Academic literature on the topic 'Populist Party (Neb.)'

Party systems all over Europe are becoming more unstable, as new parties win representation. Many of these parties have few members and little or no presence ‘on the ground’ and they tend to present themselves as an alternative to the old, corrupt, and/or incompetent elites. But are they really? In this article I investigate how the parliamentary elites of new parties differ from the elites of more established parties, using the 2020 election as a point of departure. Slovakia is a particularly interesting case, because since 1992, at least one new party has entered parliament in every election bar one. I find that new and/or populist parties are not necessarily much more representative, but most of them do represent an alternative to the established elite in some respect. Strikingly, genuinely new parties not only have younger legislators, but also literally represent a new generation: the generation of the party leader. However, as new parties grow older, so do their parliamentary elites. In leadership-dominated parties the composition of the party leader’s inner circle clearly matters for candidate selection and hence, for the social bias of the parliamentary elite. Finally, the idiosyncratic nomination practice of OĽaNO, the new prime minister’s party, is part of the reason for the party’s relative social pluralism, as well as for high turnover, ideological diversity and low party loyalty.

<p>Abstrak<br />Sejak tahun 2005 BSN mewakili Indonesia sebagai member body dalam IECEE. Sampai dengan saat ini Indonesia telah mempunyai 3 NCB dengan 4 CBTL yang telah mendapat pengakuan untuk beroperasi didalam IECEE CB Scheme, namun demikian potensi NCB dan CBTL tersebut belum dimanfaatkan secara optimal oleh produsen produk elektroteknika yang berlokasi di Indonesia. Berdasarkan data statistik CB Test Certificate (CBTC), hingga tahun 2012 baru terdapat 4 sertifikat yang diterbitkan oleh NCB di Indonesia (Teguh, dkk., 2014). Tujuan dari penelitian adalah untuk mengetahui faktor signifikan dari karakteristik produsen yang mempengaruhi pemanfaatan NCB dan CBTL Nasional. Hipotesa penelitian ini adalah karakter yang mempengaruhi adalah: (1) “Permodalan” untuk status PMA/PMDN, (2) “Pengetahuan” untuk pengetahuan produsen terhadap ketersediaan NCB dan CBTL di Indonesia, (3) “Kesadaran” untuk kesadaran perusahaan akan manfaat apabila tersedia NCB dan CBTL di Indonesia, (4) “Kesesuaian” untuk kesesuaian lingkup NCB dan CBTL dibandingkan dengan produk yang dibuat produsen, dan (5) “Penentu” untuk pihak penentu pemilihan NCB dan CBTL. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif kuantitatif, wawancara langsung dengan responden serta analisis hasil dengan regresi berganda dan korelasi. Responden dipilih berdasarkan pada kriteria sebagai berikut: (1) tercantum dalam data statistik CBTC, (2) berlokasi di Indonesia, dan (3) produk produsen memiliki lingkup yang sama dengan lingkup NCB nasional (HOUS, LITE, INST dan BATT), diperluas dengan lingkup TRON dan OFF yang mendominasi dalam statistik CBTC di Indonesia dan dunia. Didapat responden sebanyak 28 perusahaan elektroteknika dengan tingkat kepercayaan mewakili populasi sebesar 95%. Kesimpulan penelitian adalah kelima faktor yang diujikan memberikan kontribusi kuat terhadap pemilihan NCB dan CBTL sebesar 78,2% dengan keseluruh arah korelasinya positif. Tiga faktor dengan signifikansi &lt;0,15 adalah “penentu”, “kesesuaian”, dan “pengetahuan”.<br />Kata kunci : IECEE CB Scheme, pemanfaatan NCB dan CBTL Nasional, karakter produsen elektronika.</p><p><br />Abstract<br />Since 2005 BSN represent Indonesia as a member body in the IECEE. Up to now, Indonesia has 3 NCB and 4 CBTL which has received recognition to operate within the IECEE CB Scheme, however the potential for NCB and CBTL is not used optimally by the electrical engineering product manufacturer located in Indonesia. Based on the statistical data of CB Test Certificate (CBTC), until 2012, there are only 4 certificates issued by the NCB in Indonesia (Teguh et al, 2014). The aim of the research was to determine the characteristics of the producers that act as significant factors affecting the utilization of National NCB and CBTL. Hypothesis of this study is the character that affect the utilization were: (1) "Capital" for the status of foreign / domestic investment, (2) "Knowledge" for producers’ knowledge to availability of NCB and CBTL in Indonesia, (3) "awareness" for awareness of the company to benefits if NCB and CBTL available in Indonesia, (4) "suitability" for NCB and CBTL scope suitability compared to producers’ products, and (5) "Determinant" for party who deciding the election NCB and CBTL. This study used descriptive quantitative method, direct interviews with respondents, multiple regression analysis and correlation. Respondents were selected based on following criterias: (1) listed in CBTC statistical data, (2) located in Indonesia, and (3) product manufacturers have the same scope with the scope of the national NCB (HOUS, LITE, INST and BATT), expanded with TRON and OFF that the statistics dominate the CBTC in Indonesia and the world. 28 respondents were obtained, with 95% of confidence level for representing it population. Conclusion of the research was the five factors tested contribute strongly to the selection of NCB and CBTL by 78.2%, with positive correlation. Three factors with significance &lt;0.15 were "determinant", "suitability", and "knowledge".<br />Keywords: IECEE CB Scheme, utilization of National NCB and CBTL, electronic producers characteristics.</p>

