Relevant bibliographies by topics / Pre-electoral coalitions

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Academic literature on the topic 'Pre-electoral coalitions'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Pre-electoral coalitions"

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GOLDER, SONA NADENICHEK. "Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies." British Journal of Political Science 36, no. 2 (2006): 193–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123406000123.

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Political parties that wish to exercise executive power in parliamentary democracies are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to election or they can compete independently and form a government coalition afterwards. While there is a vast literature on government coalitions, little is known about pre-electoral coalitions. A systematic analysis of these coalitions using a new dataset constructed by the author and presented here contains information on all potential pre-electoral coalition dyads in twenty industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form between ideologically compatible parties. They are also more likely to form when the expected coalition size is large (but not too large) and the potential coalition partners are similar in size. Finally, they are more likely to form if the party system is ideologically polarized and the electoral rules are disproportional.
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Kellam, Marisa. "Why Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Systems?" British Journal of Political Science 47, no. 2 (2015): 391–411. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123415000198.

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Why do political parties join coalitions to support other parties’ presidential candidates if presidents, once elected, are not bound to their pre-electoral pledges? This article argues that policy agreements made publicly between coalition partners during the campaign help parties pursue policy goals. However, parties cannot use pre-electoral coalitions to secure access to patronage, pork and government benefits under the control of presidents because they cannot hold presidents accountable to these agreements. Quantitative analysis of Latin American electoral coalitions demonstrates that political parties are more likely to form presidential electoral coalitions as the ideological distance between them decreases. Yet presidential electoral coalitions tend not to include non-programmatic political parties, even though such office-oriented parties are unconstrained by ideological considerations.
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Chiru, Mihail. "Early Marriages Last Longer: Pre-electoral Coalitions and Government Survival in Europe." Government and Opposition 50, no. 2 (2014): 165–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.8.

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While the existence of pre-electoral coalitions fundamentally modifies the bargaining environment in which potential cabinet formulas are negotiated, the survival chances of cabinets that include them follow predictable yet different patterns to those of ‘regular’ coalition governments. This article combines original and existing data sets on Western and Central and Eastern European cabinets with information about pre-electoral coalitions (1944–2008) in order to estimate the impact of such alliances on government survival rates. In doing so, I employ a Cox Proportional Hazard model and a ‘competing risks’ research design which distinguishes between replacement and early election hazards. The findings indicate that both Western and post-communist cabinets formed by pre-electoral coalitions exhibit considerably lower rates of discretionary terminations. This effect is reversed in the case of incumbent pre-electoral coalitions. Last but not least, Western European cabinets that replicate pre-electoral coalitions are significantly less likely to end through dissolution and early elections.
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Ibenskas, Raimondas. "Understanding Pre-electoral Coalitions in Central and Eastern Europe." British Journal of Political Science 46, no. 4 (2015): 743–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123414000544.

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While pre-electoral coalitions have important effects on the functioning of democracy, their formation has only been systematically examined in the context of established democracies. This study examines the patterns and factors of electoral alliance formation in eleven democracies in Central and Eastern Europe by focusing on joint candidate lists. It finds that electoral coalitions are more frequent in newer democracies than in established democracies. The formation of alliances is systematically related to their potential costs and benefits. On the one hand, coalitions can provide small parties with legislative representation and larger parties with important government coalition partners. On the other hand, parties face costs related to their electoral compatibility and the sharing of election candidacies and office positions.
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Plescia, Carolina. "The Effect of Pre-Electoral Party Coordination on Vote Choice: Evidence from the Italian Regional Elections." Political Studies 65, no. 1 (2016): 144–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0032321715607512.

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Although it is theoretically relevant, the effect of pre-electoral coalitions on vote choice remains a largely unexplored area in the field of party strategy. The article addresses this gap by focusing on the Italian regional elections, where the electoral rules allow parties to run alone and, at the same time, to present pre-electoral coalitions on the ballot paper. This setting allows us to investigate under what conditions citizens vote for their preferred party and the coalition that this party indicated to coalesce with. The results suggest that ideological congruence and the size of the parties entering a pre-electoral agreement are decisive factors. Findings also reveal that the time elapsed since the establishment of a coalition has no effect on vote choice.
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Tillman, Erik R. "Pre-electoral coalitions and voter turnout." Party Politics 21, no. 5 (2013): 726–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068813499868.

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Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha. "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining." Quarterly Journal of Political Science 6, no. 1 (2011): 1–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00010043.

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Greene, Zachary, and Matthias Haber. "Maintaining Partisan ties." Party Politics 23, no. 1 (2016): 30–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354068816655570.

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Parties coordinate on a range of activities. They invite leaders from other parties to their national meetings, run joint electoral platforms and even form parliamentary factions and coalition governments. The implications of regular cooperation such as the case of pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) for party positioning are unexplored. Parties form PECs to reduce competition for voters with ideologically close competitors and to signal their ability to cohesively govern. Building on this logic, we argue that parties’ preferences converge in PECs to demonstrate their ability to govern together and diverge when parties observe that this tactic has failed to attract voter support in past elections. We demonstrate support for our approach using data on electoral coalition participation, party positions and parties’ internal speeches. Additional evidence from an extreme case of an enduring electoral coalition in Germany shows that PECs have dramatic effects on parties’ positions.
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Ufen, Andreas. "Opposition in transition: pre-electoral coalitions and the 2018 electoral breakthrough in Malaysia." Democratization 27, no. 2 (2019): 167–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1666266.

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Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ora John Reuter. "The incentives for pre-electoral coalitions in non-democratic elections." Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 137–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738865.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Pre-electoral coalitions"

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Garza, Casado Miguel Maria. "The Political Economy of Pre-Electoral Coalitions." The Ohio State University, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1583759580393628.

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Mizuca, Humberto Dantas de. "Coligações em eleições majoritárias municipais: a lógica do alinhamento dos partidos políticos brasileiros nas disputas de 2000 e 2004." Universidade de São Paulo, 2007. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8131/tde-26022008-141714/.

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A Ciência Política no Brasil tem se preocupado, nos últimos anos, em compreender o comportamento dos partidos surgidos após o período de redemocratização. Dentre as possíveis variáveis capazes de servir para explicar o fenômeno estão as coligações eleitorais, ainda pouco exploradas nos estudos. O objetivo dessa tese é compreender a existência de uma lógica capaz de explicar o comportamento das legendas em seus acordos para a disputa de prefeituras em 2000 e 2004. O universo pesquisado compreende os cerca de 5.560 municípios brasileiros e mais de treze mil candidaturas por ano, onde serão destacados os dez principais partidos brasileiros - PP(B), PFL, PL, PTB, PMDB, PSDB, PPS, PDT, PSB e PT. Parte-se da hipótese central de que existem variáveis capazes de explicar parte significativa desse ordenamento. Para tanto, realizam-se duas análises cuidadosas: da bibliografia e das questões institucionais. Nessa primeira parte destacam-se os estudos brasileiros sobre as coligações, desenvolvidos a partir do período da redemocratização dos anos 80, e as considerações de dois teóricos dos partidos políticos e suas considerações sobre as alianças: Maurice Duverger e Ângelo Panebianco. Na segunda parte os esforços se concentram na análise das leis que orientam a celebração de acordos eleitorais e os estatutos dos partidos selecionados, uma vez que o quadro institucional do país torna as legendas relativamente livres para a celebração de suas coligações. As duas últimas partes do trabalho se concentram em investigar se o comportamento dos partidos nos seus acordos em eleições majoritárias municipais tem relação com aspectos ideológicos e governamentais no plano federal ou com aspectos ligados ao alinhamento das legendas em cada estado, com destaque para a relação situação x oposição em torno da forte figura do governador. A conclusão caminha no sentido de aceitar esse segundo ambiente. Os partidos se organizam nos estados, e tal questão tem reflexo sobre as eleições municipais.<br>Brazilian political science has occupied itself for the last few years with analyzing the behavior of political parties. One of the variables that has some explanation power, and as of yet underrated in the field, are pre-electoral coalitions. This PhD thesis aims to check if there is a logic behind the main parties behavior regarding pre-electoral coalitions for mayorships in the elections of 2000 and 2004. Over 5,560 cities and 13,000 candidacies are analyzed and the parties studied are Brazil\'s ten main political parties: PP(B), PFL, PL, PTB, PMDB, PSDB, PPS, PDT, PSB e PT. We depart from the notion that there are many relevant variables that can explain why certain parties enter coalitions with others. For starters, we review the sparse literature regarding pre-electoral coalitions worldwide and specifically in Brazil and the work of two great political scientists: Maurice Duverger and Angelo Panebianco. Then we analyze the ten parties statutes to see how they regard the issue, since federal electoral laws are relatively permissive. The two last chapters investigate if pre-electoral coalitions in municipal elections are related to ideological and coalitional matters at the federal level or at the state level. The data show that the parties tend to organize themselves according to the governor\'s political position.
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Books on the topic "Pre-electoral coalitions"

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Bergman, Torbjörn, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Wolfgang C. Müller, eds. Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844372.001.0001.

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Coalitions among political parties govern most of Europe’s parliamentary democracies. Traditionally, the study of coalition politics has been focused on Western Europe. Coalition governance in Central Eastern Europe brings the study of the full coalition life-cycle to a region that has undergone tremendous political transformation, but which has not been studied from this perspective. The volume covers Bulgaria, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. It provides information and analyses of the cycle, from pre-electoral alliances to coalition formation and portfolio distribution, governing in coalitions, the stages that eventually lead to a government termination, and the electoral performance of coalition parties. In Central Eastern Europe, few single-party cabinets form and there have been only a few early elections. The evidence provided shows that coalition partners in the region write formal agreements (coalition agreements) to an extent that is similar to the patterns that we find in Western Europe, but also that they adhere less closely to these contracts. While the research on Western Europe tends to stress that coalition partners emphasize coalition compromise and mutual supervision, there is more evidence of ‘ministerial government’ by individual ministers and ministries. There are also a few coalition governance systems that are heavily dominated by the prime minister. No previous study has covered the full coalition life-cycle in all of the ten countries with as much detail. Systematic information is presented in 10 figures and in more than one hundred tables.
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Pre-electoral Alliances, Coalition Rejections, and Multiparty Governments: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007.

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Capussela, Andrea Lorenzo. The Formation of the Republican Institutions. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198796992.003.0006.

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This chapter reviews the evolution of Italy’s social order and institutions between the end of Fascism, in 1943, and the early 1950s. The peninsula was a battlefield for two years, during 1943–5. War and resistance shook Italy’s social order, and the post-war years saw the emergence of a democratic republic based on a progressive constitution. Reconstruction was rapid, and laid the basis for the country’s full industrialization. The ideological cleavage traced by Marxism, however, which split the anti-fascist coalition, and the political repercussions of the Cold War eased the efforts of the pre-war elites to constrain the opening up of the social order and undermine the newly adopted political institutions. An episode of collective action in the rural South nonetheless showed the potential of well-designed reforms sustained by effective organizations. The chapter concludes that during the 1950s electoral democracy consolidated, but Italy remained distant from the liberal democracy paradigm.
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Book chapters on the topic "Pre-electoral coalitions"

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Hooghe, Marc, Sofie Marien, and Thomas Gschwend. "Gathering Counter-Factual Evidence: An Experimental Study on Voters’ Responses to Pre-Electoral Coalitions." In Experimental Political Science. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137016645_11.

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"Pre-Electoral Agreements and Government Coalitions." In LOGIC OF PREELECTORAL COALITION FORMATION. Ohio State University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1cmsn16.12.

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Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Tomas Sjöström. "Pre-electoral Coalitions and Post-election Bargaining." In Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789814447577_0007.

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Guinaudeau, Isabelle, and Simon Persico. "France: Electoral Necessity and Presidential Leadership Beyond Parties." In Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868484.003.0007.

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Coalition-making in France is under-studied, due to the peculiar way coalitions are formed, maintained, and terminated. Due to the majoritarian two-round electoral system, parliamentary elections often result in a one-party parliamentary majority, which barely leaves room for post-electoral coalition bargaining. Coalition agreements are negotiated prior to elections. They mostly consist of pre-electoral deals in which the coalition’s senior party grant a few seats to its potential partner, after both parties agree on a laconic policy document. Moreover, in a semi-presidential regime where the executive enjoys increasing powers, coalition members play a small role compared to the president (or the prime minister in times of cohabitation). Cabinet formation and portfolio allocation rest in the discretionary power of the chief of the executive and no real (in)formal coordination or negotiation takes place. Over the past few decades, France has undergone major institutional and political transformations that have reinforced those dynamics, effectively increasing the weight of the president in coalition bargaining and leaving minor parties quite powerless.
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Mansfeldová, Zdenka, and Tomáš Lacina. "Czech Republic." In Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844372.003.0004.

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With only a few exceptions, Czech cabinets have been coalition cabinets. Two essential features of coalition politics in the Czech Republic are unstable majorities and ideological heterogeneity inside governing coalitions. Only very rarely have there been pre-electoral cooperation, and a threshold for alliances in the electoral system has meant a substantial obstacle for smaller parties. There has been no pre-electoral cooperation, such as pre-electoral coalitions with a mutual commitment to form a joint government after the elections. Instead, cabinet-building usually has been a long process, on average much longer than in the other new European Union (EU) member states. The largest parties have relied on cooperation with small centre-right parties. Another critical and typical feature of the Czech coalition formation process are strong presidential interventions. This has been practised by all presidents, starting with Vaclav Havel, continuing with Vaclav Klaus, and the current president Milos Zeman. Coalition agreements, mostly in a written form, have been crucial. Political parties have found it difficult to cooperate without such agreements. In general, the character and composition of the agreements have very much been policy-oriented. However, there have also existed unwritten rules and informal structures which have undermined coalition governance because they have established inequality among formally equal ministers. While originally tilted towards Prime Minister Dominance, because of presidential involvement, the governance system for intra-cabinet relations has become one that alternates between the coalition compromise model and the ministerial government model.
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Peacock, Timothy Noël. "Myths and secret plans: future minority governments/coalitions." In The British tradition of minority government. Manchester University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.7228/manchester/9781526123268.003.0008.

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This chapter reveals Labour’s, and especially the Conservatives’, embryonic secret plans for future minority or coalition governments during the 1970s, devised in response to the possible absence of an overall majority in a general election. Both main parties considered or rejected wide-ranging proposals, from pre-electoral pacts to reforms aimed at facilitating minority or coalition government. Some of the new sources explored include Callaghan’s personal reflections on post-electoral strategy following a meeting with Steel in 1978, and papers from his political advisers, setting out starting points for prospective post-electoral coalition negotiations. Discussion of declassified Opposition research papers shows even more radical possibilities under consideration, whether the prospect of the Conservatives making a coalition deal with the UUP, SNP, or even a Grand Coalition with Labour.
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Zucchini, Francesco, and Andrea Pedrazzani. "Italy: Continuous Change and Continuity in Change." In Coalition Governance in Western Europe. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868484.003.0012.

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Few democracies in the world have experienced so many transformations in the electoral and party systems as has Italy since the early 1990s. Therefore the study of the Italian case is an excellent opportunity to investigate if and how these changes impact on the government’s role in the decision-making process, on government formation and termination, and on the governance stage. Although the formal rules concerning executive–legislative relations have remained almost unaltered, since the 1990s Italian governments have increased de facto their agenda-setting power. Since 1994, the party competition dynamics and the electoral rules induced the political parties to build electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions. However, the persisting high level of internal fragmentation made Italian governments also very unstable compared to the governments in many other European democracies. The instruments of intra-coalitional conflict resolution used in Italy have been for long time quite informal and mostly based upon decision-making bodies partially external to the executive. The above cited changes at the beginning of the 1990s, by increasing the overlapping between government leadership and party leadership, made these mechanisms more internal to the government arena. Recent political and institutional developments—especially after the 2013 and 2018 general elections and the new electoral rules—leave very open and uncertain the prospects of consolidation of all these changes.
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Bergman, Torbjörn, Gabriella Ilonszki, and Wolfgang C. Müller. "The Coalition Life-cycle in Central Eastern Europe." In Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198844372.003.0013.

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This volume analyses the coalition life-cycle in ten countries in Central Eastern Europe, from pre-electoral alliances to government formation and portfolio distribution, to governing in coalitions, the events that eventually lead to a government termination, and electoral performance of coalition parties. This final chapter summarizes the main patterns of coalition politics and compares among the ten countries. In terms of the three models of coalition governance Hungary comes closest to the Dominant Prime Minister Model, Lithuania and Latvia approach the Ministerial Government Model, and Slovenia comes closest to the Coalition Compromise Model. The chapter also discusses how these findings contrast with the general patterns known from the literature on coalition politics in Western Europe. A few of the patterns of coalition politics are similar, including the relative frequency of different types of coalition governments and the increase and spread of the use of coalition governance mechanisms, such as written coalition contracts. Other features are more distinct: there have been fewer single-party governments and there is a stronger tendency to the Ministerial Government Model than in Western Europe. Over time, processes of learning and adjustment to coalition governance can be identified, however without a linear and general trend. Much of the change is rooted in party system changes, for instance the reversal of the initial growth of new political parties and the recent decline of the effective number of parties (ENP). While a less tangible result, the chapters also stress the role of personalities and animosities to impact coalition considerations.
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