Relevant bibliographies by topics / Price discrimination

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Price discrimination'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 29 July 2024

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Price discrimination.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Price discrimination"

1

Borgesius, Frederik Zuiderveen. "Price Discrimination, Algorithmic Decision-Making, and European Non-Discrimination Law." European Business Law Review 31, Issue 3 (May 1, 2020): 401–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2020017.

Full text
Abstract:
Our society can benefit immensely from algorithmic decision-making and similar types of artificial intelligence. But algorithmic decision-making can also have discriminatory effects. This paper examines that problem, using online price differentiation as an example of algorithmic decision-making. With online price differentiation, a company charges different people different prices for identical products, based on information the company has about those people. The main question in this paper is: to what extent can non-discrimination law protect people against online price differentiation? The paper shows that online price differentiation and algorithmic decision-making could lead to indirect discrimination, for instance harming people with a certain ethnicity. Indirect discrimination occurs when a practice is neutral at first glance, but ends up discriminating against people with a protected characteristic, such as ethnicity. In principle, non-discrimination law prohibits indirect discrimination. The paper also shows, however, that non-discrimination law has flaws when applied to algorithmic decision-making. For instance, algorithmic discrimination can remain hidden: people may not realise that they are being discriminated against. And many types of unfair – some might say discriminatory – algorithmic decisions are outside the scope of current non-discrimination law. price discrimination, price differentiation, personalised pricing, dynamic pricing, algorithmic decision-making, big data, artificial intelligence, fairness, law, equality, non-discrimination law, human rights, fundamental rights.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Zhang, Wei-li, Qi-Qing Song, and Yi-Rong Jiang. "Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2019 (June 25, 2019): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/9231582.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ireland, Norman J., and Paul L. Stoneman. "Order Effects, Perfect Foresight and Intertemporal Price Discrimination." Recherches économiques de Louvain 51, no. 1 (March 1985): 7–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800082415.

Full text
Abstract:
We will define a supplier of a single product to be «dynamically discriminating» if he offers the product for sale at a sequence of different prices. Obviously the extent of such discrimination that is possible will depend on buyers’ expectations of future price movements and on any dynamic properties of buyers’ demand functions. The objective of this paper is to examine the extent of price discrimination that can take place in a market characterised by buyers’ perfect foresight and where the value each buyer places on the product changes as the number of sales increase.If potential buyers are ‘myopic’ and believe that the current price of a commodity is not going to change in the future, then they will purchase if the current price is no more than their current reservation price. Given a distribution of reservation prices, a monopolist supplier can perfectly discriminate in this market by, say, first offering the commodity at a very high price and selling to those customers with the highest reservation price, and then gradually reducing the price, collecting more custom, and allowing no consumers’ surplus to exist.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Weber, Sylvain, and Cyril Pasche. "Price Discrimination." Journal of Industrial Organization Education 2, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1020.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Prakash Yadav, Shashi. "A Research Paper on-Price Discrimination." International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR) 12, no. 2 (February 5, 2023): 1388–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.21275/sr23220191529.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Fennell, Lee Anne. "Optional Price Discrimination." Texas A&M Law Review 10, no. 3 (March 2023): 485–548. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/lr.v10.i3.4.

Full text
Abstract:
Price discrimination generates considerable angst. As merchants develop ever-more-powerful mechanisms for gathering and compiling information about consumers, the specter of fully personalized pricing seems to loom as an ominous threat. Yet a parallel phenomenon quietly coexists with all this distress over tailored prices: models that encourage people to voluntarily contribute, typically in varying amounts, the sums necessary to cover the fixed costs of producing particular goods and services. This Article proposes enabling customers to opt into price discrimination in a more structured way across a broader range of markets. Optional price differentiation can make markets fairer and more inclusive by extending access to more consumers and facilitating provision of a broader array of products and services. For it to do so successfully, however, producers must be able to bind themselves to pricing practices and uses of revenue that are attractive enough to induce participation by both high- and low-valuing consumers, and that are transparent enough to ensure meaningful choice. Government can facilitate experimentation along these lines by setting standards for disclosure and data use, and by policing against fraud and misrepresentation.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Hazledine, Tim. "Oligopoly price discrimination with many prices." Economics Letters 109, no. 3 (December 2010): 150–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.009.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Bonatti, Alessandro, and Gonzalo Cisternas. "Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination." Review of Economic Studies 87, no. 2 (September 12, 2019): 750–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz046.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract We study the implications of aggregating consumers’ purchase histories into scores that proxy for unobserved willingness to pay. A long-lived consumer interacts with a sequence of firms. Each firm relies on the consumer’s current score–a linear aggregate of noisy purchase signals—to learn about her preferences and to set prices. If the consumer is strategic, she reduces her demand to manipulate her score, which reduces the average equilibrium price. Firms in turn prefer scores that overweigh past signals relative to applying Bayes’ rule with disaggregated data, as this mitigates the ratchet effect and maximizes the firms’ ability to price discriminate. Consumers with high average willingness to pay benefit from data collection, because the gains from low average prices dominate the losses from price discrimination. Finally, hidden scores—those only observed by the firms—reduce demand sensitivity, increase average prices, and reduce consumer surplus, sometimes below the naive-consumer level.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Chevalier, Judith A., and Anil K. Kashyap. "Best Prices: Price Discrimination and Consumer Substitution." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 1 (February 1, 2019): 126–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150362.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper proposes a method for aggregating prices when retailers use periodic sales to price-discriminate amongst heterogeneous customers. In the motivating model, loyal customers buy one brand and do not strategically time purchases, while Bargain Hunters always pay the lowest price available, the “best price.” In the model, the best price is part of an exact price index. Accounting for the best price also substantially improves the empirical match between conventional price aggregation strategies and actual prices paid by consumers. The methodology improves inflation measurement while imposing little burden on the data-collection agency. (JEL C43, D12, E31, L13, L81, M31)
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Hayati, Yetty Husnul, and Abdul Lukman Hakim. "PENGARUH DISKRIMINASI HARGA TERHADAP PENINGKATAN PENJUALAN KARTU PERDANA IM3 PADA PT. NUSAPRO TELEMEDIA PERSADA BOGOR." JIMFE (Jurnal Ilmiah Manajemen Fakultas Ekonomi) 1, no. 2 (March 27, 2018): 58–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.34203/jimfe.v1i2.561.

Full text
Abstract:
ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study was to determine the effect of price discrimination on the level of prime IM3card sales at PT. Nusapro Telemedia Persada. This study on price discrimination and the level of primeIM3 card sales are done PT. Nusapro Telemedia Persada, using price data agency locations and pricesas well as increased sales of retail locations (IDR) on card products prime IM3. The analytical methodthat used is ranging from descriptive analysis using the formulas of multiple regression analysis, multiplecorrelation analysis, as well as testing hipotesis. Price discrimination prime IM3 card company PTNusapro Telemedia Persada is based on two indicators, namely: pricing Agent locations and pricing atretail locations. Application of the implementation of price discrimination on the IM3 SIM CardCompanies PT Nusapro Telemedia Persadais good enough. At company Telemedia Persada PT Nusaproaverage increase or decrease in sales of SIM cards IM3 in 2014 at $ 1,970,569,134. While the effect ofprice discrimination against prime IM3 card sales increase at company PT Nusapro Telemedia Persadaamounting to 68.3% and 31.7% influenced by other factors.Keywords: Discrimination Hara to increased sales
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Price discrimination"

1

Simbanegavi, Witness. "Price discrimination, advertising and competition." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, (EFI), 2005. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/684.htm.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Esteves, Rosa Branca. "Competitive behaviour-based price discrimination." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2005. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:da56d0af-b6af-4cc0-ade0-05748e4f2684.

