Academic literature on the topic 'President Anwar Sadat'
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Journal articles on the topic "President Anwar Sadat"
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Berenji, Shahin. "Sadat and the Road to Jerusalem: Bold Gestures and Risk Acceptance in the Search for Peace." International Security 45, no. 1 (2020): 127–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00381.
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On November 19, 1977, the world watched in disbelief as Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat visited Jerusalem. In one dramatic stroke, Sadat met with Israel's leaders, promised “no more war,” and offered Israel de facto recognition. Recently declassified archival sources provide new insight into why Sadat suddenly made all these concessions and why he chose to initiate conciliation through such a bold move. The historical evidence supports a prospect-theoretic explanation of Sadat's risk acceptance. Sadat never accepted Egypt's loss of the Sinai Peninsula but, unable to recover it either militarily or diplomatically (through U.S. mediation), he became willing to accept greater risks to recoup Egypt's territorial losses. As Sadat grew frustrated with the efforts of Jimmy Carter's administration to reconvene the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, he sought to accelerate the peace process by abandoning multilateral diplomacy in favor of direct negotiations with Israel. He understood, however, that bilateral talks would fail given Israel's deep suspicion and mistrust of its Arab neighbors. By empathetically responding to its fears and security concerns, Sadat reasoned that he could reassure Israel of Egypt's benign intentions and remove, as he often said, the “psychological barriers” of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such an approach might help Israel feel secure enough so that its leaders would trade land for peace.
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Al-Butani, Abdul Fattah, sherzad muhammed, and khalat youssef. "Groups and Organization of Political Islam during the president Mohammad Anwar Al- Sadat 28 September 1970- 6 October 1981." Humanities Journal of University of Zakho 8, no. 1 (2020): 80–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.26436/hjuoz.2020.8.1.579.
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Cohen-Almagor, Raphael. "Lessons from the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Talks." Israel Studies Review 34, no. 2 (2019): 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/isr.2019.340202.
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This article is based on an interview conducted in July 2018 with Aharon Barak. In it, Barak reflects on the peace negotiations with Egypt at Camp David during 13 days in September 1978. While expressing great appreciation for the American negotiating team, first and foremost for President Jimmy Carter, for bringing the talks to a successful close, Barak considers negotiating with Carter as the toughest experience of his life. According to Barak, who had just completed his role as legal advisor to the government (1975–1978) and was appointed to the Supreme Court, the key people in the Israeli delegation were Menachem Begin, Moshe Dayan, and Ezer Weizman, while the key players in the Egyptian delegation were Anwar Sadat and Osama El-Baz. The negotiations went through ups and downs and had reached the brink of collapse until the Americans proposed that Carter negotiate directly with El-Baz and Barak. In the article’s conclusion, some important insights are deduced from this interview for future, successful negotiations.
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Blum, Yehuda Z. "From Camp David to Oslo." Israel Law Review 28, no. 2-3 (1994): 211–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700011638.
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On 13 September 1993 Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter “PLO”) signed on the lawn of the White House in Washington, in the presence of United States President William J. Clinton, a “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” (hereinafter “the DOP”), the text of which had been initialled the previous month in the Norwegian capital Oslo, following several months of secret negotiations. This occurred almost exactly fifteen years after the signing at the White House, on 17 September 1979, by the President of Egypt, Muhammad Anwar Al-Sadat, and the Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, of the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” that had been negotiated and agreed at Camp David, Maryland (hereinafter “the Framework”).Both the Framework and the DOP aim at resolving one of the most complex conflicts of our time, namely, the dispute that first developed between the Arab and Jewish communities in Mandatory Palestine and which widened, with the establishment of Israel in 1948, into a conflict between Israel and the entire Arab world. While both agreements provide for interim arrangements (and the DOP even stresses this aspect in its title), pending the negotiations for a definitive solution, and while both even use similar terms, the basic concepts underlying each of these agreements widely diverge.
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Yahel, Ido. "Covert Diplomacy Between Israel and Egypt During Nasser Rule." SAGE Open 6, no. 4 (2016): 215824401666744. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2158244016667449.
