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Relevant bibliographies by topics / President Dwight Eisenhower

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Academic literature on the topic 'President Dwight Eisenhower'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "President Dwight Eisenhower"

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Bologna, Matthew Joseph. "The United States and Sputnik: A Reassessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower's Presidential Legacy." General: Brock University Undergraduate Journal of History 3 (December 18, 2018): 29–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.26522/gbuujh.v3i0.1722.

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Dwight D. Eisenhower's legacy as President of the United States from 1953 to 1961 has experienced a dramatic reversal in scholarly assessment. Previously denounced as a "do-nothing" president whose ignorance and complacency tarnished the prestige of the executive office, the declassification of National Security Archives, the publication of Eisenhower's memoirs, and the memoirs of those closest to the president has contributed to a shift in Eisenhower's reputation from animosity to admiration. Scholars now praise Eisenhower for his modesty, wisdom, and resourcefulness. This paper contributes to the ongoing historiographical revaluation of Eisenhower's presidential legacy by examining his handling of an overlooked episode of American history - the Sputnik Crisis of 1957. Upon receiving word of the successful launch of the Soviet satellite in October 1957, Eisenhower surrounded himself with scientists, academics, and engineers to formulate the most appropriate policy responses to Sputnik, and to refute Congressional calls for increased military spending. As such, Eisenhower accelerated the American satellite program, established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), reorganized the Department of Defense to eliminate inter-service rivalry, and provided for moderate infusions of federal funding into post-secondary education via the National Defense Education Act. Indeed, Eisenhower's strategic handling of the Sputnik Crisis cements Eisenhower's reputation as an effective, proactive, and overall effective president.

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Lymar, Margaryta. "European integration in the foreign policy of Dwight Eisenhower." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 7 (2019): 27–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2019.07.27-36.

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The article deals with European integration processes through the prism of the President Eisenhower foreign policy. The transatlantic relations are explored considering the geopolitical transformations in Europe. It is noted that after the end of World War II, Europe needed assistance on the path to economic recovery. Eisenhower initially as Commander in Chief of NATO forces in Europe, and later as the U.S. President, directed his foreign policy efforts to unite the states of Western Europe in their post-war renovating and confronting the communist threat. For that reason, Eisenhower deserved recognition by the leading European governments and became a major American figure, which symbolized the reliable transatlantic ally. Eisenhower’s interest in a united Europe was explained by the need for the United States in a strong single European partner that would help to strengthening the U.S. positions in the international arena. The United States expected to control the European integration processes through NATO instruments and mediated disputes between the leading European powers. Germany’s accession to the Alliance was determined as one of the key issues, the solution of which became the diplomatic victory of President Eisenhower. The U.S. government was building its European policy based on the need to integrate the Western states into a unified power, and therefore endorsed the prospect of creating a European Economic Community (EEC). It was intended that the union would include Italy, France, Germany and the Benelux members, and form a basis for the development of free trade and the deeper political and economic integration of the regional countries. It is concluded that, under the Eisenhower’s presidency, Europe was at the top of priority list of the U.S. foreign policy that significantly influenced the evolution of the European integration process in the future.

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Gilbert, Robert E. "Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack: Medical treatment, political effects, and the “behind the scenes” leadership style." Politics and the Life Sciences 27, no. 1 (March 2008): 2–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.2990/27_1_2.

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During his first term as President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower suffered several serious illnesses. Particularly important was the massive heart attack he experienced in the fall of 1955. Drawing on primary sources as well as prior scholarship, this article analyzes varying interpretations of Eisenhower's 1955 medical treatment in light of his previous illnesses and their management. It explores the handling of public disclosure by the White House, by Eisenhower himself, and by his medical team. And it reconsiders Republican strategists' efforts to allay public concerns about the President's health. Current understanding is called into question in several respects. Although it sharpened speculation about his fitness and willingness to run in the 1956 presidential campaign, the 1955 heart attack made Eisenhower more likely, rather than less likely, to run. Although often sick, and in several instances critically so, Eisenhower was clearly the dominant player — intentionally “behind the scenes” — both in the management of his illnesses and in the health-perceptual aspects of his drive toward a second term. These findings should lead us to a better reading of Eisenhower as a president and to a better appreciation of health's linkage to legacy in presidential politics.

