facilitate safe exit and transitions of Eritrean refugees despite the criminalization of migration, the militarization of borders, and the potential and existing criminal activity along Eritrean, Sudanese, and Ethiopian migratory corridors. The facilitation of irregular transits by migrants themselves reproduces a collective system of migratory knowledge that aims to bring refugees to safety—a community of knowledge—in which smuggling emerges as a system of refugee protection from below.

AbstractThis article examines the social and political background of escalating violence between ethnic groups in south‐western Ethiopia who until recently had customary and ritually sanctioned ways of resolving conflict. It highlights the impact of the emerging state hegemony in a local setting on ethnic groups not yet involved in the global political economy. The account also indicates the changing arenas of ‘ethnic’ self‐definition and economic opportunity for local groups in post‐1991 Ethiopia. As the report of a big reconciliation meeting held between the government and the groups involved (and discussed here) makes clear, in the efforts of state agents to mediate emerging conflicts in conditions of increasing resource scarcity and identity struggle, the use of customary mediation mechanisms and their cultural symbolism was rhetorically recognised. But at the same time efficient mediation was structurally impeded by the very nature of the exercise of authority by the agents of the state and by their incapacity to implement practical measures to establish local peace. This failure to reconstitute a new political arena of conflict resolution was matched by the inability of the (representatives of the) ethnic groups concerned to redefine their relationship in a constructive and culturally acceptable manner.

This article reports on trends in organized violence, building on new data by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The falling trend in fatalities stemming from organized violence in the world, observed for five consecutive years, broke upwards in 2020 and deaths in organized violence seem to have settled on a high plateau. UCDP registered more than 80,100 deaths in organized violence in 2020, compared to 76,300 in 2019. The decrease in violence in Afghanistan and Syria was countered by escalating conflicts in, for example, Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), Azerbaijan and Tigray, Ethiopia. Moreover, the call for a global ceasefire following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic failed to produce any results. In fact, the number of active state-based and non-state conflicts, as well as the number of actors carrying out one-sided violence against civilians, increased when compared to 2019. UCDP noted a record-high number of 56 state-based conflicts in 2020, including eight wars. Most of the conflicts occurred in Africa, as the region registered 30 state-based conflicts, including nine new or restarted ones.

ABSTRACTThis article offers a political analysis of the practices and motives of public order policing in Ethiopia and Uganda. It offers an explanation of the continuation of forceful tactics against political protest in a context of changing methods of information gathering, organisation and mobilisation by urban activists resulting from their access to internet and communication technology. It finds the two regimes, as anocracies, are caught between legally allowing protest and yet, conscious of their fragility, determined to crush opposition. For the latter approach, their militarist leaderships rely heavily on continued police violence. The paper concludes that failure of the police to adapt their public order policing to the new protest environment leaves them increasingly ineffective and unpopular. It is likely to provoke an escalation of violence and may both undermine the legitimacy of their regimes and reverse their attempts to open political space that justified their rebellions against former autocracies.

Abstract The recognition of commercial agricultural investment unfolded the allocation of land to investors for the production of different cash and food crops in Ethiopia. But anti-expropriation voices and subsequent vandalizing of investment sites have been mushroomed and become far reminder occasions in Ethiopia. This study, thus, tried to uncover the Political-Economy of land expropriation in Ethiopia: a focus on flower farms in Amhara region. A mixed research design was employed by involving primary and secondary sources of data gathered via interview, focused group discussion, questionnaire and document review. Then, the data were presented, analyzed and interpreted through statistics-by-themes and side-by-side jointly. In the study, land expropriation was carried out without genuine public consultation, ascertaining popular consent and written notification. And, compensation was paid to evictees albeit the valuation process was full of uncertainty and jumping. Moreover, flower farms have negatively affected the livelihood and food security of peasants, which in turn brought violence, tenure insecurity and strained government-society relations. This indicated that the expansion of commercial farming was not made vis-à-vis empowering the displaced people. Thus, evictees should be part of the development process for the sustainability and success of farms.

Abstract Conflicts globally have reportedly declined even though the number of African countries plagued by internal cross border strife has increased. Given this trend, the African peace and security architecture has evolved considerably over the past decade, culminating in the award of the Nobel Peace Prize – to one of the key actors in peace-making process, Ahmed Abiy Ali. Hence, this paper explores how the inter-state conflicts in Africa, such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, reflect some colonial continuities of violence. We, therefore, stipulate the justification for the Nobel Peace Prize to illustrate how norms evolve, and further, how identities are constituted in peace-making. This, we argue, is parallel to other situations in African countries as manifested through identity, legitimacy, and authority in shaping political decisions, within the mutually constitutive relationships between agents and political structures. The paper, therefore, situates the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea into the African context using a model of the decisive action by Abiy, with limited Western influence towards peace, hence providing rationale for subaltern voices and indigenous peace processes in Africa.

This study exploits a sudden and abrupt decline in precipitation of the long rains season in the Horn of Africa to analyze the possible link between climate change and violent armed conflict. Following the 1998 El Niño there has been an overall reduction in precipitation levels – associated with sea-surface temperature changes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans – resulting in an increase in the number and severity of droughts. Given that the probable cause of this shift is anthropogenic forcing, it provides a unique opportunity to study the effect of climate change on society compared to statistical inference based on weather variation. Focusing on communal conflict in Ethiopia and Kenya between 1999 and 2014, exploiting cross-sectional variation across districts, the regression analysis links the precipitation decline to an additional 1.3 conflict events per district. The main estimates show that there is a negative correlation between precipitation and communal conflict with a probability of 0.90. Changing model specification to consider plausible alternative models and accommodate other identifying assumptions produces broadly similar results. The generaliziability of the link between precipitation decline and conflict breaks down when using out-of-sample cross-validation to test the external validity. A leave-one-out cross-validation exercise shows that accounting for climate contributes relatively little to improving the predictive performance of the model. This suggests that there are other more salient factors underlying communal violence in Ethiopia and Kenya. As such, in this case the link between climate and conflict should not be overstated.