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The history of Egypt and Israel consists of four wars and hundreds of border incidents that have taken the lives of tens of thousands of people. It seems that only the rise to power of a leader in the stature of Anwar Sadat could put an end to this bloody circle, because the previous president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, was not willing to hold any kind of political contact with Israel. But Nasser’s reign involved constant political contact between Egypt and Israel, most of whom remain confidential. This article attempts to examine whether any of these contacts were likely to succeed and yield a peace treaty between the two countries, an agreement that could have prevented three wars and saved the lives of so many people on both sides. It will do so by examining these contacts, their characteristics, and the reasons for their failure, while dividing them into three periods: the 1948 war to the 1956 war, the 1956 war to the 1967 war, and the 1967 war to the death of Nasser in 1970.
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Bielicki, Pawel. "THE MIDDLE EAST IN YUGOSLAVIA’S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN THE 1970s." Istorija 20. veka 39, no. 2/2021 (2021): 397–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.29362/ist20veka.2021.2.bie.397-414.
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The main purpose of this article is to present the most important conditions and variables characterizing the role of the Middle East in Yugoslavia’s foreign policy strategy in the 1970s, based on available literature and documentation. I also intend to analyze the conditions that contributed to intensifying Yugoslavia’s position in the region and led to a decrease in Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East in the second half of the decade. Firstly, I will describe Yugoslavia’s relations with the countries of the Middle East in 1970–1973, especially with Egypt, where Gamal Abdel Nasser, after his death, was succeeded by the country’s Vice President, Anwar Al-Sadat. It will also be important to shed light on the Yugoslav Government’s stance regarding the Middle East conflict from the point of view of the situation in Europe. Next, I will present the significance of the Yom Kippur War for Yugoslavia’s foreign policy and its implications for Belgrade’s relations with Cairo and Tel-Aviv. Moreover, it will be extremely important to explain why Yugoslavia’s importance in the Middle East gradually diminished as of the middle of the decade. In addition, I will address the issue of Yugoslav President Josip Broz-Tito’s position toward the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the fading of Yugoslavia’s interest in the region following Tito’s death and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the summary, I want to note that the period under analysis in Yugoslav-Middle Eastern relations was decisive for the country’s foreign policy and its internal situation, as Yugoslavia never again played a significant role in the Arab world.
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Ghouse, Nida. "Lotus Notes." ARTMargins 5, no. 3 (2016): 82–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/artm_a_00159.
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Lotus was a tri-lingual quarterly brought out by the Afro-Asian Writers' Association. Initially titled Afro-Asian Writings, its inaugural edition was launched from Cairo in March 1968, in Arabic and English, followed by the French. By 1971, the trilingual quarterly acquired the name Lotus. Egypt, the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic funded its production. The Arabic edition was printed in Cairo, and the English and French editions were printed in the German Democratic Republic. The Afro-Asian Writers' Association (AAWA) and its over-arching affiliate, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), both had headquarters in Cairo. In 1978, President Anwar Sadat signed the Camp David Accords and the Permanent Bureau in Cairo was deactivated. Lotus moved to Beirut despite the raging Civil War, where it was was granted home and hospitality by the Union of Palestinian Writers. Its offices remained there until the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 when it once again relocated along with the Palestinian Liberation Organization to Tunis. The journal was discontinued in the late 1980s or early 1990s with the dismantling of the Soviet Union. The Permanent Bureau in Cairo was reinstated, but the journal was not as such reactivated. The project outlines a partial biography of a forgotten magazine from a bipolar world and its interrupted historical networks. It considers graphic and textual elements from the margins of the magazine for evidence of its trajectory.
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Ariani, Nevey Varida. "Relevansi Penentuan Kriteria Desa/Kelurahan Sadar Hukum terhadap Kesadaran Hukum Masyarakat." Jurnal Penelitian Hukum De Jure 17, no. 1 (2017): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.30641/dejure.2017.v17.29-47.
