Journal articles: 'Power and ideology'

1

Pinar, William F. "The Unaddressed ‘I’ of Ideology Critique." Power and Education 1, no. 2 (January 2009): 189–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/power.2009.1.2.189.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

2

Parancika, Rd Bily, and Mohammad Aris. "HEGEMONI IDEOLOGI DALAM WACANA NOVEL AMBA KARYA LAKSMI PAMUNTJAK (KAJIAN TEORI PERKEMBANGAN HEGEMONI)." Alayasastra 17, no. 1 (May 31, 2021): 89–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.36567/aly.v17i1.794.

Full text

Abstract:

ABSTRAKPenelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengungkapkan kekuasaan dan dominasi yang terdapat dalam novel Amba karya Laksmi Pamuntjak. Adapun masalah yang melatarbelakangi penelitian ini ialah bagaimana bentuk hegemoni ideologi masyarakat dan pemerintahan yang terefleksikan dalam novel Amba. Penelitian ini bertolak pada teori ideologi Gramsci dengan menggunakan pendekatan hegemoni ideologi. Pendekatan ini merupakan konsep berpikir Antonio Gramsi mengenai konsep kebebasan, wewenang atau kekuasaan. Penelitian ini dilakukan menggunakan metode deskriptif analisis. Pengumpulan sumber data yang berupa kutipan dihasilkan dari membaca sumber. Kemudian, data yang terkumpul dicatat, dianalisis, dan diinterpretasikan dengan perspektif hegemoni ideologi. Hasil analisis disajikan dalam bentuk narasi deskriptif-kualitatif. Hasil yang didapat dari penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa novel Amba karya Laksmi Pamuntjak sarat dengan muatan hegemoni ideologi yang meliputi ideologi keagamaan, ideologi politik, dominasi kekuasaan dan kekerasan fisik maupun nonfisik yang dilakukan perorangan maupun sosial. Kata Kunci: Hegemoni, Ideologi, Kekuasaan dan Amba ABSTRACT This research is aimed to express power and domination in Amba novel written by Laksmi Pamuntjak. The issue of this research is how to shape people and government's hegemoni ideology which are reflected in Amba novel. This research stand on the theory of Gramsci's ideology using hegemoni ideology approach. This approach is a concept of Antonio Gramsi's thinking about a concept of freedom, authority, or power. This research used analysis descriptive method. The collection of data sources in the form of quotations is generated from reading sources. Then it's written, analyzed, and intepreted by perspective hegemoni ideology. The analysis result is written by descriptive-qualitative naration. The research showed Amba novel by Laksmi Pamuntjak full of hegemoni ideology content which is consist of religious ideology, politics ideology, power domination and physical-non physical abuse done by person or public. Keywords: Hegemony, Ideology, Power and Amba

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

3

Musikhin, Gleb. "Ideology and Power." Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics Politeia 58-59, no. 3 (2010): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.30570/2078-5089-2010-5859-3-25-39.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

4

Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v22i3.463.

Full text

Abstract:

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

5

Cohen, Ariel. "Power or Ideology." American Journal of Islam and Society 22, no. 3 (July 1, 2005): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v22i3.463.

Full text

Abstract:

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

6

LeBlanc, Robert. "Reform, Ideology and the Politics of Waiting for ‘Superman’." Power and Education 2, no. 3 (January 2010): 300–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/power.2010.2.3.300.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

7

Avis, James. "Beyond NEET: Precariousness, Ideology and Social Justice – the 99%." Power and Education 6, no. 1 (January 2014): 61–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/power.2014.6.1.61.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

8

West, Charles C. "Faith, Ideology, and Power." Annual of the Society of Christian Ethics 11 (1991): 193–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/asce19911111.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

9

New, S., and J. C. Oliga. "Power, Ideology and Control." Journal of the Operational Research Society 48, no. 8 (August 1997): 847. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3010715.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

10

Rowlands, Michael, Daniel Miller, and Christopher Tilley. "Ideology, Power and Prehistory." Man 20, no. 2 (June 1985): 351. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2802397.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

11

Oliga, J. C. "Power, Ideology and Control." Journal of the Operational Research Society 48, no. 8 (August 1997): 847. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jors.2600831.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

12

Pease-Alvarez, Lucinda. "Power, Agency, and Ideology." Human Development 54, no. 4 (2011): 270–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000330297.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

13

Oliga, J. C. "Power, Ideology and Control." Journal of the Operational Research Society 48, no. 8 (1997): 847. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/sj.jors.2600831.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

14

Blank, Jonah. "Power, Ideology and Authority." African and Asian Studies 16, no. 1-2 (March 16, 2017): 82–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15692108-12341372.

