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Books on the topic 'Praise and blame'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 17 February 2022

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1

Sher, George. In praise of blame. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.

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2

In praise of blame. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

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3

Praise and blame in Roman republican rhetoric. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, 2011.

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4

Praise and blame: Moral realism and its application. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002.

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5

Robinson, Daniel N. Praise and blame: Moral realism and its application. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002.

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6

1925-, Wang Guozhang, Liu Jin 1922-, Zhang Wei, and Starr Don, eds. Han yu bao bian yi ci yu yong fa ci dian =: A dictionary of Chinese praise and blame words, with Chinese-English parallel text. Beijing: Hua yu jiao xue chu ban she, 2001.

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7

Jewcentricity: Why Jews are praised, blamed, and used to explain just about everything. Hoboken, N.J: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009.

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8

The women of Ben Jonson's poetry: Female representations in the non-dramatic verse. Aldershot, England: Scolar Press, 1995.

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9

Sher, George. In Praise of Blame. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2007.

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10

Moral Responsibility and Desert of Praise and Blame. Lexington Books/Fortress Academic, 2015.

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11

Robinson, Daniel N. Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications. Princeton University Press, 2009.

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12

Robinson, Daniel N. Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications. Princeton University Press, 2009.

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13

Passing judgment: Praise and blame in everyday life. W.W. Norton & Company, 2018.

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14

Apter, Terri. Passing Judgment: Praise and Blame in Everyday Life. HighBridge Audio, 2018.

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15

Helm, Bennett W. Roles, Relationships, and Blame. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801863.003.0006.

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Tim Scanlon is right to think that how it is proper to blame (or praise) another depends on your relationships with her. This Chapter argues that such relationships are in part communal relationships you have with fellow community members. Understanding such relationships depends on understanding the different roles one might have within a community of respect and the variability in how the norms bind one depending on one’s role. In addition, how it is proper to praise or blame another varies depending on one’s connection to her actions as well as on what else is going on in both her and one’s own lives—on what excuses you each have. Consequently, this Chapter examines roles, relationships, and excuses so as to provide a clearer picture of the nature of responsibility and its grounding within communities of respect.
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16

Apter, Terri. Passing Judgment: The Power of Praise and Blame in Everyday Life. Norton & Company, Incorporated, W. W., 2018.

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17

Robinson, Daniel N. Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and Its Applications (New Forum Books). Princeton University Press, 2002.

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18

Zimmerman, Michael J., ed. Moral Responsibility and Quality of Will. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0012.

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It is frequently claimed that moral responsibility is a function of quality of will. This chapter investigates whether and, if so, how this is the case. First, it is noted that the term “quality of will” may be too narrow to fully capture the kinds of mental characteristics, both epistemic and non-epistemic, that are relevant to a person’s being morally responsible for something. Then the questions are raised just which kinds of mental characteristics are relevant and how they should be said to be relevant. In response to these questions, an account is given of the concepts of praise and blame and of the worthiness of praise and blame, on the basis of which it is suggested that (a) there are different kinds of praise and blame, (b) there are correspondingly different kinds of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, and (c) there are accordingly different kinds of moral responsibility.
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19

Epideictic rhetoric: Questioning the stakes of ancient praise. University of Texas Press, 2015.

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20

Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will: Which Is Supposed to Be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame. HardPress, 2020.

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21

Edwards, Jonathan. Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions Respecting That Freedom of Will Which Is Supposed to Be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Rewards and Punishment, Praise and Blame. HardPress, 2020.

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22

Shoemaker, David, ed. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192844644.001.0001.

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This is the seventh volume of Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (OSAR), and the fifth drawn from papers presented at the New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility (NOWAR, November 14–16, 2019). The OSAR series is devoted to publishing cutting edge, interdisciplinary work on the wide array of topics falling under the general rubric of ‘agency and responsibility.’ In this volume, roughly half of the chapters focus on agency, and half focus on responsibility. In the former camp, there are essays about the non-observational knowledge we have about our current intentional actions, constitutivism, answerability, organizational agency, socially embedded agency, and a brain sciences critique of causal theories of action. In the latter camp, there are essays about praise, guilt, blame, sanction, forgiveness, and disclaimers.
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23

Franklin, Christopher Evan. A Theory of Moral Accountability. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190682781.003.0003.

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This chapter develops a theory of moral accountability—an account of the conditions under which agents deserve praise and blame. Despite some claims, libertarianism is motivated not simply, or even primarily, by a detached set of abstract reflections on the metaphysical structure of reality but rather by an interpersonal engagement with one another. Paying careful attention to the nature of justifications, excuses, and exemptions, it is argued that an agent is morally accountable for an action only if she has free will, understood to consist in the opportunity to exercise the abilities of reflective self-control in more than one way. Importantly, this chapter makes no claim about the precise nature of the abilities and opportunities involved in free will, and thus the theory so far developed is neutral between compatibilism and incompatibilism.
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24

Holroyd, Jules. Two Ways of Socializing Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190609610.003.0006.

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This chapter evaluates two competing views of morally responsible agency. The first view at issue is Vargas’s circumstantialism—on which responsible agency is a function of the agent and her circumstances, and so is highly context sensitive. The second view is McGeer’s scaffolded-responsiveness view, on which responsible agency is constituted by the capacity for responsiveness to reasons directly, and indirectly via sensitivity to the expectations of one’s audience (whose sensitivity may be more developed than one’s own). This chapter defends a version of the scaffolded-responsiveness view, and develops two further claims. Firstly, moral responsibility should not be tied too closely to liability to praise or blame. Secondly, rather than revising our existing concept of responsibility, we would do better to ask what we want the concept of responsibility for.
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25

Sadler, John Z. Values in Psychiatric Diagnosis and Classification. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard G. T. Gipps, George Graham, John Z. Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini, and Tim Thornton. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199579563.013.0045.

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Values are action-guiding dispositions that are subject to praise or blame, and as such are fundamental in making choices and taking action in any human context, including clinical practice and research. The first half of the chapter reviews the contemporary role of philosophical value theory in understanding the clinical process of diagnosis and the development of formal classifications of psychopathology. The second half of the chapter discusses the kinds of values evident in these areas and raises unanswered questions for the field. Despite two decades of progress in understanding the key role of values in clinical and classificatory work, the open disclosure and negotiation of values in psychiatry remains a novel idea for many, and psychiatric and philosophical research into the area of values and diagnosis/classification is only in its infancy.
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26

Scanlon, T. M. Desert. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812692.003.0008.

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The idea that just economic institutions should give people what they deserve can be appealed to as a way of justifying unequal rewards or as a way of limiting them. Claims about desert that could play these roles would be pure desert claims: that treating people in a certain way is justified simply by certain facts about what they are like or have done (where the qualifier “simply” excludes claims of need, and ideas of entitlement or legitimate expectations that presuppose particular institutions). Some pure desert claims are valid, such as claims about the appropriateness of moral praise, blame, and other evaluative attitudes. But economic rewards cannot be justified in this way. Claims to special reward based on moral merit, effort, ability, and marginal productivity, insofar as they are valid, are not desert claims in the relevant sense.
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27

Langer, Ullrich. Montaigne on Virtue and Ethics. Edited by Philippe Desan. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190215330.013.29.

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This article distinguishes three approaches to Montaigne’s Essays from the perspective of ethics: first, a view of the writer as an agreeable friend or companion to us, and his writing as a compilation of charming practical advice on how to get more out of life; second, Montaigne as a systematic moral philosopher, despite his often unsystematic writing, arguing for propositions that he defends more or less well with proofs and examples; third, Montaigne’s Essays as arising out of a moral culture steeped in the virtues that are incarnated in actions and narrative and assume praise and blame and judgment. I follow this third approach, defining virtue as a deliberate and habitual activity, analyzing several chapters that deal explicitly with different virtues and often the difficulty in discerning and judging them (especially temperance, prudence, courage), and then considering the question of whether Montaigne represents himself as a virtuous man.
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28

Strawson, Galen. “Person”. Princeton University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.003.0002.

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This chapter examines John Locke's use of the word “person” as the root cause of the misunderstanding about his theory of personal identity. Most of Locke's readers tend to take the term “person” as if it were only a sortal term of a standard kind, that is, a term for a standard temporal continuant, like “human being” or “thinking thing.” However, they fail to take into account the fact that Locke is using “person” as a “forensic” term, that is, a term that finds its principal use in contexts in which questions about the attribution of responsibility (praise and blame, punishment and reward) are foremost. The chapter explains how a Lockean person, or more specifically Person [P], differs from the standard person and describes the three components of [P]: a whole human material body, an immaterial soul, and a set of actions both present and past.
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29

Vivian, Bradford. Invention. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190611088.003.0002.

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Chapter 1 uses a historical, and notably unconventional, example of witnessing to demonstrate how bearing witness involves sometimes radical and purposeful rhetorical invention (or reinvention) of historical fact. In his Cotton States Exposition Address (1895), Booker T. Washington, a former slave, romanticized the pre–Civil War South with curious irony. This counterintuitive example indicates that witnesses bear witness in public only if social, political, or moral authorities permit their testimonies. In Washington’s case, the authorities in question presided over the economic and political institutions of the post-Reconstruction South. Witnesses are either broadly empowered or narrowly constrained in their ability to invent a version of the past that presiding officials and the public at large may welcome, according to existing standards of decorum or conventions of praise and blame. Witnessing, this chapter argues, is rhetorically inventive insofar as witnesses testify by appearing to present unmediated recollections of the past; yet such apparently unmediated accounts are effects of rhetorical invention constrained by the dictates of immediate sociopolitical hierarchies.
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30

Strawson, Galen, and Galen Strawson. Locke on Personal Identity. Princeton University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691161006.001.0001.

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John Locke's theory of personal identity underlies all modern discussion of the nature of persons and selves—yet it is widely thought to be wrong. This book argues that in fact it is Locke's critics who are wrong, and that the famous objections to his theory are invalid. Indeed, far from refuting Locke, they illustrate his fundamental point. The book argues that the root error is to take Locke's use of the word “person” as merely a term for a standard persisting thing, like “human being.” In actuality, Locke uses “person” primarily as a forensic or legal term geared specifically to questions about praise and blame, punishment and reward. This point is familiar to some philosophers, but its full consequences have not been worked out, partly because of a further error about what Locke means by the word “consciousness.” When Locke claims that your personal identity is a matter of the actions that you are conscious of, he means the actions that you experience as your own in some fundamental and immediate manner. Clearly and vigorously argued, this is an important contribution both to the history of philosophy and to the contemporary philosophy of personal identity.
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31

Mason, Elinor. Ways to be Blameworthy. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833604.001.0001.

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This book examines the relationship between our deontic notions, rightness and wrongness, and our responsibility notions, praise- and blameworthiness. The book presents a pluralistic view of both our deontic concepts and our responsibility concepts, identifying three different ways to be blameworthy. First, ordinary blameworthiness is essentially connected to subjective rightness and wrongness. Subjective obligation and ordinary blameworthiness apply only to those who are within our moral community, that is to say, those who understand and share our value system. By contrast, the second sort of blameworthiness, detached blameworthiness, can apply even when the agent is outside our moral community, and has no sense that her act is morally wrong. We blame agents for acting objectively wrongly, even if we do not have any view about their state of mind in so doing. Finally, the third sort of blameworthiness is ‘extended blameworthiness’, which applies in some contexts where the agent has acted wrongly, and understands the wrongness, but has acted wrongly entirely inadvertently. In such cases the agent is not personally at fault but the social context may be such that she should take responsibility, and thus become blameworthy.
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32

Bobzien, Susanne. Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866732.001.0001.

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This volume assembles nine of the author’s essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in Western antiquity, ranging from Aristotle via the Epicureans and Stoics to the third century. It is representative of the author’s overall scholarship on the topic, much of which emphasizes that what commonly counts as ‘the problem of free will and determinism’ is noticeably distinct from the issues the ancients discussed. It is true that one main component of the ancient discourse concerned the question how moral accountability can be consistently combined with certain causal factors that impact human behaviour. However, it is not true that the ancient problems involved the questions of the compatibility of causal determinism with our ability to do otherwise or with free will. Instead, we encounter questions about human rational and autonomous agency and their compatibility with preceding causes, external or internal; with external impediments; with divine predetermination and theological questions; with physical theories like atomism and continuum theory, and with sciences more generally; with elements that determine character development from childhood, such as nature and nurture; with epistemic features such as ignorance of circumstances; with necessity and modal theories generally; with folk theories of fatalism; and also with questions of how human autonomous agency is related to moral development, to virtue and wisdom, to blame and praise. In Classical and Hellenistic philosophy, these questions were all debated without reference to freedom to do otherwise or free will—. This volume considers all of these questions to some extent.
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33

Wu, Tianyue. Augustine on the Election of Jacob. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198827030.003.0001.

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This essay aims to take up the philosophical challenge of causal determination in divine predestination to human freedom by reconstructing Augustine’s relevant insights to argue that divine predestination still can accommodate our intuitions concerning freedom and moral responsibility today. Section 1 briefly reconstructs the development of Augustine’s reflections on predestination by focusing on his interpretation of the election of Jacob. Section 2 appeals to attacks from the Idle Argument and the Manipulation Argument to present the theoretical difficulties in Augustine’s account. Section 3 argues that Augustine’s teaching of predestination contains a significant but often-neglected aspect of moral intuitions: the asymmetry of moral responsibility, namely, the conditions of being praised for a good action are substantially different from those of being blamed for an evil one. In conclusion, this essay considers some possible objections to the Augustinian asymmetry thesis to show its relevance to our moral responsibility practices today.
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