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Desa/kelurahan merupakan miniatur dari Negara, bagian dari organisasi terkecil dalam pemerintahan menunjukkan potret kehidupan termasuk kesadaran akan hukum di masyarakat. Peraturan Kepala Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional Nomor : PHN.HN.03.05-73 Tahun 2008 tentang Pembentukan dan Pembinaan Keluarga Sadar Hukum dan Desa/Kelurahan Sadar Hukum, sejak Tahun 1986 sampai sekarang baru 4,57% dari total desa/kelurahan sadar hukum kurang efektif dan perlu dilakukan revisi berdasarkan perkembangan dan kemajuan ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi bukan hanya merupakan ceremonial belaka. Adapun permasalahan yang akan diteliti dalam penelitian ini adalah: Apakah ketentuan kriteria Desa/Kelurahan sadar hukum masih releven dengan perkembangan saat ini dan kebijakan apa yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah dalam rangka menciptakan kesadaran hukum masyarakat? Berdasarkan hasil Penelitian ini dapat disimpulkan permasalahan sebagai berikut : Diperlukan 7(tujuh) kriteria sebagai berikut : Angka kriminalitas rendah termasuk semua jenis kejahatan yang diatur dalam KUHP termasuk konflik sosial, Rendahnya kasus narkoba; Tingginya kesadaran masyarakat terhadap kebersihan dan kelestarian lingkungan; Kekerasan dalam rumah tangga, Korupsi, Tingkat Pendidikan Masyarakat Minimal SMA, Kriteria lain yang ditetapkan daerah, Dengan perkembangan dalam masyarakat Pencantuman Usia Pernikahan dibawah umur, dan PBB sudah tidak relevan lagi. Revisi terhadap Peraturan Kepala BPHN menjadi Peraturan Menteri atau Peraturan Presiden dan Perlu ada program terpadu untuk menentukan program yang berkelanjuatan dan dievaluasi setiap tahunnya dalam hal sinergi antar kementerian sehingga diharapkan progam itu fokus dan tidak tumpang tindih.
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Moustafa, Tamir. "CONFLICT AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE STATE AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY EGYPT." International Journal of Middle East Studies 32, no. 1 (2000): 3–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800021024.
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Al-Azhar, traditionally Egypt's most respected and influential center for Islamic study, adopted an increasingly bold platform opposing Egyptian government policy throughout the mid-1990s. Al-Azhar defied government policy on a variety of sensitive issues, including population control, the practice of clitoridectomy, and censorship rights. Moreover, al-Azhar directly challenged the government in high-profile forums such as the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo in September of 1994. This open opposition was remarkable in light of the tremendous capacity that the Egyptian government has shown in the past to manipulate and control al-Azhar. Over the past century, and particularly since the 1952 Free Officers' coup, the Egyptian government virtually incorporated al-Azhar as an arm of the state through purges and control over Azhar finances, and by gaining the power to appoint al-Azhar's key leadership. Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Husni Mubarak all benefited from this dominance over al-Azhar by securing fatwas legitimating their policies. Given this overwhelming leverage, what can explain al-Azhar's increased opposition to the government throughout the mid-1990s?
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Sabet, Amr G. E. "Geopolitics of identity: Egypt’s lost peace." Contemporary Arab Affairs 10, no. 1 (2017): 51–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2017.1281552.
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This paper attempts to provide a conceptualization of Egypt’s current predicaments by process-tracing historical critical junctures and sequences of causal mechanisms that contributed to bringing about the January 2011 events. Focusing on the period between the July 1952 Revolution led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the events of 2011, it traces the developments and changing political and strategic trajectories of the three presidents Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. The case of Egypt is examined here as ‘an instance of a class of events’ focusing on phenomena related to the tracing of causal factors or critical junctures, and mechanisms leading to a particular outcome on 25 January 2011. It further links the uprising to that country’s 1979 ‘Peace Treaty’ with Israel. This treaty ‘de-securitized’ the latter, allowing it significant regional freedom of action. This had a causal effect on challenging Egypt’s identity-motivated action, contributing, in the process, to undermining its identity structure. An increasing awareness among many Egyptians of the link between the treaty and their identity formation is one of the main reasons for summoning the legacy of Nasser’s leadership as a source of ‘ontological security’.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "President Anwar Sadat"
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Seleem, Amany Youssef. "The Interface of Religious and Political Conflict in Egyptian Theatre." The Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1373973567.