Full text

Abstract:

In many religious (and other) communities, a dispute about ideology is often more accurately understood as a dispute about authority and power. Such a conflict may progress through three stages, each one more deeply challenging to the legitimacy of traditional authority structures. Whether the challenge ultimately succeeds or fails, its impact may reach far beyond the immediate issue ostensibly in contention: What might start as a narrowly-defined question of ideology or theology may evolve into a comprehensive rejection of the dominant authority’s moral foundation. This article examines such a dynamic through two case studies from the Daudi Bohra community, a denomination of Shi’a Islam spread across Asia, Africa, and four other continents. The first case involves a century-long contestation between the denomination’s apex cleric and a group of dissidents over the proper limits of clerical control. The second case, unfolding in 2014, involves a clerical dispute over succession to the hegemonic office of da’i-al mutlaq. In both cases, the Bohra experience in dealing with issues of ideology and authority provides an example illustrative of a dynamic found in many religious communities worldwide.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

15

Schull, Joseph. "What is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies." Political Studies 40, no. 4 (December 1992): 728–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1992.tb01795.x.

Full text

Abstract:

The article contrasts two approaches to ideology which view it, respectively, as a belief system and as a form of discourse, and argues for the second. Viewing ideology as a belief system involves unwarranted assumptions about the uniformity of convictions among the adherents of an ideology and reduces its causal power to its contingent capacity to condition beliefs. Viewing ideology as a discourse enables a more adequate account of the diversity of beliefs among members of an ideological movement and also locates its causal power at the level of social conventions rather than individual psychology. The power of ideology is based on respect, not faith. This theoretical discussion is linked with the case of Soviet-type societies, serving as the basis for a reinterpretation of ideology's role in the maintenance and more recent decline of these political systems.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

16

Silva, Márcia da. "Local power, ideology and social representations." Mercator 13, no. 02 (September 26, 2014): 39–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.4215/rm2014.1302.0003.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

17

DeMarrais, Elizabeth, Luis Jaime Castillo, and Timothy Earle. "Ideology, Materialization, and Power Strategies." Current Anthropology 37, no. 1 (February 1996): 15–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/204472.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

18

Carneiro, Robert L., and Timothy Earle. "Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology." Ethnohistory 40, no. 2 (1993): 315. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/482209.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

19

Shennan, Stephen, and Timothy Earle. "Chiefdoms: Power, Economy and Ideology." Man 29, no. 2 (June 1994): 466. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2804487.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

20

Fanthorpe, Richard. "Chiefdoms: Power, economy and ideology." Journal of Historical Geography 18, no. 3 (July 1992): 367–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-7488(92)90230-7.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

21

Piketty, Thomas. "About Capital, Power and Ideology." Agora 38, no. 01-02 (August 18, 2021): 301–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.18261/issn1500-1571-2021-01-02-15.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

22

Borges, Renato T. "Deem uma Chance à Ideologia – Notas Sobre o Poder Negligenciado nas Relações Internacionais | Give Ideology a Chance – Notes on that Neglected Power in International Relations." Mural Internacional 10 (September 24, 2019): e39513. http://dx.doi.org/10.12957/rmi.2019.39513.

Full text

Abstract:

As notas que se seguem visam colaborar com as discussões a respeito do conceito de ideologia e do seu papel na formulação de política externa referentes aos estudos da área de Relações Internacionais. O artigo, uma breve introdução sem qualquer objetivo de esgotamento do tema, aponta as relações existentes entre o conceito abordado e o do nacionalismo, assim como afirma a impossibilidade das tentativas de separação das questões ideológicas do exercício do estadista e das ações do Estado no cenário internacional. As considerações finais ressaltam a importância do estudo da ideologia para a área e reservam um comentário do autor acerca do contexto atual da política (externa) brasileira.Palavras-chave: Ideologia; Nacionalismo; Política Externa.ABSTRACT The notes below are an effort to contribute to the discussions in the area of International Relations concerning the concept of ideology and its role in foreign policy-making. This brief introduction does not exhaust the object, but it intends to be a starting point for new studies on the nexus between ideology and nationalism, or even the indivisibility of the former as a variable in the exercise of statesmanship as well as in the behavior of a state in the international system. The final thoughts underline the importance of the study of ideology in IR and expose some comments about the actual context of Brazilian (foreign) policy.Keywords: Ideology; Nationalism; Foreign Policy.Recebido em 17 jan. 2019 | Aceito em 03 set. 2019

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

23

Sanders, James A. "Scripture and Ideology." Biblical Theology Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture 51, no. 1 (January 27, 2021): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146107920980933.

Full text

Abstract:

Various movements through history have appealed to Scripture for authority. These have been called supersessionist, messianist, and/or zionist, but they continue to appeal to Scripture even after they attain power and thus repress others. Power corrupts, and when this happened in ancient Israel Prophets arose to critique and denounce it. In addition Scripture as canon, both Jewish and Christian, included Wisdom thinking, making it a thoroughly dialogical compendium that questioned abuse of power. The teachings of Jesus are themselves largely prophetic critique of abuses of power. Beyond Scripture prophetic critique can be effected by empathy for the position of “the other” and loving the enemy, thus engaging in the monotheizing process by refusing to demonize those who differ but learning from them.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

24

Iswadi, Iswandi. "STUDI GERAKAN IDEOLOGI PARTAI POLITIK PADA PEMILU 2019." Politica: Jurnal Hukum Tata Negara dan Politik Islam 7, no. 1 (December 30, 2020): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.32505/politica.v7i1.1459.

Full text

Abstract:

The ideology contestation is basically a classic polemic, where after independence the ideology of Islam was confronted with nationalism and took root until now (reform). However, the momentum of the 2019 election political contestation was again marked by the struggle of ideology namely ideology of Islamism and nationalism. The polemic began with the emergence of religious issues that were raised on the surface of political actors as a hegemony in taking the sympathy of voters. The existence of religion as a central issue began in 2016-2017 related to the prosecution of Ahok who insulted religious values (Islam), and among the political parties involved in the demonstrations namely PPP, PKS, PBB, and PKB. In that momentum the beginning of the revival of Islamic ideology as the power in defending Islamic sovereignty. Judging from the ideology of political parties in Indonesia in the 2019 election political contestation, the ideology of political parties based on the statutes and bylaws (AD / ART) that the ideology applied can be classified into three parts namely ideology Nationalism, Islamism, and Nationalist-Religious, and the three ideologies. This can be proven based on the results of a survey from Australia 2017-2018 based on the voters. However, political parties based on multiple ideologies, PAN, PKB and Democrats, each have priority orientation. PAN and PKB tend to polarize the values of Islamism (religious), while Democrats are more dominated by nationalist issues. The concept of Islamic political ideology, in the context of political contestation in political party elections, is basically a necessity to implement the values of ri'ayah, taqwin, irshad and ta'dib through political education, or campaign in elections to achieve mutual benefit, both parties whose ideology Islamism, nationalism and nationalist-religious, so as to build the moralistic side of society, and intelligence in responding to the issues that exist in the election apart from that, political parties in confronting political contestation the emphasis of the movement must reflect the value of poverty, the three ideologies have been packaged in the values of Pancasila in the third principles of Indonesian unity. Asbtak Kontestasi ideology pada dasarnya polemik klasik, dimana pasca kemerdekaan ideologi islam dihadapkan dengan nasionalisme dan mengakar sampai sampai saat ini (reformasi). Akan tetapi momentum pemilu 2019 kontestasi politik kembali diwarnai pergulatan ideology yakni ideology islamisme dan nasionalisme. Polemik tersebut berawal dengan mencuatnya isu keagamaan yang dimunculkan dipermukaan pelaku politik sebagai hegemoni dalam mengambil simpati pemilih. Eksistensi agama sebagai sentral isu berawal tahun 2016-2017 terkait penuntutan terhadap ahok yang melecehkan nilai-nilai agama (islam), dan diantara partai politik yang terlibat dalam demonstrasi yakni PPP, PKS, PBB, dan PKB. Dalam momentum tersebut awal mencuatnya kembali ideologi islam sebagai of the power dalam mempertahan kedaulatan Islam. Menilik ideologis partai politik di Indonesia pada konstestasi politik pemilu 2019, ideology partai politik berdasarkan anggaran dasar dan anggaran rumah tangga (AD/ART) bahwa ideologi yang diterapkan dapat diklasifikasikan menjadi tiga bagian yakni ideology Nasionalisme, Islamisme, dan Nasionalis-Religius, dan ketiga ideology tersebut dapat dibuktikan dengan berdasarkan hasil survey dari asutralia 2017-2018 berdasarkan pemilih. Namun demikian partai poltik yang berasaskan ideologi ganda, PAN, PKB dan Demokrat, masing-masing memiliki kiblat prioritas. PAN dan PKB condong polarisasi nilai-nilai islamisme (religious), sedangkan Demokrat lebih didominasi oleh isu-isu nasionalis. Konsep ideology politik islam, dalam konsteks kontestasi politik dalam pemilu partai politik pada dasarnya sebuah keharusan mengimplementasikan nilai-nilai ri’ayah, taqwin, irsyad dan ta’dib melalui pendidikan politik, ataupun kampanye dalam pemilu guna mencapai kemaslahatan bersama, baik partai yang berideologi islamisme, nasionalisme dan nasionalis-religius, sehingga terbangun sisi moralistik masyarakat, dan kecerdasan dalam menanggapi isu-isu yang ada dalam pemilu. selain dari itu partai politik dalam menghadapi konstestasi politik penekanan gerakannya harus mencermikan nilai kemaslahan, ketiga ideology tersebut telah kemas dalam nilai-nilai pancasila pada sila ketiga persatuan Indonesia.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

