Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Pragmatic rationality'

The main claim defended is that a notion of discursive rationality emerges from the framework of Austinian speech act theory, and, moreover, is an appropriate tool for the resolution of the identified normativity problem. I thus propose a qualified endorsement of an approach owed in large part to Habermas's concept of communicative action.

Notre travail s'attache à examiner la spécificité ainsi que la pertinence du mode d'explication cognitiviste des croyances, tel qu'il est défini par Raymond Boudon, à travers, tout d'abord, une analyse de la notion de "rationalité épistémique" et un examen de certaines des objections qui peuvent lui être faites. Nous interrogeons ensuite la compatibilité de ce type d'explication avec l'idée, propre à un certain nombre de travaux en sciences sociales, selon laquelle les intérêts sociaux et/ou les mécanismes fonctionnels sont aptes à expliquer la formation des croyances. Enfin, nous réfléchirons à la question de savoir si la présence éventuelle de facteurs explicatifs mixtes doit nous inciter à repenser la question de la rationalité des croyances, c'est-à-dire ici de la contribution explicative des raisons au sein de leurs modes de formation. Cette interrogation nous mènera alors à une tentative d'élucidation de la notion de "contexte épistémique" ainsi qu'à un examen de sa pertinence explicative<br>My work aims at examining the specificity and the relevance of what Raymond Boudon calls 'the cognitivist model of belief explanation', through an analysis of the notion of 'epistemic rationality' and an examination of some objections against it. Then I ask the compatibility between this kind of explanation with the common idea in social science that social interests and functional mechanisms are relevant to explain the belief formation process. Finally, I will study the question of the influence of the plurality of explanative factors on the rationality of social agent's beliefs. This interrogation will lead us to an elucidation of the notion of 'epistemic context' and its explanative relevance

This thesis is about the reconciliation of realistic views of rationality with inferential-intentional theories of communication. Grice (1957 1975) argued that working out what a speaker meant by an utterance is a matter of inferring the speaker's intentions on the presumption that she is acting rationally. This is abductive inference: inference to the best explanation for the utterance. Thus an utterance both rationalises and causes the interpretation the hearer constructs. Human rationality is bounded because of our 'finitary predicament': we have limited time and resources for computation (Simon, 1957b Cherniak, 1981). This raises questions about the explanatory status of inferential-intentional pragmatic theories. Gricean derivations of speakers' intentions seem costly, and generally hearers are not aware of performing explicit reasoning. Utterance interpretation is typically fast and automatic. Is utterance interpretation a species of reasoning, or does the hearer merely act as "reasoning Within the framework of cognitive science, mental processing is under stood as transitions between mental representations. I develop a traditional view of rationality as reasoning ability, where this is essentially the ability to make transitions that preserve rational acceptability. Following Grice (2001), I claim that there is a 'hard way' and a 'quick way' of reasoning. Work on bounded rationality suggests that much cognitive work is done by heuristics, processes that exploit environmental structure to solve problems at much lower cost than fully explicit calculations. I look at the properties of heuristics that find solutions to open-ended problems such as abductive inference, particularly sequential search heuristics with aspiration-level stopping rules. I draw on relevance theory's view that the comprehension procedure is a heuristic which exploits environmental regularities due to utterances being offers of information (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This kind of heuristic, I argue, is the 'quick way' that reasoning proceeds in utterance interpretation.

This thesis contributes to the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science. It introduces and explores a triangular scheme for understanding the relationship between rationality and two key abilities: pragmatics – roughly, inferring implicit intended utterance meanings – and learning from sources. The thesis argues that these three components – rationality, pragmatics, and sources – should be considered together: that each one informs the others. The thesis makes this case through literature review and theoretical work (principally, in Chapters 1 and 8) and through a series of empirical chapters focusing on different parts of the triangular scheme. Chapters 2 to 4 address the relationship between pragmatics and sources, focusing on how people change their beliefs when they read a conditional with a partially reliable source. The data bear on theories of the conditional and on the literature assessing people’s rationality with conditionals. Chapter 5 addresses the relationship between rationality and pragmatics, focusing on conditionals ‘in action’ in a framing effect known as goal framing. The data suggest a complex relationship between pragmatics and utilities, and support a new approach to goal framing. Chapter 6 addresses the relationship between rationality and sources, using normative Bayesian models to explore how people respond to simple claims from sources of different reliabilities. The data support a two-way relationship between claims and source information and, perhaps most strikingly, suggest that people readily treat sources as ‘anti-reliable’: as negatively correlated with the truth. Chapter 7 extends these experiments to test the theory that speakers can guard against reputational damage using hedging. The data do not support this theory, and raise questions about whether trust and vigilance against deception are prerequisites for pragmatics. Lastly, Chapter 8 synthesizes the results; argues for new ways of understanding the relationships between rationality, pragmatics, and sources; and relates the findings to emerging formal methods in psychology.

The aim of the thesis is to provide a tradition-specific 'Pentecostal rationality.' To do this it will first analyse and evaluate some of the main contemporary Pentecostal rationalities and' epistemologies (chapter 1), before proposing that Alasdair Macintyre's tradition-focused and historically-minded narrative approach is conducive in providing a more tradition-constituted Pentecostal rationality (chapter 2). Utilising the methodological insight of Macintyre, the thesis will then provide a philosophically informed historical narrative of a Pentecostal tradition, namely, the Elim Pentecostal Church, by exploring its underlying context and roots as a classical British Pentecostal movement (chapter 3), its emergence as a religious tradition (chapter 4), and its two major 'epistemological crises' (chapters 5 & 6). Based on this historical narration, the thesis will argue that Elim's tacit Pentecostal rationality is best defined as Pentecostal Biblical Pragmatism in a Foursquare Gospel framework. This form of rationality will then be developed vis-a-vis Elim's Pentecostal concept of truth (chapter 7), biblical hermeneutics (chapter 8), and pragmatic epistemic justification in dialogue with William Alston (chapter 9).

People who participate in policy-making, from government, academia, industry and civil society, would all prefer their perspectives be regarded as rational. There is little agreement, however, on what comprises rationality, with conflicting claims of 'scientific sense' and 'democratic sensibility', and disagreement on whether moral considerations are part of rational decision-making. Pragmatist philosopher John Dewey drew from the natural and social sciences, as well as his international political experience, to describe rationality as a characteristic of human agency. He posited that rationality should comprise scientific sense, democratic sensibility and moral imagination in order to resolve problematic situations and support individual and social flourishing. In instituting contemporary policy science, Harold Lasswell considered pragmatist philosophy to be its foundation. However, this pragmatist perspective has since been overlooked. Policy science developed with a primarily empirical focus on discrete aspects of policy-making. There is now an identified need for more integrative and normative theories to better understand and guide public policy. The primary goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that rationality, as defined in pragmatist philosophy, can integrate diverse considerations of policy theory and public participation. In order to make the philosophical concepts more operative, a new theory of policy-making - the Decision Cell 3 model - is developed. This model is structured according to key 'pillars' of pragmatist philosophy and shaped by contemporary theoretical and empirical analyses, particularly of health policy. Primary research on the impact of health services and policy research at LSHTM, and on UNICEFcivil society organisation partnerships with respect to children's rights, further informs the development and application of this model. The Decision Cell model also allows for a comparative analysis of normative frameworks for health policy. Mechanisms to facilitate adopting a pragmatist approach to rational policy-making are highlighted, as are the potential advantages and challenges of doing so.

Subject description is a linguistic practice, and therefore all controlled vocabularies are built upon theories of language. However, the underlying theories are rarely discussed in greater length. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate what epistemological foundations controlled vocabularies are built upon and what consequences that has for their internal structure. The main object of interest is the category. From a rationalistic point of view categories are universal and well defined. In a pragmatic point of view categories are contextual with fluid boundaries. A pragmatic point of view has been shown by Wittgenstein and Rosch to more accurately describe how language works, therefore the standpoint of this thesis is that a controlled vocabulary that takes a pragmatic approach will be a better tool for indexing and searching. The study is done in three parts. First the theoretical literature on knowledge organisation is investigated. The findings are that there is a divide among writers who take a rationalistic and pragmatic approach. Then, guidelines and principles from IFLA, LCSH, Svenska ämnesord and MeSH are examined. In all cases the rationalist view is favored but the quirks of language are handled in different ways. In IFLA's FRSAD, the writers claim to take no theoretical stance but in reality they take a rationalistic perspective. LCSH blame the inconsistencies in the system on the many people that have worked on it over a long period of time. SAO is built with LCSH as a role model and therefore have the same problems, although they have gone towards a more pragmatic approach. MeSH, however, acknowledges that language is more complicated, and the controlled vocabulary is built on a more pragmatic foundation. Lastly, examples from the controlled vocabularies are discussed. The finding is that, in practice, controlled vocabularies work in accordance with a pragmatic perspective. This is a two years master’s thesis in Library and Information Science.

Robert Brandom desenvolve um racionalismo que compreende os seres racionais como usuários de conceitos e sensíveis à \"força\" das razões. Essa ideia é explorada a partir de uma noção central da obra de Wilfrid Sellars, o \"espaço lógico das razões\". Este espaço é uma estrutura conceitual, linguística e normativa através da qual os seres racionais podem aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las. Contudo, sua principal característica é a articulação inferencial, isto é, aplicar conceitos, dar razões e justificá-las são atividades que só podem ser realizadas num contexto inferencial. Esta pesquisa visa discutir e analisar esta concepção de racionalidade evidenciando a centralidade do conceito de \"inferência\".<br>Robert Brandom develops a rationalism that considers rational beings as concept users and sensitive to the \"force\" of reasons. This idea is explored from a central notion of Wilfrid Sellars\'s philosophical work, the \"logical space of reasons\". This space is a conceptual, linguistic and normative structure by which rational beings can apply concepts, giving reasons and justifying them. However, the main feature of logical space is the inferential articulation, i.e., applying concepts, give reasons and justify them are activities that can be performed only in inferential context. This research aims to discuss and analyze this conception of rationality emphasizing the centrality of the concept of \"inference\".

A fundamentação e a correção de decisões jurídicas na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral exigem o cumprimento das regras e formas do discurso jurídico fundado em bases pragmático-universais. As viradas lingüística e pragmática, por obra de Frege, Wittgenstein e Peirce, fundaram os alicerces de uma teoria dos atos de fala, de Austin e Searle, de uma teoria da argumentação, de Toulmin, e de uma teoria comunicativa e discursiva da verdade e correção, em Habermas. A ética procedimentalista e cognitivista habermasiana reconstrói o princípio da universabilidade em trajes discursivos. Alexy enuncia um conceito não-positivista e inclusivo da moral fundamentado na pretensão de correção jurídica e argúi a tese do discurso jurídico como caso especial do discurso prático geral. Uma decisão jurídica correta deve ser justificada com base nas regras e formas da justificação interna e externa do discurso. A fundamentação das decisões por meio de argumentos de princípios coloca a exigência da aplicação do preceito da proporcionalidade. As dogmáticas e jurisprudências alemã e brasileira, na aplicação do direito de igualdade geral, utilizam inicialmente uma fórmula da proibição da arbitrariedade ou correlação lógica, da qual resulta uma vinculação fraca do legislador, e passam a adotar uma fórmula baseada na proporcionalidade, com uma vinculação severa do legislador, especialmente quando há tratamento desigual de indivíduos com características especiais elencadas na Constituição. A racionalidade de uma decisão que se utiliza da estrutura da proporcionalidade depende da justificação externa de cada uma das premissas usadas na justificação interna. Há uma relação necessária entre discurso jurídico, proporcionalidade e dogmáticas dos direitos fundamentais.<br>The justification and correction of legal decisions in the application of general equality principle demands the fullfilment of rules and forms of legal discourse founded on a universal-pragmatic basis. The linguistic and pragmatic turn, by Frege, Wittgenstein, and Peirce, established the foundations of a theory of speech acts, by Austin and Searle, of a theory of reasoning, by Toulmin, and a communicative and discoursive theory on truth and correctness in Habermas. The habermasian proceduralism and cognitivism ethics reconstructs the principle of universability in discoursive ways. Alexy states a non-positivistic and moral inclusive concept of law grounded in the claim to legal correction and argues that the legal discourse must be understood as a special case of general practical discourse. A correct legal decision must be justified on the rules and forms of internal and external justification of discourse. The justification for the decisions by means of arguments of principle sets the demand of applying the partial requirements of proportionality. German and Brazilian legal theory and jurisprudence, in applying the right to general equality, apply initially a formula of prohibition of arbitrary and correlational logic, where there is a weak attachment of the legislature, and start adopting a formula based on proportionality, where there is severe attachment of the legislature, especially in the case of discrimination against individuals with special features listed in the Constitution. The rationality of a decision which uses the structure of proportionality depends on the external justification of each of the premises used in the internal justification. There is a necessary link between proportionality, legal discourse and fundamental rights legal theory.

A virada linguística da filosofia contemporânea implicou a recaracterização de problemas epistemológicos em termos da natureza e estrutura da linguagem (lógica), assim como em termos de interpretações das práticas linguísticas concretas (pragmática). Nesta última forma, a concepção da linguagem como instrumento de interação social, somada à constatação do caráter contextual das situações de interação, conduz em alguns casos a um tratamento das diferentes linguagens como jogos fechados em si mesmos, dotados de regras próprias e, nos casos extremos, incomensuráveis. É por esse caminho que Richard Rorty conduz a sua versão da virada linguística. Para Rorty, os desenvolvimentos da filosofia analítica em especial, a forma como W. O. Quine, W. Sellars e D. Davidson carregam o bastão que julgam receber das Investigações filosóficas de L. Wittgenstein apontam para uma concepção holística (contextual) da linguagem e, consequentemente, da racionalidade. Essa maneira de entender a linguagem tem, naturalmente, implicações para o tratamento de outras questões filosóficas morais, políticas e para a caracterização da própria atividade filosófica. Este trabalho procura reconstruir e indicar deficiências das elaborações de Rorty em relação a tais questões.<br>The linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy entailed the restatement of epistemological problems in terms of the nature and structure of language (logic), and in terms of interpretations of linguistic practices (pragmatics). In the latter form, the conception of language as an instrument of social interaction, together with the contextual understanding of interaction situations, leads in some cases to the treatment of different languages as closed games endowed with their own rules and, in extreme cases, incommensurable. This is the path down which Richard Rorty takes his own version of the linguistic turn. For Rorty, the developments of analytical philosophy most importantly, the way W. O. Quine, W. Sellars and D. Davidson follow the lead of Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations point to a holistic (contextual) understanding of language and, as a consequence, of rationality. This way of understanding language is related to Rortys treatment of other philosophical issues (moral and political) and to his characterization of Philosophy itself. This dissertation aims at reconstructing (and pointing to shortcomings of) Rortys understanding of these issues.

Studien är en kvalitativt inriktad undersökning omfattande sex intervjuer med studenter och alumni vid ett lärosäte i södra halvan av Sverige, som har till syfte att identifiera och beskriva faktorer som gör arbetsgivare attraktiva för gruppen lärarstudenter. Frågeställningarna rör i första hand identifiering av betydelsefulla faktorer i valet av arbetsgivare. Forskningsprocessen har i stora delar varit induktiv och de teoretiska analysverktygen har därför valts sedan det empiriska materialet redan framkallats. Som utgångspunkt för den teoretiska analysen har använts epistemologisk identitetsteori (Demerath), psykologiska kontrakt (Rousseau) och pragmatisk rationalism (Hodkinson &amp; Sparkes). Delar av den teoretiska analysen har gjorts utifrån Bourdieus teorier om habitus och sociala strukturer. Avstamp har tagits i tidigare forskning kring employer branding (Parment &amp; Dyhre; Erlandsson) och kring selektionsbeteende hos universitetsstudenter (Turban).För att uppnå syftet har vi använt oss av tematiserade och relativt öppna intervjuer. Av resultatet framgår att det viktigaste inte är vilken arbetsgivaren är, utan vilken typ av arbetsplats den erbjuder. Resultatet berättar också något om hur beslut om val av yrke och arbetsgivare fattas och hur det kända och välbekanta ofta blir måttstock för det individen upplever som ett gott val. Slumpens inverkan på individers beslut granskas. Vi skildrar också hur vi undersökt synen på anställningstrygghet och därvid funnit skillnader i uppfattning mellan intervjupersonerna och oss själva om begreppets innebörd.<br>Program: Organisations- och personalutvecklare i samhället

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Carlos Silva.pdf: 1624561 bytes, checksum: 1792dbf442711d24d863dee9493eadf6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-05-24<br>This work presents an analysis of the interpretation of legal discourse that highlights features of pragmatics, with emphasis on a topical-rhetorical approach of the normative text. The proposed discussion takes into account theoretical features of the pragmatics field, analyzing its presence as one of man´s concerns for a long time. It reveals its characterization and then proceeds with the indication of the essential elements of rhetoric, with Chaïm Perelman, and topic with Theodor Viehweg. The study undertaken in two author´s work stays limited to the exposure of rupture the mathematical logic and the proposition of forming a rationality adequate to law. It also deals with notions related to the communicative situation and the need of proof presentation, as well as the foundation of the philosophy of law as a research basis pointing to a theory of argumentation. Its take the doctrine of discourse to explain its elements and pragmatic functions, transposing it to the legal discourse. There is an Endeavour to report the minimum elements for a definition of legal interpretation, while the main characteristics are emphasized. It goes on dealing with the initial analysis of the presence of legislative intent in the interpretation process, proceeding with the investigation of the relationship of the power of symbolic violence. It establishes the analysis of the rational legislator's construct to give basis to a juridical rationality fit to value the pragmatics aspect of language; it reopens the debate of what one searches in the act of interpreting, between the will of the legislator and of the law. It becomes present the possibility of dealing with such a question pragmactically, without adhering to one or other position, that could be called ideological. In order to make explicit the construction of law pragmatic interpretation, the interpreter proceeds carefully in the analysis of the clarity and doubts of juridical interpretation. Finally, this work presents the technical rules used in law in the search of decidability, explaining the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic nature. The object aimed is the analysis of juridical discourse and language through the explicit option of topic-retoric, in the purpose of giving basis and appealing to the interpretation that takes into account the pragmatic aspect of the language. The chosen method is monographic-descriptive, through the exam of literature and documents. The final part of this work tries to demonstrate the viability and relevance of the inclusion of the pragmatic element as essential to the interpretation of legal texts<br>Apresenta a análise de uma interpretação do discurso jurídico pondo em relevo os aspectos da pragmática, com destaque para uma abordagem tópica-retórica do texto normativo. A discussão empreendida toma em conta aspectos teóricos do âmbito da pragmática, analisando sua presença como preocupação do homem desde há muito tempo. Para isto apresenta sua caracterização, partindo em seguida para a indicação dos elementos essenciais da retórica, com Chaïm Perelman e da tópica, com Theodor Viehweg. O estudo empreendido no trabalho de ambos é limitado à exposição do rompimento da lógica matemática e proposta de formação de racionalidade adequado ao direito, para o primeiro, e a apresentação de noções situação comunicativa e dever de prova, além da fundamentação da filosofia do direito como investigação de base a apontar uma teoria da argumentação, no segundo. Toma-se a doutrina do discurso para explicitar seus elementos e funções pragmáticas, transpondo-o para o discurso jurídico. Informa os elementos mínimos para uma definição de interpretação jurídica e ressalta-se as suas características principais. Avança na análise inicial da presença da intenção legislativa no processo de interpretação, para em seguida proceder à investigação sobre sua relação com o poder de violência simbólica. Estabelece a análise do constructo do legislador racional para fundamentar uma racionalidade jurídica adequada à valoração do aspecto pragmático da linguagem e reabre a discussão sobre o que se busca quando se interpreta, entre a vontade do legislador e da lei, apresentando a possibilidade de lidar com tal questão pragmaticamente, sem aderir a uma ou outra posição chamada de ideológica. Para explicitar a construção da interpretação pragmática do direito procede-se à análise da clareza e dúvida na interpretação jurídica. Por fim, apresenta as regras técnicas utilizadas no direito para a busca da decidibilidade, explicitando os problemas de ordem sintática, semântica e pragmática. O objetivo é a análise do discurso e linguagem jurídicos através da opção explícita da tópica-retórica, visando a fundamentar e apelar pela interpretação que leve em conta o aspecto pragmático da língua. O método utilizado é o monográfico-descritivo, com análise bibliográfica e documental. Ao final demonstra-se a viabilidade e pertinência da inclusão da pragmática como elemento essencial à interpretação do texto normativo

A tese busca identificar os elementos jurídicos e extrajurídicos que interferem sobre o comportamento judicial do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A análise é desenvolvida com base nos seguintes modelos decisórios: o modelo legalista, o modelo ideológico, o modelo institucional e o modelo estratégico de comportamento judicial. Ao longo do trabalho, examina-se a influência do direito, da ideologia, das normas que regem o Judiciário, das regras que regem as decisões colegiadas, do Poder Executivo, do Poder Legislativo, da opinião pública e da imprensa no processo decisório do Supremo Tribunal Federal.<br>This work aims at identifying legal and non-legal factors that interfere with Brazilian Supreme Court decisions. The analysis is developed with basis on the legal model, on the attitudinal model, on the institutional model and on the strategic model of judicial decision-making. It examines the influence of constitutional law, ideology, collegial process, Executive Power, Legislative Power, public opinion and of the media on Brazilian Supreme Court attitudes.

This thesis analyses theories of practical reason. In particular I compare desire theories of reasons with value theories of reasons. Desire theories of reasons, as I define them, claim that it is a necessary condition of A having a reason to ф that A’s reason depend on A’s antecedent desires. In contrast, I define value theories of reasons as those theories that claim that it is a necessary condition of A having a reason to ф that A’s ф-ing be valuable. In this thesis my main concern lies with those value theorists who accept the motivational requirement: the claim that if an agent is to have a reason to ф, then it must be possible for the agent to ф on the basis of this reason. In particular, I concentrate on those value theorists who claim that A has a reason to ф iff a) A’s ф-ing is valuable; b) it is possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason. I reject desire theories of reasons on the basis of several criticisms. I claim that our desires are normatively arbitrary, and that according to desire theories of reasons, some of our desires ought to be eradicated. I argue instead for a value theory of reasons that adopts a particular interpretation of the motivational requirement. I distinguish three different interpretations of the motivational requirement, each offering a connection between reasons and motivations that differs in strength. The first, strongest requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason given certain qualities that A possesses (where I take the sense of ‘possible’ relevant to these interpretations to be one that reflects an agent’s capacities). The second and weakest requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason if A possessed certain qualities. The last and moderate requirement claims that in order for A to have a normative reason to ф, it must be possible for A to ф on the basis of this reason if A possessed certain qualities and A either has these qualities, or it is possible for her to get herself into a state where she has them. I argue for a value theory of reasons that employs this last, moderate motivational requirement. I argue that a value theory that adopts the moderate motivational requirement is best, as it allows the theory to be practically useful; reasons on this account have a role in deterrence, encouragement and praise- and blame-worthiness. The theory also aligns with a plausible account of eligible candidates for reasons. While the employment of the moderate motivational requirement in a value theory of reasons likens the theory, in some respects, to a desire theory, it avoids the objections raised against desire theories of reasons. In this way, a value theory of reasons that employs the moderate motivational requirement combines the attractive features of a desire theory and a value theory. Specifically, it generates reasons that are both dependent on an individual’s qualities, and also aligned with an account of value.<br>Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Humanities, 2008

Ce mémoire propose une analyse du rôle épistémologique des problèmes scientifiques complexes. En partant du holisme épistémologique hérité des positions philosophiques de Pierre Duhem et de Willard Van Orman Quine, et de la thèse voulant que la pratique scientifique s’effectue toujours à partir d’un champ théorique et conceptuel reconnu, nous développons un modèle de gestion qui propose aux chercheurs l’adoption d’une attitude pragmatique pour réagir aux problèmes complexes. Nous expliquons dans cette recherche que ces problèmes affectent l’applicabilité des théories et concepts qui forment les connaissances scientifiques. Pour les résoudre, il faut initier des recherches qui suivront les étapes d’un processus pragmatique permettant d’évaluer progressivement la situation et d’en acquérir une meilleure compréhension. Durant cette période, les conséquences négatives du problème complexe sont tolérées afin d’assurer le maintien des activités scientifiques, qu’elles visent directement ou non l’atteinte d’une solution. La thèse défendue dans cette étude veut que la gestion des problèmes complexes qu’elle propose se conclut par l’élaboration rationnelle, encadrée par des décisions pragmatiques et une conjoncture favorable, d’une hypothèse ad hoc offrant une solution au problème. Si la communauté scientifique reconnait la valeur épistémologique de cette hypothèse, elle sera intégrée au champ théorique et conceptuel ce qui aura pour effet d’enrichir les connaissances scientifiques et de redonner à la science son statut « normal ».<br>This thesis proposes an analysis of the epistemological role of complex scientific problems. Starting from the epistemological holism inherited from the philosophical positions of Pierre Duhem and Willard Van Orman Quine, and from the thesis that scientific practice is always based on a recognized theoretical and conceptual field, we develop a management model that proposes that researchers adopt a pragmatic attitude to react to complex problems. We explain in this research that these problems affect the applicability of theories and concepts that form scientific knowledge. To solve them, we must initiate research that will follow the steps of a pragmatic process to progressively assess the situation and gain a better understanding. During this period, the negative consequences of the complex problem are tolerated in order to ensure the maintenance of the scientific activities that it directly targets, or not, the achievement of a solution. The thesis defended in this study is that the management of the complex problems that it proposes is concluded by the rational elaboration, framed by pragmatic decisions and a favorable conjuncture, of an ad hoc hypothesis offering a solution to the problem. If the scientific community recognizes the epistemological value of this hypothesis, it will be integrated into the theoretical and conceptual field which will have the effect of enriching scientific knowledge and giving back to science its "normal" status.

Topic of work is an intersubjectivity of economic knowledge. Work is descriving the process, how is intersubjective economic knowledge may be manifested and legitimized in speech by lay individuals. In general, knowledge is presented as created, redacted and legitimized during the process of speech as an ongoing activity, intersubjective symbols are used as tools to proclaim itself. In the theoretical part, broad overview of sociological theories of knowledge are presented, and the research question was conceptualized by the terms of constructivist approach of Berger and Luckmann. Lay knowledge was manifested as mix of referring four modes of reasoning: economical rationality, societal rationality, habitual and doxic knowledge, discourses. Overemphasizing one of the mods leads to reducing the legitimity of manifestation, the process of balancing between modes is described. In addition, paper proposes suggestion of differences in intersubjective knowledge between Ukraine and Czechs, and discusses the possibilities of further research.