Full textBooks on the topic "President Anwar Sadat"
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Rosen, Deborah Nodler. Anwar el-Sadat: Middle East peacemaker. Childrens Press, 1986.
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Israeli, Raphael. Man of defiance: A political biography of Anwar Sadat. Barnes & Noble Books, 1985.
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Israeli, Raphael. Man of defiance: A political biography of Anwar Sadat. Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985.
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Tawilah, Abd al-Sattar. Anwar al-Sadat alladhi araftuh. al-Hayah al-Misriyah al-Ammah lil-Kitab, 1992.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "President Anwar Sadat"
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Rezk, Dina. "Early Years of Sadat’s Presidency." In The Arab World and Western Intelligence. Edinburgh University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748698912.003.0009.
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The death of President Nasser marked the end of an era in the Arab world. His successor Anwar el Sadat was an unknown quantity. Over the course of a decade, Sadat expelled the Russians from Egypt, broke the Arab-Israeli stalemate and radically reoriented Egypt’s identity towards the Western world. But what were the first impressions of this enigmatic figure? The intelligence material provides a hidden insight into Sadat that has been neglected in most Western scholarship. This chapter reveal that the intelligence communities on both sides of the Atlantic saw Sadat as a temporary figure, an inferior statesman to his predecessor and a man of tactics rather than principles. Thus while analysts were acutely aware of the Soviet-Egyptian tensions that led to Sadat’s dramatic expulsion of 15,000 Soviet advisors in July 1972, their negative perceptions of Sadat made it difficult to recognise the strategic considerations behind the move. Not until the October 1973 War did the intelligence community appreciate that Sadat might have been clearing the way for an attack on Israel.
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"Statement to the Knesset by President Anwar al Sadat (November 20, 1977)." In The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Routledge, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203871591-41.
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Mahler, Gregory S. "Statement to the Knesset by President Anwar al Sadat (November 20, 1977)." In The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 2nd ed. Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315170657-34.
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Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "Jockeying and Posturing." In The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0022.
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Through the spring of 1972, US adviser Henry Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin continued “back channel” discussion of the Soviet offer to withdraw regular forces from Egypt as part of and interim settlement with Israel. Meanwhile, Egyptian crews completed training for operation of the SAM array that the Soviet personnel had manned, which enabled beginning a handover that would ease political difficulties caused for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by these troops’ presence. Around a visit by Sadat to Moscow in April and a subsequent one to Egypt by Soviet Defense Minister Andrey Grechko, reports were spread about discord due to Soviet denial of Egyptian demands for offensive weapons. In fact, cooperation continued, including MiG-25 flights over Sinai to provide intelligence for a future offensive; renewed Israeli attempts to intercept them failed.
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Even, General Jacob, and Colonel Simcha B. Maoz. "The Egyptian Attack, October 14." In At the Decisive Point in the Sinai, translated by Simcha B. Maoz and Moshe Tlamim. University Press of Kentucky, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813169552.003.0005.
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By the evening of October 12, reports surfaced of the Egyptians’ intent to dispatch commando units against various targets in order to attack the canal front and transfer armored reserves into Sinai. From that time until the October 14 sunrise, when nearly one thousand Egyptian tanks amassed on the eastern bank of the canal, the General Staff and Southern Command created a reserve force of around 750 tanks, deployed on the line from north to south. The ultimate goals of the Egyptian army’s offensive were lost to history when Egyptian president Anwar Sadat died, but Even and Maoz do their best to reconstruct the axes of the attack.
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Even, General Jacob, and Colonel Simcha B. Maoz. "The Crossing Battle, Part 1." In At the Decisive Point in the Sinai, translated by Simcha B. Maoz and Moshe Tlamim. University Press of Kentucky, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813169552.003.0006.
