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Journal articles on the topic 'Pragmatic rationality'
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Will, Frederick L. "Pragmatic Rationality." Philosophical Investigations 8, no. 2 (1985): 120–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.1985.tb00138.x.
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McCLENNEN, EDWARD F. "Pragmatic Rationality and Rules." Philosophy Public Affairs 26, no. 3 (1997): 210–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.1997.tb00054.x.
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Finkelstein, Claire. "Pragmatic Rationality and Risk." Ethics 123, no. 4 (2013): 673–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/670757.
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CLARK, RON. "Pragmatic Paradox and Rationality." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 2 (1994): 229–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1994.10717367.
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Verma, Niraj. "Pragmatic Rationality and Planning Theory." Journal of Planning Education and Research 16, no. 1 (1996): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0739456x9601600102.
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Marino, Patricia. "Moral Rationalism and the Normative Status of Desiderative Coherence." Journal of Moral Philosophy 7, no. 2 (2010): 227–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552409x12574076813478.
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AbstractThis paper concerns the normative status of coherence of desires, in the context of moral rationalism. I argue that 'desiderative coherence' is not tied to rationality, but is rather of pragmatic, instrumental, and sometimes moral value. This means that desire-based views cannot rely on coherence to support non-agent-relative accounts of moral reasons. For example, on Michael Smith's neo-rationalist view, you have 'normative reason' to do whatever your maximally coherent and fully informed self would want you to do, whether you want to do it or not. For these reasons to be non-agent-relative, coherence would have to be grounded in rationality, but I argue that it is not. I analyze, and reject, various strategies for establishing a coherence-rationality connection, considering in detail a purported analogy between desires and a priori beliefs, with particular attention to the case of mathematics.
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Pietarinen, Ahti-Veikko. "Grice in the wake of Peirce." Pragmatics and Cognition 12, no. 2 (2004): 295–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.12.2.06pie.
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I argue that many of the pragmatic notions that are commonly attributed to H. P. Grice, or are reported to be inspired by his work on pragmatics, such as assertion, conventional implicature, cooperation, common ground, common knowledge, presuppositions and conversational strategies, have their origins in C. S. Peirce’s theory of signs and his pragmatic logic and philosophy. Both Grice and Peirce rooted their theories in normative rationality, anti-psychologism and the relevance of assertions. With respect to the post-Gricean era of pragmatics, theories of relevance may be seen to have been geared, albeit unconsciously, upon Peirce’s pragmatic agenda.
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Kennedy, Kate. "Ideal Cognition." Stance: an international undergraduate philosophy journal 11, no. 1 (2018): 106–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.33043/s.11.1.106-117.
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Both the nature and aim of human cognition are philosophically divisive topics. On one side, there are the evidentialists who believe that the sole purpose of cognition is to seek and find truths. In contrast, pragmatists appeal to cognition solely as a tool, something that helps people achieve their goals. In this paper, I put forward an account of cognition and its aims fundamentally based on a pragmatic viewpoint.Crucially, however, I claim that an evolutionary pragmatic picture of cognition must assert rationality as a core tenant of human thought, mooring a relative pragmatism within a system logic and rationality.
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Schroeder, Mark. "RATIONAL STABILITY UNDER PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT." Episteme 15, no. 3 (2018): 297–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.24.
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ABSTRACTIn this paper I will be concerned with the relationship between pragmatic encroachment and the rational instability of belief. I will be concerned to make five points: first, that some defenders of pragmatic encroachment are indeed committed to predictable rational instability of belief; second, that rational instability is indeed troublesome – particularly when it is predictable; third, that the bare thesis of pragmatic encroachment is not committed to rational instability of belief at all; fourth, that the view that Jake Ross and I have called the ‘reasoning disposition’ account of belief has the right structure to predict limited and stable pragmatic encroachment on the rationality of belief; and fifth and finally, that the very best cases for pragmatic encroachment are rationally stable in the right ways.
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Goodman, Robert F. "William James: Rationality as a pragmatic choice." History of European Ideas 20, no. 4-6 (1995): 951–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-6599(95)95834-4.
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Rengifo-Castañeda, Carlos-Adolfo. "Analogical Rationality in Social Sciences." European Journal of Social Sciences Education and Research 11, no. 2 (2017): 314. http://dx.doi.org/10.26417/ejser.v11i2.p314-319.
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This research article proposes a conception of analogical rationality, which operates in the social sciences as well as in the natural sciences, according to "epistemic, ontological and pragmatic" conditions. According to this, in this paper it is intended: First, to account for analogical rationality according to epistemic, ontological and pragmatic conditions, contrasting with this, the classical conception of rationality. And second, on the basis of the above, to enable by analogical rationality a status of scientificity for the social sciences by justifying rational beliefs and decisions, according to this tripartite condition
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Kravchenko, S. A. "From formal rationality to the digital one: Sideeffects, ambivalences, and vulnerabilities." RUDN Journal of Sociology 21, no. 1 (2021): 7–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2272-2021-21-1-7-17.
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The article considers challenges for man, society and nature, which appeared under the new types of rationality and bring not only the desired achievements but also unintended consequences in the form of side-effects, ambivalences, and vulnerabilities that become more complex. Thus, formal rationality became a factor of transition from traditional societies to industrial ones, which facilitated the establishment of high standards of living, but at the same time had side-effects such as the iron cage of bureaucratization that made social relationships impersonal and without binding values. The growing formal rationality produced more complex side-effects such as legitimation crisis, colonization of the essential functions of peoples life-worlds, and dependence on legal and administrative bureaucracies. Formal rationality led to ambivalences: rationalization helped people to adapt to the dynamics of social life but also had irrational consequences - achievements in scientific knowledge and technologies advanced beyond moral limits. Formal rationality gave birth to society of normalization and biopower which generated the system of total control in the form of the Panapticon spreading its influence throughout the whole society. McDonaldization as a form of modern formal rationality worsened the situation by producing globally dehumanized nothings. Digital rationality creates objective conditions for complex vulnerabilities to society and nature in the form of normal accidents and collateral damage. The author argues that digital rationality acquires two basic types that are culturally determined: pragmatic type - hybrid rationality rooted in the principles of practical, formal, instrumental rationality and McDonaldization; substantive digital type with an emphasis on human needs and ontological safety. To minimize the vulnerabilities of the pragmatic digital rationality and to avoid the digital iron cage, the author suggests: rejection of radicalism and pragmatism in relation to digital technologies and artificial intelligence; humanistic modernization; eco-digital policy; interdisciplinary research of complex nonlinear vulnerabilities.
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Ishomuddin, Ishomuddin. "THE CHANGE OF RELIGIOUS UNDERSTANDING FROM IDEAL-RATIONALITY TO PRAGMATIC-MATERIALISTIC." EL HARAKAH (TERAKREDITASI) 19, no. 2 (2017): 243. http://dx.doi.org/10.18860/el.v19i2.4186.
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<p>The study is conducted because of the appearance of many new beliefs in Islam, which has had considerable influence for Indonesian Muslims, regardless the fact that the beliefs have mostly been classified as a cult. The purposes of this study are to investigate the new phenomenon in the religious act, involving the change of understanding from ideals-rationality view to pragmatic-materialistic view, and to focus on the phenomenon of the emergence of new faiths in Islamic society in Indonesia. This study is aimed to answer the following questions: (1) What motives lie behind the change of religious understanding from ideals-rationality view to pragmatic-materialistic view in today's Muslim group?; (2) How does the changing process of religious understanding occur in the Muslim group?; (3) Why do religious people today tend to be pragmatic-materialistic oriented and leave the religious teachings that have been previously understood? Qualitative approach is used to examine the research questions. The research result shows that there are three kinds of typology of Muslim groups which experience a shift in religious understanding from ideality-rationality belief to pragmatic-materialistic belief. This happens because there is a gap between the quality of faith and the desire to become instantly rich.</p><p> </p><p>Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk mendeskripsikan dan memahami gejala new act dalam beragama yaitu fenomena pergeseran pemahaman spiritual dari idealitas-rasionalitas ke pragmatis-materialistis dalam beragama. Penelitian ini difokuskan pada fenomena munculnya kelompok-kelompok atau aliran-aliran baru dalam masyarakat Islam di Indonesia. Secara rinci penelitian ini adalah untuk menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyan berikut ini. Apa yang melatarbelakangi adanya perubahan pemahaman agama dari idealitas-rasionalitas ke pragmatismaterialistis dalam beragama masyarakat sekarang ini? Bagaimana proses perubahan keberagamaan itu terjadi pada masyarakat Islam? Mengapa umat beragama sekarang ini cenderung kepada pemahaman agama secara pragmatismaterialistis sehingga kehilangan orientasi dan meninggalkan ajaran-ajaran agama yang telah dipahami sebelumnya? Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif. Berdasarkan analisis data terdapat tiga macam tipologi kelompok muslim yang mengalami pergeseran pemahaman agama dari idealitas-rasionalitas ke pragmatis-materialistis. Hal ini terjadi karena adanya kesenjangan antara kualitas keimanan dengan keinginan untuk menjadi kaya secara instan.</p>
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Mudry, Léna. "Two Shapes of Pragmatism." KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy 35, no. 2 (2021): 151–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/krt-2021-0017.
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Abstract The ethics of belief is concerned with the question of what we should believe. According to evidentialism, what one should believe is determined by evidence only. Pragmatism claims that practical considerations too can be relevant. But pragmatism comes in two shapes. According to a more traditional version, practical considerations can provide practical reasons for or against belief. According to a new brand of pragmatism, pragmatic encroachment, practical considerations can affect positive epistemic status, such as epistemic rationality or knowledge. In the literature, the distinction between the two versions of pragmatism is not always made. If it is mentioned, it is quickly put aside. Sometimes, it is simply overlooked. As evidentialists face two distinct pragmatist challenges, they must get clearer on the distinction. But it matters for pragmatists too. As I see it, if one accepts one version of pragmatism, one should reject the other. This paper’s goals are to get clearer on the distinction and argue that both pragmatisms are independent. Accepting one version does not commit one to accept the other. Moreover, even if both pragmatisms tend to be neutral toward one another, I will argue that traditional pragmatism has good reasons to reject pragmatic encroachment and vice versa.
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ZAITSEVA, NATALIYA V. "Reasonableness as a way to determine the legal admissibility of a transaction in antitrust law." Public Administration 22, no. 5 (2020): 32–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.22394/2070-8378-2020-22-5-32-40.
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The article is devoted to the research of the criterion of rationality, its content and interpretation at the international level and in national systems. The author analyzes the role of rationality in the system of antitrust regulation and its impact on the acceptability of transactions that affect competition. The article outlines the criteria of a reasonable approach to permissible actions restricting competition in the conditions of Russian law, as well as the peculiarity of regulating conditions restricting trade in common law countries. Two basic models for the interpretation of rationality are based on assessment of the form and content of the principle. The qualification of rationality is based on existing precedents that gave legal interpretation to this term. A reasonable approach to determining the admissibility of actions that restrict competition is possible for a certain list of actions in the presence of mandatory criteria – no harm (at the moment) and the presence of a positive general economic effect. The author considers the issues of changing the legal content of reasonableness depending on the type of restrictions. There are three approaches to the definition of rationality – utilitarian, pragmatic and formalist, which are used to varying degrees in certain industries, but it is possible to distinguish the use as the main utilitarian approach in tort obligations and some obligations of the administrative order, a pragmatic approach in contractual relations and a formalist approach in a public relationship. The author considers the issues of changing the legal content of rationality, depending on the type of restrictions.
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Horn, Laurence. "WJ-40: Implicature, truth, and meaning." International Review of Pragmatics 1, no. 1 (2009): 3–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187731009x455820.
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Abstract40-plus years ago Paul Grice initiated modern pragmatics by defining a relation of conversational implicature within a general theory of cooperation and rationality. While critics have disputed the formulation and derivation of Gricean principles, the overall framework, with appropriate emendations, remains the most natural and explanatory approach to predicting constraints on lexical incorporation, the behavior of scalar predicates, pragmatic strengthening, and other linguistic phenomena. Despite recent arguments for an enriched conception of propositional content, a range of real and fictional exchanges bearing on the distinction between lying and misleading supports the neo-Gricean view of an austere conception of what is said.
