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Journal articles on the topic 'Propositional Attitude'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 11 February 2022

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1

Soames, Scott. "Beyond Singular Propositions?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25, no. 4 (1995): 515–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1995.10717425.

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Propositional attitudes, like believing and asserting, are relations between agents and propositions. Agents are individuals who do the believing and asserting; propositions are things that are believed and asserted. Propositional attitude ascriptions are sentences that ascribe propositional attitudes to agents. For example, a propositional attitude ascription α believes, or asserts, that S is true iff the referent of a bears the relation of believing, or asserting, to the proposition expressed by s. The questions I will address have to do with the precise nature of propositions, and the attit

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2

Bryant, Shannon, and Diti Bhadra. "Situation types in complementation: Oromo attitude predication." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 30 (March 2, 2021): 83. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v30i0.4806.

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Though languages show rich variation in the clausal embedding strategies employed in attitude reports, most mainstream formal semantic theories of attitudes assume that the clausal complement of an attitude verb contributes at least a proposition to the semantics. The goal of this paper is to contribute to the growing cross-linguistic perspective of attitudes by providing semantic analyses for the two embedding strategies found with attitude verbs in Oromo (Cushitic): verbal nominalization, and embedding under akka 'as'. We argue that Oromo exemplifies a system in which non-speech attitudes un

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3

Feldman, Richard. "Davidson's Theory of Propositional Attitudes." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16, no. 4 (1986): 693–712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1986.10717143.

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One commonly stated reason for thinking that there are abstract entities such as propositions is that they are needed to account for undeniable facts about propositional attitudes and the sentences reporting such attitudes. According to the propositional theory, belief, doubt, assertion and other attitudes are relations between individuals and propositions. In sentences reporting these relations the words in the content-sentence (e.g., ‘p’ in sentences of the form ‘S said that p’) refer to concepts or other abstract things and the entire ‘that-clause’ refers to a proposition. According to a co

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4

Yus, Francisco. "Propositional attitude, affective attitude and irony comprehension." New Theoretical Insights into Untruthfulness 23, no. 1 (2016): 92–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.23.1.05yus.

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According to relevance theory, irony comprehension invariably entails the identification of some opinion or thought (echo) and the identification of the speaker’s dissociative attitude. In this paper, it is argued that it is also essential for hearers to identify not only that propositional attitude, but also the affective attitude that the speaker holds towards the source of this echo so that an optimally relevant interpretive outcome is achieved. This notion comprises feelings and emotions of a non-propositional quality which affect the propositional effects obtained in ironical communicatio

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5

Domaneschi, Filippo, Elena Carrea, Alberto Greco, and Carlo Penco. "Propositional attitudes towards presuppositions." Pragmatics and Cognition 22, no. 3 (2014): 291–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.22.3.01dom.

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According to the Common Ground account proposed by Stalnaker (2002, 2009), speakers involved in a verbal interaction have different propositional attitudes towards presuppositions. In this paper we propose an experimental study aimed at estimating the psychological plausibility of the Stalnakerian model. In particular, the goal of our experiment is to evaluate variations in accepting as appropriate a sentence that triggers a presupposition, where different attitudes are taken towards the presupposition required. The study conducted suggests that if a speaker has the attitude of belief towards

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6

BALLIM, AFZAL. "Propositional attitude framework requirements." Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 5, no. 2-3 (1993): 89–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09528139308953761.

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7

Teimi, Cherif. "Conceptualizing Some Verbs of Propositional Attitudes in English." International Journal of English Linguistics 8, no. 4 (2018): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijel.v8n4p64.

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In this article, we discuss the semantics and syntax of Propositional Attitude Verbs. Our goal is to clarify and illustrate how Propositional Attitudes function and behave and put forth the conceptualization/ formalization of sentences containing this type of Verbs. We will see how intentions and beliefs are useful to study Propositional Attitudes. Also, we will argue that the semantic approach is more adequate than the syntactic one in terms of classifying Propositional Attitude Verbs. This, of course, is carried out in the framework of Conceptual Semantics that was mainly introduced by Jacke

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8

Butakov, Pavel. "How to Believe Faithfully and Firmly?" Philosophy. Journal of the Higher School of Economics IV, no. 4 (2020): 167–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/2587-8719-2020-4-167-184.

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Religious people are expected to believe in their religious creeds faithfully and firmly. How can one acquire such a belief? In order to answer that question, I propose a model for all belief-like propositional attitudes. The model differentiates, firstly, between voluntary and involuntary, and, secondly, between categorical and quantitative belief-like attitudes. The whole variety of belief-like attitudes is then reduced into two main groups. The first group combines all voluntary and categorical attitudes, and the second group combines all involuntary and quantitative attitudes. The resultan

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9

Kalpokas, Daniel. "Perception as a propositional attitude." THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 35, no. 2 (2020): 155. http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.20574.

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It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, "Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?" (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of "the propositional-attitude thesis", it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane's arguments against the propositional-attitude

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10

Crane, Tim. "The Mental States of Persons and their Brains." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 (May 2015): 253–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246115000053.

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AbstractCognitive neuroscientists frequently talk about the brain representing the world. Some philosophers claim that this is a confusion. This paper argues that there is no confusion, and outlines one thing that ‘the brain represents the world’ might mean, using the notion of a model derived from the philosophy of science. This description is then extended to make apply to propositional attitude attributions. A number of problems about propositional attitude attributions can be solved or dissolved by treating propositional attitudes as models.

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11

Crane, Tim. "IS PERCEPTION A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE?" Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 236 (2009): 452–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.608.x.

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12

Oppy, Graham. "Semantics for propositional attitude ascriptions." Philosophical Studies 67, no. 1 (1992): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00355226.

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13

Davies, Eirian C. "Propositional attitudes." Aspects of “Interpersonal Grammar” 8, no. 2 (2001): 217–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/fol.8.2.04dav.

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This paper attempts to outline a model for the semantic interpretation of mood and modality in constructions of knowledge or belief, as realized in the finite verb in English. It does so in terms of the attitude(s) which the speaker is seen as presenting him/herself to hold towards the proposition expressed in the clause. The account of such attitudes is based on an epistemic logic, extended to take probabilities into account, and is presented in terms of set theory.The approach takes epistemic mood to be realized either by marking (overt or covert) on the stem of the lexical verb or by the ch

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14

Frápolli, M. J. "Propositions First: Biting Geach's Bullet." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 86 (September 18, 2019): 87–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246119000080.

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AbstractTo be a proposition is to possess propositional properties and to stand in inferential relations. This is the organic intuition, [OI], concerning propositional recognition. [OI] is not a circular characterization as long as those properties and relations that signal the presence of propositions are independently identified. My take on propositions does not depart from the standard approach widely accepted among philosophers of language. Propositions are truth-bearers, the arguments of truth-functions (‘not’, ‘or’, ‘and’, ‘if’), the arguments of propositional-attitude verbs (‘know’, ‘be

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15

Lycan, William G. "DESIRE CONSIDERED AS A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE." Philosophical Perspectives 26, no. 1 (2012): 201–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12003.

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16

Brogaard, Berit. "KNOWLEDGE-THE AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE ASCRIPTIONS." Grazer Philosophische studien 77, no. 1 (2008): 147–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-90000847.

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17

Burgess, J. A. "Supervaluations and the Propositional Attitude Constraint." Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, no. 1 (1997): 103–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1017935214210.

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18

Cresswell, M. J. "Arabic numerals in propositional attitude sentences." Analysis 66, no. 1 (2006): 92–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/66.1.92.

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19

Barrios, Edison. "Linguistic Knowledge and Cognitive Integration." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 44, no. 130 (2012): 35–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2012.780.

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According to the Propositional Attitude view (PAV), a speaker is competent in her language by virtue of holding propositional attitudes towards the contents of her internal grammar. This paper develops an objection to PAV, called the “Integration Challenge”. This argument, originally suggested by Stich (1978) and Evans (1981), comprises two premises: (1) propositional attitudes are characterized by their inferential integration with other doxastic states, and (2) the cognitive states that store grammatical information are not inferentially integrated. I consider and reject replies to this argu

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20

Brasoveanu, Adrian. "Temporal and propositional de se: evidence from Romanian subjunctive mood." ZAS Papers in Linguistics 44, no. 1 (2006): 55–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.21248/zaspil.44.2006.300.

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The paper investigates the interpretation of the Romanian subjunctive B (subjB) mood when it is embedded under the propositional attitude verb crede (believe). SubjB is analyzed as a single package of three distinct presuppositions: temporal de se, dissociation and propositional de se. I show that subjB is the temporal analogue of null PRO in the individual domain: it allows only for a de se reading. Dissociation enables us to show that subjB always takes scope over a negation embedded in a belief report. Propositional de se derives this empirical generalization. The introduction of centered p

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21

Ezcurdia, Maite. "Pragmatic Attitudes and Semantic Competence." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 36, no. 108 (2004): 55–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2004.444.

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In this paper I argue against the account Soames offers in Beyond Rigidity of the semantics and pragmatics of propositional attitude reports. I defend a particular constraint for identifying semantic content of phrases based on conditions for semantic competence, and argue that failure of substitutivity is an essential component of our competence conditions with propositional attitude predicates. Given that Soames's account makes no room for this, I conclude that he does not offer an adequate explanation of propositional attitude reports.

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22

Anufriev, A. A. "Propositional attitude predicates in Latin American Spanish." Linguistics and Language Teaching 13, no. 2 (2020): 5–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.37892/2218-1393-2020-13-2-5-24.

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23

Knowles, Jonathan. "Knowledge of grammar as a propositional attitude." Philosophical Psychology 13, no. 3 (2000): 325–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080050128150.

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24

Schwartz, Justin. "Propositional attitude psychology as an ideal type." Topoi 11, no. 1 (1992): 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00768296.

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25

Carlson, Richard A. "Implicit representation, mental states, and mental processes." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22, no. 5 (1999): 761–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x99292187.

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Dienes & Perner's target article constitutes a significant advance in thinking about implicit knowledge. However, it largely neglects processing details and thus the time scale of mental states realizing propositional attitudes. Considering real-time processing raises questions about the possible brevity of implicit representation, the nature of processes that generate explicit knowledge, and the points of view from which knowledge may be represented. Understanding the propositional attitude analysis in terms of momentary mental states points the way toward answering these questions.

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26

MALCOLM, FINLAY. "Can fictionalists have faith?" Religious Studies 54, no. 2 (2017): 215–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412517000063.

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AbstractAccording to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a ‘positive cognitive attitude’. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This article shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions in a discourse is of little consequence for fic

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27

Littlejohn, Clayton. "A NOTE CONCERNING JUSTIFICATION AND ACCESS." Episteme 10, no. 4 (2013): 369–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2013.32.

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AbstractCertain combinations of attitudes are manifestly unreasonable. It is unreasonable to believe that dogs bark, for example, if one concedes that one has no justification to believe this. Why are the irrational combinations irrational? One suggestion is that these are attitudes that a subject cannot have justification to have. If this is right, we can test claims about the structure of propositional justification by relying on our observations about which combinations of attitudes constitute Moorean absurd pairs. In a recent defense of access internalism, Smithies argues that only access

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28

Saul, Jennifer M. "The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription." Mind and Language 14, no. 3 (1999): 356–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0017.00116.

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29

White, Aaron S., Valentine Hacquard, and Jeffrey Lidz. "Semantic Information and the Syntax of Propositional Attitude Verbs." Cognitive Science 42, no. 2 (2017): 416–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12512.

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30

Kazemi, Alireza. "Propositional Attitudes as Commitments: Unleashing Some Constraints." Dialogue 59, no. 3 (2020): 437–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000098.

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ABSTRACTIn a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even

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31

Forbes, Graeme. "Review of Jaszczolt (2000): The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports." Pragmatics and Cognition 9, no. 2 (2001): 372–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.9.2.17for.

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32

Mandelbaum, Eric. "Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias." Noûs 50, no. 3 (2015): 629–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12089.

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33

Song, Mean-Young. "The Semantics of Hearsay Evidentials in Propositional Attitude Constructions*1." Studies in Modern Grammar 2014, no. 81 (2014): 139–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.14342/smog.2014.81.139.

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34

Dimmendaal, Gerrit J. "Attitude Markers and Conversational Implicatures in Turkana Speech Acts." Studies in Language 20, no. 2 (1996): 249–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/sl.20.2.02dim.

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Turkana has a set of particles expressing attitudes on the part of the speaker towards the propositional content of utterances in which such markers are used. Attitude markers in Turkana form a closed set whose distributional behavior partly follows from syntactic principles of the language. The absence of these attitude markers from certain syntactic positions follows from their lexical meaning and from pragmatic structure. Their current meaning is argued to have emerged through metonymic extension in certain lexical items, and through conventionalisation of their conversational implicatures.

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35

Chevarie-Cossette, Simon-Pierre. "Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?" European journal of analytic philosophy 15, no. 2 (2019): 55–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.31820/ejap.15.2.3.

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Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self- defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised,there is a strong connection between conduct and belief—and so between thecontent of free will

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36

Schulze, Wolfgang. "Review of Andersen, Thorstein & Jucker (2000): Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude." Studies in Language 27, no. 2 (2003): 431–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/sl.27.2.12sch.

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37

Davis, Wayne. "A Causal Theory of Experiential Fear." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18, no. 3 (1988): 459–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1988.10717186.

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There is a distinction between being afraid and being afraid that something is the case. Kathy may be afraid that it will rain without being afraid, and may be afraid without being afraid that it will rain. We shall say that the distinction is between experiential and propositional fear. To be afraid is to experience fear, to be in a state of fear. The state takes many forms, such as fright, terror, and dread. To be afraid that something is the case is to have a certain propositional attitude. We may have reasons for fearing, or being fearful, that it is. My goal is to explain what it means to

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38

PALMQVIST, CARL-JOHAN. "Faith and hope in situations of epistemic uncertainty." Religious Studies 55, no. 3 (2018): 319–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412518000239.

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AbstractWhen it comes to religion, lack of conclusive evidence leads many reflective thinkers to embrace agnosticism. However, pure agnosticism does not necessarily have to be the final word; there are other attitudes one might reasonably adopt in a situation of epistemic uncertainty. This article concentrates on J. L. Schellenberg's proposal that non-doxastic propositional faith is available even when belief is unwarranted. Schellenberg's view is rejected since his envisaged notion of faith conflicts with important epistemic aims. Instead, it is suggested that a combination of hope and ‘occas

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39

López-Couso, María José, and Belén Méndez-Naya. "From clause to pragmatic marker." Journal of Historical Pragmatics 15, no. 1 (2014): 36–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/jhp.15.1.03lop.

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Propositional attitude predicates, such as English think, guess and seem, occur parenthetically in many languages. In this article we pay attention to a group of propositional attitude predicates which can be labelled epistemic/evidential, namely appear, look, seem and sound, and which, in addition to degree of certainty, also give an indication of the evidential source. In this study we describe the different parentheticals available with these verbs, paying special attention to like-parentheticals (e.g. Going to be a big one, looks like), a development characteristic of American English. Usi

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40

Hughes, Sean, Dermot Barnes-Holmes, and Jan De Houwer. "The Dominance of Associative Theorizing in Implicit Attitude Research: Propositional and Behavioral Alternatives." Psychological Record 61, no. 3 (2011): 465–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf03395772.

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41

Wurmbrand, Susi. "Tense and Aspect in English Infinitives." Linguistic Inquiry 45, no. 3 (2014): 403–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ling_a_00161.

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This article investigates the temporal and aspectual composition of infinitival complementation structures in English. I show that previous classifications of tense in infinitives are insufficient in that they do not cover the entire spectrum of infinitival constructions in English. Using the distribution of nongeneric, nonstative, episodic interpretations as a main characteristic, I show that infinitival constructions fall into three classes: future irrealis infinitives, which allow episodic interpretations with bare VPs; simultaneous infinitives that do not allow episodic interpretations; an

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42

Xiao, Hongling, Fang Li, Ted J. M. Sanders, and Wilbert P. M. S. Spooren. "Suǒyǐ ‘so’, they are different: an integrated subjectivity account of Mandarin RESULT connectives in conversation, microblog and newspaper discourse." Linguistics 59, no. 4 (2021): 1103–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ling-2021-0118.

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Abstract In this study, we analyze the meaning and use of Mandarin causal connectives kějiàn ‘therefore/it can be seen that’, suǒyǐ ‘so’, yīncǐ ‘for this reason’, and yúshì ‘thereupon/as a result’ in terms of causality and subjectivity. We adopt an integrated approach to subjectivity and analyze the subjectivity profile of a causal construction in terms of three features: the propositional attitude of the consequent, the identity of the subject of consciousness (SoC), and the linguistic realization of the SoC. The investigation is based on natural discourse produced in fundamentally distinctiv

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43

Eklund, Dan-Johan Sebastian. "The Cognitive Aspect of Christian Faith and Non-doxastic Propositional Attitudes." Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 60, no. 3 (2018): 386–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nzsth-2018-0022.

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Summary In the recent discussion, several authors have argued for the claim that propositional faith need not be doxastic, but also can be “non-doxastic”. Notable proponents of this view are William Alston, Robert Audi, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and J. L. Schellenberg. In this paper, I focus on Christian faith and consider whether its cognitive aspect can be understood solely in terms of Alston’s and others’ non-doxastic accounts. I argue for a negative answer. In my view, the cognitive aspect of Christian faith calls for, as a minimum, “a sub-doxastic attitude”. As there is no shared terminology

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44

Herzberg, F. S. "Universal algebra for general aggregation theory: Many-valued propositional-attitude aggregators as MV-homomorphisms." Journal of Logic and Computation 25, no. 3 (2013): 965–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/logcom/ext009.

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45

Capone, Alessandro. "Review of Jaszczolt (1999): Discourse, Beliefs and Intentions: Semantic Defaults and Propositional Attitude Ascription." Pragmatics and Cognition 9, no. 2 (2001): 365–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/pc.9.2.16cap.

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46

Felappi, Giulia. "Why fuss about these quirks of the vernacular? Propositional attitude sentences in Prior’s nachlass." Synthese 193, no. 11 (2015): 3521–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0903-1.

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47

Stephenson, Tamina. "Vivid attitudes: Centered situations in the semantics of 'remember' and 'imagine'." Semantics and Linguistic Theory, no. 20 (April 3, 2015): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v0i20.2582.

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This paper deals with a subset of uses of propositional attitude predicates such as 'remember' and 'imagine.' I argue that these have a distinct "vivid" reading, which requires direct witnessing or sensory perception similar to that required in direct perception reports. To account for this use, I introduce a notion of centered situations, combining situations in the sense of Kratzer (1989) with centered worlds in the sense of Lewis (1979) and others. I propose that, on their vivid uses, these predicates make reference to a (real or possible) centered situation. This makes it possible in parti

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48

Stephenson, Tamina. "Vivid attitudes: Centered situations in the semantics of 'remember' and 'imagine'." Semantics and Linguistic Theory 20 (August 14, 2010): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v20i0.2582.

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This paper deals with a subset of uses of propositional attitude predicates such as 'remember' and 'imagine.' I argue that these have a distinct "vivid" reading, which requires direct witnessing or sensory perception similar to that required in direct perception reports. To account for this use, I introduce a notion of centered situations, combining situations in the sense of Kratzer (1989) with centered worlds in the sense of Lewis (1979) and others. I propose that, on their vivid uses, these predicates make reference to a (real or possible) centered situation. This makes it possible in parti

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49

Landy, David. "Inside Doubt: On the Non-Identity of the Theory of Mind and Propositional Attitude Psychology." Minds and Machines 15, no. 3-4 (2005): 399–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11023-005-9004-0.

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50

Olmos, Susana, and Aoife Ahern. "Contrast and propositional attitude: A relevance theoretic analysis of contrast connectives in Spanish and English." Lingua 119, no. 1 (2009): 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lingua.2008.08.001.

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