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The chief of General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces was prepared to surrender, but Egyptian president Anwar Sadat rejected their surrender, giving Israel no choice but to continue fighting. From then on, the defense minister, the chief of General Staff, and the commanding general of Southern Command resolved to achieve a decisive defeat of Egyptian army and end the conflict. Israeli strategists determined that the best option would be to cross the Suez Canal in an operation called Stouthearted Men. Operation Stouthearted Men, implemented on October 15, lasted until the ceasefire on October 25 that officially ended the war. The first battle of the operation was the crossing battle itself—a uniquely large, protracted, dramatic, and significant battle that is often described as “the crossing battle.”
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Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "Withdrawn Regulars Conceal “Banished” Advisers." In The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0024.
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The figure usually (but never officially) given for Soviet military personnel repatriated from Egypt in the summer of 1972 – 15-20 thousand – is much greater than the highest number of individual advisers and technicians ever posted there. It represents the manpower of the regular Soviet formations, mostly the 18th Air Defense Division, who were stationed there since 1969-1970 in “Operation Kavkaz,” and were now repatriated in an agreed withdrawal once Egyptian crews were trained to replace them. This chapter begins to describe how the misleading concept was inculcated whereby the advisers, who actually remained, were supposedly expelled. as the result of a rift between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and his allies in Moscow due to the latter’s refusal, as part of détente, to provide offensive weapons for an offensive against Israel.
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Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "“We Will be Two Ismails”." In The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0028.
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The failure of US President Richard Nixon to make good on his post-reelection vow to press Israel was evident when Prime Minister Golda Meir, visiting Washington in the spring of 1973, offered no concessions in return for continued arms supply. Reports from “Mossad spy” Ashraf Marwan and others of imminent Egyptian attack led Israel to call a costly alert in April; US statesman Henry Kissinger took credit for getting the Soviets to make Egyptian President Anwar Sadat delay the offensive until after a summit with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in California in June. But evidence shows that the ultimate timing of a joint offensive with Syria in October had already been determined. While Sadat’s envoy Hafez Ismail impressed Kissinger with peace proposals in Washington, War Minister Ahmed Ismail shuttled between Moscow and Damascus to coordinate war plans and weapons supplies. At the summit in August, Brezhnev took a belligerent stance. The USSR’s support for the impending attack was exemplified by delivery of Scud missiles with Soviet operators, and participation in the final councils of war.
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Matesan, Ioana Emy. "Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya: From Terrorism to Nonviolence." In The Violence Pendulum. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197510087.003.0004.
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In 1981, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Over the next two decades, the group transformed from one of the most active terrorist groups in Egypt to an Islamist group that officially renounced armed action. The chapter first traces the rise of the group and investigates what pushed it to resort to violence. The increased scale and scope of violence was generated by the same causal mechanisms that explained the Muslim Brotherhood’s turn to violence: politicization, mistrust of government, a sense of betrayal by the regime, desire for revenge, and a slippery slope of militarization. The chapter then looks at the transformation of the organization starting with the 1997 Nonviolence Initiative. The analysis reveals that the high audience cost of violence and growing public condemnation led al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s leaders to rethink the group’s mission and push for permanent disengagement from violence.
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Ginor, Isabella, and Gideon Remez. "The Soviets “Return” in October." In The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967-1973. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190693480.003.0026.
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As US-Soviet discussions continued to arrange another Nixon-Brezhnev summit in California, Israeli and American actors were increasingly convinced that the USSR had suffered a setback in Egypt with the “expulsion of advisers.” US statesman Henry Kissinger felt no urgency to comply with Soviet demands to reciprocate for the supposed Soviet concession by pressing Israel for an interim settlement, including withdrawal, until after the US election. In October, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was reported – among others, by Mossad informant Ashraf Marwan – to have revised war aims toward a limited advance in Sinai without the offensive weapons he had supposedly been denied by Moscow. Deceptive reports planted in the Western press claimed that this led to a rapprochement with the Soviets, and that their advisers began to return. Actually, they never left and the weapons flow continued unabated, but as these reports were quickly discredited the US and Israeli perceptions of an irrevocable Egyptian-Soviet rift were reinforced.