Le 16 décembre 2009, quelques semaines avant les primaires qui devaient désigner le candidat officiel des partis démocrate et républicain aux États-Unis, quelques habitants de Boston se sont inspirés de la Révolution américaine dans leurs habits. En effet, les drapeaux qu'ils portaient symbolisaient un serpent à sonnette noir sur fond jaune, ayant comme slogan « Don’t Tread on Me » (Ne marchez pas sur moi), en s’inspirant du Boston Tea Party de 1773. Le rassemblement public, qui était initialement et principalement structuré dans la demeure du représentant Républicain Ron Paul, a été organisé conjointement avec une campagne de collecte de fonds lancée par des activistes. Cette campagne permettrait de collecter 6 millions de dollars de fonds sur Internet en une seule journée, grâce à des dons individuels de 50 dollars (Sinderband, 2007). Un an plus tard, un groupe de candidats républicains a balayé la majorité démocrate aux élections de mi-mandat de novembre 2010 et a remporté 60 sièges supplémentaires à la Chambre des représentants, célébrant ainsi l'un des plus grands triomphes républicains de ces cinquante dernières années (Zernike, 2010). Loin d'être un mouvement anodin en 2009, le mouvement Tea Party est considéré par beaucoup comme ayant eu un impact significatif sur cette victoire. La cristallisation du débat sur la réforme de santé avait conféré au mouvement un pouvoir et une influence inattendus. Aujourd'hui, ils représentent un nouveau mouvement conservateur, pourtant bien établi dans le pays.Le but de cette thèse est d'analyser la montée des idées et des politiques de la nouvelle droite depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale aux Etats-Unis. Au lieu de considérer la droite contemporaine comme fondamentalement sans rapport avec l’économie et la société conventionnelles des États-Unis, on analyse les nombreuses manières dont le nouveau conservatisme s’inspire profondément dans les débats politiques américains. On considère trois grandes questions : Ces questions sont les suivantes : (1) Existe-t-il une nouvelle droite et, dans l'affirmative, en quoi consiste-t-elle et pourquoi est-elle qualifiée de « nouvelle »? (2) Quel est le rôle des idées dans la formation de la politique gouvernementale ? Et (3) quelles sont les implications du nouveau conservatisme sur l’avenir de la démocratie américaine ?Après l'échec des néoconservateurs sous l'administration Bush et la victoire de Barack Obama en tant que premier président noir de l'histoire américaine, les commentateurs ont déclaré la fin du conservatisme aux États-Unis. Cependant, l’émergence du Tea Party en tant que mouvement populaire influent a tout simplement prouvé le contraire. Dès son apparition, le Tea Party était simplement considéré comme un groupe raciste, craignant l'autorité croissante d'un président noir. La thèse vise donc à révéler que les éléments entourant la réaction du mouvement du Tea Party étaient en réalité plus profonds, allant au-delà d’une simple réaction raciste et remontant à des décennies d’un mouvement conservateur de longue date enraciné dans la vie et la politique américaines.La thèse vise également à examiner les sources de soutien du mouvement Tea Party dans la sphère politique américaine. Entre les événements émergents de 2008 et les élections à mi-parcours de 2010, le mouvement Tea Party est devenu une force de mobilisation importante qui a suscité un intérêt considérable pour la politique américaine. On explique l’origine de la naissance du mouvement Tea Party qui est apparu à ce moment-là, tout de suite après l'élection d'un président démocrate en 2008. Ainsi, afin de comprendre les origines du mouvement, on met en évidence les facteurs qui ont contribué à l'émergence de ce phénomène politique
: December 16, 2009, a few weeks prior to the primaries that would agree on the official contestant of the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S., a group of people in Boston dressed in a way inspired by the American Revolution era. The flags they held symbolized a black rattlesnake on a yellow setting, by means of the slogan “Do not Tread on Me,” in the same manner asthe Boston Tea Party of 1773. The public meeting, which was initially and principally an evident movement in the dwelling of the U.S. representative Ron Paul, was held together with a fundraising campaign prearranged by activists, which would make available a 6 million dollars fundraising on the Internet in only one day, owing to 50 individual donations. One year later, a group of Republican candidates swept the Democratic majority in the midterm elections of November 2010 and won 60 more seats in the House of Representatives, celebrating one of the biggest Republican triumphs during the last fifty years. Far from being a trivial movement in 2009, the Tea Party movement, is considered by many to have had a significant impact in this victory. The crystallization of the debate on the health care reform had given the movement unexpected power and influence. Today, they represent a new conservative movement, yet formerly well established in the country.This dissertation explores the rise of Conservative social movements since WWII and the motives behind this. In the last chapter, it focuses on the Tea Party movement asthe latest chapter in the history of the populist conservative movement as the “Party of No.”Ianalyze (1) the historical background of the Right’s economic theories and ideologies, (2) how the U.S. society has been pulled to the right since the late 1970s in the most continuous political reaction since the Reconstruction era after the Civil War, (3) how welfare programs - as a unifying factor - have been used as a source of fear and fantasy for the Right, and (4) the origins of the movement: the who, what and why of the Tea Party movement and how they changed the American political landscape

