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1
Brudny, Yitzhak M. "In Pursuit of the Russian Presidency: Why and How Yeltsin Won the 1996 Presidential Election." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30, no. 3 (September 1, 1997): 255–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(97)00007-x.
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This article seeks to explain why Boris Yeltsin was able to win I996 Russian presidential election despite prolonged economic crisis and the war in Chechnya. The paper advances the argument which emphasizes Yeltsin's ability to recreate political and social alliances which were crucial to his previous electoral successes, on the one hand, and poor electoral strategy and political beliefs of Yeltsin's main challenger, the head of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Gennady Zyuganov, on the other. In particular, the paper highlights Yeltsin's campaign strategy of turning the election into a referendum on communism rather on his own record and the success of his two candidates only strategy. The paper also argues that Zyuganov communist-nationalist, rather than social-democratic, world view determined his electoral strategy and played a major role in his electoral defeat.
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Cottrell, Robert. "Russia’s Parliamentary and Presidential Elections." Government and Opposition 31, no. 2 (April 1996): 160–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1996.tb00602.x.
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In December 1995 General Elections Took Place in Russia for the lower house of parliament, the Duma. In constitutional terms the Duma is a relatively weak body, comparable with the French National Assembly. It initiates and enacts legislation, but must find a two-thirds majority if it is to override a presidential veto. The December elections were, however, of a disproportionate significance. The fact that they were taking place was important in itself. The Duma elected in December 1995 was only the second Duma to be elected in post-Soviet Russia, and the first to be elected in relatively normal circumstances. (The preceding Duma had been elected in 1993 only after President Boris Yeltsin had used tanks against the old Supreme Soviet, created a new parliament almost literally out of its ashes, and legitimized his actions by means of a new constitution approved by a national referendum.)
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Gershunsky, Boris S. "An Open Letter to Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia." Educational Forum 63, no. 3 (September 30, 1999): 230–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00131729908984422.
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Desai, Padma. "Russian Retrospectives on Reforms from Yeltsin to Putin." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 1 (February 1, 2005): 87–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330053147903.
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The kamikaze crew of liberal reformers, picked by former President Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s, succeeded in overturning the planned economy and the authoritarian political arrangements of seven decades of Soviet Communism. However, the resulting breakdown of political cohesion and the urgency of restoring stability prompted Yeltsin to select Vladimir Putin as his successor. The consolidating impetus under Putin, who was elected president in early 2000, has raised concerns about the continuation of economic and political reforms under his leadership. In this essay, nine Russian interviewees look back on the reform issues under Yeltsin and look ahead on the unfolding political economy scenario under Putin. They include three principle economic reformers under Yeltsin, three economic policy analysts, and three banking professionals.
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Nash, Marian. "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law." American Journal of International Law 88, no. 3 (July 1994): 515–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2203722.
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A congressional inquiry to the Department of State concerned the practice of signing documents such as the Trilateral Statement concluded at Moscow on January 14, 1994, by President William J. Clinton, Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, and Ukraine President Leonid M. Kravchuk and the status of such documents under both United States and international law and practice.
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Chandler, Andrea. "Presidential Veto Power in Post-Communist Russia, 1994-1998." Canadian Journal of Political Science 34, no. 3 (September 2001): 487–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423901777980.
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This article examines the use of presidential veto power in Russia from 1994 to 1998. Russia's 1993 constitution enables the president to veto legislation, but allows the bicameral Federal Assembly to overturn vetoes with a two-thirds majority. President Boris Yeltsin was a controversial figure in Russia's difficult post-communist transition, and although he had considerable executive powers, his power to veto legislation has rarely been examined as an independent variable which shapes Russian politics. This article looks at patterns of presidential vetoing in Russia within their comparative and historical context, and argues that unpredictable vetoing has become a substantial issue that has aggravated executive-legislative relations. Increasingly, the parliamentary opposition challenged presidential vetoes, with profound implications for the future constitutional order in Russia.
