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Journal articles on the topic 'Price discrimination'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 29 July 2024

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1

Borgesius, Frederik Zuiderveen. "Price Discrimination, Algorithmic Decision-Making, and European Non-Discrimination Law." European Business Law Review 31, Issue 3 (May 1, 2020): 401–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eulr2020017.

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Our society can benefit immensely from algorithmic decision-making and similar types of artificial intelligence. But algorithmic decision-making can also have discriminatory effects. This paper examines that problem, using online price differentiation as an example of algorithmic decision-making. With online price differentiation, a company charges different people different prices for identical products, based on information the company has about those people. The main question in this paper is: to what extent can non-discrimination law protect people against online price differentiation? The paper shows that online price differentiation and algorithmic decision-making could lead to indirect discrimination, for instance harming people with a certain ethnicity. Indirect discrimination occurs when a practice is neutral at first glance, but ends up discriminating against people with a protected characteristic, such as ethnicity. In principle, non-discrimination law prohibits indirect discrimination. The paper also shows, however, that non-discrimination law has flaws when applied to algorithmic decision-making. For instance, algorithmic discrimination can remain hidden: people may not realise that they are being discriminated against. And many types of unfair – some might say discriminatory – algorithmic decisions are outside the scope of current non-discrimination law. price discrimination, price differentiation, personalised pricing, dynamic pricing, algorithmic decision-making, big data, artificial intelligence, fairness, law, equality, non-discrimination law, human rights, fundamental rights.

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2

Zhang, Wei-li, Qi-Qing Song, and Yi-Rong Jiang. "Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2019 (June 25, 2019): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/9231582.

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This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market’s average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.

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3

Ireland, Norman J., and Paul L. Stoneman. "Order Effects, Perfect Foresight and Intertemporal Price Discrimination." Recherches économiques de Louvain 51, no. 1 (March 1985): 7–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800082415.

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We will define a supplier of a single product to be «dynamically discriminating» if he offers the product for sale at a sequence of different prices. Obviously the extent of such discrimination that is possible will depend on buyers’ expectations of future price movements and on any dynamic properties of buyers’ demand functions. The objective of this paper is to examine the extent of price discrimination that can take place in a market characterised by buyers’ perfect foresight and where the value each buyer places on the product changes as the number of sales increase.If potential buyers are ‘myopic’ and believe that the current price of a commodity is not going to change in the future, then they will purchase if the current price is no more than their current reservation price. Given a distribution of reservation prices, a monopolist supplier can perfectly discriminate in this market by, say, first offering the commodity at a very high price and selling to those customers with the highest reservation price, and then gradually reducing the price, collecting more custom, and allowing no consumers’ surplus to exist.

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4

Weber, Sylvain, and Cyril Pasche. "Price Discrimination." Journal of Industrial Organization Education 2, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1020.

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5

Prakash Yadav, Shashi. "A Research Paper on-Price Discrimination." International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR) 12, no. 2 (February 5, 2023): 1388–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.21275/sr23220191529.

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6

Fennell, Lee Anne. "Optional Price Discrimination." Texas A&M Law Review 10, no. 3 (March 2023): 485–548. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/lr.v10.i3.4.

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Price discrimination generates considerable angst. As merchants develop ever-more-powerful mechanisms for gathering and compiling information about consumers, the specter of fully personalized pricing seems to loom as an ominous threat. Yet a parallel phenomenon quietly coexists with all this distress over tailored prices: models that encourage people to voluntarily contribute, typically in varying amounts, the sums necessary to cover the fixed costs of producing particular goods and services. This Article proposes enabling customers to opt into price discrimination in a more structured way across a broader range of markets. Optional price differentiation can make markets fairer and more inclusive by extending access to more consumers and facilitating provision of a broader array of products and services. For it to do so successfully, however, producers must be able to bind themselves to pricing practices and uses of revenue that are attractive enough to induce participation by both high- and low-valuing consumers, and that are transparent enough to ensure meaningful choice. Government can facilitate experimentation along these lines by setting standards for disclosure and data use, and by policing against fraud and misrepresentation.

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7

Hazledine, Tim. "Oligopoly price discrimination with many prices." Economics Letters 109, no. 3 (December 2010): 150–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.09.009.

