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1
Kirilenko, Viktor, and Georgy Alekseev. "Extremists: Criminals and Victims of Radical Violence." Russian Journal of Criminology 13, no. 4 (August 23, 2019): 612–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2500-4255.2019.13(4).612-628.
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The radical political violence outgoing from extremist communities became the most dangerous trend in the modern criminal dynamics. The victims of crimes committed by suicide terrorists are not only those who are subject to political and ideological violence, but also absolutely random people outside the field of politics. The actual perpetrators of mass homicide, including the most brutal acts of terrorism, are extremists with homicide-suicidal syndrome, interested in the society’s attention to them, convinced, in an irrational way, that absolutely all people are guilty of their problems. The fate of extremists and victims of their radical violence is not always directly determined by the level of unemployment or organized relations between the rule of law state and other social management institutions. These well-known criminological determinants affect the form of extremist actions and crimes, they may lower the level of extremist aggression, but do not change the motives of criminals. The higher the quality of life in the country, the less frequently mass homicide will happen, but it is likely to use high tech. Limiting the use of firearms by extremists, we are confronted with their attempts to adapt vehicles for deadly purposes. The actions of extremists do not reflect any real political struggle for freedom and independence, for religious values, for social justice; in practice, there is irrational extremism — a new socio-political phenomenon of active criminal protest against the very idea of humanism. Violent extremism emerges against the background of a certain social situation: 1) low efficiency of social policy; 2) isolation of an individual from civil society institutions and state structures; 3) desperate human desire for self-realization that is set against universal indifference to the problems of an individual. Under the influence of criminogenic factors, an extremist’s personality may become the object of manipulation by terrorist groups and other criminal communities.
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Baier, Dirk, Patrik Manzoni, and Marie Christine Bergmann. "Einflussfaktoren des politischen Extremismus im Jugendalter — Rechtsextremismus, Linksextremismus und islamischer Extremismus im Vergleich / Influencing Factors of Political Extremism in Adolescence — Right-Wing Extremism, Left-Wing Extremism and Islamic Extremism Compared." Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform / Journal of Criminology an Penal Reform 99, no. 3 (November 1, 2016): 171–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mkr-2016-0302.
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Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag werden Einflussfaktoren von drei Formen des politischen Extremismus untersucht. Die Einflussfaktoren werden aus der Desintegrations-, Bindungs- und Selbstkontrolltheorie abgeleitet. Die Prüfung erfolgt anhand einer umfangreichen Befragung von Jugendlichen der neunten Jahrgangsstufe, die im Jahr 2013 in Niedersachsen durchgeführt wurde. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein kleiner Teil der Jugendlichen extreme Einstellungen befürwortet bzw. extremes Verhalten ausführt. Extremismusübergreifend erweisen sich »institutionelle Desintegration« in Form einer als negativ wahrgenommenen Behandlung durch die Polizei, »belief« in Form der eigenen Gesetzestreue und »Risikosuche« als eine Dimension der niedrigen Selbstkontrolle als wichtige Einflussfaktoren. Mit Blick auf den islamischen Extremismus, der aufgrund der Datenlage als Deutschenfeindlichkeit operationalisiert wird, werden zusätzlich spezifische Einflussfaktoren identifiziert (strukturelle Desintegration, Vereinszugehörigkeit und schulische Erfahrungen).
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SHULYAKOVSKAYA, J. M., and D. A. KHVATOV. "THE STATE OF SOCIETY AS A SOURCE OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM." Central Russian Journal of Social Sciences 15, no. 6 (2020): 147–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2071-2367-2020-15-6-147-158.
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The purpose of the work is to carry out a comprehensive analysis of conflict destructions in society in the form of socio-cultural contradictions that determine the manifestations of extremism and terrorism. The subject of the research is social norms aimed at regulating social relations in the sphere of overcoming manifestations of terrorism and extremism, determined by the conflict phenomena of society. Methodological basis - using the data of secondary research, an analysis of social attitudes and stereotypes that form a high level of extremist and terrorist manifestations, and in this regard, which is an indicator of the emergence of a state of anomie in society, was carried out. This article analyzes the main conflict destruction of society as a basic source of extremism and terrorism. Among them are the following: civilizational crisis, expressed in political and economic antagonism, split in society, strengthening of existing differences between the Eastern and Western worldviews. It is substantiated that these phenomena are associated with the deterioration of the state of society. The population under the pressure of threats comes to the conclusion that the public danger does not come from extremists and terrorists, but from representatives of public authorities who do not want to accept the political speculations of extremists and terrorists. In this situation, society itself becomes an "accomplice" of extremists and terrorists. As a result, the ways of overcoming the manifestations of terrorism and extremism determined by the conflict phenomena of society are identified.
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Þórisdóttir, Hulda, and Eva Heiða Önnudóttir. "Need for security and system fairness on the political extremes." Veftímaritið Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla 11, no. 2 (December 15, 2015): 115. http://dx.doi.org/10.13177/irpa.a.2015.11.2.1.
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We advance and empirically test the idea that people on both the far right and far left will be more likely than political moderates to perceive the system as fair, as long as it serves their heightened needs for security. We argue that political extremists may be especially drawn to systems that offer certainty and security. As long as ideological extremists are not alienated from the political system in general, they will, therefore, be especially motivated to see the system as fair, in particular, if extremism is coupled with a heightened need for security. We test this notion using data from Iceland, a country with a wide left–right spread in terms of the political opinions of both parties and people and which was, at the time of the study, still reeling from an economic crisis that strongly affected political trust and threatened people’s sense of security. We analyzed nationally representative data from the European Social Survey in 2012 (N = 752). The results showed a significant three-way interaction between political extremism, the need for security, and political trust in predicting perceived system fairness. The people most likely to perceive the system as fair were political extremists, with relatively high political trust and need for security. The results are discussed in light of context effects and how people on the left and right might have higher needs for security with different threats in mind.
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Kurzman, Charles, Ahsan Kamal, and Hajar Yazdiha. "Ideology and Threat Assessment: Law Enforcement Evaluation of Muslim and Right-Wing Extremism." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 3 (January 1, 2017): 237802311770477. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2378023117704771.
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Does ideology affect assessment of the threat of violent extremism? A survey of law enforcement agencies in the United States in 2014 offers a comparison suggesting a small but statistically significant effect: Political attitudes were correlated with assessment of threats posed by Muslim extremists, and threat assessment was not correlated with the number of Muslim Americans who had engaged in violent extremism within the agency’s jurisdiction. By contrast, the perceived threat of right-wing terrorism was correlated with the number of incidents of right-wing violence and not with political attitudes. These findings reflect the context of growing polarization of attitudes toward Muslims in the United States as well as the challenge of bringing counterterrorism policies into proportion with the actual scale of violent extremism.
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Baugut, Philip, and Katharina Neumann. "How Right-Wing Extremists Use and Perceive News Media." Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 96, no. 3 (November 20, 2018): 696–720. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077699018803080.
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We investigate how right-wing extremists use, perceive, and try to provoke news media coverage. Findings from qualitative interviews with former leaders of right-wing extremist groups in Germany, who served as key informants, show that reports on right-wing extremism are used and trigger feelings of being personally affected. Consequently, right-wing extremists show hostile-media and third-person perceptions. These perceptions influence both emotions and behaviors among right-wing extremists, for example, they cause right-wing leaders to strategically monitor news media to exploit them for political goals. Our findings are presented along with a model and are accompanied by a discussion of the implications for responsible journalism.
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Parker, David, and Lasse Lindekilde. "Preventing Extremism with Extremists: A Double-Edged Sword? An Analysis of the Impact of Using Former Extremists in Danish Schools." Education Sciences 10, no. 4 (April 16, 2020): 111. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/educsci10040111.
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Governments across the West have invested significant resources in preventing radicalization, and strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE) are increasingly prominent within wider counter-terrorism policies. However, we know little about their effects, especially about projects that utilize former extremists to counter extremist narratives and increase critical thinking. Despite the prominence of interventions utilizing “formers”, there are almost no systematic, scientific evaluations of these programs. The lack of evaluation is problematic given the recognized risks and negative effects of using formers to address other social issues, such as crime prevention. This paper presents findings from the largest study to date of the effects of using former extremists to prevent violent extremism. Based on a randomized controlled effect evaluation with 1931 Danish youths, it highlights significant successes, including reducing the perceived legitimacy of political violence, as well as negative effects, including a small decrease in political tolerance. Overall, the findings suggest a need for cost–benefit analyses of P/CVE initiatives, weighing the benefits against the risks.
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Zwicker, Maria V., Jan-Willem van Prooijen, and André P. M. Krouwel. "Persistent beliefs: Political extremism predicts ideological stability over time." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 23, no. 8 (December 2020): 1137–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430220917753.
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Previous research suggests that political extremists have stronger convictions in their beliefs than moderates. The present research examines the relationship between political extremism and belief stability, defined as the extent to which people change their ideological beliefs over time. Studies 1 ( N = 397) and 2 ( N = 291) revealed that participants at the left and right extremes report more stable beliefs than political moderates. We then reanalyzed a longitudinal study that tracked actual ideological changes over time during a referendum (Study 3, N = 5812). Results indicated that for ideological orientation measured at three time points, politically extreme respondents had lower standard deviations—and hence, more stable ideologies over time—than moderates. Furthermore, the effect appeared more pronounced among people at the left than people at the right. We discuss implications of these insights for political extremism in society and the malleability of political ideology.
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Ali, Hina, Sumaira Khalid, Iqra Ashraf, and Naheed Anwar. "Extremism & Terrorism: A Political Issue or An Economic One?" Review of Education, Administration & LAW 4, no. 1 (March 31, 2021): 179–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.47067/real.v4i1.124.
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Extremism and terrorism have become a serious threat to Pakistan’s security and well-being. Pakistan is situated in an uncomfortable and unfriendly neighborhood and faces an existential challenge from domestic forces of sectional and ethnic militancy and terrorism. These problems started after the 9/11 attacks. The extremists have not only affected the life in tribal areas but have also invaded the well-developed urban cities of Pakistan as well. The lusts for power, religious differences, regional disparities, political instability, illiteracy, foreign involvements, Afghan Jihad of 1975, low socioeconomic indicators, and non-democratic values are a few of the many reasons that have added fuel to the fire of militancy, terrorism, and extremism. More than 75 thousand people in Pakistan have either been killed by terrorist groups or have become a victim of religious militants and extremists. To address these problems Pakistan took a few measures such as the launching of Zarb-e-Azab, amendments to the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the establishment of NATGRID, creating awareness about religion, revising Madrassa reforms, etc. All these efforts have solved the problem but only to some extent. There is a dire need for more strict measures not only by the Government but also by the civilians. Together, they need to keep working against these evils because they have eaten up the credibility, economic stability, reputation, well-being and peace of the country.
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Mudde, Cas. "Racist Extremism in Central and Eastern Europe." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 19, no. 2 (May 2005): 161–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325404270965.
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Based in part on the results of a unique, comparative research project, the aim of this article is threefold: (1) to provide a comparative summary of racist extremism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE); (2) to compare the situation of racist extremism in CEE to that in Western Europe; and (3) to come to some further insights about racist extremism in the region. It concludes, in contrast to many of the alarming statements on the topic, that CEE is neither a hotbed of racist extremism nor a safe haven for racist extremists. In fact, if one compares the state of racist extremism in CEE to that in Western Europe, the differences seem less striking than is often assumed. Yet while the impact of racist extremism in CEE might not be as great as is often assumed, a lot remains to be done, particularly now that these countries are or will soon be members of the European Union.
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Kirilenko, Viktor, and Georgy Alekseev. "Actual Problems of Extremism Crime Counteraction." Russian Journal of Criminology 12, no. 4 (September 14, 2018): 561–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2500-4255.2018.12(4).561-571.
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In the conditions of globalization, international cooperation in counteracting the spread of radical ideologies is based on the common understanding of the necessity to combat the criminal activities of extremism groups. The use of strict criminal sanctions towards persons guilty of extremism crimes fully complies with the requirements set forth in the international agreements regarding the protection of human rights. Isolation of the most dangerous extremists from society is an effective way of preventing acts of terrorism, it has a beneficial impact on national and international security and contributes to the fulfillment of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The problem area of the criminal law qualification of extremism crimes is the necessity to differentiate between violent extremism and other offenses as well as lawful public initiatives against social discrimination and injustice. If power struggle takes place outside the legal framework, it poses a high degree of public danger, but only the gravest illegal actions should be qualified as manifestations of extremism. The ability of national law enforcement to impose sanctions corresponding to the gravity of unlawful methods of political struggle motivated by extremism is determined by the task of separating extremism ideology from less publically dangerous forms of organizing political protests. The analysis of extremism groups criminal activity showed that the ideology of criminal extremism is characterized by the desire to obtain power, authority and political clout by harming lives and health of people as well as by destroying such systemic institutes of civil society as family and private property. The solution to the problem of fair punishment in counteracting crimes with extremist motives lies in the elimination of such conditions that give rise to extremism ideologies and that act as a criminogenic factor determining the most dangerous cases of criminal violence in the Russian society.
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Marquant, T. "Pathways to violent extremism and risk assessment of terror detainees." European Psychiatry 41, S1 (April 2017): S17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2017.01.106.
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IntroductionViolent extremism has become an important challenge for forensic professionals in prisons. In Belgium, cities like Brussels and Antwerp saw the rise of recruitment hotspots for violent extremism and foreign fighters. Prisons are well-known places where radicalization occurs. Belgium has the most foreign fighters that left to fight in Syria in Europe. Subsequently, incarcerations of radicalized men and women rose for joining terrorists groups. These events have triggered a need to train psychosocial services in prisons into understanding radicalization and the risk assessment of terror detainees. Mental illness in contrast, is known to be rare amongst violent extremists, and risk assessment as well as advising on reintegration will need specific tools for psychosocial services to advise on reintegration.AimsThe current presentation aims at showing insight into pathways towards violent extremism and introduce risk assessment of terror detainees.MethodsWe assembled literature on follow-up and pathways that lead to radicalization and even to violence extremism. Radicalization is not new, whether it stems from religious, political or other motives. This resulted in important literature on different trajectories towards radicalization.ResultsWe will give an overview of the pathways towards violent extremism (Dean, Moghaddan, Bjorgo) and on risk assessment tools (VERA-2, Pressman)ConclusionsRadicalization happens stepwise in different ways and leads to different types of violent extremists. Pivotal points follow a cognitive opening in the minds of people that might push and pull people towards radicalization and violence. Cases will be used to describe the different types and pathways.Disclosure of interestThe author has not supplied his declaration of competing interest.
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de Bromhead, Alan, Barry Eichengreen, and Kevin H. O'Rourke. "Political Extremism in the 1920s and 1930s: Do German Lessons Generalize?" Journal of Economic History 73, no. 2 (May 23, 2013): 371–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050713000302.
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We examine the impact of the Great Depression on the share of votes for right-wing extremists in elections in the 1920s and 1930s. We confirm the existence of a link between political extremism and economic hard times as captured by growth or contraction of the economy. What mattered was not simply growth at the time of the election, but cumulative growth performance. The impact was greatest in countries with relatively short histories of democracy, with electoral systems that created low hurdles to parliamentary representation, and which had been on the losing side in World War I.
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Østebø, Terje. "Salafism, State-Politics, and the Question of “Extremism” in Ethiopia." Comparative Islamic Studies 8, no. 1-2 (July 8, 2014): 165–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/cis.v8i1-2.165.
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The Muslim demonstrations in Addis Ababa 2012–2013 have intensified claims that Islam in Ethiopia is becoming increasingly radicalized, and it is particularly the Salafis who are labeled as the “extremists”. My argument is that the word “extremism” is not very fruitful for understanding these developments or Salafism as a phenomenon. The intention of this article is to analyze Ethiopian Salafism as a product of both trans-local ideological impetuses and local particularities, and to demonstrate how these factors have proved pivotal the Salafis detachment from public and political life.
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Birkhead, Nathaniel A., and Marjorie Randon Hershey. "Assessing the ideological extremism of American party activists." Party Politics 25, no. 4 (September 17, 2017): 495–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068817730721.
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In this article, we investigate whether it is appropriate to generalize about the ideological and demographic characteristics of American party activists. Many studies on party polarization emphasize the role of activists in encouraging the divisions within the parties, and in so doing, commonly treat activists as a homogeneous group. Here, we show that different forms of political activity attract systematically different types of individuals. Similarly, we show that ideological extremism is more strongly associated with some forms of activism than others. Importantly, we find that extremism is most strongly associated with the forms of activity that are most likely to influence elected officials through the provision of resources, information or support in a nomination. Thus, while our findings broadly support the notion that extremists are more engaged than moderates, we challenge the consensus that the various forms of activism are interchangeable.
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Fayaz, Sadia. "The Culture of Violent Extremism in Universities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: Causes and Remedies." Global Strategic & Securities Studies Review VI, no. II (June 30, 2021): 12–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gsssr.2021(vi-ii).02.
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Violent Extremism and Radicalization is on the rise in the Universities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). In the last decade, the crisis of students discipline has increased on campuses. Many incidents of violence and intolerance on campus are alarming for the higher education of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The education curriculum is insufficient to develop a mature and critical mind instead of making sectarian activists and extremists. To counter extremism, many laws and bills have been passed to control this social problem in our societies. The existence of such issues in the universities and education sector is very alarming because the youth is part of this sector. The education sector should be freed from such problems for the social, political and economic progress and development of the society. Thus this article highlights the issue and provides necessary recommendations to solve the problem.
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van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, André P. M. Krouwel, and Julia Emmer. "Ideological Responses to the EU Refugee Crisis." Social Psychological and Personality Science 9, no. 2 (October 3, 2017): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1948550617731501.
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The 2016 European Union (EU) refugee crisis exposed a fundamental distinction in political attitudes between the political left and right. Previous findings suggest, however, that besides political orientation, ideological strength (i.e., political extremism) is also relevant to understand such distinctive attitudes. Our study reveals that the political right is more anxious, and the political left experiences more self-efficacy, about the refugee crisis. At the same time, the political extremes—at both sides of the spectrum—are more likely than moderates to believe that the solution to this societal problem is simple. Furthermore, both extremes experience more judgmental certainty about their domain-specific knowledge of the refugee crisis, independent of their actual knowledge. Finally, belief in simple solutions mediated the relationship between ideology and judgmental certainty, but only among political extremists. We conclude that both ideological orientation and strength matter to understand citizens’ reactions to the refugee crisis.
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Mondani, Hernan, Amir Rostami, Tina Askanius, Jerzy Sarnecki, and Christofer Edling. "Women in Violent Extremism in Sweden." Proceedings 77, no. 1 (May 7, 2021): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2021077015.
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This presentation summarizes a register-based study on women who have been identified as belonging to three violent extremist milieus in Sweden: violent Islamic, violent far-right, and violent far-left extremism. We studied the women in these milieus along a number of analytical dimensions, ranging from demographic and educational to criminal background and network relationships, and compared them to three reference groups: (i) non-extremist biological sisters to female extremists in the study population; (ii) men in the respective extremist milieus; and (iii) female members of other antagonistic milieus such as organized crime. Our results showed that there are both similarities and differences between groups. In some cases, like age and region of birth, there are commonalities between violent far-right and violent far-left women. Regarding region of birth and migration background, women affiliated to violent far-right and violent far-left extremism are predominantly born in Sweden. Women affiliated to violent Islamic extremism tend to be born in Sweden to a greater extent than men in the same milieu, but to a much lesser degree than women in the violent far-right and violent far-left. When it comes to education, women in the violent Islamic milieu are closer to women in violent far-right extremism. Women in violent far-left extremism perform best at school, with consistently higher grades. The average score of women in violent far-left extremism is identical to that of their sisters, and women in violent far-left extremism perform on average substantially better than men in the same milieu. Women in violent Islamic extremism, in contrast, perform on average similarly to men in violent far-left extremism, and they perform better than their biological sisters. Regarding labor market attachment, violent Islamic extremists have the weakest attachment and the highest dependency upon financial assistance as well as a low employment share (36 percent in 2016), but also a relatively high share of individuals with a high number of unemployment days, suggesting that women in violent Islamic extremism experience higher social exclusion. We find the highest employment share among women in violent far-left extremism, where 89 percent are gainfully employed in 2016 (80 percent for at least three of the last five years) and about a 20 percent unemployment share. Men in violent far-left extremism have an employment share around 10 percent below that of the women in far-left extremism for 2016. The highest fractions of individuals that have not been in contact with the health system due to mental disorders are among violent Islamic extremism, with the women’s fraction at 84 percent, compared to their non-extremist sisters and men in the same milieu that are just above 79 percent. Women in violent far-left extremism have the highest share of in-patient major mental disorders among the extremist milieus (3 percent), higher than men in the same milieu (less than 1 percent) as well as than women and their sisters in the other categories. During the period 2007–2016, 68 percent of individuals in the extremist milieus are covered by the register of suspected individuals. The coverage is substantially higher for men, 72 percent than for women, 43 percent. Compared to their sisters, women in all three milieus are criminally active to a much higher extent. However, women in all three milieus are less criminally active than women in other antagonistic milieus, among whom 67 percent have been suspected at least once. In all three milieus, the share of men with a criminal record is about twice as large as that of women. As far as the gender aspect is concerned, we know that extremist milieus generally have a conservative view of the role of women in society. In our results, this is reflected in the low rates of crime in women compared to men, and relatively marginal positions in the co-offending networks. The fact that women in violent far-left extremism have stronger positions in their networks than the other women in the study population is expected, given that the ideology of this milieu allows for greater equality. This means that women in violent far-left extremism participate more often than, e.g., women in violent far-right extremism, in political actions where violence is common. This pattern of gender roles and criminal involvement also holds concerning women in violent Islamic extremism. This milieu has a more traditional view of the role of women than views among even violent far-right extremists. Women in violent Islamic extremism are less involved in crime and, in particular, violent crime.
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Izluchenko, Tat’yana V. "The Mechanisms of Social Construction of Reality in Religious Extremism: A Socio-Philosophical Analysis." Vestnik of Northern (Arctic) Federal University. Series Humanitarian and Social Sciences, no. 5 (October 10, 2020): 106–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.37482/2227-6564-v054.
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This paper studies the social construction of reality in religious extremism. The daily life of extremists is viewed here as an alternative social reality, which is opposed to objective reality and portrayed by the ideologists as the only right one. The methodology of the research is based on Peter Berger’s phenomenological theory of world construction by numerous transcendental subjects. The daily life of extremists is regulated by the social order established in the extremist community, which is ensured by specific attitudes, preferences, conventions, values, and knowledge systems that are contained in their ideology. An important result of the study is the characterization of the social construction mechanisms according to the extremist worldview. Cognitive biases and assertion of personal significance contribute to a positive perception of the ideology and an active participation in extremist activities, while the “Us vs Them” opposition leads to the polarization of views and fewer external contacts, as well as forms a positive image of “Us” while ignoring their negative qualities and hyperbolizing the negative qualities of “Them”. The idealization of history and the heroization of individual participants in this movement form false notions of justice and of the possibility of creating an ideal state system, thereby motivating extremists to commit unlawful acts, including violent ones. Thinking models are adjusted to conform to the ideology, new patterns of behaviour are established through social actions and ritual practices. Illegal extremist activity is presented as following the will of the higher forces, thus acquiring the status of a sacred duty to establish the common good and fight against the universal evil. These mechanisms are characteristic of various types of extremism (national, political). Religion acts as an element reinforcing ideological content and allowing extremist communities to project ultimate meanings onto objective reality, endowing it with a given meaning.
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OGANESYAN, SERGEI S., and TARIM A. KHAADI. "Features of Legal Perception of the Phenomena of Extremism and Terrorism in Different Mental Civilizations: General Theoretical and Historical-Philosophical Aspects." Penitentiary science 15, no. 2 (June 30, 2021): 363–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.46741/2686-9764-2021-15-2-363-369.
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Introduction: the article reveals how extremism and terrorism are perceived in different mental civilizations: paganism (polytheism), monotheism and scientific worldview, from the standpoint of the legal consciousness of ordinary, canonical and secularethnic groups. The aim is to show that those phenomena which in the modern world are called extremism and terrorism and are subject to criminal punishment were perceived in exactly the opposite way in the mental eras of paganism and monotheism. Research methods: we use analysis of historical information about the phenomena of extremism and terrorism in different eras, related to the civilizational mentality of ethnic groups and peoples; we also use generalization (synthesis) of the information obtained. Results: revealing the attitude toward the phenomena that are now called “extremism” and “terrorism” in different mental civilizations allows us not only to understand the historically determined nature of these phenomena, but also to build an adequate system to counter them by changing existing approaches and methods. Conclusions: modern religious extremists and terrorists representinterests of the religious worldview and the way of life that are leaving the historical arena. Their re-socialization should be carried out taking into account civilizational mentality of religious people, relying primarily on the tolerant capabilities of the Holy Scriptures themselves. In the coming years, against the background of the natural decline of religious extremism and terrorism, there will be a rise of such types of “secular” extremism and terrorism as political, social, racial and linguistic, i.e. all those types of extremism that are listed in Articles 280 and 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In order to counteract these types of extremism, it is necessary, first of all, to develop high legal awareness in citizens; in this regard, it is crucial that educational and psychological services of the Russian Penal System carry out systemwide and purposeful work in this direction. Keywords: extremism; terrorism; monotheism; paganism; scientific worldview; religious wars
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Viana, Manuela Trindade, and Pedro Paulo dos Santos da Silva. "Preventing extremisms, taming dissidence: Islamic radicalism and black extremism in the U.S. making of CVE." Critical Studies on Terrorism 14, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 24–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2020.1870259.
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Tatyana V., Izluchenko. "The Role of Myth in Extremism: the Socio-Philosophical Analysis." Humanitarian Vector 16, no. 2 (April 2021): 88–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.21209/1996-7853-2021-16-2-88-96.
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This study examines myth as an ideological component of extremism. The objective is to define the role and meaning of myths in extremist activities. Extremism is a socio-cultural and political phenomenon of modern culture, expressed in actions against the foundations of the constitutional order and public security. Myths contribute to the formation of a holistic picture of the world, to the construction of an alternative social reality, and the creation of models of thinking and behavior that correspond to the goals and objectives of extremist organizations. The research methodology is based on the theories of myth by A. Losev and M. Eliade, on the phenomenological approach of P. Berger and T. Luckmann to the construction of reality, on the cognitive features proposed by A. Kruglanski, and the interpretation of deviance by J. Gilinsky. Extremist behavior is a form of deviance, expressing in the committing of non-normative actions that threaten the stability of society and activate the mechanisms of social control. Extremist thinking is the result of psychological construction, which arose on the basis of the unnatural functioning of the cognitive system. Extremist ideologies contain myths about the future ideal state and/or society, heroes, and legendary personalities, as well as eschatological myths. Essentially, these myths do not differ from the myths inherent in other types of activity and socio-cultural phenomena. However, they contribute to extremism by demonstrating acceptable and unacceptable norms of behavior as exemplified by some legendary personalities; interpretation of historical events and processes of social reality following the political goals of organizations; creation and transmission of relevant ideas and values; the formation of identity and a sense of exclusivity among extremists. Keywords: extremism, extremist organizations, ideology, myth, future state, ideal society, deviance
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Edilov, Elburus, Naila Gasimova, and Bakhtiyar Aliyev. "Political extremism in Azerbaijan." Juridical Sciences and Education 54, no. 54 (April 2, 2018): 100–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.25108/2304-1730-1749.iolr.2018.54.100-118.
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De Lange, Sarah L., and cas mudde. "political extremism in europe." European Political Science 4, no. 4 (December 2005): 476–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210056.
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Monaghan, Rachel. "Origins of political extremism." Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 5, no. 3 (September 2013): 229–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2012.686515.
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Vukovic, Nebojsa, and Zoran Milosavljevic. "Political forms of extremism." Vojno delo 67, no. 4 (2015): 121–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/vojdelo1504121v.
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Aronoff, Myron Joel. "Political Violence and Extremism." Israel Studies 4, no. 2 (1999): 237–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/is.1999.0002.
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Ben-Ner, Avner. "Political Extremism and Rationality." Economica 72, no. 288 (November 2005): 726–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.2005.00441_2.x.
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Dauster, Manferd. "Parliaments versus Raising Extremist Member of Parliament." Bratislava Law Review 5, no. 1 (June 30, 2021): 27–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2021.5.1.213.
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(Right-wing) extremism is on the rise across the continent. Propaganda and other activities affect European societies and parliaments. Extremists do not stop their activities in front of parliaments’ buildings. As far as extremist performance within parliaments is concerned, parliaments may react to them using measures of order, as provided for by their Rule Books but cannot apply them to harmful activities outside the parliament in the ordinary (political) arena. Parliamentarian means of defence appear inadequate and at the end not efficient to defend our representative democracies. By comparing the present German constitutions in perspective of the German constitutional history, the article seeks to find „sharper armoury“ for parliamentary defence. In conclusion, some consideration is given to constitutional amendment providing parliaments with the authority to expel the unruly Members of Parliament.
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van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, and André P. M. Krouwel. "Psychological Features of Extreme Political Ideologies." Current Directions in Psychological Science 28, no. 2 (January 29, 2019): 159–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0963721418817755.
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In this article, we examine psychological features of extreme political ideologies. In what ways are political left- and right-wing extremists similar to one another and different from moderates? We propose and review four interrelated propositions that explain adherence to extreme political ideologies from a psychological perspective. We argue that (a) psychological distress stimulates adopting an extreme ideological outlook; (b) extreme ideologies are characterized by a relatively simplistic, black-and-white perception of the social world; (c) because of such mental simplicity, political extremists are overconfident in their judgments; and (d) political extremists are less tolerant of different groups and opinions than political moderates. In closing, we discuss how these psychological features of political extremists increase the likelihood of conflict among groups in society.
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Jan, Abid Ullah. "Moderate Islam." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.467.
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The Debate
Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.
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Jan, Abid Ullah. "Moderate Islam." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.467.
Full textAbstract:
The Debate
Question 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics?
AUJ: The promotion of “moderate” Muslims is part of an extremist tendency sweeping the United States, unlike the situation in the Muslim world. It is the result of a war between two Americas: the America of ideals (e.g., of equality and justice) and the America of extremism, which has succumbed to self-interest groups and individuals. For the America of ideals, the Tariq Ramadan episode is a dark spot, one among many such episodes in recent times. Periodic episodes of tragedy are the hallmark of the America that has shifted its priorities under the pressure and manipulation of the extremists. These forces use all expedient means to sacrifice the wellbeing of the United States for self-interest and promotion of the Zionist state. This extremism entails a morbid dread of Islam. It never regards any Muslim as moderate unless one publicly rejects the Qur’an as “the final manifesto of God,”1 considering this belief a “disturbing cornerstone of Islam,”2 and submitting to the rejection of key parts of the Qur’an.3 Unquestioning support for Israel, along with all other American-approved dictatorships, is the minimum criterion.4 All other factors are irrelevant. The fascistic American track record of accepting “moderates” and rejecting “radicals” is clear.5 The final distinction is not defined by their adherence to Islam, but by the assumed threat they pose to the interests of these extremists. For example, a devout man, fervent in all of his personal rituals but not participating in political affairs, would be a “moderate,” whereas a marginally practicing Muslim with the zeal to voice his opposition to the injustice perpetrated by the extremists’America is classified as a “radical.” In the current political context, a moderate is one who is passive like the devout man, or active like the extremist “moderates” – the Muslim neomods – who openly promote the extremist agenda using Islamic interpretations or “Project Ijthihad”6 as a cover. Hence, the distinction is not academic or religious, but political. Two opposing factors prove this point. First, there are clear commands for Muslims to be moderate by default.7 Moderateness is a prerequisite for all Muslims, not a label of identity for some. Accordingly, Muslims cannot be part-time or partial Muslims (Qur’an 2:208) or reject part of the Qur’an (Qur’an 2:85).8 Hence, such religious labelling is irrelevant. Second, the extremists insist that strong belief in the totality of the Qur’an makes Muslims “Islamists.”9 That is why they believe themselves to be “absolutely at war with the vision of life that is prescribed to all Muslims in the Koran.”10 It means that the standards of “moderateness,” as set by the American extremists, are directed at neutralizing a preconceived threat. Under these circumstances, mere claims of being a “moderate” do not make any difference at all, as long as a Muslim is presented as a threat, however baseless, to the interests of extremist America. Similarly, the so-called extremism in the Muslim world is not the result of Muslims’faith. Rather, it is a function of the perpetually colonized and oppressed people due to the lack of true independence and a central authority to control and productively channel their energies. It is naïve to suggest that a few ill-informed “moderate” individuals or puppet regimes can emulate the abilities of an entire central authority (i.e., the Islamic state) and effect progress and positive meaningful change.
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Zelenkov, Mikhail Yuryevich, Sergey Zinkovsky, Alexei Valerivitch Altoukhov, Olga Mukhametshevna Dudina, and Alexander Nikolaev. "The duplex structure of modern political extremism." LAPLAGE EM REVISTA 7, no. 1 (May 31, 2021): 649–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.24115/s2446-6220202171952p.649-656.
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The article focuses on the identification of common grounds in the system of political extremism and making a distinction between the goals pursued by its left- and right-wing directions. The main results: detection of the wide and narrow approaches to the interpretation of the definition of political extremism, synthesis of its universal features, authorial understanding of the category of political extremism, and identification of the unity and struggle of opposites in the essence of political extremism.
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Canetti, Daphna, Brian J. Hall, Carmit Rapaport, and Carly Wayne. "Exposure to Political Violence and Political Extremism." European Psychologist 18, no. 4 (January 1, 2013): 263–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000158.
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Exposure to political violence can lead to various political and psychological outcomes. Using the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a natural laboratory, we explore the way in which exposure to conflict violence leads to changes in citizens’ political attitudes and behavior, offering a model for a stress-based process of political extremism. This model encapsulates three basic components in a causal chain leading to political extremism: exposure to political violence, psychological distress, and enhanced perceptions of threat. We find that prolonged exposure to political violence increases psychological distress, which in turn evokes stronger perceptions of threat that foment political attitudes eschewing compromise and favoring militarism. This causal chain fuels a destructive cycle of violence that is hard to break. Understanding these psychological and political consequences of exposure to political violence can help to shed light on the barriers that too often stymie peacemaking efforts and contribute to the deterioration of intractable conflicts around the globe. Thus, this review offers insights applicable to conflict zones around the world and suggests policy implications for therapeutic intervention and potential pathways to conflict resolution.
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Knox, Zoe. "Jehovah’s Witnesses as Extremists: The Russian State, Religious Pluralism, and Human Rights." Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 46, no. 2 (April 23, 2019): 128–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04602003.
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This article examines the Russian Supreme Court’s 2017 decision to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses as “extremists.” The decision will bring Russia’s anti-extremism law before the Council of Europe via the European Court of Human Rights. The article considers why this particular religious minority group became a test case by examining the unique beliefs and practices of Witnesses and their history of episodic conflict with the state. It also highlights the role of the Orthodox Church in shaping attitudes, popular and political, toward religious pluralism in Russia. In the Putin era, an increasingly illiberal rhetoric about totalitarian cults and traditional values connected nontraditional faiths to national security threats, a link made clear in the Putin regime’s promotion of spiritual security. Overall, the article argues that the 2017 ban signals the repudiation of European human rights norms by Russian governmental authorities, lawmakers, and religious elites.
