Relevant bibliographies by topics / Prerogative, Royal Constitutional history

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  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters

Academic literature on the topic 'Prerogative, Royal Constitutional history'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 16 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Prerogative, Royal Constitutional history"

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Müßig, Ulrike. "Constitutional conflicts in seventeenth-century England." Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d'Histoire du Droit / The Legal History Review 76, no. 1-2 (2008): 27–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181908x277563.

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AbstractIn the constitutional conflicts of the 17th century, both Crown and Parliament justified actions contrary to the other's will by reference to necessity. The Crown held the raising of additional finance to be necessary; the Parliament, its raising of a militia. The competence to determine a time of necessity, and to decide on the public good in it, was the key to sovereignty. In a series of cases reaching a peak in Hampden, the courts handed the Crown an unrestrained Prerogative. With the Militia Ordinance, a disturbed Parliament then claimed the competence for deciding on the public good in an emergency, even against the King's will, because its judgements as opposed to the king's discretion in his Royal prerogative were based on the common law which bound even the King. The concept of Parliament as a court of common law is often under-emphasized, though this is at the heart of the Parliament's claim to sovereignty achieved in 1689, because the Monarch could veto legislative acts, but he could not veto judgements.
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Monballyu, J. "The political responsibility for Royal pardons in Belgium during the 19th century (1830–1900)." Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis / Revue d'Histoire du Droit / The Legal History Review 75, no. 2 (2007): 153–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181907781352582.

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AbstractIn Belgium, the Royal Prerogative of pardoning convicted criminals was legally embedded in the Constitution of 14th February, 1831. It allowed the King to reduce a sentence or to grant a discharge of a sentence given by a court. Any Royal decision to pardon had, however, to be countersigned by a member of the Government, who took on the political responsibility of the decision towards Parliament. In most cases, the task fell upon the Minister of Justice. During the 19th century, in both Houses of the Belgian Parliament, the Minister of Justice was repeatedly questioned about the way the prerogative of pardoning was exercised. This usually occurred when a death sentence had been commuted to a lesser sentence. In such cases, members of the Chamber of Representatives or of the Senate would ask for an explicit justification of a particular pardon. Only exceptionally would a Government Minister be challenged about the legality of a decision either granting or refusing a pardon. Because of the constitutional convention which prevents exposing directly the political position of the King, Jules d'Anethan (Minister of Justice 1843–1847) defended the Minister's right to refuse to give any reasons for a decision regarding a pardon. He only acknowledged Parliament's right to question a Minister about his general policy on pardons. In his view, it was not within Parliament's powers to ask a Minister of Justice why a pardon had been granted or refused in a specific case. That view tended to limit considerably a Minister's responsibility for Royal pardons: it became no more than an empty shell. Another Minister of Justice, Théophile De Lantsheere (1871–1878), took an opposite view. He refused to state his general policy on pardons, but he accepted to explain the specific reasons why a Royal decision granting or refusing a pardon had been made. In his view, a pardon was in the first place a matter for the Minister's conscience. Parliament was therefore entitled to assess his particular actions. However, in the line of his predecessors' and successors' view, he believed that the reasons why the King had insisted on a pardon or refused to grant a pardon should not be mentioned to Parliament. Pardon was an issue between King and Government, not between King and Parliament. As the saying goes in Belgian constitutional law: The Crown should never be laid 'bare'.
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Hulsebosch, Daniel J. "Imperia in Imperio:The Multiple Constitutions of Empire in New York, 1750–1777." Law and History Review 16, no. 2 (1998): 319–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/744104.

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At least once during his tenure, the royal governor of colonial New York received a list of questions from London. The Board of Trade, which recommended colonial policy to the king's Privy Council, sought information about the province's geography, population, trade, and legal regime. This last question often came first: “What is the constitution of the Government?” The responses, from the first British governor in 1669 to the last before the Revolution, described the imperial arrangement as a hierarchy of power flowing directly from the Crown. In 1738, for example, the lieutenant governor wrote that “The constitution is such as his Majesty by his commission to his Governour directs, whereby the Governour with the Council and assembly are empowered to pass laws not repugnant to the laws of England.” A decade later, Governor George Clinton replied more insightfully, with the help of his closest advisor, Cadwallader Colden: “The constitution of this Government is founded on His Majesty's Commission & Instructions to his Governor. But the assembly have made such Encroachments on his Majesty's Prerogative by their having the power of the purse that they in effect assume the whole executive powers into their own hands.”
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Giurato, Rocco. "The Language of Constitutionalism and the Royal Prerogative in the English Parliament of 1593: James Morice's Speech on the Ex Officio Proceedings and his Constitutional Thought." Parliamentary History 37, no. 3 (October 2018): 327–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1750-0206.12401.

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Cust, Richard. "Charles I, the Privy Council, and the Forced Loan." Journal of British Studies 24, no. 2 (April 1985): 208–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/385832.

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The Forced Loan of 1626–27 has traditionally been regarded as one of the milestones of early seventeenth-century politics. The great nineteenth-century Whig historian S. R. Gardiner saw it as the product of “new counsels” by which Charles I came increasingly to rely on the royal prerogative, and he depicted the opposition to this as a principled defense of Englishmen's liberties. Others writing in the same tradition have generally echoed these views. Thus the loan has been presented as the climax to a first stage of struggle between “Court” and “Country” or as a staging post on the “high road to Civil War.” Latterly, however, this verdict has come into question.With the work of “localist” and “revisionist” historians we have come to appreciate more clearly the extent of attachment to the local community and the continual striving toward consensus in relations between king and subject. This has led to a general revaluation of what have traditionally been regarded as clashes of principle. Local historians have stressed that opposition to taxes generally owed far more to backsliding and provincial inertia than to any concern for constitutional propriety. And a greater understanding of the problems of administration—particularly in wartime—has led to a recognition that government decision making was often a reflex action, prompted by the immediate need to make ends meet. These insights have been incorporated into the work of Conrad Russell, who has provided the most recent assessment of the loan.
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Cox, Noel. "THE GRADUAL CURTAILMENT OF THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE." Denning Law Journal 24, no. 1 (November 27, 2012): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5750/dlj.v24i1.389.

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In the United Kingdom and those countries that recognise Elizabeth II as their Queen,1 there are to be found certain fundamental constitutional principles. One of these is that much of the legal basis of executive power derives from the Crown,2 though this has, in the past, often been downplayed for political and other reasons. Indeed, in the Commonwealth as a whole, political independence has often been equated with the reduction of the role of the Crown to a position of subservience to the political executive.3 What remains important is the position of the Crown as an organising principle of government (the framework upon which the structure of government is built4), as a source of legitimacy, and as a symbol for permanent government. Executive power, therefore, remains based on the royal prerogative, and the „third source‟ of authority (the legal powers of the legal natural person, as the Crown is a corporation aggregate), as well as upon statute law.
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Eleftheriadis, Pavlos. "Two Doctrines of the Unwritten Constitution." European Constitutional Law Review 13, no. 3 (September 2017): 525–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1574019617000190.

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United Kingdom Supreme Court – Brexit – European Communities Act 1972 – British unwritten Constitution – Theories of the unwritten Constitution – Royal prerogative – Constitutional instruments – Higher law – Process of withdrawal from the European Union – Rule of recognition – H.L.A. Hart – A.V. Dicey – John Finnis – ‘Rule of recognition’ – Theory of sovereignty – Common law Constitution – John Laws
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Lowe, William C. "George III, peerage creations and politics, 1760–1784." Historical Journal 35, no. 3 (September 1992): 587–609. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x0002598x.

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AbstractThis article looks at the political role of the royal prerogative to create and promote British peers in the period 1760–1784. It argues that during the first two decades of his reign George III maintained his original intention that peerage creations should befew in number and isolated from short-term political influences, but that during the prolonged political crisis that unfolded at the end of the American War of Independence, the king's power to create peers became deeply embroiled in politics. Not only were all eight of the peerages created in 1782–1783 influenced by political considerations, this aspect of the royal prerogative became itself the topic of parliamentary discussion. It was in this context of recent creations and heightened interest in the royal prerogative that George III's refusal to make peers proved to be an effective tactic in his struggle with the Fox-North coalition. Especially damaging was the coalition's inability to secure Lord North's promotion to the upper house. Once the coalition had been dismissed, George HI used his prerogative in an overtly political fashion to strengthen the younger Pitt in both houses of parliament.
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Carafano, James Jay. "William III and the Negative Voice." Albion 19, no. 4 (1987): 509–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4049472.

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A fresh interpretation of King William III's employment of the royal veto provides new insights into the political and constitutional issues of his reign. The veto, or the crown's negative voice as it was called by contemporaries, is a particularly fruitful subject for study in charting the course of politics in seventeenth century England. The employment of the veto offers an accurate barometer for measuring political and constitutional change. It addresses the key issue of sovereignty—who makes law? King or Parliament? It is surprising, therefore, that historians have neglected to examine the implications of William's employment of the veto. As a result, their conclusions about the veto are not supported by a full analysis of the available evidence. What they have overlooked is that a close examination of the bills the king rejected, and of contemporary views of the royal prerogative, demonstrates that underneath the turmoil of Williamite politics lay a stable foundation built on the settlement achieved at the Revolution of 1688/9.During his brief rule William III rejected a significant number of bills. Between 1692 and 1696 he vetoed five public bills: the Judges, Royal Mines, Triennial, Place, and MP Qualifications Bills. Previous Tudor and Stuart monarchs, with the exception of Queen Elizabeth I, only infrequently invoked the crown's right to refuse legislation. Queen Anne, who followed William to the throne, vetoed only one bill. She was the last monarch to employ this prerogative, although it remains theoretically a legitimate royal power.
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Freedman, Eric M., and Christopher N. May. "Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative." American Journal of Legal History 44, no. 2 (April 2000): 226. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/846124.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Prerogative, Royal Constitutional history"

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Kelly, Margaret Rose Louise Leckie. "King and Crown an examination of the legal foundation of the British king /." Phd thesis, Australia : Macquarie University, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/71499.

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"27 October 1998"
Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University, School of Law, 1999.
Bibliography: p. 509-550.
Thesis -- Appendices.
'The Crown' has been described as a 'term of art' in constitutional law. This is more than misleading, obscuring the pivotal legal position of the king, which in modern times has been conveniently ignored by lawyers and politicians alike. -- This work examines the legal processes by which a king is made, tracing those processes from the earliest times to the present day. It concludes that the king is made by the selection and recognition by the people, his taking of the Oath of Governance, and his subsequent anointing. (The religious aspects of the making of the king, though of considerable legal significance, are not examined herein, because of space constraints.) -- The Oath of Governance is conventionally called the 'Coronation Oath'-which terminology, while correctly categorising the Oath by reference to the occasion on which it is usually taken, has led by subliminal implication to an erroneous conclusion by many modern commentators that the Oath is merely ceremonial. -- This work highlights the legal implications of the king's Oath of Governance throughout history, particularly in times of political unrest, and concludes that the Oath legally :- conveys power from the people to the person about to become king (the willingness of the people so to confer the power having been evidenced in their collective recognition of that person); - bestows all the prerogatives of the office of king upon that person; - enshrines the manner in which those prerogatives are to be exercised by the king in his people(s)' governance; and that therefore the Oath of Governance is the foundation of the British Constitution. -- All power and prerogative lie with the king, who as a result of his Oath of Governance is sworn to maintain the peace and protection of his people(s), and the king can not, in conscience or law, either do, or allow, anything that is in opposition to the terms of that Oath.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
xxvii, 818 p
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Joseph, Rosara. "The war prerogative : history, reform and constitutional design." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9b7c6ac7-6c0e-4a84-ac01-bd11732d0ef8.

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This thesis studies the evolution of the war prerogative in England from 1600-2010. It traces the historical theory and practice of the war prerogative and proposes reform of the constitutional arrangements for its exercise. It addresses three key questions. First, what have writers on political and constitutional theory said about the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, and, in particular, what justifications have been advanced for those arrangements? Secondly, in practice, has the executive in fact possessed sole and exclusive powers over war and the deployment of force, or have Parliament and the courts had a role to play in their exercise and scrutiny? Thirdly, are there better ways to organise our constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, to enable a more substantive role for Parliament (particularly the House of Commons) in its exercise and scrutiny? On the first question, I show that orthodox theoretical and political discourses have continuously asserted the executive’s exclusive power over war, but the justifications advanced for that arrangement have changed over time. Those changes reflect the varying influence of different political theories at different times. On the second question, I find that, contrary to orthodox theoretical and political discourses, Parliament has played an active and substantive role in the exercise and scrutiny of the war prerogative. The courts have refused to intervene in the exercise of the war prerogative, but have been more ready to intervene in cases involving the exercise of powers incidental to the war prerogative. On the third question, I argue that reform of the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative is necessary and desirable. I recommend the use of ‘institutional mechanisms’, which are small-scale rules and institutional arrangements, within existing institutions, which aim to promote certain normative goals. In particular, I propose a statute which would impose conditions on the executive’s exercise of its war prerogative. I argue that these proposals show that, through careful institutional design, democratic values, national security and operational efficiency can each be reconciled and promoted.
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KISER, EDGAR VANCE. "KINGS AND CLASSES: CROWN AUTONOMY, STATE POLICIES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPEAN ABSOLUTISMS (ENGLAND, FRANCE, SWEDEN, SPAIN)." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184073.

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This dissertation explores the role of Absolutist states in the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe. Three general questions are addressed: (1) what are the determinants of variations in the autonomy of rulers? (2) what are the consequences of variations in autonomy for states policies? and (3) what are the effects of various state policies on economic development? A new theoretical framework, based on a synthesis of the neoclassical economic literature on principal-agent relations and current organizational theory in sociology, is developed to answer these three questions. Case studies of Absolutism in England, France, Sweden, and Spain are used to illustrate the explanatory power of the theory.
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Dyson, Jessica. "Staging legal authority : ideas of law in Caroline drama." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/366.

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This thesis seeks to place drama of the Caroline commercial theatre in its contemporary political and legal context; particularly, it addresses the ways in which the struggle for supremacy between the royal prerogative, common law and local custom is constructed and negotiated in plays of the period. It argues that as the reign of Charles I progresses, the divine right and absolute power of the monarchy on stage begins to lose its authority, as playwrights, particularly Massinger and Brome, present a decline from divinity into the presentation of an arbitrary man who seeks to impose and increase his authority by enforcing obedience to selfish and wilful actions and demands. This decline from divinity, I argue, allows for the rise of a competing legitimate legal authority in the form of common law. Engaging with the contemporary discourse of custom, reason and law which pervades legal tracts of the period such as Coke’s Institutes and Reports and Davies’ ‘Preface Dedicatory’ to Le Primer Report des Cases & Matters en Ley resolues & adiudges en les Courts del Roy en Ireland, drama by Brome, Jonson, Massinger and Shirley presents arbitrary absolutism as madness, and adherence to customary common law as reason which restores order. In this climate, the drama suggests, royal manipulation of the law for personal ends, of which Charles I was often accused, destabilises law and legal authority. This destabilisation of legal authority is examined in a broader context in plays set in areas outwith London, geographically distant from central authority. The thesis places these plays in the context of Charles I’s attempts to centralise local law enforcement through such publications as the Book of Orders. When maintaining order in the provinces came into conflict with central legislation, the local officials exercised what Keith Wrightson describes as ‘two concepts of order’, turning a blind eye to certain activities when strict enforcement of law would create rather than dissolve local tensions. In both attempting to insist on unity between the centre and the provinces through tighter control of local officials, and dividing the centre from the provinces in the dissolution of Parliament, Charles’s government was, the plays suggest, in danger not only of destabilising and decentralising legal authority but of fragmenting it. This thesis argues that drama provides a medium whereby the politico-legal debates of the period may be presented to, and debated by, a wider audience than the more technical contemporary legal arguments, and, during Charles I’s personal rule, the theatre became a public forum for debate when Parliament was unavailable.
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Glansdorff, Sophie. "Potentes saeculi: pouvoir séculier et royauté sous le règne de Louis le Germanique (826-876)." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210872.

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L’objet de cette thèse est d’étudier les relations entre Louis le Germanique et les aristocrates laïques, aussi bien ceux qui appartenaient à son propre royaume (de Bavière puis de Francie orientale), que ceux qui appartenaient aux autres royaumes issus du traité de Verdun (843). L’intérêt de cette recherche, qui s’inscrit dans le cadre d’un très récent renouveau d’intérêt pour le règne de Louis, est d’apporter un nouvel éclairage sur l’évolution politique de l’Empire carolingien central à tardif, en étudiant sa facette « orientale », souvent négligée par rapport à sa contrepartie « occidentale ».

Dans un contexte caractérisé par les rivalités et les conflits, il est évidemment vital pour le roi de s’assurer l’appui des grands et de les intégrer à son entourage. La première partie de ce travail a donc été consacrée à l’entourage du roi et à son évolution. Cet entourage a plus précisément été défini sur base du De Ordine Palatii d’Hincmar de Reims :il inclut d’abord les membres du Palais au sens étroit du terme (famille et détenteurs d’offices palatins – laïques en l’occurence -) ;ensuite l’ensemble des « grands » laïques du royaume, qui, sans détenir d’office au Palais, entretiennent une relation privilégiée avec le roi, soit qu’ils détiennent de lui un honor (les comtes), soit qu’ils appartiennent à ses vassaux ou à ses fideles. Au sein de cet ensemble de personnes, tous ne bénéficient cependant pas de la même « Königsnähe » ;par conséquent, en tenant compte de la nature des sources issues de Francie orientale (essentiellement les actes privés des abbayes et évêchés du royaume), il s’est avéré nécessaire de nuancer ce tableau en recherchant les personnalités qui font réellement preuve de la plus grande proximité avec le roi, sans être nécessairement pour autant les mieux documentés au niveau des sources.

De tous les membres (laïques) de cet entourage, les comtes sont apparus comme les plus importants, en raison de leur fonction même ;pour cette raison (et afin de rendre la consultation plus aisée et plus pratique pour qui s’intéresse aux comtes), une prosopographie a été constituée, incluant les comtes actifs en Bavière (826-887), Alémannie, Francie, Saxe, Thuringe (833-887) et Lotharingie orientale (870-887).

Si cette approche, essentiellement prosopographique, est intéressante en soi, elle ne permet néanmoins pas, en tant que telle, d’apprécier la teneur des relations entre roi et grands, ni de replacer celle-ci dans le cadre plus global de l’Empire carolingien. Pour ce faire, il est nécessaire d’y ajouter l’étude de certains éléments significatifs, qui permettent de dégager plus aisément continuités, ruptures et spécificités. A l’étude de l’évolution du fisc (et des spécificités des donations royales), s’est jointe celle des éléments représentatifs du pouvoir des aristocrates :possession de monastères privés, disposition de fortifications, transmission des offices comtaux. L’articulation de ces éléments avec le pouvoir royal révèle des spécificités très intéressantes, notamment au niveau du contrôle du roi sur les donations et honores accordés aux grands, le maintien de la révocabilité de ceux-ci étant visiblement souhaité ;s’il n’est pas toujours possible d’évaluer le rôle de la volonté royale dans cette évolution, il n’en va pas de même quand on étudie les divers actes d’infidélité, réels ou supposés, portés contre le roi. Les réactions royales, en la matière, semblent bien le signe d’une politique distincte et cohérente.

En conclusion, cette analyse se joint à l’approche prosopographique pour présenter une manière spécifique de concevoir, et d’aborder sur le plan pratique, les relations entre roi et grands. Sous certains aspects, ce règne se distingue nettement de celui de ses contemporains, et éclaire donc une autre facette de l’évolution de l’Empire carolingien postérieure au traité de Verdun, globalement (et provisoirement) plus maîtrisée qu’ailleurs ;celle-ci ne peut être ignorée et doit contribuer à nuancer l’image de l’évolution du pouvoir royal au IXème s.


Doctorat en philosophie et lettres, Orientation histoire
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

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Tyler, John. "A Pragmatic Standard of Legal Validity." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2012-05-10885.