AbstractSomaliland has recently developed an unexpected democracy after seceding from chaos-ridden Somalia, while turning its port of Berbera into a success story, competing successfully with the long established ones in the Horn of Africa. A simple game-theoretic model is used to explain why the home-grown bicameral democratic system that emerged in Somaliland is a key factor in controlling violence and providing the required security along the transport infrastructure linking Berbera to neighboring landlocked Ethiopia. The model shows that redistributing some of the fiscal resources levied on this trade is necessary for sustaining this efficient political equilibrium.

Disaster governance in conflict areas is of growing academic concern, but most existing research comprises either single case studies or studies of a variety of country contexts that group all types of conflict together. Based on three case studies, this article offers a middle-ground scenario-based approach, focusing on disaster governance in authoritarian contexts experiencing low-intensity conflict. Low-intensity conflict is characterized by intense political tensions and violence that is more readily expressed in ways other than direct physical harm. Inspired by Olson’s (2000) maxim that disasters are intrinsically political, this article explores the politics of disaster response by asking what is at stake and what happened, unpacking these questions for state, civil society, and international humanitarian actors. Using data from a total of one year of qualitative fieldwork, the article analyzes disaster governance in 2016 drought-ridden Ethiopia, marked by protests and a State of Emergency; 2015 flooded Myanmar, characterized by explosive identity politics; and 2016–2019 drought-ridden Zimbabwe, with its intense socioeconomic and political turbulence. The study’s findings show how framing and power processes in disaster governance—comprising state and non-state actors—largely lean toward the state, with the consequence that political interests, rather than needs assessments, steer who and what will be protected from disaster impact.

ABSTRACTThis paper examines inter-ethnic conflict over grazing land previously accessed as common property. It presents results of a study undertaken in Mieso district of eastern Ethiopia where two ethnic groups maintain different production systems – pastoral and agropastoral. The historical change in land use by one of the ethnic groups, resource scarcity, violation of customary norms, power asymmetry and livestock raids are among the factors that have contributed to the recurrence of conflict. Particularly important is the role of raids in triggering conflict and restricting access to grazing areas. Socio-economic and political factors are responsible for power asymmetry and the increasing scale of raids. An increase in the frequency of violence and a decline in the capacity of customary authority in conflict management advance the role of the state in establishing enforceable property rights institutions. This will succeed only if policies and interventions are redirected at suppressing incentives for violence, establishing new institutional structures in consultation with clan elders of both parties, and building internal capacity to monitor conflict-triggering events.

AbstractThis article provides a descriptive account of rulings of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission (EECC) related to harms inflicted during the Ethiopia-Eritrea armed conflict that disproportionately affected women. Following the introduction, it presents a brief overview of the creation of the EECC and its jurisdiction, procedure and rulings. It then discusses the EECC's rulings on sexual violence, describing the special considerations for applying its standard and quantum of proof in relation to liability and damages in rape claims. The next part focuses on the import of the EECC's rulings in relation to expelled and other displaced civilians (including internally displaced persons), who were largely women and other vulnerable populations. Although the EECC did not, for the most part, find displacement itself to be a violation of the jus in bello, it did award significant amounts of compensation for harms suffered by expelled and displaced civilians and for relief provided to such persons, who were predominantly women and other vulnerable populations, as well as for Eritrea's violation of the jus ad bellum.

The “third wave” of democratization, which saw the fall of old authoritarian regimes across Africa, as well as the introduction of multiparty elections and other significant new changes, has faded. Today, we are witnessing a reversal of democratic gains in favour of dictatorship, resulting in political instability and severe outbreaks of violence in Ethiopia, Mozambique, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, and elsewhere. This article seeks explanation for the failures of the democratization process in Africa, focusing on the challenging role of political institutions in determining the nature of transition trajectories, reviewing its significance, and justifying why this factor is important when analyzing the success or failure of democratization. The paper sought to provide a more robust understanding of Africa's democratization failure and the thorny issue of a transitional path toward good governance. The study found that the progress of the democratic transition process at any given point in history is dependent on the existence of powerful and capable political institutions equipped to face and respond to the challenges of the transition process, and that the more integrated and independent government and civil society institutions are, the more likely democratic practices will thrive. Furthermore, the study showed that under authoritarianism, institutions like elections, political parties, and legislatures are often referred to as "pseudo-democratic" because they are copied, imitated, and mocked to manipulate the concept of democracy and serve the continuation of autocratic rule.

In a contested international order, ideas of liberal peacebuilding are being supplanted by state-centric, authoritarian responses to internal armed conflicts. In this article we suggest that existing research has not yet sufficiently recognised this important shift in conflict management practice. Scholarship in peace and conflict studies has avoided hard cases of ‘illiberal peace’, or categorises them simply as military victories. Drawing on accounts of state responses to conflicts in Russia, Sri Lanka, China, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Turkey, we develop an alternative conceptual framework to understand authoritarian conflict management as a form of wartime and post-conflict order in its own right. Although violence is central to these orders, we argue that they are also dependent on a much wider range of authoritarian policy responses, which we categorise in three major domains: firstly, discourse (state propaganda, information control and knowledge production); secondly, spatial politics (both military and civilian modes of controlling and shaping spaces); and thirdly, political economy (the hierarchical distribution of resources to produce particular political outcomes). In conclusion, we propose a research agenda that moves on from discussions of liberal peace to examine hard cases of contemporary conflict and conflict management.

Abstract Background Undertaking research and attaining informed consent can be challenging when there is political unrest and community mistrust. Rapid ethical appraisal (REA) is a tool that uses qualitative methods to explore sociocultural issues that may affect the ethical conduct of research. Methods We used REA in northeast Ethiopia shortly following a period of unrest, during which violence against researchers occurred, to assess stakeholder perceptions of research, researchers and the informed consent process. We held 32 in-depth interviews and 2 focus group discussions. Results Most community members had little awareness about podoconiosis or healthcare research. Convincing the community to donate blood for research is challenging due to association with HIV testing. The attack on researchers was mainly motivated by the community's mistrust of their intentions against the background of a volatile political situation. Social media contributed to the spread of misinformation. Lack of community engagement was also a key contributing factor. Conclusions Using REA, we identified potential barriers to the informed consent process, participant recruitment for data and specimen collection and the smooth conduct of research. Researchers should assess existing conditions in the study area and engage with the community to increase awareness prior to commencing their research activities.

