Academic literature on the topic 'Principle of transcendence'

The paper discusses the methodological aspects of the principles of adaptive management for socio-economic, economic-ecological and other systems. Adaptive management includes a set of methods that allow to change the parameters of the regulating system depending on management actions and outcomes and external impacts. Adaptive management is based inter alia on the principles of �precedence� (past experience) and �transcendence� (beyond experience). The principle of precedence includes past experience in decision making (study the problem "from the bottom"). Based on the definition of transcendence (something that is fundamentally unavailable to experiential knowledge or not based on experience), transcendental analysis is considered as analysis of complex nonlinear phenomena and processes with a high degree of uncertainty (study the problem �from the top�). The paper presents a conceptual model of adaptive management based on the principles of precedence and transcendence. This model includes the next steps: definition and general description of the object of adaptive management; study of the object "from the bottom", based on past experience; study the object of adaptive management "from the top", taking into account a kind of "absolute", which goes beyond the existing experience; vision of the system based on the incidence matrix, ranking of interests and threats; decision making taking into account improvement of previous decisions and implementation of idealized transcendental model. The concept of the principles of precedence and transcendence in adaptive management is considered in the paper in the context of incident theory in order to form the system vision and rank the system from the point of view of interests (as a resource of development) or threats (as an anti-resource of development)

AbstractThis essay studies the unfolding of Levinas' concept of transcendence from 1935 to his 1984 talk entitled "Transcendence and Intelligibility." I discuss how Levinas frames transcendence in light of enjoyment, shame, and nausea in his youthful project of a counter-ontology to Heidegger's Being and Time. In Levinas' essay, transcendence is the human urge to get out of being. I show the ways in which Levinas' early ontology is conditioned by historical circumstances, but I argue that its primary aim is formal and phenomenological; it adumbrates formal structures of human existence. Levinas' 1940s ontology accentuates the dualism in being, between what amount to a light and a dark principle. This shift in emphasis ushers in a new focus for transcendence, which is now both sensuous and temporal, thanks to the promise of fecundity. Totality and Infinity (1961) pursues a similar onto-logic, while shifting the locus of transcendence to a non-sexuate other. The final great work, Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence (1974) offers a hermeneutic phenomenology of transcendence-in-immanence. It rethinks Husserl's focus on the transcendence of intentionality and its condition of possibility in the passive synthesis of complex temporality. If the 1974 strategy 'burrows beneath' the classical phenomenological syntheses, it also incorporates unsuspected influences from French psychology and phenomenology. This allows Levinas to develop a philosophical conception of transcendence that is neither Husserl's intentionality nor Heidegger's temporal ecstases, in what amounts to an original contribution to a phenomenology both hermeneutic and descriptive.

This study aims to reveal social prophetic values ​​in the principles of political ethics in Indonesia. This research is a qualitative research in the form of literature review. This type of legal research is normative legal research with a philosophical approach. The primary data source of this research is the text of the code of ethics of politicians and political parties. Meanwhile, secondary data sources use various scientific studies that are relevant to the object of discussion. The analytical theory approach used is Kuntowijoyo's social prophetic paradigm theory. This study concludes that the various principles of political ethics in Indonesia are parallel with the values ​​of humanization, liberation and transcendence. First, the principle of public benefit is parallel to the teachings of ukhuwah insaniyah and ta'awun insani. Second, the principle of honesty is parallel to the nature of shiddiq. Third, the principles of integrity and professionalism are parallel to the teachings of the khaira ummah, justice, deliberation, ulul albab, Imamat, and tauhid which are liberating. Fourth, the principle of accountability parallel with amanah. Fifth, this principle of justice is parallel to the universal teaching of Islam in the form of al-adalah.

This paper suggests interpreting Husserl’s thesis of the “fictional destruction of the world” (gedankliche Destruktion der Welt) in the light of the eidetic method of variation. After having reconstructed Husserl’s argument and shown how it relies on the methodologically regimented joint venture of free fantasy and bounded concepts, the author concludes that (1) the a priori of a world, namely its empirical (more or less rational) style, is tantamount to the a priori of a world that can be possibly experienced by some conceivable form of consciousness. (2) If consciousness is a priori bound to transcendence, such transcendence is not necessarily supposed to be the transcendence of a world, for a non-world would be enough to entertain the intentional directedness. This twofold claim allows for a novel interpretation of Husserl’s principle of the asymmetry between world and consciousness.

ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that the primary significance of cosmology for theology is through a notion of self-transcendence. It is an inherently theological notion arising within cosmology. It points to the realm of interiority claimed by contemporary theology. Employing the thought of Ernan McMullin in particular, I claim that self-transcendence emerges within cosmological inquiry when it becomes philosophy, and when extrapolation is involved. A theological thrust to cosmology is confirmed when one understands the limits of cosmology as an empirical discipline amidst the existential questions that can be posed about the meaning of the universe, a development well illustrated by the anthropic principle.

AbstractClassical models of the God–world relationship tend to emphasize the transcendence of God at the expense of God's immanence to the world of creation. Neo-classical or process-oriented models, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the immanence of God within the world process at the expense of the divine transcendence. Using the distinction originally made by Thomas Aquinas between person and nature within the Godhead, the author offers a modified process-oriented understanding of the God–world relationship in which the transcendence of the triune God to creation is assured but in which creatures derive their existence and activity from the divine nature or ground of being along with the divine persons. Ultimate Reality, therefore, is not God in a unipersonal sense, nor the three divine persons apart from creation, but a Cosmic Society of existents, both finite and infinite, who are sustained by one and the same underlying principle of existence and activity.

Despisers of religion throughout the centuries have poured scorn upon the idea of sacrifice, which they have targeted as an index of the irrational and wicked in religious practice. Lucretius saw the sacrifice of Iphigenia as an instance of the evils perpetrated by religion. But even religious reformers like Xenophanes or Empedocles rail against ‘bloody sacrifice’. What kind of God can demand sacrifice? Yet the language of sacrifice persists in a secular world. Nor does its secularised form seem much more appealing. One need only think of the appalling and grotesque cult of sacrifice in numerous totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. The perversion of the Jihad in radical Islam in contemporary Europe would provide another sombre instance. Throughout Europe in the last few years we have seen the revival of a classical Enlightenment atheism, a movement that, far removed from Nietzsche's pathos for the Death of God, pursues a vigorous and relentless policy of Écrasez l'infâme! Indeed, contemporary polemicists like Dawkins and Hitchens wish to emphasise precisely this dimension of Christianity: not just false but nasty! The modern cultured despisers of religion are the self confessed descendants of Hume and Voltaire. Religion is the product of the period of ignorance in the superstitious and terrified fearful infancy of humanity, and is the crude attempt to face the natural human longing for knowledge, consolation and emotional support. How can one strive to defend the concept of sacrifice against such cultured despisers? I think we need to start by reflecting upon why the slaughter of an animal, say, makes holy – sacra facere? The root meaning of ‘sacrifice’ has a basis in ritual practice, as its Latin etymology suggests. Though in common parlance it communicates a giving up or rejection, the word as we are going to understand it signifies thesubstitution, or more perhapssublimation, of an item or interest for a higher value or principle. St Augustine speaks of the outward symbol of the true sacrifice of spiritual offering that God requires in the altar of the heart – a sacrifice of humility and praise. The metaphor works because his audience was familiar with the literal sense of the term.

It is a purpose of the article to analyze the origin and evolution of the Males Law, known incorrectly as Salic Law. This law was an important succession principle of the French monarchy that appeared during the Middle Age and continued existing during the Modernity. The goal of the article is to identify the reasons why the term Salic Law is used wrongly. Furthermore, it is studied the transcendence and importance of that successional principle to the birth of the French national state.

Levinas’ relationship to Platonism is ambiguous. In Totality and Infinity, indeed, references to Plato’s writings are multiple and Levinas depicts Plato as following two diverging paths. On the one hand, Levinas considers Plato’s writings to be works that consecrate the primacy of identity over difference, of the Same over the Other. On the other hand, Platonism is presented as a philosophy of absolute transcendence due to its refusal to make the Good a simple ontological principle and to its attempt to free the Good from all forms of totality. The present study aims to show that, although Levinas criticizes the first path taken by Plato, he conceives of himself as partially in line with Plato’s philosophy of absolute transcendence, albeit in a paradoxical form. In this way, Levinas understands the meaning of the Platonic approach in an original way.

