Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Principle of legality'

This study aims to establish what level of development has the Principle of Legality reached in national jurisdictions as well as in international law. The study analyses the developments and treatment of the Principle of Legality in international criminal law by means of an analysis of several national jurisdictions and international law; in Scotland, England, the United States, Mexico and South Africa. After this, the deduction of the rules of Legality were identified and compared with international developments in international human rights law and international criminal law was made and conclusions formulated. The various legal systems represent different ways of considering the Principle of Legality, taking into account the general aspects of retroactivity, strict construction and foreseeability as guidelines for this study. Therefore, it was not possible to extract a general understanding of the Principle of Legality, and even the consideration of minimum standards was a complex task. Despite these obstacles some conclusions could be reached regarding the evolution of the Principle of Legality in international criminal law. The Principle of Legality seems to be in a very early state of development in international criminal law. There seem to be some basic rules that are recognised in treaties, but the courts and the drafters of criminal definitions have not given the Principle the same scope at domestic legislatures and courts. However, the Rome Statute seems to provide for a system where the Principle of Legality could be respected, since its text gives the broadest scope of any treaty so far. However, for now there is still a lot of work to be done, if we aspire to create a respectful system of international criminal law, since the existing rules do not comply with the expected minimum standards.

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO<br>A presente dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o fenômeno da constitucionalização do Direito Administrativo e a conseqüente releitura de dois princípios basilares deste ramo do direito: os princípios da legalidade e da legitimidade administrativas. Após algumas considerações introdutórias e a apresentação do tema no capítulo I, o trabalho analisará, no capítulo II, o nascimento e a evolução do Direito Administrativo, com o intuito de demonstrar que a concepção clássica deste ramo do Direito deve passar por uma leitura constitucional, em tempos de constitucionalização do ordenamento jurídico. No capítulo III, o enfoque será o estudo do princípio da legalidade e a sua evolução ao longo dos tempos. A concepção liberal deste princípio, consagrado no Estado Liberal de Direito, entra em crise. A lei deixa de ocupar o papel de protagonista do ordenamento jurídico para dar lugar à Constituição. O desprestígio do Parlamento, bem como a celeridade e complexidade da vida moderna, acabam por gerar a ampliação do poder normativo das entidades administrativas localizadas fora do Poder Legislativo. Com isso, institutos como a deslegalização e a reserva da administração, bem como a figura do regulamento autônomo, ganham destaque no debate jurídico atual. Ao invés do respeito apenas à lei formal, a atuação administrativa deve adequar-se ao ordenamento jurídico como um todo, o que acarreta a consagração do princípio da juridicidade. Em seguida, no capítulo IV, o estudo tecerá considerações sobre as concepções clássicas de legitimidade e demonstrará a necessidade de se reforçar a legitimidade democrática da Administração Pública através de instrumentos efetivos de participação do cidadão na tomada de decisões e elaboração de normas administrativas. O capítulo V, por sua vez, demonstrará que a releitura dos princípios da legalidade e da legitimidade administrativas pode ser verificada, com mais exatidão, na formatação das agências reguladoras. A discussão em relação à constitucionalidade do modelo regulatório adotado pelo ordenamento jurídico pátrio passa necessariamente pela compatibilidade com os princípios em comento. Por fim, no capítulo VI, a titulo de conclusão, o trabalho apontará a importância do princípio da juridicidade no âmbito do estado Democrático de Direito.<br>The main goal of this dissertation is to analyze the phenomena of constitutionalization in Administrative law and the resulting reconsideration of two basic pilars underpinning this field of Law: the principles of legality and of administrative legitimacy. After some introductory considerations followed by the presentation of the main theme in the first Chapter, the author will review, in the second Chapter, the emergence and evolution of Administrative Law in order to demonstrate that, in view of the current constitutionalization of the legal system, the constitutional perspective should be added to the classic conception of Administrative Law. The third Chapter will focus on the study of the legality principle and how it evolved through times. The liberal view of this principle, the cornerstone of the Liberal Rule of Law, comes to a crisis. The Law becomes less and less the leading agent of the legal order while this role is assigned to the Constitution. The decreasing prestige of Parliament as well as the complexity and the ever-faster pace of modern life end up extending the normative power to administrative entities found outside the realm of the Legislative Branch. Therefore, institutes such as the de-legalization and the administrative reserve, as well as the institute of -autonomous regulation-, gain prominence in the current public debate. Instead of owing respect only to the formal Law, the administrative arena should also adjust itself to the legal order as a whole, which means that the -principle of jurisdicity- becomes paramount. Subsequently, in the fourth Chapter, the study will discuss the classic conceptions of legality and will demonstrate the need to reinforce the democratic legitimacy in Public Administration by means of effective instruments allowing citizens to be part of the decision-making process and of the development of administrative norms. The fifth chapter, in turn, will demonstrate how the re- consideration of the principles of legality and administrative legitimacy can be more accurately verified in the way regulatory agencies were formatted. Any discussion on the constitutionality of the regulatory model adopted by the legal order in Brazil necessarily includes compatibility with the principles under discussion The sixth chapter will conclude the study pointing out the importance of the -principle of jurisdicity- under the Democratic Rule of Law.

Тези виступу зарубіжного гостя в рамках ІІІ Міжнародного молодіжного наукового юридичного форуму.<br>No punishment without law. A basic principle of criminal and penal law, which is universally recognised and outlined in major human rights conventions [8, p. 1; 6, p. 226]. Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: ECHR) states that no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed [5, article 7(1)]. Moreover,the penalty imposed must not be heavier than the one applicable at the time of the criminal offence [5, article 7(2)].

Тези виступу зарубіжного гостя в рамках ІІІ Міжнародного молодіжного наукового юридичного форуму.<br>No punishment without law. A basic principle of criminal and penal law, which is universally recognised and outlined in major human rights conventions [8, p. 1; 6, p. 226]. Article 7 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: ECHR) states that no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed [5, article 7(1)]. Moreover,the penalty imposed must not be heavier than the one applicable at the time of the criminal offence [5, article 7(2)].

Procedural fairness has undergone significant evolution from a moral limit on the exercise of power to a fundamental principle of the common law. The thesis explains and reconciles this evolution of procedural fairness in Australia in the context of judicial review of decisions made under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By historical analysis of the origins and development of the principles of procedural fairness, the thesis identifies values and concepts underlying those principles. The High Court’s current conception of fairness, as protecting individual rights and interests in the exercise of power, evolved from the idea that there is a morally correct and just way to decide things. The thesis explains how by judicial development the implication of the obligation to observe procedural fairness in Australia, in the context of migration decisions, was shaped and informed, expressly and implicitly, by these values and concepts. The thesis explains the basis for the current restatement of procedural fairness as a fundamental principle of the common law, the relationship between procedural fairness and the principle of legality, and the positioning of procedural fairness as a principle or presumption of statutory construction. The thesis suggests that the explanation rests in legal coherence, in particular defining the obligation to observe procedural fairness in terms of an implied limit on the exercise of statutory power. The thesis also suggests that the dual presumptions created by recognising procedural fairness as a fundamental principle buttressed by the principle of legality, practically deny the exclusion of the principles in all but a limited number of cases.

I principi del diritto amministrativo, nell'attuale contesto storico-economico, segnato dalla crisi economica mondiale, lungi dal connotarsi in termini di immutabilità, vivono una fase di ridefinizione. Ciò è particolarmente vero nel caso del principio di legalità. Esigenze finanziarie e di conservazione di un'impostazione "sostanziale", oggi si contrappongono, con una tendenziale prevalenza, anche in seno al diritto vivente, delle prime sulle seconde: una sorta di "legalità dell'emergenza economica" e - sul piano della forma di Stato - uno "Stato a prestazioni minime".

As ideias políticas e filosóficas que influenciaram a criação da regra da legalidade penal e do princípio da ofensividade têm origem no Iluminismo. Principalmente durante a Idade Média e o Antigo Regime, confundia-se crime com pecado e as pessoas podiam ser punidas por mero capricho do soberano, sem que existisse lei. As arbitrariedades eram gritantes. A finalidade de ambas as teorias surgidas no período da Ilustração, portanto ao pregarem que era necessária a existência de lei prévia para que alguém fosse punido (regra da legalidade) e que o crime pressupunha uma lesão a direito ou bem jurídico de terceiro (princípio da ofensividade) , era a mesma: limitar o poder punitivo. No entanto, a regra da legalidade penal foi muito mais absorvida pelo discurso dogmático-jurídico do que o princípio da ofensividade, sendo oportuno, pois, analisar as razões pelas quais isso ocorreu. Algumas delas serão analisadas neste estudo como, por exemplo, a ausência de previsão explícita desse princípio nas Constituições, a suposta incompatibilidade desse princípio com a separação de poderes e com a própria regra da legalidade penal e a insegurança jurídica que a aplicação de princípios poderia gerar. Além disso, há um fator político de destaque: a consolidação da burguesia exigia a imposição de limites formais ao poder estatal, mas não limites materiais. Outro fator importante foi o advento do positivismo criminológico, no final do século XIX, que, ao confundir crime com doença, retornou ao paradigma do direito penal do autor que havia vigorado na Idade Média. Finalmente, para demonstrar o que impediu a consolidação do princípio da ofensividade especificamente no Brasil, será analisada a influência da doutrina europeia na dogmática nacional.<br>The political and philosophical ideas that influenced the creation of the principle of legality and the harm principle came from the Age of Enlightenment. Mainly during the Middle Age and the Old Regime, there was a confusion between crime and sin and people could be punished simply because of the whim of the sovereign, with no law. The arbitrariness were enormous. The reason for both theories that were born at the Age of Reason which required that the legal rules would have to be declared beforehand (principle of legality) and that the crime presupposed a harm or injury to other individuals (harm principle) were the same: to limit the power of punishment. However, it can be seen that the rule of the legality has been taken by the dogmatic and legal speech much more deeper than the harm principle, being opportune then, to analyze the reasons it happened. Some of them will be analyzed in this research, for instance, the absence of this explicit principle in the Constitutions, the alleged incompatibility of this principle with the separation of powers and the legality rule itself and the legal uncertainty that the application of principles could trigger. Furthermore, there is a major political factor: the consolidation of the bourgeoisie demanded the imposition of formal limits to the power of the state, but not material limits. Another important factor was the advent of positivist criminology, in the late nineteenth century, which, by confusing crime with illness, brought the paradigm of criminal law of the author, which was applied in the Middle Ages, back. At last, to show what stopped the consolidation of the harm principle specifically in Brazil, there will be an analysis of the influence of European doctrine in the Brazilian dogmatic.

Teisėtumo principas yra vienas svarbiausių principų visoje teisinėje sistemoje, tai yra demokratinės visuomenės pagrindas. Teisinė valstybė nesuderinama su bet kokia savivale ar neteisėtumu, su žmogaus teisių ir laisvių pažeidimu. Tai įtvirtina svarbiausias valstybės dokumentas – Konstitucija. Siekiant užtikrinti teisėtumo įgyvendinimą visoje valstybėje, svarbu, jog visos valstybinės ir visuomeninės organizacijos, pareigūnai ir piliečiai uoliai ir tvirtai laikytųsi įstatymų. Užtikrinant teisėtumą valstybėje, svarbų vaidmenį atlieka ir vietos savivaldos organai, kadangi jų veikla turi būti griežtai paremta įstatymais. Teisėtumo principo laikymasis – svarbiausia vykdomosios valdžios institucijų veiklos efektyvumo, rezultatyvumo sąlyga, todėl būtina išanalizuoti, ar šis principas yra pakankamai įgyvendinamas vietos savivaldos organuose. Bakalauro baigiamojo darbo objektas – teisėtumo principas. Šiuo darbu buvo siekta išanalizuoti teisėtumo principo įgyvendinimą Šiaulių miesto savivaldybėje. Buvo išnagrinėta mokslinė literatūra, dokumentai ir publicistiniai straipsniai, siekiant atskleisti teisės normų ir teisės principų teorinius pagrindus, išanalizuoti teisėtumo principo pagrindinius bruožus bei jo reglamentavimą teisės aktuose, išnagrinėti teisėtumo principo įgyvendinimą viešajame administravime teoriniu aspektu bei identifikuoti teisėtumo principo įgyvendinimo aspektus konkrečios savivaldybės (šiuo atveju – Šiaulių miesto) atveju. Iškelta hipotezė, kad teisėtumo principas... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]<br>The principle of legitimacy is one of the main principles in the whole legal system and is the base of the democratic society. Lawlessness or illegitimacy, violation of human rights and freedoms, are undesirable in any legal country. It is confirmed by the main document of the state – the Constitution. In order to assure the implementation of legitimacy in the whole state, it is important to ensure that all state and public organisations, officers and citizens follow laws and legal acts. Within the process of legitimacy assurance in the country, the important role is given to the local governing bodies, because their activity must be strictly based on laws. Observance of the principle of legitimacy is the main condition of efficiency, usefulness of activity of governing institutions, therefore it is necessary to analyse whether this principle has been sufficiently implemented in local governing bodies. Object of the Final Bachelor’s Degree Work is the principle of legitimacy. The Work has tried to analyse implementation of the principle of legitimacy in Šiauliai City Municipality. Scientific literature, documents and publicist articles were analysed in order to reveal theoretical basics of legal norms and principles of law, to analyse main features of the principle of legitimacy as well as its regulation in legal acts, to analyse the implementation of the principle of legitimacy in public administration on theoretical aspect and to identify the implementation of the... [to full text]

<p>The transfer system was created in order to control player movement between football clubs and has existed since the late nineteenth century. During the negotiation of today’s transfer rules FIFA, UEFA and the Commission found that a breach of contract during the season could upset the balance of competition and therefore should be restricted. It was considered necessary to strengthen the contractual stability and to apply a special rule to preserve the regularity and proper functioning of competition. This was done by the means of a provision stipulating that a football player only can be registered to play with a national association during one of the two registration periods per year, generally known as the transfer windows.</p><p>Sport has never been included in the formal structures of the European Union and the regulation of sport has instead materialized through verdicts from the European Court of Justice. One of the most influential statements emerging from the Court is that sport is subject to Community law in so far it constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, if the activity is economic there is a risk that it infringes EU law. The purpose of this master thesis is to examine the FIFA transfer window system and to determine whether it violates Article 39 and/or Article 81 EC.</p><p>The transfer windows, a regulation strengthened by the ECJ in the case of <em>Lehtonen</em>, restrict the ability of players to seek alternative employment and could therefore be regarded as a violation of the free movement of workers. In order to trigger the Treaty provisions guarding the right of freedom of movement the person in question must be a national of a Member State of the European Union and the activity must have a territorial dimension beyond the borders of a single Member State of the European Union. The person in question must also be engaged in some kind of economic activity. It is, however, clear that football players who are members of the European Union and are applying for a job in another Member State, and are performing at a certain level, fulfil these requirements. Footballers should therefore be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC and the prohibition of discrimination contained in that article which catches non-discriminatory private collective measures, such as the transfer system, invented by regulatory bodies like FIFA and UEFA.</p><p>When considering the FIFA “windows system” it is clear that it is liable of restricting the ability of players to seek alternative employment in another Member State and should therefore be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. Nevertheless, restricted transfer periods have been found by the ECJ to be objectively justified as having sporting benefits in the Belgian Basketball league. It is, however, likely that the “window system”, as it operates in European football, goes beyond what is necessary to achieve team and player contract stability since it is too restrictive and somewhat redundant. Consequently, the FIFA transfer windows do not comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality and should therefore, if challenged, be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC.</p><p>The use of transfer windows in European football can also be considered to be an issue for competition law and in particular Article 81 EC. The article prohibits all agreements between undertakings that restrict competition and affect trade between Member States and has the objective to protect consumers, enhance their welfare and to facilitate the creation of a single European market. The ECJ has, however, acknowledged a certain type of sporting rule that, even though it restricts competition, will be granted immunity from Article 81 EC. The FIFA “windows system” should not be regarded as such a rule since it does not fulfil the required conditions.</p><p>The transfer windows do little for the competitive balance within the European football. It may be argued that it preserves the appeal and the unpredictability of the finishing stages of a championship. However, they also prevent clubs from developing their economic activity and restrict the free play of the market forces of supply and demand. Furthermore, the “windows system” hinders certain clubs from raising the quality of their sporting performance since clubs in minor leagues with a closed window are losing their best players to clubs in a better league with an open window, without being able to replace them. All of this affects the small and economically weak clubs and strengthens the position of the financially strong clubs. As a result a few strong clubs will, contrary to the best interest of consumers, continue to dominate European football. The FIFA regulation of transfer windows is therefore likely to fall under Article 81(1) EC.</p><p>It is unlikely that the pro-competitive benefits of the FIFA transfer windows outweigh its restrictive effects since it is improbable that they would be considered the least restrictive means of creating these benefits. Subsequently, the FIFA “windows system” would not qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) EC and should, if challenged, be void under Article 81(2) EC.</p>

À première vue, l’équité apparaît comme un phénomène absent du droit pénal. Il faut dire que l’idée de l’équité a été victime d’une histoire mouvementée autorisant les plus grandes confusions à son égard, lesquelles se sont cristallisées sous la période révolutionnaire. L’absence de référence explicite à la notion et l’anathème dont elle fait l’objet, dans une matière qui ne tolère aucun facteur déstabilisant, ne sauraient pourtant signifier que l’équité ait été totalement évincée du droit pénal. En réalité, elle est un phénomène occulte, dont il faut révéler les manifestations latentes, pour finalement convenir d’une utilisation implicite de la notion par le juge et le législateur. La rigidité inspirée par la légalité criminelle n’étant qu’apparente, l’équité jouit en effet d’une importante marge d’expression. D’une part, flexible, l’équité permet de réaliser une égalité concrète. Elle se trouve en conséquence implicitement tolérée dans la matière pénale en tant qu’outil d’harmonisation du droit. L’équité joue alors un rôle de complément à la loi pénale, en assurant le passage du général – la loi – vers le cas particulier. D’autre part, l’équité peut être mobilisée par le juge pénal, sans qu’il en ait nécessairement conscience, lorsque, confronté à un cas particulier, il décide de contourner l’application de la loi pénale qui risquerait de produire des effets iniques. Au service d’un jugement individuel subjectif, en référence à des valeurs issues du fond culturel dont il procède, l’équité s’exprime hors du cadre de la loi pénale. Elle se place alors en élément perturbateur venant concurrencer l’échelle des valeurs fixées par le législateur. Qu’elle vienne compléter ou concurrencer la loi, l’équité constitue toujours un moyen d’interroger les objectifs de la matière pénale dans la mesure où elle est souvent à l’origine d’évolutions législatives. En définitive, l’étude démontre que l’équité, sans être un principe autonome, est au coeur du droit pénal<br>The lack of clear reference to fairness and the fact that it’s rejected in criminal law which does not tolerate any destabilizing factor does not mean that fairness is totally excluded from it. Actually it is a hidden phenomenon. Judges and legislators use the notion tacitly. As the rigidity of the principle of legality seems to be only apparent, fairness has in fact quite some room to express itself in criminal law.On the one hand, the flexibility it allows, and the underlying goal to carry out concrete equality both explain it be tolerated in some respects as a tool to standardize law. The need for flexibility is inherent to each legal system. Fairness has a complementary role for criminal law. It enables to guarantee the transition from generality – that is law – to particular cases. On the other hand, fairness can beimplemented by judges in order to circumvent the application of criminal law when it induces iniquitous consequences. As the expression of subjective individual judgment which refers to judges’ values, fairness is expressed beyond law itself. Ultimately, our study shows that fairness, without being an independent principle, is at the heart of criminal law, because at last, expressed as a complement or as an adversary to criminal law, looking for fairness often leads to legislative evolutions

Принцип законності є одним найважливіших основоположних принципів суспільно-політичного ладу. У літературі відсутнє єдине визначення принципу законності. Це зумовлено декількома факторами: широким змістом поняття принципу законності; відсутністю чіткого законодавчого визначення принципу законності;суб’єктивним розумінням науковцями даного принципу.

<p>The thesis has as purpose to describe and analyse a decision made be the Swedish tax committee in which it was decided that a cooperative economical associations selling price, which was less than the comparable public bonds market price, would be the focus of a withdrawal tax. There are exceptions from a withdrawal tax, that is if the transaction has a business motivation. However the concept, business motivation, is narrowly interpreted both in the preparatory works and in case law, which makes it irrelevant to the situation at hand. A cooperative economical association is a form of association nearest akin to the limited companies. These types of associations have as purpose to increase their owners wealth with the benefit of freedom from personal responsibility. The work concludes that the purpose and meaning of a withdrawal tax is necessary to secure a consistent legality and neutrality between persons conduction business and persons who do not. However, there is one part of the subject matter that seems to be unreasonable. This thesis will show that the market price taken from the public bond market, is not a legal, neutral or comparable price to estimate the full width of a withdrawal tax.</p>

Pastaruoju metu Lietuvoje norminių aktų leidybos procese pradeda vyrauti poįstatyminiai aktai, kurie papildo ar patikslina įstatymus. Tai neretai sukelia grėsmę pažeisti teisėtumą. Teisėtumo principas reikalauja, kad valstybės institucijos, kurdamos teisės aktus, neviršytų savo kompetencijos, laikytųsi kiekvienai teisės aktų rūšiai nustatytos tų aktų priėmimo ir išleidimo tvarkos (procedūrų) ir subordinacijos pagal juridinę galią: Seimo priimami įstatymai turi neprieštarauti Konstitucijai, o Prezidento dekretai, Vyriausybės nutarimai, kitų valstybės institucijų teisės aktai – Konstitucijai ir įstatymams. Šis principas teisinėje valstybėje reiškia ne tik formos, bet ir turinio teisėtumą - konkretus teisės aktas turi neprieštarauti ne tik aukštesnę juridinę galią turinčiam teisės aktui, bet ir pagrindinėms žmogaus teisėms, jis neturi įtvirtinti įstatymų leidėjo savivalės tų teisių atžvilgiu. Teisė konstatuoti tokį prieštaravimą suteikta Konstituciniam ir administraciniam teismams.<br>The principle of legality claims that the State Institutions, when legislating the Acts of Law, shall not overstep its competence, shall observe the established procedure for the adoption and promulgation of the Acts of Law of every type and the subordination according to legal power. The Laws being adopted by the Seimas shall be in conformity with the Constitution, but the Decrees of the President, the Resolutions of the Government, the Acts of Law of other State Institutions shall be in conformity with the Constitution and Legislation. This study covers the theoretical and practical aspects for the investigation of the legality of the Statutory Administrative Acts. The conception of the principle of legality, the implementation and protection of this principle in public administration are analysed on the theoretical level. By applying the methods of documentation analyses and comparative investigation the Acts of Law of the Republic of Lithuania as well as foreign countries, regulating the investigation of the legality of the Statutory Administrative Acts, are analysed. The essence, types and process of this investigation are defined. The practice of the Constitutional and Administrative Courts of the Republic of Lithuania in the lawsuits with respect to the legality of Statutory Administrative Acts is analysed on practical level. By applying the method of empirical investigation it is pursued to highlight particular general attributes and regularities of the practice of... [to full text]

Includes bibliographical references<br>The development of subjecting government procurement awards to judicial review is a relatively recent development in South African law. It accords with a similar development in the United States, as well as South Africa's own constitutional requirements of transparency and public accountability. Given the often lucrative nature of public contracts, challenges to the lawfulness of government procurement awards have become a regular occurrence in South Africa. However, the setting aside of such an award does not automatically follow upon a finding of unlawfulness. For a number of reasons, a court may decline to set aside an unlawful government procurement award. This raises a number of interesting questions, particularly with regard to how such a decision may be reconciled with, and the implications this may have for, the principle of legality and the Rule of Law. This dissertation will address these issues, arguing that, ultimately, the concerns are resolved by appreciating the nature of the principle of legality, and the Rule of Law's place as a value in society.

« La garantie des droits de l’homme et du citoyen nécessite une force publique : cette force est donc instituée pour l’avantage de tous, et non pour l’utilité particulière de ceux auxquels elle est confiée. » Telle est la lettre de l’article 12 de la Déclaration des droits de l’Homme et du citoyen du 26 août 1789. La relation qui s’opère entre la force publique et les droits de l’homme présente un caractère amphibologique. En effet, la force publique est à la fois la garante des droits de l’homme, mais elle constitue en même temps un danger potentiel d’atteinte aux libertés publiques. Notre étude a donc pour objet de s’interroger sur la manière dont la force publique peut être la garante des droits et libertés. L’état de paix sociale est généré par la force publique qui se pose comme étant la garante des droits et libertés par l'exercice du monopole de la violence physique légitime (Max WEBER). L’exercice du monopole de la contrainte physique légitime doit viser à garantir les droits et libertés de chaque être humain vivant au sein de la société. Pour atteindre ce but fondamental, il est nécessaire que la contrainte exercée soit encadrée. Il conviendra d’étudier les éventuelles atteintes à ces droits et libertés selon une gradation examinée par rapport à l’action de la force publique. À cet égard, il convient d’étudier l’encadrement juridique de l’emploi de la contrainte opérée par la force publique au regard des libertés individuelles, lesquelles concernent la liberté d’aller et de venir et le droit de propriété. Puis, l’on examinera les atteintes potentielles de la force publique à l’égard de l’intégrité de la personne<br>"The guarantee of the rights of man and citizen requires a public force: this force is thus instituted for the advantage of all and not for the personal benefit of those to whom it is entrusted." This is the letter of Article 12 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 26 August 1789. The relationship that occurs between law enforcement and human rights presents an amphibological character. Indeed, the police is both the guarantor of human rights, but it is also a potential danger of infringement of civil liberties. Our study aims to question the way in which the police may be the guarantor of rights and freedoms.The state of social peace is generated by the public force that arises as the guarantor of rights and freedoms by exercising the monopoly of legitimate physical violence (Max WEBER). The exercise of the monopoly of legitimate physical coercion must seek to ensure the rights and freedoms of every human being living in society. To achieve this fundamental goal, it is necessary that the coercion is framed. It will be necessary to investigate possible violations of these rights and freedoms in a gradation examined in relation to the action of the police. In this regard, it is necessary to study the legal framework for the use of coercion made by the police in respect of individual freedoms, which concerns freedom of coming and going and the right to property. Then, we examine the potential damage of the police with regard to the person's integrity

Le droit est devenu de plus en plus illisible et compliqué. Les causes de ce mal juridique sont multiples, il s’agit d’une part, de ce qu’on a appelé une inflation législative où le rythme d’élaboration et de modification des textes juridiques bat tous les records. D’autre part, cette complexité normative a été renforcée par l’apparition de matières juridiques nouvelles faisant appel à des concepts techniques et scientifiques, il s’agit par exemple du droit des nouvelles technologies. Enfin, la crise de la norme juridique est due aussi à la dégradation de la qualité rédactionnelle des textes. Pouvoirs publics et personnes privées s’accordaient pour dénoncer un phénomène d’insécurité juridique. C’est dans ce contexte que le Conseil d’Etat a consacré un principe de sécurité juridique comme moyen de remédier à ce phénomène. Au lendemain de cette consécration la doctrine dans sa majorité estimait qu’il s’agissait d’un principe qui respecte la portée objective de notre droit administratif. Nous avons estimé, avec d’autres, qu’il s’agit en revanche d’un principe inspiré du principe de protection de la confiance légitime. Celui-ci d’origine allemande, et adopté par le droit Communautaire et celui de tous les Etats européens, est de portée subjective. Ainsi nous avons développé l’idée qu’à travers le principe de sécurité juridique, le Conseil d’ Etat consacre un droit public subjectif à la sécurité juridique qui rompt avec cette tradition objective du droit administratif français. En effet, depuis la consécration du principe de sécurité juridique, notre droit administratif prend une tournure subjective<br>Law has become increasingly illegible and complicated. The causes of this are multiple, it acts on the one hand, of what one called a legislative inflation where the rhythm of development and modification of the legal texts breaks all the records. In addition, this normative complexity was reinforced by the appearance of new legal matters calling on technical and scientific concepts, such as for example new technology law. Lastly, the crisis of the legal standard is due also to the deterioration of the editorial quality of the texts. Public authorities and individuals agreed to denounce a phenomenon of legal insecurity. It is in this context that the Council of State stated a principle of legal security like means of curing this phenomenon. After this decision, the doctrines in its majority estimated that it was a principle which respected the objective range of our administrative law. With others, we feel that it is principle inspired of the principle of protection of legitimate confidence.This one, of German origin, and adopted by the Community law and that of all the European States, is of subjective range. Thus we developed the idea that through the principle of legal security, the Council of State establishes a subjective public right to the legal security which breaks with this objective tradition of the French administrative law. Indeed, since the principle of legal security is proclaimed, our administrative law takes a subjective turn

Bangladesh’s place on the globe as a sovereign nation-state came at the expense of millions of victims who perished during the war of 1971. For the greater part of four decades an endemic culture of impunity deprived the surviving victims of justice. As the crimes of 1971 remained beyond the ratione temporis of the ICC, the Bangladesh Government established the first International Crimes Tribunal in 2010 under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 for the purposes of detaining, prosecuting and punishing “persons responsible for committing genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law” in 1971. According to critics, the ICTs are a case of “complementarity gone bad” because they have failed to uphold international standards of justice. This thesis determines the legality and the legitimacy of the ICTs of Bangladesh. It does so by analysing the major criticisms directed towards the statutory provisions of the ICTA and the trial process of the ICTs through the prism of the principle of complementarity with particular reference to the “principles of due process recognized by international law”.

An issue that has always caused controversy, both in the theory and in the practice, is the application of the law over time, which becomes more complex in terms of its non-retroactivity or retroactivity. In the present article, the author develops theretroactivity of the most favorable rule principle. First, the author describes the concept and fundamentals of retroactivity. Then, he reports its normative support and its delimitation. Finally, the author exposes the most discussed and controversial assumptions on its application and non-application, making parallels with its regulation in Spain.<br>Un tema que siempre ha causado controversia, tanto en la teoría como en la práctica, es la aplicación de la norma jurídica en el tiempo, la cual se complejiza en cuanto a su irretroactividad o retroactividad. En el presente artículo, el autor desarrolla el principio de la retroactividad de la norma más favorable. En primer lugar, describe el concepto y fundamentos de la retroactividad. A continuación, informa sobre su sustento normativo y su delimitación. Finalmente, expone los supuestos discutidos sobre su aplicación e inaplicación, haciendo un paralelismo con su regulación en España.

À rebours de l'enseignement des historiens, selon lequel les sociétés se pacifient à mesure que leurs mœurs s'affinent, notre société contemporaine semble en proie à une violence omniprésente. Pour autant, ni le scientifique ni le profane n'est véritablement dans l'erreur, car la notion de violence revêt une dimension subjective qui la rend susceptible de variations considérables selon les époques et les communautés. Cette subjectivité dont est empreinte la notion, le droit pénal, ne s'en accommode que difficilement. Fidèle aux principes qui le fondent, et le préservent de l'arbitraire, le droit pénal se doit de définir avec clarté et précision les comportements qu'il entend réprimer. Or, pas plus que la jurisprudence, le législateur n'a pris soin de définir la notion de violence. Pourtant, celle-ci irradie le Code pénal et connaît de surcroît un emploi inflationniste au sein de l'hémicycle, comme en témoigne la répression des violences routières, conjugales, urbaines, scolaires, sportives… S'il est de son office d'encadrer les évolutions de la société, le droit pénal ne doit cependant pas en accompagner les dérives avec bienveillance. Ne serait-ce parce qu'en matière de violence, il souffrirait immanquablement de se voir reprocher celle qui, originellement, est la sienne<br>Contrary to historian's learning, according to societies pacify themselves as their manners are refined, contemporary society seems plagued by widespread violence. However, neither the scientist nor layman is really wrong, because the concept of violence has a subjective dimension that makes it susceptible to considerable variations across periods and communities.This subjectivity imbuing the concept, criminal law can't admit it easily. Faithful to the underlying principles, and preserve itself of the arbitrary, criminal law should define clearly and precisely the behavior it intends to punish. However, no more than the jurisprudence, the legislature took care to define the concept of violence. Even so, it radiates the Penal Code and has furthermore inflationary employment within the Parliament, as evidenced by the punishment of violence roads, domestic, urban, school, sports... If it's his office to oversee the evolution of society, the criminal law should not, however, support the drifts with kindness. If only because in terms of violence, suffering inevitably be accused of that which, originally, was hers

L'article 111-4 du Code pénal prévoit, par une formule laconique, que « la loi pénale est d'interprétation stricte ». Corollaire de la légalité criminelle, ce principe a vocation à protéger les individus des risques d'une répression arbitraire en soumettant toute atteinte à leur liberté au strict domaine de la loi, expression de la volonté générale. À dépasser les désaccords entourant les théories de l'interprétation, analysée comme un procédé de révélation ou de construction de sens, cet impératif intervient a minima comme une limite à la liberté de l'interprète. Or le principe de légalité dans lequel l'exigence tire son fondement a subi d'importantes mutations. L'admission de la représentation, l'inflation législative, et l'instrumentalisation de la fonction intimidatrice de la norme pénale, ont en effet entraîné une certaine déliquescence de la loi. L'instauration de contrôles de constitutionnalité et de conventionnalité de la loi participent à ce mouvement. Par un effet de balancier, le recul de la loi s'est traduit par une recrudescence du pouvoir judiciaire. Chargée de contrôler la conventionnalité de la loi et les conditions de renvoi d'une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, la chambre criminelle a vu son office profondément modifié. La protection effective de la liberté individuelle est dorénavant réputée être mieux assurée par le contrôle judiciaire des normes pénales que par le recours à la loi : la légalité formelle se mue en une légalité matérielle. Or, en qualité de corollaire de la légalité criminelle, le principe d'interprétation stricte est nécessairement atteint par cette mutation. Bien que demeurant pareillement formulé, il voit en effet son fondement substantiellement modifié. L'exigence d'une stricte interprétation étant originellement justifiée par déférence à l'égard de la volonté générale exprimée par la loi, la reconnaissance de l'incapacité de cette dernière à la saisir entraîne une certaine souplesse dans l'application du principe. Dès lors qu'il est compétent pour contrôler la loi, le juge est par ailleurs davantage enclin à se libérer de son emprise. Il convient alors de s'interroger sur la manière dont la chambre criminelle applique le principe d'interprétation stricte de la loi pénale à l'aune des mutations de la légalité. Il apparaît que, sans suivre une ligne de conduite précise, la chambre criminelle tend à influer sur la politique pénale en usant de son pouvoir d'interprétation pour réajuster, de manière conjoncturelle et par touches d'ajustements ponctuels, le seuil de la répression fixé par le législateur. Dans un système de hiérarchie des normes se transformant en réseau normatif, l'interprétation devient outil de construction de la norme pénale<br>Article 111-4 of the Penal Code succinctly provides that “criminal law is to be interpreted strictly”. Deriving from the principle of legality, the principle of strict construction intends to protect individuals from arbitrary repression by submitting any infringement on their freedom to the strict scope of the law, which is the expression of the general will. Setting aside the disagreements regarding the theory of interpretation – analyzed as a method of either revealing or constructing meaning – this imperative, at least, limits the interpreter's freedom. However, the principle of legality, on which the imperative of strict construction is based, has undergone significant changes. The adoption of a representative system, legislative inflation, along with authorities taking advantage of the deterrence provided by criminal norms has, to a degree, led to a decline of the law. The establishment of constitutionality and conventionality reviews of the law has also contributed to it. As a result of a seesaw effect, the decline of the law resulted in an increase in the role of the judiciary. The Criminal Division of the French Supreme Court of Appeal (Court de Cassation) is responsible for reviewing the conventionality of the law and the referral procedure of preliminary rulings on constitutionality. Consequently, the Criminal Division's function has undergone major changes. Protecting individual freedom is now deemed more effective when carried out by the judicial review of criminal norms rather than by resorting to the law. Procedural legality turns into substantive legality. Therefore, as a result of the principle of legality, the principle of strict construction is affected by this transformation. Even though the principle of strict construction remains formulated in the same way, its founding principle has substantially changed. The requirement of a strict construction was originally justified out of deference for the general will, which is expressed by the law. Thus, the acknowledgement of the law's incapacity to grasp the general will leads to some flexibility in the implementation of the principle. Since the judge has the authority to review the law, he is more inclined to interpret it freely. How the Criminal Division implements the principle of strict construction of criminal law in light of changes in legality needs then to be examined: The Criminal Division tends to influence criminal policies, even though it does not seem to be following a particular course of action, by exercising its power of interpretation to adjust, as circumstances dictate, the threshold for punishment set by the legislator. In a normative hierarchy system that turns into a normative network, interpretation becomes a tool to construct criminal norms

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:27:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Regis Laraia.pdf: 795964 bytes, checksum: 8070644186db6d93695968f788f78aed (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-06-04<br>Item II Article 5 of the Federal Constitution of Brazil states that: no one is compelled to do or not do anything if not according to the law . It expresses what is known as the principle of legality. As a fruit of the so-called State of Law, it has followed political, economical and social transformations, as well as the development of Law Theory and Philosophy. Understanding it demands a rectrospective understanding of the major schools and trends of judicial thought of the last centuries. The scope of this undertaking is to demonstrate that, in the actual context, the principle of legality has two faces. In Public Law, it still represents the ideals of freedom and equality originated in the Age of the Enlightment, but in diferent modalities as it approaches Constitutional, Criminal, Tax or Administrative Law. However, in Private Law, the principle represents liberty conditioned by ethics and morality as conducted by law, in other words, liberty guided by fraternity. This study is exclusively based on library research. It involves history, economics, sociology, philosophy and law. The first parts ares focused on the investigation of the origin and evolution of the principle of legality. The final parts are dedicated to the analisys of the principle in present time. At the final part, the conclusions are presented in synthesis<br>O inciso II, do artigo 5o, da Constituição Federal estabelece que: ninguém será obrigado a fazer ou deixar de fazer alguma coisa senão em virtude de lei . Ele expressa o que se conhece por princípio da legalidade. Fruto do chamado Estado de Direito, acompanhou as transformações políticas, econômicas e sociais, bem como o desenvolvimento da Teoria e da Filosofia do Direito. Compreendê-lo exige que seja promovido um retrospecto das principais escolas e correntes de pensamento jurídico dos últimos séculos. O escopo dessa empreitada é demonstrar que, no contexto atual, o princípio da legalidade tem dupla face. No Direito Público, ainda representa os ideais de liberdade e de igualdade originários do Iluminismo, mas de diferentes modos, conforme se trate de Direito Constitucional, Penal, Tributário ou Administrativo. Porém, no Direito Privado, o princípio representa a liberdade condicionada pela ética e moral conduzidas pela lei, ou seja, a liberdade guiada pela fraternidade. Este estudo é empreendido exclusivamente com base em pesquisa bibliográfica. Envolve História, Economia, Sociologia, Filosofia e Direito. As primeiras partes são voltadas à investigação da origem e da evolução do princípio da legalidade. As últimas partes são dedicadas ao exame do princípio na atualidade. Ao final, as conclusões são lançadas a guisa de síntese

<p>För att förhindra att skattskyldiga utnyttjar lagstiftningen på ett sätt som lagstiftaren inte avsett används stopp- och speciallagstiftning. Då detta förfarande alltid ligger  steget efter, lagstiftades det om en generalklausul mot skatteflykt.</p><p>Legalitetsprincipen kommer även till uttryck inom skatterätten, ingen skatt utan lag. Detta upprätthåller rättsäkerheten och leder till att skattskyldiga kan förutse de skatterättsliga konsekvenserna av olika rättshandlingar.</p><p>Generalklausulen har ansetts vara svår att tillämpa vilket lett till att det genom praxis framkommit principer om genomsyn. Skatteverket verkar vara av den uppfattningen att det finns en skatterättslig genomsynsmetod. Denna metod förbiser de civilrättsligt giltiga avtalen och ser till den ekonomiska innebörden och beskattar förfarandet därefter. Att se till avtals verkliga innebörd är något som är vanligt förekommande på det civilrättsliga området. Det brukar sägas att skatterätten bygger på civilrättsliga grunder, det är därför anmärkningsvärt att, som Skatteverket gör, åsidosätta eller omkaraktärisera civilrättsliga avtal. Det förefaller snarare vara så att de ekonomiska konsekvenserna är en direkt följd av de civilrättsliga, vilket leder till att en skatterättslig genomsyn inte är tillämplig.</p><p>Under de senaste åren har det kommit flera avgöranden som säger att en skatterättslig genomsyn inte kan tillämpas. Trots detta fortsätter Skatteverket att tillämpa principen. Även om Regeringsrätten har sin ställning klar verkar det som om det behövs flera, tydliga, domar för att Skatteverket ska inse att det inte längre går att genomföra en skatterättslig genomsyn.</p><br><p>To prevent taxpayers from using the law in a way that the legislator never intended, i.e. abusing its meaning, the legislator constantly introduced new legislation. As this methodology always is reactive as opposed to proactive, the legislator enacted legislation against tax evasive actions - the general anti-avoidance rule.</p><p>The principle of legality is affecting not only the civil but also the tax legislation, no law no tax. This ensures the legal security and leads to taxpayers being able to foresee the tax consequences of certain legal transactions.</p><p>The general anti-avoidance rule has been found difficult to apply, why case law has lead to the establishment of a "principle of transparency" (similar to the concept of substance over form). This principle overrides the legally binding agreements entered into by two parties, and aims at determining the true substance of the transactions undertaken under the agreement. The findings made by the tax authority in this process are then deemed to be the correct basis for taxation. It is generally said that the tax law is based on the principles established through civil law, which makes it hard to understand how the tax authority can override and reclassify the terms of an agreement entered into by two parties. As the economic consequences should be a direct effect of the terms of said agreement/arrangement, the tax authority should not, under the principle of legality, be able to reclassify the legally binding agreement.</p><p>In recent years a number of cases have stated that the "principle of transparency" cannot be applied. Despite this the tax authority still applies this principle. Even if the Supreme Administrative Court believes that it has given a clear interpretation of how to apply the “principle of transparency” additional case law is needed.</p>

Dissertação sobre o regime jurídico das infrações e sanções administrativas aplicadas pelo Conselho Monetário Nacional e o Banco Central do Brasil em conformidade com a legislação do Sistema Financeiro Nacional, especialmente a Lei 4.595/64. Apresenta o regime de distribuição da função legislativa a partir da Constituição Federal de 1998, o sistema jurídico das infrações e sanções administrativas e a diferenciação destas em relação a outros atos derivados do denominado poder de polícia. Em seguida, analisa a recepção pela Constituição Federal de 1988 do modelo normativo trazido pela Lei 4.595/64 e os limites da discricionariedade administrativa para aplicação de infrações e sanções administrativas à luz dos princípios da legalidade e da tipicidade apresentados pela doutrina.<br>Dissertation on the legal regime of the administrative infractions and penalties imposed by the National Monetary Council and the Central Bank of Brazil in accordance with the rules of the Financial System, especially the Law 4.595/64. Displays the distribution scheme of the legislative function from the Federal Constitution of 1998, the system of legal administrative infractions and penalties and differentiation of these acts in relation to others derived from the so called police powers. It then goes through the reception by the Constitution of 1988 of the normative model issued by Law 4.595/64 and the limits of the administrative authorities discretion for application of administrative infractions and sanctions in the light of the principles of legality and typicality as presented by the doctrine.

Principbaserade standarder ger vag vägledning om hur standarder ska följas och de lämnarstort utrymme för tolkning och bedömning. I inkomstskattelagens 14 kap. 2 § uttrycks det attresultatet ska beräknas enligt bokföringsmässiga grunder samt att beskattningstidpunkten skafastställas i enlighet med god redovisningssed. Skatterättens legalitetsprincip uttrycker iregeringsformen att det måste finnas stöd i lag för att ett brott ska ha begåtts och inget straffkan annars påvisas. Det uttrycks därmed att ingen skatt får tas ut om det inte finns lagliggrund. Då företag ska fastställa beskattningstidpunkten i enlighet med god redovisningssed,kan det ge upphov till redovisningsmässiga skillnader. God redovisningssed som begrepp, ärsvårtolkat och kräver kompletterande normgivning för att skapa dess innebörd.Problematiken som återfinns då principbaserade normer påverkar ett företags beskattningtydliggörs främst då ett materiellt samband råder mellan redovisning och beskattning. Ettmateriellt samband innebär att redovisningsregler görs gällande även vid beräkning av detskattemässiga resultatet. Det materiella sambandet återfinns i inkomstskattelagen dåhänvisning görs till god redovisningssed. Enligt bokföringslagen är det Bokföringsnämndensansvar att utveckla god redovisningssed. Bokföringsnämnden har därför tagit framallomfattande regelverk som ska ge vägledning åt företag som upprättar redovisning efter godredovisningssed. K-regelverken ska gälla för företag i olika kategorier, beroende på dessstorlek. Studien undersöker de två vanligaste regelverken, K2 och K3.Syftet med studien är att undersöka om principbaserade normer är förenliga medlegalitetsprincipen. För att besvara studiens syfte genomförs en komparativ innehållsanalys avBokföringsnämndens K-regelverk, K2 och K3. Vi ämnar avgöra till vilken grad normernaskaraktär i K2 och K3 bör anses vara regel- respektive principbaserade samt dess förenlighetmed legalitetsprincipen och regeringsformen. Vid inledningen av denna studie kunde interelevant och tillräcklig forskning hittas inom området, varpå studien syftar till att bidra medkunskap. Vi vill även uppmärksamma problematiken då skatterätten hänvisar tillredovisningens god redovisningssed när tidpunkten för redovisning av intäkter och kostnaderska ske.Genom en modell har vi tydliggjort vår analys avseende normernas karaktär i K2 och K3.Modellen innefattar två dimensioner, dels till vilken grad normerna anses regel- respektiveprincipbaserade och dels till vilken grad normerna bör anses förenliga medlegalitetsprincipen. För att besvara studiens syfte har vi undersökt följande normer somåterfinns i båda regelverken: grundläggande principer, definitioner av tillgångar, skulder,intäkter och kostnader, materiella anläggningstillgångar, immateriella anläggningstillgångar,varulager, avsättningar och periodiseringar. Studiens slutsats är att principbaserade normer tillstörre grad bör anses som icke förenliga med legalitetsprincipen då de tillåter att analogislutkan tillämpas i redovisningen. Principbaserade normer i redovisningen skapar storttolkningsutrymme, vilket kan medföra att likartade företag upplever skillnader iredovisningen och följaktligen även skattemässiga skillnader. Således ska normerna i K3 inteanses vara förenliga med legalitetsprincipen och därmed anses grundlagsstridiga.<br>Principal-based standards give few guidelines of how the standards should be followed andthey give room for interpretations. The income tax act expresses that the income statementshould be calculated through accrual basis and the taxation time should be determined bygenerally accepted accounting principles. On the other hand, the tax law expresses a principleof legality in the governmental law that states that there has to exist a legal support for a crimeto be committed and no penalty can otherwise be addressed. When generally acceptedaccounting principles should determine the time of taxation it generates accountingdifferences. The term of generally accepted accounting principles is difficult to interpret andrequires additional standards to create its meaning.The problem that exists when principle-based standards affect a company’s taxation, clarifieswhen there is a material relationship between accounting and taxation. A material relationshipmeans that the accounting rules are applicable even for the taxable income. The material linkexists when the income tax act refers to generally accepted accounting principles, when thetaxation time should be determined. The Swedish Accounting Standards Board has thereforeestablished comprehensive framework’s that aims to guide companies when accountaccording to generally accepted accounting principles. The K-regulations shall apply forcompanies in different categories depending on their sizes. The study examines the two mostcommon frameworks, K2 and K3.The purpose of this study is to examine if principle-based standards are consistent with theprinciple of legality. To achieve the purpose of this study, a comparative content analysis ofthe The Swedish Accounting Standards Boards K-regulations, K2 and K3, is conducted. Wewish to evaluate to what extent the standards characteristics are rule- or principle-based and toevaluate the extent of the standards consistency with the principle of legality and thegovernmental law. In the beginning of this study we did not find enough relevant literature inthe field of study and we therefore want to contribute with knowledge. We also want toobserve the problems that the tax law contributes when it refers to the term of generallyaccepted accounting principles.We have clarified our analysis of the standards in K2 and K3 in a model. The modelincorporates two dimensions, partly to what extent the standards should be considered as ruleorprinciple-based and partly to what extent the standards should be considered consistentwith the principle of legality. To achieve the purpose of this study we examined standards thatoccur in both frameworks: fundamental principles, definition of assets, liabilities, incomesand costs, tangible fixed assets, intangible fixed assets, inventories, provisions and accruals. The conclusion of the study is that principle-based standards in a large extent should beconsider non consistent with the principle of legality due to that an analogy is permitted inaccounting. Principle-based standards create room for interpretation, which leads todifferences between similar companies both in accounting and in taxation. The standards inK3 should accordingly not be considered consistent with the principle of legality.This study is further on written in Swedish.

Häktning är ett av de mest ingripande tvångsmedel som staten kan vidta gentemot enenskild person. I kombination med restriktionsanvändning riskerar det att kränka ett flertalav den enskildes grundlagsskyddade rättigheter. Att reglera en häktningslagstiftninginnebär att göra en noggrann avvägning mellan de brottsutredande myndigheternas möjlighetertill en effektiv utredning samt lagföring och den enskildes skydd för grundläggande fri- och rättigheter. Med en så ingripande åtgärd mot en ännu ej dömd person är det av största vikt att ställa höga krav på reglering och tillämpning av tvångsmedlet och dess överensstämmande med grundläggande principer och rättigheter. Senaste årens ökningav häktningstider är således oroande och kräver förändring. Sverige har under flera decennier fått återkommande och omfattande kritik för sin regleringkring häktning. Kritiken har riktat sig mot att det inte finns någon övre tidsgränsför hur länge en person kan sitta häktad, en omfattande restriktionsanvändning samt avsaknaden av effektiva alternativa tvångsmedel till häktning. Till följd av kritiken presenterade regeringen år 2020 ett flertal förslag som syftade till en effektivare häktningsreglering. I min framställning kommer jag ta sikte på möjligheterna att minska de långa häktningstiderna.Flertalet av förslagen har indirekt betydelse för möjligheterna att minska delånga häktningstiderna och det mest omdebatterade förslaget är det om införandet av enövre tidsgräns för hur länge man får sitta häktad.I min slutsats argumenterar jag för att nuvarande utformning och tillämpning av häktningsregleringenkan antas strida mot överordnad rätt och i viss mån vara anledningen tillde långa häktningstiderna. Jag ställer mig positiv till de förslag regeringen presenterar isyfte att förändra nuvarande häktningslagstiftning. Jag tror det finns en stor sannolikhet för att förslagen kommer kunna leda till minskade häktningstider. Samtidigt ställer jag mig tveksam till i vilken utsträckning den maxtidsgräns som presenteras kommer lösasamma problem. Visserligen anser jag att den gräns som presenteras är viktig ur legalitetssynpunkt, men att den inte i tillräcklig utsträckning avhjälper den proportionalitetsproblematik som förekommer. Jag är inte heller övertygad om att häktningstiderna faktiskt kommer minska till följd av införandet av denna gräns. Konsekvenserna av förslagen innebär på det stora hela en minskad användning av häktning, en mindre godtycklig häktningsprocess och minskade häktningstider. Förhoppningen är att förslagen i viss mån kommer underlätta för åklagare och domstol vid beslut om häktning och särskilt bedömningen av huruvida häktningen är proportionerlig eller ej. Jag menar emellertid att mer kan göras för att komma tillrätta med nuvarande häktningsregleringoch långa häktningstider varför ytterligare förslag på förändring kommer presenterasi denna framställning.<br>Pre-trial detention is one of the most intervening means of coercion that the state authorities can use against an individual. In combination with the use of restrictions there is risk that it will infringe a numerous of the constitutional rights of the individual. To regulatet he law of detention means to balance the interests of the possibilities of the stateauthorities to an efficient investigation and prosecution and the individuals protection oftheir constitutional rights. With such an intervening action against a not yet condemnedperson it is of paramount importance to ensure high demands on the regulation and applicationof the means of coercion and its compatibility with constitutional principles andrights. The increasing times of pre trial detention the last couple of years are therefore agitating and requires a change. Sweden has during several decades received recurrent and extensive criticism regardingits regultation on detention. The critic has been adressed against that there is no upperlimit for how long a person can undergo pre-trial detention, a comprehensive use of restrictions and the lack of efficient alternative means of coercion to pre trial detention.Following the criticism the government 2020 presented a numerous proposals on how to change the legislation in purpose of a more efficient regulation of detention. In my thesis I focus on the possibilities to decrease the long times of detention. Most of the proposalsare of relevance for the possibilities to decrease the long times of detention and the most debated proposal is the one regarding the imposition of an upper limit of how long aperson can remain in continual detention.In my conclusion I argue for that the present regulation and application of detention canbe assumed to infringe superior constitutional law and to a certain extent be the cause of the long times of detention. I remain positive towards the proposals the government present in order to change the current regulation of detention. I think it´s highly likely thatthe proposals can lead to shorter times of detention. At the same time I remain doubtfultowards in what extent the upper time limit that is presented can solve the same problem. Indeed I believe that the presented limit is important in an aspect of legality, but that it´s not enough to remedy the complex problem of proportionality that exists. I´m neitherconvinced that the long times of detention actually are going to decrease as a consequence of the imposition of this limit.The consequences of the proposals can overall lead to reduced use of detention, a less arbitrary detention process and shorter times of detention. Hopefully the proposals canfacilitate for public prosecutors and courts regarding decisions of detention and especiallythe assessment of whether the detention is proportional or not. However, I mean that morecan be done to settle current regulation and long times of detention why further proposals will be presented in this paper.

L'article 111-4 du Code pénal prévoit, par une formule laconique, que « la loi pénale est d'interprétation stricte ». Corollaire de la légalité criminelle, ce principe a vocation à protéger les individus des risques d'une répression arbitraire en soumettant toute atteinte à leur liberté au strict domaine de la loi, expression de la volonté générale. À dépasser les désaccords entourant les théories de l'interprétation, analysée comme un procédé de révélation ou de construction de sens, cet impératif intervient a minima comme une limite à la liberté de l'interprète. Or le principe de légalité dans lequel l'exigence tire son fondement a subi d'importantes mutations. L'admission de la représentation, l'inflation législative, et l'instrumentalisation de la fonction intimidatrice de la norme pénale, ont en effet entraîné une certaine déliquescence de la loi. L'instauration de contrôles de constitutionnalité et de conventionnalité de la loi participent à ce mouvement. Par un effet de balancier, le recul de la loi s'est traduit par une recrudescence du pouvoir judiciaire. Chargée de contrôler la conventionnalité de la loi et les conditions de renvoi d'une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, la chambre criminelle a vu son office profondément modifié. La protection effective de la liberté individuelle est dorénavant réputée être mieux assurée par le contrôle judiciaire des normes pénales que par le recours à la loi : la légalité formelle se mue en une légalité matérielle. Or, en qualité de corollaire de la légalité criminelle, le principe d'interprétation stricte est nécessairement atteint par cette mutation. Bien que demeurant pareillement formulé, il voit en effet son fondement substantiellement modifié. L'exigence d'une stricte interprétation étant originellement justifiée par déférence à l'égard de la volonté générale exprimée par la loi, la reconnaissance de l'incapacité de cette dernière à la saisir entraîne une certaine souplesse dans l'application du principe. Dès lors qu'il est compétent pour contrôler la loi, le juge est par ailleurs davantage enclin à se libérer de son emprise. Il convient alors de s'interroger sur la manière dont la chambre criminelle applique le principe d'interprétation stricte de la loi pénale à l'aune des mutations de la légalité. Il apparaît que, sans suivre une ligne de conduite précise, la chambre criminelle tend à influer sur la politique pénale en usant de son pouvoir d'interprétation pour réajuster, de manière conjoncturelle et par touches d'ajustements ponctuels, le seuil de la répression fixé par le législateur. Dans un système de hiérarchie des normes se transformant en réseau normatif, l'interprétation devient outil de construction de la norme pénale<br>Article 111-4 of the Penal Code succinctly provides that “criminal law is to be interpreted strictly”. Deriving from the principle of legality, the principle of strict construction intends to protect individuals from arbitrary repression by submitting any infringement on their freedom to the strict scope of the law, which is the expression of the general will. Setting aside the disagreements regarding the theory of interpretation – analyzed as a method of either revealing or constructing meaning – this imperative, at least, limits the interpreter's freedom. However, the principle of legality, on which the imperative of strict construction is based, has undergone significant changes. The adoption of a representative system, legislative inflation, along with authorities taking advantage of the deterrence provided by criminal norms has, to a degree, led to a decline of the law. The establishment of constitutionality and conventionality reviews of the law has also contributed to it. As a result of a seesaw effect, the decline of the law resulted in an increase in the role of the judiciary. The Criminal Division of the French Supreme Court of Appeal (Court de Cassation) is responsible for reviewing the conventionality of the law and the referral procedure of preliminary rulings on constitutionality. Consequently, the Criminal Division's function has undergone major changes. Protecting individual freedom is now deemed more effective when carried out by the judicial review of criminal norms rather than by resorting to the law. Procedural legality turns into substantive legality. Therefore, as a result of the principle of legality, the principle of strict construction is affected by this transformation. Even though the principle of strict construction remains formulated in the same way, its founding principle has substantially changed. The requirement of a strict construction was originally justified out of deference for the general will, which is expressed by the law. Thus, the acknowledgement of the law's incapacity to grasp the general will leads to some flexibility in the implementation of the principle. Since the judge has the authority to review the law, he is more inclined to interpret it freely. How the Criminal Division implements the principle of strict construction of criminal law in light of changes in legality needs then to be examined: The Criminal Division tends to influence criminal policies, even though it does not seem to be following a particular course of action, by exercising its power of interpretation to adjust, as circumstances dictate, the threshold for punishment set by the legislator. In a normative hierarchy system that turns into a normative network, interpretation becomes a tool to construct criminal norms

År 2014 anmäldes 12 800 fall av bokföringsbrott. För att ett bokföringsbrott ska föreligga behöver brottsbalkens åsidosättande- och effektrekvisit uppfyllas. Åsidosättanderekvisitet uppfylls om bokföringsskyldigheten åsidosätts. I bokföringslagen står det föreskrivet att bokföringsskyldighet ska fullgöras på ett sätt som stämmer överens med god redovisningssed.Den statliga myndigheten Bokföringsnämnden har ett lagstadgat huvudansvar för utvecklandet av god redovisningssed. År 2004 beslutade Bokföringsnämnden att ändra inriktning av normgivningen för onoterade företag. I och med beslutet påbörjades arbetet med K-projektet med syftet att varje företagskategori ska ha ett heltäckande regelverk för upprättande av årsbokslut respektive årsredovisning. Den kategori som företag ska tillämpa baseras på de krav och val som innefattas av bokföringslagen. År 2014 blev det tvingande för onoterade företag att tillämpa ett K-regelverk.Syftet med denna studie har varit att undersöka möjligheten till bokföringsbrott om ett företag väljer att redovisa utanför det tillämpade K-regelverket och istället använder sig av en regel i ett annat K-regelverk, så kallad ”cherry-picking”. För att uppnå denna kvalitativa studies syfte har en deduktiv ansats använts för att genomföra en kartläggning av K-regelverkens relation till svensk lagstiftning, vilket har bidragit till en tydlig grund för studiens typfall. Typfallen har kompletterats med en intervju med en strategisk ekorevisor från Ekobrottsmyndigheten.Denna studies resultat visar att en avvikelse från K-regelverken kan anses vara synonymt med en avvikelse från god redovisningssed. I och med detta kan en avvikelse från K-regelverken anses vara ett åsidosättande av bokföringsskyldigheten. För att ett bokföringsbrott ska föreligga behöver det även påvisas att effektrekvisitet är uppfyllt. Ett uppfyllande av effektrekvisitet innebär att företagets räkenskaper inte går att bedöma i huvudsak. I de fall ett företag har valt att lämna information i not om avvikelse från K-regelverk kan det vara svårt att väcka åtal. Studiens resultat visar även att bestämmelserna i K-regelverken verkar ha företräde framför de redovisningsalternativ som årsredovisningslagen möjliggör.En koppling mellan god redovisningssed och K-regelverken har identifierats i denna studie men relationen mellan K-regelverken och lagen är inte helt säkerställd. Trots detta kan studiens resultat påvisa att det ar möjligt för företag att vid ”cherry-pickning” mellan K2 och K3 dömas för bokföringsbrott.<br>In 2014 there were 12,800 cases of accounting frauds reported in Sweden. According to Penal Code (Brottsbalken), classification of an accounting fraud needs to fulfill two requisites. The first requisite addresses the disregard of accounting obligation. The Accounting Act (Bokföringslagen) prescribes that the accounting obligation must be fulfilled in a manner consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (god redovisningssed).The Swedish Accounting Standards Board (Bokföringsnämnden) is a government authority that has a statutory responsibility for the development of generally accepted accounting principles. In 2004, the board changed its focus of the development of the accounting norms for unlisted companies. With this decision, they began to work on the K-project with the purpose of establishing a comprehensive framework of regulations for the companies’ annual accounts and annual reports. The regulations were divided into different categories based on the companies’ size which were constructed on the requirements and choices encompassed by the Accounting Act. The K-regulations (K-regelverken) became mandatory for unlisted companies in 2014.The purpose of this study was to investigate the possibility of accounting fraud if a company chooses to deviate from the applied K-regulation and instead use a rule from another K-regulation, what this study calls "cherry-picking". Therefore, this qualitative study utilizes a deductive approach and conducts a survey of K-regulations and their relation to Swedish legislation, which has contributed to a clear basis for the hypothetical cases in this study. The cases in this study have been supplemented by an interview with a strategic economic crime accountant from the Swedish Economic Crime Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten).The results of this study show that a deviation from the K-regulations can be considered synonymous with a deviation from the generally accepted accounting principles. With regards to this, a deviation from the K-regulations is seen as a disregard of the accounting obligation. In order to confirm an accounting fraud based on this, the second of the two requisites of Penal Code also needs to be fulfilled, the requisite of effect. The effect requisite is fulfilled when the essence of the accounts cannot be established. It may involve a certain difficulty to prosecute a company which has deviated from the K-regulation but included information in their accounts through their notes. The result of this study also shows that the provisions of the K-regulations takes precedence over the accounting options that the Annual Accounts Act (Årsredovisningslagen) offers.A link between generally accepted accounting principles and K-regulations has been identified in this study, but the relationship between K-regulations and the law is not fully specified. Despite this results of this study demonstrate the underlying risk that companies with applies "cherry-picking" between K2 and K3, may be convicted of accounting fraud.This study is hereinafter written in Swedish.

Une notion relative (formée d’un concept de base et d’un qualificatif) pourrait apparaître comme unedisposition équivoque. Le principe de légalité impose cependant de fonder toute décision sur unenorme de référence ; la saisine d’une juridiction laisse d’ailleurs supposer que le justiciable en a uneconnaissance spontanée, ni le contexte législatif ni des mesures d’instruction ne suffisant à corrigerl’imprécision linguistique de la loi. Si la coutume permet d’expliciter le concept de base, elle necirconscrit pas pour autant le seuil induit par le qualificatif législatif. La marge d’appréciationprétorienne en découlant ne rend alors la sanction concevable qu’en fonction d’une flagrancefactuelle. Cette dernière conduit à renverser la charge probatoire, en faisant peser sur le défendeurla preuve de la normalité des faits au regard de la norme socialement acceptée. Elle exclut aussi duchamp judiciaire les situations insuffisamment caractérisées, suggérant que le Code civil tolère unepart d’anomalie dans la société et impliquant une personnalisation circonstancielle de la décision. Ensomme, la disproportion des faits est seule sanctionnée et implique une pondération des droits enconflit. Ainsi comprise, la relativité procure au droit quelque souplesse, sans entraîner d’arbitrairejudiciaire : elle permet d’englober des situations marginales dans une même finalité politique. Lerecours aux notions relatives participe donc de l’idée de ne pas réglementer par un droit imposé deplano et révèle le recul de l’ordre public de direction. Le danger réside alors dansl’instrumentalisation de la relativité pour en faire un outil légistique d’exaltation des droits subjectifs<br>A relative notion (consisting of a basic concept and a qualifier) could appear as an equivocalprovision. However the principle of legality imposes to base every decision on a reference norm ;referral to a court implies moreover that the person subject to trial has a spontaneous knowledge ofit, neither the legislative context nor investigative measures being sufficient to correct the linguisticimprecision of the law. If custom allows to make explicit the basic concept, it doesn’t for all thatdelimit the threshold inferred by the legislative qualifier. The margin of praetorian appreciationfollowing from it renders then the sanction conceivable only according to factual obviousness. Thelatter leads to reverse the onus of proof by loading the defendant with the proof of the normality ofthe facts with regard to the socially accepted norm. It also excludes from the judicial field theinsufficiently characterized situations, suggesting that the civil code tolerates a share of anomaly insociety and entailing a personalization of the decision for the occasion. In short, only thedisproportion of facts is sanctioned and involves a balancing of the rights in dispute. Understood likethis, relativity gives to the law some flexibility without leading to judicial arbitrary : it affords toinclude marginal situations into a same political finality. The recourse to relative notions is akin to theidea to not regulate by a law imposed ipso jure and reveals the retreat of directional public order. Thedanger lies then in the instrumentalization of relativity in order to make of it a legistics tool pavingthe way for an ill-considered flourishing of one’s rights