The main purpose of the study was to deepen the understanding of gender and social inclusion in the context of water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. An explorative qualitative study was conducted in three districts of the Oromia region using gender analysis frameworks. Twenty-one key informant interviews and nine focus group discussions were conducted. Findings showed 52% of households in the study area have basic service level water, 29% have basic service level sanitation, and 14% have basic service level hygiene. Women, girls, and people living with disability disproportionately experience poor access to quality WASH services. Women and girls participate in unequal domestic labor related to water management which often exposes them to discrimination and violence such as rape, abduction, and assault. Overall, women, girls, and other socially excluded groups are rarely consulted and engaged by local actors. This results in incongruent policy and political commitment which limits action at the grassroots level. Integrating gender equality and inclusion efforts into local governance agendas can help to increase access to and the quality of WASH services. These efforts must advocate for moving beyond gender parity to promote gender transformative approaches and inclusion to realize better WASH services for the communities they serve.

AbstractThe role of communications in facilitating public participation in constitution-making is often neglected and misunderstood, particularly in post-war state-building when mass media may be weak. In the early 1990s, Ethiopia's ruling party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), drafted one of Africa's most ambitious constitutions, allowing for ethnic federalism, decentralization and democratic reforms. The constitution has been highly controversial and many of its aspirations remain unrealized. This article explores how the EPRDF sought to use the media to explain and encourage acceptance of the constitution. It offers a framework for analysis that is relevant for countries beyond Ethiopia by examining: the role of media policies in providing domestic and international legitimacy for constitutions; the ways in which media can provide a space for non-violent political conflict or negotiation, where elites can navigate political struggles and debate ideology; and the use of media to implement the constitution's most ambitious goals.

In most Russian and international studies, including African ones, their authors portray African women that reside in areas affected by civil wars and conflicts as victims of violence, robbery, forced labor, etc. At the same time, it is rarely taken into account that in most national liberation movements and rebel groups the number of women fighters constituted and still constitutes 10-30% of their rank and file. Moreover, many women became field commanders, chiefs of intelligence, or were responsible for the supply of weapons and ammunition. The present authors provide a new interpretation of the participation and role of women in the confrontation between armed anti-government factions and the central government. It is noted that in recent decades, not only in Africa, but also in other parts of the world, the trend towards “feminization of the militarization process” has become extremely noticeable. Many women, along with men, participate in acts of violence, including against the civilian population, and thus contribute to the destabilization of the internal political situation. Women most actively participated in hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The present paper looks into reasons and consequences of women’s involvement in insurgencies. It is pointed out that while during the years of the national liberation struggle women were motivated by the overarching goal of achieving independence, in later conflicts many of them fought to expand their political and economic rights and opportunities, i.e., to achieve gender equality. In addition to joining “armed groups” for ideological reasons, women tried to prove that they were “no worse than men”; others joined the ranks of the insurgents to protect themselves and other women from violence or death, i.e., they followed a kind of “survival strategy”. Particular attention is paid to suicide bombers, who have been increasingly used by the Islamist organization Boko Haram in recent years. The authors also consider the conditions in which demobilized women-combatants find themselves. The authors conclude that as the level of women’s involvement in African conflicts is constantly growing, it ceases to be an anomaly and to some extent reflects the “successes” achieved by the “fair sex” in the struggle for equality, although the negative consequences of this participation prevail over the positive ones.

Purpose There is a growing evidence of considering human trafficking as a severe form of violence which usually results in various health outcomes including symptoms of physical health problems. This study aims to examine the magnitude of physical health symptoms during the trafficking period and compare it with that of the period prior to it. Design/methodology/approach A total of 1,387 trafficking returnees from abroad via three trafficking corridors of Ethiopia were recruited consecutively. Among socio-demographic and other characteristics, data on various physical health symptoms that were experienced during the trafficking period and in the two years prior to trafficking were collected. The proportions of physical health symptoms experienced during the two periods were determined and compared using chi-square test. Findings Among all participants, 598 (46.79%) of them experienced weight loss during the trafficking period and 106 (8.28%) before the trafficking period. The extra 38.50% which was experienced during the trafficking period was statistically significant (p < 0.0001). Similar significant differences were observed for symptoms such as forgetfulness (p < 0.0001), stomachache (p = 0.0039), gynecological problems (p = 0.041), bone fracture (p < 0.0001), back pain (p < 0.0001), and wound (p < 0.0001); but not significantly different for symptoms such as skin disease (p-value = 0.1944), tooth pain (p-value =0.6587) and sight problem (p-value = 0.1306). Originality/value Comparing the frequencies of physical health symptoms before and during the trafficking period among victims of trafficking is relatively a new approach to measure the nexus between Human trafficking and health problems.

This paper examines resource-related conflict among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, specifically the Somali and Oromo ethnic groups. It applies theories of property rights, environmental security and political ecology to discuss the complexity of the conflict, using narrative analysis and conflict mapping. Results reveal that the conflict results from interrelated cultural, ecological and political factors. The systems of governance, including the setting up of regions on an ethnic basis and associated competition for land and control of water-points, have contributed to violent conflict between the two ethnic groups. The creation of new administrative units (kebeles) close to regional boundaries has exacerbated the conflict. Moreover, change in land use, prompted by insecure property rights to communal land, rather than expected increase in economic benefits has caused conflicts among the clans of the Oromo. The findings suggest Ethiopian authorities support the functioning of traditional access options, successful operation of customary courts and penalising opportunistic actors to address inter-ethnic conflicts. Applying land use and administration guidelines and empowering customary authorities would reduce the incidence of inter-clan conflict.

This article examines the Depo-Provera Affair—where Israeli doctors administered the contraceptive Depo-Provera to newly immigrated Ethiopian Jewish women—to argue that the Israeli settler colonial project depends on these forms of gendered anti-Black violence, through the management of Black African bodies. In 2013, then Israeli Deputy Health Minister Yaakov Litzman admitted that they had administered Depo-Provera to Ethiopian immigrant women without their consent, after reproductive and civil rights activists in Israel called for an investigation after a drop in the birthrate among Ethiopian women: close to 50 per cent within the previous decade. The demarcation of Blackness as a political tool necessary to advance Israeli modernity and the situating of Black bodies as antithetical to the state of Israel are not contradictory but rather illuminate Israel’s deployment of anti-Blackness through the racial and reproductive violence necessary to become part of the superior, European West.

