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1
Rosen, Melanie. "A Pragmatic Justification of Deduction." Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 1 (June 1, 2009): 155–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.25138/3.1.a.11.
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Snowden, Austyn, and John Atkinson. "Concurrent analysis: a pragmatic justification." Nursing Philosophy 13, no. 2 (March 9, 2012): 126–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1466-769x.2011.00523.x.
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Macário Lopes, Ana Cristina. "Justification." Pragmatics. Quarterly Publication of the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) 19, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 241–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/prag.19.2.05lop.
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The main purpose of this paper is to analyse formal and functional aspects of constructions based on a Justification (or Claim-Argument) coherence relation, explicitly marked by a connective. The prototype of this construction is an utterance like Está gente em casa, porquer as luzes estão acesas [“ There is somebody at home, because the lights are on”]. The empirical data are collected from an on-line corpus of contemporary written Portuguese (CETEMPúblico). Following Sanders et al.(2001), I assume the distinction between semantic and pragmatic coherence relations in text representation: Semantic relations connect the situations of the sociophysical world described by the propositional content of the related textual segments; pragmatic relations involve the illocutionary domain, i.e., the relation concerns the speech act status of the segments. Justification relation is a pragmatic relation and I argue that it requires simultaneously a sequence of speech acts and an inference process. In fact, Justification relations occur typically in argumentative contexts, and argumentation, according to van Eemeren & Grotendorst (1984), is a compound illocution, consisting of at least two functionally distinct statements: A main assertion corresponding to the claim being made and a subordinate assertion, which counts as an attempt by the speaker to justify his claim, convincing the listner of its acceptability. The claim being made in prototypical Justification constructions (p, because q) is an assumption, not a fact; it corresponds to a conclusion drawn by the speaker, supported by the premise expressed in the second clause and warranted by a generic implicit premise. The account presented in this paper contests Sweetser’s (1990) distinction between epistemic causal conjunctions and speech act causal conjunctions: The act of concluding may be speaker-internal, but since it is asserted and then justified, it is not possible to dissociate the epistemic and the illocutionary domains within the field of argumentative texts.
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Blokker, Paul, and Andrea Brighenti. "Politics between justification and defiance." European Journal of Social Theory 14, no. 3 (August 2011): 283–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368431011412346.
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The article discusses the status and role of politics — in its various facets — in the pragmatic sociology of critique. We focus on a number of different dimensions of politics — politics-as-justification, politics-as-distribution, politics-as-constitution, and politics-as-defiance — that can said to be of importance for a pragmatic sociology of critique, but that have not all been taken up equally in this approach. We situate pragmatic sociology in a tradition of thought that views politics as emerging in the settlement of disputes over differences without resorting to violence. However, we argue that pragmatic sociology tends to ignore questions of the constitution of politics, and suggest that one way of bringing the foundational aspect upfront is by conceptualizing and studying defiance, including forms of explicit (dissent) and implicit critique (resistance) of the existing order.
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Hassoon, Hameed, and MariamD Saffah. "JUSTIFICATION, EXCUSE AND EXPLANATION: A PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVE." International Journal of Advanced Research 5, no. 10 (October 31, 2017): 1426–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/5662.
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A. Lindaas, Ole. "Epistemic versus Pragmatic Justification of Risk Analysis." Universal Journal of Management 4, no. 10 (October 2016): 565–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.13189/ujm.2016.041006.
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KYRATZIS, AMY, TAMARA SHUQUM ROSS, and S. BAHAR KOYMEN. "Validating justifications in preschool girls' and boys' friendship group talk: implications for linguistic and socio-cognitive development." Journal of Child Language 37, no. 1 (June 15, 2009): 115–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305000908009069.
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ABSTRACTChildren are believed to construct their causal theories through talk and interaction, but with the exception of a few studies, little or nothing is known about how young children justify and build theories of the world together with same-age peers through naturally occurring interaction, Children's sensitivity to when a pair or group of interlocutors who interact frequently together feel that a justification is needed, is an index of developing pragmatic competence (Goetz & Shatz, 1999) and may be influenced by interactive goals and gender identity positioning. Studies suggest that salient contexts for justifications for young children are disagreement and control (e.g. Veneziano & Sinclair, 1995) but researchers have been less recognizant of ‘situations in which partners verbally assist in the construction of justifications as a means to maintain contact or create solidarity’ (Goetz & Shatz, 1999: 722) as contexts for justifications. The present study examined the spontaneously produced justification constructions in the naturally occurring free play of five friendship groups of preschool-aged children (aged from 3 ; 6 to 5 ; 4), in terms of the motivating context of the justification, marking of the causal relationship with a connective, and causal theories accessed in the talk. Partner expansion (validating justifications) was a salient motivating context for justifications, especially in the talk of friendship groups of girls, and seemed to privilege greater marking of the causal relationship with a connective and less arbitrary reasoning. One group of girls varied their use of validating justifications depending on the theme of play. Results are discussed in terms of the implications of use of validating justifications for children's causal theory building with peers, linguistic development, and pragmatic development.
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Gale, Richard. "The Overall Argument of Alston's Perceiving God." Religious Studies 30, no. 2 (June 1994): 135–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500001438.
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Alston's overall aim in Perceiving God is to show that we are rationally justified in believing that our apparent direct perceptions of God's presence (called ‘M-experiences’) are reliable and thus for the most part veridical, the objective, existentially-committed beliefs based on these experiences thereby being prima facie justified, subject to defeat by certain overriders supplied by some background religion. It is argued that our rational justification for believing this is of both an epistemic and pragmatic (or practical) sort, in which an epistemic reason for believing a proposition is truth conducive, rendering the proposition probable, while a pragmatic one concerns the benefits which accrue from belief. We will begin by considering the pragmatic justification, since the case he makes out for epistemic justification is built on its back.
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Deichsel, Simon. "Against the pragmatic justification for realism in economic methodology." Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 4, no. 1 (May 12, 2011): 23. http://dx.doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v4i1.68.
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In recent times, realism in economic methodology has increasingly gained importance. Uskali Mäki and Tony Lawson are the best-known realists within the discipline and even though their approaches are fundamentally different, both provide (among others) pragmatic defences of realism by claiming anti-realism to be the reason for the low quality of (some) economic models. My paper will show that a pragmatic defence of realism is untenable and furthermore, I will show that for both Mäki's and Lawson's normative ideas there is no need for realism.
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NDAYAMBAJE, JUVÉNAL. "What Goes Wrong in Habermas’s Pragmatic Justification of (U)?" Dialogue 56, no. 1 (January 24, 2017): 89–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s001221731700004x.
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In his moral theory, named ‘discourse ethics,’ Jürgen Habermas holds that a norm is morally valid only when it is universalizable. He establishes the principle of universalization (U) as the procedural principle for testing the moral validity of norms in moral discourse. He argues that this principle can be derived from the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation in general. By explicating the fiduciary status of pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation, and by distinguishing perspectival from comprehensive universalization, I argue that Habermas fails to justify his moral principle.
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Silva Corrêa, Diogo, and Rodrigo de Castro Dias. "The critique and its critical moments: The recent pragmatic turn in French sociology." Current Sociology 68, no. 6 (September 24, 2020): 721–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011392120914702.
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The aim of this article is to present the pragmatic turn in French sociology as outlined in Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s book, On Justification. First, the article gives a general introduction to the main focal points of the French sociological field in the 1980s. Then, it presents De la justification, regarded as a landmark in the pragmatic turn of French sociology. Next, the article presents two of its key concepts: cité and proof. Finally, through an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of the model, the article questions some of its limits and challenges, such as integrating pragmatic intuition with issues such as the sociologist’s critical engagement, and the analysis of long-term processes, problems and dispositions.
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Bergstra, Jan. "Instruction Sequence Faults with Formal Change Justification." Scientific Annals of Computer Science 30, no. 2 (December 21, 2020): 105–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.7561/sacs.2020.2.105.
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The notion of an instruction sequence fault is considered as a theoretical concept, for which the justification of the qualification of a fragment as faulty is mathematical instead of pragmatic, the latter approach being much more common. Starting from so-called Laski faults a range of patterns of faults and changes thereof for instruction sequences is developed.
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Gilabert, Pablo. "Two Sets of Concerns about Heath's “Pragmatic Theory of Convergence”." Dialogue 44, no. 2 (2005): 383–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300006272.
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A central concern of Joseph Heath's Communicative Action and Rational Choice is to find a plausible response to “the problem of convergence … to explain why we should ever expect to secure agreement on moral questions” (pp. 8–9). In Chapter 7 of his book, Heath proposes what he calls “a pragmatic theory of convergence.” This account is presented as contrasting with the one proposed by Jürgen Habermas, which emphasizes the existence of an internal relation between convergence and moral truth. According to Habermas, there is a “connection … between moral cognitivism and the expectation of convergence” (p. 220). One cannot take moral judgements to be amenable to rational justification (i.e., be a cognitivist) unless one also assumes that an agreement among those participating in the discursive evaluation of that moral judgement is possible in principle. (Habermas adds that this a priori possibility lies in the use of a procedural criterion of moral validity, which in his moral theory is provided by a discursive principle of universalization.) Heath considers this claim about a supposed internal connection as a remnant of foundationalism in Habermas's otherwise promissory contextualist account of moral justification. To reject non-cognitivism, according to Heath, we need not demonstrate that convergence on moral judgement is always forthcoming. It is enough to show that ordinary moral thinking takes moral claims as amenable to discursive justification. As to whether actual practices of discursive justification of moral claims will indeed end in agreement or convergence, a “wait and see” attitude seems all we can legitimately hope for.
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Ohlsson, Johanna. "On the Ethical, Moral and Pragmatic Justification of Political Decisions." Ethical Thought 19, no. 2 (2019): 87–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-4870-2019-19-2-87-97.
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Deen, Phillip. "A Call for Inclusion in the Pragmatic Justification of Democracy." Contemporary Pragmatism 6, no. 1 (April 21, 2009): 131–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18758185-90000107.
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Guerra, Lucas, and Gustavo Frisso. "RÉQUIEM PARA UMA INICIATIVA DE REGIONALISMO SUL-AMERICANO: IDEOLOGIA VS. PRAGMATISMO NO OCASO DA UNASUL." Cadernos de Campo: Revista de Ciências Sociais, no. 29 (March 12, 2021): 71–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.47284/2359-2419.2020.29.7196.
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The article presents an analysis of the recent dismantling of the Union of South-American Nations (UNASUR) under the governments of the liberal-conservative turn recently experienced in South America. Through the mobilization of excerpts from speeches by Heads of State in the region, it is possible to note that the allegedly “ideological” character of UNASUR is presented as the main justification for leaving the institution. Having that in mind, the main objective of the article is to interrogate narratives about the ‘ideological’ character of UNASUL. For that, the article presents a literature review on regionalism, pragmatism and ideology to challenge this narrative. It is argued, first, that pragmatism and ideology in regionalism are not dichotomous, but complementary concepts. Moreover, despite UNASUR’s ideological elements, the organization represents a series of alignments and pragmatic factors in its institutionalization and performance. Finally, it is argued that the proposals for “de-ideologization” and “pragmatic realignment” of the regionalism of the new rights in South America are, in fact, more ideological than pragmatic as they claim.
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Hawamdeh, Mohammad Amin. "Lexical Departure from Formal Correspondence in Translation: Semantic and Pragmatic Justification." International Journal of Linguistics 6, no. 6 (December 7, 2014): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ijl.v6i6.6739.
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Wells, Catharine Pierce. "Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury Adjudication." Michigan Law Review 88, no. 8 (August 1990): 2348. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1289541.
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Gadinger, Frank. "On Justification and Critique: Luc Boltanski’s Pragmatic Sociology and International Relations." International Political Sociology 10, no. 3 (July 8, 2016): 187–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ips/olw007.
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Наумова, Е. И. "Проблема конфликта в прагматической социологии." Konfliktologia, no. 1 (May 29, 2014): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.31312/2310-6085-2014-1-32-44.
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The article is about the analysis of the problem of conflict in the context of pragmatic sociology. Pragmatic sociology based on the observation and description of the conflicts and the ways of justification used by conflicting parties. Oppose to classic sociology of class of P. Bourdieu pragmatic sociology dealing with the situation of conflict which reveal the real practices of classification. The tradition of pragmatic sociology proposes new definition of classification as a conflict emerges as a result of the collision of justification of the vision of social reality each of the parties. The conception of sociology of «cite» of Thevenot and Boltanski is exposed as a model of conflict’s solution and achievement of agreement in the public space. The methodology of «regimes of engagement» of Thevenot elaborates the ways of the overcoming the conflict in the private space through the establishment of the relations between things and people. The «regimes of engagement» form the materialistic conception of conflict when through the building the space of the common things it becomes possible to overcome the conflict and build res public of things and people as the infrastructure of freedom.
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Lee, Byeong D. "A Pragmatic Phenomenalist Account of Knowledge." Dialogue 47, no. 3-4 (2008): 565–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300002845.
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ABSTRACTRobert Brandom argues for a “pragmatic phenomenalist account” of knowledge. On this account, we should understand our notion of justification in accordance with a Sellarsian social practice model, and there is nothing more to the phenomenon of knowledge than the proprieties of takings-as-knowing. I agree with these two claims. But Brandom's proposal is so sketchy that it is unclear how it can deal with a number of much-discussed problems in contemporary epistemology. The main purpose of this article is to develop and defend a pragmatic phenomenalist account of knowledge by resolving those problems. I argue, in particular, that this account can accommodate both the lesson of the Gettier problem and the lesson of reliabilism simultaneously.
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WESTPHAL, KENNETH R. "Rational Justification and Mutual Recognition in Substantive Domains." Dialogue 53, no. 1 (December 6, 2013): 57–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217313000796.
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This paper argues that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for rational justification in empirical knowledge or morals, is in fundamental part socially and historically based, although this is consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and with strict objectivity about basic moral principles. To judge fully rationally that one judges, and thus to justify one’s judgment rationally, requires recognizing one’s inherent fallibility and hence our mutual interdependence for assessing our own and each others’ judgments and their justification. This provides a pragmatic account of rational justification which dispatches the distinction between “rational” and “historical” knowledge.
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Westphal, Kenneth R. "Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit." Dialogue 48, no. 4 (December 2009): 753–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217309990412.
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ABSTRACT: Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification in cognition or morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. I argue for this by defending key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including the “autonomy” of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of “mutual recognition.” These themes are rooted in Kant’s and Hegel’s transformation of the modern natural law tradition, which originates the properly pragmatic account of rationality, which affords genuine rational justification, and which provides for realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about moral norms.
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Heinzel, Christoph, and Thomas Winkler. "Economic functioning and politically pragmatic justification of tradable green certificates in Poland." Environmental Economics and Policy Studies 13, no. 2 (April 19, 2011): 157–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10018-011-0010-6.
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Jagd, Søren. "Pragmatic sociology and competing orders of worth in organizations." European Journal of Social Theory 14, no. 3 (August 2011): 343–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368431011412349.
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Different notions of multiple rationalities have recently been applied to describe the phenomena of co-existence of competing rationalities in organizations. These include institutional pluralism, institutional logics, competing rationalities and pluralistic contexts. The French pragmatic sociologists Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot have contributed to this line of research with a sophisticated theoretical framework of orders of worth, which has been applied in an increasing number of empirical studies. This article explores how the order of worth framework has been applied to empirical studies of organizations. First, I summarize the basic ideas of the framework, stressing the aspects of special relevance for studies of organizations. Second, I review the empirical studies focusing on the coexistence of competing orders of worth in organizations showing that the order of worth framework primarily has been related to three main themes in organizational research: non-profit and co-operative organizations, inter-organizational co-operation, and organizational change. Third, I discuss how the pragmatic, process-oriented aspect of the research program, focusing on the intertwining of values and action in various forms of ‘justification work’, has been translated into empirical studies. I argue that even if highly interesting empirical studies have begun to appear on the pragmatic aspects of the order of worth program, empirical studies of ‘justification work’ may be a potentially very promising focus for future empirical studies.
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Doronina, S. V. "Verbal Extremism in Everyday Interpersonal Communication." Theory and Practice of Forensic Science 14, no. 2 (July 13, 2019): 61–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.30764/1819-2785-2019-14-2-61-66.
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The extremist statements are diverse and can be classified in a range of aspects: semantic, pragmatic and rhetorical. Analysis of expert practice enables to distinguish two semantic classes: statements about national/religious group and statements about nationalist ideology. In terms of pragmatism the statements are divided into the following types: calls for action against a group; statements about actions against a group and negative attitude to it; humiliation of group members; threat to group members. Apart from that constative statements are divided into two subgroups depending on their rhetorical structure: evaluative statements and statements containing justification for negative judgments. The content and pragmatic signs of “extremist” contexts can be found in various combinations limited by the features of a communicative situation. The article summarises expert practice on the study of extremist statements uttered primarily during interpersonal domestic disputes. It is shown that the variety of statements can be reduced to a finite list of features which are a special subject of the research.
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Nedeljković, Mitar. "The problem of justifying inductive reasoning." Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta u Pristini 51, no. 2 (2021): 387–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/zrffp51-30620.
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In this paper, the author considers the classical strategies of defense from Hume's argument against induction, and assesses the extent to which they were found to be successful. Synthetic, linguistic, a priori, pragmatic, and inductive strategies of defending induction are considered, as well as the question of the extent to which the justification of induction is a problem for grounding scientific knowledge. A new argument is introduced for the a priori justification of induction, as well as a critique of the synthetic and inductive defenses of induction by Black and Jacquette.
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Sterkenburg, Tom F. "THE META-INDUCTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION." Episteme 17, no. 4 (February 7, 2019): 519–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.52.
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ABSTRACTI evaluate Schurz's proposed meta-inductive justification of induction, a refinement of Reichenbach's pragmatic justification that rests on results from the machine learning branch of prediction with expert advice.My conclusion is that the argument, suitably explicated, comes remarkably close to its grand aim: an actual justification of induction. This finding, however, is subject to two main qualifications, and still disregards one important challenge.The first qualification concerns the empirical success of induction. Even though, I argue, Schurz's argument does not need to spell out what inductive method actually consists in, it does need to postulate that there is something like the inductive or scientific prediction strategy that has so far been significantly more successful than alternative approaches. The second qualification concerns the difference between having a justification for inductive method and for sticking with induction for now. Schurz's argument can only provide the latter. Finally, the remaining challenge concerns the pool of alternative strategies, and the relevant notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality that features in the analytic step of Schurz's argument. Building on the work done here, I will argue in a follow-up paper that the argument needs a stronger dynamic notion of a meta-inductivist's optimality.
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Bobek, Michal. "A Fourth in the Court: Why Are There Advocates General in the Court of Justice?" Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 14 (2012): 529–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/152888712805580516.
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AbstractWhy are there Advocates General in the Court of Justice of the European Union? A standard answer to this question is likely to be either a simple textual reference (because the Treaty provides for them); or an appeal to authority (because the original framers of the Treaties put them there, inspired by the French legal system); or a rather pragmatic appeal to their on-going utility (because they assist the Court and they do a great job); or any combination of these three. All of these explanations are valid. This contribution, however, attempts to go a little deeper in discerning what may be the ideological justification for Advocates General in the Court of Justice. It does so by carrying out a historical and comparative study concerning their origins and systemic justification from the vantage point of a national lawyer coming from a Member State that does not know any type of a ‘fourth in the court’.The first part of the contribution explains which factors have considerably eroded the position of Advocates General in the course of the last decade and why questions concerning their role and its justification became topical. Second, the commonly invoked reference to the French inspiration for introducing Advocates General is critically examined. It is suggested that justifications once provided with respect to the office of commissaire du gouvernement in the Conseil d’État can hardly be used on the European level with respect to Advocates General. Third, possibilities of internal justification of the role of Advocates General are examined: are Advocates General providing any unique assistance to the Court of Justice, which could not be provided for in different ways? With a negative answer to the latter question, the last part of the argument offers a simple yet solid overreaching justification as to why there should be Advocates General in the Court of Justice.
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Currie-Knight, Kevin. "“Yes, but…” Yes, and…” - A Sympathetic Challenge (and Reframing) of Matusov’s “The Right for Freedom of Education.”." Dialogic Pedagogy: An International Online Journal 8 (September 21, 2020): SF65—SF70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/dpj.2020.339.
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In this response to Matusov's "Right for Freedom in Education," I will offer two “yes, but…” concerns about crucial complexities of this freedom that I think Matusov leaves unaddressed, and a “yes, and…” alternative pragmatic justification of this freedom that differs from, but I think is more compelling than, Matusov’s.
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Soin, Maciej. "Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory." Annales. Etyka w Życiu Gospodarczym 21, no. 7 (April 2, 2018): 75–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1899-2226.21.7.05.
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Philosophical difficulties of stakeholder theory—which plays an important role in CSR and business ethics—are mainly connected to the questions of its status and justification. What sense does stakeholder theory have: descriptive, instrumental or normative? And if normative, why then should executives worry about multiple stakeholder demands? It is well known that Freeman, one of the most important authors of stakeholder theory, deliberately disregarded these problems. In philosophical questions, he invoked Rorty’s pragmatism that in his opinion effectively undermined the “positivistic” dichotomy between facts and values, science and ethics, and enabled stakeholder theory to be understood as both descriptive and normative. The article presents some difficulties connected with this view, focusing on its dubious assumptions and unfavourable consequences. These assumptions contain a false dilemma, taken from Rorty, which states that knowledge follows either a rule of representation or a rule of solidarity. One of the unfavourable consequences is the conclusion that stakeholder theory may be true only if its followers are able to force the stakeholders to accept its truthfulness. The main thesis of the article says that, because of pragmatic justification, stakeholder theory became a sort of arbitrary narration, which is unable to deal with its (empirical) misuses. However, a more traditional view on facts and values enables us to appreciate the descriptive advantages of the theory and to identify difficulties connected with its normative layer. From this point of view, the attempt at a pragmatic interpretation of stakeholder theory was a misunderstanding that should be withdrawn from circulation.
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Scherer, Andreas Georg. "Can Hypernorms Be Justified? Insights From A Discourse–Ethical Perspective." Business Ethics Quarterly 25, no. 04 (October 2015): 489–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/beq.2015.36.
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ABSTRACT: I explore the role of hypernorms in the Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) of Thomas Donaldson and Thomas W. Dunfee, who suggested that hypernorms are a necessary condition for the rejection of cultural relativism and justification of moral norms within and across social communities. Hypernorms are, thus, a significant part of a conception of international business ethics. I highlight philosophical problems that emerge in attempts to identify and justify hypernorms. These problems have not been sufficiently addressed in the ISCT; therefore, I will discuss the discourse–ethical contributions of contemporary German philosophers toward resolving the justification problem with regards to universal norms. Discourse ethics builds on the linguistic and the pragmatic turns in philosophy and develops procedural rules for the assessment of norms. I explore variants of discourse ethics with regards to their concept of justification and discuss the implications of discourse ethical procedures for the justification of norms and actions.
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Taljaard, Monica, Cory E. Goldstein, Bruno Giraudeau, Stuart G. Nicholls, Kelly Carroll, Spencer Phillips Hey, Jamie C. Brehaut, et al. "Cluster over individual randomization: are study design choices appropriately justified? Review of a random sample of trials." Clinical Trials 17, no. 3 (May 5, 2020): 253–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740774519896799.
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Background: Novel rationales for randomizing clusters rather than individuals appear to be emerging from the push for more pragmatic trials, for example, to facilitate trial recruitment, reduce the costs of research, and improve external validity. Such rationales may be driven by a mistaken perception that choosing cluster randomization lessens the need for informed consent. We reviewed a random sample of published cluster randomized trials involving only individual-level health care interventions to determine (a) the prevalence of reporting a rationale for the choice of cluster randomization; (b) the types of explicit, or if absent, apparent rationales for the use of cluster randomization; (c) the prevalence of reporting patient informed consent for study interventions; and (d) the types of justifications provided for waivers of consent. We considered cluster randomized trials for evaluating exclusively the individual-level health care interventions to focus on clinical trials where individual randomization is only theoretically possible and where there is a general expectation of informed consent. Methods: A random sample of 40 cluster randomized trials were identified by implementing a validated electronic search filter in two electronic databases (Ovid MEDLINE and Embase), with two reviewers independently extracting information from each trial. Inclusion criteria were the following: primary report of a cluster randomized trial, evaluating exclusively an individual-level health care intervention, published between 2007 and 2016, and conducted in Canada, the United States, European Union, Australia, or low- and middle-income country settings. Results: Twenty-five trials (62.5%, 95% confidence interval = 47.5%–77.5%) reported an explicit rationale for the use of cluster randomization. The most commonly reported rationales were those with logistical or administrative convenience (15 trials, 60%) and those that need to avoid contamination (13 trials, 52%); five trials (20%) were cited rationales related to the push for more pragmatic trials. Twenty-one trials (52.5%, 95% confidence interval = 37%–68%) reported written informed consent for the intervention, two (5%) reported verbal consent, and eight (20%) reported waivers of consent, while in nine trials (22.5%) consent was unclear or not mentioned. Reported justifications for waivers of consent included that study interventions were already used in clinical practice, patients were not randomized individually, and the need to facilitate the pragmatic nature of the trial. Only one trial reported an explicit and appropriate justification for waiver of consent based on minimum criteria in international research ethics guidelines, namely, infeasibility and minimal risk. Conclusion: Rationales for adopting cluster over individual randomization and for adopting consent waivers are emerging, related to the need to facilitate pragmatic trials. Greater attention to clear reporting of study design rationales, informed consent procedures, as well as justification for waivers is needed to ensure that such trials meet appropriate ethical standards.
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Roversi, Corrado. "Constitutionalism and transcendental arguments." Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 59, no. 1 (March 13, 2020): 109–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v59i1.506.
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In his A Theory of Legal Argumentation, Robert Alexy lists four modes of justification for his rules of practical discourse. Of these, the only one that to him seems to have a true foundationalist capability is Apel’s transcendental-pragmatic mode of justification. But there is another strategy, which Alexy calls 'definitional', based on the concept of language game, that seems to have been employed by Ronald Dworkin, in his 'Objectivity and truth. You’d better believe it', in order to reject moral scepticism. In this paper I will argue that these two modes of justification can be traced back, from a logical and genealogical perspective, to one form of argument, the transcendental argument. But I will also argue that there is a peculiar circularity in the way this kind of argument develops, a circularity possibly ascribable to certain idealising presuppositions.
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Sreekumar, Hari, and Rohit Varman. "Vagabonds at the Margins: Acculturation, Subalterns, and Competing Worth." Journal of Macromarketing 39, no. 1 (November 29, 2018): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0276146718815939.
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This study examines the cultural experiences of subaltern migrants from Kerala, India to the Middle East. It draws upon the French pragmatic sociology with attention to convention theory to cast in sharp relief different interpretations of worth that influence subaltern migrants or vagabonds as Zygmunt Bauman has labelled them. This study shows that vagabonds use different regimes of worth and justification to resist domination and to shape their cultural encounters with host and home cultures. It explains how existing acculturation research lacks insights about worth and regimes of justification that hinder it from fully understanding the role of domination and cultural experiences of subalterns.
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Filipiak, Magdalena. "Strategic actions according to Jürgen Habermas – some critical remarks from the transcendental-pragmatic procedure viewpoint." Lingua Posnaniensis 59, no. 1 (June 1, 2017): 39–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/linpo-2017-0004.
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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyze the primacy of communicative rationality in relation to other forms of rationality and to determine the status of openly strategic actions in the concept of Jürgen Habermas. In the theory of communicative actions, Habermas focuses on actions secretively strategic, recognizing them as “parasitic” in relation to communicative actions and explains the prevalence of communicative actions on the grounds of the theory of speech acts, in particular the concept of illocutionary force, the category of “social binding force”, or practice in the lifeworld. By the same, Karl-Otto Apel challenges Habermas that he has skipped explicitly strategic class of actions, which entails the inadequacy of the justification for the status of communicative rationality. This raises a doubt – why should non-strategic actions take precedence over strategic ones? Karl-Otto Apel replies to this question with the help of transcendental-pragmatic procedure of an ultimate justification.
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Zuidervaart, Lambert. "HOW NOT TO BE AN ANTI-REALIST: HABERMAS, TRUTH, AND JUSTIFICATION." Philosophia Reformata 77, no. 1 (November 27, 2012): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22116117-90000520.
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This article responds to a debate in analytic philosophy between realist and antirealist conceptions of truth, as formulated by Alvin Plantinga. Whereas Plantinga recommends a return to Aquinas, I argue for a new understanding of propositional truth that grows out of Jürgen Habermas’s “pragmatic realist” conception. By critically appropriating Habermas’s insights, I aim to move beyond the realism/anti-realism dispute, replacing questions of independence with questions of interdependence. I claim that truth theory needs to begin with the interdependence of “mind” and “object” and with the corporeal multidimensionality of both human knowers and that about which they acquire knowledge.
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Sargeant, Malcolm. "Age Discrimination: Equal Treatment with Exceptions." International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 6, no. 3 (March 2005): 251–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/135822910500600304.
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The likelihood of age discrimination in relation to employment increases the older a person becomes. The concern is that, partly as a result of this discrimination, large numbers of older workers leave the workforce and become economically inactive. This in turn brings increased pressures on the remaining members of the workforce and increased pressures on public finances in relation to pensions and healthcare. The Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation Directive (2000/78/EC) approaches this problem by introducing the principle of equal treatment in a number of areas related to employment, including age. The reasons for action on age discrimination rests upon two potentially conflicting justifications. The first is a human rights one based upon the right of all persons to equality before the law and the second is one concerned with implementing EC Employment Guidelines on integrating disadvantaged groups into the workforce. This second justification is likely to lead to a much more pragmatic approach which in turn may compromise the principle of equality of treatment. This article, uses survey material, to argue that the potential conflict between an equal treatment approach and the functional, more pragmatic, approach may lead to a lessening of the effectiveness of measures prohibiting age discrimination.
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WARD, GREGORY, and LAURENCE R. HORN. "Phatic communication and Relevance Theory: a reply to Žegarac & Clark." Journal of Linguistics 35, no. 3 (November 1999): 555–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022226799007690.
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Recent work in Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) illustrates the coming of age of modern pragmatic scholarship in creating an environment in which a particular theory of pragmatics can be taken for granted, without explanation or justification, and an analysis of a phenomenon previously unaccounted for within that theory can be advanced. One is reminded of much of the recent syntactic work within GB/Principles & Parameters/Minimalist Theory: the dominance of the Chomskyan approach – particularly in certain geographic regions – allows researchers, for better or worse, to simply assume the correctness of the theory in their work and proceed to illustrate how that theory might (or must) be extended or modified to accommodate a new class of data. In this volume, Žegarac & Clark (1999) provide the latest illustration of a similar strategy in pragmatics: the correctness of RT is assumed and an analysis of ‘phatic communication’ proposed within that framework. On the one hand, this constitutes an advance for pragmatic theory, since until recently there was no comprehensive all-inclusive framework within which certain pragmatic generalizations could be stated. If nothing else, RT has served to raise a number of important issues surrounding the semantics-pragmatics interface, helping to crystallize the debate and make explicit many assumptions that had been either implicit or non-existent in other frameworks. In particular, RT work on scalar implicature/explicature and on echoic mention and metalinguistic negation (e.g. Carston 1988, 1995; Récanati 1989) has represented major advances in our understanding of these phenomena and their theoretical implications. Thus, whatever one may think of RT, it is a theory that must be taken seriously by anyone working in this area. On the other hand, we find that RT suffers from one of the principal afflictions of the aforementioned work in the GB/P&P/Minimalism mainstream: a remarkable failure to address, come to terms with, and incorporate the extensive previous literature on the topic under current consideration.
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Alsagoff, Lubna, Zhiming Bao, and Lionel Wee. "Why You Talk Like That?" English World-Wide 19, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 247–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/eww.19.2.05als.
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In this paper, we examine one wh-construction in Singapore English, which signals a demand for justification, and show that there is a systematic correlation between its structural and pragmatic properties. We suggest that this wh-construction is based on the imperative, and inherits the structural properties associated with the relatively more polite version of the imperative. In Singapore English, this is the version that makes explicit mention of the second person subject, whereas in Standard English the use of you in the imperative decreases politeness. After a careful comparison of the pragmatics of the imperative in Standard English, Singapore English and Chinese, we conclude that the asymmetry between the why-construction in Standard English and in Singapore English can be accounted for by substrate influence from Chinese, from which the Singaporean construction has inherited its politeness constraints.
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Belliotti, Raymond A. "Our Adversary System: In Search of a Foundation." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 1, no. 1 (January 1988): 19–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900000588.
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Rhetoric in praise of “our adversary system” flows freely in the prose of many legal insiders. But unexamined rhetoric, like self-praise, is of itself of little recommendation.I will here (I) state and explain the four defining characteristics of our adversary system: (A) formal proceedings, (B) partisan presentation, (C) a neutral, passive fact finder, and (D) principles of professional responsibility. I will then (II) state, explain, and analyze critically the most common justifications advanced in defense of our adversary system: (A) the truth rationale, (B) the rights rationale, (C) the autonomy rationale, (D) the lawyer as friend rationale, (E) the ritualistic function rationale, (F) the dispute rationale, and (G) the pragmatic rationale. I conclude (III) that to date no convincing justification has been advanced which argues persuasively that our adversary system has independent value or that it serves important societal objectives better than other existing or possible legal systems.
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Tucker, Aviezer. "Holistic Explanations of Events." Philosophy 79, no. 4 (October 2004): 573–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819104000452.
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Explanations of descriptions of events are undivided, holistic, units of analysis for the purpose of justification. Their justifications are based on the transmission of information about the past and its interpretation and analysis. Further analysis of explanations of descriptions of events is redundant. The “holistic” model of explanations fits better the actual practices of scientists, historians and ordinary people who utter explanatory propositions than competing models. I consider the “inference to the best explanation” model and argue that under one interpretation, it cannot account for all the paradigmatic cases of explanation of description of events that I present, though under another interpretation it fits comfortably with my holistic model. Finally, I argue that there is nothing intrinsic or structural to distinguish holistic explanations of descriptions of events from other hypothetical propositions because the pragmatic context of inquiry may well determine exclusively whether a proposition is considered explanatory.
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Ilg, Gerard, and Sylvie Lambert. "Teaching consecutive interpreting." Interpreting. International Journal of Research and Practice in Interpreting 1, no. 1 (January 1, 1996): 69–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/intp.1.1.05ilg.
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The authors provide two perspectives on the teaching of consecutive interpreting: The pragmatic approach and the cognitive justification. Consecutive interpreting is described as requiring outstanding skills in language comprehension and production; the article provides relevant exercises to enhance these skills and features an overview of CI practice and teaching. It concludes with a list of references of published and non-published sources dealing with the wider aspects of the CI process.
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Stewart, James G. "A Pragmatic Critique of Corporate Criminal Theory." New Criminal Law Review 16, no. 2 (2013): 261–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2013.16.2.261.
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Corporate criminal liability is a controversial beast. To a large extent, the controversies surround three core questions: first, whether there is a basic conceptual justification for using a system of criminal justice constructed for individuals against inanimate entities like corporations; second, what value corporate criminal liability could have given co-existent possibilities of civil redress against them; and third, whether corporate criminal liability has any added value over and above individual criminal responsibility of corporate officers. This article criticizes all sides of these debates, using examples from the frontiers of international criminal justice. In particular, it highlights the shortcomings of corporate criminal theory to date by examining the latent possibility of prosecuting corporate actors for the pillage of natural resources and for complicity through the supply of weapons. Throughout, the article draws on principles derived from philosophical and legal pragmatism to reveal a set of recurring analytical flaws in this literature. These include: a tendency to presuppose a perfect single jurisdiction that overlooks globalization, the blind projection of local theories of corporate criminal responsibility onto global corporate practices, and a perspective that sometimes seems insensitive to the plight of the many who have fallen victim to corporate crime in the developing world. To begin anew, we need to embrace a pragmatic theory of corporate criminal liability that is forced upon us in a world as complex, unequal, and dysfunctional as that we presently inhabit.
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Albert, Victor, and Maria Davidenko. "Justification work: The homeless workers’ movement and the pragmatic sociology of dissent in Brazil’s crisis." European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology 5, no. 1-2 (April 3, 2018): 194–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23254823.2018.1452622.
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HOBBS, HARRY. "Towards a Principled Justification for the Mixed Composition of Hybrid International Criminal Tribunals." Leiden Journal of International Law 30, no. 1 (October 21, 2016): 177–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s092215651600056x.
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AbstractThe justification for a majority of international judges sitting on hybrid international criminal tribunals is tremendously undertheorized. At present, policymakers must rely on base pragmatic considerations that allege that local judges are either too incapable or too corrupt. This may or may not be true. It is, however, certainly unattractive and inadequate as an argument. In this article, I sketch out a principled theoretical argument defending internationalization of hybrid tribunals. Drawing on debates in municipal jurisdictions on the principle of fair reflection, my principled justification centres on institutional and sociological legitimacy. As international crimes strike at two societies – the local and the global – hybrid tribunals should be composed of both international and local judges. In principle, the severity of international crimes dictates that international judges should predominate. However, peculiar contextual factors may suggest moderating the principle of fair reflection in appropriate circumstances.
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Dzhokhadze, Igor D. "Rorty’s socio-ethnocentrism: the problem of its justification." RUDN Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (December 15, 2020): 77–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2020-24-1-77-88.
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‘Solidarity’ is one of the key concepts of the late Richard Rorty’s philosophy. Arguing that justification of knowledge is a matter of its acceptance by the community, Rorty reduces social relations to the discursive (intertextual or dialogical) ones. Thereby he faces a number of theoretical difficulties. Rorty’s willingness to substitute the idea of objectivity for that of solidarity is at odds with his socio-ethnocentrism. Antirepresentationalist attitude is not shared by the overwhelming majority of Rorty’s ‘cultural peers’, not to mention professional philosophers, but he strongly holds to antirepresentationalism, considering it to be sufficiently justified, not caring about what others think and whether such a strategy is politically relevant or desirable from a pragmatic point of view. Consequently, he endorses the picture of warrant as independent of communal opinion. Western (Anglo-Saxon) ethnocentrism, Rorty argues, is of a special kind: it is the ethnocentrism of a “we-community” (“we liberals”) which is dedicated to enlarging itself and creating more and more variegated, inclusive and heterogeneous society. It’s a worldview of a liberal “ironist” and cosmopolitan who is always aware of the contingency of her language and moral self, and who “has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she currently uses”. But to say, with Rorty, “We are lucky that our ethnocentrism is based on distrust of itself,” amounts to recognize the truth of anti-ethnocentrism. One who believes in cultural and social progress towards “a global, cosmopolitan, democratic, egalitarian, classless, casteless society” is de facto anti-ethnocentrist. Even if he denies it verbally.
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Bienvenu, Alexis. "Les propositions invérifiables ont-elles un sens? Probabilité, action et signification chez Hans Reichenbach." Dialogue 45, no. 1 (2006): 45–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300000317.
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ABSTRACTHans Reichenbach argued in Experience and Prediction (1938) that the theory of meaning defended by Logical Positivism, i.e., “strict verificationism,” failed to give a relevant criterion for cognitive meaningfulness. He replaces it with a wholly probabilistic criterion that allows us to establish a pragmatic connection between language and action. But serious difficulties arise in the justification of his theory. The aim of this article is to assess some of these difficulties and to indicate a way to solve them in a “reichenbachian” way.
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Seiler, Erhard. "Status of Complex Langevin." EPJ Web of Conferences 175 (2018): 01019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/201817501019.
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I review the status of the Complex Langevin method, which was invented to make simulations of models with complex action feasible. I discuss the mathematical justification of the procedure, as well as its limitations and open questions. Various pragmatic measures for dealing with the existing problems are described. Finally I report on the progress in the application of the method to QCD, with the goal of determining the phase diagram of QCD as a function of temperature and baryonic chemical potential.
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Ishak, Suraiya, Kartini Khalid, and Nidzam Sulaiman. "Influencing consumer boycott: between sympathy and pragmatic." Journal of Islamic Marketing 9, no. 1 (March 5, 2018): 19–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jima-05-2016-0042.
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Purpose This paper aims to examine consumers’ responses to products that are influenced by their moral justification. Specifically, this paper examines the factors related to consumers’ moral response and choices, including religious affiliation and obligation, group memberships, group reference, type of product and link of egregious conduct to particular products. This study explicates Adam Smith’s concept of people’s proprietary emotion that potentially affects their purchasing behavior. Design/methodology/approach This study uses focus group discussion with nine consumers across ethnic groups in Malaysia. A recent boycott case was used to stimulate the group discussion. Their statements are displayed in the findings to show their expressions verbatim. Findings The findings outline that consumers’ participation in the boycott of products is influenced by their moral judgment with frequent addressing of the religious affiliation and obligation, group reference and group membership factors. Additionally, there is a tendency that certain issue(s), although perceived as a universal humanistic issue, would be relatively closer to people with backgrounds similar to the majority of the victims of a particular issue. However, such a boycott action has issues such as duration of action, consistency of action and choice of pragmatic over moral decision that weigh the efficacy of the boycott action toward products related to certain egregious actions. Overall, the non-participation decision had been attached to factors such as type of product, boycotting cost, brand attraction and function or usefulness of products. These factors may also moderate consumers’ sentiment to boycott a particular product(s) in the long term. Originality/value This paper offers new insight regarding factors influencing participation in the boycott of products which were suspected to have link with egregious conduct towards certain Muslim groups. This paper offers a different perspective by integrating ethical theory into the discussion. In addition, it explores the influence of Muslims’ brotherhood concept on participation in boycott activities.