Academic literature on the topic 'Politics and literature – Nigeria'

Religious and ethnic identity clashes laid the structure of the Nigerian state in 1914, which transmogrified into and characterized the struggle for control of power and distribution of national resources. This paper explores the nature and manifestation of these conflicts since 1999. It seeks to find out if ethno-religious struggles led to the emergence of major conflicts in Nigeria since 1999, their impact on human insecurity, and the influence of politics on the conflicts. This inquiry is designed in line with a one-shot case study, while literature survey and ex post facto methods were adopted as methods of data collection. Trend analysis is adopted for data analysis. Analysis reveals that ethno-religious struggles were the primary progenitor of conflicts in Nigeria since 1999, and have debilitating consequences while politics exacerbated ethno-religious conflicts. Upholding Nigeria's circular state and implementing the National Political Reforms Conference Report is the panacea for ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Tanure Ojaide and Niyi Òsundare are among the foremost politically committed Nigerian poets at present. The overriding concern in virtually all their literary works is commenting on the politics of the season. In Òsundare's words, poetry is “man meaning to man.” For Ojaide, a creative writer is not “an airplant” that is not situated in a place. Both writers envision literature should have political message. Thus, in Òsundare's collection (1986) and Tanure Ojaide's (1998) the major aesthetic focus is eco-poetry, which interrogates the politics behind oil exploration in Nigeria as well as its consequences on our environment. Both writers refract this with what Òsundare calls “semantics of terrestiality”: i.e. poetry for the earth. Eco-poetry deals with environmental politics and ecological implications of humankind's activities on the planet. Armed with this poetic commitment, both writers unearth commodification of socio-economic relations, environmental/ecological dissonance, leadership malaise and endangered Nigerian environment mediated through (global) capitalism. Both writers maintain that eco-poetry is a platform for upturning environmental justice; and for decrying man's unbridled materialist pursuits. Thus, the preoccupation of this paper is to explore how both poetry collections: and interrogate the despicable state of Nigeria's environment as a consequence of global capitalism.

ABSTRACTThis article examines the institutional politics of law enforcement in Nigeria by focusing on illegal drug control since the mid 1980s. It assesses the available academic research on law enforcement governance, and contrasts it with an in-depth case study of drug law enforcement. The case study confirms views of the politicised nature of law enforcement. However, it goes beyond the patron–client centred approach to politics prevalent in the literature on African policing. The article adds an institutional dimension to the study of law enforcement governance, highlighting processes of centralisation, exclusion and shifting bureaucratic interests that have been central to the development of Nigerian drug law enforcement. It is based on previously inaccessible data from inside Nigerian drug law enforcement.

AbstractThis article argues against the long-standing instinct to read African politics in terms of programmatic versus patrimonial politics. Unlike the assumptions of much of the current quantitative literature, there are substantive political struggles that go beyond ‘public goods good, private goods bad’. Scholarly framings serve to obscure the essentially contested nature of what counts as legitimate distribution. This article uses the recent political history of the Lagos Model in south-west Nigeria to show that the idea of patrimonial versus programmatic politics does not stand outside of politics but is in itself a politically constructed distinction. In adopting it a priori as scholars we commit ourselves to seeing the world through the eyes of a specific, often elite, constituency that makes up only part of the rich landscape of normative political contestation in Nigeria. Finally, the example of a large-scale empowerment scheme in Oyo State shows the complexity of politicians’ attempts to render distribution legitimate to different audiences at once.

<div><p><em>The connection of Southern Cameroons to the Nigerian Federation by Britain after the First World War, worked to the disadvantage of Southern Cameroons’ sovereignty and political ambitions. With her international status as a Trust Territory, Southern Cameroons was marginalized by the colonial administration which failed to recognize her as a separate territory within the Nigerian Federation. Under such dispensation, Southern Cameroonians felt that for such a Nigerian connection to be of any benefit to the territory, it should be granted an autonomous regional status in line with the existing regions in Nigeria. This strain of relations caused Cameroonians to animate Nigeria political scene with series of events which became very instrumental in influencing the direction and nature of the evolution of the Nigerian federation. This feud for regional autonomy which dominated Nigerian politics was undertaken by pressures groups, political parties, and at individual levels through vocal voices, petitions, conferences and walkouts which expressed their grievances. The paper argues that the granting of quasi and full regional status in 1954 and 1959 respectively to Southern Cameroons was a consequence of their demonstrations. On this score Nigeria rose from three to four regions under colonial rule. From this paradigm we conclude that the history of the evolution of Nigerian federation can never be complete without the Southern Cameroons factor. Archival data and analyses of existing literature have provided evidence for this conclusion.</em></p></div>

The global spread of Salafism, though it began in the 1960s and 1970s, only started to attract significant attention from scholars and analysts outside of Islamic studies as well as journalists, politicians, and the general public following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda Central. After the attacks, Salafism—or, as it was pejoratively labeled by its critics inside and outside of the Islamic tradition, “Wahhabism”—was accused of being the ideological basis of all expressions of Sunni militancy from North America and Europe to West and East Africa, the Arab world, and into Asia. According to this narrative, Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Za- wahiri, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and other Sunni jihadis were merely putting into action the commands of medieval ‘ulama such as Ibn Taymiyya, the eighteenth century Najdi Hanbali Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and modern revolutionary ideologues like Sayyid Qutb and ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. To eradicate terrorism, you must eliminate or neuter Salafism, say its critics. The reality, of course, is far more complex than this simplistic nar- rative purports. Salafism, though its adherents share the same core set of creedal beliefs and methodological approaches toward the interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith and Sunni legal canon, comes in many forms, from the scholastic and hierarchical Salafism of the ‘ulama in Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority countries to the decentralized, self-described Salafi groups in Europe and North America who cluster around a single char- ismatic preacher who often has limited formal religious education. What unifies these different expressions of Salafism is a core canon of religious and legal texts and set of scholars who are widely respected and referenced in Salafi circles. Thurston grounds his fieldwork and text-based analysis of Salafism in Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country and home to one of the world’s largest single Muslim national populations, through the lens of this canon, which he defines as a “communally negotiated set of texts that is governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation” (1). He argues fur- ther that in the history of Nigerian Salafism, one can trace the major stages that the global Salafi movement has navigated as it spread from the Arab Middle East to what are erroneously often seen as “peripheral” areas of the Islamic world, Africa and parts of Asia. The book is based on extensive fieldwork in Nigeria including interviews with key Nigerian Salafi scholars and other leading figures as well as a wide range of textual primary sourc- es including British and Nigerian archival documents, international and national news media reports, leaked US embassy cables, and a significant number of religious lectures and sermons and writings by Nigerian Salafis in Arabic and Hausa. In Chapter One, Thurston argues that the Salafi canon gives individ- ual and groups of Salafis a sense of identity and membership in a unique and, to them, superior religious community that is linked closely to their understanding and reading of sacred history and the revered figures of the Prophet Muhammad and the Ṣaḥāba. Salafism as an intellectual current, theology, and methodological approach is transmitted through this can- on which serves not only as a vehicle for proselytization but also a rule- book through which the boundaries of what is and is not “Salafism” are determined by its adherents and leading authorities. The book’s analytical framework and approach toward understanding Salafism, which rests on seeing it as a textual tradition, runs counter to the popular but problematic tendency in much of the existing discussion and even scholarly literature on Salafism that defines it as a literalist, one-dimensional, and puritani- cal creed with a singular focus on the Qur’an and hadith canon. Salafis, Thurston argues, do not simply derive religious and legal rulings in linear fashion from the Qur’an and Prophetic Sunna but rather engage in a co- herent and uniform process of aligning today’s Salafi community with a set of normative practices and beliefs laid out by key Salafi scholars from the recent past. Thurston divides the emergence of a distinct “Salafi” current within Sunnis into two phases. The first stretches from 1880 to 1950, as Sun- ni scholars from around the Muslim-majority world whose approaches shared a common hadith-centered methodology came into closer contact. The second is from the 1960s through the present, as key Salafi institutions (such as the Islamic University of Medina and other Saudi Salafi bodies) were founded and began attracting and (perhaps most importantly) fund- ing and sponsoring Sunni students from countries such as Nigeria to come study in Saudi Arabia, where they were deeply embedded in the Salafi tra- dition before returning to their home countries where, in turn, they spread Salafism among local Muslims. Nigeria’s Muslim-majority north, as with other regions such as Yemen’s northern Sa‘ada governorate, proved to be a fertile ground for Salafism in large part because it enabled local Muslims from more humble social backgrounds to challenge the longtime domi- nance of hereditary ruling families and the established religious class. In northern Nigeria the latter was and continues to be dominated by Sufi or- ders and their shaykhs whose long-running claim to communal leadership faced new and substantive theological and resource challenges following the return of Nigerian seminary students from Saudi Arabia’s Salafi scho- lastic institutions in the 1990s and early 2000s. In Chapters Two and Three, Thurston traces the history of Nigerian and other African students in Saudi Arabia, which significantly expanded following the 1961 founding of the Islamic University of Medina (which remains the preeminent Salafi seminary and university in the world) and after active outreach across the Sunni Muslim world by the Saudi govern- ment and Salafi religious elite to attract students through lucrative funding and scholarship packages. The process of developing an African Salafism was not one-dimensional or imposed from the top-down by Saudi Salafi elites, but instead saw Nigerian and other African Salafi students partici- pate actively in shaping and theorizing Salafi da‘wa that took into account the specifics of each African country and Islamic religious and social envi- ronment. In Nigeria and other parts of West and East Africa, this included considering the historically dominant position of Sufi orders and popular practices such as devotion to saints and grave and shrine visitation. African and Saudi Salafis also forged relationships with local African partners, in- cluding powerful political figures such as Ahmadu Bello and his religious adviser Abubakar Gumi, by attracting them with the benefits of establishing ties with wealthy international Islamic organizations founded and backed by the Saudi state, including the Muslim World League. Nigerian Salafis returning from their studies in Saudi Arabia actively promoted their Salafi canon among local Muslims, waging an aggressive proselytization campaign that sought to chip away at the dominance of traditional political and religious elites, the Sufi shaykhs. This process is covered in Chapter Four. Drawing on key sets of legal and exegetical writ- ings by Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, and other Salafi scholars, Nigerian Salafis sought to introduce a framework—represented by the canon—through which their students and adherents approach re- ligious interpretation and practice. By mastering one’s understanding and ability to correctly interpret scripture and the hadith, Salafis believe, one will also live a more ethical life based on a core set of “Salafi” principles that govern not only religious but also political, social, and economic life. Salaf- ism, Thurston argues, drawing on the work of Terje Østebø on Ethiopian Salafism, becomes localized within a specific environment.As part of their da‘wa campaigns, Nigerian Salafis have utilized media and new technology to debate their rivals and critics as well as to broad- en their own influence over Nigerian Muslims and national society more broadly, actions analyzed in Chapter Five. Using the Internet, video and audio recorded sermons and religious lectures, books and pamphlets, and oral proselytization and preaching, Nigerian Salafis, like other Muslim ac- tivists and groups, see in media and technology an extension of the phys- ical infrastructure provided by institutions such as mosques and religious schools. This media/cyber infrastructure is as, if not increasingly more, valuable as the control of physical space because it allows for the rapid spread of ideas beyond what would have historically been possible for local religious preachers and missionaries. Instead of preaching political revo- lution, Nigerian Salafi activists sought to win greater access to the media including radio airtime because they believed this would ultimately lead to the triumph of their religious message despite the power of skeptical to downright hostile local audiences among the Sufi orders and non-Salafis dedicated to the Maliki juridical canon.In the realm of politics, the subject of Chapter Six, Nigeria’s Salafis base their political ideology on the core tenets of the Salafi creed and canon, tenets which cast Salafism as being not only the purest but the only true version of Islam, and require of Salafis to establish moral reform of a way- ward Muslim society. Salafi scholars seek to bring about social, political, and religious reform, which collectively represent a “return” to the Prophet Muhammad’s Islam, by speaking truth to power and advising and repri- manding, as necessary, Muslim political rulers. In navigating the multi-po- lar and complex realm of national and regional politics, Thurston argues, Nigerian Salafi scholars educated in Saudi Arabia unwittingly opened the door to cruder and more extreme, militant voices of figures lacking the same level of study of the Salafi canon or Sunni Islam generally. The most infamous of the latter is “Boko Haram,” the jihadi-insurgent group today based around Lake Chad in Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, which calls itself Jama‘at Ahl al-Sunna li-l-Da‘wa wa-l-Jihad and is led by the bombastic Abubakar Shekau. Boko Haram, under the leadership first of the revivalist preacher Mu- hammad Yusuf and then Shekau, is covered at length in the book’s third and final part, which is composed of two chapters. Yusuf, unlike mainstream Nigerian Salafis, sought to weaponize the Salafi canon against the state in- stead of using it as a tool to bring about desired reforms. Drawing on the writings of influential Arab jihadi ideologues including Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and the apocalyptic revolutionary Juhayman al-‘Utaybi, the lat- ter of whom participated in the 1979 seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Yusuf cited key Salafi concepts such as al-walā’ min al-mu’minīn wa-l-bara’ ‘an al-kāfirīn (loyalty to the Believers and disavowal of the Disbelievers) and beliefs about absolute monotheism (tawḥīd) as the basis of his revival- ist preaching. Based on these principle, he claimed, Muslims must not only fulfill their ritual duties such as prayer and fasting during Ramadan but also actively fight “unbelief” (kufr) and “apostasy” (ridda) and bring about God’s rule on earth, following the correct path of the community of the Prophet Abraham (Millat Ibrāhīm) referenced in multiple Qur’anic verses and outlined as a theological project for action by al-Maqdisi in a lengthy book of that name that has had a profound influence on the formation of modern Sunni jihadism. Instead of seeing Boko Haram, particularly under Shekau’s leadership, as a “Salafi” or “jihadi-Salafi” group, Thurston argues it is a case study of how a group that at one point in its history adhered to Salafism can move away from and beyond it. In the case of Shekau and his “post-Salafism,” he writes, the group, like Islamic State, has shifted away from the Salafi canon and toward a jihadism that uses only stripped-down elements from the canon and does so solely to propagate a militaristic form of jihad. Even when referencing historical religious authorities such as Ibn Taymiyya, Thurston points out, Boko Haram and Islamic State leaders and members often do so through the lens of modern Sunni jihadi ideologues like Juhay- man al-‘Utaybi, al-Maqdisi, and Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, figures who have come to form a Sunni jihadi canon of texts, intellectuals, and ideologues. Shekau, in short, has given up canonical Salafism and moved toward a more bombastic and scholastically more heterodox and less-Salafi-than- jihadi creed of political violence. Thurston also pushes back against the often crude stereotyping of Af- rican Islamic traditions and movements that sees African Muslims as being defined by their “syncretic” mix of traditional African religious traditions and “orthodox” Islam, the latter usually a stand-in for “Arab” and “Middle Eastern” Islam. Islam and Islamic movements in Africa have developed in social and political environments that are not mirrors to the dominant models of the Arab world (in particular, Egypt). He convincingly points out that analysis of all forms of African Islamic social and political mobi- lization through a Middle East and Egypt-heavy lens obscures much more than it elucidates. The book includes useful glossaries of key individuals and Arabic terms referenced in the text as well as a translation of a sermon by the late, revered Salafi scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani that is part of the mainstream Salafi canon. Extensive in its coverage of the his- tory, evolution, and sociopolitical and religious development of Salafism in Nigeria as well as the key role played by Saudi Salafi universities and religious institutions and quasi-state NGOs, the book expands the schol- arly literature on Salafism, Islam in Africa, and political Islam and Islamic social movements. It also contributing to ongoing debates and discussions on approaches to the study of the role of texts and textual traditions in the formation of individual and communal religious identity. Christopher AnzaloneResearch Fellow, International Security ProgramBelfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University& PhD candidate, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

This article examines the politics of public policies characterised by increased securitisation of Nigeria’s national boundary from 2014 to 2017. While the regulation appears on paper to discourage transborder crime, capital outflow and sustain a favourable balance of payment, the existing armoury of West African border literature argues otherwise. What is new in the transborder dynamics of West Africa? What informs government’s border policies in Nigeria? In answering these questions, this study provides a template for a reassessment of the gap between borderlands theory and policy in West Africa. The approach is comparative based on the critical analysis of oral interviews, government trade records, newspaper reports and the extant literature. The article provides a platform for rethinking of the nexus between governance and development in West Africa from the securitisation and neo-patrimonial perspectives. It concludes that effective border management in Nigeria is set aback by misguided and dysfunctional elitist-centred regulations that are devoid of the realities on the ground.

Abstract Beyond its entertainment value, every piece of creative literature has something more to say which reading between the lines often has a way of revealing. This is true of the novel Purple Hibiscus by the award-winning Nigerian writer, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie. While his novel says something about the family, politics, post-colonial history and religious realities such as priesthood, mission, Mary, and the Eucharist, this paper looks at what it can tell us about liturgical inculturation and its implications for the Roman Catholic Church in Nigeria. It is hoped that the paper would help to continue, in the spirit of interdisciplinarity, the conversation on the nexus between Ecclesiology and Creative Literature.

Using wide-ranging literature and theoretical concepts published digitally and in print, this thesis will build the emerging picture of African literature in English that is being published in the digital space. The study will analyse the technological production of classed and sexualised bodies in new African writing in cyberspace by some of the young writers from Nigeria and Kenya, as well as writing from a few of their contemporaries from other African countries. This thesis will also analyse the differences between the agenda of the previous generation – including representation and perspectives - and that of a new generation in cyberspace. In the process, I hope to show how literature in cyberspace is asking questions as much of psychic landscapes as of the material world. To my knowledge, there is no substantive literary study done so far that contextualizes this digital experience.

This thesis attempts an intervention in popular music classification. It argues that popular musicians do not only choose the titles to their works, but go further to define the genres of these works. The dynamic at play is such that most popular musicians claim to produce works of different and new genres with each new work they create. By engaging with the works of a selection of Nigerian popular musicians, the thesis demonstrates that the disorderliness in popular music branding can be restricted. Through a critical discourse analysis of the textual elements of the material and of ‘alternative’ audience contributions, the thesis advocates a new genre of popular music, namely the genre of ‘political music’. This distinctive genre is extractable from the otherwise conventional genres of popular music, and is composed of three comprehensible subgenres namely protest political music, unity political music and terrestrial praise political music. The study’s selection is made of popular music material from hip hop, reggae, afro-beat, and juju genres. They are delivered in popular Nigerian languages ranging between Yoruba, Hausa, Igbo, English and Pidgin English.

African American Studies
Ph.D.
This study examines the role of African novelists as major sources of historiography of Africa, and the socio-cultural experience of its people. Although many African novelists have over the years reflected issues of social and political significance in their works, only a few scholarly works seem to have addressed this phenomenon adequately. A major objective of this dissertation then is to help fill this gap by explicating these issues in the fiction of Chinua Achebe, a great iconic figure in African Literature. Utilizing the conceptual and analytical framework suggested in C.T. Keto's, Africa-Centered Perspective on History (1989), the contexts, themes, structures and techniques of the following five novels were examined: Things Fall Apart (1958), No Longer at Ease (1960), Arrow of God (1964), A Man of the People (1966), and Anthills of the Savannah (1987). The novels were shown to be replete with cogent social and political insights which provide an accurate portraiture of African/ Nigerian history of the 19th and 20th Century. The study seeks to make a modest contribution to the steadily mounting body of Africa centered criticism of the African novel/fiction within the context of African social and political history.
Temple University--Theses

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 1999.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In hierdie proefskrif word gekyk na die verwantskap tussen geskiedenis, mite, geheue en teater. Daar word ook gekyk na die mate waartoe historiese of mitiese toneelstukke gebruik kan word om die amptelike geheue en identiteite, soos deur bewindhebbers in post-koloniale Nigerie en Kenya geskep, terug kon wen of uit kon daag. Hierdie werke word dan vergelyk met die soort teater wat tydens die Apartheidbewind in Suid-Afrika geskep is, om verskille en ooreenkomste in die gebruik van historiese en mitiese gegewens te bekyk. Die slotsom is dat een van die belangrikste kenmerke van die teater in vandag se samelewing sy vermod is om alternatiewe historiese narratiewe te ontwikkel wat kan dien as teen-geheue ("counter-memory") vir die dominante narratief van amptelike geskiedenisse. Sodoende bevraagteken die teater dan ook 'n liniere en causale siening van die geskiedenis, maar interpreteer dit eerder as meervoudig en kompleks.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: This thesis considers the relationship between history, myth, memory and theatre. The study explores the extent to which historic or mythic plays were used to either reclaim or challenge the official memories and identities created by those in power in the postcolonial Kenyan and Nigerian context. These are then compared to the South African theatre created during Apartheid, exploring the similarities and differences in the South Africans use of historic or mythic referents. The conclusion reached is that one of the most powerful aspects of theatre in society is its ability to create alternate historic narratives that become a counter-memory to the dominant narrative of official histories. It also challenges seeing history as linear and causal, and makes it more plural and complex.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
In the last two decades, the federal government of Nigeria has employed several strategies in an effort to resolve the ongoing crisis in its Niger Delta Region. Two main approaches were adopted concurrently by both military and civilian regimes within the period of study, diplomatic and non-diplomatic. Unfortunately, both strategies failed to resolve the crisis. This thesis explains why the strategies failed, arguing that combination of an overly high military with low civil counterinsurgency strategies during the military regimes of 1990-1999 allowed an excessively repressive approach that did not only fail to end the crisis but eventually fuelled it to transform agitation into insurgency. In addition, the civilian regimes of 1999-2009, which engaged low military and relatively high civil counterinsurgency strategies, have also not been able to resolve the crisis. The study hence suggests a moderate approach comprising of both strategies; a professional military approach with moderate civil counterinsurgency strategies, and adopting measures that would assist the government to isolate its counterinsurgency strategies from political groups' interference, and resist responding to all pressures and complaints likely to sabotage its strategies.

This dissertation provides an explanation for the workings of clientelism and some preliminary insights on the conditions under which it can recede.

First, I provide evidence from Nigeria on the “loyal-voter anomaly” (Stokes et al. 2013, 66): I show that political parties tend to target clientelistic transfers to partisans, whose votes should already be secure, rather than to swing voters, whose votes are up for grabs. Second, I develop a theory of strategic safe-betting to explain the disproportionate targeting of partisans. This theory puts the emphasis on risk mitigation, an aspect of clientelistic relations that existing explanations tend to overlook. I argue that clientelistic transfers are risky and expensive endeavors, and that loyal voters represent a safer bet for political parties: their voting behavior is indeed easier to influence, predict or, in a best-case scenario, monitor. This is due to their close ties to the operatives of the party machine, as well as their deeper embeddedness in networks of control through which parties exert influence and gather information on voters before and during elections. Third, I provide preliminary insights on the demise of clientelism. I show that macro developments—in particular urbanization and economic development—that increase the weight of swing voters make clientelistic transfers riskier and provide incentives for parties to develop programmatic promises during elections.

The dissertation builds on original quantitative and qualitative empirical evidence from the most populous sub-Saharan African country, Nigeria. It draws on observational and experimental survey data to provide a quantitative analysis of the determinants and workings of clientelism at the individual level. It also builds on selected archival documents and in-depth key informant interviews to develop a qualitative narrative of the historical roots of clientelistic partisan pacts in Nigeria and the mechanisms that sustain and break them in contemporary politics.

Table of Contents -- General Introduction -- (p. v) -- One: A welcome address -- (p. 1) -- Two: Keynote address -- (p. 5) -- Three: Fully Catholic, Fully Political: Exploring the Biblical Grounds for active Christian participation in politics -- (p. 15) -- Four: Factors that Militate against the active involvement of Christians in politics and societal transformation in Nigeria -- (p. 16) -- Five: The Church and the State in Nigeria: Partners in Dialogue towards a better Nation -- (p. 75) -- Six: Elections of Selection, Ethnic and Money Politics in Nigeria: Lessons from the past towards a better tomorrow -- (p. 101) -- Seven: Art, Media and Lterature as Catalyst of Socio-Political change: The Nigerian Experience and the role of the Church -- (p. 119) -- Eight: The Church as an Alternative Society: A Critical Examination of Ecclesiastical Structures, Leadership and Prophetic witness in Nigeria today -- (p. 137) -- Nine: Diocesan Justice and Peace Departments and their Contributions as agents of Conscientization, Education and Motivation of Christians for Political Responsibility and other Civic Duties -- (p. 183) -- Communique -- (p. 199) -- Contributors -- (p. 203 -- Symposium Co-ordinators -- (p. 206)

Abstract Objective and scope This paper aims to establish that proper resource management and governance within the Nigerian oil and gas industry, more specifically, her local participation policy, which focuses on adequately addressing the social and economic concerns of the host communities in oil producing regions of Nigeria, particularly in the Niger Delta, will ultimately lead to more secure and sustainable economic development and a more attractive investment climate for Nigeria. Methods Procedure, process This research study will employ an analytical approach, more specifically qualitative analysis, in analyzing the interplay between the various factors which have birthed low oil and gas productivity in the Niger delta region of Nigeria and how proper application of Nigeria's local participation policy can influence the circumstances and yield positive result. The research study will rely heavily on available literature and legislative enactments, as well as available case law on the issues concerned. The primary sources in the collection of materials for this paper will comprise of journals, books, and articles which address the relevant research questions guiding the scope of this paper. Results, Observation, conclusion Nigeria's local content policy, just like many other governmental policies in Nigeria, has been criticized as being vulnerable to corruption as a result of the manifest lack of transparency in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, and local content has already been labelled as a potential victim of capture as a result of this dearth in transparency. It is imperative that the broad discretionary powers granted to the local content monitoring board, and the minister of petroleum by the provisions of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act, be utilized in a manner devoid of parochial ethnic sentiments or political interest, in order for Nigeria to properly take advantage of the economic development benefits provided by the proper implementation of local content policy. The long term benefits of local content policy such as technology transfer, long term fiscal incentives, and the growth of local commerce and industry, will go a long way in setting Nigeria on a plain path to sustainable economic growth and better resource management. It is important that the Nigerian government play its role in driving local content policy by facilitating Nigerian enterprises to take active part in the local content programs, as well as keep tabs and monitor the effectiveness of local content policy in achieving its targets. New or additive information to the industry Proper implementation of Local Content policy in Nigeria will be beneficial, not just for the host communities but for the rest of the country, as well as for all investors in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, by providing thousands of employment opportunities for the locals, as well as providing a much needed technology transfer which will result in a structural transformation of not just the local manufacturing industries in Nigeria but the entire Nigerian oil and gas industry as well; thus addressing a major aspect of the social and economic concerns of the local people, and also giving Nigeria's economy a much needed boost towards achieving sustainable development in her natural resources sector.

Abstract Nigerian oil and gas industry have over the years witnessed incessant conflicts between the stakeholders, particularly the host communities in Niger Delta region and the oil and gas companies in partnership with the Federal Government. Conflict which is here defined as manifestation of disagreement between individual and groups arising from differing and mutually incompatible interests has both positive and negative effects depending on how it was managed. Managing conflicts is all about limiting the negative aspects. The study examined conflicts management in Nigeria oil and gas industry and how best the positive elements of conflicts can be maximally exploited for the mutual benefit of both oil and gas company and the host communities in Niger Delta. The study adopted the multidisciplinary approach, literature review, case study and relied on secondary sources using analytical method of data analysis. The study findings revealed that the major factors that precipitate conflicts between the oil and gas industry and host communities in Niger Delta include economic, social, political, and ecological factors. There are available strategies that can be used in conflict management. These include avoiding, accommodating, or smoothing, competing, or forcing, compromising, and collaborating. Any of these strategies can be used to manage conflict depending on the situation, the environment factor, and the nature of the conflict. The problem is that the oil and gas companies in partnership with the Nigerian government often adopted the wrong approach in dealing with the conflict with host communities, using avoiding or forcing strategies. The study recommends collaboration strategy which ensues long term-term solution to mutual benefits.

Abstract Marginal oil field operators have been bedeviled by several challenges since its inception, among which are financial, technological, socio-political, ecological and environmental issues. The study examined how marginal oil field operating in Niger Delta region of Nigeria could integrate and incorporate environmental accounting for managing the environmental performance of their businesses efficiently. Using literature review and case study, the study revealed that at present, environmental accounting is gradually being implemented worldwide. It is the duty of companies to apply environmental accounting to the lives of individuals. The study summarizes some key points regarding environmental accounting, the introduction of environmental accounting in some countries around the world and demonstrates some challenges in our country's application of environmental accounting to provide some solutions to boost the application of environmental accounting to marginal oil field operators in Niger Delta. The study recommends that environmental accounting will enhance the operations of marginal oil field in Niger Delta region.

In fall 2017, the RESOLVE Network launched a major project to analyze religiosity on university campuses in the Lake Chad Basin. The project was related but not limited to the context of the Boko Haram insurgency. The project generated four major studies, including one research report based on a desk literature review and three country case studies (Nigeria, Cameroon, and Chad) based on original fieldwork. The project was driven by policymakers’ and researchers’ desire to more fully understand political and religious change in this conflict-affected region. This RESOLVE research project sought not merely to investigate questions of radicalization but also to challenge stereotypes, particularly the idea that campuses are inevitably hotbeds of religious extremism. It has been credibly asserted that some of Boko Haram’s recruits, particularly in its early phases in the 2000s, were university students. Yet universities in the region have also been sites where key peacemaking initiatives are both studied and implemented.

Why do some fuel protests in Nigeria lead to a response from government, but others are barely noticed? What are the politics behind government response and who are the winners and losers? Using a multi-method approach, this study focuses on the period between 2007 and 2017 to investigate the dynamics of fuel protest in Nigeria to ask how, and under which conditions, struggles over energy access in Nigeria produce accountability and empowerment. The findings suggest that accountability and empowerment outcomes of the struggles over fuel access in Nigeria are severely limited by the very conditions that define the state as fragile: weak institutions, elite capture, widespread corruption, and a citizenry that is protest-fatigued and disempowered. This could be true of other fragile and conflict-affected settings. Therefore, frameworks that open up the civic space for dialogues between the government and citizens may produce better outcomes than protests.

Violent conflicts and crime have reached new heights in Nigeria, as cases of kidnapping, armed banditry, and communal unrests continue to tear at the core of the ethnoreligious divides in the country. Southern Kaduna has witnessed a virulent spree of communal unrest in northern Nigeria over the last decade due to its polarized politics and power differentials between the various groups in the area, particularly the Christians and Muslims, who are almost evenly split. In response to their experiences of violence, the people of that region have also shown incredible resilience and grit in transforming their stress and suffering. This policy note focuses on the transformative practices of the Fulani and other ethnic communities in southern Kaduna in terms of how they problem-solve deep-seated socio-political rivalries and violent relations by working through their shared identity, history, and cultures of peace. The note explores how peace practitioners and donor agencies could consolidate local practices of sustaining peace as complementary or alternative resources to the state’s liberal system.

This summary reviews evidence on the urban flooding impact, risk factors, and management and mitigation measures in Lagos and other cities in Nigeria. Flooding is a common problem every year in many cities across Nigeria, but the impacts of flooding are poorly documented. There is no consistent set of statistics at a national or sub-national level that can be used to compare the impacts of flooding across cities, and reports that focus on particular flood events are often incomplete. The literature notes the principal factors contributing to flood risk including uncontrolled urban growth, inadequate and poorly-maintained drainage systems, solid waste management practices, weakness in institutional capacity and coordination, and warning systems and public awareness. The evidence base for flood impacts, risks, and mitigation efforts at the city level in Nigeria is limited, and much of the information available is low quality, inconsistent, or outdated. Many rely on surveys of city residents rather than objective empirical data, and some of these surveys appear to be poorly designed. A significant number of the academic publications available have been published in non-mainstream journals without the usual level of academic peer review. Recent information is scarce, and a significant amount of the available evidence dates from 2011 and 2012, which coincides with an episode of nationwide flooding that was among the worst in Nigeria’s history.

Recent questions surrounding the repatriation, rehabilitation, and reintegration of those who traveled to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the reintegration of violent extremists in conflict zones including Somalia, Nigeria, Libya, and Mali, and the impending release of scores of homegrown violent extremists from prisons in the United States and Europe have heightened policymaker and practitioner interest in violent extremist disengagement and reintegration (VEDR). Although a number of programs to reintegrate violent extremists have emerged both within and outside of conflict zones, significant questions remain regarding their design, implementation, and effectiveness. To advance our understanding of VEDR, this report draws insights from a review of the literature on ex-combatant disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). The literature on DDR typically adopts a “whole of society” approach, which helps us to understand how systemic factors may influence VEDR at the individual level and outcomes at the societal level. Despite the important differences that will be reviewed, the international community’s thirty-year experience with DDR—which includes working with violent extremists—offers important insights for our understanding of VEDR.

There is growing consensus that political factors are a key determinant of development impact. The practice of Thinking and Working Politically (TWP) is built around three interconnected principles: (i) strong political analysis, insight, and understanding; (ii) detailed appreciation of, and response to, the local context; and (iii) flexibility and adaptability in program design and implementation. The literature notes that while TWP emphasises the centrality of politics and power, technical knowledge is still important and can reinforce the political agenda, for example by increasing the confidence of smaller states or by strengthening collective understanding. Furthermore, improving the quality of domestic cooperation can be a step towards regional cooperation, and flexible engagement with the diverse range of actors that populate transboundary settings has been shown to be an effective strategy. The literature also highlights lessons learned including Transboundary cooperation can be built from the bottom up and for development partners, pre-existing bilateral partnerships may facilitate their engagement at a transboundary level, particularly on sensitive issues. Given the relatively isolated experience of TWP in transboundary settings, the evidence base for this report is also limited. The two areas where most examples were found concern regional integration and transboundary water management.

This fortnightly Covid-19, Conflict, and Governance Evidence Summary aims to signpost the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) and other UK government departments to the latest evidence and opinions on Covid-19 (C19), to inform and support their responses. Based on feedback from the recent survey, and analysis by the Xcept project, this edition, as a trial, focusses less on the challenges that C19 poses, and more on more on the policy responses to these challenges. The below summary features resources on legislative leadership during the C19 crisis; and the heightening of risks emanating from C19’s indirect impacts – including non-C19 healthcare, economy and food security, and women and girls and unrest and instability. Many of the core C19 themes continue to be covered this week, including anti-corruption approaches; and whether and how C19 is shaping conflict dynamics (this time with articles focussing on Northwestern Nigeria, Myanmar’s Rakhine State, and the Middle East). The summary uses two main sections – (1) literature: – this includes policy papers, academic articles, and long-form articles that go deeper than the typical blog; and (2) blogs & news articles. It is the result of one day of work and is thus indicative but not comprehensive of all issues or publications.

The author undertakes a literature review of attitudes to water usage in Jordan. One survey was identified which assessed attitudes towards water conservation, sampling 2000 residents in three regions in Jordan (Irbid, Amman, and Zarqa) in 2017. According to the survey, only 61% of respondents believed there was a water shortage in Jordan. 23% believed the water shortage was due to population pressures. The survey focussed more on water conservation than water use. Most of the respondents felt the government were not doing enough on water shortage issues. They were not asked how they feel about the role of the government versus their individual responsibility. Older respondents perceived the shortages to be more critical. A lack of interest in participating in water saving activities was identified among the youth. Water quality was perceived as poor in the USAID survey and noted in other sources. The survey found that most residents had management strategies in place for the day that the water was delivered. Views about politics of regional cooperation and refugee pressure on water use potentially affect attitudes to water but this was not identified specifically within the scope of this report.