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Holbo, Paul S., and Joann P. Krieg. "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier, President, Statesman." Journal of American History 75, no. 3 (December 1988): 1010. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1901702.

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MASON, ROBERT. "CITIZENS FOR EISENHOWER AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1951–1965." Historical Journal 56, no. 2 (May 3, 2013): 513–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x12000593.

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ABSTRACTFounded in support of Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1952 presidential candidacy, Citizens for Eisenhower took on an ambitious mission to revitalize the Republican party by expanding its activist ranks and by supporting the moderation of its conservative policy agenda. The organization proved unable to sustain the impressive momentum that it achieved during the 1952 campaign, however, instead helping to fuel factional opposition that informed the intraparty upsurge of conservatism during the 1950s and afterwards. The Eisenhower administration's efforts to encourage Citizens activists to join the party were flawed, and existing Republican activists often viewed such newcomers with hostility. More significantly, despite recruitment initiatives, in most cases activism in support of Eisenhower did not translate into enthusiasm for the party cause. The history of Citizens for Eisenhower therefore demonstrates the seriousness of Eisenhower's interests as president in boosting the Republican party's fortunes, but also the shortcomings of ‘amateur’ political activity in support of the party cause. It also sheds light on goals and activities of this era's moderate Republicans, together with their role in fostering the conservative resurgence that characterized the post-Eisenhower Republican party.

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Millett, Allan R. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Korean War: Cautionary Tale and Hopeful Precedent." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 10, no. 3-4 (2001): 155–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187656101793645515.

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AbstractLike most real history, the Korean War left ambiguous, selective, and complex lessons for the policymakers of the Eisenhower administration. The president himself, to borrow Dean Acheson’s phrase, had been “present at the creation” of the war in 1950. He had then distanced himself from it as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and as a presidential candidate. He inherited the conflict—a war to be ended—as president. Yet the war never became a defining experience for Dwight D. Eisenhower, nor did it play an inordinate role in his foreign and defense policies. His geo-strategic views had developed well before 1950, most obviously during World War II. The Korean conflict, a post-colonial civil war that became an internationalized regional conflict, was not even unique enough in its own time to dominate the national security conceptualization that became “the New Look” or “the Great Equation.” It might have encouraged a “Great Evasion,” an unwillingness to deal with instability in the Middle East and Asia, but instead the Eisenhower administration coped, more or less successfully, with comparable turmoil in the Philippines, Thailand, Iran, and Lebanon. It is true that the next land war in Asia—to be avoided at all costs according to the Korean “never again” strategic gurus—awaited a change of presidents, but President Eisenhower committed an Army-Marine Corps expeditionary force to Lebanon in 1958. So much for avoiding the use of American ground forces in local wars.

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Cuddy, Edward. "Vietnam: Mr. Johnson's War—or Mr. Eisenhower's?" Review of Politics 65, no. 4 (2003): 351–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500039073.

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Conventional wisdom pins responsibility for the Vietnam War primarily on Lyndon B. Johnson. This essay presents a revisionist argument, attempting to shift primary responsibility for the war on President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The case rests heavily on John F. Kennedy's challenge to historians: “How the hell” can they evaluate presidential performances unless they know the “real pressures” and the “real alternatives” confronting the occupiers of the Oval Office. In assessing those pressures, this essay concludes that Eisenhower had the unique luxury of a clean break from President Truman's commitments, thanks to the Vietnamese victory at Dien Bien Phu, and a clear-cut alternative provided by the Geneva Accords. Unfortunately, Eisenhower chose to ignore the Accords, committed America to South Vietnam, and played a major role, during and after his presidency, in creating the heavy pressures that shaped Johnson's Vietnam decisions.

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Allen, Craig. "News Conferences on TV: Ike-Age Politics Revisited." Journalism Quarterly 70, no. 1 (March 1993): 13–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107769909307000103.

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Televised presidential news conferences marked an advancement in media history; for the first time, tools of electronic journalism were used in covering them. Yet as early as 1955, when the first TV news conference was held under Dwight Eisenhower, it was also known that these events could benefit a president at least as much as the journalistic community. In opening news conferences to cameras and microphones, Eisenhower sought a means of channeling information directly to millions of home viewers in a way that could not be mediated by skeptical reporters, particularly those who wrote for newspapers and magazines. Despite complaints by print reporters, Eisenhower took steps to make TV news conferences a fixture, his press secretary conceiving them as a “very potent way of getting the president's personality and viewpoints” across to the American public.

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Herd, Alexander W. G. "A “Common Appreciation”: Eisenhower, Canada, and Continental Air Defense, 1953–1954." Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 3 (July 2011): 4–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00140.

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Cold War scholarship has largely neglected Canada's role, including the important part Canada played in U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower's defense policy. This article shows that after the Soviet thermonuclear detonation in August 1953, the Eisenhower administration urgently sought Canada's participation in joint continental air defense plans. Canadian officials thereafter struggled to minimize U.S. intrusions on their national sovereignty and ensure the integrity of Canada's national interests. To accomplish their respective goals, the two sides instituted secret, high-level consultative meetings from October 1953 through September 1954. The meetings enabled U.S. and Canadian officials to exchange views regarding U.S. proposals for an early warning network across northern Canada and allowed the Eisenhower administration to keep its Canadian counterpart apprised of U.S. defense plans. U.S.-Canadian interactions during this period set the tone for the two countries' defense relationship throughout the Cold War.

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Daniel, Douglass K. "They Liked Ike: Pro-Eisenhower Publishers and His Decision to Run for President." Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 77, no. 2 (June 2000): 393–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107769900007700211.

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Historians have portrayed Dwight D. Eisenhower as a reluctant candidate for president, one requiring persuasion from friends and advisers before undertaking a campaign for the Republican nomination in 1952. Lending their voices to the effort were several newspaper publishers and a few reporters. Drawing from correspondence in the Eisenhower Library, this study analyzes how the information they provided, from early poll results to analyses of opponents, may have helped persuade the general to seek the nomination. It also explores the nature of press partisanship of the era.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "President Dwight Eisenhower"

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Jones, Brian Madison. "Abolishing the taboo : President Eisenhower and the permissible use of nuclear weapons for national security." Diss., Manhattan, Kan. : Kansas State University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/773.

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Leppert, Glenn Wesley. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and People-to-People as an experiment in personal diplomacy : a missing element for understanding Eisenhower's second term as President /." Search for this dissertation online, 2003. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ksu/main.

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King, Brian Robert. "Presidential Management of International Crises: Structured Management Approaches and Crisis Learning." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1115380406.

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Cannatella, Dylan S. "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Politics of Anti-Communism at Columbia University: Anti-Intellectualism and the Cold War during the General's Columbia Presidency." ScholarWorks@UNO, 2017. http://scholarworks.uno.edu/td/2302.

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Dwight D. Eisenhower has been criticized as an anti-intellectual by scholars such as Richard Hofstadter. Eisenhower’s tenure as president of Columbia University was one segment of his career he was particularly criticized for because of his non-traditional approach to education there. This paper examines Eisenhower’s time at Columbia to explain how anti-intellectualism played into his university administration. It explains how his personality and general outlook came to clash with the intellectual environment of Columbia especially in the wake of the faculty revolt against former Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler. It argues that Eisenhower utilized the Columbia institution to promote a Cold War educational agenda, which often belittled Columbia intellectuals and their scholarly pursuits. However, this paper also counter-argues that Eisenhower, despite accusations of anti-intellectualism, was an academically interested man who never engaged in true suppression of free thought despite pressure from McCarthyite influences in American government, media and business.

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Hilmy, Hanny. "Sovereignty, Peacekeeping, and the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), Suez 1956-1967: Insiders’ Perspectives." Thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/5888.

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This research is concerned with the complex and contested relationship between the sovereign prerogatives of states and the international imperative of defusing world conflicts. Due to its historical setting following World War Two, the national vs. international staking of claims was framed within the escalating imperial-nationalist confrontation and the impending “end of empire”, both of which were significantly influenced by the role Israel played in this saga. The research looks at the issue of “decolonization” and the anti-colonial struggle waged under the leadership of Egypt’s President Nasser. The Suez War is analyzed as the historical event that signaled the beginning of the final chapter in the domination of the European empires in the Middle East (sub-Saharan decolonization followed beginning in the early 1960s), and the emergence of the United States as the new major Western power in the Middle East. The Suez experience highlighted a stubborn contest between the defenders of the concept of “sovereign consent” and the advocates of “International intervention”. Both the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and its termination were surrounded by controversy and legal-political wrangling. The role of UNEF and UN peacekeeping operations in general framed the development of a new concept for an emerging international human rights law and crisis management. The UNEF experience, moreover, brought into sharp relief the need for a conflict resolution component for any peace operation. International conflict management, and human rights protection are both subject to an increasing interventionist international legal regime. Consequently, the traditional concept of “sovereignty” is facing increasing challenge. By its very nature, the subject matter of this multi-dimensional research involves historical, political and international legal aspects shaping the research’s content and conclusions. The research utilizes the experience and contributions of several key participants in this pioneering peacekeeping experience. In the last chapter, recommendations are made –based on all the elements covered in the research- to suggest contributions to the evolving UN ground rules for international crisis intervention and management.
Graduate
hilmyh@uvic.ca

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Books on the topic "President Dwight Eisenhower"

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Steenwyk, Elizabeth Van. Dwight David Eisenhower, president. New York, N.Y: Walker, 1987.

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Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier and president. Greensboro, N.C: Morgan Reynolds, 2002.

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E, Ambrose Stephen. Eisenhower: Soldier and President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990.

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Dwight D. Eisenhower, our thirty-fourth president. Chanhassen, Minn: Child's World, 2002.

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Dwight D. Eisenhower: Our thirty-fourth president. Mankato, Minn: Child's World, 2009.

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Russoli, Edward. Dwight D. Eisenhower: General, president and cook. Allentown, Pa. (22 S. 16th St., Allentown 18102): Benedettini Books, 1990.

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Cannon, Marian G. Dwight David Eisenhower: War hero and president. New York: Watts, 1990.

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Ellis, Rafaela. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 34th president of the United States. Ada, Okla: Garrett Educational Corp., 1989.

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Hargrove, Jim. Dwight D. Eisenhower: Thirty-fourth president of the United States. Chicago: Childrens Press, 1987.

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The hidden-hand presidency: Eisenhower as leader. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

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Book chapters on the topic "President Dwight Eisenhower"

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Walch, Timothy. "Dear Mr. President, 1957." In Herbert Hoover and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 191–215. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137334091_9.

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Pfeffer, Stephen T. "AFTER THE PRESIDENCY." In A Companion To Dwight D. Eisenhower, 535–54. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119027737.ch27.

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Holl, Jack M. "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Civil Religion and the Cold War." In Religion and the American Presidency, 119–37. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230604155_7.

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Holl, Jack M. "Dwight D. Eisenhower: Civil Religion and the Cold War." In Religion and the American Presidency, 133–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62175-3_7.

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Lupton, Danielle L. "A Reputation for Resolute Action." In Reputation for Resolve, 89–114. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501747717.003.0005.