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8

Bonatti, Alessandro, and Gonzalo Cisternas. "Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination." Review of Economic Studies 87, no. 2 (September 12, 2019): 750–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdz046.

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Abstract We study the implications of aggregating consumers’ purchase histories into scores that proxy for unobserved willingness to pay. A long-lived consumer interacts with a sequence of firms. Each firm relies on the consumer’s current score–a linear aggregate of noisy purchase signals—to learn about her preferences and to set prices. If the consumer is strategic, she reduces her demand to manipulate her score, which reduces the average equilibrium price. Firms in turn prefer scores that overweigh past signals relative to applying Bayes’ rule with disaggregated data, as this mitigates the ratchet effect and maximizes the firms’ ability to price discriminate. Consumers with high average willingness to pay benefit from data collection, because the gains from low average prices dominate the losses from price discrimination. Finally, hidden scores—those only observed by the firms—reduce demand sensitivity, increase average prices, and reduce consumer surplus, sometimes below the naive-consumer level.

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9

Chevalier, Judith A., and Anil K. Kashyap. "Best Prices: Price Discrimination and Consumer Substitution." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 1 (February 1, 2019): 126–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150362.

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This paper proposes a method for aggregating prices when retailers use periodic sales to price-discriminate amongst heterogeneous customers. In the motivating model, loyal customers buy one brand and do not strategically time purchases, while Bargain Hunters always pay the lowest price available, the “best price.” In the model, the best price is part of an exact price index. Accounting for the best price also substantially improves the empirical match between conventional price aggregation strategies and actual prices paid by consumers. The methodology improves inflation measurement while imposing little burden on the data-collection agency. (JEL C43, D12, E31, L13, L81, M31)

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10

Hayati, Yetty Husnul, and Abdul Lukman Hakim. "PENGARUH DISKRIMINASI HARGA TERHADAP PENINGKATAN PENJUALAN KARTU PERDANA IM3 PADA PT. NUSAPRO TELEMEDIA PERSADA BOGOR." JIMFE (Jurnal Ilmiah Manajemen Fakultas Ekonomi) 1, no. 2 (March 27, 2018): 58–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.34203/jimfe.v1i2.561.

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ABSTRACTThe purpose of this study was to determine the effect of price discrimination on the level of prime IM3card sales at PT. Nusapro Telemedia Persada. This study on price discrimination and the level of primeIM3 card sales are done PT. Nusapro Telemedia Persada, using price data agency locations and pricesas well as increased sales of retail locations (IDR) on card products prime IM3. The analytical methodthat used is ranging from descriptive analysis using the formulas of multiple regression analysis, multiplecorrelation analysis, as well as testing hipotesis. Price discrimination prime IM3 card company PTNusapro Telemedia Persada is based on two indicators, namely: pricing Agent locations and pricing atretail locations. Application of the implementation of price discrimination on the IM3 SIM CardCompanies PT Nusapro Telemedia Persadais good enough. At company Telemedia Persada PT Nusaproaverage increase or decrease in sales of SIM cards IM3 in 2014 at $ 1,970,569,134. While the effect ofprice discrimination against prime IM3 card sales increase at company PT Nusapro Telemedia Persadaamounting to 68.3% and 31.7% influenced by other factors.Keywords: Discrimination Hara to increased sales

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11

MOROZ, SERGIY, and VITALIY ZYMA. "PRICE DISCIMINATION IN THE ELECTRICITY MARKET OF UKRAINE." HERALD OF KHMELNYTSKYI NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 300, no. 6 (December 3, 2021): 163–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.31891/2307-5740-2021-300-6-27.

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The article is devoted to the problem of price discrimination in the electricity market of Ukraine. The article reveals the essence and degree of price discrimination in the market of production, transmission and distribution of electricity. It is determined that electricity is a standardized product but has a number of features that significantly affect the formation of costs for its production. During the sale, electricity has several prices, which indicates monopoly in the market and the existence of price discrimination. It is analyzed that price discrimination allows market participants to receive higher profits, but for the use of the price discrimination system several important conditions must be fulfilled: concentration of market power; the possibility of differentiation of counterparties; impossibility of resale of goods. It is investigated that the electricity market of Ukraine is characterized by discriminatory pricing of the third degree to a greater extent, and the second – to a lesser extent. It was found that price discrimination concerning producers is represented by different generation of electricity and different purchase prices: thermal, hydro, nuclear, block stations, RES (renewable energy sources). Regarding consumer discrimination, the most common is price discrimination based on day and night prices – this is due to the specifics of electricity generation and consumption – during the day the load on the network is greater due to business, at night consumption falls, but most power plants can not stop generation, therefore, they reduce it to a minimum and still have an excess of electricity. Different electricity tariffs for household and non-household consumers provoke cross-subsidization. Cross-subsidization in electricity is understood as price discrimination: electricity tariffs for industrial and commercial consumers are set above the marginal cost, and for households – lower, so the former are forced to overpay and subsidize the latter. There is a separate price discrimination based on geographical location: for the population living in the 30-kilometer zone of nuclear power stations, distribution of electricity is supplied at a rate of 70 percent of the current tariff for the specific group of population. The consequences of price discrimination are analyzed. High tariffs for businesses translate into higher costs for the production of goods and, consequently, higher wholesale and retail prices for consumers. The social effect of subsidizing the sale of electricity prices for the population is thus largely graded. In our opinion, a number of measures, which have been proposed, are aimed at demonopolizing the electricity market in Ukraine and reducing the level of price discrimination.

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12

Zhang, Kai, and Weiqi Liu. "Price discrimination in two-sided markets." South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 19, no. 1 (March 2, 2016): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v19i1.768.

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The use of a price discrimination strategy is an important tool in competition. It can hurt firms and benefit consumers in a one-sided market. However, in two-sided markets, its primary goal is to attract more agents or increase profits. Here, the performance of a second-degree price discrimination strategy in the context of duopoly two-sided platforms is analysed. Two exogenous variables, which include the discount rate and the price discrimination threshold, are used in order to examine whether the price discrimination strategy could help two-sided platforms achieve their objective, which is to maximise their market value. Three cases are considered, and we demonstrate that the price discrimination strategy cannot attract more agents and at the same time increase the profits; a lower price discrimination threshold cannot ensure larger markets shares; a higher discount rate is detrimental to the profit of a platform. However, this is good for its market shares. Moreover, discriminative pricing increases the competition.

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13

U. Osiobe, Ejiro. "A Simplified Theoretical Understanding of Price Discrimination as a Business Management Strategy." Sumerianz Journal of Social Science, no. 52 (April 19, 2022): 20–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.47752/sjss.52.20.24.

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The paper delves into the five different types of price discrimination while giving graphical and illustrative examples of Pigou (1920) price classifications, marketing strategies, and more. The paper shows the differences and similarities between all price discriminations during transactions from first degree, second degree, third degree, fourth degree, and fifth-degree pricing [discrimination] strategies while graphically showing the ratio to marginal cost.

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14

Elegido, Juan M. "The Ethics of Price Discrimination." Business Ethics Quarterly 21, no. 4 (October 2011): 633–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq201121439.

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ABSTRACT:Price discrimination is the practice of charging different customers different prices for the same product. Many people consider price discrimination unfair, but economists argue that in many cases price discrimination is more likely to lead to greater welfare than is the uniform pricing alternative—sometimes for every party in the transaction. This article shows i) that there are many situations in which it is necessary to engage in differential pricing in order to make the provision of a product possible; and ii) that in many such situations, the seller does not obtain an above-average rate of return. It concludes that price discrimination is not inherently unfair. The article also contends that even when conditions i) and/or ii) do not obtain, price discrimination is not necessarily unethical. In itself, the fact that some people get an even better deal than do others does not entail that the latter are wronged.

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15

Armstrong, Mark, and John Vickers. "Competitive Price Discrimination." RAND Journal of Economics 32, no. 4 (2001): 579. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2696383.

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16

Leeson, Peter T., and Russell S. Sobel. "Costly price discrimination." Economics Letters 99, no. 1 (April 2008): 206–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.030.

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17

Tremblay, Mark J. "Pareto price discrimination." Economics Letters 183 (October 2019): 108559. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108559.

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18

Colombo, Ferdinando. "Random Price Discrimination." Journal of Economics 78, no. 3 (March 2003): 205–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-002-0571-8.

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19

Richards, Timothy J., and Stephen F. Hamilton. "Retail price discrimination and food waste." European Review of Agricultural Economics 47, no. 5 (July 29, 2020): 1861–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/eurrag/jbaa012.

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Abstract We examine a food retailer’s incentive to use a minimum quality standard as part of a quality-based price-discrimination strategy and show how price discrimination can result in a substantial level of retail food waste. Using data from a major US food retailer, we estimate a structural model of retail price discrimination and conduct a series of counter-factual experiments to demonstrate that observed retail prices are consistent with quality-based price discrimination in the retail market. Our findings indicate that quality standards on fresh produce can explain a substantial proportion ($7.5\%$) of food waste by retailers in the US.

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20

Wang, Zhe. "Classic Case Study of Price Discrimination in the Age of Big Data." Highlights in Business, Economics and Management 20 (November 30, 2023): 42–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v20i.12317.

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The popularization and development of big data in the age of the Internet have enabled merchants to implement price discrimination through personalized pricing strategies based on consumers' personal information and behavioral data. This paper presents a classic case study of price discrimination in the era of big data, focusing on examples from the travel industry, internet shopping, and e-commerce platforms. The case study highlights the social unfairness caused by price discrimination, as it leads to different prices for the same goods among different groups of consumers, violating the principle of fair trade. It also points out the information asymmetry between consumers and merchants, where consumers may find it difficult to determine if they are being discriminated against in pricing. Additionally, the study examines the implications of price discrimination on consumer rights and interests, emphasizing the need for fair and reasonable prices for consumers. The legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of personal information in price discrimination are also addressed. The paper suggests that government regulation, especially through antitrust laws, plays a crucial role in addressing price discrimination. It emphasizes the importance of strengthening regulatory review, increasing penalties, and focusing on a level playing field to promote fair competition and protect consumer rights. In conclusion, the study sheds light on the complexity and significance of price discrimination in the age of big data. It underscores the responsibility of governments and regulators in safeguarding consumer rights, maintaining fair competition, and formulating effective regulations to address price discrimination issues.

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21

Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. "The Limits of Price Discrimination." American Economic Review 105, no. 3 (March 1, 2015): 921–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130848.

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We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out “third degree price discrimination.” We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer sur plus is nonnegative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the surplus generated by efficient trade. (JEL D42, D83, L12)

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22

Gao, Xing You. "Analysis on Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly Market Based on Static Game Theory." Advanced Materials Research 912-914 (April 2014): 1865–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.912-914.1865.

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Equilibrium production, equilibrium price and equilibrium total revenue in the case of implementing third-degree price discrimination and unified pricing were analyzed under the condition of two oligopoly firms with 2 sub markets by complete information static game method, and the relationship between the three indexes of the two cases were studied. The results showed that, under the condition of linear demand functions of the two sub markets, the equilibrium output of unified pricing was equal to the equilibrium output of discriminative pricing; the equilibrium price of unified pricing was weighted average of the equilibrium prices of two sub markets while discriminative pricing; the equilibrium total revenue of unified pricing was less than the equilibrium total revenue of discriminative pricing.

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23

Chen, Yi-Fen, Tzu-Ting Pang, and Boedi Hartadi Kuslina. "The Effect of Price Discrimination on Fairness Perception and Online Hotel Reservation Intention." Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research 18, no. 3 (August 1, 2023): 1320–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jtaer18030067.

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In light of the development of online travel agencies (OTAs), the rules of the entire tourism industry have changed. Due to the ease of finding information and comparing products, consumers can choose a hotel not only by room type, but also by rate, according to their preferences. The purpose of this study was to explore the effect of price discrimination on the fairness perception toward reservation intentions. The interaction effects of the brand familiarity and the type of consumers on the fairness perception were also examined. The study used an experimental design, with 2 price discriminations × 2 brand familiarities × 2 regulatory focuses, on a total of 320 valid subjects. The results showed that advantaged-price discriminations had higher fairness perceptions than equal-price discriminations, and that higher fairness perceptions had higher reservation intentions. The interaction effect of brand familiarity showed no significant impact on the fairness perceptions, while the regulatory focus had a mitigating effect on the price discrimination and on the fairness perceptions. This study provides insights into the relationship between online price discrimination and tourism, and it contributes to the literature on hospitality. It also provides the managerial implications for online hotels in developing pricing strategies.

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24

Pan, Xiao Jun, Hong Min Chen, and Li Xu. "Firm Discrimination Pricing Strategies with Network Effect." Materials Science Forum 532-533 (December 2006): 941–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/msf.532-533.941.

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We explore the price and welfare effect of price discrimination in a differentiated-goods oligopoly market with network effect and the effect of network effect on the equilibrium price, profit and output. We show that competitive price discrimination and network effect may intensify competition and the price discrimination increases the social welfare under oligopoly market with network effect. If firms differ in which markets they target for aggressive pricing strategy and competitive firm’s reaction is strong, prices in all markets may fall. So both firms agree on the strategies of setting the uniform pricing.

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25

Fitzpatrick, Anne. "Shopping While Female: Who Pays Higher Prices and Why?" American Economic Review 107, no. 5 (May 1, 2017): 146–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20171127.

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I estimate gender price discrimination in the Ugandan antimalarial drug market with an audit study. To determine whether results are consistent with statistical or taste-based discrimination, I contrast gender results with results by ethnicity (tribe). Vendors initially offer women prices that are $0.12 (3 percent) higher. However, women are 16 percentage points more likely to successfully bargain for a discount, resulting in no differential in price paid. Results are stronger among majority-tribe females. I find no differences in drug quality. Both women and minorities report better service quality. Offer price differentials suggest statistical discrimination; there is no differential for prices paid.

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26

Meyer, Richard W. "A Tool to Assess Journal Price Discrimination." College & Research Libraries 62, no. 3 (May 1, 2001): 269–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/crl.62.3.269.

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This econometric study tests pricing practices of publishers and their monopoly power. It suggests that traditional publishers will retain their market clout as they shift to offering electronic publications. Librarians’ common experience with price discrimination was corroborated by a powerful model comparing prices charged to institutions while holding constant for production costs, source of publication, discipline areas, and the availability of titles in electronic format. The model also provides a robust selection tool to compare actual prices to model-predicted prices among the subscriptions within any given collection and to predict those that, statistically, are significantly overpriced. The study results reveal that commercial publishers are not the only ones that appear to over-price titles by a statistically significant amount. Campuses face continued increases in prices for traditional and electronic resources, but statistical modeling offers an opportunity for controlling costs.

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27

Knyazeva, Irina V., Nikolay N. Zaikin, and Irina V. Bondarenko. "The Price Discrimination on the Shortage Markets: Theoretical Analysis." Journal of Modern Competition 15, no. 3 (August 13, 2021): 71–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.37791/2687-0657-2021-15-3-71-85.

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Antitrust law includes a number of evaluation norms in system of commodity market analysis and proofs of anti-competitive behavior, which provide for using wide range of economics and marketing methods. The widest field of discussing embedded in definition “price discrimination”. Specific research interest presents the making recommendations of regulation of shortage markets with unfounded differences in prices. This question we propose to consider in two articles: in first article we make theoretical analysis of price discrimination in situation of shortage markets, in second article (will be published in no. 4) we analyze marketing aspects and system of sales stimulation, which the seller accomplish on the shortage markets. In the focus of this research is price discrimination as a market mechanism and shortage markets as a market anomaly. The shortage markets in contrast of shortage on the market occurs not for reason that price is below the equilibrium level. The main reason of genesis of shortage markets is speculative demand on the markets and/or difficulties in producing goods and services. These difficulties often set by outside shocks. Price discrimination undergoing of effect of long-run shortage on markets transforming in phenomenon, which damages of consumer wealth and entrepreneurs benefits. In addition, this type of price discrimination decrease the social welfare too. The risks of price discrimination in the case of shortage markets needed new decisions and methods of regulation by state. However now we do not see some consensus in the issue of principles and instruments of state regulation of shortage markets. In the article we try to approbate some scientific results. These results are the hybrid definition of price discrimination; the legislative definitions of price discrimination as a acts which limiting competition; the criteria of functioning of shortage markets; proofs of transforming markets through the impact of long-run shortage; the difference between the case of shortage markets and the case of shortage on the markets in the classical demand-supply model; costs of price discrimination on the shortage markets; perspective antitrust regulation of price discrimination on the shortage markets.

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Wu, Yuxi. "The Existence Phenomenon of Price Discrimination and Suggestions." Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 69, no. 1 (January 8, 2024): 34–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/69/20230943.