In Infidel, Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s goal is to provide “a subjective record (p. xii)”of her extraordinary life, a life that straddles six countries – Somalia, SaudiArabia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Holland, and the United States – in merely threedecades. The book’s title, however, suggests that this personal narrativeprobes well beyond the travels and escapades of a young African girl intimes of deep economic strife and political instability. Rather, Infidel mapsout a spiritual journey in reverse, what might be described as an anti-Islamicemigration “from the world of faith to the world of reason – from the worldof excision and forced marriage to the world of sexual emancipation” (pp.347-48).The work is divided into two parts. The first, “My Childhood,” tracksHirsiAli’s early years on the move with hermother, sister, and brother as herfather, beloved but perpetually absent, waged coup after coup againstMuhammad Siad Barre with the Somali Salvation Democratic Front(SSDF). Often he was deported or jailed.As a result, family life for HirsiAliwas far fromideal.After narrating her own birth, six weeks early, shemuses,“[p]erhaps my parents were happy” (p. 17). Tales of economic destitution,political corruption, and a mother who possessed all the symptoms of asevere depressive or schizophrenic suggest the young girl suffered greatphysical and emotional violence throughout her early years.Clearly, at a young age, her coping strategy was to lash out against herelders through ridicule and rebellion, despite the inevitable consequences.As a child, HirsiAli often spat at her grandmother.When hermother orderedher to make ink for the ma`alim who taught her the Qur’an, HirsiAli lockedherself in the bathroom and refused to come out for hours.Another time, shewas too tired to wash up the dishes after dinner, so she hid them all, crusted,in the refrigerator for a day. As a teenager, she devoured sensual romancenovels and trashy thrillers that aroused in her sexual feelings, even thoughshe “knew that doing so was resisting Islam in the most basic way” (p. 94).She also stole visits and kisses with a number of boyfriends, knowing fullwell her family’s disapproval.These seemingly petty alternatives to direct conflict with authority figuresand institutions were, perhaps, the only avenues available to the youngHirsi Ali to assert any control over hostile forces that denied her power overher own existence. These episodes reveal a world that, for Hirsi Ali, is ...

The phenomenon of ethnicity is being declared by many to be the cause of all the problems of Africa, especially those of violent conflict. Some salient examples are Rwanda, Burundi and Kenya. While in many cases ethnicity and ethnic-based antagonisms have indeed been a factor in conflicts and have often been suppressed within the structures of the post-colonial states (with their seemingly sacrosanct boundaries), the political relevance of the phenomenon has varied widely. In the political system and the laws of an African country, however, ethnicity seldom received official recognition.

Abstract The Horn Africa is the region that consists of Ethiopia, Eretria, Djibouti and Somalia. It is also the region where more than 100 languages are spoken. Besides, it is blessed with natural resources and assumed to be the origin of human beings. Yet, it has remained the scene of various types of conflicts. Of the many areas in the horn of Africa which has been prone to such violent conflict, is the Southwest Ethiopia. This paper attempts to investigate the causes and consequences of the conflict between the Dizi and Suri people. It is in particular stress on addressing the political, social and economic dimension of the conflict, looking first at the administration system, state lead development interventions and economic situations. Evidences were collected from archival sources, field observation and interviews (at six parishes in Maji, Bero and Surma districts) between January and August 2014. It would be factual to argue that the conflict between the Dizi and Suri people in southwest Ethiopia was mainly caused by competition over the natural resources. Until the 1940s, the conflict was merely a local issue which had been mostly resolved through elder’s mediation.

THROUGHOUT THIS CENTURY, THE STRUGGLE FOR AND consolidation of Jewish territorial sovereignty in the ancient Land of Israel has been characterized by two complementary processes: waves of Jewish immigration from throughout the diaspora, and a succession of violent conflicts with Israel's Arab neighbours. Both of those processes were at work during 1990 — 91 when Israel became reluctantly involved in the Gulf war while also having to cope with an influx of hundreds of thousands of Jews seeking escape from the crumbling Soviet empire, as well as a few thousand emigrants from Ethiopia and from South America. For many Israelis, the surrealistic spectacle of immigrants being greeted at Ben-Gurion Airport with gas-masks designed to protect them from the Iraqi Scud missiles raining down on major Israeli cities, represented highly dramatic evidence of the fulfilment of Zionism's aspirations.

This article examines customary institutions governing rangeland resources in the Oromia Region, Ethiopia. Using data from different pastoral groups, we employed a case-study approach to explore how property rights are defined and enforced. The study indicates heterogeneity in systems of defining and enforcing rights. Due to the fugitive nature of resource use in pastoral systems, property rights vary seasonally. Though flexibility in the definition of such rights has become central to the survival of pastoral herders, formal administrative boundaries and policies have limited resource access, becoming sources of violent conflict and obstacle to customary systems. Government policies favouring private land use, expansion of large-scale investment on pastoral land, establishment of national parks, and certification of privately used land challenged the smooth functioning of customary land governance. This implies that state intervention should not undermine customary systems but permit them to exercise rangeland governance and ensure pastoral rights to secure livelihoods.