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This chapter explores how Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev viewed the resolve of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, considering Khrushchev's decision making surrounding the 1958 Berlin Crisis. The historical record shows that Eisenhower's early statements were particularly influential to the formation of his reputation, as they created expectations of how he would behave in the future. However, Eisenhower was unable to solidify his reputation for resolve at the 1955 Geneva Summit, as Khrushchev perceived Secretary of State John Foster Dulles rather than President Eisenhower as being in direct control of negotiations at the summit. Yet, in the year leading up to the 1958 Berlin Ultimatum, Khrushchev's perception of who was in control of U.S. foreign policy shifted to emphasize the importance of Eisenhower to America's Berlin policy. And the president's statements leading up to the Berlin Crisis led Khrushchev to believe Eisenhower was unlikely to make major concessions on the issue. Eisenhower's subsequent firm response to the Berlin Crisis then confirmed Khrushchev's expectations of the president's resolve. Accordingly, Eisenhower established a reputation for resolute action that would last until the end of his presidency. Further evidence suggests that Eisenhower's actions as a general during World War II were influential to Khrushchev's early perceptions of the president.

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"3. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Dien Bien Phu." In The President and His Inner Circle, 64–96. Columbia University Press, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.7312/pres11620-004.

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Ritchie, Donald A. "Disliking Ike." In The Columnist, 181–202. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190067588.003.0009.

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Although Drew Pearson encouraged Dwight Eisenhower to run for president, he quickly lost his enthusiasm and became a frequent critic. Pearson had hoped that Eisenhower would stand up against McCarthyism but considered his response to be weak. Knowing that many of the newspapers that carried the “Merry-Go-Round” were Republican, Pearson tried to cover the Republican administration fairly, while scrutinizing it thoroughly. His columns helped to defeat the nomination of Lewis Strauss to be secretary of commerce, and forced the resignation of Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Sherman Adams. Eisenhower’s objective of a “leak-free” administration made investigative reporting harder and caused Pearson to be frequently assailed by Eisenhower’s press secretary, James Hagerty, for publishing lies. Later evidence, however, has supported Pearson’s reporting and revealed Hagerty to be the liar.

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Prados, John. "The Parallax Shift." In The US Special Forces. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wentk/9780199354283.003.0003.

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Special Forces materialized during a period when US military doctrine was actually least favorable to their creation. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who entered office near the end of the Korean War, the military’s emphasis shifted from preparing its forces for near-term potential conflict...

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Immerman, Richard H. "The Bush Administration’s Decision to Surge in Iraq." In The Last Card, 328–43. Cornell University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501715181.003.0016.

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This chapter argues—using the Eisenhower administration as a model of peacetime national security decision making—that the surge decision-making process displayed by the oral histories was idiosyncratic, excessively compartmentalized, and profoundly flawed. No president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has fully adopted his model, and each has tailored procedures appropriate for his needs. The Bush process had to take into account his lack of expertise in military affairs, an increasingly polarized political climate, the legacy of the Vietnam War, the proliferation of leaks of sensitive information in the new media age, the resistance of the uniformed military leadership, and most important, Rumsfeld. Administration insiders argue that for these reasons Bush jettisoned fundamental tenets of Eisenhower's system in an effort to make a virtue out of necessity. Yet the evidence suggests that Eisenhower's best practices are just that—best practices. It further suggests that their rigorous application would have benefited Bush's process by expediting the instigation of a comprehensive review, co-opting opponents of a change in strategy, mitigating politicization, facilitating the exchange of information and advice, and accelerating implementation.

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Fuller, Robert L. "France and the United States, Allies in War." In The Struggle for Cooperation, 8–27. University Press of Kentucky, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813176628.003.0002.

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General de Gaulle transformed the Free French from a minor committee in London into France’s provisional government in the face of enormous obstacles. These included President Roosevelt, who planned to impose an Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories (AMGOT) in France, replacing the German occupation and the Vichy regime with an Anglo-American occupation. This never happened because it was vigorously opposed not only by de Gaulle but also by the Allied military chief who would have been responsible for it, General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower had faced this same dilemma in French North Africa in 1942 and had managed to avoid assuming responsibility for governing French domains. He replicated this modus vivendi in France in 1944.

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