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Books on the topic 'Principal-Agent theory'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 25 July 2025

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1

Zou, Liang. Essays in principal-agent theory. CIACO, 1989.

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2

Rey, Patrick. Vertical restraints from a principal-agent viewpoint. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1985.

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3

Zhang, Weiying. A principal-agent theory of the public economy. City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, 1997.

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4

1947-, Laffont Jean-Jacques, ed. The principal agent model: The economic theory of incentives. E. Elgar Pub., 2003.

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5

Leruth, Luc. A principal-agent theory approach to public expenditure management systems in developing countries. International Monetary Fund, Fiscal Affairs Dept. and Offices in Europe, 2006.

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6

Balke, Nils J. Fuzzy Agency-Theorie: Anwendung von Konzepten der Fuzzy Set-Theorie auf Principal-Agent-Probleme. Duncker & Humblot, 2004.

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7

Schneider, Udo. Theorie und Empirie der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Zur Anwendung der Principal-Agent-Theorie auf die Gesundheitsnachfrage. Peter Lang International Academic Publishers, 2018.

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8

Anthony, Scott. Agency, incentives and the behaviour of general practitioners: The relevance of principal agent theory in designing incentives for GPs in the UK. Health Economics Research Unit, University of Aberdeen, 1996.

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9

Martimort, David, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2009.

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10

Martimort, David, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2001.

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11

The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2001.

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12

Martimort, David, and Jean-Jacques Laffont. The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press, 2002.

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13

Comparative politics: The principal-agent perspective. Routledge, 2007.

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14

Lane, Jan-Erik. Comparative Politics: The Principal-Agent Perspective. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.

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15

Lane, Jan-Erik. Comparative Politics: The Principal-Agent Perspective. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.

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16

Lane, Jan-Erik. Comparative Politics: The Principal-Agent Perspective. Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.

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17

Lane, Jan-Erik. Comparative Politics: The Principal-Agent Perspective. Taylor & Francis Group, 2007.

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18

Principal-Agent-Theory Within the Context of Economic Sciences. Books on Demand GmbH, 2008.

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19

Leruth, Luc E., and Elisabeth Paul. Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund, 2006.

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20

Leruth, Luc E., and Elisabeth Paul. Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund, 2006.

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21

Leruth, Luc E., and Elisabeth Paul. Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund, 2006.

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22

Inside the capitalist firm: An evolutionary theory of the principal agent-relation. Potsdam University Press, 2013.

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23

Clark, Gordon L., and Ashby H. B. Monk. Outsourcing and the Principal–Agent Problem. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198793212.003.0009.

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Chapter 9 relates the conventional model of pension-fund governance and management to the theory and practice of investment. It recommends that the search for an alternative is due. Outsourcing is discussed as an alternative to insourcing. Rather than managing providers through service contracts insourcing utilizes employment contracts with terms and conditions reflecting the objectives of the organization and the market premium available to those with skills and expertise. An alternative model of pension-fund governance and management is introduced. This chapter tables the ways in which the o

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24

Principal Agent Theory in Verbindung Mit Sozial Motivierten Peer-To-Peer Banking Plattformen. GRIN Verlag GmbH, 2013.

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25

Erfolgsabhängige Anreizsysteme in ein- und zweistufigen Hierarchien: Ein Beitrag zur Principal-Agent-Theorie. Physica-Verlag, 1990.

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26

Lane, Jan-Erik. Comparative Politics: The principal-agent perspective (Routledge Research in Comparative Politics). Routledge, 2007.

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27

Fraser, Robert W. Applications of Principal-Agent Theory to Agricultural Land Use Policy: Lessons from the European Union. Imperial College Press, 2015.

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28

Schneider, Udo. Theorie und Empirie der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Zur Anwendung der Principal-Agent-Theorie Auf Die Gesundheitsnachfrage. Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften, Peter, 2018.

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29

Laffont, Jean-Jacques. The Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives (The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series, 162). Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003.

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30

Hieckmann, Linda. Das Betriebliche Vorschlagswesen als Instrument zur Mitarbeitermotivation in der Industrie- und Handelskammer XY: Eine empirische Fallstudie auf Grundlage der Principal Agent Theory. GRIN Verlag GmbH, 2010.

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31

Theorie Und Empirie Der Arzt-Patient-Beziehung: Zur Anwendung Der Principal-Agent-Theorie Auf Die Gesundheitsnachfrage (Allokation Im Marktwirtschaftlichen System). Peter Lang Publishing, 2002.