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

IntroductionThere are two types of Africa. The first is a place where people and cultures live. The second is the image of Africa that has been invented through colonial knowledge and power. The colonial image of Africa, as the Other of Europe, a land “enveloped in the dark mantle of night” was supported by western states as it justified their colonial practices (Hegel 91). Any evidence that challenged the myth of the Dark Continent was destroyed, removed or ignored. While the looting of African natural resources has been studied, the looting of African knowledges hasn’t received as much attention, partly based on the assumption that Africans did not produce knowledge that could be stolen. This article invalidates this myth by examining the legacy of Ethiopia’s indigenous Ge’ez literature, and its looting and abduction by powerful western agents. The article argues that this has resulted in epistemic violence, where students of the Ethiopian indigenous education system do not have access to their books, while European orientalists use them to interpret Ethiopian history and philosophy using a foreign lens. The analysis is based on interviews with teachers and students of ten Ge’ez schools in Ethiopia, and trips to the Ethiopian manuscript collections in The British Library, The Princeton Library, the Institute of Ethiopian Studies and The National Archives in Addis Ababa.The Context of Ethiopian Indigenous KnowledgesGe’ez is one of the ancient languages of Africa. According to Professor Ephraim Isaac, “about 10,000 years ago, one single nation or community of a single linguistic group existed in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and the Horn of Africa” (The Habesha). The language of this group is known as Proto-Afroasiatic or Afrasian languages. It is the ancestor of the Semitic, Cushitic, Nilotic, Omotic and other languages that are currently spoken in Ethiopia by its 80 ethnic groups, and the neighbouring countries (Diakonoff). Ethiopians developed the Ge’ez language as their lingua franca with its own writing system some 2000 years ago. Currently, Ge’ez is the language of academic scholarship, studied through the traditional education system (Isaac, The Ethiopian). Since the fourth century, an estimated 1 million Ge’ez manuscripts have been written, covering religious, historical, mathematical, medicinal, and philosophical texts.One of the most famous Ge’ez manuscripts is the Kebra Nagast, a foundational text that embodied the indigenous conception of nationhood in Ethiopia. The philosophical, political and religious themes in this book, which craft Ethiopia as God’s country and the home of the Ark of the Covenant, contributed to the country’s success in defending itself from European colonialism. The production of books like the Kebra Nagast went hand in hand with a robust indigenous education system that trained poets, scribes, judges, artists, administrators and priests. Achieving the highest stages of learning requires about 30 years after which the scholar would be given the rare title Arat-Ayina, which means “four eyed”, a person with the ability to see the past as well as the future. Today, there are around 50,000 Ge’ez schools across the country, most of which are in rural villages and churches.Ge’ez manuscripts are important textbooks and reference materials for students. They are carefully prepared from vellum “to make them last forever” (interview, 3 Oct. 2019). Some of the religious books are regarded as “holy persons who breathe wisdom that gives light and food to the human soul”. Other manuscripts, often prepared as scrolls are used for medicinal purposes. Each manuscript is uniquely prepared reflecting inherited wisdom on contemporary lives using the method called Tirguamme, the act of giving meaning to sacred texts. Preparation of books is costly. Smaller manuscript require the skins of 50-70 goats/sheep and large manuscript needed 100-120 goats/sheep (Tefera).The Loss of Ethiopian ManuscriptsSince the 18th century, a large quantity of these manuscripts have been stolen, looted, or smuggled out of the country by travellers who came to the country as explorers, diplomats and scientists. The total number of Ethiopian manuscripts taken is still unknown. Amsalu Tefera counted 6928 Ethiopian manuscripts currently held in foreign libraries and museums. This figure does not include privately held or unofficial collections (41).Looting and smuggling were sponsored by western governments, institutions, and notable individuals. For example, in 1868, The British Museum Acting Director Richard Holms joined the British army which was sent to ‘rescue’ British hostages at Maqdala, the capital of Emperor Tewodros. Holms’ mission was to bring treasures for the Museum. Before the battle, Tewodros had established the Medhanialem library with more than 1000 manuscripts as part of Ethiopia’s “industrial revolution”. When Tewodros lost the war and committed suicide, British soldiers looted the capital, including the treasury and the library. They needed 200 mules and 15 elephants to transport the loot and “set fire to all buildings so that no trace was left of the edifices which once housed the manuscripts” (Rita Pankhurst 224). Richard Holmes collected 356 manuscripts for the Museum. A wealthy British woman called Lady Meux acquired some of the most illuminated manuscripts. In her will, she bequeathed them to be returned to Ethiopia. However, her will was reversed by court due to a campaign from the British press (Richard Pankhurst). In 2018, the V&A Museum in London displayed some of the treasures by incorporating Maqdala into the imperial narrative of Britain (Woldeyes, Reflections).Britain is by no means the only country to seek Ethiopian manuscripts for their collections. Smuggling occurred in the name of science, an act of collecting manuscripts for study. Looting involved local collaborators and powerful foreign sponsors from places like France, Germany and the Vatican. Like Maqdala, this was often sponsored by governments or powerful financers. For example, the French government sponsored the Dakar-Djibouti Mission led by Marcel Griaule, which “brought back about 350 manuscripts and scrolls from Gondar” (Wion 2). It was often claimed that these manuscripts were purchased, rather than looted. Johannes Flemming of Germany was said to have purchased 70 manuscripts and ten scrolls for the Royal Library of Berlin in 1905. However, there was no local market for buying manuscripts. Ge’ez manuscripts were, and still are, written to serve spiritual and secular life in Ethiopia, not for buying and selling. There are countless other examples, but space limits how many can be provided in this article. What is important to note is that museums and libraries have accrued impressive collections without emphasising how those collections were first obtained. The loss of the intellectual heritage of Ethiopians to western collectors has had an enormous impact on the country.Knowledge Grabbing: The Denial of Access to KnowledgeWith so many manuscripts lost, European collectors became the narrators of Ethiopian knowledge and history. Edward Ullendorff, a known orientalist in Ethiopian studies, refers to James Bruce as “the explorer of Abyssinia” (114). Ullendorff commented on the significance of Bruce’s travel to Ethiopia asperhaps the most important aspect of Bruce’s travels was the collection of Ethiopic manuscripts… . They opened up entirely new vistas for the study of Ethiopian languages and placed this branch of Oriental scholarship on a much more secure basis. It is not known how many MSS. reached Europe through his endeavours, but the present writer is aware of at least twenty-seven, all of which are exquisite examples of Ethiopian manuscript art. (133)This quote encompasses three major ways in which epistemic violence occurs: denial of access to knowledge, Eurocentric interpretation of Ethiopian manuscripts, and the handling of Ge’ez manuscripts as artefacts from the past. These will be discussed below.Western ‘travellers’, such as Bruce, did not fully disclose how many manuscripts they took or how they acquired them. The abundance of Ethiopian manuscripts in western institutions can be compared to the scarcity of such materials among traditional schools in Ethiopia. In this research, I have visited ten indigenous schools in Wollo (Lalibela, Neakutoleab, Asheten, Wadla), in Gondar (Bahita, Kuskwam, Menbere Mengist), and Gojam (Bahirdar, Selam Argiew Maryam, Giorgis). In all of the schools, there is lack of Ge’ez manuscripts. Students often come from rural villages and do not receive any government support. The scarcity of Ge’ez manuscripts, and the lack of funding which might allow for the purchasing of books, means the students depend mainly on memorising Ge’ez texts told to them from the mouth of their teacher. Although this method of learning is not new, it currently is the only way for passing indigenous knowledges across generations.The absence of manuscripts is most strongly felt in the advanced schools. For instance, in the school of Qene, poetic literature is created through an in-depth study of the vocabulary and grammar of Ge’ez. A Qene student is required to develop a deep knowledge of Ge’ez in order to understand ancient and medieval Ge’ez texts which are used to produce poetry with multiple meanings. Without Ge’ez manuscripts, students cannot draw their creative works from the broad intellectual tradition of their ancestors. When asked how students gain access to textbooks, one student commented:we don’t have access to Birana books (Ge’ez manuscripts written on vellum). We cannot learn the ancient wisdom of painting, writing, and computing developed by our ancestors. We simply buy paper books such as Dawit (Psalms), Sewasew (grammar) or Degwa (book of songs with notations) and depend on our teachers to teach us the rest. We also lend these books to each other as many students cannot afford to buy them. Without textbooks, we expect to spend double the amount of time it would take if we had textbooks. (Interview, 3 Sep. 2019)Many students interrupt their studies and work as labourers to save up and buy paper textbooks, but they still don’t have access to the finest works taken to Europe. Most Ge’ez manuscripts remaining in Ethiopia are locked away in monasteries, church stores or other places to prevent further looting. The manuscripts in Addis Ababa University and the National Archives are available for researchers but not to the students of the indigenous system, creating a condition of internal knowledge grabbing.While the absence of Ge’ez manuscripts denied, and continues to deny, Ethiopians the chance to enrich their indigenous education, it benefited western orientalists to garner intellectual authority on the field of Ethiopian studies. In 1981, British Museum Director John Wilson said, “our Abyssinian holdings are more important than our Indian collection” (Bell 231). In reaction, Richard Pankhurst, the Director of Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa, responded that the collection was acquired through plunder. Defending the retaining of Maqdala manuscripts in Europe, Ullendorff wrote:neither Dr. Pankhurst nor the Ethiopian and western scholars who have worked on this collection (and indeed on others in Europe) could have contributed so significantly to the elucidation of Ethiopian history without the rich resources available in this country. Had they remained insitu, none of this would have been possible. (Qtd. in Bell 234)The manuscripts are therefore valued based on their contribution to western scholarship only. This is a continuation of epistemic violence whereby local knowledges are used as raw materials to produce Eurocentric knowledge, which in turn is used to teach Africans as though they had no prior knowledge. Scholars are defined as those western educated persons who can speak European languages and can travel to modern institutions to access the manuscripts. Knowledge grabbing regards previous owners as inexistent or irrelevant for the use of the grabbed knowledges.Knowledge grabbing also means indigenous scholars are deprived of critical resources to produce new knowledge based on their intellectual heritage. A Qene teacher commented: our students could not devote their time and energy to produce new knowledges in the same way our ancestors did. We have the tradition of Madeladel, Kimera, Kuteta, Mielad, Qene and tirguamme where students develop their own system of remembering, reinterpreting, practicing, and rewriting previous manuscripts and current ones. Without access to older manuscripts, we increasingly depend on preserving what is being taught orally by elders. (Interview, 4 Sep. 2019)This point is important as it relates to the common myth that indigenous knowledges are artefacts belonging to the past, not the present. There are millions of people who still use these knowledges, but the conditions necessary for their reproduction and improvement is denied through knowledge grabbing. The view of Ge’ez manuscripts as artefacts dismisses the Ethiopian view that Birana manuscripts are living persons. As a scholar told me in Gondar, “they are creations of Egziabher (God), like all of us. Keeping them in institutions is like keeping living bodies in graveyards” (interview, 5 Oct. 2019).Recently, the collection of Ethiopian manuscripts by western institutions has also been conducted digitally. Thousands of manuscripts have been microfilmed or digitised. For example, the EU funded Ethio-SPaRe project resulted in the digital collection of 2000 Ethiopian manuscripts (Nosnitsin). While digitisation promises better access for people who may not be able to visit institutions to see physical copies, online manuscripts are not accessible to indigenous school students in Ethiopia. They simply do not have computer or internet access and the manuscripts are catalogued in European languages. Both physical and digital knowledge grabbing results in the robbing of Ethiopian intellectual heritage, and denies the possibility of such manuscripts being used to inform local scholarship. Epistemic Violence: The European as ExpertWhen considered in relation to stolen or appropriated manuscripts, epistemic violence is the way in which local knowledge is interpreted using a foreign epistemology and gained dominance over indigenous worldviews. European scholars have monopolised the field of Ethiopian Studies by producing books, encyclopaedias and digital archives based on Ethiopian manuscripts, almost exclusively in European languages. The contributions of their work for western scholarship is undeniable. However, Kebede argues that one of the detrimental effects of this orientalist literature is the thesis of Semiticisation, the designation of the origin of Ethiopian civilisation to the arrival of Middle Eastern colonisers rather than indigenous sources.The thesis is invented to make the history of Ethiopia consistent with the Hegelian western view that Africa is a Dark Continent devoid of a civilisation of its own. “In light of the dominant belief that black peoples are incapable of great achievements, the existence of an early and highly advanced civilization constitutes a serious anomaly in the Eurocentric construction of the world” (Kebede 4). To address this anomaly, orientalists like Ludolph attributed the origin of Ethiopia’s writing system, agriculture, literature, and civilisation to the arrival of South Arabian settlers. For example, in his translation of the Kebra Nagast, Budge wrote: “the SEMITES found them [indigenous Ethiopians] negro savages, and taught them civilization and culture and the whole scriptures on which their whole literature is based” (x).In line with the above thesis, Dillman wrote that “the Abyssinians borrowed their Numerical Signs from the Greeks” (33). The views of these orientalist scholars have been challenged. For instance, leading scholar of Semitic languages Professor Ephraim Isaac considers the thesis of the Arabian origin of Ethiopian civilization “a Hegelian Eurocentric philosophical perspective of history” (2). Isaac shows that there is historical, archaeological, and linguistic evidence that suggest Ethiopia to be more advanced than South Arabia from pre-historic times. Various Ethiopian sources including the Kebra Nagast, the works of historian Asres Yenesew, and Ethiopian linguist Girma Demeke provide evidence for the indigenous origin of Ethiopian civilisation and languages.The epistemic violence of the Semeticisation thesis lies in how this Eurocentric ideological construction is the dominant narrative in the field of Ethiopian history and the education system. Unlike the indigenous view, the orientalist view is backed by strong institutional power both in Ethiopia and abroad. The orientalists control the field of Ethiopian studies and have access to Ge’ez manuscripts. Their publications are the only references for Ethiopian students. Due to Native Colonialism, a system of power run by native elites through the use of colonial ideas and practices (Woldeyes), the education system is the imitation of western curricula, including English as a medium of instruction from high school onwards. Students study the west more than Ethiopia. Indigenous sources are generally excluded as unscientific. Only the Eurocentric interpretation of Ethiopian manuscripts is regarded as scientific and objective.ConclusionEthiopia is the only African country never to be colonised. In its history it produced a large quantity of manuscripts in the Ge’ez language through an indigenous education system that involves the study of these manuscripts. Since the 19th century, there has been an ongoing loss of these manuscripts. European travellers who came to Ethiopia as discoverers, missionaries and scholars took a large number of manuscripts. The Battle of Maqdala involved the looting of the intellectual products of Ethiopia that were collected at the capital. With the introduction of western education and use of English as a medium of instruction, the state disregarded indigenous schools whose students have little access to the manuscripts. This article brings the issue of knowledge grapping, a situation whereby European institutions and scholars accumulate Ethiopia manuscripts without providing the students in Ethiopia to have access to those collections.Items such as manuscripts that are held in western institutions are not dead artefacts of the past to be preserved for prosperity. They are living sources of knowledge that should be put to use in their intended contexts. Local Ethiopian scholars cannot study ancient and medieval Ethiopia without travelling and gaining access to western institutions. This lack of access and resources has made European Ethiopianists almost the sole producers of knowledge about Ethiopian history and culture. For example, indigenous sources and critical research that challenge the Semeticisation thesis are rarely available to Ethiopian students. Here we see epistemic violence in action. Western control over knowledge production has the detrimental effect of inventing new identities, subjectivities and histories that translate into material effects in the lives of African people. In this way, Ethiopians and people all over Africa internalise western understandings of themselves and their history as primitive and in need of development or outside intervention. African’s intellectual and cultural heritage, these living bodies locked away in graveyards, must be put back into the hands of Africans.AcknowledgementThe author acknowledges the support of the Australian Academy of the Humanities' 2019 Humanities Travelling Fellowship Award in conducting this research.ReferencesBell, Stephen. “Cultural Treasures Looted from Maqdala: A Summary of Correspondence in British National Newspapers since 1981.” Kasa and Kasa. Eds. Tadesse Beyene, Richard Pankhurst, and Shifereraw Bekele. Addis Ababa: Ababa University Book Centre, 1990. 231-246.Budge, Wallis. A History of Ethiopia, Nubia and Abyssinia. London: Methuen and Co, 1982.Demeke, Girma Awgichew. The Origin of Amharic. Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2013.Diakonoff, Igor M. Afrasian Languages. Moscow: Nauka, 1988.Dillmann, August. Ethiopic Grammar. Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2005.Hegel, Georg W.F. The Philosophy of History. New York: Dover, 1956.Isaac, Ephraim. The Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church. New Jersey: Red Sea Press, 2013.———. “An Open Letter to an Inquisitive Ethiopian Sister.” The Habesha, 2013. 1 Feb. 2020 <http://www.zehabesha.com/an-open-letter-to-an-inquisitive-young-ethiopian-sister-ethiopian-history-is-not-three-thousand-years/>.Kebra Nagast. "The Queen of Sheba and Her Only Son Menyelik I." Trans. Wallis Budge. London: Oxford UP, 1932.Pankhurst, Richard. "The Napier Expedition and the Loot Form Maqdala." Presence Africaine 133-4 (1985): 233-40.Pankhurst, Rita. "The Maqdala Library of Tewodros." Kasa and Kasa. Eds. Tadesse Beyene, Richard Pankhurst, and Shifereraw Bekele. Addis Ababa: Ababa University Book Centre, 1990. 223-230.Tefera, Amsalu. ነቅዐ መጻህፍት ከ መቶ በላይ በግዕዝ የተጻፉ የእኢትዮጵያ መጻህፍት ዝርዝር ከማብራሪያ ጋር።. Addis Ababa: Jajaw, 2019.Nosnitsin, Denis. "Ethio-Spare Cultural Heritage of Christian Ethiopia: Salvation, Preservation and Research." 2010. 5 Jan. 2019 <https://www.aai.uni-hamburg.de/en/ethiostudies/research/ethiospare/missions/pdf/report2010-1.pdf>. Ullendorff, Edward. "James Bruce of Kinnaird." The Scottish Historical Review 32.114, part 2 (1953): 128-43.Wion, Anaïs. "Collecting Manuscripts and Scrolls in Ethiopia: The Missions of Johannes Flemming (1905) and Enno Littmann (1906)." 2012. 5 Jan. 2019 <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00524382/document>. Woldeyes, Yirga Gelaw. Native Colonialism: Education and the Economy of Violence against Traditions in Ethiopia. Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2017.———. “Reflections on Ethiopia’s Stolen Treasures on Display in a London Museum.” The Conversation. 2018. 5 June 2018 <https://theconversation.com/reflections-on-ethiopias-stolen-treasures-on-display-in-a-london-museum-97346>.Yenesew, Asres. ትቤ፡አክሱም፡መኑ፡ አንተ? Addis Ababa: Nigid Printing House, 1959 [1951 EC].

PurposeThe main objective of this study is to examine how political institutions affect economic performance in Ethiopia over the 1980–2019 time periods.Design/methodology/approachMainly, the impact of political institution indicators including, level of democracy, political violence, democratic accountability and regime durability have been examined using auto regressive distributed lag (ARDL) bound test approach to co-integration and the error correction model.FindingsThis study confirms that level of democracy and democratic accountability has an adverse long effect on the economic performance of Ethiopia. On the other hand, political violence has a negative short-run causal effect on economic performance in Ethiopia. The study concluded that the deterioration of political institutions harmfully affected economic performance in Ethiopia.Practical implicationsGovernment policymakers should primarily pay attention to promoting and changing those political institutions that harm economic performance. Additionally, better management of political violence has important implications for fostering the economic performance of Ethiopia.Originality/valueOriginality: This study provides some valuable evidence on the nexuses between political institutions and economic performance in Ethiopia. Likely, this is the first investigation on the subject under the consideration to use time analysis and will vigorously contribute to the literature as well by employing the ADRL bound test. Previous studies have examined the impact of the institution on economic growth on a cross-country basis. Further analysis is required to understand the effects of institutions such as level of democracy, political violence and democratic accountability on economic development.

The Covid-19 pandemic struck Ethiopia at an important juncture in its development and political path. Following impressive progress in poverty reduction and human development in recent decades, driven by a state-led model, it is transitioning towards a more democratic governance structure and a more liberal economic model. This article examines the country’s response to the pandemic, focusing on social protection and health systems. Ethiopia’s experience demonstrates the importance of building shock-responsive systems for social protection, including pre-identification of vulnerable groups and a financing strategy to trigger an immediate response. It also highlights how the health sector capacity can be further strengthened in anticipation of future health emergencies. For example, the government could identify and build the health sector industry capacity before future shocks occur in order to quickly scale up the response. Covid-19 had a disproportionate impact on women and girls due to the closure of schools; limited access to gender-based violence and health services; and the economic impact on informal sectors. The article concludes by sharing key lessons for developing countries on how prioritisation of vulnerable groups and ensuring strong political commitment can support a more effective pandemic response.

Ethiopia has been plunged into one of the worst crises in the recent history of the country with waves of protest and violence erupting in some parts of the country since 2014. The announcement of a draft integrated developmental plan for Addis Ababa and neighbouring towns and villages of Oromia regional state, referred to as the ‘master plan’, sparked protest in April 2014 that engulfed many towns and cities of Oromia - the largest among the nine regional states formed along ethno-lingual basis.[1]Another wave of protest erupted again around mid-November 2015, this time with a far more political repercussion. Protest, which came to be known as the ‘Oromo protest’, erupted across the Oromia region and continues to reverberate to this date despite the heavy-crackdown by the government. The episode raised eyebrows among many scholars and politicians to comprehend what went wrong with the country that received wide accolades for its impressive economic growth. This commentary will unpack the discontents that precipitated the protest and suggest the way forward. The commentary argues that implementation of national developmental policy has caused discontent and disenfranchisement among the wider public; and underpinning national development policies with the ideals of process-based leadership would mitigate the discontents and offer sustainable, peaceful development. [1]Ethiopia has been restructured along with ethnic federalism since the advent of the incumbent ruling party, Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, since 1991.

This study explored the factors associated with the engagement of women in intimate partner homicide (IPH) through 10 in-depth interviews with women incarcerated in three correction facilities in Oromiya Regional State of Ethiopia. In addition, key informant interviews and six focus groups involving traditional leaders, Kebele administrators, and community members help triangulate the findings. The study revealed insight into women’s social, psychological, and economic status prior to their crime. Low levels of education and economic opportunity, forced marriage, marital dispute due to polygamy, spousal violence, and low levels of community support were associated with IPH. Implications for research, policy, and practice are discussed.

At the end of the state perpetrated largescale violence, two important puzzling questions need to be addressed by post-conflict states. The first one chiefly concern how to ensure accountability or fight impunity, and the second is concerned with how to transform a society wrecked by prolonged conflicts into a durable peace in a non-violent means (Jarstad & Sisk, 2008). One such effort to deal with these questions was implementation of a transitional justice measures which evolved to encompass broader themes in addition to criminal accountability and it has shown a considerable relevance and expansion since the end of Cold War. After the demise of Marxist military junta of Derg regime in 1991, the Transitional Government of Ethiopia attempted to respond to the Derg-era atrocities of Red Terror through the establishment of Special Prosecution Office (SPO) in 1992. Ethiopia’s SPO undertook one of the most extensive criminal investigations after Nuremburg trials by its own resources and domestic tribunals and the mass trials lasted for nearly two decades. However, the assessment about its significance for domestic political transformation and its legacy remained largely untold. The aim of this paper is to make a critical review of available works on the ‘red terror trials’ and reconsider its achievements and pitfalls and to interrogate as to whether it can still provide important lessons for today’s reality. By critically reviewing available literatures and official reports, the paper found that the efforts of Red Terror trials partly succeeded in ending impunity, averting tendency of summary executions and revenge killings, and in eliciting some ‘truths. However, the measure was affected by severe limitations including the adopting the narrower model of transitional justice measures chiefly focusing on criminal prosecutions, and also questioned legitimacy of trials amidst human rights violations by the new regime itself. These limitations coupled with other factors constrained the capacity of the Derg’s Red Terror trials so that it remained short of being translated into a lasting legacy in terms of meaningful political transformation.

Objective The pandemic is expanding exponentially, burning, and threatening the world population regardless of differences. Cognizant of these, world nations make it their daily agenda and give due concern in preventing and intervening it. However, the prevention and intervention strategies are of more biological and less attention is given for the psychological impacts. So that this manuscript is intended to review the psychological impacts and mitigating strategies of COVID-19 in Ethiopia. Method Out the 63 downloaded articles, 26 articles were selected by considering relatedness, reputable journal, and pattern of writing and reviewed. Results Most reviewed studies reported negative psychological impacts including, boredom, loneliness, anger, violence and abuse, distress, low mood and irritability, anxiety, insomnia, hopelessness and worthless, and suicide. Other associated factors like poverty, fears of infection, duration of quarantine, lack of genuine and adequate information, lack of basic supplies, stigma, housing condition, and cultural issues potentially worsen the psychological impacts. Conclusion Psychological intervention strategies like mobilizing volunteers and professionals, identifying vulnerable population, assuring psychological readiness, offering adequate and genuine information, providing adequate supplies, improving communication for those in quarantine, utilizing counseling platform and rehabilitation program are of the cures for psychological impacts of COVID-19.