25

Sharma, Abhimanyu. "Power, ideology and language policies in Scotland." European Journal of Language Policy: Volume 12, Issue 2 12, no. 2 (October 1, 2020): 163–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/ejlp.2020.9.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper deals with the role of power and ideology in language policies in Scotland and focuses on how policies promote certain languages whilst disadvantaging others. It investigates pre- and post-devolutionary legislation on language use in Scotland and examines how the role of power in policymaking has changed since the devolution of powers in 1998. Using Tollefson’s Historical Structural Analysis (HSA), the paper analyses the historical and structural factors underpinning these changes. Moreover, the paper also uses Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to assess how the changes in sociopolitical context are reflected at the textual level.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

26

Khaleel Salous, Nadia Ali. "Ideology, Power and Translation in Palestine." Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 04, no. 10 (October 31, 2019): 647–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.36348/sjhss.2019.v04i10.003.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

27

Sagadeev, Arthur. "Russia and the great power ideology." Central Asian Survey 12, no. 2 (January 1993): 169–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02634939308400812.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

28

Bossman, David M. "Ideology as Power in Biblical Religion." Biblical Theology Bulletin: Journal of Bible and Culture 44, no. 2 (May 2014): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146107914526521.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

29

Edwards, Paul. "Power and ideology in the workplace." Work, Employment and Society 20, no. 3 (September 2006): 571–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0950017006067015.

Full text

Abstract:

Steven Lukes’s Power:A Radical View had a major influence on sociology in general and the study of work in particular. A new extended edition invites careful attention. It acknowledges major limitations of the original and goes some way to correcting them. But it continues to give insufficient attention to the ideological aspects of power and the ways in which social processes reflect and reinforce, but also change, the structure of power. Studies of work relations illustrate this theme. To develop it further, systematic comparative analysis is needed.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

30

Fetterman, Adam K., Ryan L. Boyd, and Michael D. Robinson. "Power Versus Affiliation in Political Ideology." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 41, no. 9 (June 22, 2015): 1195–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167215591960.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

31

Kurniawati, Neni. "Representation of Women Power in Beyoncé Knowless’ song “Run The World (Girls)”." E-Structural 4, no. 01 (August 3, 2021): 68–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.33633/es.v4i01.4747.