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American jurisprudence currently applies two incompatible validity standards to determine which laws are enforceable. The natural law tradition evaluates validity by an uncertain standard of divine law, and its methodology relies on contradictory views of human reason. Legal positivism, on the other hand, relies on a methodology that commits the analytic fallacy, separates law from its application, and produces an incomplete model of law. These incompatible standards have created a schism in American jurisprudence that impairs the delivery of justice. This dissertation therefore formulates a new standard for legal validity. This new standard rejects the uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent in natural law theory. It also rejects the narrow linguistic methodology of legal positivism. In their stead, this dissertation adopts a pragmatic methodology that develops a standard for legal validity based on actual legal experience. This approach focuses on the operations of law and its effects upon ongoing human activities, and it evaluates legal principles by applying the experimental method to the social consequences they produce. Because legal history provides a long record of past experimentation with legal principles, legal history is an essential feature of this method. This new validity standard contains three principles. The principle of reason requires legal systems to respect every subject as a rational creature with a free will. The principle of reason also requires procedural due process to protect against the punishment of the innocent and the tyranny of the majority. Legal systems that respect their subjects' status as rational creatures with free wills permit their subjects to orient their own behavior. The principle of reason therefore requires substantive due process to ensure that laws provide dependable guideposts to individuals in orienting their behavior. The principle of consent recognizes that the legitimacy of law derives from the consent of those subject to its power. Common law custom, the doctrine of stare decisis, and legislation sanctioned by the subjects' legitimate representatives all evidence consent. The principle of autonomy establishes the authority of law. Laws must wield supremacy over political rulers, and political rulers must be subject to the same laws as other citizens. Political rulers may not arbitrarily alter the law to accord to their will. Legal history demonstrates that, in the absence of a validity standard based on these principles, legal systems will not treat their subjects as ends in themselves. They will inevitably treat their subjects as mere means to other ends. Once laws do this, men have no rest from evil.
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Books on the topic "Prerogative, Royal Constitutional history"

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La sanción real en la Constitución de Cádiz. Cádiz: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Cádiz, 2010.

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La couronne de feu: Introduction à la lecture symbolique de l'histoire de France. Paris: Dervy-Livres, 1987.

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Deacon, Russell. "God Bless the Prince of Wales": Wales' royal prerogative : do we still need a Prince of Wales? = "Duw a gadwo Dywysog Cymru" : brenhinfraint Cymru : a oes arnom angen Tywysog Cymru o hyd? Caerdydd: Y Ganolfan er Diwygio yng Nghymru, 2000.

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Presidential defiance of "unconstitutional" laws: Reviving the royal prerogative. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1998.

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Sunkin, Maurice. The nature of the crown: A legal and political analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

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Jensen, Birgit Bjerre. Udnævnelsesretten i enevældens magtpolitiske system 1660-1730. [Copenhagen]: Rigsarkivet, 1987.

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Journées, d'histoire et histoire du droit et des institutions de l'université de Perpignan (1st 2004 Perpignan France). Pouvoirs municipaux et pouvoir royal en Roussillon et en Languedoc, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles. [Perpignan]: Presses universitaires de Perpignan, 2006.

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Journées d'histoire et histoire du droit et des institutions de l'université de Perpignan (1st 2004 Perpignan, France). Pouvoirs municipaux et pouvoir royal en Roussillon et en Languedoc, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles. [Perpignan]: Presses universitaires de Perpignan, 2006.

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Silla wangkwŏn sŏngjangsa yŏnʾgu. Sŏul-si: Hagyŏn Munhwasa, 2003.

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Hwang, Sŏn-yŏng. Koryŏ chʻogi wangkwŏn yŏnʾgu. Pusan-si: Tonga Taehakkyo Chʻulpʻanbu, 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Prerogative, Royal Constitutional history"

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Barnett, Hilaire. "The Royal Prerogative." In Constitutional & Administrative Law, 97–120. Twelfth edition. | Abingdon, Oxon [UK] ; New York : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315458373-7.

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Barnett, Hilaire. "The Royal Prerogative." In Constitutional & Administrative Law, 97–120. 13th edition. | Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429322686-5.

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Cox, Noel. "Curtailment of the prerogative." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 202–14. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-10.

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Cox, Noel. "Classification of the prerogative." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 83–102. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-4.

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Cox, Noel. "The prerogative and statute." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 166–78. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-7.

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Cox, Noel. "The prerogative and convention." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 179–201. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-8.

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Cox, Noel. "The origins of the prerogative." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 20–38. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-1.

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Cox, Noel. "The nature of the prerogative." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 39–54. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-2.

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Cox, Noel. "The scope of the prerogative." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 55–82. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-3.

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Cox, Noel. "Judicial review of the prerogative." In The Royal Prerogative and Constitutional Law, 134–65. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in legal history: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003048718-6.

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