Academic literature on the topic 'President (1991- : Yeltsin)'
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Journal articles on the topic "President (1991- : Yeltsin)"
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Ross, Wiktor. "Instytucja prezydenta w systemie politycznym Federacji Rosyjskiej." Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego. Studia i Prace, no. 1 (November 1, 2011): 63–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kkessip.2011.1.3.
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This article presents the course that passed the political system of USSR going from the old soviet structure to the modern form of the state. Total economic and political crisis forced the last General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbatchev to seek the new political institutions and were helpful in the process of maintaining socialist character of the state and social relations and, simultaneously, to carry out the changes of the political system which became necessary. These efforts were a failure because of strong resistance, on the one hand, communist nomenklatura and the other hand, the new democratic movement in the Russian Federation conducted by Boris Yeltsin and independent movements in Soviet Republics. After the trial to stop the process of reforming of the state undertaken by communist leaders of USSR during coupé d'etat in August 1991 the initiative passed to the democratic forces in Russia. The fall of the USSR and foundation of the CIS as the platform of the reintegration of Post-Soviet area started the new stage of the political conflict in the Russian Federation. The objective needs occurred in the process of reforming of the economic structures, growing of the protest attitudes, necessity to relief the mood of the local authorities in order to attain their support for the course of modernization, pushed President Yeltsin to concentrate enormous power. The old Soviet Constitution was more comfortable for such political conditions than modern solutions based on the power's division in three branches - Parliament, Government and independent jurisdiction. Contradictions of the Post-Soviet period brought to the deep conflict between President Yeltsin and Supreme Soviet in October 1993. The defeat of the conservative forces in this confrontation meant the end of Soviet system in Russia, however political system that was created on such ground had authoritarian features, which was used all Yeltsin's presidential decade bringing, as a result, the system very far to the principles of the democracy.
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Rivera, David W., and Sharon Werning Rivera. "Yeltsin, Putin, and Clinton: Presidential Leadership and Russian Democratization in Comparative Perspective." Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 3 (August 19, 2009): 591–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592709990880.
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Immediately after coming to power, the Clinton administration declared the consolidation of market and democratic institutions in Russia to be a vital American interest. The administration's central tactic for promoting this outcome was to help Boris Yeltsin remain in power. In a major assault on Clinton's historical legacy, much of the scholarly community maintains that U.S. policy was fundamentally flawed, both morally and strategically. In the view of these analysts, post-Soviet Russia's founding president was an autocratic leader who derailed the country's progress toward democracy. However, this body of research focuses exclusively on the Russian Federation and fails to utilize comparative referents. In contrast, we analyze the experiences of the full population of post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia from 1991 to the present. Whether examined in cross-national or longitudinal perspective, we find that Russian democracy under Yeltsin was, relatively speaking, a success. We conclude that the Clinton administration's policy of support for Yeltsin both served various American foreign policy interests and strengthened the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia, thereby fulfilling the dictates of both real- and idealpolitik. In addition, the relative success of Russia's democratization in the 1990s, the reversal of that pattern in this decade, and the magnitude of the transformation of the polity under Putin all demonstrate the pivotal role played by presidential leadership in Russia's transition.
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Treisman, Daniel. "The Politics of Intergovernmental Transfers in Post-Soviet Russia." British Journal of Political Science 26, no. 3 (July 1996): 299–335. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400007481.
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In Russia's lingering constitutional crisis, struggles over fiscal politics have taken on a broader institutional significance – at times even threatening to undermine the federal state. This article studies the evolving fiscal relationship between Moscow and the regional governments in the early post-Soviet period. To explain why some regions currently receive large net transfers (subsidies, grants, other benefits) from the centre while others pay large net taxes, net central transfers per capita have been regressed on a range of predictors reflecting social ‘need’, preferences of central politicians (electoral interests, pork barrel allocation, policy objectives) and lobbying capacity of regional governments. The most significant turn out to be three bargaining power variables that signal regional discontent and credible resolve to threaten economic and constitutional order – a low vote for President Yeltsin in the 1991 election, an early declaration of sovereignty and the incidence of strikes in the previous year.
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Weigle, Marcia A. "Political Liberalism in Postcommunist Russia." Review of Politics 58, no. 3 (1996): 469–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500020155.
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This article examines the discussion among Russian scholars and activists concerning the principles of political liberalism in Soviet Russia during the Gorbachev era (1985–1991) and in independent Russia during the Yeltsin presidency (1991-present). After a review of the emergence of liberalism during the Gorbachev years, the analysis focuses on three models of political liberalism which have emerged in the context of Russian postcommunist state construction. Each competing model of liberalism—statist, rule of law, and social—offers a different vision of the principles of political liberalism and the strategies necessary to institutionalize liberalism as the foundation of the postcommunist polity.
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BLONDEL, J. "‘Presidentialism’ in the Ex-Soviet Union." Japanese Journal of Political Science 13, no. 1 (January 27, 2012): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109911000223.
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AbstractWhen the Soviet Union fell in 1990, three of its 15 components, the Baltic States, joined the European Union, and a fourth, Moldova, may well join in the future. The other 11 quickly became presidential republics, following the lead given by Boris Yeltsin, the president of the largest among them, Russia. By 1994, all 11 were headed by a president elected by universal suffrage. These ex-Soviet countries contribute significantly to the number of presidential republics in the world. Presidential republics form a clear majority, being predominant in Latin America and Africa, alongside the ex-Soviet Union. They are rare in Europe, the main cases being France, Romania, and, though seemingly temporarily, some Balkan states; in Asia, outside the ex-Soviet Union, they are a small minority.Like many presidential republics elsewhere, those in the ex-Soviet Union are mostly authoritarian, but with variations: this is primarily so in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan and Belarus. These presidencies have been very stable, with some of their leaders, especially in Central Asia, being repeatedly re-elected, often without opposition. There has been a regular turnover in Armenia (but less so in Georgia) and in Ukraine (but not in Belarus). The Russian case is peculiar, as is well known: Putin became prime minister because he could no longer be constitutionally re-elected as president, at least without a break. The power of these presidents has varied over time: outside Central Asia (except Kyrgyzstan) and Azerbaijan, where they have been uniformly strong, their strength has declined in Georgia, increased in Russia and Belarus, and had ups and downs in Armenia and Ukraine.
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Leisse, Olaf, and Utta-Kristin Leisse. "A Siberian Challenge: Dealing with Multiethnicity in the Republic of Buryatia." Nationalities Papers 35, no. 4 (September 2007): 773–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990701475178.
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The Republic of Buryatia, along with 12 other former Soviet states during the same year, had declared its sovereignty no later than 8 October 1990. This did not actually mean a declaration of independence. Rather, this step was taken to urge the central government to acknowledge Buryatia as a free and equal partner at the political level. Boris Yeltsin, during his time as Russian president, did much to support this claim by propagating a vision of a post-Soviet Russia as a union of free peoples with equal rights. The central government in Moscow therefore recognized the existence of relatively autonomous regions. This was also done to respond to the interests of the different ethnic groups, which became increasingly important in the political sphere.
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Mucaj, Vjollca, and Pranvera Dibra. "From the Soviet Union to Russia, the Fall and the Rise of an Empire." European Journal of Social Sciences 2, no. 2 (May 30, 2019): 31. http://dx.doi.org/10.26417/ejss-2019.v2i2-62.
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The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War incited the beginning of a new World order of international relations and the creation of new actor roles in this new stage. In the last 25 years Russia’s role as a great power had a different context, from an empire in free fall to the revitalization of its international role. The main question this work asks is: Which is Russia’s position in the international arena after the disintegration of the Soviet Union? The answer to this question is given by researching under the prism of the creation of a new vision, around what Russia represents in two and a half decades and how its role is represented in a different context of international relations. It will be also researched on the perspective of Europe as an instrument to balance and obstruct the Russian expansion. The work will be based on the analysis of the archival information of the period of time. The methods of historical, logical and comparative analysis have been used, together with various literatures from different researchers and politician. This study aims to explain the forms and weaknesses of the regime and the causes which brought to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in other words the causes of the fall of the communist bloc: Yeltsin’s presidency (1991-1999); Russia’s new context in the international arena and the role of the new actors will be explained: Putin’s presidency (1999-2008); and the explanation of the revival of Russia’s international role as a great power (2009-2014). This work also highlights the foreign policy, the alterations and the contradictory character of the leadership, the change of presidency between Putin and Medvedev and the problems with Ukraine and Crimea. With the fall of the communism, which incited the divide of the balances from the bipolarity of the Cold War, the changing economic world, in the midst of other alterations, presented a new equilibrium of power. As a descendent of the communist empire, Russia is fully convinced that it has the right of rebuilding of the empire through expansion. It also knows that the main part is not the will, but the ability. If it can, Russia will rebuild the destroyed empire through a constant expansionist policy. And if they can, the USA and the west will hinder the building of this empire.
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Baker, Norma Jo. "Trade Unions in the Comfort Zone: Liberal Authority in Yeltsin’s Russia." Socialist Studies/Études Socialistes 4, no. 2 (January 2, 2009). http://dx.doi.org/10.18740/s45p56.
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While much has been written on the failure of the Yeltsin presidency and the transformation of Russian society since 1991, little work has been done that illustrates the participation of established liberal democracies in supporting Yeltsin’s authoritarian, politically unresponsive ‘superpresidentialism,’ or linking this support to the authoritarian nature of the modern liberal democratic project itself. By examining Russian trade union culture and history, as well as international trade union representative involvement, this paper argues that the persistent neglect of unions in the 1990s to challenge social relations of production can be understood as paradigmatic of an authoritarian dynamic focused on the political elite rather than on their membership. With international support, the regime’s concern was with the dismantling of Soviet economic relations and social institutions. Working from the culture and history of Russian trade unions, the unions’ efforts to retain a place in the new era through a strategy of ‘social partnership,’ combined with the collapse of the social welfare system, reinforced a top-down inertia characteristic of the unions. The result, predictably, was an era marked by a politics of irresponsibility, a political ethic is not indicative of an inherent Russian authoritarianism, but that of the authoritarian nature of the liberal modernity itself.
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Shinar, Haim. "The Oligarchs and Democratization in Russia During Yeltsin's Presidency (1991-1999)." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375784.
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Shinar, Haim. "The Oligarchs and Democratization in Russia During Yeltsin's Presidency (1991-2000)." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1850043.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "President (1991- : Yeltsin)"
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Glad, Lotte Marie. "A Comparative Content Analysis of ITAR-TASS's and the United Press International's Coverage of the Russian Referendum in April 1993." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1994. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc500855/.
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A comparative content analysis was conducted to determine whether the Russian (ITAR-TASS) and the American (UPI) wire service coverage of President Boris Yeltsin in the April 25, 1993, referendum was balanced and unbiased. Also, the amount of space dedicated to this topic was measured. Study results indicate that ITAR-TASS was more critical of Yeltsin prior to the referendum than UPI, and that there was no statistically important difference between the two wire services in their post referendum coverage. UPI articles were almost 30% longer than the ITAR-TASS articles. Each UPI article was on an average more than 220 words longer than were the ITAR-TASS articles.
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Lavrova, Victoria N. "The role of the oligarchs in 1996 presidental election in Russia." Virtual Press, 2003. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1265093.
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This thesis explored the role of the six wealthy Russian businessmen, the oligarchs, in 1996 reelection of President Boris Yeltsin. This research was qualitative and descriptive. The goal was to collect the information from various sources and summarize it, demonstrating how the interference of the oligarchs reflected on the process of the election, as well as on the careers of their own.The research concluded that the oligarchs' role was, first of all, in the organization and financing a highly effective election campaign team; consolidating the business elite and big capital around Yeltsin, using the media that they controlled as a tool of pro-Yeltsin propaganda; and influencing some key decision taken by Yeltsin. The result was Yeltsin's victory, and the increase of the oligarchs' wealth and political power.This ability of the oligarchs to manipulate politics completely cemented the interrelation between business and politics in Russia, which contributed to Russia's reputation as a country of corruption and lawlessness.Department of Political Science
Books on the topic "President (1991- : Yeltsin)"
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Fedroy, Valentin P., and Valentin Petrovich Fedorov. Yeltsin: A Political Portrait. Imperial Pub Co, 1997.
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Boris Yeltsin And Russia's Democratic Transformation (Jackson School Publications in International Studies). University of Washington Press, 2006.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "President (1991- : Yeltsin)"
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"The Yeltsin Presidency, 1991–1993." In Russian Politics and Presidential Power: Transformational Leadership from Gorbachev to Putin, 55–86. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320: CQ Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781506354354.n3.
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Rutland, Peter, and Gregory Dubinsky. "14. US foreign policy in Russia." In US Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780199585816.003.0014.
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This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy in Russia. The end of the Cold War lifted the threat of nuclear annihilation and transformed the international security landscape. The United States interpreted the collapse of the Soviet Union as evidence that it had ‘won’ the Cold War, and that its values and interests would prevail in the future world order. The chapter first provides an overview of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 before discussing U.S.–Russian relations under Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, respectively. It then turns to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its enlargement, the Kosovo crisis, and the ‘Great Game’ in Eurasia. It also analyses the rise of Vladimir Putin as president of Russia and the deterioration of U.S.–Russian relations and concludes with an assessment of the cautious partnership between the two countries.
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Miller, Craig A. "Houston: 1990–2008." In A Time for All Things, 553–90. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/med/9780190073947.003.0011.
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The era of 1990–2008 sees the establishment of the MicroMed organization to further collaboration with NASA on a left ventricular assist device (LVAD). The High School for Health Sciences in Houston is named for DeBakey. DeBakey is consulted in the heart surgery case of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Baylor and Methodist Hospital celebrate DeBakey’s 50th anniversary in Houston, but then split. Hurricane Katrina disrupts Tulane Medical School, and DeBakey is instrumental in a temporary transfer of personnel and students to Baylor. DeBakey suffers aortic dissection at age 97, but survives the operation—a procedure which he had helped to develop. He continues in his role as medical statesman. DeBakey receives the Congressional Gold Medal, and there is rapprochement between DeBakey and Cooley. Dr. DeBakey dies in 2008, mourned across the globe and recognized as one of the all-time greatest physician-scientists in history.