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SMYTH, REGINA. "Building State Capacity from the Inside Out: Parties of Power and the Success of the President's Reform Agenda in Russia." Political Theory 30, no. 4 (August 2002): 555–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591702030004003.
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In contrast to his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russia's President Vladimir Putin continues to successfully neutralize legislative opposition and push his reform agenda through the State Duma. His success is due in large part to the transformation of the party system during the 1999 electoral cycle. In the face of a less polarized and fragmented party system, the Kremlin-backed party of power, Unity, became the foundation for a stable majority coalition in parliament and a weapon in the political battle to eliminate threatening opponents such as Yuri Luzhkov's Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.
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Mason, David S., and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson. "Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia: Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin." Slavic Review 56, no. 4 (1997): 698–717. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2502118.
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Between 1991 and 1996 Russia underwent a precipitous economic and social decline with decreases in production, gross national product, and wages, and increases in inequality, crime, and corruption. Most people experienced a decline in their standard of living, and many fondly recalled the security and stability of the communist era. Nevertheless, in the two main cases when the Russian electorate was confronted with a choice of directions in economic policy–the referendum of 1993 and the presidential elections of 1996–the majority chose reform. Writing about Boris Yeltsin's surprising victory in the 1996 presidential elections, a Pravda commentator mused: “Logically, he should have lost, since he was unable to fully solve any of the problems that have piled up: the stagnation of production, the impoverishment of a majority of the people, growing unemployment, the chronic nonpayment of wages, the decline in science, culture and education, the continuing conflict in Chechnya, etc. Nevertheless, Yeltsin received a majority of the electorate's votes.”
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Rivera, David W., and Sharon Werning Rivera. "Yeltsin, Putin, and Clinton: Presidential Leadership and Russian Democratization in Comparative Perspective." Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 3 (August 19, 2009): 591–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592709990880.
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Immediately after coming to power, the Clinton administration declared the consolidation of market and democratic institutions in Russia to be a vital American interest. The administration's central tactic for promoting this outcome was to help Boris Yeltsin remain in power. In a major assault on Clinton's historical legacy, much of the scholarly community maintains that U.S. policy was fundamentally flawed, both morally and strategically. In the view of these analysts, post-Soviet Russia's founding president was an autocratic leader who derailed the country's progress toward democracy. However, this body of research focuses exclusively on the Russian Federation and fails to utilize comparative referents. In contrast, we analyze the experiences of the full population of post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia from 1991 to the present. Whether examined in cross-national or longitudinal perspective, we find that Russian democracy under Yeltsin was, relatively speaking, a success. We conclude that the Clinton administration's policy of support for Yeltsin both served various American foreign policy interests and strengthened the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia, thereby fulfilling the dictates of both real- and idealpolitik. In addition, the relative success of Russia's democratization in the 1990s, the reversal of that pattern in this decade, and the magnitude of the transformation of the polity under Putin all demonstrate the pivotal role played by presidential leadership in Russia's transition.
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Boltunova, Ekaterina. "The President Has Entered the Building! The Boris Yeltsin Presidential Center and Memorial Tradition in Contemporary Russia." Ab Imperio 2017, no. 3 (2017): 165–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/imp.2017.0058.
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Leisse, Olaf, and Utta-Kristin Leisse. "A Siberian Challenge: Dealing with Multiethnicity in the Republic of Buryatia." Nationalities Papers 35, no. 4 (September 2007): 773–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990701475178.
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The Republic of Buryatia, along with 12 other former Soviet states during the same year, had declared its sovereignty no later than 8 October 1990. This did not actually mean a declaration of independence. Rather, this step was taken to urge the central government to acknowledge Buryatia as a free and equal partner at the political level. Boris Yeltsin, during his time as Russian president, did much to support this claim by propagating a vision of a post-Soviet Russia as a union of free peoples with equal rights. The central government in Moscow therefore recognized the existence of relatively autonomous regions. This was also done to respond to the interests of the different ethnic groups, which became increasingly important in the political sphere.
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Levintova, Ekaterina, and Jim Butterfield. "History education and historical remembrance in contemporary Russia: Sources of political attitudes of pro-Kremlin youth." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43, no. 2 (October 30, 2009): 139–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2009.10.008.
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Why during the last decade have many young Russians become politically active well beyond simply voting? Particularly striking among youth activists is their enthusiastic support for Putinism and a resounding rejection of the policies, symbols and political figures of the era of President Boris Yeltsin (1992–2000). The vast majority of youth activists are of college age (18–24), which means they were far too young to be aware of what was happening in the country in the 1990s, the period that while democratic and pro-Western, also represents a failure of the Russian state in their imagery. To what degree do the opinions and worldviews of politically active pro-Kremlin youth reflect the recently emerged, nearly ubiquitous interpretation of recent history as presented in the high school curriculum? To that end, we undertake a content analysis of 47 high school textbooks in Russian history, followed by open-ended interviews with 37 activists from the three most visible youth organizations, all of whom are pro-Kremlin in their orientation. Although demonstrating a causal relationship is methodologically unfeasible, we find a marked correlation between the views of both the Yeltsin and Putin eras presented in those textbooks and in the political beliefs of the youth groups.
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Ross, Wiktor. "Instytucja prezydenta w systemie politycznym Federacji Rosyjskiej." Kwartalnik Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznego. Studia i Prace, no. 1 (November 1, 2011): 63–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kkessip.2011.1.3.
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This article presents the course that passed the political system of USSR going from the old soviet structure to the modern form of the state. Total economic and political crisis forced the last General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbatchev to seek the new political institutions and were helpful in the process of maintaining socialist character of the state and social relations and, simultaneously, to carry out the changes of the political system which became necessary. These efforts were a failure because of strong resistance, on the one hand, communist nomenklatura and the other hand, the new democratic movement in the Russian Federation conducted by Boris Yeltsin and independent movements in Soviet Republics. After the trial to stop the process of reforming of the state undertaken by communist leaders of USSR during coupé d'etat in August 1991 the initiative passed to the democratic forces in Russia. The fall of the USSR and foundation of the CIS as the platform of the reintegration of Post-Soviet area started the new stage of the political conflict in the Russian Federation. The objective needs occurred in the process of reforming of the economic structures, growing of the protest attitudes, necessity to relief the mood of the local authorities in order to attain their support for the course of modernization, pushed President Yeltsin to concentrate enormous power. The old Soviet Constitution was more comfortable for such political conditions than modern solutions based on the power's division in three branches - Parliament, Government and independent jurisdiction. Contradictions of the Post-Soviet period brought to the deep conflict between President Yeltsin and Supreme Soviet in October 1993. The defeat of the conservative forces in this confrontation meant the end of Soviet system in Russia, however political system that was created on such ground had authoritarian features, which was used all Yeltsin's presidential decade bringing, as a result, the system very far to the principles of the democracy.
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Tingley, Megan. "Defying Putin: Leaders of the Opposition Movement Against Russian Authoritarianism." Pitt Political Review 11, no. 2 (October 13, 2017): 27–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/ppr.2015.57.
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Since being named acting president of Russia in 1999, Vladimir Putin has gone from a little-known ex-KGB agent to one of the most powerful men in the world. Handpicked by his ailing predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, Putin came to power following a decade of economic turmoil and political instability. His decisiveness, especially in regard to civic uprisings in Chechnya, garnered early support among the Russian people. In fact, Putin’s approval ratings remained high even as his actions became increasingly authoritarian. Given Russia’s position of power and its recent invasion of Crimea, there is reasonable concern among the international community over Putin’s ongoing obstructions to democracy both within and outside the country’s borders. Over the past few years, however, opposition groups have emerged with hopes of limiting Putin’s power. While widespread reform has yet to occur, movements to mobilize the Russian public are beginning to take place.
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Попова, Анна Дмитриевна. "На Материалах «Писем во Власть»." Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 41, no. 3 (November 28, 2014): 261–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18763324-04103002.