Full text
Abstract:
Advances in information technologies have increasingly enabled firms to use consumers' past purchasing data to charge different prices to its own customers and to those customers that in some sense belong to the rival firm. At first glance this new form of price discrimination seems to be lucrative as it allows a firm to generate profitable incremental sales without damaging profits it can extract from its own customer base. However, as behaviour-based price discrimination gains popularity many interesting questions arise. Is it, really, in the best interest of firms to recognise customers with different past behaviour and to price discriminate accordingly? Or is it rather in their interest to avoid any possible learning and thereby price discrimination practices? Should consumers hide their true types, i.e., should they behave anonymously? Further, should government regulation restrict information collection and price discrimination practices? The study of these questions is the study of the profit and welfare effects of behaviourbased price discrimination. This is the central issue of this thesis. With that in mind, this thesis addresses three theoretical models. The first one is based on the hypothesis that the ability of firms to predict the preferences of individual customers for the purpose of price discrimination is less than perfect but is constantly improving due to advances in information technologies. Here the main goal will be to investigate how profits, consumer surplus and welfare evolve as price discrimination is based on more accurate information. The second model is a natural sequel of the former as it tries to model how firms might obtain a signal of a consumer's preferences. Whether or not a given consumer bought from the firm previously might be used as an accurate signal of a consumer's preferences. A key issue here will be to examine whether or not it is in the interest of firms to avoid learning and price discrimination and how can they attain that goal. Finally, the third model studies the interaction between purely informative advertising and price discrimination based on customers' past behaviour. As without advertising consumers are left out of the market, the welfare effects of price discrimination are guided by how will price discrimination affect each firm's advertising decisions in relation to the social optimal level of advertising.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Trotter, S. D. "Price discrimination and public enterprise." Thesis, University of York, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.381287.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Alvi, Imran U. "Behavioural price discrimination and personalisation strategies." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.439705.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Moshary, Sarah N. S. (Sarah Nazpai Schwartz), and Gaston Illanes. "Essays in price discrimination and regulation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/101516.

Full text
Abstract:
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2015.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. "Chapter 3, co-authored with Gaston Illanes"--Page 2.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 123-126).
Chapter 1 studies price discrimination in advertising sales to Political Action Committees (PACs) in the 2012 Presidential Election. These groups have grown rapidly - expenditures neared $500 million in the 2012 presidential election - and their effect on elections depends on regulation and its interaction with imperfect competition. While the government tightly proscribes station behavior vis-a-vis official campaigns, it does not protect Political Actions Committees (PACs). Television stations potentially wield considerable power to shape access to the electorate. Using novel data on prices paid for individual ad spots from the 2012 presidential election, I find PACs pay a 40% markup above campaign rates, and that there are differences in prices paid by Republican and Democratic groups for indistinguishable purchases. I then develop and estimate a model of political demand for ad spots, exploiting misalignments of state borders and media markets to address potential price endogeneity. Findings indicate that pricing to PACs reflects buyer willingness-to-pay for viewer demographics. Chapter 2 investigates spillover effects of regulation protecting campaign advertising purchases, a most favored nation clause. This regulation guarantees campaigns the lowest rate received by any advertiser, incentivizing stations to sell less airtime to commercial advertisers to buoy campaign prices. Using spot-level data on presidential campaign advertising purchases from 2012, I find that campaign ad prices drop following the institution of rate regulation (sixty days preceding election day). I then develop a model of station price discrimination, and estimate the effect of regulation on campaign and commercial prices relative to a counterfactual without regulation. Chapter 3, co-authored with Gaston Illanes, studies the effects of potential entry on market outcomes in the context of Washington state's 2012 privatization of liquor sales. Theory indicates that entry, and even the threat of entry, plays a key role in discipling market outcomes. We exploit the post-reform licensure requirement that stores have 10,000 square feet of retail space to estimate the impact of an additional store on price competition. We compare prices and product variety in markets with stores just above versus just below the square footage cutoff.
by Sarah N. S. Moshary.
Ph. D.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Pies, John David. "Price discrimination versus the search for market information in the airline pricing dilemma." Thesis, Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1995. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B16027486.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

ROITMAN, FABIO BRENER. "PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AIRLINE MARKET." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2013. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=22277@1.

Full text
Abstract:
PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
Nesta dissertação, estuda-se a discriminação de preços no transporte aéreo brasileiro. A base de dados, construída a partir das respostas dos passageiros na Pesquisa O/D, contém informações a que as companhias aéreas não têm acesso. Passageiros com maior renda e que viajam a trabalho pagam preços maiores, e o uso de vários controles nas regressões permite concluir que isso é explicado, em parte, por discriminação de preços. Desenvolve-se um modelo empírico de discriminação de preços, em que uma firma utiliza os atributos das passagens para prever a disposição a pagar dos consumidores e, assim, estabelecer os preços. Empregando as estimativas dos parâmetros do modelo, consideram-se cenários contrafactuais em que há restrições sobre a discriminação de preços. Em média, restringir a discriminação de preços geraria uma redução do excedente do consumidor da ordem de 10 por cento.
This dissertation studies price discrimination in the Brazilian airline market. The data used are from the O/D Survey, which involved interviews with passengers. This enables us to have in our data set information that airlines do not have. Business travelers and those with higher incomes pay higher prices. By including several controls in the regressions, we obtain evidence that this is due to price discrimination, at least to some extent. We develop an empirical model of price discrimination, in which a firm uses ticket attributes to predict consumers’ willingness to pay and thus sets its prices. The model’s estimated parameters are used to construct counterfactual scenarios where price discrimination is constrained. On average, restricting price discrimination would reduce consumer surplus by approximately 10 per cent.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Wallace, Benjamin E. "ESSAYS ON PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND DEMAND LEARNING." UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_etds/40.

Full text
Abstract:
This dissertation consists of three essays examining how and why firms set prices in markets. In particular, this dissertation shows how firms may utilize nonlinear pricing to price discriminate, how firms may experiment with the prices they set to learn about the demand function in the market they serve in later periods and the effects of these pricing strategies on consumer welfare. In Essay 1, I show how firms in the milk market use nonlinear price schedules -- quantity discounts -- to price discriminate and increase profits. I find that firms have a greater ability to price discriminate on their own ``private label'' products rather than regional branded that they sell alongside their own. Though some consumers benefit from a lower price as a result of the price discrimination, total consumer surplus is lower than if the store had to offer a fixed price per unit. Additionally, I compare my structural demand estimates, which using the Nielsen household panel data include consumer demographic information and actual household choices, to the standard approach in the literature on price discrimination that uses only market level data. By doing so I find that ignoring demographic information and actual consumer choices leads to biased parameter estimates. In the case of the milk market, the biased parameter estimates due to ignoring household demographic information and actual consumer choices lead to underestimating welfare harm to consumers on average. After finding that price discrimination harms consumers overall in this market, I quantify which consumer demographic are better off and which are worse off. I find that households with children and low income households with children are the only households to benefit from the price discriminatory practices of firms in this market. Since these groups are particularly vulnerable, I suggest that policymakers take no action to correct this market, as any action will directly hurt these consumer groups. In Essay 2, I study how firms learn about the demand in a new market by exploiting a significant change in Washington's state's liquor laws. In 2012, the state of Washington switched from a price-controlled state-store system of selling liquor to one in which private sellers could sell liquor with minimal restrictions on price and range of products. As a result, a heterogeneous group of firms entered the liquor market across the state with little knowledge of the regional demand for alcohol in the state of Washington across heterogeneous localities. Using the Nielsen retail scanner data I am able to observe the variation in pricing and offerings seasonally and over time to see if there is convergence in offerings and prices, and how quickly that convergence occurs across different localities depending on local demographics and competition. I also investigate the extent to which the variation is "experimentation'' by the firms, i.e., the firms purposely experimenting to learn more about demand and the extent that local demographics and competition can affect the experimentation and whether there are spill-overs from local competition (i.e. do firms learn from each other and does this effect how much they experiment and how quickly they learn). My main findings are that over time, firms within this market have learned better how to price discriminate over the holiday season; firms experiment more with prices for the pint sized products than the larger sizes; and that menu of options that firms have offered has been expanding but at a slower rate, suggesting that they are approaching a long-run steady state for the optimal menu of options.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Fleming, M. W. A. "Price discrimination law : developing a policy for New Zealand." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Accounting and Information Systems, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/2736.

Full text
Abstract:
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a policy towards anticompetitive price discrimination in New Zealand. Price discrimination occurs where the ratio of price to cost in two sales differs. Legislation against price discrimination may be enacted as part of our Competition Law, a set of laws designed to promote efficiency and competition in industry and commerce. The first section of this thesis examines the economics of price discrimination and its effects on efficiency, income distribution and competition. We conclude that the effects are ambiguous and depend upon the circumstances in which the discrimination is practiced. However we conclude that systematic price discrimination can be harmful to competition, whilst unsystematic price discrimination can promote competition and that there are a priori grounds for anti-price discrimination legislation. The second section examines specific approaches taken to price discrimination legislation. Particular emphasis is placed on the U.S. Robinson-Patman Act which is one of the most extensively litigated price discrimination laws in the world. A review of the implementation of this Act shows that it has failed to promote competition or increase efficiency. In fact, it has done more to inhibit these goals than promote them. We conclude that there are conceptual problems with antiprice discrimination legislation and this conclusion is reinforced by a study of the Australian price discrimination law. We therefore examine the conceptual framework in which price discrimination is controlled in other developed countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Eire, France, West Germany and the EEC. We conclude generally that price discrimination is a problem of monopoly and should be treated as such. The final part of this thesis reviews price discrimination law in New zealand and suggests a policy that would align the Commerce Act with our conclusion that legislation against price discrimination is undesirable.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Arellano, Bahamonde Rolando José. "Price discrimination factors for competitive non-regulated taxi markets." Doctoral thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2018. http://tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/handle/123456789/12840.