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:25:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adelucia Miranda do Amaral.pdf: 443164 bytes, checksum: 17bd46ff5700bb9af55b3d92e5c1be1d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-10-22<br>The object of this study consists in the analysis of the aspects concerning to the principle of legality within the tributary matter. Therefore we initially argued about the positive rights juridical system, as far as an object of study of the Science of Law, to be pursued by the jurist during its interpretation process and its consequential making of juridical norms. By considering that the principle of legality is one of constitutional instruments to warrant taxpayers rights, we analyzed the concerning aspects within the Brazilian constitutional juridical system, emphasizing the tributary constitutional subsystem, as supported by crowned values under the Federal Constitution of 1988, whereas Democratic State of Law. We also analyzed the juridical texts reception phenomenon stated under the former ordainment s shields in light of the new Brazilian juridical order. In the face of the principle of legality we analyzed some concerning aspects of tributary duties, specially the homologated duty. To the end, the conclusions that were able to be drawn from the presented assertions are shown in a shortened manner<br>O objeto deste trabalho consiste na análise de aspectos relevantes ao princípio da legalidade em matéria tributária. Para tanto, inicialmente, tratamos do sistema jurídico de direito positivo, enquanto objeto de estudo da Ciência do Direito, a ser percorrido pelo jurista no processo de sua interpretação e da conseqüente construção das normas jurídicas. Considerando que o princípio da legalidade é um dos instrumentos constitucionais de garantia dos direitos do contribuinte, analisamos os aspectos relevantes ao tema dentro do sistema jurídico constitucional brasileiro, com ênfase no subsistema constitucional tributário, fundados que são nos valores consagrados pela Constituição Federal de 1988, enquanto Estado Democrático de Direito. Analisamos também o fenômeno da recepção dos textos jurídicos positivados sob a égide do ordenamento anterior diante da nova ordem jurídica brasileira. Diante do princípio da legalidade, analisamos alguns aspectos relativos ao lançamento tributário, em especial o denominado lançamento por homologação. Ao final, são apresentadas, de forma sumariada, as conclusões que se podem inferir das asserções apresentadas

Guardando all intervento moderno delle amministrazioni emergenziali si ricava una costante sensazione di estrema negatività su modi, tempi ed azioni che vengono impiegati in relazione all esercizio del potere straordinario: si parla di distorsioni, imbarazzi, defraudazioni, commissariamenti nel senso deteriore del termine, etc. Ciò che si intende piuttosto di dimostrare è che non bisogna necessariamente guardare con sfavore alle distorsioni dell uso dei poteri di emergenza, oggi incastonati, con procedimento metonimico, nel sistema della protezione civile. A legislazione invariata infatti, cioè fino a quando non verranno accolte le proposte normative che vanno via via formandosi sul tema dell organizzazione dell emergenza, occorre nel frattempo saper cogliere quanto di buono consegue dalle gestioni commissariali, in particolare l ampliamento dei poteri amministrativi e delle attribuzioni in capo ai vertici degli enti locali. Si amplia il novero dei poteri, forse si confonde la regola della separazione tra politica ed amministrazione ma si fa maggiormente leva sulla tecnica per dotare delle necessarie competenze gli organi politici. Il tutto, senza che ciò -almeno così sembra- vada a discapito del rapporto democratico con la comunità degli amministrati, perché anzi il ricorso all amministrazione dell emergenza diventa la regola ordinaria per ottenere risorse finanziarie che diversamente non potrebbero entrare nella disponibilità del medesimo ente in regime ordinario. Esiste cioè un ritorno a favore dei cittadini che deriva dal fatto che si allargano in via straordinaria le attribuzioni dei vertici degli organi rappresentativi dell ente locale, e di queste attribuzioni l amministrazione si avvale per procurare i nuovi beni-vita ed il benessere sociale, nell era della crisi, alla propria comunità. Si valorizza per questo motivo la regola del sostegno, del subsidium, con l intenzione di affermare che l intervento emergenziale non va a perpetuare una sostituzione, ma piuttosto un vero e proprio aiuto, accompagnando il soggetto pubblico nello svolgimento compito, senza meccanismi sanzionatori o punitivi. Nel predetto ordine di considerazioni si colloca, e forse trova una soluzione, lo stesso annoso problema del rapporto tra principio di legalità ed emergenza, in altre parole la questione se l emergenza stia al di dentro della legalità, rappresentandone l eccezione temperata, peraltro tenuta altamente sotto controllo dagli interventi della Corte costituzionale e dall ipertrofia legislativa manifestatasi negli ultimi anni, o se si pone invece in un regime incontrollato, del tutto atipico ed extra ordinem. Ciò che tuttavia emerge, rispetto alle anzidette due antitetiche posizioni, è che si stia pian piano formando un vero e proprio principio di legalità dell emergenza , che la legalità abbia cioè sviluppato i propri anticorpi per tutelarsi dall insorgere incontrollato delle situazioni di urgenza e dalla relativa disciplina eccezionale ed abbia finito così per ricamare un vestito addosso all emergenza stessa che rappresenta la nuova cornice, pienamente legalitaria, del regime straordinario. In tal senso, non si potrebbe più parlare di atipicità, perché lentamente si assisterebbe una nuova tipizzazione di un principio di legalità che, così operando, istituirebbe un ordinamento parallelo e si conformerebbe maggiormente alla concezione della legalità-indirizzo, di impulso al raggiungimento degli obiettivi prefissati dall azione amministrativa, piuttosto invece che a quello di legalità-garanzia, che si è fin qui soltanto (e forse eccessivamente) preoccupato di arginare, di tutelare e contemporaneamente di ingessare il sistema, generando le contraddizioni che oggi sono sotto gli occhi di tutti.

Document polyvalent, la thèse a pour ambition de démontrer que le détail juridique que la facture constitue en apparence, peut masquer des problématiques épineuses. La facture a été victime d'un détournement de fonction en raison de la pratique courante de l'insertion de données qui ne figureraient pas sur une facture rudimentaire. Il y a eu une inflation de la charge juridique contenue dans le document. C'est la possibilité du « phénomène contentieux » autour de l'acceptation d'une clause insérée dans la facture qui a permis à cette dernière d'intégrer la sphère contractuelle. Ce mouvement inflationniste s'est doublé d'une appropriation étatique du document. La juridicité du document a été renforcée par le législateur au nom d'un renforcement des conditions de libre concurrence conférant alors au document une dimension technique. Le document est alors marqué du sceau de l'autonomie, celle-ci menaçant alors d'autres droits fondamentaux et notamment, le principe de légalité, au nom d'une transparence invasive. La facture est alors sans aucun doute alors une image double. Ce qui saisit, c'est la trajectoire vécue par un document plus que polyvalent ayant pour point de départ une pratique naturelle et parvenant à un point d'arrivée technique et pesant. Le droit de la facture traduit fidèlement l'état d'un droit sous tension en ce que la législation obligatoire sur la facture est contraignante et ne répond pas aux exigences de sécurité juridique<br>Versatile paper, the thesis aims to demonstrate that the legal detail that the bill is apparently can hide thorny issues. The bill was the victim of a function of diversion due to the common practice of inserting data that do not appear on a rudimentary bill. There was an inflation of legal charge contained in the document. It is the possibility of " disputes phenomenon " around the acceptance of a clause in the bill which allowed the latter to integrate the contractual sphere. However, this movement is accompanied by another paradigm shift, when the legislature wished to seize the invoice into a competitive tool. Juridicity document has been strengthened by the legislature in the name of strengthening the conditions of free competition while giving the document a technical dimension. The document is then marked with the seal of autonomy, it then threatening other human rights, including the principle of legality, on behalf of invasive transparency. The invoice is then undoubtedly be a double image. What grabs is the trajectory experienced by a paper more versatile than having to base a natural practice and achieving a technical point of arrival and weighing. The right of the bill accurately reflects the state of a power law in that mandatory legislation on the invoice is binding and does not meet the requirements of legal certainty

Na evolução da teoria do tipo penal, podemos perceber um movimento de intensificação de complexidade, no qual os mais novos e diferentes posicionamentos doutrinários confluem para tornar aquela figura o ponto central do estudo do delito. Dentre as inúmeras classificações dogmáticas que surgiram neste desenvolvimento, nosso trabalho analisa uma em particular: a divisão entre tipos fechados e tipos abertos. Embora criada originalmente por Hans WELZEL para descrever um grupo específico de casos, a noção de tipos abertos ganhou contornos mais amplos, sendo admitida pela doutrina de maneira geral. Todavia, a aceitação dessa categoria científica não se limitou a uma atividade expositiva, servindo para a crítica de modelos jurídicos. Frente ao princípio da legalidade, conquista jurídica de longa data, os estudiosos do Direito Penal apontaram a ilegitimidade dos tipos abertos, por ofensa ao mandato de certeza, um dos quatro aspectos daquele princípio maior. Por outro lado, as conclusões da atual ciência hermenêutica ensinam que não se pode confundir texto legal e norma, e que a compreensão do fenômeno jurídico perpassa uma série de valorações adstritas ao Direito. Neste sentido, as diferenças que, em tese, tornavam específicos os tipos abertos, quando confrontadas com essa nova descoberta, se mostram apenas aparentes. Toda e qualquer norma apresenta um caráter aberto, algo intrínseco à linguagem humana. Logo, não existe tipo fechado. Inobstante, a censura que fora aventada pela doutrina não perde sua razão de ser. Pelo contrário, é necessária sua reformulação, para afirmar que o problema se encontra no grau de intensidade da abertura, na aceitabilidade ou não da indeterminação da conduta humana diante do caso concreto, único instante em que é possível a individualização da norma. Para tanto, é preciso erigir critérios seguros a fim de efetuar o julgamento da legitimidade dos tipos penais. Defendemos que os próprios fundamentos do princípio da legalidade a vedação da arbitrariedade e a previsibilidade das condutas servem como critérios de avaliação. Mais ainda, a realização dessa operação somente pode ser feita por meio do controle das decisões judiciais, o que nos leva a um problema de ordem prática e não apenas teórica.<br>In the evolution of the criminal type theory, we can notice a movement of complexity intensification, in which the newest and most different doctrinal positions join together to make that figure the central point of the crime study. Among the multiple dogmatic classifications that aroused in this development, our task analyses one in particular: the division between closed and open types. Though originally created by Hans WELZEL to describe a specific group of cases, the notion of open types acquired a wider profile, being generally admitted by the doctrine. However, the acceptance of this scientific category has not been limited to an expository activity, serving to the critic of juridical models. Before the principle of the legality, a long-term juridical conquer, the scholars of the Criminal Law pointed to the illegitimacy of the open types, due to the offense of the certainty term, as one of the four aspects of that major principle. Moreover, the conclusions of todays hermeneutic science instruct that one cannot confuse legal text and norm, and that the comprehension of the juridical phenomenon pervades a series of valuations bonded to Law. In this way, the differences that, in thesis, made specific the open types, when confronted with this new finding, prove to be only apparent. All and any rule presents an open feature, an aspect intrinsic to human language. Therefore, there are no closed types. Despite that, the censure that was made by doctrine does not lose its reason. In the opposite, its reformulation is necessary, to affirm that the problem is in the intensity extent of the opening, in the acceptance or not of the human conduct indetermination ahead of a concrete case, the single moment in which it is possible to individualize the rule. Therefore, it is necessary to built firm criteria to perform the judgment of the criminal types legitimacy. We sustain that the own foundations of the principle of the legality the prohibition of arbitrariness and the prevision of conducts serve as evaluation criteria. Furthermore, the accomplishment of this transaction can only be fulfilled by the control of judiciary decisions, what leads us to a practical problem, not only theoretical.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-12-13T11:43:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Camila Chierighini Nazar Moreira de Souza e Silva.pdf: 1619523 bytes, checksum: 34cfb06942e93cf2767433716de9940b (MD5)<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-12-13T11:43:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Camila Chierighini Nazar Moreira de Souza e Silva.pdf: 1619523 bytes, checksum: 34cfb06942e93cf2767433716de9940b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-11-22<br>This paper deals with the importance of the principle of tax legality from the “rule of law” to the present day, especially from the philosophical conception of the referred principle under the positivism and post positivism perspectives. After the contextualization of the influence of law in the State and the importance of the principles under the Brazilian constitutional system, it is presented the “ideal state” of the principle of tax legality. The principles are the true foundation of the Brazilian tax system and the principle of tax legality has a specific role in tax matters, mainly under the Brazilian Constitution enacted in 1988. The Brazilian Constitution is extremely detailed and indicates the exact path to be taken by the State to carry out the tax activity. Along with such specific role, this paper also analyzed how the three powers of the Brazilian State coexist with the principle of tax legality and whether the Brazilian Supreme Court has ensured the proper effectiveness and concreteness of this principle<br>O presente trabalho trata da importância do princípio da legalidade tributária, desde o surgimento do Estado de Direito até os dias atuais, notadamente a partir da concepção jusfilosófica deste princípio sob as perspectivas positivista e pós-positivista. Com efeito, após a contextualização da importância da lei no surgimento do Estado e da importância dos princípios na ordem constitucional brasileira, que são verdadeiros alicerces do edifício jurídico, apresenta-se o “estado ideal de ser” da legalidade para o direito tributário. Em matéria tributária, o princípio da legalidade tem nuances específicas e especiais sob a égide da Constituição Federal promulgada em 1988. Sem exceção à regra, o texto constitucional é extremamente minucioso e indica o exato caminho a ser percorrido para o Estado exercer a atividade tributante. A par dessas nuances específicas e especiais, o princípio da legalidade tributária é influenciado diretamente pelos direitos fundamentais, notadamente pelos direitos à propriedade e à liberdade. Por essa razão, analisa-se de que forma os três poderes do Estado brasileiro convivem com o princípio da legalidade tributária e se o Supremo Tribunal Federal tem garantido a devida efetividade e concretude a este princípio

O momentum simbolizado pela plena atuação do Tribunal Penal Internacional mais de anos após a entrada em vigor de seu Estatuto traz esperanças e constatações difíceis. Assim, correto o entendimento de que a instituição é um dos pilares para a construção de ordem internacional pautada pela pacífica convivência entre as nações, na qual não existam mais massacres ou ditaduras. Ocorre que a recente história da humanidade mostra-se como lamentável comprovação de que essa luz no fim do túnel ainda encontra-se distante de ser alcançada. Da análise dos julgamentos resulta claro que a pretendida atuação preventiva no sentido de evitar que os crimes sejam cometidos pela pronta intervenção de sua jurisdição no conflito, ainda é uma quimera, sendo realidade a atuação ex post factum em relação aos poucos acusados que sentaram no banco dos réus até então. A partir da premissa de que a função primordial do TPI é a investigação, processo e julgamento e, em sendo o caso, condenação dos suspeitos, resulta clara a preponderância do aspecto penal. Como visto, no único caso que conta com sentença condenatória proferida (Lubanga), ao lado do reconhecimento da importância da reparação das vítimas manteve-se a prevalência da função de prevenção geral e especial do organismo internacional. Assentado esse aspecto, tornou-se imperioso compreender como os juízes vinham interpretando os requisitos da AM-AOP. A importância da hipótese foi por diversas vezes evidenciada no trabalho e de certa forma já era antevista na ressalva de Claus Roxin, quando de sua criação em 1963. Assim, a partir da adoção pelos juízes do TPI da teoria da autoria mediata em razão de aparatos de poder como fundamento da figura prevista no artigo 25(3)(a), terceira hipótese, do Estatuto e da constatação de que é única forma idealizada para dar conta, em termos dogmáticos, das especificidades dos crimes praticados em grande escala e sistematicamente tem-se clara a perspectiva de que se torne importante opção de imputação. dos crimes de competência do Tribunal aos acusados. Até o momento o encaminhamento dos casos não permite avaliar a aplicação dos critérios da AM-AOP em sede de sentença, tendo chegado somente até a Decisão de Confirmação das Acusações no caso Katanga e Chui. A AM-AOP ganha maior relevo, outrossim, em vista das diretrizes de política criminal trazidas pelos juízes na fundamentação de suas decisões, dentre as quais podem ser referidas a busca pelo combate da impunidade desses criminosos, bem como a tendência a que se reconheça a maior importância do julgamento dos maiores responsáveis pelos crimes cometidos. Da análise dos casos resulta que a afirmação desse escopo não vem acompanhada de explicitação das razões que legitimariam esse enfoque. Ademais, a presença de um chefe de Estado no banco dos réus não se presta de garantia a que seus subordinados não cometam crimes. Os requisitos dessa forma de intervenção no fato seguem em substância a proposta de Roxin, não tendo sido incorporada somente a exigência de que os aparatos organizados de poder atuem à margem do ordenamento jurídico. Embora não haja condenação até o momento de réu com fundamento na AM-AOP, tem-se claro que poderá ser de extrema valia para a subsunção dos crimes sob investigação ou julgamento nos demais casos nos quais está sendo aplicada mas cujo andamento está impossibilitado por não terem sido presos os acusados (Saif Al Islam e Omar Al Bashir). A combinação das hipóteses da coautoria e da AM-AOP na figura híbrida da coautoria mediata encontra óbice sob duas perspectivas: não convence em termos dogmáticos porque contraria a construção teórica proposta por Claus Roxin: os critérios do domínio funcional do fato no caso de coautoria e o do domínio da vontade na vertente, interessante para a presente discussão, de AM-AOP amoldam-se à realidade que se pretende enquadrar em termos jurídicos de formas distintas. De outra parte, tendo-se em mente a rigidez do critério da essencialidade da contribuição típico do domínio funcional do fato a mera soma dos requisitos previstos para cada uma das vertentes não parece ser uma boa solução em vista do objetivo de imputar os crimes através das categorias do Estatuto aos acusados preservando equilíbrio entre a busca de responsabilização penal concreta e efetiva e a preservação dos direitos e garantias do réu. O dissenso do Juiz Cuno Tarfusser no caso Katanga explicita essa violação. Por outro lado, essa forma de agir da maioria dos juízes traz flagrante intepretação in malam partem proibida pelo artigo 22(2), do ER. Espera-se que a posição da Juíza Van den Wyngaert manifestada em seu Voto Dissidente no caso Procurador v.Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ganhe maior força no seio do Tribunal nos próximos anos. Apesar das críticas suscitadas tem-se claro que os avanços conquistados pelos juízes nessa complexa e delicada área da teoria do delito do direito penal internacional são de fundamental importância não somente para o aprimoramento das figuras jurídicas como também para a legitimação da atuação do tribunal perante os estados dada a sua vocação universalista.<br>O momentum simbolizado pela plena atuação do Tribunal Penal Internacional mais de anos após a entrada em vigor de seu Estatuto traz esperanças e constatações difíceis. Assim, correto o entendimento de que a instituição é um dos pilares para a construção de ordem internacional pautada pela pacífica convivência entre as nações, na qual não existam mais massacres ou ditaduras. Ocorre que a recente história da humanidade mostra-se como lamentável comprovação de que essa luz no fim do túnel ainda encontra-se distante de ser alcançada. Da análise dos julgamentos resulta claro que a pretendida atuação preventiva no sentido de evitar que os crimes sejam cometidos pela pronta intervenção de sua jurisdição no conflito, ainda é uma quimera, sendo realidade a atuação ex post factum em relação aos poucos acusados que sentaram no banco dos réus até então. A partir da premissa de que a função primordial do TPI é a investigação, processo e julgamento e, em sendo o caso, condenação dos suspeitos, resulta clara a preponderância do aspecto penal. Como visto, no único caso que conta com sentença condenatória proferida (Lubanga), ao lado do reconhecimento da importância da reparação das vítimas manteve-se a prevalência da função de prevenção geral e especial do organismo internacional. Assentado esse aspecto, tornou-se imperioso compreender como os juízes vinham interpretando os requisitos da AM-AOP. A importância da hipótese foi por diversas vezes evidenciada no trabalho e de certa forma já era antevista na ressalva de Claus Roxin, quando de sua criação em 1963. Assim, a partir da adoção pelos juízes do TPI da teoria da autoria mediata em razão de aparatos de poder como fundamento da figura prevista no artigo 25(3)(a), terceira hipótese, do Estatuto e da constatação de que é única forma idealizada para dar conta, em termos dogmáticos, das especificidades dos crimes praticados em grande escala e sistematicamente tem-se clara a perspectiva de que se torne importante opção de imputação. dos crimes de competência do Tribunal aos acusados. Até o momento o encaminhamento dos casos não permite avaliar a aplicação dos critérios da AM-AOP em sede de sentença, tendo chegado somente até a Decisão de Confirmação das Acusações no caso Katanga e Chui. A AM-AOP ganha maior relevo, outrossim, em vista das diretrizes de política criminal trazidas pelos juízes na fundamentação de suas decisões, dentre as quais podem ser referidas a busca pelo combate da impunidade desses criminosos, bem como a tendência a que se reconheça a maior importância do julgamento dos maiores responsáveis pelos crimes cometidos. Da análise dos casos resulta que a afirmação desse escopo não vem acompanhada de explicitação das razões que legitimariam esse enfoque. Ademais, a presença de um chefe de Estado no banco dos réus não se presta de garantia a que seus subordinados não cometam crimes. Os requisitos dessa forma de intervenção no fato seguem em substância a proposta de Roxin, não tendo sido incorporada somente a exigência de que os aparatos organizados de poder atuem à margem do ordenamento jurídico. Embora não haja condenação até o momento de réu com fundamento na AM-AOP, tem-se claro que poderá ser de extrema valia para a subsunção dos crimes sob investigação ou julgamento nos demais casos nos quais está sendo aplicada mas cujo andamento está impossibilitado por não terem sido presos os acusados (Saif Al Islam e Omar Al Bashir). A combinação das hipóteses da coautoria e da AM-AOP na figura híbrida da coautoria mediata encontra óbice sob duas perspectivas: não convence em termos dogmáticos porque contraria a construção teórica proposta por Claus Roxin: os critérios do domínio funcional do fato no caso de coautoria e o do domínio da vontade na vertente, interessante para a presente discussão, de AM-AOP amoldam-se à realidade que se pretende enquadrar em termos jurídicos de formas distintas. De outra parte, tendo-se em mente a rigidez do critério da essencialidade da contribuição típico do domínio funcional do fato a mera soma dos requisitos previstos para cada uma das vertentes não parece ser uma boa solução em vista do objetivo de imputar os crimes através das categorias do Estatuto aos acusados preservando equilíbrio entre a busca de responsabilização penal concreta e efetiva e a preservação dos direitos e garantias do réu. O dissenso do Juiz Cuno Tarfusser no caso Katanga explicita essa violação. Por outro lado, essa forma de agir da maioria dos juízes traz flagrante intepretação in malam partem proibida pelo artigo 22(2), do ER. Espera-se que a posição da Juíza Van den Wyngaert manifestada em seu Voto Dissidente no caso Procurador v.Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui ganhe maior força no seio do Tribunal nos próximos anos. Apesar das críticas suscitadas tem-se claro que os avanços conquistados pelos juízes nessa complexa e delicada área da teoria do delito do direito penal internacional são de fundamental importância não somente para o aprimoramento das figuras jurídicas como também para a legitimação da atuação do tribunal perante os estados dada a sua vocação universalista.

L’approche de la qualification en droit pénal se fait traditionnellement sous l’angle d’une opération intellectuelle dominée par le principe de légalité et, en particulier, par le principe de l’interprétation stricte de la loi pénale. Une telle approche occulte la dimension procédurale de la qualification en droit pénal qui est, pourtant, essentielle à la sauvegarde des libertés individuelles. La conjugaison de ces deux aspects de la qualification en droit pénal aboutit à faire émerger une forme statique de qualification : la qualification pénale des faits. Située entre l’incrimination et l’infraction, la qualification pénale des faits offre un statut intermédiaire où la nature des faits pénaux va être représentée intellectuellement en tenant compte de l’évolution du procès pénal. Plus précisément, la qualification pénale des faits s’analyse en une représentation encadrée et appliquée de la nature pénale des faits. Encadrée doublement par le principe de légalité et le principe du procès équitable, la qualification pénale des faits offre une représentation légaliste et équitable de la nature pénale des faits. Mais l’encadrement de la qualification pénale ne suffit pas à lui seul à l’élaboration de la qualification pénale des faits. Son élaboration commence bien en amont, alors que la qualification pénale des faits n’est que pure présomption dans l’esprit de l’autorité qualifiante. C’est au cours d’une application répressive et symbolique que la qualification pénale des faits se concrétise, faisant ainsi apparaître la qualification pénale des faits comme un objet juridique. D’une opération particulière au droit pénal, la qualification pénale des faits devient, à l’analyse, un concept proposant à l’esprit une manière de concevoir la nature pénale des faits<br>The approach of the characterization of the facts in criminal law is generally treated as an intellectual operation ruled by the principle of legality and more particularly by the principle of the strict interpretation of criminal law. Such an approach hides the procedural dimension of the characterization of facts in criminal law which is, however, essential to the protection of individual freedoms. The union of these two aspects of the characterization leads to a static form: the characterization of facts. Situated between the incrimination and the offense, it proposes an intermediate status where the nature of the criminal facts will be represented intellectually taking into consideration the evolution of the criminal trial. More precisely, the characterization of facts is analyzed as a framed and applied representation of the nature of the criminal facts. Framed by the principles of legality and of the right to a fair trial, the criminal characterization of facts offers a legalist and fair image of the criminal nature of the facts. But the frame alone is not sufficient to elaborate the notion of characterization of facts. Its elaboration begins upstream when it is a sheer presumption in the mind of the qualifying authority. It is during the process of a repressive and symbolic application that the characterization of the facts materializes, thus becoming a judicial object. In a manner peculiar to criminal law, the characterization of the facts becomes a concept which suggests a way to apprehend the criminal nature of the facts

2010/2011<br>Sommario Il principio di legalità nel diritto penale sembra avere subito in tempi recenti quello che può definirsi il processo di eterogenesi dei fini. Quanto più esso ha trovato riconoscimento incontestato tra gi studiosi, affannati ad espungere le fonti secondarie, tanto più la fonte primaria ha smarrito i connotati che ne conclamavano il valore: per un verso, in attuazione del principio di uguaglianza, la generalità e l’astrattezza; per un altro verso, in attuazione del principio di garanzia statuito a vantaggio dei destinatari della norma, la descrizione precisa e pregnante del fatto illecito e delle conseguenze punitive. Se ben deve riconoscersi, come insegnato già da Aristotele, che spetta alla legge determinare “tutto quanto è possibile”, restringendo il campo della libertà ai giudici soprattutto “perché il giudizio del legislatore non è particolare, ma riguarda il futuro e l’universale, mentre il componente dell’assemblea e il giudice giocano ogni volta su casi presenti e determinati”, incorrendo così il rischio per “amicizia, odio o utilità particolare di non vedere sufficientemente la verità, ma il piacere o il dispiacere personale”, allora è evidente come e quanto la fonte legislativa tenda attualmente a distaccarsi dai suoi fondamenti. Da un lato, la perdita di autorevolezza del legislatore determina un calo generalizzato della fiducia nella legge, vista come incapace di risolvere i nodi cruciali del diritto penale; dall’altro la giurisprudenza, “approfittando” di tale situazione, tende ad affermare la sua autorità mediante la correzione in via interpretativa dei supposti errori e delle lacune dei prodotti legislativi. Questi fattori determinano dubbi in ordine al valore oggi da attribuire alla legge, la cui supremazia dovrebbe derivare, non solo formalmente dall’organo rappresentativo che la emana, ma anche sostanzialmente da alcune peculiarità che dovrebbero caratterizzarla, quali generalità, astrattezza, stabilità, determinatezza, precisione, chiarezza, imperatività e razionalità. Tutte caratteristiche queste che sono state viste consuetamente come dirette a realizzare i valori di libertà, uguaglianza e sicurezza collettiva, di cui lo Stato si è fatto garante assoluto. Inoltre, la diluizione formale e sostanziale della sovranità, determinata, sul piano esterno, dalla moltiplicazione dei vincoli internazionali e comunitari e, su quello interno, dalla tendenza a sostituire, a livello di tecnica di regolazione giuridica, il precetto autoritario col metodo della negoziazione e del bilanciamento degli interessi dei rappresentanti dei poteri socialmente forti, solleva ulteriori perplessità sulla validità del principio di stretta legalità nel campo penale. Da non dimenticare, poi, come l’erosione del dogma, sempre alla base della legalità, della rigida sottoposizione del giudice alla legge, abbia favorito l’accrescersi dello spazio interpretativo lasciato alla giurisdizione. Procedendo con ordine, occorre subito rammentare che il senso più pregnante della garanzia apprestata dalla riserva di legge, come garantita dall’art. 25 Cost., nei confronti del c.d. potere punitivo non è solo quello della possibilità data all’individuo di regolare il proprio comportamento su una previa regola generale e astratta, ma è anche e soprattutto quello derivante dalla democraticità, che appunto individua nel procedimento legislativo il migliore sistema con cui prendere decisioni politiche. La crisi della riserva di legge consegue ad una crescente incapacità della stessa di dispiegare il suo ruolo di garanzia su entrambi i piani. Tralasciando i contorni davvero fittizi che ha assunto la garanzia della libertà di autodeterminazione offerta dalla legge al cittadino, ciò che qui rileva è la qualità della legge e della legislazione, pregiudicata dalla produzione quantitativamente inflazionistica e qualitativamente sciatta da rendere nulla più che una finzione la possibilità per il cittadino di orientare il proprio comportamento sulla base di una norma sufficientemente chiara. Ma l’aspetto che più preme è quello della garanzia recata della legge in ragione della sua democraticità, definibile come contenutistica. Su questo piano tre paiono le linee di caduta della legalità: la perdita di consistenza dello stesso principio democratico tradizionale; la trasformazione del sistema delle fonti e la loro proliferazione a scapito della legge; l’alterazione dell’originario equilibrio tra la legge e il potere giudiziario. Quanto al primo aspetto ci si interroga su quali siano i reali vettori che conducono la volontà popolare a trovare espressione nella legge, se i meccanismi della rappresentanza parlamentare o non, piuttosto, le interpretazioni che di tale volontà forniscono le concentrazioni massmediatiche e più in generale i potenti gruppi economici con la loro attività lobbistica; nel campo penale poi il carattere spesso emotivamente coinvolgente delle materie oggetto di disciplina penale finisce per accrescere il ruolo dei mass media nella formazione del necessario consenso sociale. Per quanto riguarda poi le conseguenze del passaggio al sistema maggioritario, è facile constatare come all’accentuato potere della maggioranza in sede parlamentare e governativa faccia riscontro la tendenza a protrarre il processo di formazione normativa presso gli organi di garanzia, quali Corte costituzionale e Presidente della Repubblica. Il fatto è poi che la democrazia non costituisce più l’unico asse su cui si regge il sistema istituzionale. In primo luogo si assiste al diffondersi dell’opera interpretativa dei giudici, per non parlare delle decisioni della Corte Costituzionale. Infatti, sebbene la Corte Costituzionale abbia consolidato un rigoroso self restreint quanto alle questioni di costituzionalità in malam partem, ciò non ha evitato, da parte della stessa, manipolazioni di disciplina talvolta davvero innovative e creative, con effetti favorevoli per il reo. Basti all’uopo pensare alle c.d. sentenze additive di principio, con cui la Corte dichiara l’incostituzionalità di una omissione legislativa: esse, enunciando anche il principio a cui dovrà ispirarsi il legislatore se e quando deciderà di provvedere, implicano, per un verso, forti limiti al quomodo dell’eventuale disciplina legislativa e, per altro verso, conferiscono da subito al giudice il potere-dovere di tradurre sul piano operativo il principio affermato. In secondo luogo, non è possibile non prendere d’atto che alla volontà e certezza alla base della legalità di stampo illuminista, in grado quindi di controllare previamente il conflitto di interessi, si è sostituita l’idea del diritto come strumento di governance dei plurimi interessi in gioco. Alla volontà unitaria del precetto penale si sostituiscono, più che le volontà dei giudici e delle parti chiamati a confrontarsi con la fattispecie, le valutazioni che essi opereranno per rendere la disciplina coerente con gli obiettivi strategici del sistema; dunque, governance al posto di volontà prescrittiva. Questo mutamento comporta nella pratica che alla rigidità descrittiva della fattispecie penale si sostituisca l’indicazione legislativa di parametri, criteri e obiettivi di disciplina; alla certezza della decisione giuridica, sintomo di onnipotenza del diritto, è subentrato l’equilibrio che è, invece, il risultato di un diritto che riconosce la molteplicità delle forze e la conseguente difficoltà delle scelte decisionali e per questo vi appresta degli strumenti per arrivarvi. In terzo luogo, non si può non osservare come la realtà, sempre più pervasa dalla tecnologia, abbia determinato lo spostamento del baricentro normativo dall’organo parlamentare all’apparato amministrativo, con tutta la fioritura di autorità indipendenti e organi tecnici dotati di specifiche competenze comprensive di poteri normativi. Quanto al secondo piano del discorso attinente alle fonti, si può osservare come la maggior parte degli atti parlamentari aventi un contenuto provvedimentale sono quelli elaborati all’esterno attraverso la c.d. contrattualizzazione del processo di formazione della decisione normativa, mentre le poche leggi di principio spesso assumono valore simbolico o si limitano a comporre il conflitto ideologico che sta alla loro base solo grazie a formulazioni ambigue e indeterminate, tali cioè da esprimere solo in apparenza una volontà parlamentare, rimettendo, nella realtà, la decisione agli organi dell’applicazione. Ma ciò che segna la crisi della legge penale è, come noto, l’incremento delle fonti primarie di origine governativa: dopo l’alt dato dalla Corte Costituzionale all’abuso del decreto legge, si è aperta la stagione del decreto delegato. I requisiti costituzionali della delegazione legislativa hanno subito un progressivo allentamento nella prassi, ma è soprattutto con l’invenzione dei decreti delegati correttivi che si è ottenuto il risultato di un prolungamento della delega che tende a stabilizzare nel Governo il potere di normazione primaria. In questo quadro si inserisce anche il procedimento di attuazione delle direttive comunitarie, affidato appunto ad un meccanismo che fa congiuntamente ricorso alla delegazione legislativa e alla delegificazione. In ogni caso, data la quantità di direttive che ormai condizionano la fisionomia attuale dell’ordinamento, ne risulta per questa via potenziato il ruolo delle fonti primarie di origine governativa. Naturalmente si potrebbe osservare, non senza fondamento, che la crisi della legge riguarda l’ordinamento nel suo complesso, mentre il diritto penale dovrebbe esserne immune stante la riserva di legge costituzionalmente sancita in materia. Ma è altrettanto vero che il diritto penale non può ritenersi avulso dalla realtà, condividendo, in misura maggiore o minore, le sorti dell’intero ordinamento, sollecitato com’è, anch’esso, ad aprirsi al pluralismo delle fonti da fattori sia interni che esterni. Invero, se il quadro sopra descritto concerne i fattori interni della crisi del principio della riserva di legge, non si può fare a meno di notare come elementi di minaccia promanino anche dall’esterno; all’uopo occorre distinguere tra diritto comunitario e quello internazionale. Nello scenario mondiale domina ancora lo strumento convenzionale, il quale fa salva la sovranità nazionale e il ruolo del Parlamento, chiamato ad autorizzare la ratifica delle sempre più numerose convenzioni internazionali multilaterali. Tuttavia la libertà dell’organo parlamentare appare piuttosto limitata: da un lato, le convenzioni concernenti la materia penale paiono sempre più dettagliate, perché si spingono non solo a formulare modelli minuziosi di fattispecie ma, non di rado, vincolano gli Stati anche a livello del trattamento sanzionatorio; dall’altro, l’oggetto di tali atti normativi è sempre più spesso tale da imporre obblighi sempre più difficilmente eludibili dagli Stati. Si assiste pertanto ad un fenomeno di grande interesse sul piano delle fonti, caratterizzato dalla riduzione del margine di discrezionalità del legislatore nazionale di fronte ad atti convenzionali e di fatto cogenti, i quali per un verso traggono origine da organi privi di legittimazione democratica e per altro verso si rivelano dotati di una particolare autorevolezza derivante da una legittimazione fattuale fondata sulla capacità di soddisfare bisogni di tutela ovunque condivisi. Passando all’ordinamento comunitario si assiste, oltre al già menzionato meccanismo di recepimento predisposto dalla legge comunitaria annuale, sia all’estensione della competenza penale dell’Unione europea ad opera del Trattato di Lisbona, che al sempre più ampio ricorso a direttive, a loro volta sempre più stringenti e dettagliate, anche riguardo al profilo sanzionatorio, così che anche qui il ruolo della volontà parlamentare nella produzione del diritto penale risulta ridotta. Il descritto stato di crisi del principio di legalità è costretto, altresì, a fare i conti con il diffondersi, nel nostro ordinamento, di un nuovo fenomeno di natura esogena: il (o anche la) soft law, locuzione traducibile in italiano come diritto leggero, ovvero morbido, ovvero soffice, ovvero attenuato. Con tale espressione si intende far riferimento ad una moltitudine variegata di atti latu sensu normativi, accomunati dall’assenza del requisito della forza cogente, che, appunto, sembrava essere l’essenza della nozione di norma giuridica. Alla luce di tale definizione risulta allora evidente come affrontare la tematica della soft law significhi affrontare un paradosso. Innanzitutto perché all’interno di tale categoria vengono ricompresi una congerie di atti che, seppur privi di efficacia obbligatoria, dispiegano comunque degli effetti giuridici. Secondariamente, ma non certo per importanza, tale ambiguità emerge, con immediatezza dall’accostamento dell’aggettivo soft al termine law: il diritto è, infatti, per tradizione considerato hard, ossia obbligatorio. Secondo l’impostazione maggioritaria, infatti, un soft law privo di effetti legali non è law, laddove un soft law fornito di essi è sicuramente hard law. Nonostante tale posizione tradizionale prevalente, alcuni studiosi, a partire dagli anni Settanta del secolo scorso hanno cominciato, nell’ambito del diritto internazionale, a prospettare la possibilità di immaginare l’esistenza di un tertium genus di fonte di produzione del diritto, nascente in risposta alla complessità giuridica della globalizzazione. Lo sviluppo del diritto soffice testimonierebbe, in tal senso, la possibilità di ingresso nel circuito della giuridicità di soggetti nuovi, non sempre formalmente titolari delle competenze necessarie per produrre un diritto “a denominazione di origine controllata”. Ciò implica anche la creazione di un circuito giuridico che attiva logiche e processi che superano il criterio essenziale dell’obbedienza. In pratica, non si tratta solo di un percorso di perdita del carattere verticale del diritto, ma anche in un certo senso di un rimodellamento del suo criterio di legittimazione, che non è più affidato alla forma, ma piuttosto ad un contenuto o a delle modalità che sappiano riscuotere l’adesione dei destinatari, indipendentemente dalla previsione di sanzioni. Alla luce delle descritte peculiarità della normativa attenuata, tutto il sistema penale, hard law per eccellenza, sembra muoversi in una direzione antitetica a quella della soft law. In particolare, questa antinomia si appalesa in tutta la sua chiarezza ove si mettano a confronto alcune caratteristiche fondamentali delle due normative: se l’unico organo di produzione abilitato in campo penale è, ai sensi dell’art. 25 Cost., il Parlamento, in quello attenuato gli enti legittimati sono plurimi e non sono solo statali, substatali o sovranazionali, ma anche espressivi di poteri non necessariamente a carattere territoriale; mentre le norme soffici possono anche limitarsi a porre degli obiettivi, quelle penali devono essere formulate quanto più possibile in modo chiaro e preciso, indicando inequivocabilmente i comportamenti vietati; laddove i destinatari delle norme attenuate coincidono spesso con i soggetti produttori delle stesse e si indirizzano solitamente a categorie ben individuate di soggetti, le norme penali generalmente si rivolgono in maniera indifferenziata a tutti gli individui presenti sul territorio statale; se il diritto debole costituisce un diritto meramente esortativo, diretto a persuadere più che ad obbligare, risultando pertanto privo di sanzioni, all’opposto il diritto penale è il ramo dell’ordinamento giuridico più di ogni altro vincolante; la normativa leggera prescinde dal tradizionale modello delle fonti kelseniano di tipo piramidale, su cui il sistema penale si fonda, per collocarsi all’interno di un modello improntato ad una logica reticolare, senza gerarchie; la soft law è per definizione destinata ad operare in ogni ambito, da quello angusto di una singola impresa a quello sconfinato del mercato globale, mentre il diritto penale è la branca meno universalizzabile, perché simbolizza la sovranità nazionale e la cultura di ciascun popolo; infine, se il diritto penale si caratterizza per un elevato tasso di rigidità e stabilità, dati i beni giuridici che va a tutelare, all’opposto il diritto morbido si esprime con strumenti non solo flessibili, ma anche mutevoli, per meglio rispondere alla rapida evoluzione della società. Tale insanabile antinomia tra diritto soffice e diritto penale pare però, ad un’attenta analisi del panorama giuridico attuale, più astratta che reale, ove solo si consideri quanto detto in apertura sulla crisi dei principi di legalità e della riserva di legge e sulla progressiva alterazione di alcuni tratti peculiari del diritto penale.<br>XXIV Ciclo<br>1984

Within the well-known Taricco affair, the Constitutional Court, with the refer n. 24 of 2017, raised the principle of legality in criminal law, enshrined in art. 25, second paragraph of the Constitution, to the rank of supreme principle of the constitutional legal order, insofar it requires that criminal rules must be precise and must not have retroactive effect, recognizing the extraordinary importance of the individual guarantees related to it. However, this statement of the Constitutional Judge comes into a context of deep crisis of the guarantees historically referred to the principle of nullum crimen, which, due to the distortions of legislative procedures and the increasingly importance of the jurisprudence (common and constitutional), due to the definitive affirmation of a European criminal law and of the progressive incidence of the European Court in the criminal sector, has profoundly changed its own content of guarantee, compared to the original model traced by the Constituent. This doctoral research intends to investigate, with the peculiar perspective of constitutional law, this complex ground focusing, after a brief introduction of its historical and philosophical origins, on the evolution of the principle of legality in criminal law, in light of the integration with the European Charters, with the idea of particularly deepening the most recent and controversial issues: firstly, the definition of the scope of the principle recognized by the art. 25, second paragraph of the Constitution (which is a priority topic); the current significance of the statutory clause in criminal matters in a scenario where the representative Parliament seems ousted from the definition of the criminal policy’s directives; the role played in criminal matters by the Constitutional Court, called to represent the last bastion in defense of the principle of legality and sometimes becomes itself the source of guarantees’ weakening linked to the statutory clause and the principle of certainty; and lastly, the impact on the domestic penal system brought by the criminalization’s choices taken by the institutions of the European Union and the increasingly role of supranational Courts.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:28:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bianca Mizuki Dias dos Santos.pdf: 1305263 bytes, checksum: 965de8dc9c1a1c8eda287cb968fa8b39 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-20<br>Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior<br>The subject matter of this work is the analysis of the concept of legal security in the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988, especially with regard to the activity of taxation by the state. Legal security is not isolated in the normative context, because there are other values related to legal security, such as justice and equality. Although they are different values, there is no antinomy or conflict between them, because they are considered to be fundamental values of the Brazilian Democratic State that abides by the Rule of Law. As a value, legal security needs to gain objectivity, that is, there must be a support to hold this value, because values only exist with reference to a support and to man (the value is nonexistent per se). In this regard, the support chosen to fulfill legal security in the context of taxation is the principle of tax legality. This principle is the best underpinning of legal security in the Brazilian legal system, because it guarantees that individual freedom to own property may only be limited by law. Pragmatically, some significant cases will be analyzed in order to verify if the Brazilian Supreme Court acknowledge the relevant function of the principle of tax legality to achieve Legal security<br>O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a definição do conceito de segurança jurídica na Constituição Federal de 1988, em especial no tocante à atividade estatal de tributação. A segurança jurídica não aparece isolada no ordenamento jurídico, pois existem outros valores que se relacionam com a segurança jurídica, como a justiça e a igualdade. Embora sejam valores diversos, não há antinomia ou conflito entre eles, já que são considerados valores fundamentais no Estado Democrático de Direito Brasileiro. Como valor, a segurança jurídica precisa ganhar objetividade, ou seja, necessita realizar-se em um suporte que possa ser portador desse valor, já que os valores só existem com referência a um suporte e ao homem (o valor não existe per si). Nesse sentido, o suporte eleito para a realização da segurança jurídica no âmbito tributário é o princípio da legalidade tributária. Este princípio é o que melhor informa o estado de segurança jurídica no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, já que garante que a liberdade patrimonial dos particulares só pode ser limitada por meio de lei. Pragmaticamente, serão analisados alguns casos paradigmáticos com vistas a verificar se o Supremo Tribunal Federal tem reconhecido o relevante papel do princípio da legalidade tributária na realização da segurança jurídica

La protection pénale du consommateur conduit à envisager une union entre le droit pénal et le droit de la consommation, laquelle n’est pas évidente. En effet, le premier est tourné vers la protection de la société alors que le second a pour objet la protection d’une personne, le consommateur. Si l’intégration de l’action de groupe tend à donner au droit de la consommation une dimension plus collective, ces deux matières conservent cependant des finalités distinctes. Malgré l’opposition, le constat est sans appel : un rapprochement existe mais, surtout, la protection pénale semble être omniprésente. Dès lors, pourquoi y-a-t-il un recours quasi-systématique au droit pénal ? Ce recours est-il légitime ? De fait, la finalité de la protection et la nature de celle-ci sont incertaines. En réalité, il apparaît que, d’une part, le but poursuivi est essentiellement la protection du marché, et que, d’autre part, les méthodes empruntées au droit pénal traduisent plus une volonté de régulation que de répression classique. Le consommateur bénéficie bien d’une protection renforcée, mais sur un double constat : d’abord, elle n’est pas directe, ensuite, elle est la conséquence d’une dénaturation sensible du droit pénal. La création de nombreuses sanctions administratives par la loi Hamon du 17 mars 2014 ne peut que conforter cette évolution, tout comme la récente recodification à droit constant opérée par l’ordonnance du 14 mars 2016 ne la contredit en rien<br>Criminal protection of the consumer leads to the consolidation of criminal and consumer laws. This burden on business is not obvious. Indeed, the criminal law is geared towards the protection of society whereas the purpose of the consumer law is to give redress to individuals, who, in this case, is the consumer. Regardless of whether introducing the concept of group action would give a more collective dimension, the criminal and consumer law retain distinct purposes. Despite arguments to the contrary, the findings are clear: common ground does exist but, more importantly, protection derived from the criminal law seems to be the sole solution used. We may ask why this near-systematic use of the criminal law should exist and if it is justified. Indeed, the aim of this type of protection and its nature are uncertain. Pragmatically, it would appear that the aim is mainly market protection yet the techniques borrowed from criminal law translate more into a willingness to regulate than to formally punish. The consumer does indeed benefit from enhanced protection but this comes with two costs: firstly, it is indirect thus it is a noticeable misrepresentation of the criminal law. Secondly, the creation of a plethora of administrative sanctions by the “Hamon law” of March, 17 2014 serves only to confirm this evolution.The ordinance of March 14, 2016 only reinforces this trend

This work investigates city Mayor's ordinance power in the light of the rule of law. In particular, it focuses on the problems resulting from the extension of the scope of this power to the field of «sicurezza urbana»: the practice shows that ordinance power, originally conceived to face extraordinary situations, is now exercised to resolve situations manageables with ordinary powers. But the misuse of this power can't be accepted by virtue of the rule of law.

This research aims at analyzing the influence of the implied powers theory on the Italian public law system. In particular, the Author investigates whether and to what extent this theory - that was developed for the first time in the US in the context of the legislative power of the Union - is applicable to other public entities too and, in particular, to administrative entities. This research will be carried out with a specific focus on the limits that the administrative action encounters in the light of the new features acquired by one of the most important principles in administrative law, that is the principle of legality. Specifically, the Author explores the relation between the implied powers theory and the principle of legality, with specific reference to the powers granted to independent administrative authorities and to the legal context in which they operate. In conclusion, the research focuses on some of the most recent and relevant cases where some independent authorities did (or allegedly did) specific use of their implied powers, analyzing case law on the point.

L'existence de mécanismes efficaces de contrôle de l'activité administrative est une problématique commune aux pays européens. Le contrôle des juges y apparaît fondamental. Il est un gage de la soumission de l'administration au droit, via le respect du principe de légalité. Le rôle qu'ils jouent ne selimite toutefois pas à cette simple fonction. C'est ce que tend à démontrer une étude comparée globale du recours pour excès de pouvoir français et la judicial review anglaise. Alors que chacun de ces deux mécanismes apparaît comme une forme limitée de contrôle de la légalité, ils ont en réalité une portée plus étendue. Sous l'effet du développement des contraintes pesant sur l'action administrative, conséquence de l'enrichissement normatif des ordres juridiques, le rôle des juges s'accroît. La place qu'ils occupent au sein des institutions nationales doit être clairement définie, afin d'en assurer la légitimité.N'étant plus uniquement les garants de la volonté d'un Parlement de plus en plus contraint, les juges voient les fondements de leur rôle être renouvelés. La liberté dont ils disposent va croissante. Ce mouvement révèle leur double figure : tantôt acteurs du contrôle de légalité, et principal outil de soumission de l'administration à un droit en constant développement, ils sont également un moteur de ce mouvement. Cela leur permet d'en fixer les limites afin de ne pas scléroser l'activité administrative, elle aussi porteuse d'une légitimité propre. L'étude comparée du recours pour excès de pouvoir et de la judicial review permet la mise en lumière de cette dualité : les juges en définissent les différentes facettes et participent ainsi activement à la définition de leur propre rôle<br>The existence of efficient mechanisms of control for administrative activity is a common problem in European countries. Judicial control is of primary importance. It is a guarentee of the respect of law by public authorities, through the principle of legality. But, the role of judges is not only defined by this function. This can be demonstrated by a global comparison of the French recours pour excès de pouvoir and the English judicial review. While both mechanisms seem to allow a limited control of legality, the picture is not as simple. Because of the development of the strains on administrative action, due to the normative enrichment of legal orders, the role of the judiciary is extending. The position of judges within national institutions has to be clearly defined, in order to guarantee their legitimacy.As they can no longer be described as protectors of the will of Parliament, the foundations of their role is reassessed. Their discretionary power is increasing. It reveals their dualiaty: they are active in the control of legality, and as such they are the main instrument of the submission of public authorities to a developing legality, and they are also actors of this movment. As such, they draw limits in order not to ossify administrative activity, which is also legitimate. The comparision between the recours pour excès de pouvoir and judicial review can reveal this duality : the judges define its various aspects and actively participate to the definition of their own role

Le grandi trasformazioni sociali, politiche e culturali che, nel corso del XX Secolo, hanno attraversato l Europa occidentale hanno pure messo in luce l insufficienza delle forme e dei principi giuridici proposti dal modello di Stato di diritto ottocentesco. Fra questi, il principio di obbligatorietà dell azione penale, attuazione nel procedere del principio di stretta legalità formale. Con il presente lavoro ci si propone di affrontare il tema dell azione penale chiedendosi se, poste le trasformazioni intervenute, il mantenimento in Italia del principio di cui all art. 112 Cost., così come la scelta a favore dell indipendenza esterna e dell irresponsabilità politica degli organi requirenti, siano ancora opzioni concretamente praticate e praticabili al di là di ogni affermazione di principio. A supporto di tale quesito sopraggiungono sia gli studi che da anni si occupano dei fenomeni di discrezionalità occulta celati dietro le scelte per lo più organizzative delle Procure italiane, sia le sollecitazioni cui, da ultimo, il nostro sistema penale è esposto. Il riferimento è alle evoluzioni ermeneutiche in tema di lesività, alle soluzioni legislative riguardanti la minima offensività, ai provvedimenti di depenalizzazione, di indulto e amnistia, nonché alle timide aperture che anche l ordinamento italiano mostra verso forme di mediazione della litigiosità giudiziaria. Tali elementi, che paiono atipici rispetto al modello di stretta legalità formale, costituiscono probabilmente espressione di un esigenza di flessibilizzazione del sistema penale che, attualmente realizzata per il tramite della discrezionalità giudiziale e mediante soluzioni aventi per lo più carattere sostanziale, potrebbe ipoteticamente essere più efficacemente (e più democraticamente) ripensata attraverso il meccanismo processuale della discrezionalità dell azione penale.

La recherche s’intéresse aux rapports qu’entretiennent le droit de l’UE et les systèmes répressifs nationaux italien et français. Elle vise notamment à analyser les problèmes posés par l’influence croissante des sources européennes sur l’exercice par les Etats du droit de punir. Elle analyse également la compatibilité des obligations européennes de punir par rapport au principe de la légalité des délits et des peines, consacré au niveau constitutionnel en Italie et en France. En effet, quoiqu’issus d’une même tradition romano-germanique, ces deux systèmes semblent consacrer des conceptions sensiblement différentes du principe de la légalité. Par exemple, alors que le droit italien conçoit la légalité surtout comme relevant de la loi au sens formel, le système français semble insister sur la clarté, l’intelligibilité et l’accessibilité de la norme pénale qui seules peuvent en assurer la prévisibilité. Compte tenu de la pratique de la Cour de Justice d'interpréter le droit européen selon les traditions communes aux États membres, la comparaison entre les systèmes juridiques de deux États membres permettra de mieux apprécier les choix opérés dans le cadre de l'harmonisation européenne en matière pénale.Une fois le principe défini, la deuxième partie du travail se concentre sur la possibilité d'utiliser les obligations de criminalisation et la primauté du droit de l'Union pour protéger les droits fondamentaux des victimes. A ce propos le travail vise à un équilibre entre légalité pénale et protection effective des droits fondamentaux qui découlent de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne.Descripteurs : Principe de légalité des délits et des peines, obligations d’incrimination ; droit pénal comparé ; droit pénal européen ; droits fondamentaux ; droits des victimes<br>The research focuses on the influence of the EU competence in criminal law on Italian and French criminal systems. More specifically it refers to the impact of this competence on the traditional principle of legality and on individual safeguards it represents. The first part deals with the increasing Union’s power to impose specific obligations of criminalization in relation to the fundamental principle of legality in criminal law. This principle acquires different meanings according to different national systems. While in Italy it is mainly conceived as a statute monopoly, France considers clarity, ascertainability and foreseeability of criminal norms as the main aspect. The research analyses whether it is possible to set aside certain national specific features in order to achieve a new European common definition of the principle of legality. Given the practice of the Court of Justice to interpret Union law according to traditions common to Member States, the research has been conducted following a comparative approach. A comparative analysis makes it possible to better assess the choices made by the European Union towards harmonization in criminal matters.The second part of the thesis concerns the possibility to use EU obligations of criminalization and the primacy of Union law to protect fundamental interest, in particular fundamental rights of victims. The research aims therefore at finding a compromise between the legality principle in criminal law and an effective protection of fundamental rights stemming from the European Convention of Human Rights and the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.Keywords: Principle of legality ; obligations of criminalisation ; comparative criminal law ; EU criminal law ; fundamental rights; victims’ rights

La norme pénale valide est celle qui possède la capacité de déployer ses effets. Elle est celle qui autorise le déclenchement des poursuites, le prononcé des condamnations et l'exécution de peines. En premier lieu, il a fallu montrer ce qui paraît s’imposer d’instinct : loin de se résumer au respect d'exigences formelles, la validité de la norme pénale dépend directement de la conformité à des exigences substantielles, portées par la Constitution et les conventions européennes. La preuve de la part substantielle de validité est apportée en deux temps. D’abord, l’entrée en vigueur de la règle pénale est subordonnée à sa bonne insertion dans la hiérarchie des normes. Ensuite, les normes répressives irrégulières sont systématiquement invalidées.En second lieu, la composante substantielle de la validité de la norme pénale a de multiples conséquences, qui sont tantôt bénéfiques, tantôt problématiques. En effet, les principes qui conditionnent substantiellement la validité de la norme pénale assoient la légitimité de la répression. En revanche, l’avènement du pouvoir prétorien, dans une discipline en quête de stabilité, soulève de nombreuses difficultés. Pour les surmonter, proposer des clefs de résolution s’est révélé nécessaire<br>The valid criminal norm is the one that is able to have a legal impact. It allows for the commencement of a prosecution, the imposition of a sanction, and the enforcement of sentences. Firstly, we had to demonstrate what seems manifest: far from being only a matter of respecting the formal requirements, the validity of a criminal norm depends directly on its compliance to substantial requirements that are contained in the French Constitution and the European conventions. The substantial proportion of the validity is demonstrated in two steps. The entry into force of the criminal rule is at first subordinated to its correct integration in the hierarchy of norms. Then, the improper repressive norms are systematically invalidated. Secondly, the substantial part of the validity of the criminal norm has several consequences that are in some cases beneficial but not in others. Indeed, the principles that substantially determine the validity of the criminal norm make the punishment legitimate. However, the emergence of the judge-made law raises many difficulties in a discipline that yearns for stability. In order to overcome them, it appeared necessary to suggest some key elements of resolution

L'existence de mécanismes efficaces de contrôle de l'activité administrative est une problématique commune aux pays européens. Le contrôle des juges y apparaît fondamental. Il est un gage de la soumission de l'administration au droit, via le respect du principe de légalité. Le rôle qu'ils jouent ne selimite toutefois pas à cette simple fonction. C'est ce que tend à démontrer une étude comparée globale du recours pour excès de pouvoir français et la judicial review anglaise. Alors que chacun de ces deux mécanismes apparaît comme une forme limitée de contrôle de la légalité, ils ont en réalité une portée plus étendue. Sous l'effet du développement des contraintes pesant sur l'action administrative, conséquence de l'enrichissement normatif des ordres juridiques, le rôle des juges s'accroît. La place qu'ils occupent au sein des institutions nationales doit être clairement définie, afin d'en assurer la légitimité.N'étant plus uniquement les garants de la volonté d'un Parlement de plus en plus contraint, les juges voient les fondements de leur rôle être renouvelés. La liberté dont ils disposent va croissante. Ce mouvement révèle leur double figure : tantôt acteurs du contrôle de légalité, et principal outil de soumission de l'administration à un droit en constant développement, ils sont également un moteur de ce mouvement. Cela leur permet d'en fixer les limites afin de ne pas scléroser l'activité administrative, elle aussi porteuse d'une légitimité propre. L'étude comparée du recours pour excès de pouvoir et de la judicial review permet la mise en lumière de cette dualité : les juges en définissent les différentes facettes et participent ainsi activement à la définition de leur propre rôle<br>The existence of efficient mechanisms of control for administrative activity is a common problem in European countries. Judicial control is of primary importance. It is a guarentee of the respect of law by public authorities, through the principle of legality. But, the role of judges is not only defined by this function. This can be demonstrated by a global comparison of the French recours pour excès de pouvoir and the English judicial review. While both mechanisms seem to allow a limited control of legality, the picture is not as simple. Because of the development of the strains on administrative action, due to the normative enrichment of legal orders, the role of the judiciary is extending. The position of judges within national institutions has to be clearly defined, in order to guarantee their legitimacy.As they can no longer be described as protectors of the will of Parliament, the foundations of their role is reassessed. Their discretionary power is increasing. It reveals their dualiaty: they are active in the control of legality, and as such they are the main instrument of the submission of public authorities to a developing legality, and they are also actors of this movment. As such, they draw limits in order not to ossify administrative activity, which is also legitimate. The comparision between the recours pour excès de pouvoir and judicial review can reveal this duality : the judges define its various aspects and actively participate to the definition of their own role

On the 1st of January 2009, a new regulation regarding interest deduction limitations was enforced. The aim was to prevent tax structure with interest deductions in a community of interest. The changes meant that intra-group share transfers, which generates an intra-group loan structure, can lead to borrower losing their right to deduct interest expenses. Except from the main rule two exceptions were also introduced. These eliminates the limitations, and accept the deductibility despite the above conditions. The exceptions are named ten-percent rule and “ventilen”. It was found that Swedish municipal communities also engaged in such arrangements. As a result of this discovery the Swedish Tax Authority was delegated the task to investigate companies that are in a community of interest with a fully or partially exempted taxpayer in general and its relationship to the tax structure of interest deductions in particular. The application of “ventilen” creates problems regarding the definition of business purpose as well as the relationship between business and organizational purposes. The assessment of organizational purposes is of particular importance for municipal communities of interest where transparency, control and quality assurance are of great importance. Needs of rationalization and organizational changes occurs continually within municipal community groups. Unclarity due to organizational purpose makes these changes, within the municipal communities, problematic. Both municipal communities as well as experts regard the deduction limitations due to municipal community interest unclear. Due to the unclarity a few municipal communities have chosen to switch their internal loans to ones through Kommuninvest. This to avoid the rising risk-taking as any interest deductibility limitations may entail. The Swedish High Administrative Court has in their judgements expressed their support for this kind of loan structure. It is unclear how the law concerning “ventilen” should be applied in regards to municipal communities interest, which also raises questions about “ventilens” compatibility with the principle of legality. The High Swedish Administrative Court has solved the problem, at least for now, by approving an alternative approach, the one including Kommuninvest, which thereby reduces the stress for the Court to come to a conclusion regarding “ventilens” proper functioning and application.<br>Den 1 januari 2009 trädde en ny lagstiftning i kraft gällande ränteavdragsbegränsningar. Syftet var att förhindra skatteupplägg med ränteavdrag inom en intressegemenskap. Förändringarna innebar att koncerninterna andelsöverlåtelser, som genererar en koncernintern upplåning hänförlig till lånet, kan resultera i att låntagaren förlorar sin avdragsrätt för ränteutgifterna. Till huvudregeln infördes två undantag som undanröjer begräsningen, och godtar avdragsrätt trots ovan förutsättningar. Undantagsreglerna betecknas tioprocentsregeln samt ventilen. Syftet med ränteavdragsbegränsningarna är att förhindra skatteupplägg med ränteavdrag inom intressegemenskaper, och då främst inom privata internationella sådana. Det har dock framkommit att även svenska kommunala intressegemenskaper ägnar sig åt dylika upplägg. Med anledning av denna upptäckt fick SKV i uppdrag att utreda bolag som befinner sig i intressegemenskap med helt eller delvis skattebefriade skattesubjekt i allmänhet samt dess relation till skatteupplägg med ränteavdrag i synnerhet. Tillämpningen av ventilen, i förhållande till kommunala intressegemenskaper, genererar problem gällande såväl definitionen av affärsmässigt samt relationen mellan affärsmässiga och organisatoriska skäl. Bedömning kring organisatoriska skäl blir av stor vikt för kommunala intressegemenskaper där insyn, kontrollutövande och kvalitetssäkring är betydelsefullt. Det uppkommer ständigt behov av effektivisering och förändring för att kunna uppnå en acceptabel nivå av kontroll och inblick i bolagen som kommunen äger och förvaltar.  Då rättsläget enligt kommuner och sakkunniga är oklart har flertalet kommunala intressegemenskaper lagt om sina interna lån via Kommuninvest. Det har gjorts för att undvika det ökade riskatagande som en eventuell förlorad ränteavdragsrätt kan komma att innebära. HFD har i praxis uttryckt sitt stöd för denna typ av omläggning. Gällande rätt bör dock anses vara oklar gällande ventilens tillämpning inom kommunala intressegemenskaper, vilket även väcker frågor kring ventilens kompatibilitet med legalitetsprincipen. HFD kan dock ha ansetts finna en, om än en provisorisk sådan, lösning på problematiken genom att godkänna en omläggning till Kommuninvest som därmed minskar stressen för HFD att komma till en slutsats gällande ventilens korrekta tolkning och tillämpning.

La régularisation des actes administratifs s’inscrit dans un mouvement global de recherche de stabilité juridique, mettant à l’épreuve la dialectique bien connue de la sécurité juridique et de la légalité administrative. Elle implique en effet que l’acte puisse subsister dans l’ordonnancement juridique, en dépit d’une illégalité originelle. Mais, l’état actuel du droit français de la régularisation des actes administratifs interpelle par le décalage existant entre la présence croissante de ses mentions en droit positif et l’indétermination de son emploi. À l’inverse, le législateur brésilien a consacré depuis vingt ans la régularisation des actes administratifs comme un pouvoir aux mains de l’administration, et fournit l’exemple d’une expérience mature de son utilisation. Le droit comparé se mobilise alors comme un outil de découverte autant que comme un révélateur des perspectives qui pourraient accompagner l’expansion de la régularisation en droit français. À partir de cette démarche, la notion a pu être précisée, désignant un processus de correction à effets rétroactifs, permettant de maintenir l’acte administratif dans l’ordonnancement juridique et de restaurer la légalité. Cette définition contribue à singulariser la notion et à en préciser le champ, permettant d’envisager ensuite ses effets juridiques. À cet égard, la construction d’un régime propre à la régularisation des actes administratifs a pour but d’en clarifier les implications juridiques. Ce régime repose alors sur la recherche d’un équilibre, en ce qu’il doit à la fois permettre de respecter les objectifs poursuivis par la régularisation et de contenir certains de ses effets négatifs, notamment à l’égard des tiers<br>The regularisation of administrative acts is part of a global search for legal stability, which calls into question the familiar dialectic between legal certainty and administrative legality. It implies that administrative acts can be retained in the legal system despite their original illegality. Yet the French current legal system is characterised by a striking discrepancy between increasing references to regularisation in positive law, and uncertainty around its usage. On the contrary, regularisation has been embedded in Brazil’s legal architecture for twenty years as a power resting with the administration, which provides us with an example of mature use of this process. In this context, comparative law is both a tool to learn more about regularisation and a means to examine the prospects that could accompany its expansion within the French legal system. This approach allows for a definition of this notion as a corrective process with retroactive effects, enabling administrative acts to be kept in the legal order and legality to be restored. This definition helps to specify the scope of the notion, which then enables us to consider its legal effects. In this respect, building a specific system for the regularisation of administrative acts aims at specifying its legal implications. This system rests on a balance between meeting the objectives pursued by regularisation and limiting some of its negative effects, in particular towards third parties