To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Propagande communiste – Chine.
Journal articles on the topic 'Propagande communiste – Chine'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Propagande communiste – Chine.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Dal Lago, Francesca. "Les racines populaires de l’art de la propagande communiste en Chine : des gravures sur bois du Mouvement pour la nouvelle xylographie (xinxin banhua 新新版畫) aux nouvelles estampes du Nouvel An (xin nianhua 新年畫)". Arts asiatiques 66, № 1 (2011): 225–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/arasi.2011.1764.
Full text
2
Wu, Guoguang. "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People's Daily." China Quarterly 137 (March 1994): 194–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000034111.
Full textAbstract:
Most studies of communication in China or in other Communist states focus on the functions of mass media: as propaganda, organization, mobilization and control. They examine the transmission of messages from state to society and see the news media under the Communist system as a crucial part of the party-state machine. These studies usually emphasize two features. First, mass media and the party-state are seen as identical in essence, as implied in the concept of “propaganda state.” Secondly, they focus on how this “propaganda state” restructures people's opinions and transforms society.
3
Sun, Zhen. "Utopia, nostalgia, and femininity: visually promoting the Chinese Dream." Visual Communication 18, no. 1 (2017): 107–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470357217740394.
Full textAbstract:
The concept of the Chinese Dream has become a primary developmental goal of the Chinese Communist Government since it was put forth by Xi Jinping in 2012. It has been promoted through different forms of media, of which propaganda posters have played a dominant role. The propaganda discourse regarding the Chinese Dream has been mainly articulated in both the verbal text in official documents and the visual text in the posters. This study focuses on analyzing the visual images represented in the posters and exploring how they accord with social and historical texts, particularly the official verbal text of the Chinese Dream, the historical text of the propaganda of the Communist Party of China, and the social–cultural text interrelated with the visual symbols. The approach of intertextuality and intervisualityis adopted for the analysis and interpretation. The study shows that the majority of the visual symbols used in the posters are transposed from the sign systems of Chinese traditional culture and the revolutionary discourse of the Communist Party of China. The political concept of the Chinese Dream has embodied the characteristics of utopia, nostalgia, and femininity. With the posters in public spaces, the visual propaganda of the Chinese Dream has turned it into a mundane movement of political culture. This study hopes to contribute to the understanding of the role of visual images in political discursive formations and integrated propaganda in post-socialist China.
4
Fan, Ka-wai. "Film Propaganda and the Anti-schistosomiasis Campaign in Communist China." Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 12, no. 1 (2012): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.21866/esjeas.2012.12.1.001.
Full text
5
Aminulloh, Akhirul, Myrtati Dyah Artaria, Yuyun Wahyu Izzati Surya, and Kamil Zajaczkowski. "The 2019 Indonesian Presidential Election: Propaganda in Post-Truth Era." Nyimak: Journal of Communication 5, no. 1 (2021): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.31000/nyimak.v5i1.3882.
Full textAbstract:
Presidential elections often are colored by propaganda and post-truth politics in its campaign to influence public opinion. This study aimed to identify the way and forms of propaganda and post-truth communicate political messages from the 2019 presidential election in Indonesia through political communication on social media. This research employed a mixed-methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative data were obtained from Twitter with social network analysis (SNA) from December 2018 to March 2019. Meanwhile, the qualitative data were obtained from literature searches and expert interviews. The results of this analysis indicated that presidential candidate Jokowi was widely rumored to be a liar, claimant of success, weak leader, communist, pro-China, and anti-Islam. There were also many rumors that referred to presidential candidate Prabowo as a pro caliphate, human rights violator, person with a questionable religion, bad-tempered person, inexperienced leader, and hoax spreader. These negative issues constitute propaganda in the form of stories, rumors, and myths that were manipulated to influence public opinion on social media. Some parts of society believed them based on emotional belief instead of on rationally observed facts. We conclude that even when it involves many people in a big nation, propaganda can be manipulated to influence public opinion.Keywords: Propaganda, post-truth, social media, political communication, presidential election ABSTRAKPemilihan presiden sering kali diwarnai oleh propaganda dan politik pasca-kebenaran dalam kampanyenya untuk memengaruhi opini publik. Kami mempelajari kasus pemilihan presiden di Indonesia tahun 2019. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengidentifikasi bagaimana bentuk-bentuk propaganda dan post-truth mengkomunikasikan pesan politik melalui komunikasi politik di media sosial. Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan metode campuran, yaitu kombinasi metode kuantitatif dan kualitatif. Data kuantitatif diperoleh dari media sosial Twitter dengan analisis jejaring sosial (SNA) dari Desember 2018 hingga Maret 2019. Data kualitatif diperoleh dari penelusuran literatur dan wawancara ahli. Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa capres Jokowi banyak diisukan sebagai pembohong, klaim keberhasilan, pemimpin lemah, komunis, pro-China, dan anti-Islam. Banyak rumor yang menyebut calon presiden Prabowo sebagai pro khilafah, pelanggar HAM, orang yang agamanya dipertanyakan, pemarah, pemimpin yang tidak berpengalaman, dan penyebar hoax. Implikasi dari penelitian ini adalah bahwa isu-isu negatif tersebut merupakan propaganda berupa cerita, rumor, dan mitos yang dimanipulasi untuk memengaruhi opini publik di media sosial. Sebagian masyarakat percaya bahwa propaganda ini sebagai kebenaran karena didasarkan pada keyakinan emosional, bukan fakta yang diamati secara rasional. Kami menyimpulkan bahwa meskipun melibatkan banyak orang di negara besar, propaganda dapat dimanipulasi untuk memengaruhi opini publik.Kata Kunci: Propaganda, post-truth, media sosial, komunikasi politik, pemilihan presiden
6
Hung, Chang-tai. "The Anti–Unity Sect Campaign and Mass Mobilization in the Early People's Republic of China." China Quarterly 202 (June 2010): 400–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741010000305.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe anti-Unity Sect campaign (1949–53), a precursor to the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (thezhenfanmovement), was one of the Chinese Communists' most violent policies to root out a perceived evil cult in China. This article argues that the drive was never simply a religious crusade. It was essentially a mass mobilization for the purpose of consolidating the Communists' power and legitimacy. Through a host of propaganda channels, including media attacks and public trials, the Communists dealt a crippling blow to the sect. The mobilization campaign turned many citizens into supporters and agents of the government, and its tactics would soon be mimicked in subsequent political movements.
7
Xie, Ying. "The Patriotism and the Heroism Embedded in the Subtitles of Chinese-English Movies: The Mission of “Main Melody” Films." International Journal of Comparative Literature and Translation Studies 8, no. 3 (2020): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.7575/aiac.ijclts.v.8n.3p.34.
Full textAbstract:
The dissemination of audiovisual products has played an indispensable role in shaping ideological propaganda and national influence in China. The “Main Melody” are the films that serve to propagandize the mainstream ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). As a typical example of this genre, Wolf Warrior II (《战狼2》) (2017) has been the top-grossing film in the Chinese mainland since its release in July 2017. The science fiction film The Wandering Earth ( 《流浪地球》) (2019), with its subtle implication of “Main Melody”, quickly ranks as the third. Meanwhile, the action movie Operation Red Sea (《红海行动》) (2018), which advocates the element of “Main Melody”, has been ranked fifth in the Chinese mainland box office. In this paper, I will move beyond the conventional linguistic research in audiovisual translation to focus on the ideology revealed through the subtitles of this specific film genre. By considering the movies as multilingual texts targeted for both Chinese audiences and English-speaking audiences, I seek to explore the ideology reflected in the subtitles of the films by probing into several questions through the paper including: What stereotyped image does China still hold towards the West? What kind of image does the CCP and the Chinese government attempt to portray China as in the mind of Chinese audiences and English-speaking audiences?
8
Zhao, Suisheng. "A State-Led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 31, no. 3 (1998): 287–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0967-067x(98)00009-9.
Full textAbstract:
The decline of Communism after the end of the post-Cold War has seen the rise of nationalism in many parts of the former Communist world. In countries such as the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, nationalism was pursued largely from the bottom up as ethnic and separatist movements. Some observers also take this bottom-up approach to find the major cause of Chinese nationalism and believe that “the nationalist wave in China is a spontaneous public reaction to a series of international events, not a government propaganda.” (Zhang, M. (1997) The new thinking of Sino–US relations. Journal of Contemporary China, 6(14), 117–123). They see Chinese nationalism as “a belated response to the talk of containing China among journalists and politicians” in the United States and “a public protest against the mistreatment from the US in the last several years.” (Li, H. (1997) China talks back: anti-Americanism or nationalism? Journal of Contemporary China, 6(14), 153–160). This position concurs with the authors of nationalistic books in China, such as The China That Can Say No: Political and Sentimental Choice in the Post-Cold War Era (Song, Q., Zhang Z., Qiao B. (1996) Zhongguo Keyi Shuo Bu (The China That Can Say No). Zhonghua Gongshang Lianhe Chubanshe. Beijing), which called upon Chinese political elites to say no to the US, and argue that the rise of nationalism was not a result of the official propaganda but a reflection of the state of mind of a new generation of Chinese intelligentsia in response to the foreign pressures in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Chinese nationalism was mainly reactive sentiments to foreign suppressions in modern history, and this new wave of nationalist sentiment also harbored a sense of wounded national pride and an anti-foreign (particularly the US and Japan) resentment. Many Chinese intellectuals gave voice to a rising nationalistic discourse in the 1990s (Zhao, S. (1997) Chinese intellectuals' quest for national greatness and nationalistic writing in the 1990s. The China Quarterly, 152, 725–745). However, Chinese nationalism in the 1990s was also constructed and enacted from the top by the Communist state. There were no major military threats to China's security after the end of the Cold War. Instead, the internal legitimacy crisis became a grave concern of the Chinese Communist regime because of the rapid decay of Communist ideology. In response, the Communist regime substituted performance legitimacy provided by surging economic development and nationalist legitimacy provided by invocation of the distinctive characteristics of Chinese culture in place of Marxist–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. As one of the most important maneuvers to enact Chinese nationalism, the Communist government launched an extensive propaganda campaign of patriotic education after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The patriotic education campaign was well-engineered and appealed to nationalism in the name of patriotism to ensure loyalty in a population that was otherwise subject to many domestic discontents. The Communist regime, striving to maintain authoritarian control while Communist ideology was becoming obsolete in the post-Cold War era, warned of the existence of hostile international forces in the world perpetuating imperialist insult to Chinese pride. The patriotic education campaign was a state-led nationalist movement, which redefined the legitimacy of the post-Tiananmen leadership in a way that would permit the Communist Party's rule to continue on the basis of a non-Communist ideology. Patriotism was thus used to bolster CCP power in a country that was portrayed as besieged and embattled. The dependence on patriotism to build support for the government and the patriotic education campaign by the Communist propagandists were directly responsible for the nationalistic sentiment of the Chinese people in the mid-1990s. This paper focuses on the Communist state as the architect of nationalism in China and seeks to understand the rise of Chinese nationalism by examining the patriotic education campaign. It begins with an analysis of how nationalism took the place of the official ideology as the coalescing force in the post-Tiananmen years. It then goes on to examine the process, contents, methods and effectiveness of the patriotic education campaign. The conclusion offers a perspective on the instrumental aspect of state-led nationalism.
9
MITTER, RANA. "Classifying Citizens in Nationalist China during World War II, 1937–1941." Modern Asian Studies 45, no. 2 (2011): 243–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x1100014x.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThis paper argues that the first phase of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937–1945 saw a significant change in the relationship between state and society in China, leading to a greater use of techniques of classification of the citizenry for purposes of welfare provision and mobilization through propaganda, methods until recently more associated with the Communists than with their Nationalist rivals. The paper draws on materials from Sichuan, the key province for wartime resistance, showing that the use of identity cards and welfare provision regulations were part of a process of integrating refugees from occupied China into the wider wartime society, and that propaganda campaigns were deployed to persuade the local indigenous population to support wartime state initiatives. Although Nationalist efforts to mobilize the population in wartime were flawed and partial, they marked a significant change in the conception of Chinese citizenship.
10
Brady, Anne-Marie. "The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction." China Quarterly 197 (March 2009): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741009000058.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractFrom 2006 to 2008 the predominant theme in the Chinese media was preparations for the 2008 Olympics. These preparations were not merely about putting up new sports stadiums; China also underwent a massive public etiquette campaign, aimed at “civilizing” Chinese citizens. This was nominally so they could be good hosts during the Beijing Olympics. The 2006–08 emphasis on Olympic-related news coverage and the ongoing public morals campaign was what I have called a campaign of mass distraction: a propaganda campaign designed to mobilize the population around a common goal, and distract them from more troubling issues such as inflation, unemployment, political corruption and environmental degradation. This article discusses China's Olympics propaganda within the context of the modernization of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda system – which has included incorporating practices originating in modern democratic states – and considers in what way changes in the propaganda system reflect changes in China's system of political control.
11
Graziani, Sofia. "Youth and the Making of Modern China." European Journal of East Asian Studies 13, no. 1 (2014): 117–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700615-01301008.
Full textAbstract:
The beginning of the twentieth century marked in China the emergence of “youth” (qingnian) as a distinct analytical category associated with national modernity. As the term qingnian assumed unprecedented significance, a new generation of educated youth aware of its role as agent of social change also came into being. In fact, the May Fourth movement turned Chinese youth into a social force that could be organized and mobilized for effective action by nascent ideologically committed political parties. The historical analysis of the Socialist/Communist Youth League, the Chinese Communist Party-affiliated youth organization, is rather biased, as official historiography tends to overemphasize its role as well as the symbiotic nature of its relationship with the Party. Moreover, so far Western scholars have carried out little work on the topic. This paper makes use of largely unexploited documentary material to reconstruct the history of the Youth League from its inception to its disbandment on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war, and to show how the League interacted with the party’s development in the early stage of the Communist movement. It argues that, in a political context of contestation over power, it was mainly conceived as a tool for Communist propaganda and mobilization of mass support. Yet, the League’s relationship with the party was not always one of symbiosis and subordination.
12
Brady, Anne-Marie. "“We Are All Part of the Same Family”: China's Ethnic Propaganda." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 41, no. 4 (2012): 159–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261204100406.
Full textAbstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government works hard to promote an image of ethnic harmony in China and downplays ethnic conflict by carefully controlling public information and debate about ethnic affairs. Despite such efforts, the recent clashes in Tibetan areas in 2008 and violent riots in Urumqi in 2009 reveal the weaknesses of this approach. This paper surveys the broad themes of ethnic propaganda ([Formula: see text], minzu xuanchuan) in present-day China, looking at the organisations involved, the systems of information management they utilise, and the current “go” and “no-go” zones for debate. The paper forms part of a larger study of the politics of ethnicity in China. It is based on primary-and secondary-source research in Chinese, secondary sources in English, and extensive interviews with Chinese bureaucrats and scholars regarding China's ethnic affairs conducted during fieldwork in China in 2002, 2004, 2005–2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012. Ethnic issues in China concern not only the minority peoples there, but also the majority Han – hence, my definition of ethnic propaganda incorporates materials relating to all of China's ethnic groups. The paper uses the events in Tibetan areas in 2008 and in Urumqi as case studies to demonstrate how these policies play out in periods of crisis. It concludes with a discussion of the role that ethnic propaganda plays in maintaining China's long-term political stability and its international affairs.
13
Zuenko, I. Y. "Chinese Reaction and Interpretation of 1991 Events in the Soviet Union." Journal of International Analytics 12, no. 1 (2021): 96–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.46272/2587-8476-2021-12-1-96-111.
Full textAbstract:
The article is timed to coincide with two anniversaries: centenary of the Communist Party of China, and thirty years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to the author’s idea, these two anniversaries correlate: analysis of the reasons and consequences of the USSR dissolution became one of the factors of current policy of Chinese communists. The article brings light to this coherence. A wide range of Chinese sources and literature regarding 1991 events in the USSR was used for the article. Another feature is the attention to historical context of the late 1980s – early 1990s, analysis of which helps to understand domination of conservative view to the USSR dissolution. The article shows how the Chinese state and party interest in the Soviet experience led to creation of a large bulk of works regarding historical, sociological and culturological aspects of the USSR dissolution. The analysis of the most impactful of these works shows a wide range of views regarding certain aspects (fi rst of all, the role of reforms in the fi nal dissolution of the state) and consensus regarding other aspects (negative role of Mikhail Gorbachev, labelling the dissolution of the USSR and the Communist Party as a ‘catastrophe’). Further analysis of the Soviet experience led to such measures by the Chinese leadership like strengthening of partocracy regime, conducting of media-covered anti-smuggling campaigns, establishing of harsh administrative and security control in areas with ethnic minorities, active counterpropaganda and struggling with foreign information infl uence. Appellation to the negative experience of the USSR and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is using by the Chinese leadership in its propaganda as an argument for unacceptability of any political reforms regarding weakening of the party role.
14
Zhou, Min, and Hanning Wang. "Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Chinese University Students: The Influence of Contemporary Nationalist Propaganda." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 46, no. 1 (2017): 167–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261704600107.
Full textAbstract:
This study looks at the sources of anti-Japanese sentiment in today's China. Using original survey data collected in June 2014 from 1,458 students at three elite universities in Beijing, we quantitatively investigate which factors are associated with stronger anti-Japanese sentiment among elite university students. In particular, we examine the link between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s nationalist propaganda (especially patriotic education) and university students’ anti-Japanese sentiment. We find that nationalist propaganda does indeed have a significant effect on negative sentiment towards Japan. Reliance on state-sanctioned textbooks for information about Japan, visiting museums and memorials or watching television programmes and movies relating to the War of Resistance against Japan are all associated with higher levels of anti-Japanese sentiment. The findings suggest the effectiveness of nationalist propaganda in promoting anti-Japanese sentiment. We also find that alternative sources of information, especially personal contact with Japan, can mitigate anti-Japanese sentiment. Thus, visiting Japan and knowing Japanese people in person can potentially offset some of the influences of nationalist propaganda.
15
Morris, Andrew D. "‘Praising Righteous Fan’: pla Air Force Commander Fan Yuanyan’s 1977 Defection to Taiwan." International Journal of Taiwan Studies 2, no. 1 (2019): 57–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24688800-00201004.
Full textAbstract:
People’s Liberation Army Air Force Squadron Commander Fan Yuanyan flew his MiG-19 from Fujian Province, People’s Republic of China (prc) to the Republic of China (roc) on Taiwan on 7 July 1977. The timing of this defection, which came as u.s. President Jimmy Carter was moving decisively towards normalisation of relations with the prc, made Fan an anticommunist star. Fan spoke for years afterwards on behalf of the ‘800 million mainland compatriots’ who he felt wanted the roc to retake the mainland, even as he also became more critical of the excesses of capitalism and liberalism in Taiwan. Much of the Kuomintang’s propaganda use of Fan was related to ways in which Nationalist and Communist ideologies about authoritarian and antibourgeois values overlapped. Fan thus represents the ways in which Nationalist and Communist ideologies and societies were mutually constitutive and constructed with the other clearly in mind during the Cold War.
16
Lams, Lutgard, and Wei-lun Lu. "Puppets, Compatriots, and Souls in Heaven: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Chiang Kai-shek's Early Wartime Rhetoric." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 47, no. 2 (2018): 87–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261804700204.
Full textAbstract:
The study adopts a critical discourse analysis approach to Chiang Kai-shek's (CKS) internal nationalist propaganda and authoritarian discourse practices, investigating his New Year and National Day speeches in the 1950s. Authoritarian characteristics are evident in strategies such as legitimation, reification, or myth-making, in the antagonist categorisation of Self versus Other, in Self-glorification and the idolisation of the dead, in the hegemonic creation of commonality and unity, and in the metaphorical conceptualisation of reality. Patterns of idolising the dead serve to impose and legitimise CKS's worldview among his citizens. Another pattern is CKS's invention of imaginary compatriots within the “enslaved China” waiting for the best time to overthrow the “bandits”' rule. Reference to these imaginary agents indirectly presents to his audience a false but better impression of the Self, and a dimmer view of the communist bandits. A third pattern is CKS's metaphorical use of language, such as references to communist China as a puppet regime of Russia.
17
Feng, Chongyi. "The Dilemma of Stability Preservation in China." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 42, no. 2 (2013): 3–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261304200201.
Full textAbstract:
Stability preservation ([Formula: see text], weiwen) has been a core policy of the Chinese communist government for the last two decades. China is the only major country in the contemporary world to have set up stability preservation offices at all levels of government alongside the normal administrative institutions for social control. These offices are mainly staffed by the existing personnel of the security apparatus, who in turn exercise control over people and the propaganda apparatus, who exercise control over information. The consequences of the stability preservation policy and the “system of stability preservation” ([Formula: see text], weiwen tizhi) are widely reported in the media, but the academic community is still in the initial stages of understanding the process of this unique phenomenon in China (Sandby-Thomas 2011; Shambaugh 2000; Social Development Research Group 2010; Sun 2009; Yu 2009). Why has the Chinese government pursued this policy? Is stability preservation in China a conventional issue of “law and order”? Are the policy and institutions of stability preservation effective in providing social and political stability? What are the implications of these special arrangements for China and the Chinese communist regime in the long run?
18
Wang, Haiyan, Colin Sparks, and Huang Yu. "Popular journalism in China: A study of China Youth Daily." Journalism 19, no. 9-10 (2017): 1203–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1464884917691987.
Full textAbstract:
It is commonly stated that the press in China can be divided into two main categories, the party-oriented official press and the market-oriented commercial press. This article examines an official paper, China Youth Daily, which is a central organ of the Communist Youth League of China. The findings of a content analysis demonstrate that this title differs significantly from other central official titles, like People’s Daily, but also from commercial papers, like Southern Metropolis Daily. While China Youth Daily’s journalism is close to the official pole in the amount of propaganda-related material it covers, it also has a greater emphasis on watchdog journalism than does People’s Daily. It places a much greater emphasis on infotainment than do either of the official and commercial poles. It is more likely to use journalistic techniques like sensationalism and the revelation of personal details than are the other titles analysed. These findings lead to the conclusion that the bi-polar characterization of the Chinese press requires modification. At least one prominent national title is best described as ‘popular official’ media. One of the main features of this kind of journalism is that it presents the party and business elite in a human light and thus constitutes a renewal of the repertoire of hegemonic devices at the party’s disposal. What is certainly the case is that the frequent claim that there is a contradiction between popular journalism responding to audience tastes and official journalism constrained by the propaganda needs of the party is mistaken.
19
Cheung, Siu Keung. "Ideological battles in and out 1911." Social Transformations in Chinese Societies 13, no. 2 (2017): 137–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/stics-04-2017-0006.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose During the centennial anniversary of Xinhai Revolution in 2011, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television supported the production of 1911 for celebrating such an important event that lead to the rise of the Republic of China in the contemporary Chinese history. This paper aims to reflect upon this film in relation to China’s propagation of “Greater China” for the Empire-building project. Design/methodology/approach By scrutinizing the film text and following the strait controversies over the film, this paper demonstrates how the Chinese Communist agents employed the coproduction model with Hong Kong for globalizing a cinematic discourse of Greater China in part of their Empire-building project. Findings The study challenges how contemporary Chinese history is ideologically and politically manipulated for advancing the Chinese Communist propaganda over Taiwan. The overall objective is to reflect upon the longstanding historical divergences that stand on the current geopolitical envision and strategy of China for reunification. Originality/value This paper provides an interdisciplinary reflection upon the intricate post-Cold War politics in part of the contemporary Chinese cinema under the China–Hong Kong coproduction model. The findings advance novel and timely insights into China’s current envision and strategy for reunification.
20
Cho, Sungmin. "Why Non-Democracy Engages with Western Democracy-Promotion Programs." World Politics 73, no. 4 (2021): 774–817. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887121000137.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACTBetween the mid-1990s and the mid-2010s, the Chinese government was distinctly open to the Western offer of democracy-assistance programs. It cooperated with a number of Western organizations to improve the rule of law, village elections, administrative capacity, and civil society in China. Why did the Chinese government engage with democracy promoters who tried to develop these democratic attributes within China? The author argues that the government intended to use Western aid to its advantage. The Chinese Communist Party had launched governance reforms to strengthen its regime legitimacy, and Chinese officials found that Western democracy assistance could be used to facilitate their own governance-reform programs. The article traces the process of how the government’s strategic intention translated into policies of selective openness, and includes evidence from firsthand interviews, propaganda materials, and research by Chinese experts. The findings show how democracy promoters and authoritarian leaders have different expectations of the effects of limited democratic reform within nondemocratic systems. Empirically, reflecting on the so-called golden years of China’s engagement with the West sheds new light on the Chinese Communist Party’s survival strategy through authoritarian legitimation.
21
ALTEHENGER, JENNIFER E. "On Difficult New Terms: The business of lexicography in Mao Era China." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 3 (2017): 622–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x16000147.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractEntries in Mao Era reference works today serve as windows into the world of words and meanings of a bygone era. Dictionaries and encyclopaedias, though, did not speak with one voice, even under Communist Party control. Lexicography and the question of who would get to publish on and explain the meaning of the ‘new terms’ and ‘new knowledge’ of ‘New China’ were subject to constant debates. Lexicographers, editors, and publishers specialized in the business of setting up categories and, together with readers and state censors, they policed them. Following on their heels, this article examines four moments in Mao Era lexicography, ranging from the early years of transition to Chinese Communist Party rule to the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Internal reports and letter exchanges on the production and circulation of single-volume encyclopaedic dictionaries show who contributed to encyclopaedic work, how it was controlled, and why control and censorship were often far from simple. Taking lexicography seriously as a component of the socialist information economy after 1949 sheds light on complex processes of knowledge transmission that defy simple models of socialist state propaganda.
22
Perry, Elizabeth J. "The Populist Dream of Chinese Democracy." Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 4 (2015): 903–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002191181500114x.
Full textAbstract:
Mainstream Chinese discussions of “democracy” have long betrayed a decidedly populist understanding of the concept. Xi Jinping draws freely on this tradition in formulating his China Dream. Xi's efforts are part of the Chinese Communist Party's “re-Orientation” of official propaganda to showcase the glories of the ancient civilization that it claims to represent and rejuvenate. The idea of “democracy” (minzhu民主)—understood in populist rather than institutional terms—plays an important role in the process. This populist interpretation of “democracy” seeks to elide the fundamental contradiction between Enlightenment values and illiberal politics. Whether it will prove persuasive to contemporary Chinese intellectuals remains to be seen.
23
Su, Zhenhua, Yang Cao, Jingkai He, and Waibin Huang. "Perceived Social Mobility and Political Trust in China." African and Asian Studies 14, no. 4 (2015): 315–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15692108-12341347.
Full textAbstract:
Existing studies have traced China’s high political trust to three sources: traditional culture, the state’s success in fostering economic growth, and ideological propaganda. We identify a fourth source: perceived social mobility. We argue that when people perceive a reasonable chance for upward mobility based on personal initiatives and efforts, the status quo becomes more justifiable because individuals are responsible for their own successes and failures. Perceived social mobility thus instills a sense of optimism and fairness and exonerates the regime from many blames, thereby enhancing political trust. Regression analysis of the China portion of the 2007 World Values Survey data shows that respondents who saw themselves as having choices and control in life were indeed more likely to trust the ruling communist party. The respondents’ overall level of perceived social mobility is also high, which is consistent with the massive shake-up of the preexisting social order in China’s reform era.
24
Tai, Qiuqing. "China's Media Censorship: A Dynamic and Diversified Regime." Journal of East Asian Studies 14, no. 2 (2014): 185–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800008900.
Full textAbstract:
Media censorship is the hallmark of authoritarian regimes, but much of the motivation and practices of autocratic media censorship still remain opaque to the public. Using a dataset of 1,403 secret censorship directives issued by the Chinese propaganda apparatus, I examine the censorship practices in contemporary China. My findings suggest that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is gradually adjusting its censorship practices from restricting unfavorable reports to a strategy of “conditional public opinion guidance.” Over the years, the propaganda apparatus has banned fewer reports but guided more of them. However, this softer approach of regulating news is not equally enforced on every report or by different censorship authorities. First, the party tends to ban news that directly threatens the legitimacy of the regime. In addition, due to the speed with which news and photographs can be posted online, the authorities that regulate news on the Internet are more likely to ban unfavorable reports, compared with authorities that regulate slower-moving traditional media. Lastly, local leaders seeking promotions have more incentive to hide negative news within their jurisdictions than their central-level counterparts, who use media to identify misconduct among their local subordinates. Taken together, these characteristics create a strong but fragmented system of media regulation in contemporary China.
25
Liu, Siyuan. "“The Brightest Sun, The Darkest Shadow”: Ideology and the Study of Chinese Theatre in the West during the Cold War." Theatre Survey 54, no. 1 (2013): 27–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0040557412000403.
Full textAbstract:
This is the new Communist drama, and the picture is frequently artless and sterile, without depth, without truth, and without reality.—Walter and Ruth Meserve, 1970Peking opera now is a mixture of drama, music, dance, acrobatics, poetry, propaganda and revolutionary history, with indefatigable heroes (more adroit than James Bond, and with a purpose he never dreamed of) and fabulously wicked villains—the whole socking out a message of exemplary struggle and courage.—Lois Wheeler Snow, 1972The study of Asian theatre as an academic field independent of English and Asian Studies arose in the West, particularly the United States, after World War II, in part as a result of the U.S. occupation of Japan and cold war–era funding policies aimed at spreading democracy in Asia. The notable exception was research on theatre in the People's Republic of China (PRC), which was restrained by the McCarthyist Red Scare, which greatly constricted China studies, and the PRC's self-imposed closure to the West, which made field and archival research virtually impossible. However, these conditions changed dramatically in the early and mid-1970s when the combined effect of China's midcourse correction during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and Nixon's 1972 trip to China prompted a small boom in the translation, publication, reporting, and research of Chinese plays and performance. At the same time, as the two epigraphs above indicate, this first group of writings on Chinese theatre was made largely problematic by a number of factors: the inherently ideological nature of Chinese theatre during the Cultural Revolution; the diverse ideological, academic, and theatrical background of the authors working on the subject during a similarly volatile era in the West; an overreliance on official Chinese publications (usually as the only source available); and restricted access to China for all but a small number of Westerners. Although insightful and well-researched writings certainly existed, much of this body of work reflects the ideological preoccupations of Euro-American intellectuals in the cold war era. The latter manifested themselves either through oversimplified condemnation of communist theatre as artless propaganda or through radical leftist eulogy of China's supposed success in combining theatre and ideology, making theatre serve the people, and promoting amateur performance to stimulate production.
26
Laliberté, André. "Buddhist Revival under State Watch." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 40, no. 2 (2011): 107–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261104000205.
Full textAbstract:
The Chinese Communist Party has shown tolerance, if not direct support, for the growth of Buddhism over the last few decades. Three explanations for this lenient attitude are explored in this article. The flourishing of Buddhism is encouraged by the state less for its propaganda value in foreign affairs than for its potential to lure tourists who will, in turn, represent a source of revenue for local governments. Buddhist institutions are also establishing their track record in the management of philanthropic activities in impoverished area where local governments lack the resources to offer specific social services. Finally, the development of such activities has contributed to enhance cooperation between China and Taiwan, whose governments have a vested interest in the improvement of relations across the Strait. The article concludes that the growth of Buddhism in China results from the initiatives of Buddhists themselves, and the government supports this growth because it serves local politics well.
27
Schoenhals, Michael. "Abandoned or Merely Lost inTranslation?" Inner Asia 10, no. 1 (2008): 113–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/000000008793066777.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractPolitical action and political thinking ('ideology') provide the twin sets of data on which most conventional analyses of the Chinese Communist Party's transformation are made to rest. The twenty-first century's unprecedented concern with information and communication technologies has underscored, however, the need for analysts to upgrade the relevance of political language to any actionable appreciation of an untidy present and forecasting of a potentially turbulent future. A study that focuses on how language and state officialdom intersect in the areas of propaganda and nationalities/ethnic affairs is reported here. Its findings show how in China in the reform-era of the 1980s and 90s, language control and strategic management of political discourse exercised by cadres in the party propaganda apparatus helped forestall a development along Soviet lines ending with the sudden collapse of the socialist state. The findings indicate that the postreform future – which in parts of the country has, in fact, already arrived – is likely to see the contested disappearance of the traditional symbols and rhetoric of socialism 'as we know it', but that this transformation of discourse must be distinguished from the demise of socialism per se.
28
Yang, Dominic Meng-Hsuan. "Humanitarian Assistance and Propaganda War: Repatriation and Relief of the Nationalist Refugees in Hong Kong’s Rennie’s Mill Camp, 1950-1955 人道救援與宣傳戰爭: 香港調景嶺國民黨難民之 接運與救濟, 1950-1955 年". Journal of Chinese Overseas 10, № 2 (2014): 165–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17932548-12341280.
Full textAbstract:
In 1949, the world witnessed a tidal wave of involuntary migration out of China when the Chinese Communists came to power. Among this vast sea of human misery were tens of thousands of exiled Nationalist supporters in Hong Kong — common soldiers, low-ranking civil servants, and their families. In June 1950, a minor clash occurred between the Nationalist refugees and the pro-ccpelements in the colony. To prevent further political upheaval, the British authorities transported the former to a remote location called “Rennie’s Mill” or Tiu Keng Leng and built a temporary internment camp to house them. The initial plan was to gather the Nationalist supporters in the colony and shipped them to Taiwan as soon as possible. Yet Chiang Kai-shek’s government was reluctant to receive these people for both economic and security reasons. As the repatriation process dragged on, the Nationalists used the refugee camp as an international showcase in their propaganda war against the People’s Republic of China (prc) much to the chagrin of the British. Consequently, a considerable number of the Nationalist refugees were stranded in Hong Kong. They became victims of their own government under the pretense of humanitarian assistance. This paper examines the early history of Rennie’s Mill community with an emphasis on the interplay between humanitarian relief, propaganda war, and international politics. It sheds light on the actual lived experiences of Rennie’s Mill refugees against the conflicting ideological constructions and humanitarian discourse surrounding them.
29
Holbig, Heike. "Shifting Ideologics of Research Funding: The CPC's National Planning Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43, no. 2 (2014): 13–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261404300203.
Full textAbstract:
For more than two decades, the National Planning Office for Philosophy and Social Sciences (NPOPSS) has been managing official funding of social science research in China under the orbit of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) propaganda system. By focusing on “Major Projects”, the most prestigious and well-funded program initiated by the NPOPSS in 2004, this contribution outlines the political and institutional ramifications of this line of official funding and attempts to identify larger shifts during the past decade in the “ideologics” of official social science research funding – the changing ideological circumscriptions of research agendas in the more narrow sense of echoing party theory and rhetoric and – in the broader sense – of adapting to an increasingly dominant official discourse of cultural and national self-assertion. To conclude, this article offers reflections on the potential repercussions of these shifts for international academic collaboration.
30
Jacob, Jabin T. "‘To Tell China’s Story Well’: China’s International Messaging during the COVID-19 Pandemic." China Report 56, no. 3 (2020): 374–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0009445520930395.
Full textAbstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has dented China’s image as an efficient party-state, given how an effort to cover up the outbreak and the resulting delays in reporting led to the virus spreading beyond its origins in Wuhan in Hubei province to the rest of the country as well as rapidly across the world. This article examines China’s massive external propaganda effort launched as part of the effort to repair the damage to its global image and interests. It notes how China has not let the situation stop it from pursuing its traditional foreign policy and security interests, including, of competition with the USA. The article also argues that it is the ruling Communist Party of China’s concerns about its legitimacy at home that have determined the nature and scale of Chinese responses to the pandemic outside its borders.
31
Yi, Guolin. "The “Propaganda State” and Sino-American Rapprochement: Preparing the Chinese Public for Nixon’s Visit." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 20, no. 1 (2013): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-02001005.
Full textAbstract:
Studies of Sino-American rapprochement in 1972 have not sufficiently explored how the Chinese public, which had been taught to hate the American “imperialists,” learned (or was instructed) about the dramatic change. By analyzing Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) and Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), an internal (neibu) newspaper circulated only among Chinese Communist Party cadres, this article examines how the Chinese government prepared the party and its people for rapprochement from 1969 through 1971. Reference News kept cadres posted about Washington’s overtures, Nixon’s expressed wish to visit China, and Mao’s willingness to receive him, among other items not shared with the wider public. Before official exchanges were agreed, the Chinese government conducted “people-to-people diplomacy” by inviting American “friends” and displaying them to the Chinese public through banquets, receptions, and ceremonies. People’s Daily, which offered intensive coverage to these visitors, was particularly important in promoting the atmosphere of friendship. Party leaders did not need the approval of the public and party workers, but they did take their response into account in making foreign policy, especially on dramatic changes. By evaluating the Chinese communication system and its handling of public opinion on relations with the United States, this article presents a more nuanced picture of the “propaganda state.”
32
Williams, Emily Rebecca. "Red Collections in Contemporary China." British Journal of Chinese Studies 11 (June 29, 2021): 71–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.51661/bjocs.v11i0.73.
Full textAbstract:
“Red Collecting” is a widespread phenomenon in contemporary China. It refers to the collecting of objects from the Chinese Communist Party’s history. Red Collecting has received only minimal treatment in English-language scholarly literature, much of which focuses on individual object categories (primarily propaganda posters and Chairman Mao badges) and overemphasises the importance of Cultural Revolution objects within the field. Because of this limited focus, the collectors’ motivations have been similarly circumscribed, described primarily in terms of either neo-Maoist nostalgia or the pursuit of profit. This article will seek to enhance this existing literature and, in doing so, offer a series of new directions for research. It makes two main arguments. First, that the breadth of objects incorporated within the field of Red Collecting is far broader than current literature has acknowledged. In particular, the importance of revolutionary-era (pre-1949) collections, as well as regional and rural collections is highlighted. Second, it argues that collectors are driven by a much broader range of motivations, including a variety of both individual and social motivations. Significantly, it is argued that collectors’ intentions and their understandings of the past do not always align; rather, very different understandings of China’s recent past find expression through Red Collecting. As such, it is suggested that Red Collecting constitutes an important part of contemporary China’s “red legacies,” one which highlights the diversity of memories and narratives of both the Mao era and the revolutionary period. 
 Image © Hou Feng
33
Ranta, Michael. "Mao’s Homeworld(s) – A comment on the use of propaganda posters in post-war China." Semiotica 2020, no. 232 (2020): 53–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sem-2019-0054.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractWithin cognitive science, narratives are regarded as crucial and fundamental cognitive instruments or tools. As Roger Schank suggests, the identity of (sub-)cultures is to a considerable extent based upon the sharing of narrative structures (Schank. 1995. Tell me a story: Narrative and intelligence. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.). According to Schank, culturally shared stories, as do many other stories, occur frequently in highly abbreviated form, as “skeleton stories” or “gists.” Collective identities are conveyed in and between cultures not only through verbal discourse, but also by pictorial means. Many pictures and visual artworks have indeed been produced in order to establish and to consolidate a home-culture and to demarcate it from conceived extra-cultural counterparts.Some of my previous work on these lines has been concerned with demarcation efforts in visual media of “Jews” as extra-cultural, since the Middle Ages onwards, in the Third Reich’s iconography, as well as in modern, radicalized forms of anti-Semitic picturing in Arab media (Ranta. 2016. The (pictorial) construction of collective identities in the Third Reich. Language and Semiotic Studies 2(3). 107–124, Ranta. 2017. Master narratives and the (pictorial) construction of otherness: Anti-semitic images in the Third Reich and beyond. Contemporary Aesthetics 15. https://contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=765 (accessed 17 November 2019.). In building upon and extending this work, I shall focus in the current paper upon attempts of creating cultural and political cohesion by means of pictorial propaganda in post-war China from the early 1950’s onwards, as promoted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership by Mao Zedong. Some concrete pictorial examples indicating these attempts will be discussed from a narratological and cultural semiotic perspective.
34
Duan, Demin. "On Authoritarian Political Representation in Contemporary China." Politics and Governance 7, no. 3 (2019): 199–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i3.2119.
Full textAbstract:
Both in the Party Charter and in the State Constitution, the Chinese Communist Party claims to represent the Chinese people. Instead of treating this claim as mere rhetoric made by the party for propaganda purposes, this article demonstrates that it indicates a rather significant transition in the party’s understanding of its relationship with the people. Particularly, roughly about two decades into the Open and Reform policy initiated under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the party made a strategic choice in imagining itself as the representative of the people instead of the revolutionary vanguard. This change in the language was very remarkable in the post-1949 Chinese history, in the sense that the party no longer considers itself as the facilitator of proletariat revolution, but as the authoritarian representative in the political community. If representation means “re-presentation”, as in bringing something absent present, this appears to be what the party tries to do. By embodying the nation, the party tries to represent both the rich and the poor, acting as the arbiter of forever present discords and conflicts within the society. Clearly, this representation has nothing to do with what people usually call “democratic” representation. But considering that representation and democracy are conceptually rooted in very different sources, exploring “authoritarian representation” in contemporary China would enable us to better understand both China and democratic representation.
35
Bo, L. Maria. "Freedom Over Seas: Eileen Chang, Ernest Hemingway, and the Translation of Truth in the Cold War." Comparative Literature 71, no. 3 (2019): 252–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00104124-7546276.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article examines Eileen Chang’s 1953 translation of Ernest Hemingway’s The Old Man and the Sea into Chinese as Cold War propaganda for the United States Information Service (USIS). It argues that this translation, meant to show the truth of democracy through its high modernist form, directly influenced the writing and translating of The Rice-Sprout Song (1955), the novel Chang wrote next for the USIS to expose the truth of famine in Communist China. I show that Chang’s translation practices connect US and Chinese literary modernisms in a showdown of literary forms and their disparate claims to the truth. Chang navigates political ideologies by eschewing linguistic equivalence to favor equivocation instead, ultimately transforming Hemingway’s modernist form via her own. It thus adds to transpacific studies and Cold War historiography by revealing the intimate relationship between political ideology and literary form, and their cross-fertilization in the process of translation.
36
Hao, Xiaoyang. "What Is Criminal and What Is Not: Prosecuting Wartime Japanese Sex Crimes in the People's Republic of China." China Quarterly 242 (February 11, 2020): 529–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741019001085.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) prosecuted Japanese military servicemen for war crimes committed during and after the Sino-Japanese War. This paper examines written confessions left by those Japanese war crimes suspects and considers to what extent they were used by the CCP to prosecute sexual violence during the trials. The historical analysis is contextualized by an examination of the representation of the CCP's legal approach to sexual violence in articles from the People's Daily. This paper finds that although accounts of sexual violence are found in the confessions written by suspected Japanese war criminals, the courts did not make rape a focal point of the prosecutions and did not pursue the so-called “comfort women” issue. Furthermore, no victim of rape was called to testify before the court. The CCP's approach to the issue of sexual violence in the 1956 trials closely corresponded to the discourse and propaganda in the People's Daily.
37
Yang, Yiting. "The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941: China's response." Исторический журнал: научные исследования, no. 2 (February 2021): 67–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0609.2021.2.35602.
Full textAbstract:
The subject of this research is response of the government, political parties, and society of the Republic of China to signing the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan on April 13, 1941 – one of the crucial bilateral agreements of the World War II, which entailed fundamental changes to the Far Eastern international system. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact negatively affected the relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China. The goal of this work is to objectively assess the impact of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941 upon the domestic and foreign policy of the Chinese government, as well as further development of the Sino-Soviet relations. The novelty of this work consists in the fact that based on the poorly studied Russian and foreign documentary materials, the author examines the questions that have been rarely touched upon within the Russian historiography, such as: China’s response to conclusion of the Neutrality Pact between the USSR and Japan; its effect upon Sino-Soviet relations. The conclusion is made that the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941, which marked the most difficult moment of the Sino-Japanese War, was a psychological blow to China. The position of the Kuomintang government was ambivalent: on the one hand, it refrained from the public anti-Soviet propaganda; while on the other hand, used dissatisfaction of China’s population to enhance pressure on its major political opponent – China’s Communist Party. Therefore, the Sino-Soviet relations in general did not experience severe problems; however, the internal split in the Chinese society has worsened, which substantially undermined the formation of Second United Front.
38
Tsang, Winnie. "Creating National Narrative: The Red Guard Art Exhibitions and the National Exhibitions in the Chinese Cultural Revolution 1966 - 1976." Contemporaneity: Historical Presence in Visual Culture 3 (June 5, 2014): 117–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/contemp.2014.58.
Full textAbstract:
The artistic development in China experienced drastic changes during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. Traditional Chinese art was denounced, whereas propaganda art became predominant in shaping the public’s loyalty towards the Communist Party and the country. Two major groups of art exhibitions emerged during the Revolution—the unofficial Red Guard art exhibitions organized by student activists in collaboration with local communes and art schools between 1966 and 1968, and the state-run national exhibitions from 1972 to 1975. These exhibitions were significant to this period because they were held frequently in the capital city Beijing and occasionally elsewhere, and through art they presented unique revolutionary beliefs to the Chinese people in a public setting. While the Red Guard art exhibitions and the national exhibitions certainly created different national narratives, I argue that the national exhibitions were in fact an attempt to revise the national narrative created by the Red Guard art exhibitions in order to re-establish a more utopian, consistent, and official national narrative. This paper unravels the intricate relationship between the two groups of exhibitions by comparing their exhibition venues, ideological focuses, work selection and quality editing.
39
GRAZIANI, SOFIA. "The Case of Youth Exchanges and Interactions Between the PRC and Italy in the 1950s." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 1 (2016): 194–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x16000305.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractSoon after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), youth exchanges came to be a major part of the Chinese campaign to reach out and influence the people of other nations. Despite the growing scholarly discussion regarding the role of people-to-people diplomacy and external propaganda in China's foreign policy, so far no direct attention has been paid to the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to institutionalize youth exchanges and use them as a tool to promote the new Chinese government's foreign relations. This article locates the position of young people within the PRC's people-to-people diplomacy. It attempts to explore youth exchanges with the West in the early years of the Cold War by focusing on relations between Italian and Chinese youth groups in the 1950s. Relying mainly on unexplored archival material and memoirs, this article documents contacts and exchanges between adult-led youth organizations and their members, and shows how Italian left-wing party-affiliated youth groups and Soviet-dominated transnational organizations provided important channels for Sino-Italian encounters and for building long-lasting contacts among potential future leaders of these countries.
40
FAIRCLOUGH, PAULINE. "The Russian Revolution and Music." Twentieth-Century Music 16, no. 1 (2019): 157–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1478572219000148.
Full textAbstract:
Nearly thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have got used to seeing the Bolshevik Revolution as the prelude to a failed political experiment, albeit one that lasted a remarkably long time. But why do we see it as a failure? After all, the Soviet Union was a vast empire regarded as the military equal of the United States, feared and hated by successive US presidents, whose influence extended far beyond Soviet borders to include regimes in Africa, South East Asia, Central and South America. Had Mikhail Gorbachev not been removed in 1991, and had the Soviet system been able to reform itself into something like the form of communism we see today in China, no one would regard those seventy-plus years of Soviet power as a failure at all. What is meant by failure, in truth, is not really military or economic failure so much as a failure to sustain and uphold the ideals of equality and social justice that originally drew so many to the communist cause. The haemorrhaging of members from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1956, for instance, was a result of widespread feelings of shock and disgust after Nikita Khrushchev's revelations at the Twenty-First Party Conference that year, at which he delivered his so-called ‘secret speech’ condemning Stalin's regime. For those who left the CPGB, and other communist parties across Western Europe, it was painful to realize that what they had for decades dismissed as ‘anti-Soviet propaganda’ had in fact been accurate reportage. Most shocking of all was learning that the mass arrests and disappearances of the 1930s, and even the show trials of prominent Politburo and party members, were not proportionate, if regrettable, responses to plots to murder Stalin and overthrow Soviet power at all, but rather Stalinist crimes of epic and tragic proportions. Right up to the end of the Communist regime in Russia, reports of political and religious repression, the continued use of the Gulag system, confinement and forced treatment of dissidents in mental hospitals, literary and other cultural censorship continued to filter through the Iron Curtain.
41
Kiehl, Christine. "From Chimera to Reality: Lucy Kirkwood’s Chimerica or ‘What State Are We in?’." Journal of Contemporary Drama in English 6, no. 1 (2018): 191–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jcde-2018-0020.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractMark Ravenhill’s 2007 Shoot/Get Treasure/Repeat is a relevant state of the nation(s) play drawing an acid portrait of Anglo-American nations and their self-congratulatory ‘freedom and democracy’ propaganda in Irak. Other committed voices have made themselves heard on the British stage in addressing worldwide political and ethical issues. This paper focuses on Lucy Kirkwood, a young British dramatist whose pungent style was revealed in Tinderbox (2008), a dystopian farce set in 21st century England. Today, Lucy Kirkwood (33) who sees herself as ‘a radical young dramatist,’ continues to explore the confused landscape of western democracy: she sketched the relations between the USA and China in Chimerica (2013), an epic drama which won her an Olivier Award for Best New Play. In the wake of Brexit and the Trump election, Lucy Kirkwood has recently announced that she would pursue her investigation of the leading nations’ policies: “The whole of democracy looks fragile and farcical. After writing about communist China in Chimerica, you suddenly look at western democracy and think: is this necessarily better? Maybe this is the endgame” (Lawson, “Chimerica”).This paper explores Kirkwood’s vitriolic portrait of today’s leading nations, and her questioning of universal concerns experienced on a personal level such as power and privacy, nationalism and identity, profit and subservience. I will examine her peculiar ability to reformulate a ‘state-of-the-nation’ format and associate innovation and convention in her treatment of subject matter, language, dramatic form and performance.
42
Lopes, Helena F. S. "War, State-Building, and International Connections in Nationalist China." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 29, no. 1 (2018): 169–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1356186318000469.
Full textAbstract:
In a recent survey of modern China, historian Rana Mitter noted: “The war between China and Japan may have been the single most important event to shape twentieth-century China”. This perspective hasn't been around for very long. The relevance of China's War of Resistance against Japan (KangRi zhanzheng) has been revaluated by historians in recent years, a prime example of this being Mitter's book on the subject and the work of Hans van de Ven. For years, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 was crystallised into a crucial turning point and the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party/KMT) was seen as corrupt and ineffective, as epitomised by Lloyd Eastman's studies. Eastman's verdict is not entirely contradicted by some of the new scholarship, although important revisionist works have led to a reassessment of the KMT state-building efforts, in particular during their pre-war decade in power, the so-called Nanjing decade (1927–1937). Although the ‘rediscovery’ of the war came later in the English-language than it did in Chinese, it is undeniable that recent years have seen a growing interest in the period, both in academia and in popular culture. The three monographs under review here are, in many ways, illustrative of the best new research on the conflict. They provide comprehensive insight on the impact of the war on the Nationalists' state-building efforts in fiscal policy, propaganda, and justice. All are first monographs, springing from meticulous doctoral and post-doctoral research anchored on a plethora of new primary sources. They make important contributions to our understanding of the impact of the war in China, as well as to economic history, media studies, and legal history more broadly.
43
Witek, Michał. "Historia, naród i nacjonalizm. Ewolucja misji chińskich muzeów w kontekście współczesnej „gorączki” muzealnej w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej." Prace Kulturoznawcze 23, no. 2 (2019): 183–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/0860-6668.23.2-3.11.
Full textAbstract:
History, nation and nationalism: The evolution of the mission of Chinese museums in the context of the contemporary museum “fever” in the People’s Republic of ChinaThe peculiar “museum boom” in the People’s Republic of China PRC attracts much attention from Western researchers. This phenomenon is undoubtedly linked to the cultural shift towards national and cultural heritage promoted by the authorities, which in turn is an important element of the nationalist political ideology. This policy is becoming more and more important in the last three decades of the reform and opening-up period. Museums, like the concept of a “nation” and the nationalist ideology, came to China from the West at about the same time and in a similar political and intellectual context, which meant that the museums quickly became entangled in politics and propaganda. This situation, strengthened even further in the communist period, led to the creation of a very specific form of state-controlled museology. Nowadays, museums and associated thematic parks play a key role in the strategy of developing the culture of the Chinese government, the project of “management and social order.” In this context, these institutions form part of an important mission entrusted to them by the party — the mission of building a new cultural and historical narrative serving the needs of the “new China.” The mission of various types of museums in contemporary China is shaped by overlapping political, economic, ideological and even moral dimensions. It is an important element of the soft power of modern China, which is also an important global symbol of China, attracting millions of foreign tourists a year. In this dimension, the museum’s mission is significantly expanded, it becomes a tool for building an international position and prestige. The aim of the article was to look at the history of Chinese museums in the 20th century in the context of continuity and changeability of the missionary dimension of their functioning, and to conduct a critical analysis of this missionary dimension in the unique conditions of “capitalism with Chinese characteristics” in the contemporary PRC.
44
Weatherley, Robert, and Coirle Magee. "Using the Past to Legitimise the Present: The Portrayal of Good Governance in Chinese History Textbooks." Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 47, no. 1 (2018): 41–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810261804700102.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines how Chinese middle-school history textbooks are written as a means of legitimising the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), by carefully utilising China's past. The authors identify (or perhaps “construct”) a sinified model of good governance in the textbooks that derives from the teachings of Confucius and Mencius, and the subsequent practises of certain revered Chinese emperors. This model is then applied to CCP leaders in the modern-era textbooks in order to cast them as diligently upholding a time-honoured Chinese tradition of legitimate rule. In a broader context, our analysis fits within the ongoing discussions about the continuing legacy of Confucianism in contemporary China and the CCP's efforts to locate itself within this as a way of fortifying its own legitimacy. We also note how some of the themes of good governance contained in the textbooks are closely linked to contemporary government policies and priorities, such as anti-corruption schemes and constitutionalism. The objective in so doing is to propagate the importance of these themes to a young audience.
45
WOOD, SALLY PERCIVAL. "‘CHOU GAGS CRITICS IN BANDOENG’ or How the Media Framed Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Conference, 1955." Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (2009): 1001–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x09990382.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractAt the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, the world's press concentrated its gaze on Premier Zhou Enlai of the People's Republic of China. Premier Zhou's every gesture, interaction and statement was scrutinized for evidence that his motivations at Bandung were antagonistic to Western interests. This preoccupation with the motivations of the Chinese was, however, no new phenomenon. By 1955, literary tropes of the ‘Yellow Peril’ had been firmly established in the Western imagination and, after 1949, almost seamlessly made their transition into fears of infiltrating communist Chinese ‘Reds’.The first half of this paper explores the historical roots of the West's perceptions of the Chinese, through the literary works of Daniel Defoe to the pulp fiction of Sax Rohmer's Dr Fu Manchu series, which ran from 1917 to 1959. It then examines how this negative template was mobilised by the print media at the height of the Cold War to characterize Premier Zhou Enlai, not only as untrustworthy, but also as antagonistically anti-Western. This reading of representations of Premier Zhou at Bandung, as well as the literary tropes propagated in support of eighteenth and nineteenth-century imperial expansion, exposes a history of Western (mis)interpretations of China, and sheds light upon the media network's role in constructing a Chinese enemy in the mid-1950s.
46
Gruszczyński, Oskar. "Taniec w kajdanach: chińska cenzura filmowa w latach 1949–1966." Gdańskie Studia Azji Wschodniej, no. 18 (2020): 103–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/23538724gs.20.038.12875.
Full textAbstract:
Dancing in chains: Chinese film censorship, 1949–1966 After the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and the subsequent nationalization of the domestic film industry three years later, the Chinese Communist Party gained unlimited control over the entire Chinese film world, while film itself became an instrument of state propaganda. In order to fulfill their role ‘in the service of workers, peasants, and soldiers’, filmmakers had to abide strictly by the requirements which the CPC had imposed upon them, and subject themselves to a rigorous film censorship system. Artistic independence and freedom were subject to the political needs of a one-party state and its ideology. The establishment of a full-fledged and extremely complex institutional censorship system in 1953 resulted in the emergence of two distinct phenomena: self-censorship and social censorship. Both of these made it possible for the CPC to gain full control not only over the film industry, but also, in certain aspects, over the minds of filmmakers as well as the audiences. This article aims at revealing the mechanisms of the Chinese censorship system in the period stretching from 1949 to 1966, and to elucidate the disastrous effects which these exceedingly rigorous control mechanisms brought upon the Chinese film industry in general in this turbulent era
47
Deng, Jianguo. "The Paper Janus: How exceptionalism based on regaining influence and doing new media help a Chinese mobile news app negotiate censorship for better journalism." Communication and the Public 3, no. 2 (2018): 113–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057047318770466.
Full textAbstract:
Amid fleeing audience from the state legacy news media to the varied and vociferous new media, the Chinese government launched a mobile news app The Paper ( Pengpai) in 2014 in Shanghai as a pilot test of digital journalism to “regain lost influence.” This seemingly against-the-tide expensive news project makes one wonder: How did The Paper come about and what is its nature? As a government-funded digital media, what old and new strategies have its journalists used in its marketing and content-making to achieve the designated goal of regaining lost influence/win public trust? Through in-depth interviews, this article finds the following: (1) The Paper is a product of patron-clientelism based on a consensus among imperatives of the legitimacy-seeking Party, Confucian-minded and job-losing journalists, and the quality-information-hungry public; (2) as it operates, The Paper has learned to speak both digitally and differently; (3) much like a Janus, its news executives initially used different narratives to the Party and the public to curry favor from both; (4) The Paper used both old and new strategies to negotiate with the censors, most notably two new exceptionalist discourses of “regaining influence” and “doing new media.” The author suggests that, using this exceptionalism trope, The Paper and a score of its clones across China have led Chinese journalism into a phase of “influence-seeking Communist new media-ism (2014–now),” during which Chinese journalists, while honing their digital abilities to propagandize China, have produced some quality digital journalism in public interest with the Party paying the bill.
48
Soler, Lorena. "Redes y organizaciones anticomunistas en Paraguay. La XII Conferencia Anual de la Liga Anticomunista Mundial, realizada en Asunción en 1979." Revista Paginas 10, no. 24 (2018): 55. http://dx.doi.org/10.35305/rp.v10i24.309.
Full textAbstract:
A partir de documentos inéditos y de los periódicos de la época, el artículo se propone reconstruir y estudiar la celebración de la XII Conferencia Anual de la Liga Anticomunista Mundial (LAM; en inglés: World Anti-Communist League, WACL), realizada en Asunción ⃰en abril de 1979 en el marco del régimen stronista (1954-1989).Asumimos que la celebración del congreso de la LAM, además de haber generado un espacio de socialización de las élites y de haber funcionado como un mecanismo de propaganda política de la propia dictadura, fue un hito cuya observación nos permite analizar la reelaboración de los discursos anticomunistas, en una coyuntura específica dada por el redireccionamiento de las relaciones externas de los países no comunistas desde el gobierno de 1971 cuando la Organización de las Naciones Unidas dejo de reconocer la dictadura de Chang Kai-shek como representante legítimo de la China continental y especialmente bajo la administración de Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), el avance del Sandinismo en Nicaragua, los problemas diplomáticos de Paraguay con EE. UU. por las denuncias de ilícitos, la toma de conocimiento internacional de las violaciones a los DD.HH. y la nueva coyuntura local de crecimiento económico que se abría con la represa de Itaipú.Para ello el texto se organizar en una presentación del problema y una descripción de los cambios de la política de cooperación de Paraguay en el marco de la Guerra Fría y en la red trasnacional de la Liga Anticomunista Mundial. Finalmente se detiene en los cambios de la organización mundial tras la nueva política exterior de EE. UU. y algunas conclusiones del estudio general.
49
Kam, Stefanie, and Michael Clarke. "Securitization, surveillance and ‘de-extremization’ in Xinjiang." International Affairs 97, no. 3 (2021): 625–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab038.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract Previous explanations on China's counterterrorism strategy have highlighted the results of China's strategy of repression in Xinjiang, the historical antecedents and institutional foundations of its counterterrorism policies, as well as international and domestic sources of China's counterterrorism strategy. While acknowledging the importance of all these dimensions, this article draws attention to a largely neglected feature of China's counterterrorism strategy: the Chinese party-state's social engineering of Xinjiang. Building on Maoist-era practices such as the mass line and the ‘friend vs. enemy’ binary, the Communist party under Xi Jinping has integrated surveillance technologies as part of its strategy of preventive counterterrorism and ‘de-extremization’. This article argues that the Chinese party-state's embrace of modern technologies, a weak liberal tradition in China, Xi Jinping's rise to power in late 2012, and the appointment of Chen Quanguo as Xinjiang's party-secretary in 2016, provides the socio-political background for the intensification of securitization, surveillance and introduction of ‘re-education and training centres’ in Xinjiang. Surveillance technologies now complement collective, face-to-face methods of surveillance and Maoist-era techniques of mass mobilization, enabling the Chinese party-state to govern and manage the biopolitical spaces of Uyghurs with greater intensity, according to the state's precise norms. The legalization and institutionalization of ‘de-extremization’ has also led to the shift from mass ‘de-extremization’ propaganda to ‘drip-irrigation’ ideological and political re-education of individuals deemed at risk of extremism. The result is an increased capacity by the Chinese party-state to surveil and control the region, and to more effectively negate the possibility of individual resistance.
50
Lancashire, Edel. "The Lock of the Heart Controversy in Taiwan, 1962–63: A Question of Artistic Freedom and a Writer's Social Responsibility." China Quarterly 103 (September 1985): 462–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s030574100003071x.
Full textAbstract:
The early 1960s marked a period of intellectual and literary ferment in Taiwan. The East-West Controversy, which had its roots in the debate that took place in the middle of the last century regarding the continued validity of the Chinese tradition in the face of western military and economic superiority and in the controversy regarding westernization as the road to modernization in the 1930s, had broken out afresh. Creative writers, musicians and painters were experimenting with new forms and new techniques. As early as 1954 the writers of modern Chinese poetry had started the search for a more contemporary expression of their art form; and modern poetry societies, each with its own philosophy on how modernization should take place, had come into being. Writers of fiction who up till then had been almost exclusively concerned with the Sino-Japanese War; the mainland before the communist takeover in 1949, or the various aspects of the struggle against communism, were moving away from this kind of “propaganda-motivated writing” towards the production of “pure literature.” However, there were few modern Chinese creative writers of stature on whom either the poet or fiction writer could model himself. This was because of the ban imposed by the government in Taiwan on the works of writers prior to 1949 due to the association of many of them with communism or with ideologies unacceptable to the authorities. This meant that they had to seek for inspiration in the works of western writers which could be found in translation or in pirated versions of the original texts in the major cities of Taiwan. The traditionalists viewed this growing trend with alarm as did those writers who were closely associated with the Kuomintang. The latter had formed themselves during the early 1950s into three writers' associations, the China Association of Literature and Art, the Chinese Youth Writers' Association, and the Taiwan Women Writers' Association.