Full text
Abstract:
The lack of information on price discrimination regarding which characteristics of the client are used and how they influence the definition of the initial price offered in a competitive non-regulated taxi market is the main problem that encouraged this investigation. The study differs from other studies in its use of an experimental research method which allowed analysis of the problem as close as possible to the natural context of the phenomenon. Interviews with 10 taxi drivers produced six variables affecting the process of price definition. A group of 16 people matching those variables collected rates offered by a random sample of taxi drivers. Due to the lack of normality in the distribution of the prices collected, an ordered regression model was implemented. The findings are that price discrimination exists in a nonregulated market such as that of taxis in Lima and that phenotype and the accent of the client are individual characteristics that have a significant influence on the initial price offer. The results confirm that price discrimination is applied in a context like the one of the study, but the question remains as to why it is naturally present and what conditions make it work
Tesis
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Books on the topic "Price discrimination"

1

Norman, George. Price discrimination. Leicester: University of Leicester, Department of Economics, 1991.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Meyer, R. W. Beating publisher price discrimination. San Antonio, TX: R.W. Meyer, 2000.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ngwe, Donald. Essays on Price Discrimination. [New York, N.Y.?]: [publisher not identified], 2014.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Canada. Bureau of Competition Policy. Price discrimination enforcement guidelines. [Ottawa, Ont.]: Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

B, Leverich Bingham, and American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education., eds. Price discrimination in perspective. 2nd ed. Philadelphia, Pa: American Law Institute-American Bar Association Committee on Continuing Professional Education, 1987.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Simbanegavi, Witness. Price discrimination, advertising and competition. Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics, 2005.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Simbanegavi, Witness. Price discrimination, advertising and competition. Stockholm: Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, 2005.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Armstrong, Mark. Price discrimination, competition and regulation. Oxford: OxfordUniversity, Institute of Economics and Statistics, 1992.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Shepard, Andrea. Price discrimination in retail markets. Cambridge, Mass: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1989.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Corsetti, Giancarlo. Macroeconomics of international price discrimination. Washington, D.C: Federal Reserve Board, 2002.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Price discrimination"

1

Harrison, Barry, Charles Smith, and Brinley Davies. "Price Discrimination." In Introductory Economics, 102–8. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-22006-9_12.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Bhattacharya, Rajeev. "Price Discrimination." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1327–29. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_674.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Phlips, Louis. "Price Discrimination." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–5. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1413-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Harrison, Barry. "Price Discrimination." In Introductory Economics Course Companion, 67–72. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-13004-7_12.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Mochrie, Robert. "Price discrimination." In Intermediate Microeconomics, 285–302. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-09166-6_16.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Bhattacharya, Rajeev. "Price Discrimination." In The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1–3. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_674-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Phlips, Louis. "Price Discrimination." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 10680–83. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1413.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Miravete, Eugenio J. "Price Discrimination (Theory)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 10687–91. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_2630.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Miravete, Eugenio J. "Price Discrimination (Theory)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–5. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_2630-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Cummings, Rachel, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, and Xiangning Wang. "Algorithmic Price Discrimination." In Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2432–51. Philadelphia, PA: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975994.149.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Price discrimination"

1

Cohen, Maxime C., Adam N. Elmachtoub, and Xiao Lei. "Price Discrimination with Fairness Constraints." In FAccT '21: 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445864.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Zhao, Xuesong. "Big Data and Price Discrimination." In 2020 IEEE 5th International Conference on Cloud Computing and Big Data Analytics (ICCCBDA). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icccbda49378.2020.9095721.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Flammini, Michele, Manuel Mauro, and Matteo Tonelli. "On Fair Price Discrimination in Multi-Unit Markets." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/34.

Full text
Abstract:
Discriminatory pricing policies, even if at first glance can be perceived as unfair, are widespread. In fact, pricing differences for the same item among different national markets are common, or forms of discrimination based on the time of purchase, like in tickets' sales. In this work we propose a framework for capturing the setting of ``fair'' discriminatory pricing and study its application to multi-unit markets, in which many copies of the same item are on sale. Our model is able to incorporate the fundamental discrimination settings proposed in the literature, by expressing individual buyers constraints for assigning prices by means of a social relationship graph, modeling the information that each buyer can acquire about the prices assigned to the other buyers. After pointing out the positive effects of fair price discrimination, we investigate the computational complexity of maximizing the social welfare and the revenue in these markets, providing hardness and approximation results under various assumptions on the buyers valuations and on the social graph topology.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Chen, Zhide, and Li Xu. "Service Price Discrimination in Wireless Network." In 2010 IEEE 13th International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering (CSE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cse.2010.14.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Matsubara, Shigeo. "Online Task Allocation by Price Discrimination." In 2015 IEEE / WIC / ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wi-iat.2015.158.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Ko, Shao-Heng, and Kamesh Munagala. "Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms." In EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538335.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Jiang, Xintong. "Analysis on Price Discrimination in Airplane Tickets." In 2021 International Conference on Economic Development and Business Culture (ICEDBC 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210712.023.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Tabors, R. D., and S. Adamson. "Price Discrimination in Organized/Centralized Electric Power Markets." In Proceedings of the 39th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS'06). IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2006.386.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Odlyzko, Andrew. "Privacy, economics, and price discrimination on the Internet." In the 5th international conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/948005.948051.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Mikians, Jakub, László Gyarmati, Vijay Erramilli, and Nikolaos Laoutaris. "Detecting price and search discrimination on the internet." In the 11th ACM Workshop. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2390231.2390245.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "Price discrimination"

1

Chevalier, Judith, and Anil Kashyap. Best Prices: Price Discrimination and Consumer Substitution. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20768.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Dana, James, and Kevin Williams. Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26794.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Coen, Jamie, Anil Kashyap, and May Rostom. Price Discrimination and Mortgage Choice. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w31652.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Vélez-Velásquez, Juan Sebastián. Banning Price Discrimination under Imperfect Competition: Evidence from Colombia's Broadband. Banco de la República de Colombia, December 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/be.1148.

Full text
Abstract:
Economic theory is inconclusive regarding the effects of banning third-degree price discrimination under imperfect competition because they depend on how the competing firms rank their market segments. When, relative to uniform pricing, all competitors want higher prices in the same market segments, a ban on price discrimination will reduce profits and benefit some consumers at the expense of others. If, instead, some firms want to charge higher prices in segments where their competitors want to charge lower prices, price discrimination increases competition driving all prices down. In this case, forcing the firms to charge uniform prices can increase their profits and reduce consumer surplus. We use data on Colombian broadband subscriptions to estimate the demand for internet services. Estimated preferences and assumptions about competition are used to simulate a scenario in which firms lose their ability to price discriminate. Our results show large effects on consumer surplus and large effects on firms’ profits. Aggregate profits increase but the effects for individual firms are heterogeneous. The effects on consumer welfare vary by city. In most cities, a uniform price regime causes large welfare transfers from low-income households towards high-income households and in a few cities, prices in all segments rise. Poorer households respond to the increase in prices by subscribing to internet plans with slower download speed.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Spurlock, Cecily Anna. Appliance Efficiency Standards and Price Discrimination. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), May 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1171529.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Manzano Antón, R., G. Martínez Navarro, and D. Gavilán Bouzas. Gender Identity, Consumption and Price Discrimination. Revista Latina de Comunicación Social, February 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4185/rlcs-2018-1261en.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Vogel, Jonathan. Spatial Price Discrimination with Heterogeneous Firms. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14978.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Hendel, Igal, and Aviv Nevo. Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Storable Goods Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16988.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Jung, Jae Wook, Ina Simonovska, and Ariel Weinberger. Exporter Heterogeneity and Price Discrimination: A Quantitative View. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21408.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Hamermesh, Daniel, and Jeff Biddle. Taking Time Use Seriously: Income, Wages And Price Discrimination. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25308.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Price discrimination' for particular source types:
Journal articles Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography