Journal articles on the topic 'Presidential Medals'

A short essay was published about Pál Losonczi, the Presidential Council’s president and about his medals, which are owned by our museum int he pages of Numizmatikai Közlöny. Now our main purpose is to elaborate the medal-col-lection of the wife of the former President. As a part of diplo-matic protocol, Mrs. Pálné Losonczi often kept his husband’s company during his external visits, when she also got pres-tigous medals. In our opinion all of information about prize-winners belong to the verification of the objects. Our script tries to answer the question, who Mrs. Pálné Losonczi was with the technique of oral history. After it her four medals will be intro-duced professionally, which are held in our museum right now.

We write this Editorial Introduction following the conclusion of the First Annual Conference and Awards Ceremony of the European Society for Person Centered Healthcare (ESPCH) hosted by Francisco de Vitoria University, Madrid, Spain, on 3 & 4 July 2014. The Conference proved an important event which successfully brought together a very wide range of distinguished speakers and delegates from across the length and breadth of Europe, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere. Following the close of Day One of the Conference, and prior to the Conference Dinner, we were pleased to confer on particularly eminent colleagues, the Society's Platinum, Gold, Silver and Bronze Medals, the Presidential Medal and the Senior Vice Presidential Medal and, in addition, to award the Society's Essay Prize and Book Prize. A full Conference Report, with the usual obligatory photographs and a YouTube videolink to highlights of the proceedings, has been included within the first e-Bulletin of the European Society for Person Centered Healthcare, the Society's new bi-monthly and detailed Newsletter.

“Myanmar is telling Asia ‘we are coming back!’ This is the time. Watch out! We are coming back. After the SEA Games, we will host ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. Big things are happening in our country.” “Kyaw,” an amiable rig coordinator in his early thirties, was relaxing on the ground drinking beer with his wife, passing the time prior to Myanmar's opening men's football match of the 2013 Southeast Asian or SEA Games. Fifteen days later—after a glorious opening ceremony, a slew of gold medals, and a celebratory closing ceremony—his assessment seemed prescient. The government newspaper,The New Light of Myanmar, boasted: “With the honor of hosting the Games that returned to the country after a 44-year long wait, Myanmar successfully hosted the biggest regional sporting event.” Thailand'sNationconcurred: “The country failed to overhaul Thailand as overall winners, but its symbolic triumph as host was far more important.” “Myanmar has basked in its host status and a rare moment in the international limelight after years in isolation under military rule,” declared Agence France-Presse in a widely syndicated article. “Some local and international observers thought Myanmar could not host the SEA Games. They were wrong,” boasted triumphant presidential spokesman U Ye Htut.

Since the fall of the ‘New Order’ in 1998, democratic reforms in Indonesia deeply changed the Constitution. The President may be elected only two times. The Presidential and general elections are general, direct, equal, secret polls. The Army reduced control over National Police. The Army lost its dual function, impliing its highest authority in politics and other social and economic issues. Democratic reforms include changes in the award system of Indonesia. Since the Independence, most orders, decorations and medals have been of the military kind. Even those awards, which should have been civilian by their statutes, were often given to the military personnel for particular services to the State. In 2009, then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed the Law No. 20 ‘About the Titles, Decorations and Awards’ (Tentang Gelar, Tanda Jasa, Dan Tanda Kehormatan). The Act established the division of the orders into civilian and military groups. The civilian orders are higher than military ones. Both groups include seven orders each. The Law instituted two new civilian orders — Bintang Kemanusiaan and Bintang Penegak Demokrasi. The Bintang Kemanusiaan, or the Star of Humanities, has the only class. The Bintang Penegak Demokrasi, or the Star of the Upholder of Democracy, has three classes. Both awards are rewarded to President and Vice-President ex officio. There are no recipients of the Bintang Kemanusiaan, with the exception of Presidents Yudhoyono and Joko Vidodo and their Vice-Presidents. There are still only four recipients of the Bintang Penegak Demokrasi Utama, or first class. The Bintang Kemanusiaan and Bintang Penegak Demokrasi show the highly hierarchic structure of the Indonesian State.

Prof. Dr. Omar Abou El Seould was born in Cairo, Egypt on May 21, 1945. He obtained the B.S. and M.S. Degrees in Chemistry from Ain Shams University, Cairo in 1964 and 1966, respectively, and was awarded the Doctor of Chemistry Degree by the University of São Paulo, Brazil in 1972. He has occupied various faculty positions at the University of São Paulo and at the present is Full Professor of Organic Chemistry. His research interests deal with green chemistry, modified biopolymers, synthesis and applications of surfactants, and education in chemistry. He has trained a large number of research scientists including many master and doctoral students and is the author of approximately four hundred scientific works. Prof. Omar Abou El Seoud is the recipient of many scientific prizes and awards including the Presidential Medal of Scientific Merit and is a member of the Brazilian Academy of Science.

Wilbert J. McKeachie has been the president of the American Psychological Association (APA), the American Association of Higher Education, the American Psychological Foundation, the Division of Educational and School Psychology of the International Association of Applied Psychology, and APA's Divisions 2 and 15. He received his PhD at the University of Michigan in 1949 and is former Director of the University of Michigan Center for Research on Learning and Teaching. He also served as Chair of the Psychology Department at the University of Michigan from 1961 to 1971. Professor McKeachie has received eight honorary degrees, the American Psychological Foundation Gold Medal for Lifetime Contributions to Psychology, and the American Psychological Association Presidential Citation for exemplary service to the academic and scientific community. His classic book, Teaching Tips, is now in its 12th edition (McKeachie & Svinicki, 2006). Héfer Bembenutty is an Assistant Professor of Educational Psychology at Queens College of The City University of New York in the Department of Secondary and Youth Services. He received his BA in psychology from the University of Michigan, an MS in psychology from Eastern Michigan University, and an MA and PhD in educational psychology from The City University of New York. He maintains an active research agenda in students' and teachers' self-regulation of learning, the effects of test anxiety on learning, homework self-regulation, self-efficacy beliefs, multicultural education, and academic delay of gratification. He teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in educational psychology, cognition, instruction and technology, human development and learning, classroom management, and multicultural education.

If one morning I walked on top of the water across the Potomac River, the headline that afternoon would read: "President Can't Swim". —Lyndon B. Johnson Introduction The term “spin” implies manipulating the truth, and this concept, along with “spin doctoring,” is now common in media and public discourse. The prevalence of “spin zones” in American politics is undeniable; media outlets themselves, such as Bill O’Reilly’s “No Spin Zone” on Fox News, now run segments on the topic. Despite this apparent media certainty about what constitutes “spin” there is a lack of conceptual clarity regarding the term among those who study media and politics. This article will draw on previous literature to identify two competing yet overlapping spin zones in American politics: the media’s spin zone and the President’s spin zone. Highlighting examples from the two most recent American presidential election campaigns, the article will evaluate the interplay of these zones and the consequences for future campaigns. Spin Zones In the United States, the press and the President are engaged in a struggle over providing information. Ever since the Watergate Scandal, the media is increasingly expected to be a “watchdog” that informs citizens and keeps the Executive accountable (Coronel 13) The President, conversely, may attempt to use the power of his position to set the discursive agenda or frame the political debate in his favor. Furthermore, with the rise of multi-media access and information provision, the lines between the spin doctoring of the Executive and the media have become even more blurred. Because of the complexities of these overlapping spin zones, many scholars disagree on how to define and/or precisely measure these effects. The following section briefly describes the ‘spin zone’ tools of agenda setting, framing, and priming, and then considers the example of a candidate who failed to prime his negative evaluation and a President who primes his image and successfully counterattacks his negative evaluation. The literature recognises two separate, yet interrelated zones that are integral to understanding these media/presidential relations: what we term the presidential spin zone and the media spin zone. The interplay between these zones comes together around three key concepts—agenda setting, framing, and priming. A key difficulty for scholars is that the President, his electoral challengers, and the press are engaged in agenda setting, framing and priming, sometimes simultaneously. Agenda setting is a broad concept and refers to focusing on certain issues to the exclusion of others. Framing is defined as the decision by the news media to “emphasise certain elements to define the ‘public’s belief’ about social and political issues” (Van Gorp 488). Other scholars describe priming as “a disproportionate amount of public comments with the hope . . . of causing voters to base their selection among the candidates on [that] issue” (Druckman et al. 1181; see also Druckman “Framing Effects”; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley; Van Gorp). Candidates may also undertake “image priming,” which is proposed by James Druckman et al., as a tool that can be used to counteract negative candidate evaluations (1182–1183). The definition of the media spin zone is, in most instances, synonymous with priming. Defining the presidential spin zone is more complex. Clearly the presidential spin zone involves both the previously-discussed “issue framing abilities of the president” and how he “set[s] the agenda” (Miller and Krosnick 301; see also, Gamson and Modigliano, Baumgardner and Jones; Druckman, “Framing Effects”). Mark Rozell, for instance, found that the Ford and Carter administrations had difficulty controlling the public agenda since many issues were either beyond their control, or because the president and his advisors lacked the strategy or skill to affect media coverage. The Reagan White House however was able to use his “image” to control the media (85–86). Similarly, George W. Bush’s administration was able to implement policies concerning the invasion of Iraq after the 9-11 through “issue framing” scare tactics, which were constantly reinforced by media outlets (Kellner 643). However, the President can also be engaged in priming at any given time. In other words, the President (or candidate) may attempt to prime what the media has already spun about him/her. A problem, of course, is that the President or candidate, in attempting to prime an issue that has already been spun in a sense tacitly admits they have lost the opportunity to set the agenda in the first place. However, this is when he can seize the aforementioned opportunity to use “image priming” to counterattack the media. In the examples that follow we examine whether the President or candidate can use priming to effectively counterattack the media spin zone, with a focus on two political tools that have been historically reserved for the President or candidates, namely, holding the base and wedge issues. Holding the Base and the Media Spin Zone Holding the base has been defined as a way in which candidates or Presidents can use the media to strengthen support among voters who already identify with their political party (Iyengar and McGrady 246). A classic example of this is the 1984 Reagan/Bush re-election campaign, the “The Bear.” This featured a bear in the woods that “some” could “see” and others didn’t “see at all” which was an implicit threat regarding Soviet communism and a reminder that Reagan was tough on foreign policy (“The Bear”). However, the evidence indicates that the media has increasingly begun “holding the base” on its own to facilitate its partisan framing and priming of candidates or Presidents. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth attack advertisements on 2004 Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry is a key example of a media attempt to “hold the base.” In these advertisements, former “Swift Boat Veterans attack[ed] his [Kerry’s] military record” (Muravchik A17). While this initiative began as a means to collect Republican donations, Shanto Iyengar and Jennifer McGrady maintain that the amount was “trivial” and that the real impact came with “the torrent of news reports across the country” (150). Indeed, Kathleen Jamieson and Joseph Capella found that by August 2004, “viewers of Fox News were more likely than other network viewers to say that candidate John Kerry did not earn his Vietnam medals” (279). Their evaluation of this data demonstrated the power of the media spin zone: “He (Limbaugh) employs intense language, disparaging information and negative framing to distance perceptions of the Democratic candidate from those of the anointed Republican candidate” (Jamieson and Capella 228). The coverage of disputes surrounding Kerry’s military record was augmented by the media’s simultaneous coverage of the threat of terrorism. This priming “in the media continued, reaching a high peak of 55 threat messages in August 2004, a month later 25% of the public was very concerned about another major terrorist attack in the US—two months before the presidential election” (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro 120). Both President Bush and Candidate Kerry acknowledged that their respective win/loss could be attributed in some measure to the press coverage of the “war on terror” (Nacos, Bloch-Elkon and Shapiro 124). While questions loomed about his military experience against the backdrop of the war on terror, Senator Kerry won the first two Presidential debates by significant margins. Alec Gallup and Frank Newport suggested that the Kerry camp had “won the spin contest … to characterize their own candidate as the winner” (406). So, what happened to Kerry? The media spin zone stopped him. The presidential debate wins were 30 September 2004 and 8 October 2004, respectively. Iyengar and McGrady demonstrate that before the debates even began the number of Swift Boat veteran stories primed in the national and international press went from under 100 to over 500 (151). According to Kim Fridkin et al. the media’s spin was a significant factor in the third debate. They found that media coverage concerning Senator Kerry’s response to one question on whether homosexuality was a choice affected citizens’ evaluations of the candidate. In the post debate coverage, the tone “in newspapers, on the Internet, and on television was uniformly negative in its assessment of Senator Kerry’s comments” (Fridkin et al. 30). The impact of this negative framing was sufficiently strong to override positive evaluations of Kerry held by those who watched the debate. In sum, the “perfect storm of media coverage lessened the bounce that Senator Kerry received from the actual debate and led people to develop negative impressions of Kerry a mere three weeks before Election Day” (Fridkin 43). Despite these liabilities, Kerry should have counterattacked the media spin zone. He should have “counterpunched,” as noted by Drew Westen, priming the media that he was “a different kind of Democrat”—“one who knows when it’s time to take off the gloves” (337). Westen’s advice is echoed in Druckman’s call for further research in this area as well as by his own research findings. The media’s framing and priming led to negative evaluations of Kerry, which afforded him the opportunity to prime his “image” in a counterattack, as Druckman suggests (1183). Overcoming the Wedge Issues of the Media Spin Zone President Obama, however, orchestrates a different outcome in dealing with the media spin zone attack against him which centered on a “wedge” or “us verses them” issue. Iyengar and McGrady note that “wedge issues are designed to pit groups against each other, to appeal to voters’ sense of group identity” (145). However, they define wedge issues within the context of presidential spin zones; thus, the candidate or the president would be framing the “us versus them” topic. In this instance, the media framed a wedge issue, the status of President Obama’s citizenship, against him. In this case the birther movement, oft-promoted by conservative radio host Rush Limbaugh, argued that President Obama was not a US citizen. This issue became so prominent that it was soon adopted by the media spin zone. The media framing demanded proof in addition to the short form birth certificate that the President had already released (Wilson 109). For his part, President Obama handled the media spin zone’s wedge issue with great aplomb, responding in a brief statement to the public on 27 April 2011: “We do not have time for this kind of silliness” (Shear). Moreover, he did not alienate the media for framing the birther movement, but he placed the blame implicitly on Donald Trump who had taken up the birther gauntlet thrown down by Rush Limbaugh. It was “clearly Trump” he was priming when he indicated that he did not want to be “distracted by sideshows and carnival barkers” (Shear). Moreover, his strategic focus on “silliness” is an illustration of “image priming”. He did not allow himself to be drawn into the race-baiting or religious controversy that was a component of some of the media talk show discussions. The Washington Post reported after Obama’s speech that the percentage of Americans who questioned his legitimacy to serve as President dropped from 20% to 10%—thus legitimating his choice to address the nation. This result meant that the President responded to an attack from the media spin zone with a counterattack of his own; he effectively counterattacked to prime his image. Interestingly, Stephen Ansolobehare and Iyengar have indirectly demonstrated the efficacy of counterattacks in presidential spin zone situations by evaluating situations where one candidate attacks another and the “victim” of the attack either, does not respond, responds with a positive message or responds with a counterattack (143). They found overwhelming evidence that voters prefer their party’s candidate to counterattack rather than be victimised. Conclusion In this paper we have furthered the call for conceptual clarity in the field by joining Druckman et al. in emphasising the need for more research on “image priming” on the part of candidates and Presidents in the interplay between the press and the presidency. If used properly, image priming seems a viable way for the presidency to counterattack against media framing and priming, but squandered opportunities may irreparably harm candidates. President Obama faced a difficult wedge issue that had undercurrents of both racial and religious tensions, but he deftly avoided those issues and found a way to “use Trump as a foil and present the president as a more serious leader” (Shear). His counterattack against the wedge used by the media spin zone was successful. Senator Kerry, on the other hand, failed to counterattack the media spin zone’s rallying of the base. His silence allowed the media to generate both issue and image frames and priming against him. This is an important lesson for future candidates and presidents and the media and presidential spin zones are important topics for further research. References Ansolabehare, Stephen, and Shanto Iyengar. Going Negative: How Political Advertisements Shrink and Polarize the Electorate. New York: Free Press, 1995. Baumgardner, Frank, and Bryan D. Jones. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago, Illinois: U of Chicago P, 1993. Cappella, Joseph N., and Kathleen Hall Jamieson. Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good. New York: Oxford UP, 1997. Coronel, Sheila S. “The Media as Watchdog.” The Role of the News Media in the Governance Realm 29–31 May 2008. 18 Oct. 2011 ‹http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Conference/Conference%20papers/Coronel%20Watchdog.pdf›. Druckman, James N. “On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?” The Journal of Politics 63.4 (2001): 1041–1066. ——. “The Power of Television Images.” The Journal of Politics 65.2 (2003): 559–71. Druckman, James N., et al. “Candidate Strategies to Prime Issues and Image.” The Journal of Politics 66.4 (2004): 1180–1202. Esser, Frank, Carsten Reinemann, and David Fan. “Spin Doctoring in British and German Election Campaigns: How the Press Is Being Confronted with a New Quality of Political PR.” European Journal of Communication 15.2 (2000): 209–239. Fridkin, Kim L., et al. “Spinning Debates: The Impact of the News Media’s Coverage of the Final 2004 Presidential Debate.” The International Journal of Press/Politics 13.1 (2008): 29–51. Funk, Carolyn. “Bringing the Candidate in Models of Candidate Evaluation.” The Journal of Politics 61.3 (1999): 700–720. Gallup, Alec M., and Frank Newport. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion in 2004. Lanham, Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield Publishers, 2006 Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach.” American Journal of Sociology 95.1 (1989): 1–37. Goffman, Erving. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. New York: Harper and Row, 1974 Iyengar, Shanto, and Jennifer A. McGrady. Media Politics: A Citizens Guide. New York: W.W. Norton, 2007. Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. News That Matters. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987. Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness.” Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Joseph N. Capella. Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment. New York: Oxford UP, 2008. Kellner, Douglas. “Bushspeak and the Politics of Lying: Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Terror.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37.4 (2007): 622–645. Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. “News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens are Guided by a Trusted Source.” American Journal of Political Science 44.2 (2000): 301-315. Muravchik, Joshua. “Kerry’s Cambodia Whopper.” Washington Post 24 Aug. 2004: A17. Nacos, Brigette L., Yaeli Boch-Elkon, Robert Y. Shapiro. “Post 9-11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States.” International Journal of Conflict and Violence 1.2 (2007): 105–126. Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley. “Media Framing of Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance.” American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 567-583. Rozell, M.J. “Presidential Image-Makers on the Limits of Spin Control.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 25.1 (1995): 67–90. Scheufele, Dietram A., and David Tewksbury. “Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models.” Journal of Communication 57.1 (2007): 9–20. Shear, Michael D. “With Document, Obama Seeks to End Birther Issue.” New York Times 28 April 2011. 18 Oct 2011 ‹http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/us/politics/28obama.html›.“The Bear.” 4President TV 2 Oct 1984. 18 Oct 2011 ‹http://tv.4president.us/1984/reagan1984bear.htm›. Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. “The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice.” Science 211.4481 (1981): 452–58. Van Gorp, Baldwin. “Where Is the Frame: Victims and Intruders in the Belgian Press Coverage of the Asylum Issue?” European Journal of Communication 20.4 (2005): 484–507. Westen, Drew. The Political Brain. New York: Public Affairs, 2007. Wilson, John K. The Most Dangerous Man in America: Rush Limbaugh’s Assault on Reason. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2011.

Im Herbst 1947 machte sich Carl Schmitt, Verfasser der bis heute immens einflussreichen Parlamentarismusschrift von 1923 und international bekanntester Exponent des NS-Staatrechts, wieder an die Arbeit an der Gegenwart. Zu seinen ersten in seinem Denktagebuch Glossarium verzeichneten Lektüren nach der Entlassung aus der Nürnberger Haft und seiner Rückkehr nach Plettenberg gehörte James Burnhams 1941 in den USA erschienener Klassiker The Managerial Revolution. Darin entwickelte der bis zum Hitler-Stalin-Pakt bekennende Trotzkist, der es im Laufe seines Lebens noch zum Empfänger der Presidential Medal of Freedom unter Ronald Reagan bringen sollte, eine funktionalistische Rechtfertigung polititscher Opposition. Die Erfahrung zeige, dass ein gewisses Maß an Demokratie sehr nützlich sei, damit die Systemfeinde und die Massen ohne größeren Schaden Dampf ablassen könnnen (« to let off steam without endangering the foundations of the social fabric»). Gerade weil die Opposition in einer absolouten Diktatur keine Ausdrucksmittel habe, werde sie zum Widerstand und nehme gewaltsame Formen an.

Hans Bachmann, an honorary member of the ICRC, died on 7 July 1997, a few days after his 85th birthday.Mr Bachmann had a long career in the service of the ICRC. A lawyer by profession, he joined the institution in early 1942, in the middle of the Second World War. He immediately occupied senior posts under Carl Burckhardt and in relief operations, playing a key role in the Joint Relief Commission and especially in the Foundation for the organization of Red Cross transport, which he was instrumental in setting up. The Foundation conducted activities on an unprecedented scale, supplying countries affected by the conflict and its aftermath. At the beginning of 1946 Mr Bachmann left the ICRC but returned 12 years later, in 1958, as a member of the Committee, on which he remained until 1976. In this capacity he served on the Presidential Council from 1963 to 1971 and as Vice-President of the ICRC from 1964 to 1965 and from 1968 to 1971. When he decided to leave the Committee in 1976, he was appointed an honorary member and was awarded the ICRC silver medal by the then President Éric Martin, in recognition of his long years of service.