Relevant bibliographies by topics / Principal-Agent theory

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'Principal-Agent theory'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 25 July 2025

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'Principal-Agent theory.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "Principal-Agent theory"

1

Bobek, Michal. "Materiality and Principal - Agent Theory." Český finanční a účetní časopis 2014, no. 4 (2014): 149–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.cfuc.430.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Coletta, Damon. "Principal-agent theory in complex operations." Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 2 (2013): 306–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.778016.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Garen, John E. "Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory." Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 6 (1994): 1175–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261967.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Gauld, Robin. "PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE." Policy Studies 28, no. 1 (2007): 17–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01442870601121395.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

WULANSARI, Ajeng Septiana. "BLOCKCHAIN IMPLEMENTATION AND PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY." BUSINESS EXCELLENCE AND MANAGEMENT 13, no. 2 (2023): 97–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.24818/beman/2023.13.2-07.

Full text
Abstract:
One of the biggest issues in organization in centuries is problem raised by the relationship between actor inside. This problem called principal-agent problem which explained by principal agent theory (PAT). The emerged new technology disruption called blockchain technology (BCT) receive the challenge to offers the solution for principal agent problem, it claims empirically could reduce or even eliminate the problem, thus lead to lower cost to solved the problem, called agency cost. This technology application wide spread in several sectors, the example is the implementation of Decentralized A
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Hausken, Kjell. "Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle." Decision Analysis 16, no. 2 (2019): 105–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.2018.0380.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Malmir, Ameneh, Alireza Shirvani, Ali Rashidpour, and Iraj Soltani. "Citizen Relationship Management and Principal/Agent Theory." International Journal of Managing Value and Supply Chains 5, no. 3 (2014): 83–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5121/ijmvsc.2014.5307.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Popov, E., and V. Simonova. "Endogenous Opportunism in the Principal-Agent Theory." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 3 (March 20, 2005): 118–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2005-3-118-130.

Full text
Abstract:
The point of the article is studying basic problems of the firm institutional theory - opportunism behavior problem in a principal-agent relationship system on the firm level. The article is devoted to the analysis of the essence of opportunism as economic category, definition of basic forms of inside opportunism and estimation of their influence on performance of firms of the Ural region. Factors that influence the level of opportunism are classified.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Poth, Stephan, and Torsten J. Selck. "Principal Agent Theory and Artificial Information Asymmetry." Politics 29, no. 2 (2009): 137–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2009.01349.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Peterson, Steven A., and Amy M. Brofcak Hartz. "Principal-Agent Theory and Street Level Bureaucrats." School Psychology International 19, no. 3 (1998): 195–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0143034398193001.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Principal-Agent theory"

1

Bon, RJN. "Principal agent theory and blockchain technology: Smart contract applications." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2021. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/208427/1/Ramon_Bon_Thesis.pdf.

Full text
Abstract:
When economic agents have private information, the agents will be incentivised to use this information advantage by acting in a manner that does not always coincide with production and social efficiency, or the interests of the principal. This thesis investigates details specific to designing a contract with blockchain technology and smart contracts that consistently elicit efficiency and good behaviour with the best possible outcome for participating agents. We use the lens of the principal agent theory to show that implementing blockchain technology and smart contracts in contractual agreeme
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Hernández, Santibáñez Nicolas Iván. "Contributions to the principal-agent theory and applications in economics." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2017. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/148316.

Full text
Abstract:
Doctor en Ciencias de la Ingeniería, Mención Modelación Matemática En Cotutela con la Universidad Paris-Dauphine<br>En esta tésis se estudian aspectos teóricos del modelo de Agente-Principal y se presentan algunas aplicaciones en economía. En la primera parte de la tésis se presentan dos aplicaciones del modelo. En la primera, un proveedor de electricidad determina la tarifa óptima para cobrar a los clientes por su consumo. La población es heterogénea y el proveedor observa perfectamente el consumo de cada cliente. Esto conlleva a una situación de selección adversa sin riesgo moral. El p
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Hernández, Santibáñez Nicolás Iván. "Contributions to the principal-agent theory and applications in economics." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris Sciences et Lettres (ComUE), 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PSLED086.

Full text
Abstract:
Dans cette thèse, les aspects théoriques et les applications en économie du modèle Principal-Agent sont étudiés.La première partie de la thèse présente deux applications du modèle. Dans la première, un fournisseur d’électricité détermine le tarif de consommation optimal pour ses clients. La population est hétérogène et le fournisseur observe parfaitement la consommation des clients. Cela conduit à une sélection adverse sans aléa moral. Le problème du Principal s’écrit commeun problème variationnel non standard, qui peut être résolu sous certaines formes particulières de l’utilité de réservatio
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Kuhn, Kai-Uwe. "Principal-agent problems and commitment in imperfectly competitive markets." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.315884.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Banerjee, Anindya. "Information and contracts : a study of principal-agent relationships." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1987. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:62b32d23-b43f-4a1a-a4e0-8185e3104ecd.

Full text
Abstract:
This thesis is concentrated broadly in the field of mathematical industrial economics and more specifically upon what is known in the literature as principal-agent relationships. It focuses on investigating the nature of optimal contracts between, say, owners of the firm and the manager appointed by them to run the affairs of the firm or yet again between the owners and the workers employed in the firm. Chapter 1 introduces by first establishing the background of the analysis and then summarising the results of the thesis. The background consists mainly of implicit contract models, both of the
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Erixson, David, Emil Folkesson, and Elvira Hendeby. "Remuneration Programs : A Principal Agent Theory perspective of CEO Remuneration Programs." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Accounting and Finance, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-770.

Full text
Abstract:
<p>In the media today, remuneration programs to CEO’s are frequently discussed. Media are usually focusing on the large amounts paid out rather than why the companies use the programs. The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the conflict of interest presented by the Principal Agent Theory is affected by a CEO remuneration program.</p><p>To reach the purpose, an inductive method has been used. Questionnaires have been send out by e-mail and phone interviews have been carried out with two sample groups, one with remuneration programs, and one that do not use remuneration programs.</p><p
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Pate, Steven Shane. "The new deal for city management : a principal-agent theory policy analysis /." Read thesis online, 2007. http://library.uco.edu/UCOthesis/PateSS2007.pdf.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Dunn, Malcolm. "Inside the capitalist firm : an evolutionary theory of the principal agent-relation." Universität Potsdam, 2013. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2013/6515/.

Full text
Abstract:
This book deals with the inner life of the capitalist firm. There we find numerous conflicts, the most important of which concerns the individual employment relationship which is understood as a principal-agent problem between the manager, the principal, who issues orders that are to be followed by the employee, the agent. Whereas economic theory traditionally analyses this relationship from a (normative) perspective of the firm in order to support the manager in finding ways to influence the behavior of the employees, such that the latter – ideally – act on behalf of their superior, this book
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Andersson, Jens, Olle Karlsson, and Mattias Pettersson. "Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv." Thesis, Malmö universitet, Fakulteten för kultur och samhälle (KS), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-21661.

Full text
Abstract:
Titel: Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv Universitet: Malmö Universitet Kurs: TR128C – Företagsekonomi: Examensarbete i Transport Management Författare: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Handledare: Benedikte Borgström Nyckelord: Agentteori, agentproblem, måldivergens, informationsasymmetri, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmerbarhet Syfte: Att utifrån ett principal-agent-perspektiv studera hur relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare i den studerade miljön påverkas av förekomsten av informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder, s
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Pignatti, Erika <1977&gt. "Principal-Agent Theory: un'applicazione nel sistema italiano di certificazione dei prodotti da agricoltura biologica." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2007. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/160/1/TESI-Pignatti.pdf.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Books on the topic "Principal-Agent theory"

1

Zou, Liang. Essays in principal-agent theory. CIACO, 1989.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Rey, Patrick. Vertical restraints from a principal-agent viewpoint. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Zhang, Weiying. A principal-agent theory of the public economy. City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, 1997.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

1947-, Laffont Jean-Jacques, ed. The principal agent model: The economic theory of incentives. E. Elgar Pub., 2003.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Leruth, Luc. A principal-agent theory approach to public expenditure management systems in developing countries. International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept. and Offices in Europe, 2006.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Balke, Nils J. Fuzzy Agency-Theorie: Anwendung von Konzepten der Fuzzy Set-Theorie auf Principal-Agent-Probleme. Duncker & Humblot, 2004.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Schneider, Udo. Theorie und Empirie der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Zur Anwendung der Principal-Agent-Theorie auf die Gesundheitsnachfrage. Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2018.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Anthony, Scott. Agency, incentives and the behaviour of general practitioners: The relevance of principal agent theory in designing incentives for GPs in the UK. Health Economics Research Unit, University of Aberdeen, 1996.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Martimort, David, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Martimort, David, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2001.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "Principal-Agent theory"

1

Schneeweiss, Christoph. "Principal Agent Theory." In Distributed Decision Making. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24724-1_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Bernhold, Torben, and Niklas Wiesweg. "Principal-agent theory." In A Handbook of Management Theories and Models for Office Environments and Services. Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003128786-10.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Spremann, Klaus. "Agent and Principal." In Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Cvitanić, Jakša, and Jianfeng Zhang. "Principal–Agent Problem." In Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14200-0_1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

van Thiel, Sandra. "A Principal-Agent Perspective." In Theory and Practice of Public Sector Reform. Routledge, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315714141-4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Gauld, Robin. "Principal-Agent Theory of Organizations." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20928-9_72.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Gauld, Robin. "Principal-Agent Theory of Organizations." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_72-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Gauld, Robin. "Principal-Agent Theory of Organizations." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66252-3_72.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Firchau, Volker. "Information Systems for Principal-Agent Problems." In Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-75060-1_5.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Oren, Sigal, and Dolav Soker. "Principal-Agent Problems with Present-Biased Agents." In Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_16.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "Principal-Agent theory"

1

"Study on Principal-agent Theory." In 2019 Scientific Conference on Management, Education and Psychology. The Academy of Engineering and Education (AEE), 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.35532/jsss.v1.015.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Yan Zhao and Ying Lu. "Principal-agent theory in venture business." In 2008 Chinese Control and Decision Conference (CCDC). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ccdc.2008.4597838.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Liu, Yang, Zhikui Chen, and Xiaoning Lv. "Principal-Agent Theory Model in Dynamic Spectrum Sharing." In 4th IEEE Int'l Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (CPSCom). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ithings/cpscom.2011.7.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Chen, Xueqing. "Principal-agent Theory and Its Application to Administrative Management." In Proceedings of the 2017 5th International Education, Economics, Social Science, Arts, Sports and Management Engineering Conference (IEESASM 2017). Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/ieesasm-17.2018.86.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Wu, Baiqing, Gang Wu, Yun Li, and Lan-Fang Chen. "Applying the Principal-Agent Theory for Reverse Logistics Outsourcing." In Second International Conference on Transportation Engineering. American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/41039(345)250.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Haiyan, Wang, and Tu Min. "Reverse Logistics Outsourcing Model Based on Principal-Agent Theory." In 2010 International Conference on Optoelectronics and Image Processing (ICOIP). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icoip.2010.98.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Xu-bo, Zhang, and Zhang Zi-gang. "A Venture Investment Principal-agent Model Base on Game Theory." In 2007 IEEE International Conference on Automation and Logistics. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ical.2007.4338718.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Hu, Linlin. "Research on Prefabricated Building Promotion Based on Principal-Agent Theory." In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Economic and Business Management (FEBM 2018). Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/febm-18.2018.76.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Zhang, Yan-Fu, Hong-Qing Zhang, and Lin Liu. "The DSM Optimal Incentive Mechanism Based on Principal-Agent Theory." In 2008 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wicom.2008.2990.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Fei Xiao. "Logistics Finance incentive mechanism design based on principal-agent theory." In 2011 International Symposium on Information Technology in Medicine and Education (ITME 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/itime.2011.6130748.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "Principal-Agent theory"

1

Antic, Nemanj, Ameet Morjaria, and Miguel Ángel Talamas Marcos. Preliminary Findings: Task Clarity and Credibility in Relational Contracts. Inter-American Development Bank, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0013146.

Full text
Abstract:
We develop and test a relational contracting model where building relationships requires the principal and agent to solve task clarity and credibility problems. We model task clarity as the likelihood of the agent finding a productive action for the principal and demonstrate that it influences the agents propensity to fulfill promises the usual notion of credibility in relational contracts. This is because improving task clarity increases the ease of replacing a relationship after a defection, making defection more tempting. We validate our model using a decade of administrative data from the
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Boix, Carles, Alícia Adserà, and J. Mark Payne. Are You Being Served?: Political Accountability and Quality of Government. Inter-American Development Bank, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010787.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper explores, both formally and empirically, the political accountability mechanisms that lie behind the varying levels of public corruption and of effective governance taking place across nations. The first section develops a principal-agent model in which good governance is a function of the extent to which citizens can hold political officials accountable for their actions. Although policy-makers may have strong incentives to appropriate parts of the citizens' income, well-designed institutions (those increasing both informational flows and elite competitiveness) boost political acco
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Moore, Mark, and Marla Spivack. A Public Value Approach to Analyzing and Intervening in National Educational Systems. Research on Improving Systems of Education (RISE), 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.35489/bsg-rise-misc_2023/10.

Full text
Abstract:
Any analysis of a “National Educational System” reveals a highly complex social production system that is neither a hierarchical organization, nor a market, nor simply a misaligned system of principals and agents. It is, instead, a complex array of social actors bound together through various social structures and processes on one hand, and important functional relationships on the other. In approaching the challenge of moving that system towards sustained productivity gains, national governments naturally fall prey to the assumption that, in the principal/agent framework they are the principa
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'Principal-Agent theory' for particular source types:
Journal articles Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography