Academic literature on the topic 'President, Constitution, prerogatives'
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Journal articles on the topic "President, Constitution, prerogatives"
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de Raadt, Jasper. "Contestable constitutions: Ambiguity, conflict, and change in East Central European dual executive systems." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 83–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2009.02.003.
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This article investigates how ambiguous constitutional design affected president–cabinet relations and constitutional change in post-communist Poland and Hungary. Constitutional provisions related to the prerogatives of presidents and governments were frequently subject to political conflict during the 1990s. The power struggle in the two cases developed and consolidated along two distinct pathways. In Poland, failed attempts to modify the constitution initially stirred up and extended intra-executive conflicts. With the adoption of a new constitution in 1997 the struggle over power between president and council of ministers was finally settled. In Hungary constitutional court rulings were instrumental in the settlement of president–cabinet conflicts.
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Kerimov, Alexander. "The President in the state machinery of the Russian Federation (constitutional and legal analysis)." Russian Journal of Legal Studies (Moscow) 7, no. 2 (November 2, 2020): 22–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/rjls46763.
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Based on an analysis of the updated version of our State Constitution, the author comes to the unequivocal conclusion that the powers of the President of Russia have now significantly increased as his prerogatives have expanded.
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Harjudin, Laode. "AMBIVALENSI KEKUASAAN PREROGATIF PRESIDEN PASCA AMANDEMEN KONSTITUSI." Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Indonesia 1, no. 1 (September 2, 2020): 27–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.15408/jisi.v1i1.17104.
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Abstract. This study discusses the political process relating to the issue of presidential prerogative control with an emphasis on the views and interests of the actors involved in discussing the issue. This study explains two main questions, namely how the actualization of presidential prerogative powers in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment and what is behind the ambivalence of the president's prerogative power formulation in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment. This study finds that constitutional amendments related to the president's prerogatives show ambivalence that distorts the prerogative meaning itself and is not strict between limiting or actually expanding the president's power. This happens because of the tug-of-war between legislative and executive interests. Behind the issue of controlling the president's prerogative powers, there is the interest of legislative institutions to equalize power with the president. Instead, the executive seeks to maintain or extend the president’s prerogative power.Keywords: Prerogative Power; Presidential; Amendment of Constitutions.Abstrak. Studi ini membahas proses politik berkaitan dengan isu pengendalian prerogatif presiden dengan penekanan pada pandangan dan kepentingan para aktor yang terlibat dalam pembahasan isu tersebut. Studi in menjelaskan dua pertanyaan pokok: (1) Bagaimana aktualisasi kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? (2) Apa yang melatarbelakangi ambivalensi rumusan kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? Hasil studi inii menemukan bahwa amandemen konstitusi terkait dengan prerogatif presiden menampakkan ambivalensi yang mendistorsi makna prerogatif itu sendiri dan tidak tegas antara membatasi atau justru memperluas kekuasaan presiden. Hal ini terjadi karena adanya tarik menarik antara kepentingan legislatif dan eksekutif. Di balik isu pengendalian kekuasaan prerogatif presiden, ada kepentingan institusi legislatif untuk menyetarakan kekuasaan dengan presiden. Sebaliknya, pihak eksekutif berupaya untuk mempertahankan atau mempeluas kekuasaan prerogatif presiden.Kata Kunci: Kekuasaan Prerogatif; Presidensial; Amandemen Konstitusi.
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Modrzejewska-Leśniewska, Joanna. "President of the state in the Afghan Constitutions." Studia z Polityki Publicznej, no. 1(5) (February 2, 2015): 137–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/kszpp.2015.1.8.
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The institution of the president exists in the majority of the countries of the western world.Depending on the prerogatives granted by the constitution, the president may performeither a representative function or have the real power. No matter what the role of thepresident is, the position is deeply embedded in the political system, and the constitutional law as well as political practice specify its scope of competencies and capabilities.When we go beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, we can also find the states where an officeof president is run. While its formation, Asian, African and South American societies,consciously or not, usually emulated the Euro-Atlantic experiences. In general, historicalbackground of the non-European states, however, makes the history of the presidentialoffice shorter, and the introduction of this position was often a result of violent sociopolitical changes. What often distinguishes the presidencies of the African and Asiancountries from the Euro-Atlantic ones is their instability – in running this office a lotdepends on the personality traits of the person holding it as well as on the tradition (orlack thereof) of strong central governance. On that premise, the presidency history ofa non-European state, i.e. Afghanistan can be presented. This is an interesting case sincethe above mentioned factors are clearly visible in here, and the state’s internal politicalsituation is unstable. In addition, as the international forces are supposed to be withdrawnfrom the country until the end of 2014, the president may then become the main bodyformulating public policy and, thus, shaping the future of Afghanistan.
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Loveman, Brian. "¿Mision Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition." Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 3 (1991): 35–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/165933.
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The armed forces have reconstructed authentic democracy. They have once again definitively carried out their mission…. I love this country more than Life itself.Captain General Augusto Pinochet11 September 1989The Constitution of 1980 does not meet, in its elaboration of the manner in which it was ratified, the essential conditions required by constitutional doctrine for the existence of a legitimate political order based on the rule of law.Francisco Cumplido C. (1983)Minister of Justice (1990)On 11 March 1990, Patricio Aylwin took office as Chile's first elected president since 1970. Chile thus joined the list of Latin American nations making a transition from military to civilian government. Like the civilian governments in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, El Salvador and Guatemala, Chile's new government faced the challenge of returning the armed forces to a less central role in politics and reducing their institutional prerogatives.
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Aspani, Budi. "PERGESERAN HAK PREROGATIF PRESIDEN PASCA AMANDEMEN UNDANG-UNDANG DASAR 1945." Solusi 18, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 91–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.36546/solusi.v18i1.259.
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The President as the Head of State has prerogative rights besides having authority in outgoing relations contained in the 1945 Constitution. In the case of the formation, amendment and dissolution of state ministries after the 1945 Constitution Amendments do not become the full authority of the President, but are based on the law (Article 17 paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution), so that there will be no more unilateral dissolution of a state ministry by the President. The issues to be discussed are as follows: What has been changed in the amendment to the 1945 Constitution regarding the President's Prerogative Rights, and how the amendments to the 1945 Constitution on the President's Prerogative Rights on the government system in Indonesia. With the amendment of the 1945 Constitution four times, it has an influence on the position of the President in exercising his prerogative rights. The President's prerogative right before the amendment is not fully implemented to carry out the President's Constitutional obligations, but is related to political content. After the amendment to the 1945 Constitution there was a shift in the application of the President's prerogative rights, namely by including other state institutions in the implementation of the prerogative. Amendments to the 1945 Constitution on the President's Prerogative Rights did not result in a change in the Indonesian government system.
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Adhayanto, Oksep, Irman Irman, and Fithriatus Shalihah. "Comparison of the President Prerogative Rights in Indonesia Constitutions." FIAT JUSTISIA:Jurnal Ilmu Hukum 12, no. 3 (October 4, 2018): 192. http://dx.doi.org/10.25041/fiatjustisia.v12no3.1329.
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Prerogative rights can be interpreted as privileges or privileges, The Indonesian constitutional history that has used several constitutions indirectly has implications for the practice of the use of prerogative rights in Indonesia. This study research on the preogrative rights of the President in the Constitutions of Indonesia. The approach used in this study is normative juridical with the law approach model. It is concluded that the use of prerogative rights has ups and downs influenced by the concept of checks and balances and distribution of power. Therefore, the use of prerogative rights as in the previous constitution is more directed to heavy executives who do not require confirmation to other state institutions, now it has begun to be restricted so the use of the term prerogative privileges is no longer pure as before. Keyword: President, Prerogative Rights, Indonesia Constitution
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Swift, Elaine K. "The Making of an American House of Lords: The U.S. Senate in the Constitutional Convention of 1787." Studies in American Political Development 7, no. 2 (1993): 177–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x00001097.
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The Framers of the U.S. Constitution saw the Senate as their paramount creation. To James Madison, it was “the great anchor of the government,” and in his seminal plans for a new national government, the Senate figured as the most prominent and powerful institution, to be endowed with a potent combination of legislative, executive, and judicial prerogatives that were greater and more wide-ranging than those of either the House or the president. In the four months that the Framers met in Philadelphia, they spent more time and energy deliberating on the Senate than on any other single institution or issue, devoting most of the first seven critical weeks to the upper house, and thereafter, though more scattered, the equivalent of another week or two of consideration. In contrast, they focused on the House, executive, and federal judiciary for a few weeks each at most, and spent even less time on such vital issues as sectionalism and slavery. By the end of the Convention, the Framers had created an imposing chamber, possessing far more power and autonomy than any other upper house heretofore created in independent America. Small wonder, then, that in assessing the work of the Convention, the influential delegate from Connecticut, Roger Sherman, pronounced it “the most important branch in the government.” Smaller wonder still that the Framers would comprise over half the membership of the first Senate.
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Mattie, Sean. "Prerogative and the Rule of Law in John Locke and the Lincoln Presidency." Review of Politics 67, no. 1 (2005): 77–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500043333.
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Locke's Second Treatise of Government argues for the rule of law as just and rightful politics, not only in the fundamental legislation that is the constitution but also in regular governance by the legislature. Locke also argues for executive prerogative, the power of doing good without or even against law during contingency and necessity. Rule by legislation and rule by prerogative each preserve the political community and reflect its foundation out of the state of nature. But they do not easily coexist in the constitution, which provides no means to judge the rightful use of prerogative. President Lincoln's strong, discretionary actions during the crisis of the Civil War illustrate Locke's argument about prerogative's fundamental importance and its problematic relation to ordinary lawfulness. However, as Lincoln recognized, both the Constitution and Congress formally provided for an executive power that was remarkably compatible with the rule of law—and that thereby responded to the Lockean problem.
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Kazalska, Olga. "Zwolnienie z konstytucyjnego wymogu kontrasygnaty – rozważania na tle niekontrasygnowanych obwieszczeń Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o wolnych stanowiskach sędziego w Sądzie Najwyższym i Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym." Studia Iuridica 76 (January 17, 2019): 218–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.8620.
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On June 29, 2018 in Dziennik Urzędowy “Monitor Polski” (the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland) were published two announcements by the President of the Republic of Poland – from May 24, 2018, on the vacant positions of the judges in the Supreme Court and from May 28, 2018 on the vacant positions of the judge in the Supreme Administrative Court. The obligation to announce the number of vacant judges’ positions is a result of changes in the structure of the Supreme Court introduced by the new law of 8 December 2017 and the obligation to apply these provisions to the judges of the Supreme Administrative Court. The controversy is aroused by the fact that the published announcements were not countersigned – although this competence is not included in the catalog of presidential prerogatives, exempted from the obligation of co-signing by the Prime Minister. The analysis of the constitutional shape of the countersignature and the practice of using by the President of his competences will allow to answer the question whether the President’s announcements require for their validity the signature of the Prime Minister’s or are they exempt from this requirement. In the light of the doctrinal reflections, the recognition of the announcement of the President of the Republic of Poland on vacant judicial positions in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court may be considered as a derivative or analogous competence to the presidential prerogative of appointing judges. However, this stands in contradiction with the Constitutional Tribunal jurisprudence, which excludes the possibility of a broad interpretation of the constitutional catalog of prerogatives. Nevertheless, due to the informative, non-normative character of the announcements of the President, the issue of qualifying them to the catalog of official acts, for which the countersignature is required, raises reasonable doubts.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "President, Constitution, prerogatives"
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Senate, University of Arizona Faculty. "Faculty Senate Minutes August 28, 2017." University of Arizona Faculty Senate (Tucson, AZ), 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625785.
Full textBooks on the topic "President, Constitution, prerogatives"
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Presidential prerogative: Imperial power in an age of terrorism. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010.
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Serafino, Nina M., and Eleni G. Ekmektsioglou. Congress and National Security. Edited by Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190680015.013.13.
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Congress may not be seen as a major player in U.S. national security, but it is congressional action that sets the foundation on which national security policy is constructed. Congressional legislation empowers the actions of federal departments and agencies, authorizes and appropriates funds, and defines the roles and missions of different offices (and who can occupy them). Yet Congress’s role in national security can vary based on the president’s ability to respond quickly to set the national security agenda; the president’s acumen, political skills, and popularity; and structural and political limitations on how the legislature can impose its preferences on the executive branch. Congress finds it harder to prevail when the president responds in a crisis using preexisting powers and authorities, but it can constrain the executive branch using constitutional prerogatives along with informal means such as influencing public opinion.
