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Aguiar González, Fernando. "Justicia distributiva : Distributive Justice." EUNOMÍA. Revista en Cultura de la Legalidad, no. 17 (September 27, 2019): 207. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/eunomia.2019.5025.
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Resumen: En este artículo se realiza un breve recorrido por las teorías de la justicia distributiva más influyentes, partiendo de John Rawls y terminando con los principios propuestos por Martha Nussbaum para el desarrollo de una justicia global. En ese recorrido veremos cómo responden esas teorías a tres preguntas: qué se distribuye, cómo se distribuye y entre quiénes se distribuye. Esto nos permitirá comparar sus fundamentos y sus principios de distribución justa, así como comprender mejor sus límites. Palabras clave: bienes primarios, capacidades, comunidad, igualdad, justicia global, principio de diferencia, renta básica, suerte, utilitarismo. Abstract: This article offers a brief overview of the most influential theories of distributive justice, starting with John Rawls and ending up with Martha Nussbaum´s principles for a global justice. Along this way we will see how they answer these three questions: what to distribute, how it is distributed and among whom it is distributed. This will allow us to compare its foundations and principles of fair distribution, as well as to better understand its limits. Keywords: basic income, capabilities, community, difference principle, equality, global justice, luck, primary goods, utilitarianism.
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Brodeur, Jean-Paul. "Justice distributive et justice rétributive." Articles 24, no. 1 (August 7, 2007): 71–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/027425ar.
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RÉSUMÉ Cet article examine les positions de John Rawls par rapport à la justice retributive (pénale). Nous soutenons d'abord que la perspective de Rawls est éclectique par rapport aux deux polarités exemplaires de la justice pénale soit, en première part, celle du rétributivisme et de l'utilitarisme, et, en seconde part, celle du déontologisme et du conséquentialisme. L'examen des textes révèle que la pensée de Rawls conjugue des éléments qui la qualifient à la fois comme rétributiviste et déontologiste et d'autres qui la rapprochent de l'utilitarisme et du conséquentialisme. Les positions de Rawls sont ensuite scrutées à la lumière des résultats récents de la recherche empirique sur la justice pénale. Nous soutenons alors que la conception rawlsienne de la justice pénale comme un processus sanctionnateur de nature strictement réactive fpost factoj ne peut se concilier avec les aspects pro-actifs de plus en plus affirmés de ce type de justice. On suggère enfin que le principe de Rawls que l'inégalité n'est légitime que lorsqu'elle profite aux plus défavorisés n'a que peu d'application au sein de la justice pénale, dont la cible première est précisément constituée par les pauvres et les sans-pouvoirs.
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Baumrucker, Steven J., Matt Stolick, Paige Mingle, Karrie A. Oertli, Gerald M. Morris, and Gregg VandeKieft. "The Principle of Distributive Justice." American Journal of Hospice and Palliative Medicine® 29, no. 2 (January 12, 2012): 151–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1049909111433307.
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O'Brian, W. E. "Distributive Justice and the Sovereignty Principle." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. 1 (December 1, 2010): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqq032.
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GUIBET LAFAYE, CAROLINE. "Quelle théorie de la justice pour l’épigénétique?" Dialogue 54, no. 3 (July 28, 2015): 489–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217315000657.
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L’épigénétique dévoile les mécanismes biologiques sous-jacents à la reproduction, voire à la transmission des inégalités sociales de santé, et souligne la complexité des facteurs intervenant dans le développement de certaines pathologies. Cette complexité semble poser des difficultés inédites aux théories de la justice. Nous dessinons les contours d’une «justice épigénétique» en appréhendant d’abord les questions que l’épigénétique pose aux théories de la justice distributive. Le modèle de l’égalité des chances est-il le plus approprié pour saisir ces questions? Nous montrons que l’épigénétique ne peut être pensée qu’à partir d’un modèle de justice plurifactoriel. Selon la perspective adoptée (individuelle, populationnelle, intergénérationnelle), le principe de justice pertinent est distinct.
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Greenacre, Matthew, and Katherine Fleshner. "Distributive justice in disaster triage." University of Western Ontario Medical Journal 86, no. 1 (August 29, 2017): 35–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5206/uwomj.v86i1.2162.
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Disasters that produce an overwhelming number of casualties demand that healthcare resources be rationed. Given the gravity of these decisions, it is imperative that they be guided by acceptable principles of distributive justice. Utilitarianism governs current disaster triage protocols because the efficient use of resources prevents the greatest amount of disability and mortality in the population. However, this conflicts with maximin egalitarianism, which demands that the most severely injured patients be prioritized even if it is not an efficient use of resources. Utilitarian triage also conflicts with the egalitarian principle of equal chances, which states that all people should be given an opportunity to be given treatment since all persons value their lives equally. Utilitarianism protects the needs of the entire population, and so demands that an individual patient’s right to autonomy and a fiduciary relationship with their physician must be sacrificed. Like other policies in a democratic society, the legitimacy of disaster triage protocols comes from support by the majority. For this reason, choosing the values that guide disaster triage requires open and transparent communal disaster planning that reflects the values of all members of society. Rather than prioritizing one principle over another, it is likely that the most just approach to allocating resources in disaster triage may be to apply a mixture of distributive justice principles.
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Brigati, Roberto. "Desert as a principle of distributive justice." Philosophy & Social Criticism 40, no. 7 (June 4, 2014): 705–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453714536434.
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Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Cheryl L. Eavey. "Laboratory Results on Rawls's Distributive Justice." British Journal of Political Science 17, no. 1 (January 1987): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400004580.
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The behavioural underpinnings of Rawls's notion of distributive justice as outlined in A Theory of Justice are tested in experimental contexts. Under conditions approximating Rawls's ‘original position’ (including the appropriate agenda, a ‘veil of ignorance’ and a choice rule designed to capture his main theoretical constraints), we test his ‘predictions’ that individuals would reach a unanimous consensus on a principle of distributive justice and would select the difference principle: a principle that maximizes the welfare of the worst-off individual in the society. This view is contrasted with our belief, that any general concern for fairness (or distributive justice) will take a different form: one that both attempts to take into account several values and pays attention to cardinal rather than ordinal measures of utility. Our results strongly indicate that individuals are capable of reaching consensus but that they choose what Rawls has called an ‘intuitionistic’ principle which attempts to take into account not only the position of the worst-off individual but the potential expected gain for the rest of society. The overwhelmingly preferred principle is maximizing the average income with a floor constraint.
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Robinson, Paul H. "A Truce in Criminal Law’s Distributive Principle Wars?" New Criminal Law Review 23, no. 4 (2020): 565–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2020.23.4.565.
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Crime-control utilitarians and retributivist philosophers have long been at war over the appropriate distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment, with little apparent possibility of reconciliation between the two. In the utilitarians’ view, the imposition of punishment can be justified only by the practical benefit that it provides: avoiding future crime. In the retributivists’ view, doing justice for past wrongs is a value in itself that requires no further justification. The competing approaches simply use different currencies: fighting future crime versus doing justice for past wrongs. It is argued here that the two are in fact reconcilable, in a fashion. We cannot declare a winner in the distributive principle wars but something more like a truce. Specifically, good utilitarians ought to support a distributive principle based upon desert because the empirical evidence suggests that doing justice for past wrongdoing is likely the most effective and efficient means of controlling future crime. A criminal justice system perceived by the community as conflicting with its principles of justice provokes resistance and subversion, whereas a criminal justice system that earns a reputation for reliably doing justice is one whose moral credibility inspires deference, assistance, and acquiescence, and is more likely to have citizens internalize its norms of what is truly condemnable conduct. Retributivists ought to support empirical desert as a distributive principle because, while it is indeed distinct from deontological desert, there exists an enormous overlap between the two, and it seems likely that empirical desert may be the best practical approximation of deontological desert. Indeed, some philosophers would argue that the two are necessarily the same.
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Karelis, Charles. "Distributive Justice and the Public Good." Economics and Philosophy 2, no. 1 (April 1986): 101–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s026626710000081x.
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Many philosophers and some economists value economic equality on the ground that transfers from the relatively rich to the relatively poor increase the utility of the poor more than they reduce the utility of the rich. These philosophers and economists are assuming the ethical principle that a pattern of economic distribution is justified by maximizing aggregate utility. They are also assuming the truth of an empirical generalization proposed in the eighteenth century by Daniel Bernoulli–that successive equal increments of income produce ever-diminishing increments in an individual's level of utility. In the first part of this essay I will argue against Bernoulli's hypothesis, and suggest an alternative view of the relation between income and utility.
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Strike, Kenneth. "Charter schools, choice, and distributive justice: What evidence do we need?" Theory and Research in Education 8, no. 1 (March 2010): 63–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477878509356343.
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This article looks at charter schools from the perspective of distributive justice. It suggests three principles of distributive justice that should be satisfied by schools: the adequacy principle, the equity principle, and the communicative principle. It also sketches the justice argument for charter schools and uses the three principles to examine it. The focus of the article concerns the kinds of evidence required to decide if charter schools promote distributive justice. It argues that a focus on distributive justice helps to formulate a suitably broad view of what evidence is required that serves as a corrective to the excessive emphasis on test scores that characterizes much of the empirical work on school reform. The article also considers the claim that charter schools are more effective than other public schools because they create competition. It argues that an alternative explanation of their (alleged) success is that they are more communal.
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Hamric, Ann B. "Case Commentary." Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 9, no. 1 (January 2000): 131–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0963180100241133.
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Ethics raises questions about what kind of society we ought to be, questions that are at the heart of this case. Increasingly, inequalities in healthcare fueled by lack of access, inadequate insurance coverage, and rising costs are creating dilemmas in the proper distribution of healthcare resources. Questions of distributing scarce and valuable resources are fundamentally questions of justice. The classic definition of justice is the duty to give to each person what they deserve and can legitimately claim so that justice is understood as a moral obligation to help persons exercise their rights. Distributive justice, i.e., what distribution of resources is fair, equitable, and appropriate, thus turns on the concept of rights. One of the key questions in this case is whether and to what extent this patient has a right to treatment for his heart disease. In the classic understanding of justice, he must assert and we as a society must agree that he has a right to treatment for his heart condition before we are morally obligated to provide this care. Are there limits to this patient's right to healthcare? If so, what are they? The differing principles of distributive justice use different criteria to rank or weight decisions regarding the proper and just distribution of healthcare services. In this case, at least two competing but ethically valid principles can be identified: the humanitarian principle and the libertarian principle.
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Blythe, Mark. "The Means to Social Justice: Accounting for Functional Capabilities in the Rawlsian Approach." Canadian Journal of Political Science 41, no. 4 (December 2008): 1003–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423908081146.
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Abstract. In developing his theory “Justice as Fairness,” John Rawls imagined a hypothetical initial situation designed to yield principles of justice to regulate society's main institutions, or what he called the “basic structure.” The positing of citizens as fully capable in this hypothetical “original position” allowed Rawls to consider advantage in terms of the primary social goods (all-purpose means) a citizen held. Rawls reasoned that the representatives of free and equal citizens would design principles of justice that yield equal liberties and “a fair equality of opportunity,” while ensuring that permissible inequalities are those which “contribute effectively to the benefit of the least-advantaged” citizens (2001: 64). This essay considers two criticisms of the Rawlsian approach to distributive justice made by capability theorists (principally, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum). Sen's criticism is that primary social goods will not be equally usable by citizens because of variances in functional capabilities. Extending Sen's criticism, Nussbaum argues that disadvantaged citizens are not represented in the selection of the principles of justice, and this is problematic for a theory that emphasizes a fair equality of opportunity, especially for society's least advantaged members. This paper argues that the Rawlsian approach can successfully respond to and accommodate these concerns. The main ideas are as follows: (1) The representatives in “the original position” are to represent the known range of citizen capability rather than the normal range. (2) Rawls's two principles of justice would still be chosen, but these would be preceded by a lexically prior principle of basic citizen capabilities, which Rawls characterized as the “two moral powers” (rationality and reasonableness). (3) The desirability of other functional capabilities (those which enable persons to use primary social goods to realize their ends) and their development are to be publicly debated.Résumé. En développant sa théorie dans «La justice comme équité» John Rawls a imaginé une situation initiale hypothétique, conçue de telle sorte qu'elle produise des principes de justice régissant les principales institutions de la société, ou ce qu'il a appelé «la structure de base». Le positionnement des citoyens comme jouissant de toutes leurs capacités dans cette «position originelle» hypothétique a permis à Rawls de considérer la notion d'avantage en termes de biens sociaux primaires (moyens adéquats à tous les buts) détenus par le citoyen ou la citoyenne. Rawls maintenait alors que les représentants de citoyens égaux et libres concevraient des principes de justice produisant des libertés égales et une «juste égalité des chances», et ceci tout en s'assurant que les inégalités permises soient celles qui «bénéficient efficacement aux [citoyens] les moins avantagés» (2001 : 64). Cet article considère deux critiques faites à l'approche Rawlsienne de la justice distributive par les théoriciens des capacités (notamment Amartya Sen et Martha Nussbaum). La critique de Sen objecte que les biens sociaux primaires ne seront pas une égalité utilisable par les citoyens à cause des variations de leurs capacités fonctionnelles. Poursuivant la critique de Sen, Nussbaum montre que les citoyens désavantagés ne sont pas représentés lors de la sélection des principes de justice, ce qui est est problématique pour une théorie qui met l'accent sur une juste égalité des chances, en particulier pour les membres les plus défavorisés de la société. Le présent article soutient que l'approche Rawlsienne peut répondre avec succès à ces objections et s'en accommoder. Les idées principales suivantes seront développées : (1) les représentants dans la position originelle sont censés représenter l'éventail connu des capacités des citoyens plutôt que l'éventail normal; (2) les deux principes de justice de Rawls seraient toujours choisis, mais ceux-ci seraient alors précédés par un principe, lexicalement prioritaire, de capacités de base des citoyens, principe que Rawls a caractérisé comme les deux pouvoirs moraux (rationnel et raisonnable) (3) La désirabilité des autres capacités fonctionnelles (celles qui donnent aux personnes la possibilité d'user de biens sociaux primaires afin de réaliser leurs fins) et leur développement sont des questions qui doivent être débattues publiquement.
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Yulianingsih, Indra. "DIMENSI KEADILAN PENGELOLAAN PERIKANAN TANGKAP DALAM PERSPEKTIF OTONOMI DAERAH." Yuridika 32, no. 1 (August 23, 2017): 57. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/ydk.v32i1.4823.
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The enactment of Act No. 23 Year 2014 on Regional Government revised the Article 18 paragraph (1) of Act No. 32 of 2004 and caused the authority of local governments in the exploration and exploitation of resources in the sea area not applicable anymore. The impact of this change is the difficulty of local authorities to ensure the welfare and/or the prosperity of communities in the coastal areas that lead to injustice in the realization of people's constitutional rights. Legal issues discussed in this paper are the principle of distributive justice on the management of fishery resources in the autonomous region and the application of the principle of distributive justice on fisheries management in the autonomous region. The principle of distributive justice in an effort to fisheries management is based on several principles: the principle of utility, justice, solidarity, equity and sustainable development. Distributive justice serves as the basis of government policies to the people. The studies of state policy on regional autonomy could delegate that policy through local governments. This should be an opportunity for the region to manage natural resources in order to accelerate the achievement of well-being, especially in the regions.
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Heath, Joseph. "Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 31 (2005): 193–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2005.10716854.
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Critical response to John Rawls's The Law of Peopleshas been surprisingly harsh) Most of the complaints centre on Rawls's claim that there are no obligations of distributive justice among nations. Many of Rawls's critics evidently had been hoping for a global application of the difference principle, so that wealthier nations would be bound to assign lexical priority to the development of the poorest nations, or perhaps the primary goods endowment of the poorest citizens of any nation. Their subsequent disappointment reveals that, while the reception of Rawls's political philosophy has been very broad, it has not been especially deep. Rawls has very good reason for denying that there are obligations of distributive justice in an international context.
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Knoll, Manuel. "La giustizia distributiva tra Platone e Aristotele = Distributive Justice in Plato and Aristotle." ΠΗΓΗ/FONS 3, no. 1 (June 7, 2019): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2019.4550.
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Riassunto: Secondo l’opinione prevalente tra gli studiosi di lingua tedesca, bisogna considerare Aristotele come colui che ha “scoperto” la giustizia particolare. Questo articolo dimostra che quest’opinione è errata, innanzitutto perché Platone aveva già precedentemente sviluppato, nella Repubblica e nelle Leggi, la dottrina della giustizia distributiva e il suo principio di uguaglianza geometrica o proporzionale. In un primo momento, l’articolo interpreta la dottrina della giustizia distributiva esposta da Aristotele nell’Etica Nicomachea e nella Politica. In un secondo momento, si mostra che i principali elementi di questa dottrina erano già stati sviluppati da Platone nelle Leggi. Infine, l’articolo offre un’interpretazione innovativa del concetto di giustizia presentato da Platone nella Repubblica.Parole chiave: Platone, Aristotele, giustizia distributiva, Repubblica, Leggi.Abstract: According to the prevailing opinion in German-speaking research, Aristotle is to be understood as the “discoverer” of particular justice. This article demonstrates that this view is incorrect, especially as Plato developed the doctrine of distributive justice and its principle of geometrical or proportional equality already previously in the Republic and the Laws. In a first step, this article interprets the doctrine of distributive justice that Aristotle lays out in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics. In a second step, it shows that the main elements of this doctrine have already been developed by Plato in the Laws. In a final step the article offers an innovative interpretation of the concept of justice that Plato presents in the Republic.Keywords: Plato, Aristotle, Distributive justice, Republic, Laws.
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Pérez Garzón, Carlos Andrés. "Unveiling the Meaning of Social Justice in Colombia." Mexican Law Review 1, no. 20 (December 14, 2017): 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iij.24485306e.2018.20.11892.
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Through the presentation of the history of social justice in global constitutional discourse, this article aims to demonstrate that, although in Colombia there is not a constitutionalized purpose or principle of social justice, as in other countries, the modern notion of distributive justice, also called social justice today, is implicit in the Constitution of 1991 because it enshrined as mandatory rules the three main elements of its meaning at the time of its promulgation: the principle of social rule of law, the principle of human dignity and the right to a material equality. Thus, in Colombia social justice must not be understood in the Aristotelian sense of distributive justice but in accordance with these three elements, and can only be achieved if they are fulfilled.
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Wibisana, Andri Gunawan. "KEADILAN DALAM SATU (INTRA) GENERASI:SEBUAH PENGANTAR BERDASARKAN TAKSONOMI KEADILAN LINGKUNGAN." Mimbar Hukum 29, no. 2 (September 30, 2017): 292. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jmh.19143.
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AbstractThis paper attempts to discuss intragenerational equity based on the taxonomy of environmental justice, i.e. distributive justice, corrective justice, procedural justice, and social justice. Based on distributive justice perspective, the paper places the polluter pays principle (PPP) and common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) as two important legal principles in implementing intragenerational equity. Based on corrective justice perpective, the paper considers that the PPP plays an important role in implementing intragenerational equity. The paper explains the implementation of procedural justice in terms of access to participation, access to information, and legal standing. Finally, the paper observes the importance of the integration of environmental protection and social justice.IntisariTulisan ini mencoba untuk mendiskusikan lebih mendalam keadilan intra generasi dengan menggunakan taksonomi keadilan lingkungan, yaitu keadilan distributif, keadilan korektif, keadilan prosedural, dan keadilan sosial. Secara khusus, berdasarkan perspektif keadilan distributif, tulisan ini melihat adanya kaitan erat antara keadilan intra generasi dengan polluter pays principle (PPP) dan common-but-differentiated responsibility. Dalam perspektif keadilan korektif, tulisan ini melihat pentingnya PPP untuk mewujudkan keadilan intra generasi. Tulisan ini melihat perwujudan keadilan prosedural melalui hak untuk berpartisipasi dalam pengambilan keputusan, hak atas informasi, dan hak gugat. Dalam konteks keadilan sosial, tulisan menjelaskan integrasi perlindungan lingkungan dengan penciptaan keadilan sosial.
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MOEHLER, MICHAEL. "The (Stabilized) Nash Bargaining Solution as a Principle of Distributive Justice." Utilitas 22, no. 4 (November 2, 2010): 447–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820810000348.
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It is argued that the Nash bargaining solution cannot serve as a principle of distributive justice because (i) it cannot secure stable cooperation in repeated interactions and (ii) it cannot capture our moral intuitions concerning distributive questions. In this article, I propose a solution to the first problem by amending the Nash bargaining solution so that it can maintain stable cooperation among rational bargainers. I call the resulting principle the stabilized Nash bargaining solution. The principle defends justice in the form ‘each according to her basic needs and above this level according to her relative bargaining power’. In response to the second problem, I argue that the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can serve as a principle of distributive justice in certain situations where moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning. In particular, I argue that rational individuals would choose the stabilized Nash bargaining solution in Rawls’ original position.
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Volacu, Alexandru, and Iris-Patricia Golopenta. "A Boundedly Rational Analysis of Global Distributive Justice." Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 20 (June 29, 2013): 99–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.20.9.
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In the present paper we analyze two prominent global distributive justice theories, i.e. Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend theory (1994) and Dorsey’s maxificing welfarism (2005) under an assumption of bounded rationality. We consider that the agencies responsible for distributing resources are informationally constrained in regard to the assessment of economic positions in society and cognitively constrained in regard to the decision making process within the agency. We argue that under these conditions the distributive patterns prescribed by both theories can be severely distorted. Further, in Dorsey’s case bounded rationality can even lead to a complete failure of the theory, since not only are the resulting distributions sub-optimal if we introduce the possibility for a single mistake in the identification process, but they can also be completely redundant by prescribing distributions which are not capable of lifting a single citizen to the minimum level required for the fulfillment of basic needs. We further show that for both theories the identification problem becomes more severe and that the agencies are more susceptible to make mistakes in circumstances of extreme poverty, i.e. the circumstances primarily targeted by the theories. Aside from this main result, we also obtain three secondary results: 1. we extend the ongoing debates in political philosophy between ideal and non-ideal theories and in particular between fact-insensitivity and fact-sensitivity, 2. we provide a preliminary defense of a proportional distributive principle for global justice and 3. we provide a new starting point for the construction of arguments regarding the nature of the agency (e.g. global government, national governments, UN institutions, international NGOs) entitled to distribute resources in global justice theories.
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Piguet, Frédéric-Paul. "Climate Change Mitigation Justice and the No-Harm Principle." Humanistyka i Przyrodoznawstwo, no. 24 (December 20, 2018): 49–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/hip.2597.
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When translated into concrete policy, any allocation of emissions leads to the attribution of emissions rights based on distributive justice (even if the policy was previously examined in terms of utilitarianism at the philosophical level). Consequently, the distributive justice approach legitimizes the corresponding amount of emissions. If a certain level of emissions can receive emissions rights, provided they are compatible with a certain emissions budget, to allocate emissions rights when the dangerous concentration level has been overshot could understate the need to preserve the functioning of a “balanced” climate system. From the perspective of Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge, and with the purpose of assessing the epistemology of climate justice, it will be possible to question the possible importation of the mode of production of norms of social law into climate mitigation justice. Additionally, it will be questioned whether the amount of anthropogenic emissions rights can be provided by “the laws of nature” and whether and how the no‑harm principle can contribute to the epistemological relevance of the narrative of climate justice.
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Emil, Dinga, Tănăsescu Cristina, and Ionescu Gabriela-Mariana. "A Proposal for an Automatic Stabilizer in Social Justice." Studies in Business and Economics 14, no. 3 (December 1, 2019): 72–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/sbe-2019-0044.
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AbstractGenerally, social justice has two sides which are intercorrelated and inter-dependend: a) constitutive social justice (for example, the so called commutative social justice); b) regulative social justice (for example, the so called distributive social justice). The paper approaches the regulative social justice, more exactly, an automatic mechanism to get it. To this end, an automatic stabilizer to provide distributive social justice, according to the Rawlsian principle of difference. Such an automatic stabilizer is grounded on the wealth, more precise, on the share of the wealth which is not invested in order to benefit to the more disadvantaged class of the society. Paper does not test empirically the proposal, such a propose remaining for next intervention in this publication.
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Kniess, Johannes. "Justice in the Social Distribution of Health." Social Theory and Practice 45, no. 3 (2019): 397–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract201992665.
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How should we think, from the point of view of distributive justice, about inequalities in health and longevity? Norman Daniels’s influential account derives a social duty to reduce health inequalities from Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity. This paper criticises Daniels’s approach and offers an alternative. To the extent that the basic structure of society shapes people’s opportunities to be healthy, we ought to think of ‘the social bases of health’ directly as a Rawlsian primary social good. The paper attempts to clarify the correct principle for its distribution, and its relationship to other goods that give rise to considerations of justice.
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Rödl, Florian. "Justice in Contract, no Justice in the Background." European Review of Contract Law 17, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 157–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ercl-2021-2024.
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Abstract In the first part of his book, Peter Benson elaborates for the common law that fairness in exchange is not only a fundamental principle of contract law, but that it is, moreover, conceptually rooted in the idea of private autonomy. For the common law presumes that a party to a contract intends, in principle, to exchange performance at its value and on fair terms. The following comment shows that this presumption also animates German contract law, including the rules on the review of standard terms. In the second part, Benson develops the image of a harmonious complementarity of private law, which is characterised by transactional justice, and public law, which instantiates distributive justice. The following comment disputes the claimed harmony by demonstrating the fundamental asymmetry in the institutionalisation of both forms of justice in civil society.
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Frohlich, Norman, and Joe A. Oppenheimer. "Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production." American Political Science Review 84, no. 2 (June 1990): 461–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1963529.
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We examine in a laboratory setting how direct participation in choosing a principle of distributive justice and a tax system impinges on subjects' attitudes and subsequent productivity when they participate in a task, produce income, and then experience losses or gains according to the tax system. Experience with a redistributive principle and its associated taxation system in a production environment does not detract from overall acceptance of the distributive principle, particularly for subjects who participate in choosing the principle. Participation in discussion, choice, and production increases subjects' convictions regarding their preferences. For these subjects (especially recipients of transfers) productivity rises significantly over the course of the experiments. No such effect is evident for subjects who do not participate in setting the regime under which they are to labor. The results' implications for questions of democratic participation and the stability of income support programs are drawn.
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Hums, Mary A., and Packianathan Chelladurai. "Distributive Justice in Intercollegiate Athletics: Development of an Instrument." Journal of Sport Management 8, no. 3 (September 1994): 190–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jsm.8.3.190.
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This study examined the development of an instrument to assess the views held by NCAA male and female coaches and administrators concerning the principles of distributive justice used in the allocation of resources in athletic departments. The steps in the development of the instrument, including the use of a panel of experts, a pilot study, and a confirmatory study, are presented. Scenarios were developed describing situations involving either distribution or retribution of three different resources within athletic departments; money, facilities, or support services. The eight allocation principles listed under each scenario were (a) equality of treatment, (b) equality of results, and (c) equality of opportunity; contributions based on (d) productivity, (e) spectator appeal, (f) effort, and (g) ability; and (h) need. Subjects were asked to rate the justness of each allocation principle in each scenario and to choose which allocation principle they would implement in that scenario.
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Wall, Steven. "RESCUING JUSTICE FROM EQUALITY." Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no. 1 (December 14, 2011): 180–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052511000136.
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AbstractIn the wake of G. A. Cohen's masterful critique of Rawls's work, this paper discusses Rawlsian justice in general and the difference principle in particular. It argues that Rawlsian arguments for the difference principle present a puzzle and that to respond adequately to the puzzle we must engage in rational reconstruction. After explaining the puzzle and considering and rejecting a number of responses to it, the paper begins its reconstructive project. It presents the case for viewing the difference principle as a maximizing prioritarian principle of justice, one that that contains no trace of commitment to equality as a distributive norm. The paper concludes by bringing out some of the implications of viewing Rawlsian justice in this light.
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Lissowski, Grzegorz. "Porównanie zasad sprawiedliwości dystrybutywnej." Etyka 22 (December 1, 1986): 153–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.14394/etyka.324.
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The purpose of the article is to draw comparisons between the major normative rules of distributive justice. This comparison is based on a kind of distribution of goods which is sometimes called the problem of pure distribution, i.e. the distribution of a homogeneous, infinitely distributable good in a situation when claims of different persons on the distributed good were in no way differentiated. This problem is defined against the background of typology of problems of goods distribution. Normative rules of distributive Justice are defined formally as social welfare functionals. Eight rules of justice are distinguished: the rule of the utilitarian, Rawls’s maximin rule, Rawls’s lexicographical maximin rule, the maximax rule of the conservatives, the rule of lexicographical maximax of the conservatives, Nash’s rule, and two rules advanced by egalitarianists which differ by the meaning attributed to equality of distribution (equal utility or equal size of the good, accorded to individual persons in result of the distribution). Premises underlying the construction of these rules of justice and which indicate the measurement of preferences and possibilities of interpersonal comparisons are discussed. The same justice rules are also presented graphically. The method of the comparison amounts to examining if a certain set of ethical postulates is fulfilled by the rules under consideration. Several ethical postulates concerning the distribution of goods are formulated. Some of them define conditions any method of evaluating inequality of distribution of goods should fulfil. The remaining postulates involve more general requirements put to methods of making social decisions. Theorems about the fulfilment or nonfulfilment by individual rules of distributive justice of the considered ethical postulates are presented in a recapitulating table. The author demonstrates that almost a1l justice rules fulfil general postulates put to methods of social decision making. Nash’s rule and the two rules of the egalitarians are the exceptions, as they do not fulfil the postulate of separability with respect to unconcerned individuals. Besides, the two rules of the egalitarians do not fulfil the Pareto optimality principle. Significant differences between rules of distributive justice become manifest only when you compare way they fulfil ethical postulates concerning the manner of evaluating the inequality of the distribution. With regard to this set of postulates, they can be arranged along a definite continuum, with Rawls’s lexicographical maximin — the radical egalitarian rule, and the lexicographical maximax of the conservatives – the radical conservative rule as the extreme points of this continuum.
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Dziedziak, Wojciech. "Szkic o sprawiedliwości naturalnej i rozdzielczej." Studia Iuridica Lublinensia 29, no. 4 (September 30, 2020): 71. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/sil.2020.29.4.71-83.
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<p>The article addresses the issues of natural justice and distributive justice. The traditional formula “to render to everyone his or her own” (<em>suum cuique tribuere</em>) was taken as the point of departure. The discussion leads to the conclusion that natural justice concerns every person, and that everyone is entitled to inherent, innate rights, fundamental human rights. The exercise of natural justice ensures basic participation in the goods of the community, namely the state. This is so because this justice requires that every person be provided with an existence appropriate to the dignity of the human person. The relationship between natural justice and distributive justice exists at the level of elementary objective needs. Natural justice, when exercised, in a sense meets the formula “to render to everyone according to their legitimate needs”, meeting objective, basic needs, but this applies only to part of society. This justice is broader, it does not boil down to these elementary needs and, of course, it relates also to other things than needs. In a sense, it could be said that natural justice “intervenes” where justice applied according to the principles of proportionality is not enough. Man, with his or her guaranteed natural, equal rights enacted as positive law in line with natural justice, through his or her own action “uses justice” by using (positive) law and provides himself or herself with a decent life. However, natural justice does not omit anyone, its implementation actually replaces the formula of distribution justice “render to everyone according to legitimate needs”. In distributive justice, equality is about proportion to the contribution made, but also to the merit. Of these two principles, the guiding principle, because of its universality, is the formula “render to everyone according to their contribution”: those who contribute more to the good of the community, receive more.</p>
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ZHANG, Xue, Wen LIU, Lin ZHU, and Yu ZHANG. "Distributive Justice of Young Children Based on the Principle of Equity." Advances in Psychological Science 22, no. 11 (2014): 1740. http://dx.doi.org/10.3724/sp.j.1042.2014.01740.
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Chauvier, Stéphane. "Les principes de la justice distributive sont-ils applicables aux nations ?" Revue de métaphysique et de morale 33, no. 1 (2002): 123. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/rmm.021.0123.
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Gatskova, Kseniia. "Distributive justice attitudes in Ukraine: Need, desert or social minimum?" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46, no. 2 (April 23, 2013): 227–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2013.03.007.
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This paper presents research findings based on a factorial survey study of attitudes toward the justice of income distribution in Ukraine. The factorial survey design was used for the first time in a representative large-scale survey in Ukraine and provided an opportunity to investigate the effect of multiple factors concerning individual, family and enterprise characteristics in complex subjective evaluations of just earnings. The focus within this study lays on three fundamental principles, according to which the just income is assessed: equality, desert and need principles. Empirical results of the study show that Ukrainian respondents pay attention to almost all characteristics used in the vignettes, a fact which empirically supported the basic idea of the multiprinciple justice theory. Some generational differences in justice perception were uncovered and discussed. The analyses also revealed an overall domination of the need principle in the judgments on income justice. However, the need criterion loses its relative significance at the expense of the desert principle, as soon as rather large income amounts are treated. This finding leads to the reflection that the need considerations appear to be popular in the post-Soviet countries to the extent to which they find support among low-income population and not because of the Soviet ideological heritage.
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Dietsch, Peter. "L'interprétation du principe de la propriété de soi au sein du libertarisme de gauche." Dialogue 47, no. 1 (2008): 65–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300002389.
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ABSTRACTAny substantive notion of self-ownership presupposes well-defined property rights over external resources. Left-libertarians usually limit this category to natural resources. I argue that in a specialized economy, substantive selfownership equally needs to be complemented by a definition of property rights to the cooperative surplus. The natural way for left-libertarianism to provide such a definition is to view the cooperative surplus as an external resource and to distribute it equally. The second part of the article makes the general point that a complete theory of justice needs to take a stance on distribution in various contexts. Articulating the differences between these contexts allows us to gain a better understanding of how left-libertarianism relates to other theories of justice.
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Faillo, Marco, Laura Marcon, and Pedro Francés-Gómez. "Distributive Justice in the Lab: Testing the Binding Role of Agreement." Analyse & Kritik 42, no. 1 (May 1, 2020): 107–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/auk-2020-0005.
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AbstractLorenzo Sacconi and his coauthors have put forward the hypothesis that impartial agreements on distributive rules may generate a conditional preference for conformity. The observable effect of this preference would be compliance with fair distributive rules chosen behind a veil of ignorance, even in the absence of external coercion. This paper uses a Dictator Game with production and taking option to compare two ways in which the device of the veil of ignorance may be thought to generate a motivation for, and compliance with a fair distributive rule: individually-as a thought experiment that should work as a moral cue- and collectively-as an actual process of agreement among subjects. The main result is that actual agreement proves to be necessary for agents to be led towards a fair distributive principle and to generate a significant amount of compliance in absence of external authority. This conclusion vindicates the role of actual agreements in generating motivational power in correspondence with fair distributive rules.
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Stamenkovic, Srecko, Biljana Ratkovic Njegovan, and Maja S. Vukadinovic. "Intra-national diversity." Cross Cultural & Strategic Management 25, no. 3 (August 6, 2018): 425–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ccsm-05-2017-0061.
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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of organizational justice on the ethical climate in organizations in Serbia.Design/methodology/approachIn the study, 3,413 employees participated whose task was to assess the dimensions of organizational justice (procedural, distributive and interactional) as well as the dimensions of ethical climate (egoism, benevolence and principle).FindingsThe obtained results show that the dimensions of organizational justice are significant predictors of dimensions of ethical climate. The dimension of distributive justice significantly predicts the dimensions of egoism and principle, while the dimensions of procedural and interactional justice significantly predict the dimensions of benevolence and principle. Concerning the structure of the relationship between dimensions of organizational justice and ethical climate, the results also showed that there is intra-national diversity depending on the region of the Republic of Serbia where the organization operates. Ethical climate based on maximization of personal interest is more connected to economically more developed regions with a larger population, while ethical climate based on duties related to norms, laws, rules and policies characterizes less developed regions with a smaller population.Originality/valueIn the context of contemporary Serbian business surrounding, the obtained results are discussed regarding the possibilities for improvement of ethical climate, which should be accompanied and supported by the positive impact of organizational justice.
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Diquattro, Arthur. "Liberal Theory and the Idea of Communist Justice." American Political Science Review 92, no. 1 (March 1998): 83–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2585930.
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My aim is to bring Marx's general theory of exploitation into line with contemporary theories of distributive justice advanced by liberal egalitarians, theories that stress the ideal of equal concern and respect for persons qua persons and require implementation of the ideal consistent with what historical circumstances permit. I begin by dismissing the labor theory of value as relevant to Marx's general theory, emphasizing instead a “property rights matching power” account. I conclude with some speculative comments about Kantian influences in Marx's sense of justice. Throughout, I assume that Marx believes that exploitation is unjust, and I pursue and sharpen this view in my analysis of Marx's criticism of the distributive principle of socialism.
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Saunders, Melanie K. "Mining on Celestial Bodies: The Equitable Distribution of Benefits Doctrine and Distributive Justice." Australian Year Book of International Law 36, no. 1 (October 1, 2019): 195–238. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26660229_03601010.
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Abstract The United States and Luxembourg have recently legislated to permit the acquisition of private property rights over celestial resources mined by private actors. Considering these developments, this note will consider an element of the Common Heritage of Mankind under international space law: the equitable sharing of benefits doctrine. It proposes a formulation of the doctrine that entails material and equitable distribution of economic benefits derived from space mining among all States, ensuring that space is utilised in a manner delivering a tangible collective benefit. It suggests that this doctrine presently lacks the preconditions to amount to an international legal principle erga omnes, and therefore considers how it may develop into a binding juridical standard through analysing an existing model of equitable sharing in an analogous context: the deep seabed. Accordingly, this note conceptualises an international legal framework that delivers an effective mechanism for the redistribution of wealth obtained from mining celestial resources, and that will enhance the compliance of States and private actors with principles of equitable sharing.
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Kaplow, Louis, and Steven Shavell. "Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice." Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 1 (January 2003): 331–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/345679.
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Wei, Xiaoping. "From Principle to Context: Marx versus Nozick and Rawls on Distributive Justice." Rethinking Marxism 20, no. 3 (July 2008): 472–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08935690802137720.
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Pasaribu, Wadyo Pandapotan. "Kebijakan Kredit Usaha Rakyat (KUR) dalam Pandangan "Theory of Justice" John Rawls." Societas Dei: Jurnal Agama dan Masyarakat 5, no. 1 (May 28, 2018): 97. http://dx.doi.org/10.33550/sd.v5i1.80.
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ABSTRACT: This article with a title "ThePolicy of People Business Credit (PBC ID: KUR) in the view of John Rawls Theory of Justice" will firstly explain the economic condition of our country (the Republic of Indonesia) from the analysis of experts in economy and governments view to the current economic situation. Next, the discussion is about the formula of the policy of people business credit as an economic policy of Indonesian government in her effort to reduce the number of economic gap or income gap with a business fund allocation to SMEthrough PBC program. Then, this article explains John Rawls general principle of justice which is related to pareto optimalitywhereas on its practical level it is distributive justice that takes effect, in which each actor will get in accordance with his contribution in the market. KEYWORDS:people business credit, distributive justice, John Rawls
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Nathanson, Stephen. "Are Special Education Programs Unjust to Nondisabled Children?: Justice, Equality, and the Distribution of Education." Journal of Education 180, no. 2 (April 1998): 17–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002205749818000203.
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This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.
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Eenmaa-Dimitrieva, Helen. "The Problem of Dependency of Corrective Justice: Corrective Entitlements and Private Transactions." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 32, no. 1 (February 2019): 59–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cjlj.2019.3.
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Several legal philosophers have argued that the principle of corrective justice provides the best explanation of various areas of the law—especially the law of torts. On the other hand, some philosophers of law and many economists of law have argued that the principle of corrective justice is not an independent principle of justice. I call this the problem of dependency. If the critics are right, the principle of corrective justice cannot be an explanation of a large area of our law as it claims to be.I argue that the increasingly complex forms of the problem of dependency that the critics have proposed lose their force once we have a better understanding of the principle of corrective justice and its relationships with other principles. The principle of corrective justice does not serve a conception of distributive justice or efficiency and can provide an explanation of a large area of our law despite the criticism. It does so independently as a principle of justice that is reflected in our legal practice.
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Steinberger, Peter J. "A Fallacy in Rawls's Theory of Justice." Review of Politics 51, no. 1 (1989): 55–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500015850.
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An important feature of Rawls's theory of justice is the putative separation of justice and desert. It is shown that Rawls in fact presupposes a quite strong theory of desert which provides the key justification for the original position. It is further argued that the theory of desert has implications for distributive shares which contradict those of Rawlsian justice in general and the difference principle in particular. Finally, it is claimed that this contradiction seems to resist any kind of easy resolution since the theory of justice rests upon, hence requires, the theory of desert.
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Hums, Mary A., and Packianathan Chelladurai. "Distributive Justice in Intercollegiate Athletics: The Views of NCAA Coaches and Administrators." Journal of Sport Management 8, no. 3 (September 1994): 200–217. http://dx.doi.org/10.1123/jsm.8.3.200.
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This study examined the principles of distributive justice held by male and female coaches and athletic administrators from all three NCAA divisions in allocating resources within athletic departments. A total of 328 subjects from Divisions I, II, and III responded to the instrument, which contained 12 scenarios describing situations of either distribution or retribution of three different resources-—money, facilities, or support services. The eight allocation principles listed under each scenario were (a) equality of treatment, (b) equality of results, and (c) equality of opportunity; contributions based on (d) productivity, (e) spectator appeal, (f) effort, and (g) ability; and (h) need. In each distributive situation, subjects were asked to rate the justness of each allocation principle and to choose one of the eight principles for implementation. All subgroups rated equality of treatment, need, and equality of results as the most just and the other principles as relatively unjust. These principles were also the principles most frequently chosen by subjects for implementation.
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Dietrich, Manuel, and Thomas H. Weisswange. "Distributive justice as an ethical principle for autonomous vehicle behavior beyond hazard scenarios." Ethics and Information Technology 21, no. 3 (May 14, 2019): 227–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10676-019-09504-3.
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Dekker, Teun J. "Out-Kanting Rawls: An Argument for Responsibility-Sensitive Theories of Justice from an Autonomy-Based Account of Normativity." Dialogue 48, no. 2 (June 2009): 353–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217309090295.
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ABSTRACT: When considering normative concepts, such as distributive justice, one must consider both the question how concepts can have normative force and which particular conceptions of these concepts have this normative force. In this article I consider the view that the human capacity for autonomy accounts for normativity, and argue that adopting this view commits one to a responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. This conclusion puts me directly at odds with the work of John Rawls, who derives his responsibility-insensitive difference principle from a similar account of autonomy. However, I argue that such an argument would be based on a mischaracterisation of what is significant about the human capacity for autonomy.
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Macleod, Colin M. "The Market, Preferences, and Equality." Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 7, no. 1 (January 1994): 97–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0841820900002587.
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The perfectly competitive market of economic theory often enters political philosophy because it can be represented as illuminating important values. Theorists who are enthusiastic about the heuristic potential of the market claim that we can learn much about individual liberty, the promotion of mutual advantage and efficiency in the distribution of goods by studying it. However, a principal limitation of the market for many theorists is its supposed insensitivity to the demands of egalitarian justice. According to the standard charge, markets—even idealised ones—are hostile to the achievement and maintenance of an equitable distribution of resources. It is striking, then, that a leading exponent of egalitarian justice like Ronald Dworkin should argue that there are very deep and systematic links between equality and the market. He contends that, contrary to the received view, “the best theory of equality supposes some actual or hypothetical market in justifying a particular distribution of goods and opportunities.” Moreover, the articulation of Dworkin’s influential egalitarian account of liberal political morality depends on acceptance of the market as an ally of equality. Thus Dworkin claims not only that the market plays a crucial role in the elaboration of a doctrine of distributive justice but also that it illuminates the distinctively liberal commitments to the protection of extensive individual liberty and to the requirement that the state must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. The aim of this paper is to raise some doubts about the soundness of one of the fundamental onnections Dworkin draws between the market and distributive justice.
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Haaga, Paul T. "DISTRIBUTING COVID-19 RELIEF FUNDS IN NIGERIA: PERSPECTIVES FROM JOHN RAWLS’ DISTRIBUTIVE THEORY OF JUSTICE." PREDESTINATION: Journal of Society and Culture 1, no. 2 (January 14, 2021): 119. http://dx.doi.org/10.26858/prd.v1i2.18555.
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This paper argues that every responsible government has an obligation, to the best of its ability, to ensure an adequate provision of economic welfare and healthcare for its citizens. In view of this global pandemic, the Nigerian government, like many other nations, has urgently developed a plan to provide health and economic assistance to the tens of millions of people who are vulnerable. However, the provision of these palliatives by the government designed to assuage the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on the poor and vulnerable Nigerians is not fairly undertaken. Adopting an expository and analytic approach, this paper examines the role of the government in distributing the COVID- 19 relief funds; in doing this, the questions in this paper are in two fronts: firstly, what constitutes vulnerability and who is vulnerable? Secondly, what is the criterion adopted by the government for determining who benefits from these palliatives? Finally, the paper proposes a model for assessing the role of government in the distribution of palliatives from the prism of John Rawls’s principle of distributive justice. This is imperative because the fair distribution of relief funds and benefits from the government will further ease the burdens, and it will fundamentally affect the people’s wellbeing.
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Sun, Ivan Y., Yuning Wu, Rong Hu, and Ashley K. Farmer. "Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Public Cooperation with Police." Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 54, no. 4 (June 1, 2017): 454–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022427816638705.
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Objectives: The principal objective of the current study is to test the applicability of Tom Tyler’s process-based model of policing in China. A secondary objective of this research is to examine the internal consistency and discriminant validity of key composite constructs in Tyler’s model. Methods: Using survey data collected from approximately 1,000 residents in a Chinese city, ordinary least squares regression was employed to assess the direct and indirect (through legitimacy) effects of procedural justice, specific distributive justice, and police effectiveness on willingness to cooperate with the police. Results: The internal consistency and discriminant validity of key composites in Tyler’s original model appear questionable with the Chinese data. Procedural justice, just like in the West, plays a significant role in predicting Chinese views on police legitimacy and willingness to cooperate with the police. Meanwhile, the strongest predictor of Chinese perceptions of police legitimacy is police effectiveness. The impact of both distributive justice and effectiveness on Chinese willingness to cooperate is mainly indirect through police legitimacy. Conclusions: Key arguments of Tyler’s model are largely supported by the Chinese data. Future research needs to develop culture-specific measures to further elaborate Tyler’s process-based model of policing.
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Ladwig, Bernd. "Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit." PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 30, no. 121 (December 1, 2000): 585–610. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v30i121.761.
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The author defends an egalitarian conception of justice against recent anti-egalitarian criticisms in politics and philosophy. On a conceptual level he argues that modern morality is based on a principle of equal respect and concern. As a consequence, all that a conception of distributive justice has to elaborate is an adequate interpretation of equality. In short, equality is the epitome of justice. The article gives an outline of a conception that respects and accentuates the responsibility of persons for leading their own lives and that nevertheless justifies strong demands for redistribution in the realm of social politics.