The basic historical-philosophical conceptions of interpretation of paideia are analyzed. In addition, the understanding of paideia as an ancient method of cultural reflection and the metaphysical method of transcendence is substantiated. The pedagogical content of the ancient principle of the paideia is proved as the dialectical unity of the main contradictions of contemporary socio-cultural life: sacred and profane, social and individual, eternal and changeable. The unity of sacred and profane is revealed by the author through the concept of value, which is ontologically expressed in the space of freedom. The combination of social and individual are focuses on the category of responsibility as a result of the free choice. The conceptes of eternal and changable are actualized in the philosophical category of the possible as the preconditions of creativity, which is also the realization of freedom.

Using the generative processes developed over two stages of creative development and the performance of The Physics Project at the Loft at the Creative Industries Precinct at the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) from 5th – 8th April 2006 as a case study, this exegesis considers how the principles of contemporary physics can be reframed as aesthetic principles in the creation of contemporary performance. The Physics Project is an original performance work that melds live performance, video and web-casting and overlaps an exploration of personal identity with the physics of space, time, light and complementarity. It considers the acts of translation between the language of physics and the language of contemporary performance that occur via process and form. This exegesis also examines the devices in contemporary performance making and contemporary performance that extend the reach of the performance, including the integration of the live and the mediated and the use of metanarratives.

Este trabalho discute a transcendência, requisito específico de cabimento do recurso de revista trabalhista, instituído pela Medida Provisória n.º 2226, de 05 de setembro de 2001. Quase uma década depois, essa criação legislativa não surtiu qualquer efeito prático, porque dependente de regulamentação por parte do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho (TST), o qual, todavia, depois de vários estudos, inclina-se por descartar esse critério de admissibilidade, em face da evidente dificuldade de se conceituar o que é transcendência econômica, política, social e jurídica. A celeuma envolvendo esse requisito recursal, no entanto, abriu oportunidade para se discutir um pouco o papel da Justiça do Trabalho e, particularmente, a atuação do TST, incumbido de julgar um número cada vez maior de recursos de revista, o que pode comprometer a credibilidade de sua missão. O surgimento da transcendência, portanto, instiga a revisitar as origens do próprio recurso de revista, procurando-se identificar na herança histórica romana, ibérica e lusitana, como surgiram a recorribilidade extraordinária das decisões e a jurisprudência e de que maneira isso se transferiu para o Brasil. Examinam-se, também, o processo legislativo de criação desse requisito, as experiências similares e a influência estrangeira e aborda-se a constitucionalidade da transcendência à luz da jurisprudência do Supremo Tribunal Federal, que, desde 1999, não admite o uso de medida provisória para legislar direito processual. A dificuldade de operacionalização desse pressuposto, fato declarado em entrevistas por alguns Ministros do TST e reconhecido pela última Comissão incumbida de estudá-lo, resultou na elaboração de anteprojeto de lei, alternativo à transcendência, que é revelado e comentado neste trabalho. Porque, na maioria das vezes, o direito do trabalho envolve interesses de grupos de indivíduos e de categorias profissionais e econômicas, com reflexos em todo o mercado de trabalho, a uniformidade de sua aplicação e de sua interpretação continua necessária, mas não pode restringir-se ao TST; deve, antes, ser compartilhada com os Tribunais Regionais, obrigados à unificação de sua jurisprudência interna. São urgentes alterações no sistema recursal trabalhista, com a adoção de medidas, mais simples, objetivas e práticas, em sintonia com os propósitos de celeridade, qualidade, eficácia, segurança e justiça nos julgamentos.
This work discusses the principle of transcendence of appeals, a specific requirement for the admission of an appeal in a labor case instituted by the Provisional Presidential Decree no. 2226 of September 5, 2001. After almost a decade, such legislative creation has not had any practical effect because it depends on regulation by the Superior Labor Court (TST) which, however, after several studies, tends to discard such criterion of admissibility in light of the clear difficulty of defining what is economic, political, social and legal transcendent. Notwithstanding, the argumentation involving such requirement has opened the door to discussions about the role of Labor Courts and, in particular, the action of the TST that is responsible for adjudging an increasing number of appeals, which might compromise the credibility of its mission. Hence, the rising of the principle of transcendence directs us to revisit the origins of the appeal in labor cases with the purpose of identifying in the Roman, Iberian and Portuguese historical heritage the source of the extraordinary appealability of decisions and the related case law and how this was transferred to Brazil. The legislative process of creation of such requirement is also examined, as well as similar experiences and foreign influences, and the constitutionality of the principle of transcendence in light of case law of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, seeing that it has not admitted the use of provisional presidential decrees to legislate on procedural right since 1999. The difficult operationalization of such principle, as stated in interviews by some TST Justices and recognized by the last Commission incumbent on studying it, has resulted in the preparation of a bill alternative to the principle of transcendence that is disclosed and commented herein. Considering that Labor Law, more often than not, involves interests of groups of individuals and professional and economic categories with reflexes in the labor market as a whole, it is required be consistently applied and constructed, albeit not restricted to the TST; it should, above all, be shared with the Regional Courts, compelling them to unify their internal case law. The changes in the labor appealing system are urgent, with the adoption of simpler, more objective and practical measures in accordance with the principles of celerity, quality, effectiveness, safety and justice in judgments.

Sob o signo do aprofundamento e da intensificação da consciência de si, o ato filosófico de Pierre Thévenaz se define como uma filosofia radicalizante. E porque não abre mão e nem elide o lócus de resposta do qual seu ato filosófico toma sua consistência própria que é o da tradição protestante pode receber o complemento (protestante). Assim, uma filosofia radicalizante (protestante). Isso porque a secularização da filosofia, a que seu método de radicalização leva de modo conseqüente, já pressupõe a assunção da própria contingência que é consciência de condição. Consciência de que se fala de algum lugar; consciência de que o pensamento se encontra previamente engajado em um específico hic et nunc que, por conta da condição, recebe sua densidade própria e não pode mais ser cotado no trato das formas abstratas do tempo e do espaço. O que já é um dos índices da superação thévenaziana da redução da filosofia à epistemologia, tal como se tem estabelecido após Kant. Nesse sentido, a abertura plena à contingência pela radicalização forçará a mudança do problema do sentido, ligado pela fenomenologia à consciência intencional, para o problema da hermenêutica histórica. Quer dizer, para o da compreensão dos eventos significativos que têm poder de reorganizar em torno de si o movimento da história. Com a epoché do sentido, lançada sobre o núcleo mesmo do que a fenomenologia husserliana descobrira como a atividade própria da consciência intencional, assim, um passo decisivo no movimento de radicalização thévenaziana, só restará à razão filosófica (ao ser humano) tomar o sentido como tarefa por se fazer, inacabada e não garantida. Esse passo negativo, todavia, não recebe, em Pierre Thévenaz, o tom de palavra final, de última palavra. Pois se assim fosse, serviria ainda como álibi para a instauração de uma nova instalação. Desta vez tão segura no negativo quanto o era na ingenuidade otimística do sentido garantido. O qual permanecia na consciência intencional como ainda um último bastião de força e de atração, exercido sobre a consciência ingênua da atitude natural, sem ser superado. Isso porque agora a razão, já tendo alcançado um nível profundo de consciência de sua condição humana, de sua contingência, de sua fraqueza e equívoco sempre possíveis, para continuar sua atividade crítica costumeira, sua vocação mesma, deverá aprender a tirar força de sua fraqueza. A razão terá de se desdivinizar; de parar de tentar falar por Deus, ou pelos olhos de Deus; de parar de postular reduplicações de si como razão juiz ou razão instância não tocada pela crítica. Ela deverá assumir-se como estando em crise: assumir-se como humana, e humana só. Ora, esta possibilidade inusitada que se abre à própria razão pela radicalização, como vemos, não surge do nada. Ela representa, no inverso mesmo, outra possibilidade que à que Hegel estabeleceu na linha do horizonte e cuja atração exercida no interior do pensamento contemporâneo é bem mais sutil e presente do que parece. Por isso, será preciso desvencilhar a metafísica de certos comprometimentos históricos que a têm desacreditado, para se chegar ao seu mais autêntico núcleo afim à radicalização. Pelo que o signo da defesa da especificidade e da singularidade contra as categorias gerais continentes; o signo da defesa das irredutibilidades aos reducionismos, espiritualistas ou materialistas, será o que caracteriza, para Thévenaz, o movimento mais interno à metafísica ocidental. Este signo é o do espaço ontológico que a metafísica, descoberta por Platão, esclarece a necessidade de que seja mantido entre as grandezas em relação. Todavia, para ativar o que esta descoberta, neutralizada sob a lógica auto contida de uma razão autista, poderia auferir em termos de aprofundamento da consciência de condição, será necessário um apoio externo à razão. E este ela o recebe da experiência choque de imputação de loucura sobre ela que a fé cristã primitiva lançou. E não sendo possível à razão avaliar a justeza de tal imputação, pois não se trata de mais um argumento lógico com o qual ela jogar o seu jogo, a razão é levada a verificar por si mesma a pertinência de tal possibilidade. E assim, nessa nova disposição, um campo insuspeito e infinito, sobre o qual ela pode retomar sua atividade crítica, inesperadamente se abre. Só que agora esta atividade já não poderá mais ser exercida sob o selo de sua inconsciência e do seu autismo tradicional, mas sob o novo índice de uma consciência de condição aprofundada que muda o registro do cumprimento de sua vocação para o de uma atividade intelectual responsável no aqui em baixo, neste mundo
The philosophical act ofPierre Thévenaz, that takes the sign of thedeepening and intensification of self-consciousness, it is here defined as a radicalizing philosophy. Because he doesnt abandon and doesnt hides the locus of his answer,of which philosophical act takes its consistence whereas it is the protestant tradition his philosophical act can to receive the following complement: protestant. So, a (protestant) radicalizing philosophy. It is because a secularization of philosophy, for which his method of radicalization leads consequently, alreadypresupposes the accepting of selfcontingence that is consciousness of condition. Consciousness of speakingfrom somewhere; consciousness of the thought has finding prior engaged in a specific hic etnunc. Because of condition receives its characteristic density and so it cant be quoted in the rank of abstract forms of time and space. It is one of the evidences of thévenazian overcoming of reduction of philosophy to the epistemology, as it has been fixed after Kant. This way, the full overture to the contingence by radicalization will compel the change of the problem of sense, connected by phenomenology to the intentional consciousness, to the problem of historical hermeneutic. I mean, to the understanding of meaningful events that have capacity to reorganize around themselfs the movement of the history. Theepoché of sense putson kernel of husserlian phenomenology, it founded as the specific activity of intentional consciousness, so a conclusive step in the motion of thévenazian radicalization, only rest to philosophical raison (namely, the human being) to take a sense as a task to be make unconcluded and no guaranteed. This negative step, however, no receive in Pierre Thévenaz the hue of last word. So this way serve or it would be serve still as an alibi for the setting of a new ideological fixed. This time, such certain on the negative as it were on optimistic naivety of secure sense. This remained in the intentional consciousness as still the last bastion of power and attraction, exerted on the naïve consciousness of natural attitude, that is, without overcoming.This is because now the raison had already reached the deep level of consciousness of its human condition, (its contingence), of its weakness and misunderstanding always possible. Then, for it to continue its usual criticism activity, its calling, it must to learn to take advantage from its weakness. The reason must be undivinize by itself; to stop to try speaks instead eye God; or by Gods eyes. It must be to stop to claim self-reduplications as judge or instance raison never touched by criticism. It must looks like being in the crisis condition; to admit yourself as human, only human. However, this unused possibility that appers the own reason, through radicalization, as we can see, it doesnt emerge from nothing. This typify, in the exact converse, another possibility that Hegel sets up on horizon line whose appeal, inner of the contemporary thought, is more subtle and present than it seems. So, it would be necessary to separate the metaphysic from certain historical commitments that made its discredit, to reach to its more authentic pith related with the radicalization. So, the sign of defense of specificity and singularity against the continent general categories; the sign of defense of no-reductive quality to the reduction, spiritualistic reductions or materialistic reductions, will be the main character, for Pierre Thévenaz, the more internal movement of occidental metaphysic. This sign is from ontological space, that the metaphysic founded by Plato clarifies the need to keep on among the magnitudes in relation. However, to start activing this discovery, which has been neutralized about the self-contained of an autistic reason, it might obtain in terms of deepening of consciousness of condition, will be necessary an external support to the reason. And the reason receives it from shock-experience of imputation of madness on the reason that ancient Christian faith launched. But, it not been possible for the reason to evaluate the right of that imputation, because it wasnt the most logical argument for the reason to play its game. So, the reason is conducted to checking itself the relevance of such possibility. And so, in this new arrangement, an unsuspected field open to the reason, on which the reason can to retake its criticism activity, suddenly open. But, now, people can`t practice this activity anymore about its traditional unconsciousness and its autism. But about the new evidence of a consciousness of conditiondeepening that changes the key of the perform of its calling, now as responsible intellectual practice on the hereunder, in this world

This paper aims to reveal the multidimensionality of human being-in-the-world within the human existence analytics and to show that human existence is reflexively correlated with the Other. The key question is how the subject ontologically lives and at the same time existentially experiences his relations to the world. The distinction between be-living and living through human’s being-in-the-world is substantiated as the principle of onto-phenomenological differentiation. Within the irreducible multiplicity of human relations to the world four modes of human experience are formed: the transcendent, the symbolic, the objective and the sensual ones. Ultimately, it is shown that the key to understanding the human existence is the highest form of its correlation with the Other: the ethical relation. Thus, the universal for the world philosophy understanding of man as ethical and, as such, reasonable being is expounded. The paper can be of interest to anyone who is concerned with the problem of man and who is familiar with some basic philosophical approaches to it.

This chapter turns the tables on the standard conception of the relation between the liar paradox and theories of truth. We should not look to the liar paradox as constraining the development of a materially adequate theory of truth; rather, we should see the development of a materially adequate theory of truth as sufficient to block the Liar. This evident reversal has important consequences for a number of issues that are widely discussed in the literature. The chapter advocates a substantivist theory of truth and conceives of such a theory as a cluster of interconnected principles of truth. In particular, according to the chapter, there is some material principle of truth, which is arrived at by investigating the nature of truth itself. This material principle, which the chapter calls ‘IMMANENCE’, has three subprinciples, ‘immanence’, ‘transcendence’, and ‘normativity’. Given the combination of the first two subprinciples, the chapter argues that the liar paradox does not arise.

This chapter introduces the book’s core ideas and some of the principal issues raised. Beginning with a discussion of Michel Foucault’s understanding of “technologies of the self,” it explores how drugs might be understood as “technologies of transcendence”—technologies that have the power to subvert dominant readings of reality. As such, they are always countercultural. By inducing the transcendence of ordinary consciousness, they are often understood to provide access to gnosis, or a special form of knowledge. They also typically induce mystical experiences of oneness that lead to a form of perennialism. In order to understand these mystical experiences, the chapter makes use of William James’s analysis of mysticism. Also, drawing on Mircea Eliade’s understanding of shamanism as “techniques of ecstasy,” it shows that drugs are often understood as technologies that induce ekstasis, meaning “to be located outside,” to “transcend,” or to be “displaced from” the embodied self.

Under the influence of Arabic Neoplatonism, the Ismā‘īlī branch of Shī‘ite Islam developed such a radical conception of the absolute transcendence of God that ‘theology’—in the sense of a ‘discourse about God’—becomes for them an impossible science. Overtly hostile to both Ashʿarism and Muʿtazilism, Ismā‘īlī authors of the Fātimid period (tenth–eleventh centuries) nevertheless introduced doctrines borrowed fromKalām, but they applied them to the first created being, the Intellect, and not to the Ultimate Principle. Hence, the Word (kalima), the Will (irāda), and the Command (amr) are identified with the Intellect; the ‘most sublime names of God’ are considered as attributes of the Intellect; their plurality does not affect the absolute unity of its essence; moreover, the Intellect is presented as the source of divine revelation.

This chapter posits that international law, like all law, can be understood as a hybrid of positive and natural law. The history of natural law from Ancient Greece to today’s global community reveals that the method used for centuries to explain extra-positive features of law consists of three integral elements. The method uses reason, reflection on nature, and openness to transcendence. Certain contemporary natural law theorists, however, prefer to focus on reason and nature alone. Yet, the history of natural law thinking shows that transcendence is integral to the method. History also reveals that religion is not the only avenue to transcendence. Transcendence completes a natural law method capable of explaining persuasively why law binds in general and why certain principles are superior to positive law.

Ḥājj Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī (1212/1797 or 1798–1289/1873), was one of the major followers and commentators of Mullā Ṣadrā’s transcendent philosophy. Sabzawārī’s profound understanding of the transcendent philosophy and his skill in teaching and commenting upon it was such that after Mullā Ṣadrā himself, Sabzawārī is generally considered to have played one of the most important roles in the development and propagation of this school. The most important work of Sabzawārī is the Ghurar al-farāʾid and his own commentary upon it is a relatively systematic summary of introduction to Mullā Ṣadrā’s magnum opus, the Asfār. The chapter introduces and analyzes the major principles and foundations of Sabzawārī’s philosophical thought, including the three fundamental principles of the ontology of the transcendent philosophy: the primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), the unity of the reality of existence (waḥdat ḥaqīqat al-wujūd), and gradation in the levels of being (tashkīk al-wujūd).

Love lies at the heart of the religious life, as a principle mode of relationship between the human and the transcendent, as a guiding motivation for the moral life, and, for many, as a defining attribute of the transcendent. Among all the emotions, love is the most transformative. Yet the transformative power of love can be highly disruptive, contravening the careful conceptual apparatus of religion, undermining institutional religious authority, and upsetting social expectations and hierarchies. And if the power of the emotion of love is not harnessed for self-transformation, then rather than enhancing the other-regarding perspective prescribed by religion, this emotion can increase attachment, partiality, and self-centeredness. In theistic traditions such as Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Baha'i, bhakti Hinduism, and Sikhism, love is considered an essential defining attribute of God and a definitive mode—if not the single definitive mode—of relationship between humans and the divine. This article discusses the nature of love and emotion, love as an attribute of the transcendent, and love as the response to the transcendent.

Coleridge is presented as a two-level theorist of the innate powers of mind in Chapter 11, which argues that Coleridge distinguishes (1) a transcendental, Kantian sense of the a priori principles of human discursive cognition (comparable to Plato’s mid-level diánoia), from (2) the noëtic, Platonic a priori principles of intellectual intuition (or nóēsis, a higher-level intuitive cognition of ontological, theological, and ethical truths). Drawing on Logic and Opus Maximum, the author demonstrates that Coleridge characterizes Kantian a priori principles as ‘subjectively real’, finite-mind-dependent rules of sense-experience and cognition, and Platonic a priori principles as ‘objectively real’ principles of knowing and being that are dependent upon ‘the transcendent and unindividual’ reason (i.e. God, ‘the absolute Self, Spirit, or Mind’). This ‘two-level’ theory is framed in terms of Coleridge’s Kantian ‘threefold division’ of the human cognitive capacities into sense, understanding, and reason, and their respective a priori operations and contents.

This chapter examines Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl's concept of God from a phenomenological point of view. Husserl is not content merely to recognize as the “principle of principles” the originary presence of the thing to consciousness; he also excludes the concept of a God who would escape the laws of intentionality. God is not only a limiting-concept for philosophy, but is also what is revealed to religious consciousness as an absolute transcendence. The transcendental reduction bears not only on the whole of the natural world, but also on all the products of culture, and in particular on custom, law, and religion. The chapter explores how Heidegger and Husserl approach the relations between phenomenology and religion.

The purpose of this address is to argue for the following theses: (1) the concept of transcendentality can be associated not only with idealism but also with materialism; (2) such a connection was made possible by Karl Marx's theory; and (3) in the development of Marxism up to now, theory has been tied to a political movement, which is an error of principle, for what survives of it is a kind of social ethics which should more appropriately be called Marxism. Transcendence and immanence are notions of relationship. Values exist sensually above the senses: e.g., the aesthetic value of a painting is not identical with the material of the canvas and the oils on it, although it cannot exist without them. Persons who do not recognize values that are transcendent compared to the merely natural immanence or, to put it in another way, those for whom nothing is sacred are in fact not truly human.

In the ontological argument and the method of Anselm, we find many phenomenological elements. The proximity of the ontological argument to phenomenology shows itself especially from a parallel between Anselm's and Husserl's deriving a necessity of thinking from a necessity of being. But, Medieval proofs for the existence of God appear to contradict the principles of phenomenological method, particularly the 'bodily self-givenness,' the epoché as bracketing the real existence as well as the transcendence of essence vis-àvis consciousness. The phenomenological method must indeed be rethought and reformulated to allow a transition from returning to 'things themselves' to a philosophical knowledge of God. It must be freed from Husserl's subjectivistic theory of 'constitution' and from any generalization of the methodological principle of epoché. In this way, Anselm's position contains the germ for a critical rethinking of the phenomenological method in the vein of realist phenomenology.

Religious topics are increasingly common in video games, frequently addressing issues such as spirituality and transcendence. Yet this is only the surface of more complex phenomena, deeply tied to religious experience itself in interactive digital simulations. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the implications of the ties between religion and belief dynamics in video games. First, it focuses on different kinds of player–game belief relationships, which take the forms of agreements (symmetrical) and self-givings (asymmetrical). Then, it addresses the process of institution of belief: the necessity for players not only to pretend to believe in the digital world, but to experience the act of believing itself while playing. Lastly, it presents a series of case studies (Planescape Torment, Nier: Automata, The Talos Principle, and The Stanley Parable) to show different peculiar dynamics involved in the relationships between religio, belief, and the ludic experience.

The article presents an overview of the key arguments of Terrence Deacon's theory of how mind emerged from matter. Deacon’s emergentism is analyzed as a way of refocusing the «hard problem» of consciousness. He suggests considering the phenomenon of consciousness as a dynamic coupling of mutually constraining processes. Such coupling is the defining feature of the subjective self and other teleodynamic phenomena. So self cannot be found as something embodied in existing material substrates. Consciousness is not present in such substrates themselves, but in the way different processes unfolding in these substrates constrain each other. Deacon shows that even looking at the simplest forms of life (autogens) one can observe that in them each part, interacting with other parts, creates the whole, and the whole as a synergetic complex makes possible the reproduction of its parts. The same principle underlies the organization of subjective consciousness, as subjective consciousness is hierarchically entangled with other levels of sentience. Thus, Deacon's emergentism is an attempt to take seriously the problem of the interrelation of spirit and matter by not simply to disregarding explanations that refer to the spiritual substance, but by offering the models of consciousness, sentience and purposiveness that could convincingly solve fundamental questions about the nature of consciousness in an alternative way. It is also an attempt to avoid the «naturalistic dualism» of David Chalmers, which involves splitting material information into physical and phenomenal aspects. According to Deacon, in explaining subjective self, one can do without both Cartesian spiritual substance and Chalmers' phenomenal information, but then what is necessary is to acknowledge the significance of absential phenomena (the phenomena that are intrinsically existing in relation to something missing, separate or nonexistent).

All political authorities to strengthen the pillars of their power rely on a set of foundations and principles in order to justify their strength and ability. Likewise, the Umayyads wanted to use various methods, especially if we knew that the Umayyad's opponents were strong in terms of their legitimacy and personality, because they were from the family of the Messenger of God. This is what made the Umayyads to search for legitimacy. One of the techniques they used is the ideas of determinism and political determinism. And the summery of the idea is, that man is a transcendent power and it is God who imposed everything on them, as well as the Umayyad's political and authority rule within that inevitable scope, so the people must accept it, and submit to it, because their authority was derived from God. To impose this idea, the Umayyads benefited from the roots of that idea that is prevalent among Muslims and had many followers who defended it.

O turismo rural surge no Brasil na década de 1990 como interesse do setor nas dinâmicas dos espaços rurais que representam novas experiências a serem oferecidas ao viajante, sendo a principal motivação o contato com comunidades rurais. A potencialidade do turismo rural está no caráter histórico e cultural inerentes as formas de viver e produzir evidenciando a diversidade de grupos sociais e trazendo a tona a imaterialidade do patrimônio. A valorização do patrimônio cultural de um território pode contribuir para o desenvolvimento econômico e social e ainda favorecer o incremento da indústria do turismo. Nesse sentido, entende-se o turismo como uma atividade “complexa” que envolve relações entre o contexto social humano, a influência do setor de produtos e serviços da economia e as dinâmicas socioculturais. Diante do exposto, analisar o fenômeno do turismo é considerar o ambiente como parte integrada a outras áreas em uma abordagem sistêmica, pois o turismo cresce, acompanha as necessidades do mercado, formata o objeto de venda em produto turístico que é intangível e demanda um olhar mais abrangente transcendendo a lógica do produtor e consumidor. Nesse sentido importa reflexões sobre as inter-relações ocorridas em comunidades questionando como se estabelece a relação do turismo com comunidades rurais e o patrimônio cultural local? E onde o Design se insere tendo em vista esse cenário? Este artigo de abordagem teórica qualitativa pretende contextualizar o turismo rural relacionando-o ao patrimônio cultural como norte às perspectivas do Design sistêmico voltado ao desenvolvimento de comunidades rurais com respeito às especificidades socioculturais. Como procedimentos metodológicos foi feita revisão de literatura mediante levantamento bibliográfico e documental de artigos e livros impressos ou na forma de bases de dados eletrônicas com vistas a compor o referencial teórico. Acredita-se que este estudo traz contribuições ao apontar lacunas para ações do Design voltadas às concepções dos espaços rurais na atualidade, sem perder de vista a história que os constituiu, explorando suas atividades não-agrícolas, a forma de participação dos atores sociais desses espaços, em especial, a família agricultora e sua relação na venda de produtos e serviços representativos do território e patrimônio cultural local.Palavras-chave: turismo rural; patrimônio cultural; design sistêmico.