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32

Department of Defense. National Security Council and Synchronization for Multi-Domain Operations - Terror War, Goldwater-Nichols Act, Principal-Agent Theory, Smartpower, Forecasting, Talent Management, Operational Void. Independently Published, 2019.

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33

Kenny, Paul D. A Theory of Populist Success in Patronage Democracies. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198807872.003.0003.

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This chapter details the theory and sets up the predictions to be tested. Drawing on principal–agent theory and social network theory, it argues that in patronage democracies an increase in broker autonomy weakens the ties between parties and voters as it exacerbates conflicts of interest between central leaders and subnational brokers. The main hypothesis is that in patronage democracies where subnational brokers have greater autonomy from central leadership, fragmentation of the party-system between national and subnational levels is likely, resulting in populists successfully appealing dire

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34

Motivation and Punishment of Referees In Non-Professional Football: An Analysis of Existing Problems and the Development of Solution Strategies with Particular Regard to the Principal-Agent Theory. Diplomica Verlag, 2010.

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35

Henschel, Eduard. Credit Default Swaps in der Finanzkrise: Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungen und Einflüsse und Darstellung systemrelevanter Kritikpunkte anhand der Principal Agent Theory, sowie die Bewertung unterschiedlicher Ansätze von Regulierungsmaßnahmen. GRIN Verlag GmbH, 2009.

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36

Honig, Dan. Agents. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190672454.003.0003.

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This chapter discusses agent judgment and when relying on agents will be a more or less reliable strategy. The chapter explores agent motivation and why it is critical to successful Navigation by Judgment. Agent motivation is a function of both treatment and selection effects. Job design can play an important role in changing agent motivation for better or for worse (treatment); job design can also prompt differential exit and entry of motivated agents into international development organizations (IDOs) (selection). It argues that there may be different equilibria IDOs can meet, with a Theory

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37

Linder, Stefan, Nicolai J. Foss, and Diego Stea. Epistemics at Work. Edited by Michael A. Hitt, Susan E. Jackson, Salvador Carmona, Leonard Bierman, Christina E. Shalley, and Douglas Michael Wright. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190650230.013.8.

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Agency theory studies the impact of and remedies to asymmetrically distributed information in principal-agent relations. Yet, it does so in a surprisingly binary manner: It assumes the principal to be perfectly knowledgeable of some pieces of information (such as the agent’s risk aversion), while others (such as the agent’s true effort exerted) are considered to be perfectly private information of the agent. Agency theory thus makes highly asymmetrical assumptions about the knowledge of principals and agents, largely neglecting the role of individual differences in the human capacity to read o

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38

Roderick, Munday. 9 Legal Relations Between Principal and Agent: Rights of the Agent against the Principal. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784685.003.0009.

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This chapter examines the three principal rights enjoyed by the agent specific to the principal–agent relationship. The first is the agent’s entitlement to remuneration: if it is a term of the contract, the agent will be entitled to remuneration in accordance with what the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed in their contract. Alternatively, the agent may be entitled to recover from the principal on the basis of a quantum meruit. Next is the right to indemnity: regardless of whether or not there is a contract, an agent is entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred and losses occas

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39

Roderick, Munday. 8 Legal Relations Between Principal and Agent: Duties the Agent Owes to his Principal. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784685.003.0008.

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This chapter describes the duties the agent owes to his principal, which fall into two broad categories. On the one hand, because the majority of agencies will arise out of a contract between principal and agent, the latter will owe well recognized duties at common law—most notably, a duty to perform the mandate with reasonable skill and care. On the other hand, however, equity also wields strong influence over the development of agents’ duties. Therefore, agents have often to be considered both as contracting parties, under customary contractual duties to their principals, and also as fiducia

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40

Brandsma, Gijs Jan, and Jens Blom-Hansen. Theorizing Delegation and Control Regimes in the EU. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198767909.003.0002.

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This chapter presents the book’s theoretical argument. Building on the delegation literature and principal-agent theory, it argues that legislative principals delegate to reduce transaction costs. However, they delegate with hesitance because they fear that delegated powers may be used for unintended purposes. This dilemma between efficiency and control is partly resolved by installing monitoring mechanisms. However, since control implies influence on future decisions to be made by the agent, the principals are likely to disagree on their exact design. There is therefore a ‘multiple principals

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41

Public administration and public management: The principal-agent perspective. Routledge, 2005.

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42

Roderick, Munday. 11 The Tortious Liabilities of Principal and Agent. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784685.003.0011.

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This chapter examines the personal liabilities incurred by both principals and agents for the torts they commit. An agent is personally liable for torts committed in the course of the agency that occasion damage to a third party, irrespective of whether the agent was acting within or outside the principal’s authority. The tortious liability of the principal is more varied. A principal is personally liable for torts which the agent has been authorized to commit. In addition, the principal is also vicariously liable for torts committed by the agent in the course of employment. Finally, as in the

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43

Roderick, Munday. 12 Legal Relations Between Agent and Third Party. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784685.003.0012.

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This chapter explores the legal relations between the agent and the third party. An agent acting for a disclosed principal (named or unnamed) normally can neither sue nor be sued by the third party on contracts concluded on behalf of that principal. In cases of disclosed agency, the object is to bring principal and third party into direct contractual relations. At this point, the agent customarily drops out of the transaction, neither acquiring rights against the third party nor incurring liability to the third party. There are, however, a number of exceptions to the general rule that an agent

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44

MacDonald, Jason. Terry M. Moe, “The New Economics of Organization”. Edited by Martin Lodge, Edward C. Page, and Steven J. Balla. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199646135.013.8.

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This chapter focuses on Terry Moe’s 1984 paper “The New Economics of Organization”, which offers an in-depth analysis of Congressional and presidential influence on the bureaucracy and suggests that these institutions, as well as their officeholders, have the incentive to influence bureaucratic policy. Moe urges scholars of public bureaucracy to emulate economists who study why firms exist in the marketplace. This chapter examines Moe’s main ideas on topics ranging from principal-agent theory to agency losses, the ability of political principals to effectively employ contract design to specify

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45

Dutta, Shantanu, Arup Ganguly, and Lin Ge. The Economics of Hedge Funds. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190607371.003.0002.

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For anyone interested in investments, fascination with hedge funds is almost inevitable. This enthusiasm occurs because amid the ocean of dismal performances in the asset management industry, top-performing hedge funds still manage to garner unbelievable returns even during economic downturns. This chapter explores the economics behind these supersecretive alternative investment vehicles and finds that their functioning can be broadly explained through four different economic paradigms: (1) the principal-agent framework, (2) the adaptive market hypothesis, (3) the governance framework, and (4)

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46

Roderick, Munday. 3 The Actual Authority of the Agent. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784685.003.0003.

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This chapter is an overview of the ‘actual authority’ of the agent. ‘Actual authority’ refers to authority the agent possesses either because the principal has expressly conferred that authority upon the agent (‘express actual authority’) or because the law regards the authority as having been conferred upon the agent by necessary implication (‘implied actual authority’). It is famously defined as a legal relationship between principal and agent created by a consensual agreement to which they alone are parties. As a practical matter, the ‘actual authority’ of an agent is customarily contrasted

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47

Thomas, Krebs. Ch.2 Formation and authority of agents, s.2: Authority of agents, Art.2.2.5. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198702627.003.0044.

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This commentary focuses on Article 2.2.5 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning agents acting without, or exceeding their, authority. Art 2.2.5 stipulates that where an agent acts without authority or exceeds its authority, its acts do not affect the legal relations between the principal and the third party. However, where the principal causes the third party reasonably to believe that the agent has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that the agent is acting within the scope of that authority, the principal may not invoke against the thi

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48

Die Steuerung des Vorstandshandelns: Eine rechtsökonomische Untersuchung der Principal-Agent-Problematik in Publikumskapitalgesellschaften. C.H. Beck, 2007.

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49

Roderick, Munday. 6 Ratification. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784685.003.0006.

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This chapter concerns the ratification of unauthorized acts. The doctrine of ratification is concerned with acts performed without authority by an agent in the name of a principal. In short, ratification occurs whenever the ratifying party clearly manifests that he has adopted the unauthorized transaction effected by his agent purportedly on his behalf. There is no requirement that this intention must be communicated either to the third party or to the agent. Express ratification is self-explanatory. Implied ratification, however, will take place where either the conduct of the principal or th

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50

Gormley, Bill. James Q. Wilson,. Edited by Martin Lodge, Edward C. Page, and Steven J. Balla. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199646135.013.2.

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This chapter examines James Q. Wilson’sBureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do it, and compares Wilson’s approach to that of neoclassical economics, paying particular attention to his denunciation of William Niskanen’s “bureaucratic imperialism” hypothesis and his rejection of “principal-agent” models which predict widespread “shirking” by bureaucrats. It discusses his argument that every bureaucracy has a distinctive culture that helps shape the behavior of individual bureaucrats. The chapter explores Wilson’s other views with regards to “capture theory,” accountability, and

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