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Zatlukal, Marek. "Moral Hazard in the principal-agent problem." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-125099.
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This paper will introduce the reader to the issues of moral hazard in a principal-agent setting, with the primary focus on the incentive pay models of moral hazard. Firstly, with an introduction and analysis of various microeconomic models designed to alleviate the problems of moral hazard, and secondly, with an analyses of these models in the context of a specific company, the aim of this thesis is to offer a comprehensive understanding of the specific problems caused by moral hazard in the principal-agent problem, as well as the mechanisms used to lessen such problems in the real business environment and their connection to the theoretical microeconomic models.
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Andersson, Jens, Olle Karlsson, and Mattias Pettersson. "Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv." Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för kultur och samhälle (KS), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-21661.
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Titel: Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv Universitet: Malmö Universitet Kurs: TR128C – Företagsekonomi: Examensarbete i Transport Management Författare: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Handledare: Benedikte Borgström Nyckelord: Agentteori, agentproblem, måldivergens, informationsasymmetri, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmerbarhet Syfte: Att utifrån ett principal-agent-perspektiv studera hur relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare i den studerade miljön påverkas av förekomsten av informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder, samt hur motivationen att prestera på arbetsplatsen kan påverkas av incitamentsstrukturer kopplade till kontraktsupplägget och olika nivåer av övervakning. Metod: Studien har genomförts via en kvalitativ ansats där data insamlats genom intervjuer, observationer och textanalys. Teori: Studiens teoretiska ramverk bygger på principal-agent-teorin och dess komponenter med fokus på informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder. Slutsatser: I den studerade miljön där relationen mellan principal och agent kännetecknas av hög informationsasymmetri, hög programmerbarhet och parterna motiveras av olika målbilder står principalen inför valet att antingen komplettera ett beteendebaserat kontrakt med tillräckliga övervakningsmekanismer för att utröna agentens beteende, eller försöka upprätta ett resultatbaserat kontrakt. Hög informationsasymmetri kopplat till ett beteendebaserat kontrakt riskerar att lägga grunden för problem kopplade till moral hazard då agenterna blir helt fria att agera efter sina egna målbilder.Title: The relationship between managers and workers - An agency perspective University: Malmö Universitet Course: TR128C – Business Administration: Bachelor thesis in Transport Management Writers: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Mentor: Benedikte Borgström Keywords: Agency theory, agency problem, goal divergence, information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmability Purpose: From an agency perspective study how the relationship between managers and workers in the studied environment is affected by the existence of information asymmetry and diverging goals, and also how the motivation to perform at the workplace can be affected by different incentive structures related to the contract form and different levels of surveillance. Methods: The study has been conducted via a qualitative approach and the data has been collected through interviews, observations and text analysis. Theories: The studies theoretical framework is based on the agency theory and its components with a focus on information asymmetry and diverging goals. Conclusion: In the studied environment the relationship between principal and agent is characterized by asymmetrical information flows, high programmability, and diverging goals. This leaves the principal to either reinforce a behavioral based contract with sufficient surveillance to uncover the agent’s behavior, or to try and establish a contract based on results. A high degree of information asymmetry in combination with a behavioral based contract runs the risk of laying the foundation for problems related to moral hazard as the agents are free to act according to their own personal goals.
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Froňková, Pavlína. "Principal-Agent Problem in the Theory of Discrimination - Do HR Managers Discriminate More Than Business Owners?" Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2014. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-193309.
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Becker's discrimination theory predicted that the discrimination by employers on competitive markets should cease to exist. However, in past decades, it was shown that discrimination on the labour market is a prevalent phenomenon. In this thesis I analyse what is the impact of agency problem on the theory of discrimination. I show that when an agent (in the thesis called 'agent employer') is deciding whether to employ or not to employ a worker, his motivation is different compared to principal's. The outcome of the analysis is such that under certain assumptions, the agent employer with non-zero taste for discrimination will always choose to discriminate.
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Hill, Daniel R. "Regional determinants of residential energy expendi- tures and the principal-agent problem in Austria." ERSA (European Regional Science Association), 2015. http://epub.wu.ac.at/5279/1/66%2D322%2D1%2DPB.pdf.
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The aim of this paper is twofold: 1) to examine the determinants of residential energy expenditures and compare them on a regional level; and, 2) attempt to identify
and measure the effect of possible principal-agent (PA) problems on residential energy efficiency in Austria. The results of this paper are partially based on findings from a
master's thesis, which focused more directly on the PA problem. This paper expands on those results to include regional aspects in energy expenditures. A conditional demand model is regressed on a large number of variables representing housing characteristics,
socioeconomic factors, occupancy type, and regional characteristics sourced from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions dataset. The analysis indicates that
significant regional differences exist in the determinants of residential energy expenditures and that PA problems appear to be an unimportant factor in energy efficiency in Austria, even at the regional level. The paper concludes with some possible explanations as to why this is the case.
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Hernández, Santibáñez Nicolás Iván. "Contributions to the principal-agent theory and applications in economics." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PSLED086.
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Dans cette thèse, les aspects théoriques et les applications en économie du modèle Principal-Agent sont étudiés.La première partie de la thèse présente deux applications du modèle. Dans la première, un fournisseur d’électricité détermine le tarif de consommation optimal pour ses clients. La population est hétérogène et le fournisseur observe parfaitement la consommation des clients. Cela conduit à une sélection adverse sans aléa moral. Le problème du Principal s’écrit commeun problème variationnel non standard, qui peut être résolu sous certaines formes particulières de l’utilité de réservation de la population. Les contrats optimaux obtenus sont linéaires ou polynomiaux par rapport à la consommation et le fournisseur d’électricité ne contracte que les consommateurs avec un faible ou un fort appétit pour l’électricité.Dans la deuxième application, une banque surveille un pool de prêts identiques soumis à une contagion Markovienne. La banque collecte des fonds auprès d’un investisseur, qui ne peut pas observer les actions de la banque et ne sait pas sa capacité à faire son travail. Ces travaux c’est une extension du modèle de Pagès et Possamaï [84] au cas du aléa moral avec sélection adverse. Suivant l’approche de Cvitanić, Wan et Yang [31] à ces problèmes, l’ensemble crédible est calculé explicitement et la fonction valeur de l’investisseur est obtenue au moyen de un système récursif d’inégalités variationnelles. Les propriétés des contrats optimaux sont discutées en détail.Dans la deuxième partie de la thèse, le problème d’un Agent contrôlant le drift d’un processus de diffusion sous incertitude de volatilité est étudié. On suppose que le Principal et l’Agent ont une approche pessimiste du problème et ils agissent comme si un troisième joueur, la Nature, choisissait la pire volatilité possible. Ce travail est une extension à Mastrolia et Possamaï [64] et Sung [125] à un cadre plus général. Il est prouvé que la fonction valeur de l’Agent peut être représentée comme la solution à un EDSR de second ordre, et aussi que la fonction valeur du Principal correspond à la solution de viscosité unique de l’équationassociée Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs, étant donné que celle-ci satisfait un résultat de comparaisonIn this thesis, theoretical aspects and applications in economics of the Principal-Agent model are studied.The first part of the thesis presents two applications of the model. In the first one, an electricity provider determines the optimal tariff of consumption for its clients. Population is heterogeneous and the provider observes perfectly the consumption of the clients. This leads to a setting of adverse selection without moral hazard. The problem of the Principal writes as a non-standard variational problem, which can be solved under certain particular forms of the reservation utility of the population. The optimal contracts obtained are either linear or polynomial with respect to the consumption and the electricity provider contractsonly consumers with either low or high appetite for electricity.In the second application, a bank monitors a pool of identical loans subject to Markovian contagion. The bank raises funds from an investor, who cannot observe the actions of the bank and neither knows his ability to do the job. This is an extension of the model of Pagès and Possamaï [84] to the case of both moral hazard and adverse selection. Following the approach of Cvitanić, Wan and Yang [31] to these problems, the dynamic credible set is computed explicitly and the value function of the investor is obtained through a recursive system of variational inequalities. The properties of the optimal contracts are discussed in detail.In the second part of the thesis, the problem of an Agent controlling the drift of a diffusion process under volatility uncertainty is studied. It is assumed that the Principal and the Agent have a worst–case approach to the problem and they act as if a third player, the Nature, was choosing the worst possible volatility. This work is an extension to Mastrolia and Possamaï [64] and Sung [125] to a more general framework. It is proved that the value function of the agent can be represented as the solution to a second–order BSDE, and also that the value function of the Principal corresponds to the unique viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation, given that the latter satisfies a comparison result
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Thabane, Matela. "Assessing the Principal Agent Problem in Mobile Money Services: Lessons from M – PESA in Lesotho." Thesis, University Of Cape Town, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/29934.