Contemporary center right parties in Europe are often known for their ideological focus on 'bread and butter' issues such as the free market economy and law and order, alongside their promotion of traditional institutions and values in society. However, the strategies they use to emphasize the immigration issue are less discussed in academic literature, as are the issue's electoral implications for this party family in different economic contexts across the 21st century. The central research question of this dissertation investigates the electoral success of center right parties and how they are able to prosper electorally from emphasizing immigration in different economic contexts, often at the expense of populist radical right parties. The dissertation focuses on center right parties rather than the center left, as the center right is spatially and ideologically closer to the populist radical right on a number of issues. This dissertation tests an original aggregate level theoretical framework of 'strategic emphasis' that features a dynamic game of party competition. The theory argues that immigration is not an issue 'owned' solely by populist radical right parties, but one that can also help today's center right parties to prosper electorally. This theory proposes a discussion of the relative electoral success of center right parties in two different economic contexts, showing how in certain situation they can perform better electorally than the radical right when they emphasize immigration, as opposed to adopting specific positional stances on immigration. The central story in this dissertation is not about spatial positions in the form of anti-immigrant sentiment driving electoral success for center right parties. Rather, it is about issue salience and the emphasis that center right parties place on immigration in their party strategies that determines their electoral fortunes in the 21st century. This theory is then tested in three separate empirical chapters (Chapters 5, 6 and 7), which draws on the ParlGov dataset on European national parliamentary elections that has been merged with the Whitefield-Rohrschneider expert survey on party positions. The Chapel Hill Expert Survey data is also utilized. Chapter 7 comprises a case study analysis of four research cases derived from the results of the large N comparative analysis in Chapter 5. Chapters 5 and 6 set out an original contribution to knowledge in two different economic contexts, demonstrating through statistical models the electoral success of the center right. The findings show that when they emphasize the immigration issue, center right parties tended to perform better than populist radical right parties in different contexts, in times of economic crisis (2008-13) and particularly in times of economic stability (1999-2007). Drawing on a research design consisting of four case studies (Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and France), Chapter 7 investigates qualitatively how center right parties' emphasis on immigration affects their electoral success in economic bad times and how in some cases, this strategy allows them to perform better electorally than the populist radical right. However, the case studies show that there are restrictions to center right party electoral success. For example, when center right parties are (i) incumbents and (ii) do not emphasize immigration; this allows the populist radical right to achieve electoral success at their expense. 'Challenger' center right parties (specifically non-incumbents and those in opposition) tended to perform better electorally and further underlined incumbency-punishment patterns in the context of greater voter volatility. The dissertation argues that there may be a 'new electoral winning formula' in the 21st century, whereby specific center right parties profit electorally through strategically emphasizing the immigration issue, rather than on traditional issues such as law and order alongside the free market that the center right tend to be more historically associated with. These findings have implications for contemporary party politics, in showing the potential for center right parties to perform electorally well on the immigration issue and has important implications for the state of contemporary liberal democracy across Europe.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 1997. Graduate Programme in Political Science.
Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 397-423). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ27314.