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Sarzano, Melanie. "COSTLY FALSE BELIEFS: WHAT SELF-DECEPTION AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT CAN TELL US ABOUT THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEFS." Dossier: On Self-Deception 13, no. 2 (2019): 95–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1059501ar.
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In this paper, I compare cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment and argue that confronting these cases generates a dilemma about rationality. This dilemma turns on the idea that subjects are motivated to avoid costly false beliefs, and that both cases of self-deception and cases of pragmatic encroachment are caused by an interest to avoid forming costly false beliefs. Even though both types of cases can be explained by the same belief-formation mechanism, only self-deceptive beliefs are irrational: the subjects depicted in high-stakes cases typically used in debates on pragmatic encroachment are, on the contrary, rational. If we find ourselves drawn to this dilemma, we are forced either to accept—against most views presented in the literature—that self-deception is rational or to accept that pragmatic encroachment is irrational. Assuming that both conclusions are undesirable, I argue that this dilemma can be solved. In order to solve this dilemma, I suggest and review several hypotheses aimed at explaining the difference in rationality between the two types of cases, the result of which being that the irrationality of self-deceptive beliefs does not entirely depend on their being formed via a motivationally biased process.
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Filipiak, Magdalena. "Strategic actions according to Jürgen Habermas – some critical remarks from the transcendental-pragmatic procedure viewpoint." Lingua Posnaniensis 59, no. 1 (2017): 39–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/linpo-2017-0004.
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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyze the primacy of communicative rationality in relation to other forms of rationality and to determine the status of openly strategic actions in the concept of Jürgen Habermas. In the theory of communicative actions, Habermas focuses on actions secretively strategic, recognizing them as “parasitic” in relation to communicative actions and explains the prevalence of communicative actions on the grounds of the theory of speech acts, in particular the concept of illocutionary force, the category of “social binding force”, or practice in the lifeworld. By the same, Karl-Otto Apel challenges Habermas that he has skipped explicitly strategic class of actions, which entails the inadequacy of the justification for the status of communicative rationality. This raises a doubt – why should non-strategic actions take precedence over strategic ones? Karl-Otto Apel replies to this question with the help of transcendental-pragmatic procedure of an ultimate justification.
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Grossmann, Igor, Richard P. Eibach, Jacklyn Koyama, and Qaisar B. Sahi. "Folk standards of sound judgment: Rationality Versus Reasonableness." Science Advances 6, no. 2 (2020): eaaz0289. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aaz0289.
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Normative theories of judgment either focus on rationality (decontextualized preference maximization) or reasonableness (pragmatic balance of preferences and socially conscious norms). Despite centuries of work on these concepts, a critical question appears overlooked: How do people’s intuitions and behavior align with the concepts of rationality from game theory and reasonableness from legal scholarship? We show that laypeople view rationality as abstract and preference maximizing, simultaneously viewing reasonableness as sensitive to social context, as evidenced in spontaneous descriptions, social perceptions, and linguistic analyses of cultural products (news, soap operas, legal opinions, and Google books). Further, experiments among North Americans and Pakistani bankers, street merchants, and samples engaging in exchange (versus market) economy show that rationality and reasonableness lead people to different conclusions about what constitutes good judgment in Dictator Games, Commons Dilemma, and Prisoner’s Dilemma: Lay rationality is reductionist and instrumental, whereas reasonableness integrates preferences with particulars and moral concerns.
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Daoud, Adel, and Goran Puaca. "An organic view of students’ want formation: pragmatic rationality, habitus and reflexivity." British Journal of Sociology of Education 32, no. 4 (2011): 603–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01425692.2011.578440.
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Rickel, A. M. "Rational, Pragmatic and Competitive: Generation “Y” Stereotype Empiric Research." Social Psychology and Society 11, no. 3 (2020): 135–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.17759/sps.2020110309.
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Objectives. The study of the socio-psychological portrait of the so-called “Y” generation (born 1982—1999) in terms of stereotypes and autostereotypes regarding the rationality and pragmatism of this generation. Background. Stereotypes that arise when interacting with people of another generation, always remain a relevant topic due to the constant change of generational cohorts. The media and popular image of the “Y” generation in the context of its rationality and pragmatism is due to the socialization of most representatives of this generation in the new post-Soviet individualized and “market” Russian society. Study design. The study was carried out in 3 stages and was based on a mixed qualitative and quantitative methodology (which may explain the limited sample size). Participants. 100 people (Stage I — 62, II — 18, III — 20), representatives of the so-called generations “Y” and “X” (Russia). Methods. At Stage I, a questionnaire survey and an author’s projective method were used, dedicated to the perception of interpersonal relations in movies; at Stage II — an in-depth interview on the topic of romantic relationship; at Stage III — a semi-structured interview on the topic of organizational loyalty. Results. Data were obtained according to which the generation “Y” perceives itself, as well as is perceived by the older generation “X” as (1) more rational in romantic relations, (2) different in terms of interpreting the presence of competition and cooperation in interpersonal relations, and as well as (3) a less loyal and more pragmatic in terms of organizational career generation. Conclusions. The obtained results confirm the stereotypes of the “Y” generation that have developed in the media space considered in the article, and also contribute to the formation of a comprehensive socio-psychological portrait of representatives of this generational cohort.
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Kanaris, Jim. "The "ins and outs" of religions love: Bernard Lonergan's pragmatics." Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 27, no. 3 (1998): 295–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000842989802700304.
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Recent interest in the growing field of pragmatics has inspired philosophers and theologians to rethink the problematic issue of method in connection with their own proper subject matter. Inasmuch as pragmatics deals with the relationship between language and its users, this level of reflection, particularly in its philosophical guise, evokes something more than the mere implementation or destruction of method. Indeed, I argue that one of its primary concerns is the function of method, raising questions like "How does method relate to its users?" or "To what end is method employed?" In this article I attempt to show what the benefits of such pragmatic questioning are in a climate that is not favorably disposed, by and large, toward the methodological. Moreover, I do so in connection with the thought of Canadian philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan (1904-84), whose emphasis on method and methodical rationality seems to disqualify him as a thinker concerned with the pragmatics of meaning.
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Valantiejus, Algimantas. "Racionalumo problema sociologijoje (II)." Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas 33, no. 2 (2013): 7–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/socmintvei.2013.2.3809.