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The expansion and diffusion of mobile phones globally has resulted in the provision of financial transactional services over the existing mobile phone platforms, generally referred to as mobile money. The supply end of mobile money services is an important factor in the success of the financial transactions offering. This research assessed vulnerabilities in the mobile money supply network that are inherently related to the existence of the principal – agent problem and their implications on availability and access to the services. The research study was conducted using a qualitative approach. Qualitative information was collected through interviews guided by open – ended questionnaires. Thematic analysis approach was followed to systematically analyse the data and generate findings of the study. Agent transactional data was analysed to complement the findings from qualitative analysis The findings suggest that the principal agent problem permeates the mobile money delivery network mainly after businesses joining as agents and manifests as moral hazard. Moral hazard is the dominant feature of the principal – agent problem, with adverse selection very low. Drivers of moral hazard are demonstrated by the influences and demands of agents’ core businesses and challenges in agent monitoring and training. The existence of the principal – agent problem has limited or no implications on access and availability of services. However, overtime the combined vulnerabilities identified related to the principal agent problem are likely to manifest into risks that are likely to affect access and availability of mobile money services. Regulators, Mobile Network Operators and agent enterprises must collectively review monitoring approaches for mobile money service providers to address challenges identified and increase the effectiveness of monitoring. Service provision standards should be reviewed to suit the various business environments the services are provided within. Mobile Network Operators and agent enterprises need to institute stronger partnership arrangements that enhance ownership and obligations for all parties, in particular agent enterprises. Agreements must enable application of different mobile money delivery models suitable to meet the demands and requirements of the agents’ core businesses. Innovations such as Near Field Communication (NFC) can be integrated with Point of sale (POS) applications and mobile money platforms to reduce the administration burden on agents and human error. Such applications must consider the cost implications of adoption from the agents’ business perspective.
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Cole, Verlan R. Cramer Jayson L. Hollingsworth L. Scott. "Solving the principal - agent problem in Iraq economic incentives create a new model for security /." Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/07Dec%5FCole%5FMBA.pdf.
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"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007."Advisor(s): Melese, Francois ; Laverson, Alan J. "December 2007." "MBA professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on January 10, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-114). Also available in print.
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Cole, Verlan R., L. Scott Hollingsworth, and Jayson L. Cramer. "Solving the principal - agent problem in Iraq: economic incentives create a new model for security." Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10189.
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MBA Professional ReportApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited
This paper offers a path for Iraqis to provide for their own security by ensuring each Iraqi citizen has a stake in Iraq's oil wealth. The hypothesis is that private, individual oil ownership provides dual incentives. First, each Iraqi citizen would have an interest in contributing to the security of Iraq's oil infrastructure and in monitoring the quality of investments, since they and their family would directly benefit. Second, if each Iraqi had the ability to convert some of their stake in Iraq's nonrenewable oil resources into renewable financial capital, then they would make entrepreneurial investments that could help diversify Iraq's economy and contribute to economic development. This report evaluates several alternatives that might be offered for consideration by Iraqi policy makers to distribute Iraq's oil wealth directly to the Iraqi people. The Alaska Permanent Fund dividend offers one potential model for Iraq. Other models explored in this study include the experience of Chad and various privatizations that took place in Eastern Europe. The advantages and disadvantages of alternative oil distribution schemes are explored in an effort to offer new insights and opportunities to policy makers. Several criteria were developed to evaluate the proposed alternatives. These criteria were an outgrowth of three main questions asked of each alternative: First, how efficiently would the model distribute oil ownership to the Iraqi people? Second, how effective is it likely to be in encouraging individuals to support increased security and stability? And finally, how effective is it likely to be in contributing to future economic development?
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Kaczmarczyk, Kamila, and Sofia Kaddani. "The effect of asymmetric information in real estate agent commissions." Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-189266.
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Real Estate Agencies compensation consists of commissions and a part of the commission corresponds to what the real estate agent gets as salary. This incentive-based commission system is usually covered by an agreed fixed amount, a variable commission model or a combination of both depending on the brokerage object's final selling price. Commission system can lead to adverse consequences when the real estate agent abuses their position and exploits an information advantage to gain a financial benefits. Based on completed questionnaires, that have been posted for this study, directed to consumers and real estate agents, it is recognized that the parties in the Swedish real estate agent industry has experienced or is experiencing a certain unethical behavior because of commission-based pay structures. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how asymmetric information affects the real estate industry brokerage contract negotiations regarding the commission and whether conflicts of interest may occur due to this. Because of asymmetric information in contract situations, there may be situations in which agreements will contradict societal norms and ethical principles, because the broker abuses his advantage. The essence of this thesis is to convey a discussion in order to associate the legal application of contracts with normative ethics. The essay writers propose for instance based on ethical approaches to create a complement to the existing law and further to come up with practical solutions to limit the possibility of unreasonable commission models in real estate brokerage. The essay writers argue that the introduction of a stricter supervision of the commission procedure would create stronger assurance and reduce the abuse of the information asymmetry in the industry.Fastighetsmäklarbranschens ersättningssystem utgörs av provision och motsvarar en del av vad en fastighetsmäklare får i lön. Detta incitamentbaserade provisionssystem brukar omfattas av ett avtalat fast belopp, en rörlig provisionsmodell eller en kombination av båda som beror på förmedlingsobjektets slutliga försäljningspris. Provisionssystemet kan föranleda negativa följder om fastighetsmäklaren missbrukar sin ställning och utnyttjar ett informationsövertag till att skapa sig en finansiell fördel. Utifrån genomförda enkätundersökningar i denna studie riktade till konsumenter och fastighetsmäklare medges det att parterna inom den svenska fastighetsmäklarbranschen har upplevt eller upplever ett visst oetiskt beteende på grund av provisionsbaserade lönestrukturer. Syftet med denna uppsats är därför att undersöka hur asymmetrisk information påverkar fastighetsmäklarbranschens avtalsförhandlingar avseende provisionen och huruvida intressekonflikter kan uppstå till följd av detta. På grund av asymmetrisk information i avtalssammanhang kan det förekomma situationer där avtalen strider mot samhällsnormer och etiska principer när mäklaren missbrukar sitt övertag. Kärnan i denna uppsats är att föra en samlad diskussion som avser att koppla den rättsliga tillämpningen av avtalslagen med den normativa etiken. Uppsatsförfattarna resonerar bland annat utifrån etiska synsätt för att skapa ett komplement till gällande lag och vidare komma fram till praktiska lösningar till hur eventuellt oskäliga provisionsmodeller kan begränsas. Uppsatsförfattarna hävdar att ett införande av en starkare tillsyn över provisionsförfarandet skulle skapa större förtroende och minska asymmetrin i branschen.
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Broman, Niklas, and Sara Sjöberg. "Utdelning och ägarstrukturer : En kvantitativ studie om ägarstrukturens betydelse för utdelningspolitiken på den svenska börsen." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-23563.
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Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att testa sambandet mellan en koncentrerad aktieägarandel och låg utdelning bland aktieföretag på den svenska börsen. Vad som är unikt för just denna studie är att den genomförs på den svenska börsen samt den skattesats som skiljer sig mellan Sverige och exempelvis Finland där tidigare studier av samma karaktär genomförts. Metod: Studien har genomförts med en kvantitativ metod och en deduktiv ansats. Den finansiella data som används i studien har hämtats via databasen ”Retriever”, information om aktieägande har manuellt hämtats från ”Ägarna och makten” (Sundqvist, 2015). Resultat och slutsats: Slutsatsen innefattar en saknad av direkt samband mellan koncentrerat ägande och låg utdelningsnivå vilket besvarar syftet. Vad som kan lyftas fram som en eventuell förklaring är den skattemässiga aspekten gällande utdelning och kapitalvinst. Tidigare forskning som påträffat samband i andra länder har en skattesats som skiljer sig mellan utdelning och kapitalvinst vilket innebär skattemässiga fördelat att välja det ena framför det andra. Detta var en av de aspekter som var av stort intresse innan studien startade. Studiens bidrag: Denna studies teoretiska bidrag påvisar att sambandet mellan ägarkoncentrationen och företagens utdelning inte är självklart på den svenska börsen. Istället finner vi att det är huvudsakligen företagens finansiella nyckeltal som ligger till grund för företagens utdelning. Förslag till vidare forskning: Resultatet av denna studie föder ytterligare nyfikenhet kring möjligheter att forska vidare. Exempel på intressanta ämnen är Agnblads (2001)teori om det utländska ägandets påverkan på det framtida ägandet i Sverige. Även agentteorin och dess olika påverkan på företagen går att fördjupa sig i och studera på den svenska marknaden då ägandet är koncentrerat och en stor del maktfördelning sker.Aim: The aim of this study is to test the relationship between ownership concentration and dividends in listed Swedish firms. Method: This study has a quantitative method and a deductive approach. The financial data has been collected via the database ”Retriever”, information about the ownership of the companies was manually collected from the book ”Ägarna och makten” (Sundqvist, 2015). Result and conclusions: The result of the study is that dividends may variate due to the independent variables. However, there is not a significant relationship between ownership concentration and dividends. Contribution of the thesis: The contribution of this study provides further information regarding ownership concentration and dividends, we find that the financial ratios of the companies have a larger impact on the dividends than the ownership concentration. Suggestions for future research: The result of this study adds alot of curiosity to the future studies about this subject. Our suggestions to future research is to elaborate Agnblads (2001) theory about foreign ownership and how it might affect companies in Sweden. We also propose to research further about the Agency-theory and which effects it has on the Swedish listed firms since we have a concentrated ownership.