The key research question of my diploma thesis deals with the problem of whether the President of the Czech Republic Milos Zeman creates the same discourse as far-right political parties in the Czech Republic. The research concerns the social discourse surrounding the current migration crisis facing Europe. In this connection, there is a discourse analysis of the themes of migration, Islam, terrorism, external and internal actors. This research is conducted on the basis of the theory of binaries from Teun Van Dijk, which can be applied to a populist political style characterized by President Zeman and extreme right-wing political parties, among which are analyzed the Workers' Party of Social Justice, National Democracy, Dawn - the National Coalition, Freedom And Direct Democracy - Tomio Okamura and the Citizens' Rights Party. Research data is collected from President Zeman's official communications channels and political parties, including official websites and social networks. Based on a discourse analysis of their political views, it is possible to compare President Zeman and the extreme right-wing parties to each topic and to conclude whether they speak the same or differently about these themes.

The 2014 European Parliament elections were hailed as a “populist earthquake” with parties like the French Front National, UKIP and the Danish People's Party topping the polls in their countries and commentators warning about the consequences of a large radical right populist bloc in the Parliament. But what happened after the elections? Based on policy positions, voting data, and interviews conducted over more than four years with senior figures from fourteen radical right populist parties and their main partners, this is the first major study to explain these parties' actions and alliances in the European Parliament. International Populism answers three key questions: Why have radical right populists, unlike other ideological party types, long been divided in the European Parliament? Why, although divisions persist, are many of them now more united than ever? And how does all of this inform our understanding of the European populist radical right today? Arguing that these parties have entered a new international and transnational phase, with some attempting to be “respectable radicals” while others have instead embraced their shared populism, McDonnell and Werner shed new light on the past, present and future of one of the most important political phenomena of twenty-first-century Europe.