Book chapters on the topic "President, Constitution, prerogatives"
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McConnell, Michael W. "The Three Varieties of Presidential Power." In The President Who Would Not Be King, 276–84. Princeton University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691207520.003.0016.
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This chapter reviews Article II's organization according to the nature of presidential powers: prerogative powers, qualified prerogative powers, powers or duties involving limited discretion, defeasible residual powers, or delegated powers. It analyzes the structure of Article II by two key variables: whether a presidential power derives from the Constitution or a statute, and whether it is defeasible or not. It also mentions Justice Robert Jackson's three-part framework in his concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case, which was adopted by a unanimous Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan. The chapter considers the Steel Seizure concurrence as a prime reason modern separation of powers jurisprudence is in disarray. It cites Jackson's claim that presidential powers are not fixed, but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.
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Farrier, Jasmine. "Lawful but Awful." In Constitutional Dysfunction on Trial, 140–46. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501702501.003.0008.
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This concluding chapter assesses whether federal courts can stop the systemic dysfunction in the separation of powers by policing every allegedly egregious instance of presidential overreach and/or force members of the House and Senate to revive institutional ambition? This book answers no, while also acknowledging the deep and broad existential crisis that has led hundreds of members to seek relief outside of the chambers' vast arsenal of existing constitutional weapons. The twelve interviews conducted for this book explored the “awful” side of congressional delegation of power and executive expansion, which are more than theoretical constitutional arguments. The human consequences of executive branch unilateralism can be tragic, with ripple effects that last decades. These points were especially prominent among members and attorneys on specific foreign policies that have destabilized governments around the world and inflicted lasting harm to innocent civilians and, some argue, long-term U.S. national security. The “lawful” perspective of these conflicts is not necessarily a defense of these policies, nor a muscular executive branch in general. Rather, federal judges cannot take on the presidency in sustained and meaningful ways without Congress's support for its own prerogatives and powers—regardless of which party is in power and where.
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Strote, Noah Benezra. "Sectarian Visions of the Economy." In Lions and Lambs. Yale University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300219050.003.0003.
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This chapter examines the failure of elites to build consensus on a proper policy response to the onset of worldwide economic depression after the crash of the New York Stock Exchange in October 1929. Economic crisis overwhelmed all other public discussion in the early spring of 1930, when the Social Democratic chancellor Hermann Müller and his cabinet were forced to resign. In this potentially dire situation, Paul von Hindenburg decided to use his constitutional prerogative as president to declare a national emergency. In Hindenburg's eyes, not only had the Müller regime failed to formulate a response to the downturn, but more fundamentally, they had divided the national community, stoking class conflict and alienating the religious communities by advocating a complete separation of church and state. Thus, Hindenburg appointed Heinrich Brüning as chancellor, a policy expert from the country's Center Party, which represents the interests of Germany's Catholic population and was still strongly affiliated with the Catholic Church.
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Cleveland, Sarah H., and Paul B. Stephan. "Introduction." In The Restatement and Beyond, 1–20. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197533154.003.0001.
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This introductory chapter serves as a foreword for the volume. It sketches the history of past restatements and the evolution of the latest one. The first (confusingly called Second) Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States brought widespread attention to the term “foreign relations law.” It staunchly defended the proposition that foreign relations, no matter how imbued with discretion and prerogative, still must rest on law. The Third Restatement, prepared during a period of what to many seemed constitutional retrenchment and a loosening of judicial supervision over public life, offered a robust defense of the proposition that, “In conducting the foreign relations of the United States, Presidents, members of Congress, and public officials are not at large in a political process; they are under law.” Moreover, it insisted that the judiciary, as much as the executive and Congress, creates and enforces this law. To the extent that the Third Restatement rested its claims on its view of the state of customary international law, other influential actors pushed back. The Fourth Restatement revisits the Third’s claims, especially about the central role of the judiciary, in light of the evolution of both U.S. and international law and practice.