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Trepper, Piers [Verfasser], and Sven [Akademischer Betreuer] Rady. "Dynamic problems and learning : microtheoretic applications to two-sided markets, team production, and the principal-agent problem / Piers Trepper. Betreuer: Sven Rady." München : Universitätsbibliothek der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, 2012. http://d-nb.info/1029040427/34.
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Pushkarskaya, Helen N. "NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL: INCENTIVES THEORY APPROACH." The Ohio State University, 2003. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1041607329.
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Zíka, Vojtěch. "The Time-Saving Bias in a Firm." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-193108.
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The time-saving bias is a cognitive error which systematically influences human perception of relationship between speed and time. As a consequence they overestimate time gained/lost when accelerating/decelerating from higher speed and underestimate time gained/lost when accelerating/decelerating from lower speed. This bias is most salient in the context of a car driving where such a misperception might lead to an excessively high travelling speed. Apart from the impact on the driving safety, unduly high speed have negative effect also on the fuel economy. An undue fuel consumption can be an issue not only for firms, but also for the environment. This work tested a formerly proposed de-biasing measure, a paceometer, in a field experiment with the intention to find out if this kind of intervention can alter drivers' behaviour in order to reduce speeding and thus increase the driving safety and decrease the fuel consumption. To test also the strength of the measure the experiment was done within a middle size company where employees did not bear driving costs. Results based on 1 year fuel consumption data of 45 participants showed no particular effect of the measure on the average fuel consumption. A reason for this finding can be an existence of a principal/agent problem which considerably affects incentives of drivers.
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Berglund, Amie, and Oskar Danell. ""Inte sjutton läser man alla de där papperna man får" : En kvalitativ studie om hur MiFID II påverkat Principal agent problem vid investeringsrådgivning." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Företagsekonomi, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-158492.
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Bakgrund: Den tredje januari 2018 trädde EU-direktivet Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) i kraft. Direktivet ämnar öka investerarskyddet genom att eliminera informationsasymmetri och intressekonflikter på finansmarknaden, och samtidigt harmonisera reglerna mellan EU-länder. Inom investeringsrådgivning innebär det nya regelverket ökad dokumentation, ett större fokus på att försäkra sig om att investerarna förstår risker, hårdare krav på hur avgifter kommuniceras och striktare regler kring incitament. Allt detta för att skydda investerarna, som ofta visat sig ha en bristfällig finansiell kunskap och ett lågt intresse för privatekonomi. Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att utifrån värdepappersföretagens perspektiv skapa förståelse för vilken påverkan EU-direktivet MiFID II har haft på principal-agent problem som uppstår vid investeringsrådgivning. Genomförande: Uppsatsen är en kvalitativ fallstudie. Vidare har ett fenomenologiskt forskningsperspektiv använts, med en abduktiv ansats. Det empiriska materialet har samlats in genom semistrukturerade intervjuer med sammanlagt sju respondenter som alla jobbar på värdepappersföretag, vilka valdes ut med ett målstyrt bekvämlighetsurval. Resultat: Uppsatsen kommer fram till att principal-agent problemen inom investeringsrådgivning inte har eliminerats. Informations- asymmetrin är enligt vår tolkning av de traditionella teorierna närmast obefintlig, men utgör fortfarande ett stort problem på grund av investerarnas ointresse och relativt låga förmåga att ta till sig informationen. Vi argumenterar därav att dessa dimensioner bör inkluderas i teorin för vilka trösklar som kan orsaka informationsasymmetrin. Intressekonflikterna har reducerats, men finns till viss mån fortfarande kvar. Motivationen att agera i ett egenintresse har dock inte påverkats. Uppsatsen visar således på att MiFID II inte har förflyttat principal-agent relationen till en stewardship relation. Kunskapsbidrag: Det teoretiska bidraget gällande informationsasymmetri utmanar antagandet om att principalen vill ha information som är relevant för denne. Uppsatsen visar att så inte alltid är fallet. Förutom att det uppstår informationsasymmetri om det är kostsamt eller svårt att ta reda på agentens handlingar, kan det även uppstå i situationer där principalen är ointresserad av, eller oförmögen att ta till sig av informationen enligt vår mening. Vidare har MiFID II inneburit att det är svårare för agenten att tillgodose sitt egenintresse om detta strider mot principalens. Däremot har direktivet inte inneburit att den interna motivationen ändrats och det går därför inte att förutsätta att ett kontraktsförhållande som haft en principal-agent relation övergår till en stewardship relation när dessa problem elimineras. Genom en ökad förståelse för hur tvingande lagstiftningar påverkar principal-agent problem kan det empiriska bidraget hjälpa tillsynsmyndigheter i sitt arbete att hantera principal-agent problem. Uppsatsen skulle således kunna underlätta vidareutveckling av regleringen som finns idag, likväl som utformningen av framtida direktiv och lagar. Med ett utomstående perspektiv på vilka intressekonflikter som kan uppstå vid investeringsrådgivning skulle det empiriska bidraget också kunna vara gynnsamt för värdepappersföretag och deras arbete för att hantera intressekonflikter.Background: On January 3, 2018, the EU directive Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) came into effect. The directive is intended to expand investor protection through eliminating information asymmetry and conflicts of interest in the financial market, while also harmonizing the regulations between nations within the EU. For investment advising, the directive results in more extensive documentation and stricter regulation of how fees and risks are communicated, as well as how incentives are handled; all with the aim of protecting investors. At the same time, the general public shows low interest in personal finance, as well as inadequate financial knowledge. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to further the understanding of how the introduction of the EU directive MiFID II has affected the principal-agent problem that arises during investment advising, from an investment firm perspective. Completion: This is a qualitative case-study which utilizes a phenomenological research perspective and an abductive approach. The empirical material has been collected through semi-structured interviews at investment firms with a total of seven respondents, whom were selected through goal-oriented convenience sampling. Conclusion: The study concludes that the principal-agent problems in investment advising have not been eliminated. According to our interpretation of the traditional theories, information asymmetry is nearly non-existent. Yet it remains a significant problem due to lack of interest and an inability to assimilate the information. Thus, we argue that the theoretical framework should be revised to include these barriers, as they may lead to information asymmetry. Conflicts of interest have been reduced, but still remain to some extent. Furthermore, the motivation to act based on self-interest still remain. Hence, the study shows that MiFID II has not turned the principal-agent relationship into a stewardship relationship. Contribution: The theoretical contribution to information asymmetry challenges the assumption that the principal is interested in all the information that is of relevance for them. The study show that this is not always the case. Apart from information asymmetry arising when ascertaining the actions of the agent is expensive or difficult, it can also arise due to the principal’s lack of interest or inability to assimilate the information. Moreover, MiFID II has made it more difficult for the agent to act in their own self-interest, should it deviate from the interest of the principal. The directive has not, however, affected the intrinsic motivation of the agent. Thus, we cannot assume that the elimination of these problems causes a principal-agent relationship to transform into a stewardship relationship. Through an increased understanding of how binding legislation affects principal-agent problems, the empirical contribution can help regulatory bodies in their work to mitigate the aforementioned problems. Hence, the study may help to not only expand existing legislation, but also in the development of future legislation and directives. By providing an outside perspective of what conflicts of interests could arise in investment advising, the empirical contribution could also be of use for investment firms in their work to identify and manage conflicts of interest
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Orefice, Marcelo de Castro. "Portfolio pumping no mercado acionário brasileiro." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/17967.
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In this dissertation, we discuss the practice of portfolio pumping in Brazil. Although the topic is recurrent in other countries, few studies provide this analysis for the Brazilian case. The statistical study is elaborated in three stages: first, we considered Brazilian investment funds‟ shares for the period from September 2011 to June 2016, estimating daily abnormal returns of those funds based on the Ibovespa, considering and not considering the adjusted beta of the portfolios of those funds. Our results suggest that the practice of portfolio pumping is more frequent at the end of months ex-semester than at the end of semesters. When we consider the beta adjusted to calculate abnormal returns of the funds, we found a greater significance for the existence of this practice. In the second step, the funds were ordered based on their performance in the previous period (by month, semester, and year), which resulted in few relevant results for the analysis of the topic, despite what is proposed by the principal-agent problem literature. In the last step, we analyzed the practice of portfolio pumping in stocks traded on BM&F Bovespa, ordering them by their participation in the portfolios and by their Market Cap. The results indicated that the stocks with greater presence in the portfolios of the investment funds have higher abnormal returns at the end of the periods, reinforcing the thesis that this increase in stock prices in those moments may be a consequence of a deliberate action taken by the managers of those funds
Nesta dissertação, discutimos a prática de portfolio pumping para o caso brasileiro. Embora o tema seja frequente em outros países, são poucos os estudos que realizam essa análise para o Brasil. O estudo estatístico foi realizado em três etapas: na primeira, consideramos o valor das cotas de fundos brasileiros de investimento em ações para o período de setembro de 2011 a junho de 2016, calculando o retorno anormal diário desses fundos com base no Ibovespa, com e sem a consideração do beta ajustado das carteiras desses fundos. O resultado observado sugeriu que a prática de portfolio pumping é mais frequente ao final dos meses ex-semestre do que ao final dos semestres. Quando consideramos o beta ajustado para o cálculo do retorno anormal dos fundos, verificamos maior significância para a existência dessa prática. Na segunda etapa, os fundos foram ordenados com base em seu desempenho no período anterior (mês, semestre e ano), com resultados observados pouco esclarecedores para a análise do tema, diferentemente do que é sugerido pela literatura do problema do principal-agente. Na última etapa, analisamos a prática de portfolio pumping nas ações negociadas na BM&F Bovespa, ordenando-as pela sua participação nos portfólios e pelo seu Market Cap. Os resultados obtidos indicaram que as ações com maior presença nos portfólios dos fundos de investimento têm retornos anormais mais elevados ao final dos períodos, reforçando a tese de que esse aumento nos preços de ações naqueles instantes pode ser uma consequência de uma ação deliberada por parte dos gestores desses fundos.
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Rex, Jonathan, and Daniel Roos. "I Kölvattnet av IFRS 2: En Studie av Optioner som Incitament till VD i Svenska Börsbolag." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-202328.
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The implementation of IFRS 2 led to significant changes in the accounting practices for corporations regarding stock related compensation. The new regulations required firms to account for the stock based compensation as an expense in the financial statements, rather than merely disclosing the information in the notes section to the statements. Following prior research on the area; specifically studies made in the U.S., where researchers find that companies change their use of stock based compensation due to the increased accounted expenses, this study hypothesizes that the same pattern may be found among companies listed on the Swedish stock market. The results of this study show that the use of option incentives has decreased during the studied period 2001-2008 and that the decrease in part can be derived from IFRS 2 and in part from other factors. The results are useful to future research, as they provide an overview of the effects that IFRS 2 had on companies, and various factors that influence the behavior of corporations, as well as in a larger perspective be a factor to take into account for future modifications of the IFRS.
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Thoresson, Alexander, and Pontus Niléhn. "Determinants of voluntary disclosure in Swedish corporate annual reports." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-230442.
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This study examines if three hypothesized variables affect the extent of corporate strategic information, i.e. voluntary information, in corporate annual reports, specifically in Sweden in the year of 2012. The variables deemed appropriate to the Swedish environment, i.e. firm size, ownership dispersion and performance, were retrieved from previous disclosure research conducted in a Swedish context (Cook, 1989; Adrem, 1999), as well as relevant theoretical consideration. The statistical analysis conducted in this thesis suggests that firm size is significantly positively related to the extent of strategic corporate information in Swedish listed firms’ corporate annual reports. The result hence confirms the expectation that larger listed firms to a larger extent disclose strategic corporate information, i.e. voluntary information, in their corporate annual reports. No positive relation was found between the variables performance or ownership dispersion and the extent of strategic corporate information. The results of this thesis are interpreted to suggest that asymmetric information and agency costs are important determinants of the extent of strategic corporate information, i.e. voluntary information, in Swedish corporate annual reports. Larger firms seem to reduce agency costs and narrow the information asymmetry by increasing the level of information disclosed.
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Werner, Adrian. "Bilevel stochastic programming problems: Analysis and application to telecommunications." Doctoral thesis, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Social Sciences and Technology Management, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-577.
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We analyse several facets of bilevel decision problems under uncertainty. These problems can be interpreted as an extension of stochastic programming problems where part of the uncertainty is attributed to the behaviour of another actor.
The field of decision making under uncertainty with bilevel features is quite new and most approaches focus on the interactions and relations between the decision makers. In contrast to these studies, the approach of bilevel stochastic programming pursued here stresses the stochastic programming aspect of the problem formulation. The framework enables a direct application of stochastic programming concepts and solution methods to the bilevel relationship between the actors. Thus more complex problem structures can be studied and the aspect of uncertainty can be treated adequately.
Our analysis covers both theoretical and more practically oriented issues. We study different formulations of one and two stage bilevel stochastic programming problems and state necessary optimality conditions for each of the problem instances. Additionally we present a solution algorithm utilising a stochastic quasi-gradient method. A further study is concerned with the uniqueness of the minima of a convex stochastic programming problem with uncertainty about the decision variables. We state conditions on the distribution of the parameters representing the uncertainty such that the minima of the optimisation problem are unique. We formulate a model of competition and collaboration of two different types of telecom service providers, the owner of a bottleneck facility and a virtual network operator. This represents an application of a bilevel stochastic programming formulation to a liberalised telecommunications environment. Furthermore, the utilisation of the bilevel stochastic programming framework and the developed solution concepts for the analysis of principal agent models is demonstrated. Also here the background of a regulated telecom environment, more specific the relations between a regulator and a regulated telecommunications company, was chosen.
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Meng, Jingyi. "Labour supply with reference-dependent preferences." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2018. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/labour-supply-with-referencedependent-preferences(7ccb3ed0-d64c-46c4-b733-ad583e5b106f).html.
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This thesis studies the labour supply with aspiration-based reference-dependent preferences. The first contribution of the thesis is the theoretical modelling of behavioural contract theory. In Chapter 1, I modify the classical principal-agent model with uncertainty and moral hazard by replacing the Expected Utility preferences of the agent with chance theory preferences (Schmidt and Zank, 2013). Chance theory agents are primarily concerned with the sure wage they can obtain, i.e., the certain component in their contract, as they treat increments in bonuses markedly different to similar changes in sure wages. Similar to the classical predictions, our agents' optimal contracts are contingent payment schemes, however, they differ with respect to the level of the sure wage. I also contrast my predictions to those of the model of Herweg et al. (2010), who assume agents with expectation-based loss-averse preferences. The other contribution of this thesis is the empirical support for the theory of aspiration-based reference-dependent preferences with field data in education economics. In Chapter 2, I study aspiration-based reference-dependent preferences in undergraduate students' performance and effort provision. Students' reference points are set as their targeted grades. I extend a two-period economics-of-education model (Krohn and O'Connor, 2005) by proposing an additional utility function that is based on the difference between the realised grade and targeted grade. I design surveys and collect data by following a group of undergraduate students at the University of Manchester for two semesters of a full academic year with a two-period panel. My results provide evidence for students' reference-dependent preferences in two ways: first, a significant jump in students' proxied utility of grade is found at the reference point, which also implies students are loss averse. Second, the reference point positively affects students' effort provision. I further study the formation of the reference point and its variation over time. My results suggest that students partially update their past realised results into the formation of reference points. Further, the relative change of their reference points depends on the achievement of the past period reference point.
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Olarnsakul, Tavin. "Are Personality Traits a Viable Indicator of the Agency and Disposition Effect?" Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1384.
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Can the HEXACO personality dimensions and facets be used to explain the principal-agent problem and the disposition effect? The proposed research is designed to address the relationship between personality dimensions and individuals’ propensity to engage in self-interested behavior (agency effect) and irrational investment decisions (disposition effect). This paper proposes a correlational study that will be one of the first to apply Ashton and Lee’s (2009) HEXACO framework of personality to examine the association between the six personality dimensions and measurements of the agency and disposition effect. The HEXACO model of personality dimension includes Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Openness to Experience, Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness. Total participants in both experiments will be 480 undergraduate college students. Participating students will complete the HEXACO-60 self-report inventory and take part in a stock simulation where measurements of interests are recorded. Higher scores along the Honesty-Humility and Emotionality dimensions are expected to have a strong negative relationship with the agency effect measurement, while Openness to Experience, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Extraversion will have a weak to moderate positive association. Higher scores along the Emotionality dimensions are expected to have a strong negative association with the disposition effect measurement, while lower scores of Conscientiousness are expected to have a positive relationship.
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El, Euch Omar. "Quantitative Finance under rough volatility." Thesis, Sorbonne université, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SORUS172/document.
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Cette thèse a pour objectif la compréhension de plusieurs aspects du caractère rugueux de la volatilité observé de manière universelle sur les actifs financiers. Ceci est fait en six étapes. Dans une première partie, on explique cette propriété à partir des comportements typiques des agents sur le marché. Plus précisément, on construit un modèle de prix microscopique basé sur les processus de Hawkes reproduisant les faits stylisés importants de la microstructure des marchés. En étudiant le comportement du prix à long terme, on montre l’émergence d’une version rugueuse du modèle de Heston (appelé modèle rough Heston) avec effet de levier. En utilisant ce lien original entre les processus de Hawkes et les modèles de Heston, on calcule dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse la fonction caractéristique du log-prix du modèle rough Heston. Cette fonction caractéristique est donnée en terme d’une solution d’une équation de Riccati dans le cas du modèle de Heston classique. On montre la validité d’une formule similaire dans le cas du modèle rough Heston, où l’équation de Riccati est remplacée par sa version fractionnaire. Cette formule nous permet de surmonter les difficultés techniques dues au caractère non markovien du modèle afin de valoriser des produits dérivés. Dans la troisième partie, on aborde la question de la gestion des risques des produits dérivés dans le modèle rough Heston. On présente des stratégies de couverture utilisant comme instruments l’actif sous-jacent et la courbe variance forward. Ceci est fait en spécifiant la structure markovienne infini-dimensionnelle du modèle. Étant capable de valoriser et couvrir les produits dérivés dans le modèle rough Heston, nous confrontons ce modèle à la réalité des marchés financiers dans la quatrième partie. Plus précisément, on montre qu’il reproduit le comportement de la volatilité implicite et historique. On montre également qu’il génère l’effet Zumbach qui est une asymétrie par inversion du temps observée empiriquement sur les données financières. On étudie dans la cinquième partie le comportement limite de la volatilité implicite à la monnaie à faible maturité dans le cadre d’un modèle à volatilité stochastique général (incluant le modèle rough Bergomi), en appliquant un développement de la densité du prix de l’actif. Alors que l’approximation basée sur les processus de Hawkes a permis de traiter plusieurs questions relatives au modèle rough Heston, nous examinons dans la sixième partie une approximation markovienne s’appliquant sur une classe plus générale de modèles à volatilité rugueuse. En utilisant cette approximation dans le cas particulier du modèle rough Heston, on obtient une méthode numérique pour résoudre les équations de Riccati fractionnaires. Enfin, nous terminons cette thèse en étudiant un problème non lié à la littérature sur la volatilité rugueuse. Nous considérons le cas d’une plateforme cherchant le meilleur système de make-take fees pour attirer de la liquidité. En utilisant le cadre principal-agent, on décrit le meilleur contrat à proposer au market maker ainsi que les cotations optimales affichées par ce dernier. Nous montrons également que cette politique conduit à une meilleure liquidité et à une baisse des coûts de transaction pour les investisseursThe aim of this thesis is to study various aspects of the rough behavior of the volatility observed universally on financial assets. This is done in six steps. In the first part, we investigate how rough volatility can naturally emerge from typical behav- iors of market participants. To do so, we build a microscopic price model based on Hawkes processes in which we encode the main features of the market microstructure. By studying the asymptotic behavior of the price on the long run, we obtain a rough version of the Heston model exhibiting rough volatility and leverage effect. Using this original link between Hawkes processes and the Heston framework, we compute in the second part of the thesis the characteristic function of the log-price in the rough Heston model. In the classical Heston model, the characteristic function is expressed in terms of a solution of a Riccati equation. We show that rough Heston models enjoy a similar formula, the Riccati equation being replaced by its fractional version. This formula enables us to overcome the non-Markovian nature of the model in order to deal with derivatives pricing. In the third part, we tackle the issue of managing derivatives risks under the rough Heston model. We establish explicit hedging strategies using as instruments the underlying asset and the forward variance curve. This is done by specifying the infinite-dimensional Markovian structure of the rough Heston model. Being able to price and hedge derivatives in the rough Heston model, we challenge the model to practice in the fourth part. More precisely, we show the excellent fit of the model to historical and implied volatilities. We also show that the model reproduces the Zumbach’s effect, that is a time reversal asymmetry which is observed empirically on financial data. While the Hawkes approximation enabled us to solve the pricing and hedging issues under the rough Heston model, this approach cannot be extended to an arbitrary rough volatility model. We study in the fifth part the behavior of the at-the-money implied volatility for small maturity under general stochastic volatility models. In the same spirit as the Hawkes approximation, we look in the sixth part of this thesis for a tractable Markovian approximation that holds for a general class of rough volatility models. By applying this approximation on the specific case of the rough Heston model, we derive a numerical scheme for solving fractional Riccati equations. Finally, we end this thesis by studying a problem unrelated to rough volatility. We consider an exchange looking for the best make-take fees system to attract liquidity in its platform. Using a principal-agent framework, we describe the best contract that the exchange should propose to the market maker and provide the optimal quotes displayed by the latter. We also argue that this policy leads to higher quality of liquidity and lower trading costs for investors
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Zhang, Tuo. "THREE ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN CHINA." Doctoral thesis, Kyoto University, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/263409.
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Mach, Milan. "Vliv problému pána a správce na vznik finanční krize." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2013. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-193739.
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The core focus of this thesis is the principal-agent problem and its role in the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis. Analysis of key elements of the problem like moral hazard and adverse selection lays foundations for identifying situations, in which conflict of interests led to negative impacts on the economic performance before and during the financial crisis. This work also studies the influence of factors that are often overlooked by theoretical economists but are still tightly connected to the principal-agent problem, like exogenous incentives based on the mechanism of trust. The author also evaluates mechanisms that have been put into place after the financial crisis and which could help lower agency costs. He also sketches out possible venues of future research in this area.
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Jans, Ivette. "Extensions and applications of principal-agent problems." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Economics, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/4500.
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This thesis extends principal-agent models with hidden actions, and uses those models to gain insight into issues in education.
Chapter 2 gives a comparative statics analysis of a conventional model with a single principal and agent. It describes the effect on contracts of changes in the outcome of the principal-agent relationship, stating the results in the form of Slutsky equations.
Continuing with the same model, Chapter 3 allows the principal to choose an action and shows that this action can motivate the agent, and thus act as an incentive device. The model is extended further in Chapter 4, which allows agents to bargain with the principal over the outcome. In this form the model is an extension of a commodity exchange model with uncertain endowments. Using the core as a solution concept, contracts which survive bargaining among agents are derived.
Chapters 5 and 6 consider moral hazard in education. In Chapter 5 the government gives loans to students, and structures loan repayments so that students' future income is to some extent insured. The government chooses the optimal level of insurance, given the possibility of shirking by students. In Chapter 6 the government hires educators, and chooses the optimal compensation of educators, given that they have an incentive to shirk.
Both models extend principal-agent theory. In Chapter 5 students choose the length of education, so that the length of the principal-agent relationship is endogenous. This may affect the optimal insurance of students' future earnings. In Chapter 6 the number of educators and the skilled wage are endogenous. In terms of principal-agency, optimal contracts are derived in a general equilibrium model in which the number of agents hired by the principal, and their opportunity cost are endogenous.
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Chang, Hualei. "Continuous-time principal-agent problems with behavioral preferences." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.526551.
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Kuhn, Kai-Uwe. "Principal-agent problems and commitment in imperfectly competitive markets." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.315884.
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Sonderegger, Silvia. "Principle-agent problems with type-dependent outside options." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2005. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1963/.
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The literature on adverse selection has until recently concentrated on the case where the agent's outside option is type-independent, implying that all types of agent receive the same payoff should no trade occur with the principal. Unfortunately, this assumption is not innocuous. If it is relaxed, the properties of the optimal contract can change dramatically. This thesis characterizes the impact of type-dependent outside options in three different settings. First, we explore the notion that a worker's prospects in the labour market may be influenced by his employment history. Under these circumstances, employers may incentivise their employees by randomizing over the probability with which current employees are retained. We identify a set of sufficient conditions for this to be the case in a two-period employment relationship, where the employee's ability is private information and both parties are risk-neutral. Although randomization is seldom observed in the real world, our results suggest that employers may optimally introduce some ambiguity over the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to be retained. Second, we study competition in price-quality menus within the context of an horizontally differentiated duopoly, where each firm also operates in a local, monopolistic market. It is assumed that the consumer's (unobservable) valuation for quality is determined by the nature of his preferences over horizontal (or brand) product characteristics. We find that, if competition between the two firms is sufficiently fierce: (1) the equilibrium quality schedule exhibits bunching and (2) the equilibrium contract features overprovision of quality for sufficiently low types. Thus, with respect to the monopoly setting, competition may introduce new types of distortions, namely upward distortions. Third, we analyze the conflict of interests that arises between employers and employees with respect to the adoption of innovations that change the nature of the skills relevant for production. If an employer decides to adopt a new technology, he will also replace his specialist workforce. Thus, although a current employee has access to superior information concerning the efficiency of the new technology, he also has an incentive to misreport it. We show that if (1) the employee's expected utility from alternative employment is lower when the new technology is superior and (2) the employer cannot commit to retain the employee if the new technology is adopted, no renegotiation-proof contract exists, which induces the employee to truthfully reveal his information. In the special case where the employee can ex-ante commit to make his information publicly available (commitment to transparency), access to external sources of information can result in the employer's choice of technology being less efficient than otherwise.
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Hernández, Santibáñez Nicolas Iván. "Contributions to the principal-agent theory and applications in economics." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2017. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/148316.
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Doctor en Ciencias de la Ingeniería, Mención Modelación Matemática En Cotutela con la Universidad Paris-DauphineEn esta tésis se estudian aspectos teóricos del modelo de Agente-Principal y se presentan algunas aplicaciones en economía. En la primera parte de la tésis se presentan dos aplicaciones del modelo. En la primera, un proveedor de electricidad determina la tarifa óptima para cobrar a los clientes por su consumo. La población es heterogénea y el proveedor observa perfectamente el consumo de cada cliente. Esto conlleva a una situación de selección adversa sin riesgo moral. El problema del Principal se escribe como un problema variacional no estándar que se resuelve para formas particulares de la utilidad de reserva de la población. El contrato óptimo resulta ser o bien lineal o polinomial con respecto al consumo y el proveedor contrata solo a aquellos consumidores que presentan una alta o una baja necesidad de electricidad. En la segunda aplicación, un banco monitorea un conjunto de préstamos idénticos sujetos a contagio Markoviano. El banco obtiene fondos de un inversor, que no puede observar las acciones del banco y tampoco conoce su competencia para el trabajo. Este trabajo es una extensión del modelo de Pagès and Possamaï [84] al caso de incluye tanto riesgo moral como selección adversa. Siguiendo el enfoque de Cvitanić, Wan and Yang [31] para este tipo de problemas, el conjunto creíble dinámico es calculado explícitamente y la función valor del inversor se obtiene a través de un sistema recursivo de inecuaciones variacionales. Las propiedades del contrato óptimo se discuten en detalle. En la segunda parte de la tesis se estudia el problema de un Agente que controla el retorno esperado de un proceso de difusión bajo incerteza de la volatilidad. Se asume que tanto el Principal como el Agente tiene un enfoque pesimista al problema y actúan como si un tercer jugador, la Naturaleza, escogiera la peor volatilidad posible. Este trabajo es una extensión de Mastrolia y Possamaï [64] y de Sung [125] a un marco más general. Se demuestra que la función valor del Agente puede ser representada como la solución de una Ecuación Diferencial Estocástica Retrógrada de segundo orden, y también que la función valor del Principal corresponde a la única solución viscosa de la ecuación de Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman- Isaacs asociada, asumiendo que esta última satisface un principio de comparación.
Este trabajo ha sido parcialmente financiado por CONICYT-Beca Doctorado Nacional 2013
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Hernandez, Perez Adriana Azevedo. "Federalismo: uma abordagem do problema do principal e do agente." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/272.
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Previous issue date: 2001-04-23The government has two objectives in this economy: make the states invest in thepriority sector and equalize wealth among states. Applying the model of the Principal-Agent Problem, we obtain that the federal system may not increase society 's wellfare when the states not necessarily invest in its respective thepriority sector. We also obtain that it is possible to implement an optimal mechanism where government equalize wealth among states without cost and can make states invest in thepriority sector.
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Hashimoto, Gilberto Rodrigues. "Problemas de principal-agente no processo orçamentário brasileiro: análise e alternativas." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/5231.
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Previous issue date: 2002-04-02T00:00:00ZAnalisa a problemática da relação principal-agente sob seus aspectos teóricos. Relaciona o orçamento no Brasil com mudanças constitucionais e legais e examina os efeitos no processo orçamentário brasileiro da legislação com relação a problemas de agency. Apresenta alternativas para redução ou eliminação de problemas de principal-agente, em especial a proposta de execução participativa
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Pupich, Daniel William Lewis Victor Scott. "Combating principle-agent relationship problems use of the truth revealing incentive mechanism /." Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/07Dec%5FPupich%5FMBA.pdf.
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"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007."Advisor(s): Gates, William R. ; Yoder, E. Cory ; Coughlan, Peter J. "December 2007." "MBA professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on January 11, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69). Also available in print.
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Lewis, Victor Scott, and Daniel William Pupich. "Combating principle-agent relationship problems: use of the truth revealing incentive mechanism." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/10168.
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MBA Professional ReportThe purpose of this MBA professional report is to introduce the Truth Revealing Incentive Mechanism (TRIM) as a tool to help the government obtain more accurate cost estimates and control program costs. The TRIM is an economic mechanism based on principal-agent relationships that uses incentives to align contractors' interests with those of the Government. The TRIM combats principal-agent problems by extracting a contractor's true estimated costs. The TRIM is structured so that revealing the true estimated cost offers the contractor the highest potential fee. This report describes the principal-agent theory, identifies principal-agent problems in the current DoD contracting environment, discusses how the TRIM addresses these problems more effectively than traditional cost-reimbursement contracts, and explains how and where the TRIM can be applied. This report also includes an electronic version of the TRIM in Microsoft Excel format, as well as a practitioner's guide to help contracting officers use the TRIM.
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Backhoff, Julio Daniel. "Functional analytic approaches to some stochastic optimization problems." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17138.
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In dieser Arbeit beschäftigen wir uns mit Nutzenoptimierungs- und stochastischen Kontrollproblemen unter mehreren Gesichtspunkten. Wir untersuchen die Parameterunsicherheit solcher Probleme im Sinne des Robustheits- und des Sensitivitätsparadigma. Neben der Betrachtung dieser problemen widmen wir uns auch einem Zweiagentenproblem, bei dem der eine dem anderen das Management seines Portfolios vertraglich überträgt. Wir betrachten das robuste Nutzenoptimierungsproblem in Finanzmarktmodellen, wobei wir Bedingungen für seine Lösbarkeit formulieren, ohne jegliche Kompaktheit der Unsicherheitsmenge zu fordern, welche die Maße enthält, auf die der Optimierer robustifiziert. Unsere Bedingungen sind über gewisse Funktionenräume beschrieben, die allgemein Modularräume sind, mittels dennen wir eine Min-Max-Gleichung und die Existenz optimalen Strategien beweisen. In vollständigen Märkten ist der Raum ein Orlicz, und nachdem man seine Reflexivität explizit überprüft hat, erhält man zusätzlich die Existenz einer Worst-Case-Maße, die wir charakterisieren. Für die Parameterabhängigkeit stochastischer Kontrollprobleme entwickeln wir einen Sensitivitätsansatz. Das Kernargument ist die Korrespondenz zwischen dem adjungierten Zustand zur schwachen Formulierung des Pontryaginschen Prinzips und den Lagrange-Multiplikatoren, die der Kontrollgleichung assoziiert werden, wenn man sie als eine Bedingung betrachtet. Der Sensitivitätsansatz wird dann auf konvexe Probleme mit additiver oder multiplikativer Störung angewendet. Das Zweiagentenproblem formulieren wir in diskreter Zeit. Wir wenden in größter Verallgemeinerung die Methoden der bedingten Analysis auf den Fall linearer Verträge an und zeigen, dass sich die Mehrheit der in der Literatur unter sehr spezifischen Annahmen bekannten Ergebnisse auf eine deutlich umfassenderer Klasse von Modellen verallgemeinern lässt. Insbesondere erhalten wir die Existenz eines first-best-optimalen Vertrags und dessen Implementierbarkeit.In this thesis we deal with utility maximization and stochastic optimal control through several points of view. We shall be interested in understanding how such problems behave under parameter uncertainty under respectively the robustness and the sensitivity paradigms. Afterwards, we leave the single-agent world and tackle a two-agent problem where the first one delegates her investments to the second through a contract. First, we consider the robust utility maximization problem in financial market models, where we formulate conditions for its solvability without assuming compactness of the densities of the uncertainty set, which is a set of measures upon which the maximizing agent performs robust investments. These conditions are stated in terms of functional spaces wich generally correspond to Modular spaces, through which we prove a minimax equality and the existence of optimal strategies. In complete markets the space is an Orlicz one, and upon explicitly granting its reflexivity we obtain in addition the existence of a worst-case measure, which we fully characterize. Secondly we turn our attention to stochastic optimal control, where we provide a sensitivity analysis to some parameterized variants of such problems. The main tool is the correspondence between the adjoint states appearing in a (weak) stochastic Pontryagin principle and the Lagrange multipliers associated to the controlled equation when viewed as a constraint. The sensitivity analysis is then deployed in the case of convex problems and additive or multiplicative perturbations. In a final part, we proceed to Principal-Agent problems in discrete time. Here we apply in great generality the tools from conditional analysis to the case of linear contracts and show that most results known in the literature for very specific instances of the problem carry on to a much broader setting. In particular, the existence of a first-best optimal contract and its implementability by the Agent is obtained.
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Anderson, Greg J. "Congress, the Executive, and the problems of agency, a principal-agent approach to American foreign economic policy." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0017/MQ46962.pdf.
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Posner, Eric. "Coloquio de análisis costo- beneficio: análisis del costo- beneficio como una solución al problema principal- agente." THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/108100.
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Luengo, Vanda. "Cabri-euclide : un micromonde de preuve intégrant la réfutation : principes didactiques et informatiques, réalisation." Université Joseph Fourier (Grenoble), 1997. http://www.theses.fr/1997GRE10162.
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Nous avons specifie et developpe un environnement informatique d'apprentissage humain sur cabri-geometre, qui est base sur des formalisations du systeme didactique. En particulier, il est concu comme element d'un milieu antagoniste qui a pour objectif de permettre l'apprentissage de la preuve dans un cadre de resolution de problemes. Nous proposons un modele base sur les principes d'un micromonde de preuve permettant a l'eleve d'interagir avec un agent rationnel auquel il exprime les connaissances qu'il souhaite utiliser afin de resoudre un probleme et de construire une preuve. La fonction de l'agent rationnel est d'assurer les retroactions qui soient liees a la coherence propre au raisonnement de l'eleve et non a une conception a priori de ce que devrait etre la resolution. Pour cela, nous nous basons sur la theorie d'agents semi-empiriques. Une des caracteristiques de notre systeme, en tant qu'element du milieu antagoniste, est le fait qu'il refute la demarche de l'utilisateur quand cela est possible pour l'environnement. L'eleve exprime sa connaissance sous la forme d'enonces. La relation elementaire entre les enonces est le modus ponens. Pour un probleme de geometrie donne, l'eleve pourra construire la figure correspondante dans cabri-geometre et produire les enonces qu'il souhaite dans le micromonde de preuve. L'agent rationnel peut analyser la structure de l'ensemble des enonces et diagnostiquer s'il a ou non la structure d'une preuve relativement a un enonce donne comme conclusion. De plus, il peut evaluer un enonce dans le cadre de la figure construite dans cabri-geometre et eventuellement le refuter en produisant le dessin d'un contre-exemple. Il est a noter que les competences de l'agent rationnel sont limitees a l'analyse de raisonnements directs simples (excluant donc, dans cette premiere approche, le raisonnement par l'absurde, par cas, ou par recurrence).
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Kotrba, Martin. "Comparison of managerial aspects of Corporate Governance within Groups of Companies in Selected Jurisdictions." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-201991.
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One of the ways how to solve the agency problem is to align the managers and shareholders interests. Such concord can be achieved through an appropriate selection and set-up of remuneration policy for the top managers of companies. This thesis studies the compensation methods of five biggest corporations in each of the G7 countries and then further analyses the outcomes of the research using statistical and descriptive methods. The analysis is done through a comparison of performance of the company and the industry in order to identify if there is a link between the used compensation method and the company s under or over performance. The findings are described and eventual implications are presented at the end of the paper.
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Siqueira, Gustavo Borges Alencar. "Terceirização de Tecnologia da Informação como um problema de risco moral." Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, 2013. https://repositorio.ufpe.br/handle/123456789/12204.
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CAPES
A Terceirização da Tecnologia da Informação (TI) é destacada na literatura como um tema complexo e controverso. Por um lado, as firmas visualizam na terceirização a oportunidade de reduzir custos, aumentar eficiência, focar nas suas atividades centrais e usufruir da expertise especializada de terceiros. Por outro, pelo simples fato de delegar suas atividades de TI à outra organização, a empresa contratante passa a vivenciar uma situação de risco pela possibilidade dessas atividades não serem desempenhadas com o ímpeto esperado. Conhecido como Risco Moral, esse problema surge a partir do conflito de interesses entre as partes envolvidas e da assimetria de informação intrínseca ao problema. Como forma de analisar matematicamente essa questão, este trabalho apresenta um modelo Principal-Agente aplicado ao contexto de terceirização de serviços de desenvolvimento de software. São propostos dois contratos com formas diferentes de pagamento e avaliadas as implicações decorrentes das estratégias adotadas pelos jogadores em cada situação. Como resultado, o trabalho constata que: (1) em um contrato de pagamento fixo a firma contratante é incapaz de influenciar as ações a serem escolhidas pela firma contratada; (2) a solução de equilíbrio encontrada na situação de Risco Moral apresenta ineficiência se comparada à solução sem Risco Moral; (3) uma relação ganha-ganha poderia ser obtida a partir de uma negociação entre jogadores cooperativos; e, finalmente, (4) apresenta-se no trabalho a equação referente ao valor do pagamento ótimo a ser proposto pela firma contratante à firma contratada, considerando um contrato de pagamento proporcional à qualidade.
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Hadincová, Ludmila. "Being in the Right Place at the Right (and Bad) Time: Analysis of CEO Rewards for Luck before and after the Credit Crunch." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2013. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-192671.
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Diploma thesis tests the existence of luck premium on U.S. CEOs' compensations. Luck premium means that in case of high principal-agent costs, CEOs are rewarded for random luck and not only for their productivity. Thesis uses financial crisis in 2008 as a breaking event after which attention and control of CEOs' remuneration by owners, public, and media intensified. Using regression with fixed effects on panel data between years 2004 and 2012 thesis proved impact of luck premium before 2008 while the influence was not significant after 2008. Results were not robust for other model specifications, which might be caused by selectivity of the dataset. Thesis then presents overview of theoretical approaches to CEOs' compensation analysis and recommendations for optimal compensation set-up.
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Benedetti, Giuseppe. "Investissement optimal et évaluation d'actifs sous certaines imperfections de marché." Phd thesis, Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX, 2013. http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00957313.
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Dans cette thèse, nous nous intéressons à des sujets différents en mathématiques financières, tous liés aux imperfections de marché et à la technique fondamentale de la maximisation d'utilité. Elle comporte trois parties. Dans la première, qui se base sur deux papiers, nous considérons le problème d'investissement optimal sur un marché financier avec coûts de transaction proportionnels. On commence par étudier le problème d'investissement dans le cas où la fonction d'utilité est multivariée (ce qui s'adapte particulièrement bien aux marchés des devises) et l'agent a une dotation initiale aléatoire, qui peut s'interpréter comme une option ou un autre contrat dérivé. Après avoir analysé les propriétés du problème et de son dual, nous utilisons ces résultats pour examiner, dans ce contexte, certains aspects d'une technique de pricing devenue populaire dans le cadre des marchés incomplets, l'évaluation par indifférence d'utilité. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous étudions le problème d'existence d'un ensemble de prix (appelés "prix fictifs" ou "shadow prices") qui offrirait la même utilité maximale à l'agent si le marché n'avait pas de frictions. Ces résultats sont utiles pour clarifier le lien entre la théorie classique des marchés sans frictions et la littérature en croissance rapide sur les coûts de transaction. Dans la deuxième partie de cette thèse, nous considérons le problème d'évaluation de produits dérivés par indifférence d'utilité dans des marchés incomplets, où la source d'incomplétude provient du fait que certains actifs ne peuvent pas être échangés sur le marché, ce qui est le cas par exemple dans le cadre des modèles structurels pour le prix de l'électricité. Sous certaines hypothèses, nous dérivons une caractérisation en terme d'équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades (EDSR) pour le prix, et nous nous concentrons ensuite sur les options européennes en établissant en particulier l'existence d'une stratégie de couverture optimale, même lorsque le payoff présente des discontinuités et est éventuellement non borné. Dans la dernière partie, nous analysons un simple problème de principal-agent à horizon fini, où le principal est essentiellement interprété comme un régulateur et l'agent comme une entreprise qui produit certaines émissions polluantes. Nous traitons séparément les problèmes du principal et de l'agent et nous utilisons la théorie des EDSR pour fournir des conditions nécessaires et suffisantes d'optimalité. Nous effectuons également des analyses de sensibilité et nous montrons des résultats numériques dans le but de fournir une meilleure compréhension du comportement des agents.
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Possamaï, Dylan. "Voyage au coeur des EDSRs du second ordre et autres problèmes contemporains de mathématiques financières." Phd thesis, Ecole Polytechnique X, 2011. http://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/pastel-00651589.
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Cette thèse présente deux principaux sujets de recherche indépendants, le dernier étant décliné sous la forme de deux problèmes distincts. Dans toute la première partie de la thèse, nous nous intéressons à la notion d'équations différentielles stochastiques rétrogrades du second ordre (dans la suite 2EDSR), introduite tout d'abord par Cheredito, Soner, Touzi et Victoir puis reformulée récemment par Soner, Touzi et Zhang. Nous prouvons dans un premier temps une extension de leurs résultats d'existence et d'unicité lorsque le générateur considéré est seulement continu et à croissance linéaire. Puis, nous poursuivons notre étude par une nouvelle extension au cas d'un générateur quadratique. Ces résultats théoriques nous permettent alors de résoudre un problème de maximisation d'utilité pour un investisseur dans un marché incomplet, à la fois car des contraintes sont imposées sur ses stratégies d'investissement, et parce que la volatilité du marché est supposée être inconnue. Nous prouvons dans notre cadre l'existence de stratégies optimales, caractérisons la fonction valeur du problème grâce à une EDSR du second ordre et résolvons explicitement certains exemples qui nous permettent de mettre en exergue les modifications induites par l'ajout de l'incertitude de volatilité par rapport au cadre habituel. Nous terminons cette première partie en introduisant la notion d'EDSR du second ordre avec réflexion sur un obstacle. Nous prouvons l'existence et l'unicité des solutions de telles équations, et fournissons une application possible au problème de courverture d'options Américaines dans un marché à volatilité incertaine. Le premier chapitre de la seconde partie de cette thèse traite d'un problème de pricing d'options dans un modèle où la liquidité du marché est prise en compte. Nous fournissons des développements asymptotiques de ces prix au voisinage de liquidité infinie et mettons en lumière un phénomène de transition de phase dépendant de la régularité du payoff des options considérées. Quelques résultats numériques sont également proposés. Enfin, nous terminons cette thèse par l'étude d'un problème Principal/Agent dans un cadre d'aléa moral. Une banque (qui joue le rôle de l'agent) possède un certain nombre de prêts dont elle est prête à échanger les intérêts contre des flux de capitaux. La banque peut influencer les probabilités de défaut de ces emprunts en exerçant ou non une activité de surveillance coûteuse. Ces choix de la banque ne sont connus que d'elle seule. Des investisseurs (qui jouent le rôle de principal) souhaitent mettre en place des contrats qui maximisent leur utilité tout en incitant implicitement la banque à exercer une activité de surveillance constante. Nous résolvons ce problème de contrôle optimal explicitement, décrivons le contrat optimal associé ainsi que ses implications économiques et fournissons quelques simulations numériques.
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Shadnam, Mojdeh. "The Mathematics of principal-agent problem with adverse selection." Thesis, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/3482.
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This thesis studies existence and characterization of optimal solutions to the principal-agent problem with adverse selection for both discrete and continuous problems. The existence results are derived by the abstract concepts of differentiability and convexity.
Under the Spence Mirrlees condition, we show that the discrete problem reduces to a problem that always satisfies the linear independence constraint qualification, while the continuum of type problem becomes an optimal control problem. We then use the Ellipsoid algorithm to solve the problem in the discrete and convex case. For the problem without the Spence Mirrlees condition, we consider different classes of constraint qualifications. Then we introduce some easy-to-check conditions to verify these constraint qualifications. Finally we give economic interpretations for several numerical examples.Graduate
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Dunn, Martin James. "Economic rationalism in Canberra revisited - evidence for a principal-agent problem." Thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.13/1296540.
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Professional Doctorate - Doctor of Business Administration (DBA)Michael Pusey in "Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A nation-building state changes its mind" (1991) argued that Senior Executive Service (SES) officers in the Australian Public Service had a major influence on policy-making. This was particularly the case for those in the central agencies (the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury and the Department of Finance) who he say as advocates of “economic rationalism”. This thesis revisits these claims by interviewing the current generation of SES officers in the Treasury and Department of Finance and finds significant differences between today's attitudes and those reported by Pusey.
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Yon-Yang, Chang, and 張永煬. "The Optimal Contract under Asymmetric Information - A Case of Principal – Agent Problem of Professional Tax Agent." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82291510377864952313.
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博士中華大學
科技管理研究所
94
Abstract 1970s was the foundation laying time for information and uncertainty economics. Until 2001 three Nobelists of Economics prizes George A. Akerlof, A. Micheal Spence and Joseph E. Stiglitz advanced the extensive and precise verify analysis on existing asymmetric information in market and established an indelible contribution by applying economic theory to the real life. The study is for establishing the optimal contract of information asymmetry under three frameworks Principal-Agent Theory, Information Economics and Game Theory. The Intention of this study is to find out a reasonable incentive compatible contract for the principal-agent problem. Taiwanese small and medium size enterprises hiring tax agents were used as an example to verify the validity of the research. The conclusions are as the following : 1. The principal designs incentive compatible contract has certain state interdependence. When brσ²＜1, the principal ought to provide the incentive contract of high risk, high earnings share proportion and low salary. When brσ²＞1, he ought to provide the contract of low risk, low earnings share proportion and high salary. 2. The principal designs incentive compatible contract, the optimal incentive degree is reduced when the agents’ benefit share proportion is increasing. But if the principal released the contribution in the process, agents are difficult to guarantee gaining the best result. 3. The advantages of the surveillance mechanism and the positive action of the principal are not allowed to neglect in designing the incentive contract, and promoting the efficiency.
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Krulce, Darrell L. "Efficiency wages and executive compensation : the participation constraint in a principal-agent problem." Thesis, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/10125/9640.
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Novotný, Jan. "Režim zadávání veřejných zakázek a míra korupce: komparace České republiky a Dánského království." Master's thesis, 2011. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-91681.
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Fu, Jing-Lin, and 傅景林. "The Study of the Principal-Agent Problem of Externally Managed on Real Estate Securitization." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06044302368254410621.
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碩士國立屏東商業技術學院
不動產經營系
94
Externally advised real estate securitization brought lots of principal-agent problems, and affected rights and interests of invrstors. To Taiwan just put into practice the system, it is imperative either in learning or practice to be probed. For this reason, first of all, the study probes into principal-agent problems of externally advised REITs by means of related of documents of the America have put into practice Real Estate Investment Trust Law fourty years yet. And the study explan principal-agent problems of externally advised real estate securitization by means of principal-agent games, and further, three operation models may exist by principal-agent problems means of case studies, and find the way to deal with a situation. Finally, according to workers of financial institutions of taipei and taipei country proceeds investigation into their perspectives on three models. The result shows workers of financial institutions of taipei and taipei country consider principal-agent problems of “ to appoint the conglomerate of sponsor ” to be serious than “ to appoint the oringinator”, and principal-agent problems of “ to appoint the oringinator ” to be serious than “ to appoint the independent institution ”. It also means principal-agent problems of “real estate investment trusts” to be serious than “ real estate asset trusts”.
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Bogle, Timothy Norman. "Timber supply on public land in response to catastrophic natural disturbance: a principal-agent problem." Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/4333.
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Managing public forestland is a challenging enterprise as the government must steward the actions of private forest companies while simultaneously considering public values, natural disturbance, markets, revenue generation and environmental services. Governments use timber sales, volume-based, and area-based tenures to delegate forest harvesting activities to individual timber companies. By delegating forest management, government must wisely navigate the principal-agent relationship to avoid unexpected outcomes. However, the agents’ response is often overlooked despite the likelihood that the agents may possess company-centric financial motivations.
The British Columbia context, where the government is facing the aftermath of a catastrophic mountain pine beetle epidemic, provides a fruitful location for the study of the principal-agent dilemma. If forest companies share a future forest focus with the government, such that agents respond with actions that lead to the government’s first best outcome, the government could reduce policy analysis to an examination of the tradeoff between short-term revenue generation and sustainable differentiated product supply. But review of the silviculture funding mechanism reveals that the very regulatory mechanism used to achieve government’s results may affect the future forest estate by reducing the
amount of salvage once the value of the forest is degraded below the cost to harvest and regenerate it. Relying primarily on harvest-based silviculture funding, the principal is shown to forego a 20 per cent increase in forest growth in the study area by not using the agents’ forestry expertise to improve the long term productive potential of the forest.
A bi-level linear programming model is developed to merge the goals of government with the behavioural responses of the two predominant volume-based tenures used in BC. Results show that the government’s choice of harvest level, timber price and tenure instrument in recognition of agent response is the only way to achieve the government’s forest stewardship objective. Treating each element in isolation neglects the nature of the institutional system and will result not only in unintended outcomes, but very likely, policy failure.Graduate
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Liu, Bibo. "The mathematics of principal-agent problems." Thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/2518.
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The principal-agent problem is an important model in the field of Economics of Information. In this thesis we study only a particular type of principal-agent problem which is called moral hazard model and by the principal-agent problem we mean it is moral hazard model. The moral hazard model actually belongs to the class of bilevel programming problems in Mathematics. In Economics. the first order approach is used to reduce the principal-agent problem to a single level optimization problem. However, this approach is only valid under some strong conditions. Moreover the approach can only be used under the assumption that the optimal action of the principal-agent problem and its relaxed problem appears only at an interior point. In this thesis, we consider a new relaxed problem. Under more general assumptions. we can solve the principal-agent problem without restricting the optimal action of the agent to be in the interior.
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Xu, Rui-Teng, and 徐瑞騰. "Strategy Analysis for Agent Problems Derived From Multiple Principals and Multiple Agents." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/49180356719779656228.
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碩士朝陽科技大學
會計所
99
This research is conducted under the premise that it is quite common the ownership of the contemporary enterprise is separated from the right to operate; therefore under the circumstances that the owner and the operator are not the same person, i.e. the agent problem derived from both the principal and the agent who are all in the multiple status will be researched as result. This thesis intends to complement multiple vs. multiple agent models which have not been delved into within traditional literatures and proceed to in-depth findings, and explores the interactions between two principals and two agents respectively. Major conclusions of this research are: 1. When all productions are independent, when the profit for the principal is the distribution between share possessed between principals and agent output, the optimal incentive plan would be “individual compensation contracts”. 2. When both principals decide to jointly cooperate with each other, the marginal reward offered to the agent by principal should be equivalent to the marginal income for the principal; then, both principals can reach the goal of maximizing their joint profits. 3. Elasticity of demand in the market situation is big, the principals give the agent the agent''s reward and the output of a positive correlation. Elasticities of demand in the market situation is small, the principals give the agent the agent''s reward and the output of a negative correlation. When Elasticity of demand in the market situation is equal to 1, the principals give the agent reward, but the principals will lead to loss of profits. 4. When the principals hold shares will be taken into account when the cost of capital: (1) when profit is greater than the cost of Capital, following two results: (i) assume that the principals make decisions with the same time, the two principals hold of the shares will form two half principals hold shares in each situation. (ii) assuming two principals are not at the same time to make decisions, the principals will form a single case with a number of agents. (2) Conversely, when profit is less than the cost of Capital, the two principals do not hold shares. Finally, if the interest rate is set to share a function: (1)If Interest rate function first-order differential is greater than 0, profit is greater than the cost of Capital ,stock and z is internal solution (2) If Interest rate function first-order differential is less than 0 , profit is greater than the cost of Capital ,stock and z is internal solution. (3) If Interest rate function first-order differential is equal 0, this result is the same with the four propositions.