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Santrauka. Antroje straipsnio dalyje konkretinamos ir analizuojamos paralelės 1) tarp postempiristinės mokslo filosofijos ir postanalitinės sociologijos, 2) tarp epistemologijos sampratos natūralizavimo filosofijoje ir racionalumo sampratos pragmatizavimo sociologijoje. Teigiama, kad metodologinė racionalumo problema sociologijoje yra siauresnė epistemologinio santykio tarp filosofijos ir mokslo dalis. Analizuojant filosofinės nuostatos natūralizavimo šiuolaikinėje sociologijoje tendencijas skiriamos dvi – analitinė ir postanalitinė – pozicijos. Nagrinėjama normatyvinė santykio tarp racionalumo normų ir mokslinių objektyvumo kriterijų problema abiejose pozicijose.
 Pagrindiniai žodžiai: racionalumas, normatyvumas, natūralizmas, a priori problema, reliatyvizmas.
 Key words: rationality, normativity, naturalism, the problem of the a priori, relativism.
 
 ABSTRACT
 THE PROBLEM OF RATIONALITY IN SOCIOLOGY (II)
 The second part of the article aims to articulate and explicate the parallels between post-empiricist scientific philosophy and post-analytical sociology, and between the conception of naturalistic epistemology in philosophy and the conception of pragmatic rationality in sociology. The article argues that the methodological problem of rationality in sociology is the part of the larger epistemological relationship between philosophy and science. Normative relationship between the norms of rationality and the criteria of scientific objectivity is analyzed in two main perspectives of contemporary sociology – analytical and post-analytical.
 
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Rošker, Jana S. "Li Zehou’s Ethics and the Structure of Confucian Pragmatic Reason." Asian Studies 8, no. 1 (2020): 37–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2020.8.1.37-55.
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Li Zehou believes that human psychology, just like humanness or “human nature”, is not fixed or given, but is rather something characterized by changing developmental forms of human pragmatic reason, which is formed over millions of years, and is still continuously accumulating and changing. However, reason alone is by no means something that would absolutely separate humans from their sensuality and thus from other animals. The difference between human beings and animals primarily occurs somewhere else, namely in the very realm of the specifically human social existence, which is defined by “subjectality” (zhutixing 主體性) and includes specific human values. In this context, Li shows that Confucian pragmatic reason is formed and functions within the “emotio-rational formation” (qingli jiegou 情理結構), which is deeply rooted in the human world. It is based on actual human conditions and arises from human social emotionality, transforming these culturally integrated general communal emotions through rites in the process of “condensation of reason” (lixing ningju 理性凝聚) into rational concepts of right and wrong, good and evil. The rationality of these concepts governs the subjective personal feelings of each member of a community; the pragmatic nature of this rationality, however, is tightly linked to and intertwined with human emotions. In the concrete social life, these rational concepts can nevertheless dissolve—through the process of the “melting of reason” (lixing ronghua 理性融化)––in the heart-minds of people and thus become an integral part of individual emotions. This paper aims to posit the Confucian pragmatic reason into the framework of Li Zehou’s ethics and political axiology.
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Bastian, Lisa. "Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind." Philosophical Studies 177, no. 12 (2019): 3615–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01385-y.
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AbstractThis paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the ‘right kind’ and the ‘wrong kind’. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.
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Hodges, Bert H. "Resisting knowledge, realizing values, and reasoning in complex contexts: Ecological reflections." Theory & Psychology 29, no. 3 (2019): 291–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354319852423.
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In this article I explore the social, pragmatic, ecological contexts within which reasoning occurs, and without which it cannot function properly. A diverse set of perspectives are used to guide this exploration: (a) pragmatic critiques of studies showing failures to reason logically, (b) theoretical claims that reasoning is fundamentally social and argumentative, (c) a values-realizing account of resistance and truthfulness in social reasoning dilemmas, and (d) arguments related to the nature of rationality and resistance to scientific claims. Implications emerging from the integration of these sources point to improved prospects for a more ecological, values-realizing approach to theory, method, and application with respect to reasoning.
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Bigirimana, Stanislas. "Beyond the thinking and doing dichotomy: integrating individual and institutional rationality." Kybernetes 46, no. 9 (2017): 1597–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/k-10-2016-0275.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to introduce a dynamic and integrative epistemology as a substitute to normative epistemology. Design/methodology/approach A philosophical argument based on the critique of literature. Findings Normative epistemology implies that knowing leads to certainty, and it has to be objective and universal because it is an accurate representation of reality. Dynamic and integrative epistemology uphold that knowing leads to accumulating insights though information processing. Knowing is a unified but fourfold process of experiencing, understanding, judging and acting (Lonergan, 1990). It occurs at four levels of consciousness: the empirical, the intellectual, the evaluative and the pragmatic (Lonergan, 1990). Dynamic and integrative epistemology extends rationality, knowledge and intelligence to non-humans because institutions have substantive, structural, behavior and teleological dimensions and processes that enable them to process information, i.e. to know. Research limitations/implications Translating a conceptual paper into practical action, organizational structuring or product design can be difficult. Practical implications Extending the concept of rationality to non-humans implies realizing that human abilities are limited and need to be augmented by proper institutional design and artificial tools. Social implications The design of intelligent organizations, societies and artificial tools. Originality value Normative epistemology which considers reason and faith, empirical (experience) and rational (understanding), positive (facts) and ideal (principles, representations or wishes), physical (objects) and “mental” (ideas or concepts), practice and theory, knowledge (episteme) and opinion (doxa), reflection and action as opposed and mutually exclusive can be replaced by a dynamic and integrative epistemology which puts emotional, intellectual, evaluative and pragmatic dimensions of human knowing in an order of succession through a unified but yet differentiated process which can be augmented by non-human “experts”.
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Bermúdez, Juan Pablo. "Truth and falsehood for non-representationalists: Gorgias on the normativity of language." Journal of Ancient Philosophy 11, no. 2 (2017): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v11i2p1-21.
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Sophists and rhetoricians like Gorgias are often accused of disregarding truth and rationality: their speeches seem to aim only at effective persuasion, and be constrained by nothing but persuasiveness itself. In his extant texts Gorgias claims that language does not represent external objects or communicate internal states, but merely generates behavioural responses in people. It has been argued that this perspective erodes the possibility of rationally assessing speeches by making persuasiveness the only norm, and persuasive power the only virtue, of speech. Against this view, I show how Gorgias’ texts support a robust normativity of language that goes well beyond persuasion while remaining non-representational. Gorgias’ claims that a speech can be persuasive and false, or true and unpersuasive, reveal pragmatic, epistemic, and agonistic constraints on the validity of speech that are neither representational nor reducible to sheer persuasiveness.
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McCabe, Darren, Sylwia Ciuk, and Margaret Gilbert. "‘There is a crack in everything’: An ethnographic study of pragmatic resistance in a manufacturing organization." Human Relations 73, no. 7 (2019): 953–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0018726719847268.
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Why is resistance a pervasive feature of organizations? We seek to add to the established ways of understanding resistance by arguing that it may emerge owing to the rationality and irrationality, order and disorder that imbues organizations. We explore how such conditions create ambivalent situations that can generate resistance that is ambivalent itself as it can both facilitate and hinder the operation of organizations. Drawing on ethnographic research conducted in a manufacturing organization, we introduce the concept of pragmatic resistance as a means to grasp the everyday resistance that emerges through and reflects cracks in the rational model of organizations. Rather than being anti-work, we demonstrate how pragmatic resistance is bound up with organizational disorder/irrationality, competing work demands and the prioritization of what is interpreted as ‘real work’. Overall, the concept of pragmatic resistance indicates that resistance may be far more pervasive and organizations more fragile and vulnerable to disruption than is often assumed to be the case.
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Hedrick, Lisa Landoe. "The Structure of Rationality and the Ideal of Aesthetic Harmony in Whitehead's Pragmatic Philosophical Theology." Process Studies 45, no. 2 (2016): 223–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/process201645216.
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Douglass, Curran F. "Rescuing Responsibility – and Freedom." Symposion 7, no. 1 (2020): 9–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion2020712.
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This paper confronts two questions: How is it possible to be free if causal determinism is true?; and relatedly, How then is the practice of holding persons responsible for their actions to be justified? On offer here is a compatibilist account of freedom, tying it to control; the relation – argued to be a necessary connection – is considered in some detail. Then the question of ability to ‘do otherwise’ is discussed, which has held a fascination for many in regard to free choice. Our ability to learn to choose rationally is key here, to becoming able to choose well and (hence) freely, freedom being understood realistically. A developed rationality is necessary for maximal free choice, and (as argued here) is also key to the justification of the practice of holding persons responsible for their actions – a practice which is both necessary (socially indispensable) and capable of being justified, on both moral and pragmatic grounds. There is nothing in determinism that threatens that justification, but rather enables it.
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Bratman, Michael E. "Rational Planning Agency." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80 (May 16, 2017): 25–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246117000042.
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AbstractOur planning agency contributes to our lives in fundamental ways. Prior partial plans settle practical questions about the future. They thereby pose problems of means, filter solutions to those problems, and guide action. This plan-infused background frames our practical thinking in ways that cohere with our resource limits and help organize our lives, both over time and socially. And these forms of practical thinking involve guidance by norms of plan rationality, including norms of plan consistency, means-end coherence, and stability over time.But why are these norms of rationality? Would these norms be stable under a planning agent's reflection? I try to answer these questions in a way that responds to a skeptical challenge. While I highlight pragmatic reasons for being a planning agent, these need to be supplemented fully to explain the force of these norms in the particular case. I argue that the needed further rationale appeals to the idea that these norms track certain conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time. With respect to diachronic plan rationality, this approach leads to a modest plan conservatism.
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Connelly, Steve, and Dave Vanderhoven. "The craft of evaluative practice: Negotiating legitimate methodologies within complex interventions." Evaluation 24, no. 4 (2018): 419–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1356389018794519.
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Evaluations of complex interventions are likely to encounter tensions between different methodological principles, and between the inherent causal rationality of evaluation and the messy complexity of real institutional contexts. Conceptualizing evaluation as producing putatively authoritative evidence, we show how ‘legitimacy’ is a useful concept for unpacking evaluation design in practice. A case study of service integration shows how different approaches may have unpredictable levels of legitimacy, based in contrasting assessments of their methodological acceptability and actual utility. Through showing how practitioners resolved the tensions, we suggest that crafting a patchwork of different methodologies may be legitimate and effective, and can be seen as underpinned by its own pragmatic rationality. However, we also conclude that the explanatory power of theory-driven evaluation can be embedded in such an approach, both in elements of the patchwork and as an overarching guiding principle for the crafting process.
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Lian, Yun. "A Study of Pragmatic Functions of Fuzziness in News Reports from the Perspective of Adaptation Theory." Theory and Practice in Language Studies 8, no. 2 (2018): 232. http://dx.doi.org/10.17507/tpls.0802.08.
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Accuracy is one of the biggest features of news reports, but in fact, we often note that news reports will use a lot of fuzziness, which plays an important role in these news reports. Grounded on Verschueren’s adaptation theory, mainly choosing the representative news reports of China Daily and USATODAY as an example, this paper analyzes the pragmatic functions of fuzziness in news reports and illustrates the rationality of fuzziness in theses news reports and reveals that appropriate use of fuzziness in news reports is conductive to the rigor and accuracy of news reports.
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Albinus, Lars. "The Limitation of Truth-Semantics in the Understanding of Religion." Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 27, no. 4-5 (2015): 447–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341344.
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While this article salutes attempts to use Donald Davidson’s principles of radical interpretation in the study of religion in order to avoid the pitfalls of correspondence theory of truth, on the one hand, and cultural relativism, on the other, it suggests that an adequate understanding of religion may also take other pragmatic aspects of meaning into account. Buying into Jürgen Habermas’ critique of Davidson, the more specific argument is that a differentiation of validity criteria serves to disclose the restricted role “truth” plays in speech acts. It is also argued that although Richard Rorty’s skepticism towards universal criteria of rationality borders on relativism, he is justified in focusing more radically—along with Robert Brandom—on pragmatic and situational criteria of meaning. Finally, drawing on Wittgenstein’s concept of “perspicuous representation” I suggest an alternate way of coming to grips with meaning potentials in religious ways of life.
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Dolník, Juraj. "Lexikálny Význam V Recepcii." Journal of Linguistics/Jazykovedný casopis 69, no. 3 (2018): 302–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/jazcas-2019-0012.
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Abstract Asking first about how the lexical meaning manifests itself as we experience it in a communicative event, the author explores the background of the ways in which we are able to perceive the meaning of words in texts. One useful way of thinking about how recipients react to the words in utterances is in terms of behavioural and actional lexical meaning. The first refers to the understanding of meaning, the second corresponds to interpretations of words when the recipient does not succeed in the process of natural understanding of words. These terms lead to questions about the rationality of language. One aspect of this rationality is the function of the intentionalemergent mechanism that adjusts the interplay of automatic and deliberate use of language. This mechanism has its roots in the fundamental human nature: we are behaviouralactional beings. Pragmatic analysis sheds light on how hearers understand and interpret what they hear with regard to their conceptual knowledge associated with words.
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Tan, Zhong Xing. "The Proportionality Puzzle in Contract Law: A Challenge for Private Law Theory?" Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 33, no. 1 (2020): 215–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2019.36.
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This article explores the emerging use of the proportionality concept in the contract law of the Anglo-common law world, first to understand its internal logic, and secondly, to situate its invocation within private law theory. What are judges doing when they appeal to “proportionality”?, and what does this say about the ideology of adjudication? I draw insights from the use of proportionality in other domains, in particular public law, to uncover its internal rationality as a means-ends rationality review coupled with a process of balancing competing considerations, which I illustrate with reference to the illegality, penalty, and cost of cure doctrines. I argue that proportionality reflects a method of pragmatic justification, expressing an aspiration towards a structured and transparent mode of argumentation that is anti-formal and anti-ideological, focusing from the bottom-up on contextual considerations, and occupying a distinct space against existing theories in private law driven, for instance, by “top-down”? rights-based ideologies or critical and communitarian perspectives.
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Nascimento, Roberta Simões. "Teoria da legislação e argumentação legislativa: a contribuição de Manuel Atienza à racionalidade legislativa." Teoria Jurídica Contemporânea 3, no. 2 (2019): 157–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v3i2.24474.
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RESUMO:Uma das principais críticas que a teoria standard da argumentação jurídica recebe é falta de atenção dada às práticas legislativas. O momento da produção do direito é relevante? Como seria possível analisar uma argumentação legislativa? Como avaliá-la? Qual é o peso dos argumentos para o produto final, a lei? Na Espanha, Manuel Atienza, um dos primeiros autores a dar atenção ao tema, desenvolveu uma teoria da legislação que, com o passar o tempo, recebeu os elementos tendentes à formação do que se pode considerar a primeira teoria da argumentação legislativa. Para isso, o autor formulou cinco níveis ideais de racionalidade a serem alcançados pelas leis: (R1) racionalidade linguística ou comunicativa; (R2) racionalidade jurídico-formal ou sistemática, (R3) racionalidade pragmática, (R4) racionalidade teleológica, e (R5) racionalidade ética. Depois, acrescentou um nível transversal de meta-racionalidade: a razoabilidade. Em seguida, cruzou com as concepções formal, material e pragmática que marcam a sua teoria da argumentação jurídica. O objetivo do artigo é o de apresentar os desenvolvimentos teóricos de Manuel Atienza quanto à temática aos longo dos quase trinta anos em que vem estudando o tema, explicando os pontos fortes e as deficiências de sua teoria. Ao final, o presente trabalho propõe o aprofundamento de uma agenda de estudos mais ampla – a partir das ideias de Manuel Atienza e em resposta às críticas frequentemente lançadas à temática –, voltada para a promoção do giro argumentativo dentro do Poder Legislativo, fomentando a cultura de legisladores argumentadores, bem como apontando outros elementos na análise e avaliação das decisões legislativas e das argumentações respectivas, o que poderá resultar na construção de leis mais racionais. ABSTRACT:One of the main criticisms that the standard theory of legal argumentation receives is the lack of attention given to legislative practices. Is the law-making moment relevant? How can a legislative reasoning be analysed? How to evaluate it? What is the weight of the arguments for the final product, the parliamentary laws? In Spain, Manuel Atienza, one of the first authors to give attention to the subject, developed a theory of legislation that, over time, received elements tending to build what can be considered the first theory of legislative reasoning. For that purpose, the author formulated five ideal levels of rationality to be achieved by the laws: (1) linguistic or communicative rationality, (R2) legal-formal or systematic rationality, (R3) pragmatic rationality, (R4) teleological rationality, and (R5) ethical rationality. Then he added a transversal level of meta-rationality: the reasonableness. After that, he crossed with the formal, material and pragmatic conceptions that mark his theory of legal argumentation. The purpose of this article is to present the theoretical developments made by Manuel Atienza on this subject during the almost thirty years he has been studying it, explaining the strengths and weaknesses of his theory. In the end, this paper proposes to deepen a broader study agenda – based on Manuel Atienza’s ideas and in response to the criticisms frequently made on the subject – aimed at promoting the argumentative turn in the Legislative Power, fomenting culture of argumentative legislators, as well as pointing out other elements in the analysis and evaluation of legislative decisions and their respective arguments, which may result in the construction of more rational parliamentary laws.
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Mohan, Mahdev. "Singapore and Its Free Trade Agreement with the European Union: Rationality ‘Unbound’?" Journal of World Investment & Trade 18, no. 5-6 (2017): 858–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22119000-12340064.
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Abstract Querying Poulsen’s view that some States negotiate investment treaties in ‘bounded’ rational ways, this article focuses on how the recently concluded European Union-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (EUSFTA) illustrates the evolution of Singapore’s treaty practice. Singapore has abandoned the ‘old’, and has joined the bandwagon of next-generation FTAs; yet, shrewdly, it is not fully convinced about the ‘new’ either. For example, the EUSFTA does not include a most-favoured nation clause, and does not commit to an appeals mechanism, unlike its Canadian and Vietnamese counterparts. Singapore’s caution appears to be motivated by a pragmatic desire to avoid the pitfalls that these provisions could bring with them, as Investor-State arbitration (ISA) jurisprudence demonstrates, and to study the implications of a recent decision by the EU’s highest court regarding the FTA. Indeed, that shows that the EU itself is now equally wary of the ISA regime removing disputes from the jurisdiction of national courts.
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Krasnov, E. V. "Personality traits and intelligence as predictors of decision making process in gambling strategies of IOWA gambling task (on the sample of military executives)." Experimental Psychology (Russia) 10, no. 2 (2017): 54–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.17759/exppsy.2017100205.
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We present the results of empiric researches for decision making strategy of Iowa Gambling Task (Iowa Gambling Task – IGT) based on focus group of mid-level military leaders (N=120). We analyzed a correlation between such personality traits as tolerance for uncertainty, rationality, risk readiness, traits of Dark triad and Big Five, and also common level of intellectual abilities (KOT – short selective test), and pragmatic successful result of consistent process of decision making in the situation with main target as maximum possible profit. It was found that gradual choice analysis gives extra information about self-regulation strategies while decision making.
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Westphal, Kenneth R. "Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit." Dialogue 48, no. 4 (2009): 753–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217309990412.
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ABSTRACT: Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification in cognition or morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. I argue for this by defending key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including the “autonomy” of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of “mutual recognition.” These themes are rooted in Kant’s and Hegel’s transformation of the modern natural law tradition, which originates the properly pragmatic account of rationality, which affords genuine rational justification, and which provides for realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about moral norms.
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Scott, David. "Understanding the Categories and their Natural Properties." Magis, Revista Internacional de Investigación en Educación 11, no. 22 (2018): 33–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/javeriana.m11-22.ucnp.
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There are four ways of distinguishing theories or models about categories such as quantity, race and dis-ability and the relationship between mind and world. (i) Epistemic: a theory is superior to another because it has a better relationship with the world. (ii) The converse: a version of reality is superior to another because it contains fewer contradictions and disjunctions. (iii) The giving of reasons: some reasons and systems of rationality are superior to others. (iv) Pragmatic: a theory is better than another because it is more practically adequate. I suggest that a combination of all four reasons is appropriate.
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Arabatzis, George. "Byzantinism and Rationality: Julien Benda and Constantine Tsatsos." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 8, no. 1 (2017): 423–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2017.1.27.
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This article examines the concept of Byzantinism that Julien Benda employed in his book La France Byzantine. In the fin-de-siècle European sensibility, Byzantinism was transferred from political to literary level, but Benda created an epistemological break when he asserted in his book that Byzantinism is literature in its normal function. Furthermore, of Byzantinist character is especially the modern literature (e.g. Valéry or Mallarmé). Thus, labeling modern literati as Byzantinist writers served as a critical tool for Benda, who condemned the degradation of modern intellectuals into clerks. This transformation of literary normality affected also pure thought as is manifested in the ambiguous manner of expressing their ideas by modern thinkers (this being a mixture of idealism and apocryphal thinking, which renders ideas rather abstractions than instruments of rationality). An example of such a Byzantinist use can be found in the manner Emmanuel Levinas exploited Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, Benda engaged in a discussion with Paulhan’s view that literary philosophy is a form of critical terror. The position of Benda is that of a rationalist, whereas Paulhan is a thinker who focuses on the use of language. For Constantine Tsatsos (1899–1987), on the other hand, a Greek philosopher and author of a philosophical novel entitled Dialogues in a Monastery (1974), the Byzantine moment is a part of great continuity of Greek culture, which is characterized by various structures in its period of long duration. One of these is the synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that can be seen in Byzantium, where the transposition of the philosophical (Platonic) Eros to the mystical one plays a major role. This development is of paramount importance not only for the whole European culture but also for all questions of beauty and morality. The present paper concludes with a brief discussion of Richard Rorty’s account of pragmatic reason, which makes it possible to show how contemporary philosophy can be placed in the context of the debate about Byzantinism.
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Arabatzis, George. "Byzantinism and Rationality: Julien Benda and Constantine Tsatsos." Peitho. Examina Antiqua, no. 1(8) (October 24, 2017): 423–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/peitho.2017.12241.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines the concept of Byzantinism that Julien Benda employed in his book La France Byzantine. In the fin-de-siècle European sensibility, Byzantinism was transferred from political to literary level, but Benda created an epistemological break when he asserted in his book that Byzantinism is literature in its normal function. Furthermore, of Byzantinist character is especially the modern literature (e.g. Valéry or Mallarmé). Thus, labeling modern literati as Byzantinist writers served as a critical tool for Benda, who condemned the degradation of modern intellectuals into clerks. This transformation of literary normality affected also pure thought as is manifested in the ambiguous manner of expressing their ideas by modern thinkers (this being a mixture of idealism and apocryphal thinking, which renders ideas rather abstractions than instruments of rationality). An example of such a Byzantinist use can be found in the manner Emmanuel Levinas exploited Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally, Benda engaged in a discussion with Paulhan’s view that literary philosophy is a form of critical terror. The position of Benda is that of a rationalist, whereas Paulhan is a thinker who focuses on the use of language. For Constantine Tsatsos (1899–1987), on the other hand, a Greek philosopher and author of a philosophical novel entitled Dialogues in a Monastery (1974), the Byzantine moment is a part of great continuity of Greek culture, which is characterized by various structures in its period of long duration. One of these is the synthesis of Hellenism and Christianity that can be seen in Byzantium, where the transposition of the philosophical (Platonic) Eros to the mystical one plays a major role. This development is of paramount importance not only for the whole European culture but also for all questions of beauty and morality. The present paper concludes with a brief discussion of Richard Rorty’s account of pragmatic reason, which makes it possible to show how contemporary philosophy can be placed in the context of the debate about Byzantinism.
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Kravchenko, S. A. "The Factor of Food in Biopolitics and National Security." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 6(39) (December 28, 2014): 189–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-6-39-189-198.
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The paper examines the role of food factor in the liberal biopolitics from its birth to the present day. According to the author, the consequences of this policy of food administration are ambivalent in character. On the one hand, there are real gains in mass production of food, its delivery to the consumer, medical supervision of the implementation of its quality. However, on the other hand, the basic principles of this biopolitics - scientism, formal rationalism, pragmatism and commercialism have not allowed to solve the problems of social inequality in the access to healthy food and of illuminating the hunger. In the end of the last century the liberal biopolitics acquired globo-networked and neo-liberal character but the corresponding transition from the national to the global scale administration of food production only intensified risks and challenges of modern human nutrition. In a number of countries including Russia there appeared the problems of food security. The adopted national programs to address these challenges in a "world risk society" (U. Beck) will not solve them without fully understanding and practical implementation of the principle of the indivisibility of food security for all peoples of the world and implementation of the global food security. To achieve this, the author believes, it is necessary to abandon the "repair" of the current neo-liberal wing of biopolitics and its pragmatic and mercantilist approaches to human nutrition and pass over to a humanistic biopolitics. There offered a concrete roadmap motion to it, in particular, intending to strengthen the natural sciences and engineering for the production of food with the theoretical instruments of social sciences and humanities; to replace the outdated positivistic, scientistic postulate «knowledge - power" with the formula of ethical, humanistically oriented responsibility of scientists: "the integral knowledge of all sciences - quality food for the health of all people"; to rediscover the nature of formal rationality and its modern variations that in practice lead to the organized social irresponsibility that can be substituted by different types of value rationality, the ideology of humanism, ethics of eating healthy organic food produced in "ecologically friendly environment".
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Kostina, Alina O. "Epistemology of Belief." Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 57, no. 2 (2020): 231–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202057233.
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The following article discovers current trends of contemporary epistemology, related to epistemic agent and his/her activities. A number of issues raised here describe internal experience of the agent, such as (in)voluntary nature of belief formation, trust in one’s faculties of perception, correspondence of formed beliefs to evidence, demarcation between purely epistemic and pragmatic rationality. Another part of the issues is related to external experiences of the agent. The most crucial among them are: blameworthiness of the agent’s belief system, limited intake of testimonial knowledge as a result of social bias; epistemic disagreement and “epistemic peers” as the sources of knowledge or additional pressure from the environment. The author considers virtue epistemology as a new way of performing normativity.
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Blotta, Vitor. "Selective Solidarity and Discursive Modulation in the Brazilian Public Sphere." Comparative Sociology 19, no. 6 (2020): 729–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341525.
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Abstract In this article the author argues that solidarity can be used as an analytical concept in order to understand the dynamics of discourses in the public spheres of contemporary democracies. He begins by discussing conceptions of solidarity in political theory, followed by descriptions of its manifestations in recent public debates in different countries. After that, he relates solidarity to Habermas’s formal-pragmatic concept of communicative rationality, which enables him to sketch out notions such as discursive and selective solidarity, as well as discursive modulations of solidarity, which are formulated through analogies of discourse theory and musical theory. In the last part of the article, the author applies these notions to three specific examples of public debates in the Brazilian public sphere.
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Kahar, Kahar. "PARADIGMA BARU PEMBEJARAN DALAM PENDIDKAN ISLAM BERWAWASAN MULTIKULTURAL." Jurnal Al-Qalam: Jurnal Kajian Islam & Pendidikan 7, no. 2 (2020): 42–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.47435/al-qalam.v7i2.198.
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This paper focuses on the education of paradigm new multicultural vision of Islam that has a significant role in the current state today. Multicultural education requires rationality , ethical , intellectual , social pragmatic inter - relative , ie, teaching the ideals of inclusiveness , pluralism and mutual respect for all people and cultures is a humanistic imperative that a prerequisite for ethical living and full participation in civic and democratic multicultural world diverse . Already the laws that man was created in diversity , difference and equality . Seeing the reality of human life are not aware of the essence itself . We see the development of all future time of the old order , the new order samapai order Reforms Democracy has brought winds revive the educational discourse of multiculturalism as a strength of the Indonesian nation
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Longo, Anna. "Escaping the Network." Open Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2020): 175–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2020-0013.
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AbstractWe are today agents of a peculiar reality, the global network or the system for automated information production. Our condition in the global network is that of agents of the real, since we all contribute to the coproduction of this ever-evolving process. Nevertheless, I will argue, this reality is but the effect of the adoption of a notion of instrumental pragmatic rationality which denies the existence of any other possible reality as the actualization of different determinations of Reason. While following Deleuze s notion of deterritorialization, I ll show that the real philosophical choice does not concern the introduction of new moves that create differentiations within a universal game, but that it is concerned with the possible abolition of the agency which is instantiated within the collective network.
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Naumova, E. I., та A. V. Makarin. "ФАШИСТСКАЯ МОРАЛЬ VS. МЫШЛЕНИЕ". Konfliktologia 13, № 2 (2018): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.31312/2310-6085-2018-13-2-128-139.
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this article is about the conflict between such phenomenons as the fascist morality and thinking. The fascist morality is the distinctive feature of the totalitarian regimes, it based on the capitalist rationality. The origins of the capitalist rationality are connected with two processes: the extinction of the antique division into public and private sphere and the expropriation of the property. In antique time the property was the private space of the person, the place of his birth and death. The expropriation happened with the Reformation that, firstly, lead to the destruction of the dichotomy public/private and, secondly, laid foundation for the capitalism. The social space destroyed the public/private sphere and the social possession of the things emerged instead of the private property. The man alienated of the world and earth and it means the transition from the modus «taking care of ourselves» to the regime of production. The «mass» person, atomized and lonely, appeared with the classless society, imperialistic tendencies and totalitarian movements in the Modern Time. Imperialism is the phenomenon of the global tendencies of the expansion of the capital in connection with the totalitarian movements. The imposition of totalitarianism and its intellectual consequences find the description in the private Eichmann case which demonstrates that the person lose the main thing — the ability of thinking — in the frame of totalitarian system. Cognition with its pragmatic aspect become the basis of the New European/capitalist rationality in contrary to the thinking. The capitalist rationality is «thinking» by to the rules. The conception of the banality of evil opened through this phenomenon: people support the criminal regime because of the habit to live by the rules. If the rules change, the person submit to this rules by inertia. Totalitarian system break of the habit to live one’s mind, in particular, make own judgment about the world. The basis of the fascist morality is that the person ready to kill another, carrying out the criminal order, and reject to bear the personal responsibility for his actions. The maxim of the fascist morality is such: of two evils choose the lesser.