Full text

Abstract:

Song is one of the propaganda media for ideolgy. Beyonce Knowless's song “Run the World (girls)” is an example of a song that raises the issue of Black Feminism Thought. This paper will discuss how textual and discursive practices through the signs in the text of the song lyrics and video clips of the song in constructing the paradigm of black women power or black feminism thought. By interpreting the structure of the text in the lyrics of the song and the visual signs in the video clip of the song "Run the World (girls)" to find meaning and ideology reproduced in the song. The results show that the dialectic of verbal and visual signs represents black women power and to bolster black women to become well-respected women especially by black men. The presence of this song is also related to the black feminist movement which propagates their ideology through song media. The independence of black women in the economic and educational aspectss, as well as the ability to bare children are discourses that are reproduced by the singer to make social changes in black women’s live.Keywords: Black woman, discourse, hermeneutics, ideology, Paul Ricouer

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

32

Goatly, Andrew. "Ideology and metaphor." English Today 22, no. 3 (July 2006): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266078406003051.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper attempts to show the important role that ideology (‘meaning in the service of power’) plays in the nurturing and proliferation of metaphors and metaphoric themes, a psychological and linguistic role that is just as important as bodily experience. It discusses such themes as power is high, sex is violence, disease is invasion, and race is colour, attempting to show how they drive social practices. It also explores how the themes activity is game and quality is quantity (along with such subthemes as time is money and human quality is wealth) have been implicated in the emergence of both capitalist economic philosophy and the Darwinism and neo-Darwinism which developed from it (as represented successively in Hobbes, Smith, Hume, Malthus and Darwin himself).

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

33

Francisconi, Michael. "History, Power, Ideology: Central Issues in Marxism and Anthropology:History, Power, Ideology: Central Issues in Marxism and Anthropology." American Anthropologist 102, no. 2 (June 2000): 384–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.2000.102.2.384.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

34

Ding, Dan. "Marxism, Ideology, Power and Scientific and Technical Writing." Journal of Technical Writing and Communication 28, no. 2 (April 1998): 133–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/c4d3-6lb2-19q3-fv02.

Full text

Abstract:

This article claims that the primary determinant of how texts are structured and produced in scientific and technical communication is the ideology of the ruling force. Scholars concerned with ideology in scientific and technical communication have treated ideology as a competing approach to writing not as the determinant of writing. Thus, they have not been able to suggest how texts are structured and produced. Scientific and technical writing actually belongs to a tradition in which science and scientific activities have always been used to create and transmit the ideology of the ruling force. An examination of several cases of scientific and technical communication suggests that ideology of the ruling force indeed determines how a text is structured and produced. The immediate implication is that we should perhaps avoid resistant pedagogy and try what I call the “revelation pedagogy,” which is aimed at dialogue rather than resistance.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

35

Freedberg, David. "The Problem of Classicism: Ideology and Power." Art Journal 47, no. 1 (1988): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/776898.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

36

Ralston, Helen, and Vanaja Dhruvarajan. "Hindu Women and the Power of Ideology." Anthropologica 31, no. 2 (1989): 264. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/25605545.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

37

Sułkowski, Łukasz. "Strategic Management as the Ideology of Power." Journal of Intercultural Management 5, no. 3 (September 1, 2013): 5–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/joim-2013-0014.

Full text

Abstract:

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to present the key themes of strategic management from the perspective of Critical Management Studies [More: Sułkowski, 2012]. Strategic management seen as the most advanced and sophisticated form of targeting reseved only for the elite top menagement is interpreted by critical scholars as an ideology of power exercised by elites. The article presents the analysis of the foundations of the CMS, and then puts these issues in the field of strategic management.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

38

Williams, Linda S. "Motherhood, ideology, and the power of technology." Women's Studies International Forum 13, no. 6 (January 1990): 543–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0277-5395(90)90049-4.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

39

Azeez, Govand Khalid, and Alejandra Gaitán-Barrera. "Power, Ideology, Politics and the Revolutionary Subject." Critique 45, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 501–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03017605.2017.1377928.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

40

Inomata, Takeshi. "The Power and Ideology of Artistic Creation." Current Anthropology 42, no. 3 (June 2001): 321–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/320475.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

41

Nassaney, Michael S. ": Chiefdoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology . Timothy Earle." American Anthropologist 95, no. 1 (March 1993): 177–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/aa.1993.95.1.02a00310.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

42

Preston, James J., and Vanaja Dhruvarajan. "Hindu Women and the Power of Ideology." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 30, no. 2 (June 1991): 231. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1387234.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

43

Jodamus, Johnathan. "Gendered Ideology and Power in 1 Corinthians." Journal of Early Christian History 6, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 29–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2222582x.2016.1184884.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

44

Morris, Martin. "Communicative Power and Ideology in Popular Music." Journal of Communication Inquiry 37, no. 2 (March 14, 2013): 113–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0196859913479800.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

45

Oliga, John C. "Power-ideology matrix in social systems control." Systems Practice 3, no. 1 (February 1990): 31–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01062820.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

46

Smith, Gaddis, and Noam Chomsky. "On Power and Ideology: The Managua Lectures." Foreign Affairs 65, no. 5 (1987): 1105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20043228.

