Academic literature on the topic 'Populist party. [from old catalog]'

Little research has explored the gender dimension of political actors who have emerged in response to the erosion of Western mainstream parties after the Great Recession. This article analyzes the case of Podemos, a party inspired by the protest movement Indignados, which has disrupted the Spanish two-party system in only two years. Through the analysis of its leadership’s discourse, I expose the constitutive friction between Podemos’ commitment to “new” alternative practices and the “feminization of politics,” and the reproduction of “old” and “masculinized” politics through a competitive rationale. I characterize this rationale with four features that underlie a dominant masculine party culture: (1) emphasis on winning and aggressive strategy, (2) adversarial style and internal confrontation, (3) hierarchy based on intellectual authority, and (4) charismatic masculine leadership. I suggest that this originates from a populist notion of empowerment and political power that relies on a patriarchal and dominant understanding of successful politics.

AbstractThis article deals with the Italian working-class attitude to vote right-wing, seen in a long-term perspective, in particular in the northern and more industrialized regions. It stresses the fact that the left-wing parties reached their largest majority among working-class voters only for a short period. The end of the long cycle of factory conflicts of the 1970s on the one side, and the crisis of the “local political subcultures”—Catholic and Communist—in mediating the relationship between the working class and the central State on the other, marked the outbreak of a new political phenomenon: the establishment of the Lega Nord party in the 1980s. This party has been able to shift progressively from identity-based claims and secessionist proposals to xenophobia and the demand that a priority be accorded to Italian workers on the labour market. In the most recent years workers’ support for the Lega Nord has been contended by a new populist competitor, the Five Star Movement, whose ability to intercept a widespread “working-class malaise” will be tested in years to come.

Party systems all over Europe are becoming more unstable, as new parties win representation. Many of these parties have few members and little or no presence ‘on the ground’ and they tend to present themselves as an alternative to the old, corrupt, and/or incompetent elites. But are they really? In this article I investigate how the parliamentary elites of new parties differ from the elites of more established parties, using the 2020 election as a point of departure. Slovakia is a particularly interesting case, because since 1992, at least one new party has entered parliament in every election bar one. I find that new and/or populist parties are not necessarily much more representative, but most of them do represent an alternative to the established elite in some respect. Strikingly, genuinely new parties not only have younger legislators, but also literally represent a new generation: the generation of the party leader. However, as new parties grow older, so do their parliamentary elites. In leadership-dominated parties the composition of the party leader’s inner circle clearly matters for candidate selection and hence, for the social bias of the parliamentary elite. Finally, the idiosyncratic nomination practice of OĽaNO, the new prime minister’s party, is part of the reason for the party’s relative social pluralism, as well as for high turnover, ideological diversity and low party loyalty.

In November of 2003, I received an e-mail from Diana, a 26 year old Hungarian Ph.D.-student of archaeology and Egyptology. She is also interested in gender studies, she wrote me, especially in the cult of female goddesses. She also sent me the article on this topic that she had recently published in the very mainstream Hungarian journal of religious studies, theReview of History of the Church. In this article, she refers to articles published in English, French, German and Italian, quoting sources in Latin and in Ancient Greek. In the e-mail, Diana asked for my help to give suggestions about literature on re-interpreting the role of women in religion because she was familiar with my work on populism, religion and gender. Before the reader starts believing that I am using this very precious occasion to celebrate the developing communication between two generations of female scholars in Hungary, I would like to continue the story with a police report issued on the 23 June in 2004. In this police report, it was announced that, posters announcing a meeting of the so-calledGroup of Hungarian Futurehad been placed on the main boulevard of Budapest Arrow Cross. As is well known, the Arrow Cross was the Hungarian Nazi Party before and during World War II. The Group which is so concerned about the so-called Hungarian Future has 27 members and the founder of this group is Diana.

Contemporary democracies face a trend toward the diffusion of the representational void left by under- legitimized political parties (Mair 2013). The essential functions of traditional political parties to organize and articulate political conflict and societal interests have been challenged both from the inside of the party system, by the emergence of populist habits of newcomers, and from the outside, by the progressive erosion of old political culture and corresponding increasing of hostility feeling. Intermediaries organizations of political and economic interests usually push their demands toward political actors in order to shape policy choices. What can happen when the traditional party system suffers from de- legitimation? In this paper, I will try to understand the level of concern of interest organizations toward the progressive detachment of civil society from political actors, in order to define if the risk of a void of representation is perceived as real and contingent. Thanks to a new original European dataset (the Comparative Interest Groups Survey), the analysis shows that different types of interest groups perceive the void to be real and with a possible impact on their activities and their own survival. As expected, in the regression model, differences emerge between countries with a traditional strong interests’ system and countries where groups activities are usually barely regulated. The results support the idea that the distance between civil society and political representatives should be considered a prominent focus of contemporary social and political investigation in order to understand the challenge for democratic life and the possible strategy of reaction.

Contemporary democracies face a trend toward the diffusion of the representational void left by under- legitimized political parties (Mair 2013). The essential functions of traditional political parties to organize and articulate political conflict and societal interests have been challenged both from the inside of the party system, by the emergence of populist habits of newcomers, and from the outside, by the progressive erosion of old political culture and corresponding increasing of hostility feeling. Intermediaries organizations of political and economic interests usually push their demands toward political actors in order to shape policy choices. What can happen when the traditional party system suffers from de- legitimation? In this paper, I will try to understand the level of concern of interest organizations toward the progressive detachment of civil society from political actors, in order to define if the risk of a void of representation is perceived as real and contingent. Thanks to a new original European dataset (the Comparative Interest Groups Survey), the analysis shows that different types of interest groups perceive the void to be real and with a possible impact on their activities and their own survival. As expected, in the regression model, differences emerge between countries with a traditional strong interests’ system and countries where groups activities are usually barely regulated. The results support the idea that the distance between civil society and political representatives should be considered a prominent focus of contemporary social and political investigation in order to understand the challenge for democratic life and the possible strategy of reaction.

This paper contains a comparative analysis of the presentation of the national identity of Spain and Germany by the far-right populist parties Vox España and Alternative für Deutschland. It shows how each party views national identity as being in a serious crisis arising from the betrayal by old-line parties which has led to the increased influence of the EU, the consequent reduction of national sovereignty, a deleterious impact on their own and on European culture, and a harmful influence on the family. The parties repudiate many of the provisions of the EU treaties. They are equally opposed to the presence of Islam in Christian Europe, viewing it as a menace to values shared by all European nations. These analyses lead to an examination of the performance of crisis by means of deliberate provocation and the use of electronic media. It shows how these parties from very different parts of Europe share remarkably close positions and use the technological achievements of the twenty-first century to attack the late-twentieth-century political and social achievements of the European Union in order to replace them with the nineteenth-century idea of the distinct ethno-cultural nation fully sovereign in its own nation-state.

A relatively broad support enjoyed by the populist and nationalist parties and movements (AfD, National Democratic Party of Germany, PEGIDA), as well as a higher rate of hate crimes in the eastern part of the Federal Republic of Germany raise a question on the nature of nationalism in this region. The present paper examines the causes of widespread xenophobic and nationalist sentiments in the ‘new’ federal states. To this end, the authors address a wide range of social-political and psychological factors, focusing on the historical roots and causes of the recent rise of nationalism in East Germany. Particularly, the authors show that the right-wing parties took advantage of popular frustration caused by the collapse of the East German economy after the country’s reunification and massive unemployment by putting all the blame on migrants. Nevertheless, the causes of growing xenophobia in East Germany were far from being solely economic. For example, the authors underline the role of the politics of memory in the GDR and primarily the approaches of its leaders to the issues of the Nazi past and their attempts to draw on the country’s history to shape a new national identity. However, the failure of the state to provide an unbiased view on the national history, rigid official ideology and its alienation from the popular demands have led to the growing nationalism in the GDR. Besides, a number of other aspects is pointed out which have also fostered xenophobic sentiments in this part of the country. Unlike West Germany which started to accept labour migrants from Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia back in 1950s, the GDR saw few foreigners and contacts between them and local population were limited. As a result, the paper not only helps to create a more detailed image of the East German nationalism but also to identify the underlying causes of the growing popularity of right-wing populist parties and movements in the FRG, most notably, the unfinished process of the country’s reunification and structural imbalances between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ federal states.

In the past few years, UNESCO World Heritage status has become more popular in Indonesia. Many cities are trying to get their sites inscribed on this prestigious list. This ambition has made some city governments take major efforts in revitalizing their heritage sites. Semarang with its famous Old Town -formerly a trading hub during the Dutch colonial period, is jumping on the bandwagon. UNESCO World Heritage is based on the 1972 Convention which accompanied by its operational guidelines. This convention set the standards on what kind of site could be listed as a world heritage and how a state party should manage and nominate their property accordingly. Critics have argued that the standards are Eurocentric, both in terms of the site selection and the management. In a developing country like Indonesia, heritage preservation has its own discourse. People were skeptical about the benefit of preserving heritage mainly because it seemed to only entertain the needs of the elites, professionals, and academics. That is why the approach towards heritage preservation in a city like Semarang has shifted to become more populist, which apparently has its backlash. The approach strives to preserve heritage sites and buildings while at the same time provide social and economic advantages for the community through tourism. However, this approach has turned heritage conservation into careless beautification projects that might have gone too far from UNESCO standards for world heritage. This paper will answer why it seems unrealistic to pursue this title considering the ongoing social and economic issues. It will also tell what heritage preservation practice and policy are lacking thus making the site management failed to meet the standards of the 1972 Convention. In a broader sense, this paper will examine what are the odds and challenges for developing countries in nominating their sites as World Heritage, especially in the era of mass tourism.

Yugoslavia, once an advanced country in market reforms, was one of the least transformed countries in Eastern Europe in the nineties. Such a situation was caused by the civil war, policy of the Milosevic?s regime and international sanctions. The resistance of the ruling conservative forces made it impossible to establish an adequate reform policy. Thus, the transition stopped short halfway. The situation has radically changed only since the autumn of 2000, after Milosevic?s downfall, when after the gradual lifting of international isolation, economic and political reforms were given a new stimulus, and the country could start the process of European integration. This article is an attempt to give an overview of the transition of the Yugoslav economy in the last ten years or so. The growth rate of Yugoslavia?s GDP is compared not only with that of its neighbouring countries, i.e. other former socialist countries of South-Eastern Europe (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Romania) but also with that of other transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Commonwealth of Independent States. A particular attention is given to the role of research and development (R&D) in Yugoslavia in the nineties as compared to Croatia, Slovenia, and the United States. The structural changes in the Yugoslav economy during the past decade are analysed together with property relations as well as the issues concerning small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). At the sectoral level, it is the performance of manufacturing and agriculture that is separately explored. In relation to this, wage formation and relative wage levels in Yugoslavia?s manufacturing are viewed regarding the country?s international competitiveness and wider characteristics of globalising world economy. In analysing the role of external sources in the Yugoslav economy, the problems of foreign trade, external indebtedness, and attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) are emphasized together with the economic assistance rendered to the FRY by the European Union. Regarding the important indicator of openness, i.e. the share of exports and imports in GDP, a comparison is made between Yugoslavia, on one hand, and Croatia, Slovenia, the European Union, and the United States, on the other. The economic policy of Milosevic?s regime is contrasted with that of the new democratic government that came to power after the events in October 2000. Stabilisation, liberalisation, privatisation, and institutional reform are considered giving particular attention to the experience of the member republics of the Yugoslav federation: Serbia and Montenegro. The author comes to the following conclusions: in transition countries stabilisation, liberalisation, and privatisation cannot be successful without carrying out a comprehensive, deep reform of the system of political institutions that along with creation of conditions for establishment of democracy and its strengthening also enables building of a modern and efficient market economy. This complicated and often contradictory process could come across serious obstacles if the old state and party nomenclature in power retains the command economy without planning, and under demagogical, nationalistic, and populist slogans gets involved in wars even taking the risks of being put under international isolation. However, such an outdated economic system characterised by autarchy can only temporarily exist and hinder the unravelling of market reforms in the epoch of globalisation.

The polish party system has evolved from having been an extremely fragmented one to a moderate pluralist one. Up to 2005, the main political cleavage was that between post-communist and anti-communist parties. There was also a left–right dimension of political competition, but it was the ‘old regime’ divide that constituted the basic axis of political conflict. Coalitions were formed either by the successor party (SLD) or by the post-‘Solidarity’ parties. All cabinets between 1993 and 2005 were minimal winning ones. Since 2005 two parties with ‘Solidarity’ pedigree compete with each other for the victory in parliamentary elections. On the left–right spectrum, they both represent the ‘right’. The left has been marginalized. Socioeconomic and socio-cultural conflicts between the nationalist-conservative PiS and the liberal-conservative PO have dominated the electoral and parliamentary arenas. Also, after 2005, minimal winning coalitions led by either PiS or PO have prevailed, but new forms of cabinets have appeared. In 2005, a single-party cabinet was formed by PiS. In 2006, a support party agreement (the so called pakt stabilizacyjny) was signed by PiS and two small, populist parties. After a few months, the coalition was formalized in a regular coalition agreement. Within the same time period, from the turn of the millennium, the two large parties have both practiced a governance model with prime ministers dominating internal procedures and mechanisms. Another regularity is that the largest parliamentary party always forms the cabinet, either on its own (rarely) or in alliance with smaller parties. Also, junior parties in the coalitions are likely to be punished rather than awarded by the electorate. Notable is that formal coalition agreements have been signed by coalition partners since 1993. They are programmatic as well as procedural and contain not only distribution of portfolios but also the rules of resolving intra-coalition conflicts.

There’s an apocryphal story, still in circulation, that the word OK was made up by President Andrew Jackson. According to the tale, Jackson used the letters when he was a major general in the War of 1812, marking his approval on papers with initials abbreviating the words oll korrect . “The Gen. was never good at spelling,” the Boston Atlas dryly concluded, recounting the story in August 1840. By that time Old Hickory, as Jackson was known, had served his eight years as president, and his successor, Martin Van Buren, was running for a second term. A native of Kinderhook, New York, Van Buren appealed to the Jacksonian vote with the nickname Old Kinderhook, using the initials O. K. as a political slogan. His Whig Party rivals sought, successfully, to turn his populist appeal into a liability by calling attention to Jackson’s alleged semiliteracy. By a sort of logical doggerel endemic in American politics, Old Kinderhook’s slogan became a symbol of his ignorance. The true origin of OK , as the American lexicographer Allen Walker Read skillfully uncovered in 1963, was much closer to the Atlas’s editorial offices. The letters did stand for oll korrect, but the spelling was no accident. The coinage almost certainly came from the waggish editor of the Boston Morning Post , Charles Gordon Greene, who was at the center of what Read characterizes as “a remarkable vogue of using abbreviations” beginning in the year 1838. The Morning Post was full of them, generally used with a touch of irony, as in the mock dignity of O.F.M. (our first men), or a fit of whimsy, as in the pure zaniness of G.T. (gone to Texas). It was only a matter of months before the fad turned to creative misspelling, a source of humor then as it was in Mark Twain’s time. There was N.C. (nuff said) and N.Y. (no yuse), as well as O.W. (oll wright). The first known appearance of OK followed that pattern.