This book provides a field theoretic account of the origins of electoral populism, which first emerged in the American state of South Dakota in 1890, at the height of what was known as the Populist movement. Lasting from roughly 1877 to 1896, the movement brought together farmers throughout the agrarian periphery in an effort to combat material hardship at the hands of railroads and banks. The book argues that the rise of electoral populism in the American West was a strategic response to a political field in which the configuration of positions was literally locked in place, precluding the success of new contenders or otherwise marginal actors. This argument is developed in two parts. The first part of the book examines the transformation of physical space resulting from the simultaneous expansion of both state and market. Together, these two processes contributed to the stability of the political field, where the struggle for power was synonymous with a struggle for position in an emerging urban hierarchy. The second part of the book examines the subsequent push for market regulation and the rise of the Populist movement in southern Dakota. Unable to make headway through social movement organizations such the Farmers’ Alliance and administrative agencies such as the Dakota Territory Board of Railroad Commissioners, farmers in southern Dakota looked to third-party alternatives as means of affecting change. The result was the People’s Party which, for a brief period between 1892 and 1896, threatened to destroy the prevailing party system.

Populist forces are increasingly relevant, and studies on populism have entered the mainstream of the political science discipline. However, no book has synthesized the ongoing debate on how to study the phenomenon. The main goal of this Handbook is to provide the state of the art of the scholarship on populism. The Handbook lays out not only the cumulated knowledge on populism, but also the ongoing discussions and research gaps on this topic. The Handbook is divided into four sections. The first presents the main conceptual approaches and points out how the phenomenon in question can be empirically analyzed. The second focuses on populist forces across the world with chapters on Africa, Australia and New Zealand, Central, Eastern, and Western Europe, East Asia, India, Latin America, the post-Soviet States, and the United States. The third reflects on the interaction between populism and various issues both from scholarly and political viewpoints. Analysis includes the relationship between populism and fascism, foreign policy, gender, nationalism, political parties, religion, social movements, and technocracy. The fourth part encompasses recent normative debates on populism, including chapters on populism and cosmopolitanism, constitutionalism, hegemony, the history of popular sovereignty, the idea of the people, and revolution. With each chapter written by an expert in their field, this Handbook will position the study of populism within political science and will be indispensable not only to those who turn to populism for the first time, but also to those who want to take their understanding of populism in new directions.

This prologue argues that the election of Donald Trump was made possible in part by the emergence of a new political formation. The formation promotes deal-making sensibilities, the amplifies white masculine anxieties, an fosters interest in self-improvement and organizational management. All three are unusually well-developed in the media culture surrounding professional football.

This chapter returns to the research question of this study and briefly restates its argument and main findings. It discusses the role of explanatory factors of this study, namely party system institutionalization, turnout, social policy legacy in shaping welfare policies, and inequality in new democracies. Then it asks to what extent income inequality and political inequality foster one another, and argues for the importance of economic resources in creating political equality among citizens. The chapter ends with a discussion of the major debate on populism and democratic backsliding in new democracies, with a focus on Turkey and Poland. It emphasizes the conducive political and economic context that encouraged the rise of (populist) parties with nationalist/illiberal discourse and policies in these countries.

The contributions to this volume analyse the complex relations between religious traditions, groups and ideas on the one hand, and (neo-)nationalism on the other. They do so on a conceptual level as well as with regard to concrete contexts and countries. They shed light on these relations from historical, sociological, theological and ethical perspectives, and contribute to the discourse on neo-nationalism, populism and public theology. While the first part of the book situates religion and (neo-)nationalism in a globalised world, the second puts the concepts of neo-nationalism, populism, religion in context. The third part presents different case studies (particularly from European countries), and the final part concludes with ethical and political perspectives. With contributions by José Casanova, Mark Juergensmeyer, Hans Joas, Maureen A. Eger, Siniša Malešević, Ulf Hedetoft, Hans-Richard Reuter, Sonja Angelika Strube, Rik Pinxten, Thijl Sunier, Teija Tiilikainen, Cora Alexa Døving, Adrian Pabst, Rolf Schieder, Frank Mathwig, Philippe Portier, Raffaella Perin, István Povedák, Kristina Stoeckl, Dino Abazović, Philip S. Gorski, Robert Vosloo, Marcia Pally, Christian Polke and Torsten Meireis.

Chapter 5 discusses the premises of the emergence of the cartel party with the parties’ resilience to any significant modification in the face of the cultural, societal, and political changes of the 1970s–1980s. Parties kept and even increased their hold on institutions and society. They adopted an entropic strategy to counteract challenges coming from a changing external environment. A new gulf with public opinion opened up, since parties demonstrated greater ease with state-centred activities for interest-management through collusive practices in the para-governmental sector, rather than with new social and political options. The emergence of two sets of alternatives, the greens and the populist extreme right, did not produce, in the short run, any impact on intra-party life. The chapter argues that the roots of cartelization reside mainly in the necessitated interpenetration with the state, rather than on inter-party collusion. This move has caught parties in a legitimacy trap.

This chapter focuses on framing and contexts for the eighteenth century as a period of history. While eighteenth-century Iran has been neglected, partly due to its political fragmentation, it can be fitted into an early modern context of Eurasia, one that was part of Iran’s post-Mongol legacy—and one that continued through the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Qajar dynasty. Key changes here include new elites; the emergence of a vernacular language and populist religion; reshaping of political geographies, especially the role of pastoral nomadic tribal confederations; and the emergence of “simultaneous rulership,” in which the ruler’s persona embodied new ideas and constituencies.

This chapter traces US populism back to President Andrew Jackson (1828–1836), providing early characteristics of a US populist leader. Major US populist issues have included immigration, the banking sector, and more recently, foreign trade. While Franklin D. Roosevelt’s populist-inspired New Deal reforms included trade liberalizing measures, postwar populists linked advancing globalization in the late twentieth century to elitist trade policy, inspiring new populist movements. Anti-trade populists were unsuccessful third-party presidential candidates until Donald Trump exploited this issue, capturing the Republican Party nomination and developing particularly provocative anti-trade rhetoric. He successfully integrated an anti-trade platform with a host of other populist issues, and vowed to alter US trade policy to “make America great again.”

The concluding chapter examines how housewife populist ideology influenced a new generation of conservative female activists, and questions how the history of women on the right might bring useful scrutiny to the categories and assumptions that frame U.S. feminist and political history. It argues that housewife populism continues to shape conservative beliefs about women's importance to society and American politics, as the career of Alaska's former governor, Sarah Palin, illustrates. After Barack Obama won the election in 2008, Palin's populist style carried over into the conservative Tea Party movement, an alliance of organizations and bloggers that emerged in opposition to government-sponsored economic stimulus, health-care reform, and numerous other grievances directed against the Democratic administration and Congress. The endurance of housewife populist ideology demands that scholars pay closer attention to the ambiguities and paradoxes that conservative women have managed to reconcile and marshal to their own interests, in much the way that suffragists and other skillful political actors in American history achieved their goals.

This chapter explains the formation of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group containing Front National, Northern League, Austrian Freedom party, Flemish Vlaams Belang and the Dutch Party for Freedom. Based on expert survey data and interviews, it shows how, while these parties have long held compatible positions on key issues, cooperation between them all has only become possible over the last decade, in part through the role of new party leaders such as Marine Le Pen. The chapter argues that the ENF’s creation reflects a shared desire to create a lasting European group composed of radical right populist parties unashamed of their commonalities. Finally, it discusses how the ENF parties have presented themselves not only as defenders of their own nations, but of a wider “European” people against the supposedly increasing threats posed by EU elites and dangerous “others” (in particular Muslims).

This chapter discusses the political shift in Saudi Arabia from religious nationalism and pan-Islamism—which played a central role in the consolidation of the Saudi state—to populist nationalism under the new crown prince. The shift is explained as part of the rise of the personality cult of Muhammad ibn Salman.

In this chapter Deborah Beckel reconsiders historians' analyses of the Knights of Labor in Gilded Age North Carolina. Based on new research, it reframes interpretations of labor's role in the rise of Populism. Reevaluating race, class, gender, and power relations within and among the Knights of Labor, Farmers' Alliance, and People's Party movements, it shows how black and white men and women, including Ellen Williams, shaped interracial, cross-class, and cross-gender activism. It reexamines the ways that grassroots African-American leaders communicated with state and national leaders, including Marion Butler, Elias Carr, and John Hayes. The chapter rethinks the roles of the Knights of Labor and the Republican Party in North Carolina's fusion coalition. It reassesses the meanings of the Republican-Populist political victories of the 1890s.

Ours is an age of pervasive political turbulence, and the scale of the challenge requires new thinking on politics as well as public ethics for our world. In Western countries, the specter of Islamophobia, alt-right populism, along with racialized violence has shaken public confidence in long-secure assumptions rooted in democracy, diversity, and citizenship. The tragic denouement of so many of the Arab uprisings together with the ascendance of apocalyptic extremists like Daesh and Boko Haram have caused an even greater sense of alarm in large parts of the Muslim-majority world. It is against this backdrop that M.A. Muqtedar Khan has written a book of breathtaking range and ethical beauty. The author explores the history and sociology of the Muslim world, both classic and contemporary. He does so, however, not merely to chronicle the phases of its development, but to explore just why the message of compassion, mercy, and ethical beauty so prominent in the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet came over time to be displaced by a narrow legalism that emphasized jurisprudence, punishment, and social control. In the modern era, Western Orientalists and Islamists alike have pushed the juridification and interpretive reification of Islamic ethical traditions even further. Each group has asserted that the essence of Islam lies in jurisprudence (fiqh), and both have tended to imagine this legal heritage on the model of Western positive law, according to which law is authorized, codified, and enforced by a leviathan state. “Reification of Shariah and equating of Islam and Shariah has a rather emaciating effect on Islam,” Khan rightly argues. It leads its proponents to overlook “the depth and heights of Islamic faith, mysticism, philosophy or even emotions such as divine love (Muhabba)” (13). As the sociologist of Islamic law, Sami Zubaida, has similarly observed, in all these developments one sees evidence, not of a traditionalist reassertion of Muslim values, but a “triumph of Western models” of religion and state (Zubaida 2003:135). To counteract these impoverishing trends, Khan presents a far-reaching analysis that “seeks to move away from the now failed vision of Islamic states without demanding radical secularization” (2). He does so by positioning himself squarely within the ethical and mystical legacy of the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet. As the book’s title makes clear, the key to this effort of religious recovery is “the cosmology of Ihsan and the worldview of Al-Tasawwuf, the science of Islamic mysticism” (1-2). For Islamist activists whose models of Islam have more to do with contemporary identity politics than a deep reading of Islamic traditions, Khan’s foregrounding of Ihsan may seem unfamiliar or baffling. But one of the many achievements of this book is the skill with which it plumbs the depth of scripture, classical commentaries, and tasawwuf practices to recover and confirm the ethic that lies at their heart. “The Quran promises that God is with those who do beautiful things,” the author reminds us (Khan 2019:1). The concept of Ihsan appears 191 times in 175 verses in the Quran (110). The concept is given its richest elaboration, Khan explains, in the famous hadith of the Angel Gabriel. This tradition recounts that when Gabriel appeared before the Prophet he asked, “What is Ihsan?” Both Gabriel’s question and the Prophet’s response make clear that Ihsan is an ideal at the center of the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, and that it enjoins “perfection, goodness, to better, to do beautiful things and to do righteous deeds” (3). It is this cosmological ethic that Khan argues must be restored and implemented “to develop a political philosophy … that emphasizes love over law” (2). In its expansive exploration of Islamic ethics and civilization, Khan’s Islam and Good Governance will remind some readers of the late Shahab Ahmed’s remarkable book, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Ahmed 2016). Both are works of impressive range and spiritual depth. But whereas Ahmed stood in the humanities wing of Islamic studies, Khan is an intellectual polymath who moves easily across the Islamic sciences, social theory, and comparative politics. He brings the full weight of his effort to conclusion with policy recommendations for how “to combine Sufism with political theory” (6), and to do so in a way that recommends specific “Islamic principles that encourage good governance, and politics in pursuit of goodness” (8).