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Astashin, Vadim. "Political Extremism in Contemporary Russia." Journal of Human Security 5, no. 1 (2009): [49]—61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3316/jhs0501049.
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Wolitzky, Alexander. "Endogenous institutions and political extremism." Games and Economic Behavior 81 (September 2013): 86–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.04.006.
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Berger, Alan L. "Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism." Journal of Ecumenical Studies 53, no. 4 (2018): 608–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/ecu.2018.0048.
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Hellevik, Ottar, and Tor Bjørklund. "OPINION LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 3, no. 2 (1991): 157–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/3.2.157.
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Schmidt, Catherine, George Joffé, and Elisha Davar. "The Psychology of Political Extremism." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18, no. 1 (April 2005): 151–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09557570500060157.
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Micklethwait, Brian. "Political Extremism for Economic Dynamism?" Economic Affairs 7, no. 3 (February 1987): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.1987.tb01838.x.
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Haavelsrud, Magnus. "Education, political socialization and extremism." British Journal of Sociology of Education 30, no. 1 (January 2009): 113–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01425690802532807.
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Weinberg, Leonard, and Ami Pedahzur. "Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism." Nova Religio 8, no. 2 (November 1, 2004): 106–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nr.2004.8.2.106.
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Weinberg, Leonard, and Ami Pedahzur. "Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism." Nova Religio 9, no. 4 (May 1, 2006): 124–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nr.2006.9.4.124.
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Rao, Matthew, Paul A. Raschky, and Christis G. Tombazos. "Political extremism and economic activity." Economics Letters 170 (September 2018): 59–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.027.
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Brückner, Markus, and Hans Peter Grüner. "Economic growth and political extremism." Public Choice 185, no. 1-2 (October 31, 2019): 131–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00745-w.
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Colussi, Tommaso, Ingo E. Isphording, and Nico Pestel. "Minority Salience and Political Extremism." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 13, no. 3 (July 1, 2021): 237–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.20190703.
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We investigate how the salience of an ethnic minority affects the majority group’s voting behavior. We use the increased salience of Muslim communities during Ramadan as a natural experiment. Exploiting exogenous variation in the distance of election dates to Ramadan over the 1980–2013 period in Germany, our findings reveal an increased polarization. Vote shares for both right- and left-wing extremist parties increase in municipalities with mosques when an election takes place shortly after Ramadan. We use survey data to provide evidence on mechanisms: Ramadan increases respondents’ perceived share of the foreign-born population and emphasizes cultural dissimilarities, ultimately worsening attitudes toward Muslims. (JEL D72, D91, J15, Z12, Z13)
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Dodlova, Marina, and Galina Zudenkova. "Incumbents’ performance and political extremism." Journal of Public Economics 201 (September 2021): 104473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104473.
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Frimer, Jeremy A., Mark J. Brandt, Zachary Melton, and Matt Motyl. "Extremists on the Left and Right Use Angry, Negative Language." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 45, no. 8 (December 11, 2018): 1216–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167218809705.
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We propose that political extremists use more negative language than moderates. Previous research found that conservatives report feeling happier than liberals and yet liberals “display greater happiness” in their language than do conservatives. However, some of the previous studies relied on questionable measures of political orientation and affective language, and no studies have examined whether political orientation and affective language are nonlinearly related. Revisiting the same contexts (Twitter, U.S. Congress), and adding three new ones (political organizations, news media, crowdsourced Americans), we found that the language of liberal and conservative extremists was more negative and angry in its emotional tone than that of moderates. Contrary to previous research, we found that liberal extremists’ language was more negative than that of conservative extremists. Additional analyses supported the explanation that extremists feel threatened by the activities of political rivals, and their angry, negative language represents efforts to communicate as much to others.
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el-Ojeili, Chamsy, and Dylan Taylor. "The Extremism Industry: A Political Logic of Post-Hegemonic Liberalism." Critical Sociology 46, no. 7-8 (April 17, 2020): 1141–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0896920520912459.
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The rising fortunes of the academic ‘extremism industry’ call for robust social scientific scrutiny. We contend this industry is a significant expression of our current moment of post-hegemonic liberalism. We set out the typical definitional devices found in the literature, which assemble ‘extremism’ as a syndrome consisting of six major elements: non-normative values, anti-democracy, anti-liberalism, utopianism and a war on the present, totalisation and abstraction, justifications of unlawfulness. The extremism industry can be approached by way of three investigative spaces: modernisation approaches, psychological and culturalist explanations, and security and policing approaches. Within these spaces, we outline five ideal-typical modes of explaining extremism: consensual anti-fascism, civilisational provincialism, folk secularism, psychologistic pathologisation and moral educationism. We maintain that the extremism industry is analytically weak and politically pernicious and suggest that what passes for ‘extremism’ is better situated and understood at the crossroad of three important vectors: intellectual, geo-political and world-economic.