Full text

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

47

IVANOV, Iskren. "UNDERSTANDING RUSSIAN SMART POWER: PERCEPTIONS AND IDEOLOGY." Public Administration and Civil Service, no. 1-76 (March 31, 2021): 50–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.52123/1994-2370-2021-76-1-65.

Full text

Abstract:

Russian foreign policy today incarnates the double-headed eagle of smart power perceptions and Neo-Eurasian ideology. The main purpose of this article is to examine the emergence and development of Russian smart power by analyzing the foreign policy concepts of the Russian Federation after September 11. In this paper, I will argue that Moscow’s smart strategy is much similar to the American concept of smart power, but only in terms of its purpose. The article’s assertion rests on the assumption that smart power allowed Washington to sustain its global dominance after the terrorist attacks from September 11, and alternately – could help Russia to consolidate Eurasia. The Coronavirus Pandemic, of course, will have long-term consequences for the international security. Finally, I will conclude that if Moscow wants to maintain the Russia-dominated security system in Eurasia, it should develop its original concept of smart power.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

48

Althouse, Peter. "The Ideology of Power in Early American Pentecostalism." Journal of Pentecostal Theology 13, no. 1 (2004): 97–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096673690401300106.

Full text

Abstract:

AbstractThis essay contends that early American Pentecostalism has been shaped and defined by an underlying ideology of power, moulding its charismatic experiences and theological declarations. To demonstrate this, section one will describe how the ideology of power nourished early Pentecostal theology. Section two will offer an interpretive analysis of the social implications of power using the sociological theories of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. By way of conclusion I suggest that the ideology of power in early Pentecostalism functions as a hermeneutical key.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

49

Shepherd, Edward, Andy Inch, and Tim Marshall. "Narratives of power: Bringing ideology to the fore of planning analysis." Planning Theory 19, no. 1 (February 2020): 3–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1473095219898865.

Full text

Abstract:

This Special Issue starts from the premise that the concept of ideology holds significant analytical potential for planning but that this potential can only be realised if ideology is brought to the fore of analysis. By naming ideology and rendering it visible, we hope to bring it out from the shadows and into the open to examine its value and what it can tell us about the politics of contemporary planning. The articles in this Special Issue therefore seek to contribute to established academic debates by exploring some of the ways ideology can be deployed as a tool in the analysis of planning problems. This article introduces the Special Issue by exploring the various accounts in the articles of (1) what ideology is; (2) what its effects are; (3) where ideology may be identified and (4) what different theories of ideology can tell us about planning. There inevitably remain many un-answered questions, paths not taken and debates left unaddressed. We hope other scholars will be inspired (or provoked) to address these omissions in the future.

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

50

Vindevoghel, Lana J. "Power, Identity, and the Construction of Knowledge in Education." in education 22, no. 2 (November 23, 2016): 87–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.37119/ojs2016.v22i2.308.

Full text

Abstract:

This paper explores the social construction of knowledge, identity formation, and the ways in which the education system supports dominant societal ideology. I examine how dominant historical and societal ideologies are deeply cultivated and facilitated through education systems, including forcefully through the residential school system and, in many cases, subtly through post-secondary education. Further, I identify the method in which personal biases, predisposed by dominant social influence, are subconsciously reflected in the classroom through micro-aggressive behaviour. Weber’s (2010) framework of themes provides a comprehensive perspective from which to understand the nature in which identity is influenced by dominant societal ideology. Finally, I analyze the social construction of knowledge, development of identity, and support of dominant ideology through Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and Foucault’s theory of discourse. The discussion then shifts to describe how conscientization and critical reflection can provide a step forward towards diminishing dominant societal ideology within the educational environment and create a path to embracing Freire’s concept of liberating education.Keywords: knowledge; identity; ideology; education

APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Journal articles on the topic 'Power and ideology'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles