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Simbanegavi, Witness. "Price discrimination, advertising and competition." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, (EFI), 2005. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/684.htm.
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Esteves, Rosa Branca. "Competitive behaviour-based price discrimination." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2005. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:da56d0af-b6af-4cc0-ade0-05748e4f2684.
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Advances in information technologies have increasingly enabled firms to use consumers' past purchasing data to charge different prices to its own customers and to those customers that in some sense belong to the rival firm. At first glance this new form of price discrimination seems to be lucrative as it allows a firm to generate profitable incremental sales without damaging profits it can extract from its own customer base. However, as behaviour-based price discrimination gains popularity many interesting questions arise. Is it, really, in the best interest of firms to recognise customers with different past behaviour and to price discriminate accordingly? Or is it rather in their interest to avoid any possible learning and thereby price discrimination practices? Should consumers hide their true types, i.e., should they behave anonymously? Further, should government regulation restrict information collection and price discrimination practices? The study of these questions is the study of the profit and welfare effects of behaviourbased price discrimination. This is the central issue of this thesis. With that in mind, this thesis addresses three theoretical models. The first one is based on the hypothesis that the ability of firms to predict the preferences of individual customers for the purpose of price discrimination is less than perfect but is constantly improving due to advances in information technologies. Here the main goal will be to investigate how profits, consumer surplus and welfare evolve as price discrimination is based on more accurate information. The second model is a natural sequel of the former as it tries to model how firms might obtain a signal of a consumer's preferences. Whether or not a given consumer bought from the firm previously might be used as an accurate signal of a consumer's preferences. A key issue here will be to examine whether or not it is in the interest of firms to avoid learning and price discrimination and how can they attain that goal. Finally, the third model studies the interaction between purely informative advertising and price discrimination based on customers' past behaviour. As without advertising consumers are left out of the market, the welfare effects of price discrimination are guided by how will price discrimination affect each firm's advertising decisions in relation to the social optimal level of advertising.
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Trotter, S. D. "Price discrimination and public enterprise." Thesis, University of York, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.381287.
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Alvi, Imran U. "Behavioural price discrimination and personalisation strategies." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.439705.
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Moshary, Sarah N. S. (Sarah Nazpai Schwartz), and Gaston Illanes. "Essays in price discrimination and regulation." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/101516.
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Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2015.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. "Chapter 3, co-authored with Gaston Illanes"--Page 2.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 123-126).<br>Chapter 1 studies price discrimination in advertising sales to Political Action Committees (PACs) in the 2012 Presidential Election. These groups have grown rapidly - expenditures neared $500 million in the 2012 presidential election - and their effect on elections depends on regulation and its interaction with imperfect competition. While the government tightly proscribes station behavior vis-a-vis official campaigns, it does not protect Political Actions Committees (PACs). Television stations potentially wield considerable power to shape access to the electorate. Using novel data on prices paid for individual ad spots from the 2012 presidential election, I find PACs pay a 40% markup above campaign rates, and that there are differences in prices paid by Republican and Democratic groups for indistinguishable purchases. I then develop and estimate a model of political demand for ad spots, exploiting misalignments of state borders and media markets to address potential price endogeneity. Findings indicate that pricing to PACs reflects buyer willingness-to-pay for viewer demographics. Chapter 2 investigates spillover effects of regulation protecting campaign advertising purchases, a most favored nation clause. This regulation guarantees campaigns the lowest rate received by any advertiser, incentivizing stations to sell less airtime to commercial advertisers to buoy campaign prices. Using spot-level data on presidential campaign advertising purchases from 2012, I find that campaign ad prices drop following the institution of rate regulation (sixty days preceding election day). I then develop a model of station price discrimination, and estimate the effect of regulation on campaign and commercial prices relative to a counterfactual without regulation. Chapter 3, co-authored with Gaston Illanes, studies the effects of potential entry on market outcomes in the context of Washington state's 2012 privatization of liquor sales. Theory indicates that entry, and even the threat of entry, plays a key role in discipling market outcomes. We exploit the post-reform licensure requirement that stores have 10,000 square feet of retail space to estimate the impact of an additional store on price competition. We compare prices and product variety in markets with stores just above versus just below the square footage cutoff.<br>by Sarah N. S. Moshary.<br>Ph. D.
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Pies, John David. "Price discrimination versus the search for market information in the airline pricing dilemma." Thesis, Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1995. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B16027486.
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ROITMAN, FABIO BRENER. "PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE BRAZILIAN AIRLINE MARKET." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2013. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=22277@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO<br>COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR<br>CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO<br>PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO<br>Nesta dissertação, estuda-se a discriminação de preços no transporte aéreo
brasileiro. A base de dados, construída a partir das respostas dos passageiros na
Pesquisa O/D, contém informações a que as companhias aéreas não têm acesso.
Passageiros com maior renda e que viajam a trabalho pagam preços maiores, e o
uso de vários controles nas regressões permite concluir que isso é explicado, em
parte, por discriminação de preços. Desenvolve-se um modelo empírico de
discriminação de preços, em que uma firma utiliza os atributos das passagens para
prever a disposição a pagar dos consumidores e, assim, estabelecer os preços.
Empregando as estimativas dos parâmetros do modelo, consideram-se cenários
contrafactuais em que há restrições sobre a discriminação de preços. Em média,
restringir a discriminação de preços geraria uma redução do excedente do
consumidor da ordem de 10 por cento.<br>This dissertation studies price discrimination in the Brazilian airline market.
The data used are from the O/D Survey, which involved interviews with
passengers. This enables us to have in our data set information that airlines do not
have. Business travelers and those with higher incomes pay higher prices. By
including several controls in the regressions, we obtain evidence that this is due to
price discrimination, at least to some extent. We develop an empirical model of
price discrimination, in which a firm uses ticket attributes to predict consumers’
willingness to pay and thus sets its prices. The model’s estimated parameters are
used to construct counterfactual scenarios where price discrimination is
constrained. On average, restricting price discrimination would reduce consumer
surplus by approximately 10 per cent.
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Wallace, Benjamin E. "ESSAYS ON PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND DEMAND LEARNING." UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_etds/40.
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This dissertation consists of three essays examining how and why firms set prices in markets. In particular, this dissertation shows how firms may utilize nonlinear pricing to price discriminate, how firms may experiment with the prices they set to learn about the demand function in the market they serve in later periods and the effects of these pricing strategies on consumer welfare.
In Essay 1, I show how firms in the milk market use nonlinear price schedules -- quantity discounts -- to price discriminate and increase profits. I find that firms have a greater ability to price discriminate on their own ``private label'' products rather than regional branded that they sell alongside their own. Though some consumers benefit from a lower price as a result of the price discrimination, total consumer surplus is lower than if the store had to offer a fixed price per unit. Additionally, I compare my structural demand estimates, which using the Nielsen household panel data include consumer demographic information and actual household choices, to the standard approach in the literature on price discrimination that uses only market level data. By doing so I find that ignoring demographic information and actual consumer choices leads to biased parameter estimates. In the case of the milk market, the biased parameter estimates due to ignoring household demographic information and actual consumer choices lead to underestimating welfare harm to consumers on average.
After finding that price discrimination harms consumers overall in this market, I quantify which consumer demographic are better off and which are worse off. I find that households with children and low income households with children are the only households to benefit from the price discriminatory practices of firms in this market. Since these groups are particularly vulnerable, I suggest that policymakers take no action to correct this market, as any action will directly hurt these consumer groups.
In Essay 2, I study how firms learn about the demand in a new market by exploiting a significant change in Washington's state's liquor laws. In 2012, the state of Washington switched from a price-controlled state-store system of selling liquor to one in which private sellers could sell liquor with minimal restrictions on price and range of products. As a result, a heterogeneous group of firms entered the liquor market across the state with little knowledge of the regional demand for alcohol in the state of Washington across heterogeneous localities. Using the Nielsen retail scanner data I am able to observe the variation in pricing and offerings seasonally and over time to see if there is convergence in offerings and prices, and how quickly that convergence occurs across different localities depending on local demographics and competition. I also investigate the extent to which the variation is "experimentation'' by the firms, i.e., the firms purposely experimenting to learn more about demand and the extent that local demographics and competition can affect the experimentation and whether there are spill-overs from local competition (i.e. do firms learn from each other and does this effect how much they experiment and how quickly they learn).
My main findings are that over time, firms within this market have learned better how to price discriminate over the holiday season; firms experiment more with prices for the pint sized products than the larger sizes; and that menu of options that firms have offered has been expanding but at a slower rate, suggesting that they are approaching a long-run steady state for the optimal menu of options.
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Fleming, M. W. A. "Price discrimination law : developing a policy for New Zealand." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Accounting and Information Systems, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/2736.
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop a policy towards anticompetitive
price discrimination in New Zealand. Price discrimination
occurs where the ratio of price to cost in two sales differs.
Legislation against price discrimination may be enacted as part
of our Competition Law, a set of laws designed to promote efficiency and
competition in industry and commerce.
The first section of this thesis examines the economics of price
discrimination and its effects on efficiency, income distribution and
competition. We conclude that the effects are ambiguous and depend
upon the circumstances in which the discrimination is practiced. However
we conclude that systematic price discrimination can be harmful to
competition, whilst unsystematic price discrimination can promote
competition and that there are a priori grounds for anti-price
discrimination legislation.
The second section examines specific approaches taken to price
discrimination legislation. Particular emphasis is placed on the U.S.
Robinson-Patman Act which is one of the most extensively litigated price
discrimination laws in the world. A review of the implementation of this
Act shows that it has failed to promote competition or increase
efficiency. In fact, it has done more to inhibit these goals than
promote them. We conclude that there are conceptual problems with antiprice
discrimination legislation and this conclusion is reinforced by a
study of the Australian price discrimination law. We therefore examine
the conceptual framework in which price discrimination is controlled in
other developed countries such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Eire,
France, West Germany and the EEC. We conclude generally that price
discrimination is a problem of monopoly and should be treated as such. The final part of this thesis reviews price discrimination law in
New zealand and suggests a policy that would align the Commerce Act with
our conclusion that legislation against price discrimination is
undesirable.
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Arellano, Bahamonde Rolando José. "Price discrimination factors for competitive non-regulated taxi markets." Doctoral thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2018. http://tesis.pucp.edu.pe/repositorio/handle/123456789/12840.
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The lack of information on price discrimination regarding which characteristics of the client
are used and how they influence the definition of the initial price offered in a competitive
non-regulated taxi market is the main problem that encouraged this investigation. The study
differs from other studies in its use of an experimental research method which allowed
analysis of the problem as close as possible to the natural context of the phenomenon.
Interviews with 10 taxi drivers produced six variables affecting the process of price definition.
A group of 16 people matching those variables collected rates offered by a random sample of
taxi drivers. Due to the lack of normality in the distribution of the prices collected, an ordered
regression model was implemented. The findings are that price discrimination exists in a nonregulated
market such as that of taxis in Lima and that phenotype and the accent of the client
are individual characteristics that have a significant influence on the initial price offer. The
results confirm that price discrimination is applied in a context like the one of the study, but
the question remains as to why it is naturally present and what conditions make it work<br>Tesis
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Hashizume, Ryo. "Essays on Network Effects and Third-degree Price Discrimination." Doctoral thesis, Kyoto University, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/265173.
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Pan, Hui. "Essays on Chinese TV Media Market and on Price Discrimination." Thesis, University of Essex, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.495526.
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This thesis looks at some important issues on applied microeconomic theory and industrial economics relating to two real industries: the Chinese TV-media market and the British home-energy market. The first chapter presents the main distinctive features of the Chinese TV media market that will be used as building blocks for the formal models that follow in chapters 3 and 4. We focus on the features of the Chinese TV channels, TV viewers and advertisers. The second chapter is a selective review of research which is relevant to the study of TV media. We present the definitions, features and intuitions of previous work which we combine to generate the new insights of our subsequent chapters, as well as the areas where further research is needed. The third chapter builds a formal model to study the competition in the Chinese TV advertising market. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the competition among different types of platforms in the TV-Advertising market and the Chinese context. The fourth chapter adds two-sided market features to existing political models in media economy as well as a focus on strategic pricing and quality decisions. We look into program quality and price competition in a two-sided market framework and how media competition affects the government's decision on political advertising. The fifth chapter is an independent chapter which investigates the competition and consumer behaviour in the UK home-energy market. We analyze a realistic long term contract structure observed on this market and focus on the effect of commitment to profitability and social surplus.
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Parakhoniak, Anastasiia. "Essays on economics of information : search, networks and price discrimination." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018TOU10031/document.
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Cette thèse se compose de trois chapitres indépendants abordant différentes questions de l’économie de l’information. Le premier chapitre étudie des stratégies optimales des entreprises qui sont présentes sur les marchés en ligne et hors ligne. Nous étudions des stratégies de prix optimales des détaillants en présence de showrooming et leurs décisions sur des canaux de distribution. Le showrooming est une situation où les consommateurs essayent des produits dans des magasins classiques avant de les acheter en ligne à un prix inférieur. Une manière d’empêcher le showrooming est d’utiliser des prix identiques dans le magasin physique et en ligne. Nous montrons que dans l’optique de recherche de prix bas, le choix de prix identiques est, en effet, un choix optimal. Cependant concernant des prix plus élevés, les prix identiques sont suboptimals, et les achats en ligne et en magasins classiques coexistent avec le showrooming. Une entreprise qui fait face à la concurrence en ligne d’un détaillant multicanaux étranger a une incitation au geo-blocking, c.-à-d. qu’elle refuse de servir les clients étrangers, bien que cela amène à une diminution de la demande. Le geo-blocking modère la concurrence en ligne et mène à des prix plus élevés aussi bien en ligne que dans les magasins physiques. L’exigence juridique des prix identiques, aide à éliminer les incitations au geo-blocking et reconstitue ainsi la concurrence en ligne. Le deuxième chapitre analyse la diffusion de l’information dans les réseaux de la communication où les interactions sociales sont coûteuses. Nous proposons un modèle dynamique avec les agents stratégiques qui décident combien d’effort mettre dans la stratégie publicitaire d’un produit pour une période donnée. Nous montrons que le niveau d’équilibre de l’effort individuel de la communication est convexe avec la proportion des agents avertis, et inférieur le niveau socialement optimal au cause de l’effet substantiel de free-riding. Nous prouvons que pour des coûts de recommandation suffisamment élevées c’est socialement optimal que les agents symétriques exercent le même effort de communication tandis que pour des coûts de recommandation basses ceci n’est pas vrai. Dans le cadre de notre modèle nous analysons la stratégie de la publicité de l’entreprise lançant un nouveau produit avec des extériorités de réseau positives pour des consommateurs. Les expositions d’analyse montrent que les résultats de la publicité diminuent rapidement en proportion de consommateurs avertis de l’effet de free-riding. Ainsi, de façon optimale l’entreprise doit ajuster et réduire le niveau de la publicité par intermittence. Le troisième chapitre est un papier co-écrit avec Maarten Janssen et Alexei Parakhonyak. Dans cet article nous proposons un nouveau concept d’équilibre “Non-reservation price equilibria” (Non-RPE). “Reservation price equilibria” (RPE) n’évaluent pas exactement la puissance du marché dans les marchés de recherche du consommateur. Sur la plupart des marchés de recherche, les consommateurs ne connaissent pas les éléments importants de l’environnement dans lequel ils font des recherches (comme, pour exemple, le coût pour les entreprises). Nous discutons que RPE souffrent de questions théoriques, telles que la non-existence et la dépendance critique des croyances spécifiques hors-de-équilibre, quand les consommateurs apprennent en faisant des recherches. Nous définissons équilibrée, la situation où les consommateurs choisissent rationnellement des stratégies de recherche qui ne sont pas caractérisées par un prix de réservation. Non-RPE existent toujours et ne dépendent pas des croyances spécifiques hors-deéquilibre. Non-RPE ont pour objectif la recherche active du consommateur et sont compatibles avec les résultats empiriques récents<br>This thesis consists of three independent chapters addressing different questions of information economics. The first chapter studies optimal strategies of firms which are present in both offline and online markets. We study optimal pricing strategies of retailers in presence of showrooming and their decisions on distribution channels. Showrooming is a situation where consumers try products at brick-and-mortar stores before purchasing them online at a lower price. One way to prevent showrooming is to use a price matching policy, whereby price is the same in both the physical store and the online channel. We show that for small search costs, a price matching policy is indeed optimal. However for higher search costs price matching is suboptimal, and online and offline purchases coexist with showrooming. A firm which faces online competition from a foreign multichannel retailer has an incentive to geo-block, i.e. refuse to serve foreign customers, even though it leads to a decrease in potential demand. Geo-blocking relaxes online competition and leads to higher prices both online and in brick-and-mortar stores. A legal price parity requirement helps to eliminate incentives to geo-block and thus restores online competition. The second chapter analyzes information diffusion process in communication networks where social interactions are costly. We provide a dynamic model with strategic agents who decide how much effort to put into the propagation of information about a product in each period. We show that the equilibrium level of the individual communication effort is convex in the proportion of informed agents, and lower than the socially optimal level due to the substantial free-riding effect. We show that for sufficiently high recommendation cost it is socially optimal that symmetric agents exert the same communication effort while for low recommendation cost this is not true. In the context of our model we analyze the advertising strategy of the firm launching a new product with positive network externalities for consumers. The analysis shows that the outcome of advertisement is decreasing fast with the proportion of informed consumers due to the free-riding effect. Thus, optimally the firm has to adjust and reduce the level of advertising in each period. The third chapter is a co-authored paper with Maarten Janssen and Alexei Parakhonyak. In this paper we propose a new equilibrium concept of Non-reservation price equilibria (Non-RPE). Reservation price equilibria (RPE) do not accurately assess market power in consumer search markets. In most search markets, consumers do not know important elements of the environment in which they search (such as, for example, firms’ cost). We argue that when consumers learn when searching, RPE suffer from theoretical issues, such as non-existence and critical dependence on specific out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We characterize equilibria where consumers rationally choose search strategies that are not characterized by a reservation price. Non-RPE always exist and do not depend on specific out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Non-RPE have active consumer search and are consistent with recent empirical findings
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COLOMBO, STEFANO. "DIRECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN THE HOTELLING FRAMEWORK." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/361.
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Questa tesi studia da una prospettiva teorica le implicazioni della discriminazione del prezzo in oligopoli spaziali. Nel capitolo 1 presentiamo una raccolta selettiva dei principali articoli riguardanti discriminazione del prezzo e differenziazione del prodotto nel modello di Hotelling. Nel capitolo 2 studiamo l’incentivo per le imprese a discriminare quando la differenziazione del prodotto è endogena. Due diverse versioni di un gioco a tre stadi sono considerate. Nella prima versione, le imprese prima scelgono quale varietà produrre, poi scelgono se discriminare o non discriminare, e infine fissano i prezzi. Emerge un Dilemma del Prigioniero: le imprese discriminano e i profitti sono inferiori di quelli che sarebbero emersi in caso di prezzo uniforme. Nella seconda versione del gioco i primi due stadi sono invertiti: in questo caso, in equilibrio nessuna impresa discrimina e non c’è Dilemma del Prigioniero. Nel capitolo 3 studiamo la relazione tra sostenibilità della collusione e differenziazione del prodotto quando le imprese possono discriminare. Analizziamo tre schemi collusivi: collusione sui prezzi discriminatori, collusione su un prezzo uniforme, collusione per non discriminare. Otteniamo che la sostenibilità del primo e del terzo schema non dipende dalla differenziazione del prodotto, mentre la sostenibilità del secondo schema dipende negativamente della differenziazione del prodotto.<br>This thesis studies from a theoretical point of view the implications of price discrimination in spatial oligopolies. In Chapter 1, we provide a selective survey of the main contributions regarding price discrimination and product differentiation in the Hotelling framework. In Chapter 2 we study the firms’ incentive to price discriminate when product differentiation is endogenous. Two different versions of a three-stage game are considered. In the first version, firms first choose which variety to produce, then choose whether to price discriminate or not, then set prices. A Prisoner Dilemma arises: firms price discriminate and profits are lower than under uniform pricing. In the second version of the game, the first two stages are reversed: in this case uniform pricing emerges in equilibrium and there is not Prisoner Dilemma. In Chapter 3, we study the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability when firms may price discriminate. Three different collusive schemes are analyzed: collusion on discriminatory prices, collusion on a uniform price, and collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the sustainability of the first and the third scheme does not depend on product differentiation, while the sustainability of the second scheme depends negatively on product differentiation.
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COLOMBO, STEFANO. "DIRECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION IN THE HOTELLING FRAMEWORK." Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/361.
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Questa tesi studia da una prospettiva teorica le implicazioni della discriminazione del prezzo in oligopoli spaziali. Nel capitolo 1 presentiamo una raccolta selettiva dei principali articoli riguardanti discriminazione del prezzo e differenziazione del prodotto nel modello di Hotelling. Nel capitolo 2 studiamo l’incentivo per le imprese a discriminare quando la differenziazione del prodotto è endogena. Due diverse versioni di un gioco a tre stadi sono considerate. Nella prima versione, le imprese prima scelgono quale varietà produrre, poi scelgono se discriminare o non discriminare, e infine fissano i prezzi. Emerge un Dilemma del Prigioniero: le imprese discriminano e i profitti sono inferiori di quelli che sarebbero emersi in caso di prezzo uniforme. Nella seconda versione del gioco i primi due stadi sono invertiti: in questo caso, in equilibrio nessuna impresa discrimina e non c’è Dilemma del Prigioniero. Nel capitolo 3 studiamo la relazione tra sostenibilità della collusione e differenziazione del prodotto quando le imprese possono discriminare. Analizziamo tre schemi collusivi: collusione sui prezzi discriminatori, collusione su un prezzo uniforme, collusione per non discriminare. Otteniamo che la sostenibilità del primo e del terzo schema non dipende dalla differenziazione del prodotto, mentre la sostenibilità del secondo schema dipende negativamente della differenziazione del prodotto.<br>This thesis studies from a theoretical point of view the implications of price discrimination in spatial oligopolies. In Chapter 1, we provide a selective survey of the main contributions regarding price discrimination and product differentiation in the Hotelling framework. In Chapter 2 we study the firms’ incentive to price discriminate when product differentiation is endogenous. Two different versions of a three-stage game are considered. In the first version, firms first choose which variety to produce, then choose whether to price discriminate or not, then set prices. A Prisoner Dilemma arises: firms price discriminate and profits are lower than under uniform pricing. In the second version of the game, the first two stages are reversed: in this case uniform pricing emerges in equilibrium and there is not Prisoner Dilemma. In Chapter 3, we study the relationship between product differentiation and collusion sustainability when firms may price discriminate. Three different collusive schemes are analyzed: collusion on discriminatory prices, collusion on a uniform price, and collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the sustainability of the first and the third scheme does not depend on product differentiation, while the sustainability of the second scheme depends negatively on product differentiation.
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Ebina, Takeshi, and Takanori Adachi. "The Welfare Effects of Oligopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination When Own and Cross Price Elasticities Are Constants." 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科附属国際経済政策研究センター, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/21073.
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Delalic, Senija. "Crossing Øresund : A case study of price discrimination on Øresund Bridge." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Nationalekonomi, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-14677.
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The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the competition structure in the market for crossing Øresund and which price setting techniques are used. The results show that the market for crossing Øresund Bridge is monopolistically competitive market. While Øresund Bridge can in some cases be seen as a monopoly. Furthermore the results show how the firms that are operating in the market offer their consumers various pricing schedules to self-select from. The results based upon the information collected found that Øresund Bridge uses price discriminatory pricing schedules such as two-part tariff, quantity discount and peak-load pricing. According to the theory of price discrimination the firm needs to have market power in order to price discriminate and it is found that Øresund Bridge have a market share of 76%. The negative consequences of price discrimination in the particular market can mostly be seen in the ferry market where the two largest firms have to start collaborating in order to sustain as a part of the market. The positive consequences is found to be that a wider range of consumer groups are able to travel over Øresund due to the extensive range of different prices offered by the market operators.
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Sohi, Jacinth K. "The Cloak of Copyright: How Costco v. Omega Enabled Price Discrimination." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2011. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/189.
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In December of 2010, Costco v. Omega came down from the Supreme Court. The Switzerland-based watchmaker Omega sold Seamaster Collection watches, which were affixed with its copyrighted logo, in the United States as well as in foreign markets. Omega priced watches in the United States market higher than elsewhere. Costco obtained Omega’s watches from a third party that had purchased the watches abroad, then sold them at its membership warehouses for cheaper prices than authorized Omega dealers in the United States. Consequently, Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement. Costco pursued a defense based on the first sale doctrine in response. While from a legal perspective the case was a copyright dispute, this categorization does not make sense from an economic view. Rather, the application of economic models reveals that the core issue in Costco centers about price discrimination, not copyright. This thesis uses a law and economics framework to analyze the facts of and the decision in Costco to determine whether the outcome was welfare maximizing and to assess the implications that the case will have on copyright law in the future.
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Fouché, Elizabeth Maria. "The impact of price discrimination on tourism demand / Elizabeth Maria Fouché." Thesis, North-West University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10394/1162.
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The primary goal of this study was to determine the impact of price discrimination
on tourism demand. Four objectives were defined with reference to the primary
research goal.
The first objective was to analyse the concept of price discrimination and relevant
theories by means of a literature study. In this regard it was found that price
discrimination between markets is fairly common and that it occurs if the same
goods were sold to different customers at different prices. Price discrimination is
also possible as soon as some monopoly power exists and it is feasible when it is
impossible or at least impractical for the buyers to trade among themselves.
Three different kinds of price discrimination can be applied, namely first-degree,
second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. The data also indicated
that price discrimination is advantageous (it mainly increases profit) and that it
has several other effects too.
The second objective was to analyse examples of price discrimination by means
of international case studies. In these different case studies it was found that
demand and supply, therefore consumer and product, formed the basis of price
discrimination. If demand did not exist, it would be impossible to apply price
discrimination. The findings also indicated that, for an organisation to be able to
practice price discrimination, the markets must be separated effectively and it will
only be successful if there is a significant difference in demand elasticity between
the different consumers. Furthermore, the ability to charge these different prices
will depend on the consumer's ability and willingness to pay. If an organisation
should decide to price discriminate, it would lead to a higher profit, a more
optimal pricing policy and also to an increase in sales.
The third objective was to analyse national case studies. This was done through
comparing the data of a tourism organisation price discriminating (Mosetlha Bush
Camp, situated in the North West) to two organisations that did not implement
price discrimination (Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in the Northern Cape and
Golden Leopard Resort, also situated in the North West). It was found that a
customer with low price elasticity is less deterred by a higher price than a
customer with a high price elasticity of demand. As long as the customer's price
elasticity is less than one, it will be very advantageous to increase the price: the
seller will in this case get more money for less goods. With the increase in price
the price elasticity tends to rise above one.
The fourth objective was to draw conclusions and make recommendations. It
was concluded that price discrimination could be applied successfully in virtually
any organisation or industry. Furthermore, price discrimination does not always
have a negative effect; but can have a positive ass well. It can have a positive
effect on tourism demand. The findings emphasised that the main reason for
implementing price discrimination is to increase profit at the cost of reducing
consumer surplus. From the results it was recommended that more research on
this topic should be conducted.<br>Thesis (M.Com. (Tourism))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2006.
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Velez-Velasquez, Juan S., and Juan S. Vélez-Velásquez. "Three Essays on Colombia's Telecommunications." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/624582.
Full textAbstract:
Colombia's telecommunication industry has changed drastically in the last decade. Among the most salient events, a series of mergers between some of the industry's largest providers which resulted in a reduced number of competitors. One would expect that this reduction in the number of competitors would translate into higher prices. However, competition is at such high level that the media even talk about a "price war". My dissertation aims to shed light on the causes of this apparent inconsistency between a smaller number of competitors and more competitive outcomes. I start by showing that, in effect, the latest of these mergers, the one between Comcel and Telmex, had a pro-competitive effects on the provision of broadband. Next I show that the services provided by Comcel and Telmex were complements and that the pro-competitive effects of the merger can be explained by this complementarity. Finally, I study the effects of price discrimination under oligopolistic competition.
In chapter 1 I assess the ex-post short-run effect on broadband provision of the Comcel-Telmex merger. Employing administrative data about the universe of plans and firms providing wired telecom services, I use several difference-in-difference specifications to obtain estimates for the effect of the merger on price and download speeds of plans provided by the merging firm and its rivals. My estimates suggest that, in markets affected by the merger, download speeds rose by .6 Megabits per second on average. The average increase in the markets resulted from increases in the plans offered by the merging firm (1.2 Mbps) and increases in the speeds of plans provided by its rivals (.5 Mbps).
In chapter 2 I study mergers of firms producing complementary goods. Mergers of firms producing complementary products have ambiguous effects on consumer welfare. The merged firm may lower prices because the merger internalizes the profits originated by the complementarity. But with the merger the firm gains the ability to bundle and with bundles the firm can exert price discrimination, increasing the prices of standalone products. I employ a comprehensive, administrative data set, which records prices, market shares, and plan attributes of the universe of Colombia’s telecom carriers, to assess which effect dominates. I estimate a random-coefficient discrete choice model of consumer demand model for bundled and standalone telecom products, in which the degree of substitutability or complementarity among products is an essential parameter of interest. I find that major telecom products display a mix of substitutability and complementarity, but in general hardwired and mobile services are perceived as complements by Colombian households. My counterfactual experiments using the estimated model, indicate positive net effects of mergers with complements: despite a small increase in the price of standalone goods, consumer surplus increases by around 7 million dollars per quarter.
Finally, in chapter 3, I study price discrimination in an oligopolistic setting. Economic theory is not conclusive about the effects of banning third degree price discrimination under imperfect competition. Price discrimination can enhance competition if the firms practicing don't agree on the ranking of their markets. In this case, price discrimination can lead to lower prices in all markets. Thus, forcing the firms to charge uniform prices can increase their profits and reduce consumers' surplus. Using data on prices, market shares and characteristics of telecommunication services sold under price discrimination by Colombian telecom providers, I estimate a model of competition. The estimates allow me to simulate a counterfactual scenario in which firms lose their ability to exert price discrimination within a city. Simulating a ban on price discrimination has negligible effect on consumer surplus and increases profits slightly.
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Vagliasindi, Maria. "Competition, access pricing and regulation in a second degree price discrimination setting." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1995. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/81921/.
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In broad terms, this work aims to gain a greater understanding of the particular features introduced in the regulatory set-up by competitive issues and vertically related markets. Specifically, we explore their impact on the profitability of the market and the p~ssibility for the incumbent to maintain monopoly profits under different regulatory regimes. There was a time when utilities industries and in particular telecoms each seemed to be a natural monopoly. Most governments liked it that way because they owned the monopoly and siphoned off some of the profits. Nowadays, competition is spreading in most utilities market and it becomes imperative to assess its impact on the tariffs and in general on social welfare. We deal with a second degree price discrimination model allowing the players -namely, an incumbent, who has a natural monopoly on the network, and a rival- to make use of non-linear pricing in intermediate and final goods. In this framework the entrant's choice of the customer types is endogenised in a sequential multistage game, where the incumbent, who is undoubtedly the most powerful player, acts as a first mover. We also show that cream skimming, contrary to the general wisdom, can be welfare enhancing. Particular attention is devoted to the access pricing problem which is becoming the key issue to the regulators, examining the relevance of simple pricing rules, such as the Baumol-Willig rule. Despite the presence of a growing literature in these areas, other models fail to incorporate the use of non-linear access pricing. Since price discrimination is common in practice this omission can lead to misleading results. Our analysis shows that the regulator should not allow competition for the low-demand consumers' types or by a less efficient entrant and should impose the adoption of socially optimal non-linear access tariffs. Therefore the general conclusion is that competition will not obviate the need of regulation.
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Yang, Zheng. "Price Discrimination on Complementary Goods: Evidence from the Men's Shaving Razor Market." UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/economics_etds/41.
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This dissertation analyzes the men's razor market to examine whether a monopolist can implement price discrimination for the complementary goods. I estimate a demand system for razors using the random coefficient logit model with market level sales data from the Nielsen Store Scanner dataset and individual demographic data from the March CPS. The estimated parameters are used to construct price-cost markups. By comparing the markups of different products, I find evidence that Gillette uses a two-part tariff strategy. This conclusion can be generalized as that of a monopolist setting the prices of tie-in products consistent with a two-part tariff.
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Grindley, Peter Conrad. "A strategic analysis of the diffusion of innovations : theory and evidence." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.308388.
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Gratz, Linda. "Three essays in industrial organization: pay-for-delay settlements, exclusive contracts, and price discrimination." Diss., lmu, 2012. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-143619.
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Eriksson, Rickard. "Price responses to changes in costs and demand." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.) (EFI), 2001. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/554.htm.
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Fredriksson, Henrik. "Husqvarna AB : a study on pricing and quality." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Nationalekonomi, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-14481.
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This thesis will compare and examine three different chainsaw models with re-spect to price, elasticity, price discrimination, product differentiation and durabili-ty. The three different saws are all aiming at different customer groups; hobby users, leisure users and professional users. The demands and needs of this groups differs a lot. The hobby users have the largest amount of different saws to choose from, this is a field with many different brands and the quality varies a lot, this implies that here is a fierce competition with respect to price. This indirect affects the elastic-ity and possibilities to price discriminate and product differentiation. I found that this model has the highest elasticity which is perfectly inline with the theory. Here is also a low possibility to price discriminate and the durability is the low-est. The other two models examined, the leisure and professional, are located in less competitive segments and from this follows that the professional model which has the smallest amount of competitors also has the lowest elasticity. Here was also the possibility to price discriminate the highest, durability the best and the product were viewed as differentiated.
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Mertens, Yves. "Price discrimination and the effects of trade restrictions in the European car market, 1970-1985." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.320718.
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Printezis, Antonios. "Pricing Models for Admission in Service Systems." Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1112718326.
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Pofahl, Geoffrey Michael. "Essays on horizontal merger simulation: the curse of dimensionality, retail price discrimination, and supply channel stage-games." Texas A&M University, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/4833.
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In the words of Joel I. Klein, former Assistant Attorney General of the United
States, âÂÂ[a]ntitrust enforcement in the merger area has never been as time-consuming,
complex, or as central to the functioning of our economy as it is todayâ (Klein, 1998).
As such, the development of transparent, efficient, and accurate merger analysis tools is
an endeavor whose value continues to increase in the eyes of regulators and industry
participants alike. Arguably, the most visible result of such endeavors is the emergence
and advancement of a practice known as merger simulation.
The first goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the merits of the Distance Metric
(DM) demand model and its usefulness in merger simulations. Revered by its creators as
easy-to-use, flexible, and able to handle large numbers of products, the DM approach
has not received the âÂÂroad-testingâ necessary for establishing its practical usefulness.
The DM model is used to estimate demand elasticities for 45 bottled-juice products.
Elasticities are then used to simulate numerous hypothetical mergers. While adding
validity to the alleged strengths of the DM approach, an additional contribution is made
by demonstrating the robustness of merger simulation results across 22 DM
specifications. Despite the oft-recognized reality of zone pricing by food retailers, this form of
price discrimination has received little attention within the context of upstream merger
analysis. Thus, the second objective of this dissertation is to relax the conventional
merger simulation assumption of uniform pricing by retailers, allowing us to explore the
impacts of zone pricing on post-merger price effects. Using the ready-to-eat cereals
industry as a backdrop, it is shown that ignoring retail price discrimination veils a
potentially diverse set of price effects that are otherwise lost in uniform pricing analyses.
The goal of the final essay is to explore the implementation of more realistic
supply channel interactions in merger simulations. In particular, a two-stage pricing
game is used to conduct merger simulations in the refrigerated orange juice category.
The overriding finding is that comparisons with conventionally used models will not be
practical until the relationship between demand specification and two-stage game
modeling is better understood.
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Kusch, Katharina. "Beyond customer perception of price discrimination: A consumer behavior analysis and its implications on aviation revenue management." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2016. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-262169.
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The purpose of this paper is to assess consumer behavior in the airline industry from a perspective beyond the effects of price discrimination. First the consequences of dynamic pricing will be assessed before looking at the role of social media and offline social influences, consumer satisfaction and airline equilibrium networks and their effects on consumer loyalty. Final implications on aviation revenue management will be drawn.
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Rosická, Markéta. "Využití cenové diskriminace na mezinárodních trzích." Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta podnikatelská, 2021. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-443098.
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The diploma thesis is focused on price discrimination of a selected company operating in an international environment. The work is divided into three main parts. The theoretical part of the thesis describes the key concepts and characteristics necessary to understand the issues related to the topic of the thesis. The analytical part of the work is focused on the description of the current state of the company in selected foreign markets. The proposal part of the work used the method of multiple regression analysis and also presents possible proposals and recommendations for price discrimination in individual foreign markets with regard to the purchasing power of individual countries.
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Cadman, Richard. "Remedies for non-price discrimination : their application in the UK broadband market and their effect on investment decisions." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2015. https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/53408/.
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In 2004, Ofcom launched a strategic review of the telecommunications market. This established that the expectation of non-price discrimination by the incumbent operator, BT, against its smaller rivals was a significant concern holding back investment in market entry via local loop unbundling (LLU). To address this problem, Ofcom and BT agreed a set of Undertakings in lieu of a reference to the Competition Commission. BT agreed to a new form of non-discrimination remedy referred to as Equivalence of Input (EoI) and to a set of organisational changes known as functional separation. Under EoI, BT’s retail division had to use the same inputs under the same terms and conditions as its rivals. Functional separation referred to the creation of a separate access services division that would supply services in markets where BT was dominant. This thesis discusses the economic principles of network industries and why discrimination can be a particular problem. It makes three specific contributions to knowledge of the subject. First, a historical record of the actions and issues that led to the Undertakings. Secondly, a breakeven analysis to determine how effective the Undertakings, and other regulations imposed by Ofcom, were at correcting the problem of non-price discrimination. The breakeven analysis establishes the location of “marginal exchange” before and after the regulatory changes. Finally, an assessment of the longer-term consequences by employing a discrete choice model to determine whether the presence of entrants using LLU or Virgin Media had a stronger effect on where BT installed fibre. The thesis concludes that the Undertakings did affect the location of the marginal exchange by up to 950 exchanges covering 31% of customer premises. LLU price cuts imposed by Ofcom moved the marginal exchange by a further 796 exchanges: 11% of premises. The thesis also finds that up till the end of 2012, the presence of LLU operators had a stronger influence on the location of fibred exchanges than Virgin Media.
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Strand, Niklas. "Empirical studies of pricing." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.) (EFI), 2001. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/570.htm.
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Gratz, Linda [Verfasser], and Klaus [Akademischer Betreuer] Schmidt. "Three essays in industrial organization : pay-for-delay settlements, exclusive contracts, and price discrimination / Linda Gratz. Betreuer: Klaus Schmidt." München : Universitätsbibliothek der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1022791214/34.
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Gafarova, Gulmira [Verfasser]. "Price discrimination and market power in the international wheat market : the case of Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine / Gulmira Gafarova." Halle, 2018. http://d-nb.info/1169652883/34.
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Lobb, Alexandra E. "Two studies of the Australian Wheat Board : a traditional price discrimination model, and the privatisation process and pricing behaviour of a risk averse firm." University of Western Australia. School of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 2003. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2004.0071.
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This thesis is motivated by the impacts of contemporary political and economic issues such as microeconomic reform and regulatory control on the Australian wheat industry. Firstly, the suggestion of whether the AWB (International) Ltd commands market power and secondly, that the objectives of the AWB Ltd have changed since semi-privatisation of the Australian Wheat Board under the Wheat Marketing Act, 1989. The AWB (International) Ltd’s ability to price discriminate is a key component to the retention of the single desk regulatory arrangement for the export of Australian wheat. Due to data restrictions the market power of the AWB (International) Ltd has not been determined within this thesis. To complement this traditional approach, a more novel proposal is developed to determine the effect of microeconomic reform on the Australian wheat industry. Conceptualising the change of the AWB Ltd’s objectives as a shift from revenue maximization to profit maximization, this study examines the impact of such a change on the pricing policies of a multi- market price-setting firm. More specifically, this study investigates, for two hypothetical objective functions, a risk averse firm’s price-setting behaviour in an “overseas” and a “domestic” market, given differing costs of supply, uncertain demand functions and differing price elasticities of demand in each market. The aim is to generate empirically testable hypotheses relating to the impact of a change of objectives on pricing behaviour.
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Stroukal, Dominik. "Cenová diskriminace na trhu s marihuanou: Venkáč nebo podlampa?" Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-96406.
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This paper presents an example of price discrimination on the market for marijuana in northern Bohemia in 2006. First, a model for a multifirm market is built, with emphasis on the existence of two types of firms and two qualities good offered. It is shown that in the case of a dealer of two qualities of marijuana there is an incentive to raise the price of the more expensive quality and reduce the price of the cheaper. Using econometric estimates, price discrimination is found in accordance with the predictions of the model in the amount of about 50 crowns per gram.
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Luu, Hieu Duc. "Essays on the Industrial Organization of Mortgage Markets." Thesis, Boston College, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:108036.
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Thesis advisor: Michael Grubb<br>This dissertation consists of two chapters on the industrial organization of mortgage markets in the United States.In the first chapter, titled “Consumer Search Costs in U.S. Mortgage Markets”, I focus on estimating the distribution of consumer search costs in the market for government-backed mortgages in the US during the period from September 2013 to March 2015. I adapt the Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) search model to mortgage markets. I estimate the distribution of consumer search costs in each U.S. state using recent data on government-insured mortgages. I find that estimated search costs are large; a median borrower would face a search cost equivalent to about $40 in monthly repayment. At the state-level, search cost magnitude is related positively to household income and age and negatively to years of education. I solve counterfactual scenarios in order to study the relationship between search costs and welfare. Compared to the full information scenario, the presence of costly consumer search decreases social welfare by about $600 in monthly repayment per borrower. This decrease in welfare occurs because under costly search borrowers are matched with lower quality lenders and spend resources on searching. At the national level, this decrease corresponds to approximately $35 million per-month. Reductions in search costs would raise social welfare monotonically. A 10% reduction in search cost may raise social welfare by as much as $130 per borrower per month. These findings support recent policies that aim to reduce search costs of mortgage borrowers. In the second chapter, titled “Price Discrimination in U.S. Mortgage Markets”, I examine the existence of price discrimination generated by costly consumer search in the market for mortgages. I develop a stylized model of consumer search in mortgage markets where firms charge optimal prices that depend on borrowers' search cost level. The model produces testable restrictions on the conditional quantile function of observed transacted rates. Using the data on insured Federal Housing Agency loans where price variation is not driven by default risk, I run a quantile regression of transacted interest rates on a set of loan observables, including borrower's credit score, original principal balance, and loan-to-value ratio, among others. I find that predictions of the theoretical model are satisfied for all loan observables under consideration, and price discrimination created by costly consumer search is likely to exist in U.S. mortgage markets<br>Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018<br>Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences<br>Discipline: Economics
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Gill, Peter. "Lågprisflygbolagens prissättningsstrategier : En kvantitativ studie av Ryanairs prissättning av flygbiljetter." Thesis, Södertörn University College, School of Business Studies, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-3653.
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<p><strong>Syfte</strong>: Studiens syfte är att analysera hur flygbolaget Ryanair prissätter sina flygbiljetter och om det skiljer sig beroende på flygsträcka.</p><p><strong>Metod</strong>: En kvalitativ longitudinell studie med deduktiv ansats där primärdata i form av prisuppgifter samlats in från Ryanairs hemsida.</p><p><strong>Teorier</strong>: Prisdiskriminering, Priselasticitetshävstång, Operationell hävstång och Hallbergs prisstrategier.</p><p><strong>Slutsats</strong>: Studiens resultat bekräftar Anjos, Chengs och Curries teori om att lågprisflygbiljetter håller sig på en ganska stabil nivå fram till att det återstår ungefär 20 dagar kvar till avresa, då priset stiger fram till avgångsdagen då det är som högst. Detta motsäger Anderson och Wilsons teori om att biljettpriset går i cykler och att flygbiljetterna är som dyrast några dagar före avresa för att sedan sjunka i pris. Den höga prishöjningen på avgångsdagen sker konsekvent på alla de undersökta flygsträckorna och är intressant eftersom höga priser inte är något som lågprisflygbolagen vill förknippas med. Förklaringen kan vara det som diskuteras av Piga och Bachis om att flygbolagen försöker skapa en osäkerhet hos resenärer kring när det är billigast att köpa sina flygbiljetter. Studien resultat visar också på att det går att se ett mönster i prissättningen av flygbiljetter på Ryanairs resmål med få flygningar medan de mer populära resmålen har en mer dynamisk prissättning som är desto svårare att förutspå.</p><br><p>The purpose of this Bachelor thesis is to analyze how the airline Ryanair is pricing their tickets and if there is a distinction between different flight destinations. The thesis used a deductive approach and the data (ticket prices) was collected during a time period of 53 days from Ryanair’s internet homepage. The theories used to analyze the data were price discrimination, price elasticity leverage, operating leverage and four different price strategies presented by Niklas L. Hallberg. The result shows that Ryanair uses second degree of price discrimination in all of the observed flights at the departure day. As for the rest, the result shows that there is a distinction between how Ryanair uses pricing as a strategy depending on what the destination is. The conclusion of the thesis is that Ryanair uses different price strategies depending on how popular the specific flight or destination is. The more popular the flight or destination is, the more dynamic the price is and the harder it is to predict the coming price. The pricing of the more popular flights could be, as presented by Piga and Bachis, a way of creating an uncertainty when it is the cheapest to buy airline tickets. Further the Study confirms Anjos, Cheng and Currie’s theory that the prices low-fare tickets are at a stable level until it remains about 20 days until departure, when the price increases until the departure date. This contradicts Anderson and Wilson’s theory that the ticket price goes in cycles where the price is at the highest level some days before departure before it starts to decrease.</p>
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Larrieu, Thomas. "Topics in industrial organization applied to competition policy." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019SACLX058/document.
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Les notions de plateforme, de marché bifaces ou même multi-faces sont aujourd’hui au cœur des discussions économiques du fait de l’explosion du e-commerce lié à l’essor des nouvelles technologies de l’information. Ces plateformes en lignes offrent de nouvelles opportunités et soulèvent de nombreuses questions (stratégie tarifaire, règlementation, etc.). Les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse s’intéressent aux plateformes de réservation en ligne et plus particulièrement à l’impact concurrentiel des clauses de parités tarifaire. Ces dernières, mises en place par les plateformes, imposent aux vendeurs de proposer son bien ou service via la plateforme au meilleur prix disponible sur tous les autres canaux de ventes. Dans le premier chapitre, je montre que, d'un point de vue théorique, l'effet concurrentiel des clauses de parité est majoritairement négatif mais peut devenir positif en fonction du pouvoir de négociation de chacun des acteurs. Dans un second temps, une analyse empirique reposant sur une base de données unique de plus de 6 millions de prix, me permet de montrer que la suppression des clauses de parité à Paris a engendré une baisse tarifaire moyenne des hôtels de -3,1% à - 4,5%. Cette baisse peut en partie s'expliquer par une augmentation des stratégies de discrimination tarifaire. En effet, les hôtels ont augmenté de 1,4 à 2,3% la discrimination entre plateformes et ils ont augmenté de 2,1% à 3,6% leurs stratégies de discrimination inter-temporelle. Le dernier chapitre de cette thèse est dédié à l'analyse des amendes décidées par l'Autorité de la Concurrence entre 2006 et 2018 pour des pratiques de cartels. Nous montrons que ces amendes sont sous optimales car elles ne satisfassent pas les critères de dissuasion et de compensation<br>The Internet technology and the web economy create new types of markets and new relationships between market players. The majority of these new markets can be associated to platforms where two or more sides of the same market meet. Such “multi-sided” industries raise specific issues. Determining the optimal pricing strategy for both the platform and the users selling goods through the platform is one of the main challenges of this new economy. The first two chapters of my thesis analysis Price Parity Agreement (PPA) from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. I first study the effect of Price Parity Agreements from a theoretical perspective. I demonstrate that PPAs on the online booking market are detrimental to consumers if platforms have most of the bargaining power. They attenuate competition between platforms, lead to higher commission fees and higher hotel rooms’ prices. However, MFN clauses may also be welfare improving when hotels own the bargaining power and competition between them is high. The second chapter is dedicated to an empirical analysis of the effects of PPAs. Using a before-after design and controlling for external shocks, I demonstrate that the end of Price Parity Agreements imposed by public authorities to OTAs causes a decrease of about 3.1% to 4.5% in the average level of prices set by hotels. This decrease may be explained by an increase of price discrimination. I show that the level of price discrimination across OTAs increases by 2.3% to 1.4% after the drop of Price Parity Agreements and that the degree of inter-temporal price discrimination also increases by 3.6% to 2.1%. The last chapter of my thesis is focused on the analysis of the financial fines imposed by the French Autorité de la Concurrence to cartels in France between 2006 and 2018. We show that the level of these fines is sub-optimal and doesn’t meet the deterrence objective in the majority of the cases
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Prasad, Kadambari. "The industrial organization of input markets." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3ec5eae8-e25a-4c87-bee7-136bb88cb683.
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This thesis consists of three closely connected pieces of work and an enhanced version of my M.Phil. thesis. The first three substantive chapters analyse vertical contracting in input markets under the exercise of differential buyer power. Chapters 2 and 3 consider the case of a supplier selling its output via a supermarket that offers captive demand (due to customers who anyway make a trip for their weekly shopping), which its rival, a local store is not able to offer. It is shown that the supermarket can negotiate an input price lower than the local store's only if its advantage translates into sufficient bargaining strength in setting contracts. The existence of a waterbed effect, the implications of a partially covered market, a nonlinear pricing structure and welfare implications of a ban in discrimination are also explored. Chapter 4 modifies the standard model where size determines buyer power to show that if quantities need to be decided in advance, an increase in a retailer's size is always welfare improving. For the presence of waterbed effects, we propose a novel insight that runs across different classes of models: following a discount to one retailer, the supplier faces two competing incentives - it wants to extract profits from the rival retailer but it also wants to transfer sales towards it. The waterbed effect is shown to be present only if the discount to the retailer is small, so incentives for profit extraction outweigh those for transferring business. Finally chapter 5 studies a firm's strategic incentive to outsource when its product displays network effects. It shows that a firm would choose to increase its observable marginal cost to make its competitor less aggressive and thereby increase its own probability of winning competition for the market. This is robust to small levels of uncertainty.
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Zhang, Xiaochen. "Welfare Properties of Recommender Systems." Research Showcase @ CMU, 2017. http://repository.cmu.edu/dissertations/904.
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Recommender systems are ubiquitously used by online vendors as profitable tools to boost sales and enhance the purchase experience of their consumers. In recent literature, the value created by recommender systems are discussed extensively. In contrast, few researchers look at the negative side of the recommender systems from the viewpoint of policymakers. To fill this gap, I critically investigate the welfare impact of recommender systems (RSs) during my Ph.D. study. The main focus of my Ph.D. dissertation is analyzing whether there exists a conflict of interest between the recommendations provider and its consumers in the electronic marketplace. My dissertation is composed of three parts. In Part I, I evaluate empirically whether in the real world, the profit-driven firm will choose a recommendation mechanism that hurts or is suboptimal to its consumers. In Part II, I analyze the role of personalization technology in the RSs from a unique perspective of how personalization resembles price discrimination as a profitable tool to exploit consumer surplus. In part III, I investigate the vendor’s motivation to increase the level of personalization in two-period transactions. As the RSs are designed by the firm, and the firm’s objective is to maximize profits, the RSs might not maximize consumers’ welfare. In Part I of my thesis work, I test the existence of such a conflict of interest between the firm and its consumers. I explore this question empirically with a concrete RS created by our industry collaborator for their Video-on-Demand (VoD) system. Using a large-scale dataset (300,000 users) from a randomized experiment on the VoD platform, I simulate seven RSs based on an exponential demand model with listed movie orders and prices as key inputs, estimated from the experimental dataset. The seven simulated RSs differ by the assignments of listed orders for selected recommended movies. Specifically, assignments are chosen to maximize profits, consumer surplus, social welfare, popularity (IMDB votes and IMDB ratings), and previous sales, as well as random assignments. As a result, the profit-driven recommender system generates 8% less consumer surplus than the consumer-driven RSs, providing evidence for a conflict of interest between the vendor and its consumers. Major e-vendors personalize recommendations by different algorithms that depend on how much and types of consumer information obtained. Therefore, the welfare evaluations of personalized recommendation strategies by empirical methods are hard to generalize. In Part II of my thesis, I base my analysis of personalization in RSs on a conceptual approach. Under an analytic framework of horizontal product differentiation and heterogenous consumer preferences, the resemblance of personalization to price discrimination in welfare properties is presented. Personalization is beneficial to consumers when more personalization leads to more adoption of recommendations, since it decreases search costs for more consumers. However, when the level surpasses a threshold when all consumers adopt, a more personalized RS decreases consumer surplus and only helps the firm to exploit surplus from consumers. The extreme case of perfect personalization generates the same welfare results as first-degree price discrimination where consumers get perfectly fit recommendations but are charged their willingness-to-pay. As shown in Part II, personalization is always profitable for the monopoly seller. In Part III, I investigate the vendor’s motivation to increase the level of personalization in a two-period transactions. In the first period, consumers do not observe the true quality of the recommendations and choose to accept recommended products or not based on their initial guesses. In the second period, consumers fully learn the quality. The settings of consumer uncertainty and consumer learning incentivize the firm to charge lower-than-exploiting price for recommendations to ensure consumers’ first-period adoptions of the RS. Therefore, uncertainties mediate the conflicts of interest from the vendor’s exploitive behavior even though the vendor might strategically elevate consumers’ initial evaluation to reduce such effect.
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Lormières, Laetitia. "Les prix bas en droit économique." Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010MON10054/document.
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Les prix bas suscitent de nombreux débats en droit économique. Bien que l'opportunité de leur régulation ne semble guère sujette à caution, la liberté de pratiquer une concurrence par les prix est indissociable de la liberté de commerce. Les prix bas apparaissent donc licites par principe. L'interdiction de la revente à perte fait alors figure d'exception en obligeant le législateur à déterminer un prix minimal. Lier cette prohibition au principe de non discrimination a longtemps présenté l'indéniable avantage de contourner une si flagrante difficulté. Cela a toutefois régulièrement mis le législateur au défi de concilier l'effectivité de la sanction avec la possibilité d'une réelle négociation des conditions de vente du fournisseur. La négociabilité retrouvée le place plus que jamais au défi de concilier cette effectivité avec la liberté contractuelle : puisque tout est déductible, tout doit être aisément justifiable et contrôlable<br>Low prices have caused much controversy. Although the need of regulation is actually not an issue in economic analysis of law, the freedom to practise competition based on prices is linked to the freedom of trade. Consequently, low prices appear to be lawful as a rule. Prohibiting to resell at a loss is quite exceptional since it requires from the law-maker to fix a minimum price. Linking the prohibition to the principle of non-discrimination has allowed to get round such a problem for a long time. Nevertheless, it regularly challenged the law-maker to associate the effectiveness of the penalty with the possibility for the retailers to really negociate the suppliers' sales conditions. Removing the principle of non-discrimination challenges the law-maker to link the effectiveness of the penalty with the freedom of contracts, since everything is deductible, everything must be easily justified and controlled
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Escobari, Urday Diego Alfonso. "Essays on pricing under uncertainty." Texas A&M University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/85918.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation analyzes pricing under uncertainty focusing on the U.S. airline
industry. It sets to test theories of price dispersion driven by uncertainty in the demand
by taking advantage of very detailed information about the dynamics of airline
prices and inventory levels as the flight date approaches. Such detailed information
about inventories at a ticket level to analyze airline pricing has been used previously
by the author to show the importance of capacity constraints in airline pricing.
This dissertation proposes and implements many new ideas to analyze airline pricing.
Among the most important are: (1) It uses information about inventories at a
ticket level. (2) It is the first to note that fare changes can be explained by adding
dummy variables representing ticket characteristics. Therefore, the load factor at a
ticket level will lose its explanatory power on fares if all ticket characteristics are
included in a pricing equation. (3) It is the first to propose and implement a measure
of Expected Load Factor as a tool to identify which flights are peak and which ones
are not. (4) It introduces a novel idea of comparing actual sales with average sales
at various points prior departure. Using these deviations of actual sales from sales
under average conditions, it presents is the first study to show empirical evidence of
peak load pricing in airlines. (5) It controls for potential endogeneity of sales using
dynamic panels.
The first essay tests the empirical importance of theories that explain price dispersion
under costly capacity and demand uncertainty. The essay calculates a measure of an Expected Load Factor, that is used to calibrate the distribution of demand
uncertainty and to identify which flights are peak and which ones are off-peak. It
shows that different prices can be explained by the different selling probabilities. The
second essay is the first study to provide formal evidence of stochastic peak-load pricing
in airlines. It shows that airlines learn about the demand and respond to early
sales setting higher prices when expected demand is high and more likely to exceed
capacity.
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Ji, Xiaoxuan. "Tax Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Greenfield Investment and Cross-border Merger and Acquisition." OpenSIUC, 2019. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/1660.
Full textAbstract:
In the present dissertation, we study tax competitions for foreign direct investment, which includes the study of greenfield investment with the firm's ownership problem and the cross-border merger and acquisition (M\&A). It sheds light on the literature of public finance, international economics, and industrial organization. In chapter 1, we develop an open economy model with two segmented countries and one monopoly firm which registered in one of the countries. Our results show that when there is an exogenous transportation cost when exporting, the market size plays an important role in tax competition, however, when there is an endogenous tariff determined optimally by each country, the market size does not matter in the tax competition. Chapter 2 and 3 study the tax competition for a post-cross-border merger and acquisition firm, which the firm has three location options, located in either of the countries or both. We found that when the governments have two tax instruments, the lump-sum tax and tariff, the market size and price policy play an important role in tax competition. Moreover, when the governments utilize the lump-sum tax as the only instrument for tax competition, both the firm and countries will be better off when the firm keeps both plants.
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Evers, Patrik, and Oscarsson Andreas Hagen. "Prisstrategier : En studie om dynamisk prissättning på Major events." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för samhällsvetenskaper, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-19601.
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Purpose: The purpose of this Bachelor is to analyze how the organizers of a Major event price their tickets and how these strategies consistent and differs from dynamic pricing. The study also aims to analyze whether there are conditions for dynamic pricing in Major events in the future. Theories: Dynamic pricing - Kimes model, Segmentation, price discrimination, variable ticket pricing. Method: The study used a triangulation where a qualitative interview was combined with quantitative data collection. Primary data was collected through a qualitative approach through an interview with General Secretary Tony Wiréhn and Marketing Director Malin Eldh in the local organization of the IIHF World Championship in Sweden. The quantitative data collection was to collect price information from the games played in the Swedish side of the World Championship organization arrangements. Conclusion: The conclusions that can be drawn are that the organizer of Ice Hockey World Championships today largely applies segmentation and also the second and third degree price discrimination. World Cup organization believes that it has something they call "semi-dynamic pricing", which according to this study involves a variable pricing with dynamic tendencies, then prices on some games adapted based on supply and demand during the sales period. The investigation has revealed that changes in pricing almost exclusively done by time-limited campaigns and not through a continuous influence of variables that control supply and demand. According to analysis by Kimes model revealed that future use of dynamic pricing in Major events are very possible, but there are some obstacles that must first be overcome.
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Faber, Andreas D. [Verfasser], Stefan [Gutachter] Spinler, and Arnd [Gutachter] Huchzermeier. "Data analytics in supply chain planning : applications in intermittent demand forecasting, partial defection prediction and price discrimination / Andreas D. Faber ; Gutachter: Stefan Spinler, Arnd Huchzermeier." Vallendar : WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management, 2021. http://d-nb.info/1240764359/34.
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Ngwe, Donald. "Essays on Price Discrimination." Thesis, 2014. https://doi.org/10.7916/D8PG1PWC.
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The increasing availability of detailed, individual-level data from retail settings presents new opportunities to study fundamental issues in product design, price discrimination, and consumer behavior. In this set of essays I use a particularly rich data set provided by a major fashion goods manufacturer and retailer to illustrate how observed firm strategies correspond to predictions from producer theory. I present evidence on the importance of multidimensionality in consumer preferences, both within the theory of price discrimination and as a factor in actual firm decisions. Finally, I explore the applicability of concepts from signaling theory and behavioral economics in explaining consumer purchase decisions.
The first chapter describes the empirical setting used throughout the entire dissertation. Data is provided by a luxury goods firm that dominates its category of fashion goods in the United States. The firm operates hundreds of stores in the US, with different types of stores differing markedly in their geographic accessibility to consumers. I present and estimate a model of demand that admits consumer heterogeneity in two dimensions: travel sensitivity and product age sensitivity. I show that consumer heterogeneity in these two dimensions outweigh that in observable characteristics, such as household income. Furthermore, I estimate a high correlation in the two dimensions, such that consumers who are most averse to travel are also those for whom product newness is most valuable.
The second chapter focuses on the firm's store location and product introduction strategies. I introduce a model of product introduction wherein the firm selects only the parameters of the distribution of product characteristics, rather than the characteristics of each new product. This dramatically simplifies the firm's optimization program. I use this model to simulate counterfactual product assortments given alternative store location decisions. I show that the optimality of observed store locations depends substantially on the correlation in consumer values for travel distance and product quality. I also show that increased differentiation in geographic accessibility enables the firm to profitably increase differentiation in product quality.
The third chapter studies how consumers respond to different price signals conditional on store visitation. Many firms employ price comparisons as a selling strategy, in which actual prices are framed as discounted from a high list price, occasionally even when no units are sold at list prices. I show that high list prices enhance demand both on product and store levels. I present evidence that suggests that consumers infer quality from list prices. I also demonstrate that these demand-enhancing effects are dependent on characteristics of the retail context, such as the general level and dispersion of discounting.
These essays study in isolation components of consolidated selling strategies that have been widely adopted by US manufacturers and retailers across a wide variety of categories. My hope is to achieve a deeper understanding of the aspects of consumer behavior and firm incentives that have led to the prevalence of these selling strategies. This understanding is central in forming prescriptions for managers as well as measuring welfare implications, both of which I leave for future work.
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jia-rong, Li, and 李家榮. "Third-degree price discrimination in price leader duopoly." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82558160627328664128.
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碩士<br>佛光大學<br>經濟學系<br>99<br>With liberalization in current markets and competition between all firms, even identical products may have various sales results due to different time, different places, customers’ loyalty toward brands, or even diverse habits of consumers. Besides, not all firms work equally well, among which there might be a couple of leader. This research is going to look into the situation in which exists a leader as well as effective market segmentation, and probe into the leader’s and follower’s policies toward the third-degree price discrimination.
This paper first assumes that there are only two firms—one is leader, and the other is a follower--both producing substitute product, and both existing in two oligopoly markets which serve as market segmentation. It analyzes if the two firms would decide to engage in third-degree price discrimination. Providing that under the condition of perfect information, mainly based on third stage-game theory analysis, while both firms target profit maximization, this paper will find, on the basis of Stackelberg model, Nash equilibrium solution through backward induction.
Our research result indicates that no matter what valuation model the leader apply, the follower will turn to third-degree price discrimination. Under this condition, the leader will also adopt third-degree price discrimination. The equilibrium outcome is both application of third-degree price discrimination. This paper further discusses that if government intervention is around, that is, no third-degree price discrimination is allowed, both firms’ output will not be altered, but the leader will increase its output in a large-scale market, while cut down on its output in a small-scale one. On the contrary, as far as the follower is concerned, its sales in both markets are related to proxy indicators instead of one single approach. At last, this paper will develops the positive effect on society welfare under the condition that no third-degree price discrimination is allowed.
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"Price discrimination and patent policy." Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy Policy Research, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/29492.
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by Jerry Hausman and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason.<br>"September, 1986. Current version: March 15, 1988."--3rd prelim. page.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>Financial support from the Center for Energy Policy Research of the MIT Energy Laboratory.