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“The Process of Reform during the Era of Perestroika and the Social Consciousness of Russian Society, from ‘Letters to the Authority’ Materials,” by Anna Dmitrievna Popova (Ryazan State University named for S. A. Yesenin): This article analyzes the transformation of Soviet public consciousness during the era of perestroika (restructuring). The authors examined letters which were sent by Soviet citizens to then President of the Russian Soviet Republic and future Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin. In these letters, citizens stated their opinions about the transformation of the Soviet political and economic system during this period. The authors’ analysis of these letters reveals that the mentality of the Soviet populace was strongly influenced by its assessment of perestroika. In this public consciousness, citizens placed a large emphasis on the traditional Soviet values of equality, justice, and labor, which defined public opinions about the transformation of Soviet society during perestroika. Soviet citizens demanded that the state deal with the problem of wide-ranging privileges afforded to officials of the Communist Party, while citizens negatively estimated the freedoms in spiritual life accorded to them by the state.
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Sarotte, M. E. "How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95." International Security 44, no. 1 (July 2019): 7–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00353.
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Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.
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Ceaser, James W. "THE IDOL OF HISTORY." Social Philosophy and Policy 20, no. 1 (December 18, 2002): 38–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052503201035.
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“The idol of communism, which spread social strife, enmity and unparalleled brutality everywhere, which instilled fear in humanity, has collapsed.” These words, spoken by Russian president Boris Yeltsin before a joint session of the U.S. Congress in 1992, brought a tumultuous response from America's political leaders. The evocation of the theme of idolatry by a former member of the Communist Party was striking, all the more so because it must have called to his listeners' minds the dramatic scenes of the destruction of the statues of Lenin then taking place throughout the Communist world. Nothing of the kind had been seen since the end of the Pagan era, when temples of the old gods were toppled throughout the Roman Empire. The events that historian Edward Gibbon, in his classic The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, described as happening in Alexandria in A.D. 389 might just as well have applied to what was happening in Minsk or Tirana: “The huge idol [of Serapis] was overthrown and broken into pieces, [its] limbs ignominiously pulled through the streets.
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Kopaliani, Karlo, and Zurab Kvetenadze. "2007 Munich Conference and Contours of the New World Order." Works of Georgian Technical University, no. 2(520) (June 25, 2021): 114–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.36073/1512-0996-2021-2-114-126.
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The International Security Conference held in Munich in February 2007 laid the foundation for the formation of the new world order. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, everyone thought that Russia would choose the way for pro-Western democratic development. In the first stage, it seemed that the Russian Federation was making a choice in favor of the free world. However, the weakness of both the state and style of oligarchic governance showed that the conclusion was premature. Although civil society was developing in Russia and after some time it could achieve concrete successes, the Russian political leadership under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin was unable to solve the acute problems facing the state. The strengthening of the Russian state is linked to the coming to power of Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin. As a result of effective counterterrorism operations, the authority of Russian president has increased significantly. Putin aimed to change pro-Western orientations to Eurasian. We think, it was a natural occurrence for Russia, but it would inevitably lead to a confrontation with the West. The 2007 Munich International Security Conference is a clear example, where the Russian president strongly criticized the existence of a unipolar world and initiated foundation of a new phase of confrontation with the Euro-Atlantic space.
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Iur'ev, Dmitrii. "Russia Four Steps Away from the Third Millennium and a Second President: At His Last Breath: The Fin du Siècle of Boris Yeltsin." Russian Politics & Law 35, no. 4 (July 1997): 15–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/rup1061-1940350415.
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Jonson, Lena. "Post-Pussy Riot: art and protest in Russia today." Nationalities Papers 44, no. 5 (September 2016): 657–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2016.1190327.
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This article shows that resistance and a critical discourse continue in the arts, especially in visual art, in Russia under the present political conditions when free speech has been seriously circumscribed. When in May 2012 Vladimir Putin was reinstalled as president with a new authoritarian conservative agenda, it was expected that the situation for culture would change. This article addresses the question of whether a critical discourse survived in the arts under the new conditions. It presents the new political context for the arts, and provides examples of various artistic strategies of resistance/protest in Russian contemporary art by applying Jacques Ranciere's concept of dissensus. The focus is on visual art, although references are also made to the world of theater. The first section presents the new official role given to culture and the new state cultural policy as components of a reactionary backlash against the reform policies under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, and describes conflicts around art and art productions that followed from the new state policy. A second section gives examples of dissensus in art today by presenting artworks by Piotr Pavlenskii, Arsenii Zhilyaev, Stas Shuripa, and Anna Titova.
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BLONDEL, J. "‘Presidentialism’ in the Ex-Soviet Union." Japanese Journal of Political Science 13, no. 1 (January 27, 2012): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109911000223.
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AbstractWhen the Soviet Union fell in 1990, three of its 15 components, the Baltic States, joined the European Union, and a fourth, Moldova, may well join in the future. The other 11 quickly became presidential republics, following the lead given by Boris Yeltsin, the president of the largest among them, Russia. By 1994, all 11 were headed by a president elected by universal suffrage. These ex-Soviet countries contribute significantly to the number of presidential republics in the world. Presidential republics form a clear majority, being predominant in Latin America and Africa, alongside the ex-Soviet Union. They are rare in Europe, the main cases being France, Romania, and, though seemingly temporarily, some Balkan states; in Asia, outside the ex-Soviet Union, they are a small minority.Like many presidential republics elsewhere, those in the ex-Soviet Union are mostly authoritarian, but with variations: this is primarily so in Central Asia, as well as in Azerbaijan and Belarus. These presidencies have been very stable, with some of their leaders, especially in Central Asia, being repeatedly re-elected, often without opposition. There has been a regular turnover in Armenia (but less so in Georgia) and in Ukraine (but not in Belarus). The Russian case is peculiar, as is well known: Putin became prime minister because he could no longer be constitutionally re-elected as president, at least without a break. The power of these presidents has varied over time: outside Central Asia (except Kyrgyzstan) and Azerbaijan, where they have been uniformly strong, their strength has declined in Georgia, increased in Russia and Belarus, and had ups and downs in Armenia and Ukraine.
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Gonchar, Oleg. "The Great Russian People as the Russian National Idea." Bulletin of Kemerovo State University. Series: Political, Sociological and Economic sciences 2020, no. 2 (May 29, 2020): 139–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.21603/2500-3372-2020-5-2-139-155.
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The present research featured the state-forming status of the Russian people. The article focuses on the issue of fixing the legal status of Russians as the state-forming nation in the preamble to the Constitution. The research was based on a complex extrapolation modeling, comparative historical analysis, and behavioral approach. The author justified the amendments and explored domestic and foreign policy prospects for the long-overdue constitutional reforms. He introduced three possible constitutional solutions to the so-called Russian question and commented upon the opinion expressed by the judge of the Constitutional Court K. V. Aranovskiy on the state historical continuity of the Russian state. The author believes that there is no alternative to the national roadmap proclaimed by the President of the Russian Federation. However, there is a legal option to restore sovereignty by correcting the incorrigible "Yeltsin" Constitution. The country can claim its political sovereignty by adopting a new fundamental law and conducting the national Referendum on the New Constitution. The author gives evidence in favor of the spontaneous onset of the Russian irredenta in Ukraine. The denationalization of the state-forming ethnic group probably determined the collapse of the USSR and triggered the current constitutional crisis. The research also involved a geopolitical strategic analysis of various projects that proclaim the USSR and the Russian Federation the direct successors of the Russian Empire. The article features the traditional global practice of granting constitutional status to the dominant state-forming ethnic group. The analysis proved the Russian national idea as the optimal political and legal structure for solving the Russian question.
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Popov, Nikolai P. "Socio-Political Views of the Russian Population. Report. Preliminary Results of a Sociological Study of the Russian Population’s Socio-Political Views, Commissioned by the Analytical Department of the President of the Russian Federation. August 1995." Sociological Journal 26, no. 1 (2020): 141–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.19181/socjour.2020.26.1.7057.
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The report analyzes the public opinion on the main socio-economic and political issues at the end of the fourth year of Boris Yeltsin’s presidential term, on the eve of the Duma elections in December 1995 and the presidential elections in 1996. The poll’s data show the growing discontent of the population with the state of affairs in the country, the economic crisis, their own impoverishment, and the inability of the authorities to solve the country’s main problems. At the same time, a growing number of people lost interest in politics, lost confidence the political and economic reforms will lead to the country’s revival, democratization, and the ability to choose the best people for positions of power. Two thirds of the people said that they have become worse off than at the start of radical reforms ten years ago, while the main responsibility for the plight of the people and the country lies within the current government, which had no idea where the country’s economy was going, and had no program for overcoming the crisis. 75% believed that the government lives by its own interests; they do not care about the people. Market reforms initiated by Boris Yeltsin spurred mass negative assessments: our life before the reforms was better and more prosperous; the people were deceived, they were promised market socialism, and were drawn into the construction of capitalism; reforms were based on robbing the people, only speculators, swindlers, and officials had benefited from them. Regretting the dismantling of socialism, the population had lost belief that the ideas of socialism and communism were able to unite society again. As such an idea, the majority suggested reviving Russia as a powerful state, while calling for following a special, Russian path which implies a “strong hand” in power. The majority believed that the President and the government had already exhausted their opportunities to put an end to the crisis in Russia, and that they should be replaced with new people. The assessment of the President’s performance reached its lowest point during his administration – only 6% expressed their approval and 71% disapproved. The war in Chechnya seriously harmed the President’s popularity. More than 80% expressed negative assessments on the Kremlin’s Chechnya policies.
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Delong, Marek. "The Concept of Russian Federation Foreign and Security Policy by Eugene Primakov." Internal Security 12, no. 1 (July 22, 2020): 307–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.3205.
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The aim of this article is to analyze the concept of Russian foreign and security policy by Eugene Primakov, one of the most eminent Russian politicians of the twentieth century. The article applies research methods and techniques appropriate to science about politics. These include a comparative analysis and a method of historical analysis that enabled the presentation of political events and factors shaping the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin appointed Primakov to the post of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The goals and assumptions of foreign and security policy have undergone a thorough redefinition, related to the tendencies noticeable in Russia in 1993–1995. Before, foreign policy had been dominated by neoliberal and Euro-Atlantic options, whose representative was predominantly Primakov’s predecessor as the minister of foreign affairs, Andrei Kozyrev. After the fall of Sergei Kirijenka’s government, Primakov assumed the office of Prime Minister on September 11, 1998 and held it until May 12, 1999. It was a cabinet of political compromise, which was supposed to facilitate agreement with the opposition and the continuation of reforms, although not on the same principles as before. Primakov criticized his predecessors for the wrong political line, the lack of effectiveness of the stabilization policy, which resulted in a fall in production. He stressed that his government did not give up market reform, but called for the state’s participation to be increased. Yevgeny Primakov claimed that Russia should strive to formulate a multipolar system of international relations that truly reflects the multifaceted nature of the present world with the diversity of its interests. Primakov exerted a huge influence on the Russian foreign and security policy of Putin’s day. His political line was carried out by his successors, and above all Igor Ivanov and Sergey Lavrov. The main directions and assumptions of his concepts are still repeated in official documents articulating the Russian doctrine of security and defense, and nothing indicates that this state of affairs has changed, and this in turn carries the threat of destabilization in Central and Eastern Europe.
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"Russian Republic President Boris Yeltsin Visits Washington." Foreign Policy Bulletin 2, no. 1 (July 1991): 70–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s105270360000753x.
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"Inaugural Speech by President Boris Yeltsin of the Republic of Russia." Foreign Policy Bulletin 2, no. 1 (July 1991): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1052703600007425.
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