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This paper analyzes the emergence, phenomenon and solution of price discrimination driven by The Times. This paper will analyze the two main categories of price discrimination: gender discrimination and big data killing. Among them, gender discrimination covers the discrimination suffered by women in the labor market and the pink tax, and big data killing includes price discrimination against consumers by taxi apps and housing apps. The purpose of this study is to draw out the problems of price discrimination, let the market pay attention to the problem and protect the rights and interests of consumers. The analysis found that women are often discriminated against based on gender in the workplace, and women pay a much higher price than men in the "pink tax" over their lifetime. At the same time, taxi-hailing software and housing software will take advantage of consumers' ignorance to discriminate in price according to their own conditions. It is hoped that the analysis of this paper can warn consumers of price discrimination, and attract the attention of authorities to protect the interests of the public. The article not only combines the survey of different audience groups, but also covers the results of experiments on the same subject and the experiences of people. According to the analysis, this paper suggests that consumers pay more attention to the market of goods before consumption and compare the prices of different platforms. The regulatory authorities can collect more public suggestions and check the price discrepancy, and target the crackdown.

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29

Williams, Martin. "Pricing In The Case Of Privately-Owned Water Utilities." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 8, no. 4 (October 4, 2011): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v8i4.6130.

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This paper is concerned with the extent of price discrimination among customer classes for privately-owned water utilities that are regulated by state commissions. The test of price discrimination requires the specification and estimation of long-run marginal cost functions for each class of customer and prices of service. This procedure yields the price-long-run marginal cost ratios for each customer class required to test for price discrimination. We examine whether the rates afforded the respective customer classes are set in accordance with variations in the elasticity of demand of the respective customer classes. In so doing, we proceed to test the existence of Ramsey pricing.

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30

Wei, Dong, and Brett Green. "(Reverse) Price Discrimination with Information Design." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 16, no. 2 (May 1, 2024): 267–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220242.

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A seller markets a good to a customer whose willingness to pay depends on his private type and the good's quality. The seller designs a screening mechanism that specifies both transfers and information revealed about quality. We show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a menu of price-experiment pairs, featuring both price discrimination and information discrimination: buyers with higher private types face lower prices and receive less discerning positive signals. Moreover, we demonstrate the complementarity between these two forms of discrimination. Information design facilitates surplus creation on the extensive margin, but causes surplus destruction on the intensive margin. (JEL D21, D42, D82, L15, M31)

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31

Soukal, Ivan. "THE DEFENSE OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN NETWORK AND INFORMATION GOODS MARKETS." E+M Ekonomie a Management 24, no. 4 (December 2021): 39–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.15240/tul/001/2021-4-003.

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It is not uncommon that articles focused on consumer-price interaction in the network and information goods market swiftly condemn price discrimination as an obfuscation, on-purpose price complexity, or market failure. The reason is a general neoclassical rule of an efficient market where prices are set at marginal cost with no price discrimination. However, the matter is more complicated. This review provides authors an overview of why, where, and which type of price discrimination should be viewed by different optics. Goods such as software, cell carrier services, electronic newspapers subscription, electric energy supply, payment accounts, books, copyrighted content streaming, etc, cannot be treated like manufactured goods. The reasons are specific conditions – substantial and/or repeated fixed/sunk cost, economies of scale, and demand heterogeneity. Recognized economist W. J. Baumol described marginal cost set prices under these conditions as an ‘economic suicide’. Reviewed articles showed that firms are forced to adopt price discrimination in order to recover their costs and to serve more consumer segments. Reviewed authors provided facts to support the use of multipart tariffs, dynamic pricing, versioning, bundling, and Ramsey pricing. These conclusions are used for suggestions on how several studies of information and network goods should be modified. Modifications are related mostly to model assumptions and pricing conclusions. I argue that, in the case of information and network goods, there is justified price discrimination. Hence, there is a certain justified level of price complexity that has to be accepted and not taken as automated evidence of inefficiency, market power, and consumer exploitation.

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32

Andrews, Rodney J., and Kevin M. Stange. "Price Regulation, Price Discrimination, and Equality of Opportunity in Higher Education: Evidence from Texas." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 11, no. 4 (November 1, 2019): 31–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170306.

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We assess the importance of price regulation and price discrimination to low-income students’ access to opportunities in public higher education. In 2003, Texas shifted tuition-setting authority away from the state legislature to public universities themselves. In response, most institutions raised sticker prices and many began charging more for high-earning majors, such as business and engineering. We find that poor students actually shifted toward higher earning programs following deregulation, relative to non-poor students. Deregulation facilitated more price discrimination through increased grant aid and enabled supply-side enhancements, which may have partially shielded poor students from higher sticker prices. (JEL D63, H75, I22, I23, I24, I28, I32)

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33

SHMANSKE, STEPHEN. "PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND CONGESTION." National Tax Journal 44, no. 4.2 (December 2, 1991): 529–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/ntj41788939.

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34

Baranowska-Prokop, Ewa, and Jacek Prokop. "Price Discrimination and Countertrade." Gospodarka Narodowa 214, no. 3 (March 31, 2007): 67–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.33119/gn/101395.

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Liu, Qihong, and Konstantinos Serfes. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination." Journal of Industrial Organization Education 5, no. 1 (January 21, 2011): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1030.

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Reitzes, James D., and David T. Levy. "Price Discrimination and Mergers." Canadian Journal of Economics 28, no. 2 (May 1995): 427. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/136038.

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37

Kim, Jaesoo, and Dongsoo Shin. "Price Discrimination with Demarketing." Journal of Industrial Economics 64, no. 4 (December 2016): 773–807. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12129.

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Rondán Cataluña, Francisco Javier. "Price discrimination in retailing." International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 32, no. 4 (April 2004): 205–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/09590550410528971.

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Cuellar, Steven S., and Marco Brunamonti. "Retail channel price discrimination." Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 21, no. 3 (May 2014): 339–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jretconser.2013.06.004.

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Liu, Qihong, and Jie Shuai. "Multi-dimensional price discrimination." International Journal of Industrial Organization 31, no. 5 (September 2013): 417–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.07.007.

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Guriev, Sergei, and Dmitri Kvassov. "Barter for price discrimination." International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, no. 3 (March 2004): 329–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.09.003.

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42

Sher, Itai, and Rakesh Vohra. "Price discrimination through communication." Theoretical Economics 10, no. 2 (May 2015): 597–648. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te1129.

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Sherry, John E. H. "Sex-Based Price Discrimination." Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 35, no. 2 (April 1994): 16–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001088049403500212.

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Cowan, Simon. "Regulating monopoly price discrimination." Journal of Regulatory Economics 54, no. 1 (July 2, 2018): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9361-2.

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Chen, Yongmin. "Oligopoly Price Discrimination and Resale Price Maintenance." RAND Journal of Economics 30, no. 3 (1999): 441. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2556057.

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Larson, Ronald B. "Price Promotion Evaluation Using Price Discrimination Theory." Journal of Promotion Management 4, no. 1 (January 22, 1997): 75–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/j057v04n01_07.

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47

Png, I. P. L., and D. Hirshleifer. "Price Discrimination Through Offers to Match Price." Journal of Business 60, no. 3 (January 1987): 365. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/296402.

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Heywood, John S., Shiqiang Wang, and Guangliang Ye. "Resale price maintenance and spatial price discrimination." International Journal of Industrial Organization 57 (March 2018): 147–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.02.001.

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Noel, Michael D. "Edgeworth Price Cycles and intertemporal price discrimination." Energy Economics 34, no. 4 (July 2012): 942–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2011.05.004.

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D’Haultfœuille, Xavier, Isis Durrmeyer, and Philippe Février. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium with Unobserved Price Discrimination." Review of Economic Studies 86, no. 5 (October 29, 2018): 1973–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdy064.

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Abstract In markets where sellers are able to price discriminate, individuals pay different prices that may be unobserved by the econometrician. This article considers the structural estimation of a demand and supply model of differentiated products with such price discrimination and limited information on prices taking the form of, e.g., observing list prices from catalogues or average prices. Within this framework, identification is achieved not only with usual moment conditions on the demand side, but also through supply-side restrictions. The model can be estimated by GMM using a nested fixed point algorithm that extends the usual contraction mapping algorithm to our setting. We apply our methodology to estimate the demand and supply in the French new automobile market. Our results suggest that discounting arising from price discrimination is important. The average discount is estimated to be 9.6%, with large variation depending on buyers’ characteristics and cars’ specifications. Our results are consistent with other evidence on transaction prices in France.

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